

4383

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY SERIES

KIMBALL YOUNG, *General Editor*

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY SERIES

Problems of a Changing Social Order

JOHN M. GILLETTE and JAMES M. REINHARDT

Sociology, A Study of Society and Culture, Second Edition

KIMBALL YOUNG

Social and Cultural Dynamics, Vols. I-IV

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

Isolated Communities

OSCAR W. JUNEK

Administration of Public Welfare

R. CLYDE WHITE

Fundamental Concepts of Sociology

(*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*)

FERDINAND TONNIES

Translated and Supplemented by Charles P. Loomis

Crime and Its Treatment

ARTHUR E. WOOD and JOHN B. WAITE

Population Problems, A Cultural Interpretation

PAUL H. LANDIS

The Family

ERNEST W. BURGESS and HARVEY J. LOCKE

Rural Sociology

LOWRY NELSON

Social Work, An Introduction to the Field

HERBERT H. STROUP

Sociology A STUDY OF
SOCIETY AND CULTURE

SECOND EDITION

KIMBALL YOUNG
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

American Book Company

NEW YORK

CINCINNATI

A STUDY OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE

SECOND EDITION

COPYRIGHT, 1949, 1942, BY

AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY

DEVELOPED FROM AN INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY,

COPYRIGHT, 1934, 1939, BY KIMBALL YOUNG

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. NO PART OF THIS BOOK PRO-
TECTED BY THE ABOVE COPYRIGHTS MAY BE REPRINTED
WITHOUT WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE PUBLISHER.

TO
Helen Ann and the Boys



E. P. 1

YOUNG, SOCIOLOGY, 2ND EDITION

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Preface to the Second Edition

THIS BOOK, like the first edition, is designed to introduce the student to general and systematic sociology. The major emphases are on three variables: groups, processes, and institutions. Yet the role and status of the individual with reference to these three are also given attention. In view of the trends both in theory and in empirical findings, we have followed a somewhat eclectic point of view. To orient the student to this approach we have introduced, in the opening chapter, a consideration of the standpoint and methodology of sociology. This chapter also discusses the relationship of sociology to certain other sciences. Other of the more important changes in the content, organization, and emphases of the present edition are as follows:

(1) In line with current trends in sociology, cultural anthropology, and psychology the author has attempted a more adequate integration of some of the basic concepts and materials of these fields with special reference to the relations of institutions to social processes. Instead of treating institutions as distinct from processes, they are presented together as representing structure and function in dynamic interrelation. For example, competition, conflict, co-operation, differentiation, and other processes are discussed with reference to the basic institutional features of the family, the community, the class structure, education, religion, play, esthetic experience, economics, politics, and international relations in peace and war. This does not mean that the processual standpoint is neglected. Quite to the contrary, it is basic to sociology. But the present organization does eliminate some unnecessary duplication.

(2) Considerable emphasis is given to the interplay of cultural systems and individual and group behavior. This involves

an analysis of factors making for cultural variability as well as for cultural likenesses. To make this discussion concrete and meaningful for the student, examples of contrasts among selected nonliterate societies and between contemporary authoritarian and democratic culture systems are thoroughly explored.

(3) There is a more complete presentation of world population problems. In particular there is a rather full discussion of the crises which confront us today as a result of the sharp contrast of levels of living and cultural values in the highly industrialized countries with relatively stationary populations vis-à-vis those with "explosive" or rapidly growing populations living under quite different conditions.

(4) The present and potential impact of the Air Age and the Atomic Age on society and culture is examined critically in the chapter on geographic factors and also in those chapters dealing with community life, cultural change, and international relations.

(5) Closely associated with contemporary concern about the conservation of resources, the problems associated with business cycles, the effects of population pressure, the establishment of a peaceful world order, and others are the implications of large-scale state planning and the drift toward statism. The effects of the extension of governmental controls over every aspect of life, of expanding bureaucracy, and of the growing identification of the national society with the state itself are made clear. Just what this drift means in terms of cultural change for democratically oriented societies is discussed in some detail.

(6) The treatment of personality has been more closely linked with the basic processes of socialization and enculturation. And the chapters on the family have been

enriched by the inclusion of recent research findings in this whole field. Here the contributions of social psychology to sociology are clearly in evidence.

(7) The treatment of rural and urban communities and of intranational regions has been amplified by the introduction of new postwar data. Special attention is given to the further effects of the continuing industrialization of agriculture and the urbanization of rural life generally.

(8) Attention is given to the persistence of racialism in the modern world and to certain new areas of its expression.

(9) The discussion of role and status systems, especially those found in the social structure, has been amplified by the inclusion of material from recent investigations.

(10) Each chapter closes with an Interpretative Summary, providing certain generalizations regarding the subject matter. There are, as heretofore, Questions and Exercises. The more technical bibliographies have been replaced by briefer but more useful annotated lists of suggested readings.

Many suggestions from teachers and students who used the earlier text were incor-

porated in this revision. The present organization of Parts and Chapters was worked out on the basis of various attempts at rearrangement of the topics in our basic course at Northwestern University. Yet there is nothing sacred in any particular order of topics, and teachers will feel free to make whatever modifications they find desirable in the preferential presentation of materials.

A number of people aided in the arduous task of preparing the present volume. For help in the collection of certain statistical data I want to thank Gordon D. Kaufman. Peter Jacobsohn assisted in the gathering of additional material, in revising the Glossary, and in proofreading. Dr. Paul C. Glick of the Bureau of the Census was most generous in furnishing certain census data, and my friends in the United States Department of Agriculture were helpful in providing certain materials and some of the pictures. For their good work in the preparation of the manuscript I extend my thanks to Alene Gustavson, Vera Mara, and Mary K. Lannen.

Kimball Young

Evanston

Contents

CHAPTER	PAGE
1 What Sociology Is and What It Tries to Do	1

PART ONE

Society, Culture, and Personality

2 The Major Forms of Group Life	17
3 The Nature of Culture	31
4 Variability of Culture	41
5 Social-Cultural Processes	59
6 Social-Cultural Processes (continued)	70
7 Heredity, Maturation, and Environment	83
8 The Foundations of Personality	99
9 Socialization and the Personality	113

PART TWO

Place and People

10 Geographic Factors in Social-Cultural Life	137
11 Race and Racialism	159
12 Problems of World Population	184
13 Differentials in Population	210
14 Primary Communities	238
15 Urban Communities	266
16 Regions and Regionalism	290

PART THREE

Basic Institutions and Processes

17 The Family: Its Institutions	313
18 The Family: Interpersonal Relations	329
19 Education: Its Structure and Function	349
20 Religion	371
21 Play and Esthetic Experience	387
22 Sociological Aspects of the Economic Order	403
23 Sociological Aspects of the Political Order	422
24 War, Peace, and International Relations	440

PART FOUR

CHAPTER	Social Relations Based on Role and Status	PAGE
25	Role and Status as Related to Age	465
26	Sex Differences in Role and Status	481
27	Specialization and Leadership	494
28	Stratification and Class Structure	511

PART FIVE

Control and Change

29	Social Control	541
30	Social-Cultural Change	560
31	Progress and Planning	577
32	Theory and Practice in Planning	596
Glossary		615
Index of Authors		621
Index of Subjects		629

Sociology

A STUDY OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE



What Sociology Is and What It Tries to Do

THIS BOOK is an introduction to sociology. It attempts to select the most telling facts, theories, and generalizations about man's social life. Yet it does not ride any particular sociological hobby or theory. As a scientific discipline sociology is too new to have developed a compact and closely woven body of facts and generalizations or laws, as is true of modern physics and chemistry. However, sociology can give a good deal to the student who wants to know something of the customs, institutions, and ways of living which influence him and his fellows. In addition, some students may find such knowledge will help them personally to get along with themselves and their fellows.

Definition of sociology. Sociology is a systematic and orderly study of *man in society*, that is, of group life and of the customs, traditions, institutions, and ways of thinking and living which are linked to group life. For the sociologist normal men and women everywhere deal with each other chiefly in terms of group membership. Only in most exceptional cases and under most unusual circumstances do individuals as individuals survive in isolation. And, as we shall see, such isolation from others is never absolute.

Man is born into a group and spends his lifetime in a more or less patterned web of social relations. But what he does is closely bound up with what others do to and for him and with what others accept and expect from him in the way of thought and conduct. These group-accepted and group-expected ways of feeling, thinking, and acting are what the anthropologist calls *culture*.

As we shall note later, present-day sociology and cultural anthropology have much in common. Moreover, sociology has close relations with biology, psychology, economics, political science, and history. Before pointing out these relations, let us look more closely at what sociology tries to do.

The aims of sociology. One of the first aims of sociology is to help people to understand themselves and others more adequately and objectively as they work and play and otherwise act together. Only by this means will mankind be able, in time, to predict and hence to control human action to more satisfactory ends. Such ends may be justice, good will, peace, happiness, or whatever the aims of a given group or society may be.

We all have some idea of the great strides of the physical and biological sciences which have made possible modern industry and agriculture, modern means of communication and transportation, and man's conquest of disease. Yet when we try to be scientific about our personal and social problems most of us are loath to apply the viewpoint and methods of objective study. We ridicule the man who, finding that his automobile will not run, curses the engine. Or we consider a person highly superstitious who tries to set a broken arm by magic rather than by calling in a doctor. In fact, with regard to personal health most of us who live under what is called "Western civilization" recognize that the use of science, not magic, is the sensible way of solving our problems.¹

¹ See Francis L. K. Hsu, *Magic and science in western Yunnan*. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,

When we try to examine and explain our own ideas, emotions, and conduct, especially those which reflect our deep-laid habits and values regarding our family, getting a living, our politics, religion, play, and art — to note the chief human interests — we find it hard to be unbiased and coldly intellectual. Strongly emotionalized habits and values continue to keep mankind from attaining a more adequate knowledge of human motive and behavior. Yet if we are to advance on the areas of prejudice and ignorance, we must get the help of science, its methods and findings.

The Nature of Science

The term *science* may refer either to established and verifiable knowledge about the world and man or to the manner of arriving at such knowledge. The first may be called the content of science; the latter, the method. As content it consists of facts and generalization regarding cause-and-effect relations in nature, among men, or between men and nature. Science tells us the real reasons for things; in popular slang, "what makes them tick." The bodies of general facts to be found in a textbook in chemistry, physics, or biology are cases in point. We know that the elements H and O in the combination H_2O make water, that adding common salt (NaCl) to water produces a different effect on the human palate than adding ethyl alcohol (C_2H_5OH). The latter, in turn, if taken too freely may make one drunk, but like amounts of its close chemical relative, methyl alcohol (CH_3OH), will kill. We know from biology that mixing white and black breeds of chickens will result in certain combinations of physical traits according to the laws of genetics.

When we come to human and social sciences the verified and verifiable generalizations or laws are not as yet well-established. As to degree of certainty in comparison with the natural sciences, the social sciences are in their infancy. Yet in terms

of science, we know a great deal more than men knew formerly. In psychology there are fairly well-established general laws of learning. We know, for instance, that children may be taught to fear almost any stimulus or situation by applying certain forms of conditioning. We know that children at the imbecile level of intelligence are definitely limited in the amounts of ordinary schoolwork they can acquire.

In sociology we know many general facts within rather broad limits of probability. For example, unless checked by some means or other, population tends to press upon the food supply. We know that if two peoples of different cultures come into close and continuing contact with each other, the statistical chances are that they will exchange technological skills far sooner than they will their respective values in morals and religion. It is also becoming increasingly clear that the universal forms of human interaction are opposition (conflict and competition), co-operation, and differentiation, and their derivatives.

Yet in these examples, as is true of most sociology, the specific cause-and-effect relations are not known in any such precise and verified detail as is true of the data of the natural sciences. But sociology is becoming more scientific, and on occasion we shall offer certain tentative generalizations as we discuss various aspects of the field.

It is the methodological aspect of science, however, which is our chief concern here. While this is not the place to treat scientific method in any detail, certain basic features, especially as they concern sociology and the related social sciences, must be examined, at least in a brief way.

The standpoint and method of science. Science arose out of man's efforts to solve his problems more effectively. And though the methods of science have now become elaborate, and though scientists today may set themselves hypothetical problems in the laboratory before society faces them in everyday life, the essential standpoint of science has been much the same for a long time.

1943 (mimeographed). Hsu cites excellent examples of the mixture of ancient magic and modern science in present-day China.

The roots of science, historically, lie in practical problems. Thus, prehistoric man learned that a sharp stone made a better tool than a dull one; that a long stout stick was better for prying loose rocks or other objects than a shorter and more fragile one; that velocity, and hence killing power, could be added to a small spear (arrow) when it was propelled from a bow. Later man domesticated plants and animals and improved locomotion by use of the wheel.

Actually these and hundreds of other inventions had long been in use before the objective principles or "laws of nature" were organized in a systematic way. But in any case the first step in science rests upon the belief or idea that one condition, thing, or event "causes" or is the "reason" for a second and subsequent condition, thing, or event.² In technical language we say this is a working *hypothesis*, or probably best guess, that the one thing or event (variable) relates causally to the second. In logical terms an hypothesis is a tentative premise with respect to an expected conclusion. In common-sense terms it is a prospective solution to a problem. From such a beginning the scientist goes on through several steps to test his hypothesis.

For our purposes, we may summarize scientific method as follows:

- (1) There is always a problem to be solved, either practical or theoretical.
- (2) Some hypothesis is set up about cause-and-effect relations between or among the given or assumed factors or events. In sound research the hypothesis is stated clearly and explicitly.
- (3) Using standard units of measurement and all the proper instruments, careful and unbiased observations are made of the events or conditions associated with the problem itself.
- (4) Yet not all events associated with the problem-situation need be observed. A selection is made of those which, in terms of logic and the best information at hand, are thought to bear upon the cause-and-effect relation under investigation.

² In the logic of modern science, the concept *event* is used for any occurrence or phenomenon which is observable in a time-space situation.

(5) An accurate record of the observations must be made.

(6) When the data are collected, description and analysis in terms of classification and correlation follow. In this the best methods of mathematics and other forms of logic should be applied. While the ideal is quantification of data, in many fields, especially in much of social science, we must deal in qualitative analysis for some time to come.

(7) On the basis of the analysis, generalizations of varying degrees of certainty may be drawn. The degree of certainty is a measure of possible prediction and control of like condition or event in the future.

Upon the basis of such systematic generalizations, the practical engineer and technician may make whatever application he can. In turn, he may, in trying to apply science, return to the research worker with still other unsolved problems. In fact, there is and should be constant communication between scientist and engineer and vice versa. This should be as true of the social sciences as it is of the natural sciences. Unfortunately, all too often the practical worker in human affairs feels that he knows the answer to his problem without the aid of the social scientist. But in any case all personal wishes and values of the practical man must be completely divorced from scientific method itself. (See below.)

Methods in sociology. Brief mention was made above to the fact that some scientific findings are qualitative and less accurate — at least mathematically speaking — than those of the strict laboratory or careful statistical study. This situation has bearing on the present state of scientific research in the social sciences.

In terms of the nature of the problems to be studied, and in terms of the state of advancement of the applicable methods, three distinctions may be drawn in terms of data and their analysis: These are the experimental, the statistical, and the historical. The first is amply illustrated in the older and more established fields of physics and chemistry and, in part, in biology. Here the data lend themselves to controlled observations of high accuracy under strict

laboratory conditions. Variables can be adequately determined, the units of measurement are well-developed, and the use of instruments is at an advanced level. In the other disciplines strict experimentation is more difficult to carry out.

The second is exemplified in biology, psychology, and the social sciences. Statistics attempts to substitute for the rigid controls of the laboratory — where one case, carefully controlled, may be sufficient — by treating large numbers of cases or units of a given universe or population by devices developed by the mathematics of probability. Bacteria, seedlings, animals, men, farms, machines, or anything of mass nature that can be counted but which is otherwise difficult to bring under firm laboratory restrictions may be studied statistically. The basic features of statistical treatment are as follows:

- (1) There must be an adequate representative sample of the universe to be studied. The units may be individual organisms or parts of them.
- (2) Some average or typical measure of the total sample is assumed to represent the conditions for all.
- (3) The devices for treating mass data are chiefly:
 - (a) Measures of central tendency or average of the frequency of the element in question on a given scale.
 - (b) Measures of dispersion from the central tendency, that is, of range of cases on the scale.
 - (c) Various correlational devices for treating the relations of averages and measures of dispersion of two or more comparable series as a method of getting at cause and effect.

Some illustrations familiar to students of society and culture are: the distribution of intelligence quotients of school children and the correlation of these with the occupations of the fathers of the children; the distribution of people in a given country according to age, sex, marital status, occupation, religion and other things, and; a variety of interesting and highly informative correlations among these variables. We

shall have ample opportunity to see how useful statistics is as a scientific tool for handling much of our sociological data.

The historical method is the oldest in the social sciences and remains one of those most frequently used. This method concerns itself with prior events in time and space with reference to which it was not possible to apply any of the usual controls of scientific method. It is not, however, confined to psychology and the social sciences. Such matters as the geological development of the earth and the evolution of new plant and animal species are instances of the use of the historical method in the natural sciences. One of the essential aims of historic studies is the reconstruction of past events or conditions in some meaningful fashion. Workers may or may not care to generalize on their reconstructions.

The use of this method in the social sciences has taken several directions, which we mention but briefly. For the most part history as an academic discipline, while it uses careful methods of sorting and analyzing its evidence, eschews generalization. Therefore its reconstruction of the past is usually limited to a recital of events for a given period of time. Traditionally this material comes from written records of various sorts. Some historians are now beginning to use the living interview as an additional source.

Sociology, cultural anthropology, and psychology, however, have all developed methods of direct or indirect interview with living persons. These may involve such things as the collection of material on social participation, culture patterns, or various personal ideas or attitudes by means of lengthy interviews. From such data reconstructions may be made.

For the most part it is not possible to control historical data as the physical scientist controls his data in the laboratory. As M. J. Herskovits aptly puts it: "Unlike the atoms, plants, or guinea pigs, man is the only animal who can 'talk back,' and, moreover . . . who has to be motivated to participate in a given observation by the

scientist."³ However, the worker with such data uses the best methods he can to select his sample of informants, to control the interviews, and to record his data faithfully. In analyzing the same, he uses informal quantitative concepts of more or less, and presence or absence of variables, and the best canons of inductive and deductive logic. After all, it must not be forgotten that *the trained human mind is still a valid instrument in science and logic*. From such analysis, he will draw his conclusions or generalizations. For the most part the conclusions drawn from historical data are far less satisfactory than are those of the laboratory experiment or the carefully designed statistical study. Yet, if carefully and cautiously made, such historical analyses are extremely valuable in building a body of social-science content and systematic generalization. So, too, the historical method is often profitably combined with the statistical. For example, selected individuals who have answered an opinion poll may later be given personal interviews to discover the roots of such views in their life histories.

In terms of the problems and standpoint, research workers sometimes make a cross-sectional description and analysis of their data. Here they view their material as if it were fixed in time and space. At other times they treat their data longitudinally, that is, with regard to changes in the variables over time. An analogy will make the difference in the approaches clear. The cross-sectional study is like examining a single stereopticon or microscopic slide to describe its details and total patterning. The longitudinal study, in contrast, is like looking at a motion picture, which is nothing but a series of pictures moving one after another before the spectator, thus producing the effect of movement. The experimental and statistical methods are applicable chiefly to the former. The latter falls essentially in line with the historical method since it deals with time dimension. Yet, under certain conditions both experi-

mental and statistical method may be applied in this field also. Table 1 gives a summary of certain basic factors which may well be taken into account if and when it is desired to examine social-cultural data from one or the other of these standpoints. Let us note a few illustrations to make this more meaningful.

The basic units of sociology are the individual, the society or group, and culture. A cross-sectional study of the first might include among other things a descriptive analysis of a person's motives, such as desire for power and new adventures; of his traits, such as honesty and tact; of his attitudes, such as favorableness or its opposite toward some minority. A trade union might be studied from the group frame of reference. This might contain such items as the aim and codes of control of the union, the number and composition of its membership, and the "table of organization" of its various officers and members. Similarly, features of culture might be described in terms of a single trait, a patterning of traits, or as a large cultural system. (See chapters 3 and 4 for illustrations of systems.)

In some instances quantitative measurements of the units may be used. In others qualitative description or analysis would be needed because one could not count or measure given features of the data.

Longitudinal studies of the backward-tracing kind are known to us from the usual historical monograph on some society through a given period of time, such as England in the 16th century or the colonial period of the United States. The cultural anthropologist, using archeological findings and studies of living tribes, might attempt to reconstruct the history of a given region and its inhabitants. Efforts in this direction, for example, have been made for the American Southwest.

Autobiographies of prominent persons are illustrations of informal and often not very objective longitudinal method. More systematic studies are found in well-documented biographies of historical characters. Or any living person's life story may be gathered through the oral interview, a written questionnaire, or other device. Sometimes tests and interviews may be combined with the historical method to get at the development of attitudes, ideas, or habits.

A good instance of the forward-tracing technique is found in Arnold Gesell's studies

³ Comment in a seminar at Northwestern University, 1948.

TABLE 1
TWO KINDS OF SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY ⁴

I. CROSS-SECTIONAL DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

(Data fixed in time)

A. Methods

1. Experimental and statistical or quantitative, preferable
2. Quasi-statistical and descriptive-historical or qualitative, often necessary because of nature of data

B. Basic Factors to Describe and Analyze

(Stress on formal features)

<i>Units of Description</i>	<i>Classifications and Patterns</i>	<i>Relationships</i>
INDIVIDUAL:		
Total personality or parts, <i>e.g.</i> , traits	Types of modes of personality, <i>e.g.</i> , introvert-extrovert	Interactional linkages, <i>e.g.</i> , membership roles and status
SOCIETY OR GROUP:		
Primary-secondary In-group: out-group	Types of primary and secondary groups; in-groups and out-groups	Forms of solidarity-opposition
CULTURE:		
Traits	Patterns	Forms of relationships among patterns
Totality	Cultural systems	Forms of relationships among systems

II. LONGITUDINAL DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

(Data in motion through time)

A. Methods

1. Experimental and statistical, preferable
2. Historical-descriptive, often necessary because of nature of data

B. Basic Factors to Describe and Analyze

(Stress on dynamic features)

<i>Units of Description</i>	<i>Classifications and Patterns</i>	<i>Relationships</i>
Individuals, groups, and culture, as above	As above, but stress on change through time	Interactional dynamics or processual analysis: (a) Backward tracing, or reconstruction of change in past (b) Forward tracing, or observation through time

in human maturation and learning. On the basis of observation of infants as they grow up, he has been able to give us a reasonable idea about the important stages which an individual in the American culture goes through as he advances from babyhood to adolescence.

As we proceed through the many topics discussed in this book, there will be ample illustrations of various research studies in sociology. Some of them used one method, some another, but they all had their place in contributing to the science of sociology.

⁴ Some features of this Table were suggested by R. H. Seashore.

Concepts, words, and science. Words are the essential tools of thought, scientific

or otherwise. The setting-up of hypotheses and propositions, the layout of methods, and the analysis and drawing of conclusions involve the use of carefully defined terms or concepts. Behind the most efficient instrument of observation and measurement lies a logic of science couched in precise language, where words and mathematical symbols have exact meanings. Yet words may influence logic and science negatively.

The concepts of science derive, as do all other concepts, from a process of abstraction from sensory-perceptual experience. At a simple level, concept formation is evident in the classification of objects. The concept "chair" is not to be confused with the perceptual term for any given chair. As a concept it refers to a class of objects, defined at the most rudimentary common-sense level as "something to sit on." While this is not, strictly speaking, an adequate definition, it shows that everyday experience has led man to make concepts for classes of common objects. So, too, out of a welter of everyday living we have developed concepts of attributes, such as those of length, breadth, volume, color, and the like. When we use the word "inch" we do not necessarily think of a particular thing an inch long. Nor does the use of the word "blue" as a concept necessarily refer to a particular species of bird.

Science draws its concepts from the cultural storehouse of everyday concepts but tries to define these more carefully. The term *construct* is sometimes used to distinguish concepts of science from others. In technical language we want the concepts to have denotation or precise meaning only. All connotations or suggestions and especially emotional implications must be eliminated. It is for this reason, among others, that logicians and scientists build up vocabularies of technical words for their special subject matter. The technical vocabulary of chemistry, physics, or mathematics is completely beyond the comprehension of most lay people. Yet there is a social-cultural component in the use of these concepts. Without general agreement or consensus among logicians and scientists, such con-

cepts would be meaningless to scientists as well.

The social sciences have not, as yet, developed an adequate set of scientific constructs. In some phases of mathematical economics and in highly technical aspects of psychology, considerable advance toward special vocabularies has been made. But in sociology and most of the other social sciences, many of our concepts are words also in everyday usage. For example, the word "instinct" once had rather technical meaning in biology but, because of its literary and everyday meaning as any more or less learned but automatic response, it has been abandoned. So, too, in sociology and social psychology such concepts as attitude and opinion and terms for processes cause difficulty because they are also used loosely by the man in the street. One of the first steps to a refinement of our social-science vocabulary is to develop denotative technical terms which have no connotations in ordinary speech and writing. Second, we must get general acceptance of these terms by workers in the various fields. The development of dictionaries of sociological and psychological terms is an aid in this direction.⁵

A word should be said about the nature of definition. If we in the social sciences are to advance to a more objective analysis of social and cultural data, we must begin by carefully defining our concepts. A sound definition must include, among other things, the following: (1) It must give the essential features or attributes of the thing defined. (2) It must be stated in terms other than the term defined. (3) It must delimit the concept sufficiently to make it unequivocal. And it should not be in figurative or ambiguous language. (4) It should be useful for the purpose of the particular scientific study. The present trend is toward "operational definitions" which define a term by what it *does* rather

⁵ The student will find the following helpful: E. B. Reuter, *Handbook of sociology*, New York: The Dryden Press, 1941; H. P. Fairchild, ed., *Dictionary of sociology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1944; and H. C. Warren, ed., *Dictionary of psychology*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934.

than in terms of what it *is*. (5) There is nothing inherently sacred about any concept or term. The scientist only insists that the concepts be applied in a consistent manner. It follows that there can be no "right" or "wrong" definitions since any concept *is* what it is in terms of its logical delimitations and what is generally accepted or agreed upon by the experts in the particular field.

In science, as in everyday life, for that matter, there are various levels of abstraction. For description and analysis at simpler levels such concepts as group, society, community, and the like will do. When, however, we go on to discuss patterning, we often have to step to a higher level of abstraction and talk in terms of form. When we deal with relationship, still other and even more abstract terms may come into play. And finally, as we reach the level of systematic generalizations, principles, or laws, the concepts may seem far removed from the everyday reality.

There is always the danger, too, that highly abstract words will come to be viewed as if they were themselves concrete things, not merely the *symbols* of attributes, qualities, quantities, and relationship. The tendency to reification also rests on common habits. Since words stand for objects or classes of objects, or their qualities and the like, we easily fall into the habit of using them as if they were actual things. Everyday illustrations are such combinations of words as Capital *vs.* Labor or terms like the Public Good or The New Deal. Using capital letters always increases the connotation that these are real things. Too often social scientists fall into a similar trap.

The central problem, however, is to make sure that the high abstraction can be rigidly applied to concrete data in such a way as to make them meaningful. We are making some gains and we may expect, in time, to see the armchair theorist — and he has his place — and the empirical research worker combine their efforts in developing a more satisfactory system or theory. Until this happy day arrives, we must continue to define our sociological concepts as care-

fully as we can, put them to the empirical test of scientific description and analysis as often as we can, and thus contribute to the growing body of more exact knowledge in the field.

Before going on to state the relations of sociology to other disciplines, especially the social sciences, we must examine several of the more serious handicaps which we all face in trying to be objective about our own or other people's social-cultural world.

Handicaps to Scientific Thinking in Sociology

Science is man's most fruitful way of observing, classifying, and interpreting the world and himself. It is a great cultural advance over magic and fiction as a way of dealing with serious problems. Sociology, in addition to the technical difficulties of deciding on adequate units of description and analysis and of finding applicable methods of study, is handicapped by much emotionalized thinking. Such thinking derives from tradition and from the persistent tendency of laymen and public leaders alike to assume that they can know the answers to social-science problems without recourse to scientific study. Let us see what some of these handicaps are.

Man follows his group. More than one wise man of history and the present world has repeated the expression: *Know thyself*. And truly, man everywhere, primitive and modern, is interested in himself and in his immediate fellows. Yet more often than not this interest takes the form of *ethnocentrism*. This means that individuals believe their group or society to be the center of the world, their values the highest, and their ethics the only correct one.

To cite some illustrations: The Navahos of our own Southwest refer to themselves, in their native tongue, as "The People." When the Carib Indians — from whom our word "Caribbean" comes — were asked whence they came, they told the early white explorers, "We alone are people," implying that all others were of lesser breed. The Greenland

Eskimos, when they first had white visitors, thought the latter were sent there to learn virtue and good manners; and the highest compliment which could be paid a white man was that he was, or soon would be, as good as a Greenlander. Coming to more advanced peoples, the Jews separated all mankind into themselves and the Gentiles. The ancient Greeks referred to all non-Greeks as barbarians, that is, babblers or those who could not speak Greek. In our own day the dominant party in Russia believes its mission is to bring peace and planned prosperity to the rest of the world while it views us and most western European nations as decadent plutocrats. On our part, in turn, many leaders view with alarm the expansion of Russian power and influence as foreshadowing the end of Christianity and of higher civilization.

Social scientists realize that group-centeredness is a solid fact of culture. There is no such thing, technically speaking, as "Russian sociology" or "British psychology" or "bourgeois genetics"! The customs, traditions, and laws of the people residing in Russia have different values from our own, but the basic human relations everywhere involve co-operation, conflict, competition, and other processes. True, the statements of particular Russian leaders are often interpreted as expressions of some unique "Russian" psychology, as if the thinking and behaving of these men were distinctive. What they want or hope to get may not agree with what the representatives of Britain or this country want or wish; but the underlying machinery of mind and action is the same everywhere, and there must be some universal general terms or "laws" which can state these uniformities. Of course, the sociologist, along with his colleagues in social science and psychology, may wish to discover "how come" the Russians say and do what they do, why it is so hard to "get along" with them. But, if they are scientific, this will not consist in maintaining that the Western nations are inherently superior in morals and manners to them, nor, per contra, that somehow or other the ideals of Karl Marx are really being effectively worked out in a highly authoritarian society.

Almost endless examples might be cited of the unscientific, self-centered, and group-centered thinking which goes on everywhere. The student will be able to provide many of his own case studies. Just to cite a few which come from areas of behavior with which sociology deals:

We are all familiar with, and yet too often the victims of, a lot of nonsense about the relation of race to thought and action. In American society white men almost universally believe themselves innately superior to people of colored races. And World War II was fought, in part at least, because the Nazis were actually implementing the race myth of "Nordic" or "Aryan" superiority and hence divine right to conquer and rule the world. The Japanese also were trying to imitate the followers of Hitler in their program for "Asiatic Co-prosperity."

Now some may say that such ideas are silly, that all we need is to pass laws against racial discrimination. Closer at home, reformers often tell us we can cure war by law, or crime and divorce by education. But these approaches are hardly scientific. We must realize that *human values and beliefs make up some of the most stubborn of all social-cultural facts*. We shall make no advance if we shut our eyes to the place that irrational, emotionally colored attitudes and values have in group as well as individual actions.

The simple world of good or bad. Closely linked to ethnocentrism is the widespread and traditional tendency to see our personal and social problems and their possible solutions in terms of *good or bad, right or wrong, white or black, for or against*, or from some other two-directional standpoint. Facts, situations, and people that we do not like or understand, or fear, we assign to the limbo of the evil or dangerous. That with which we agree or with which we feel at home, we believe "all right." Thus, the rugged individualists among our businessmen, who accept the doctrine of *laissez faire* as some men take their religion, damn any or all talk of social planning.

Personalization of causes. Furthermore, in describing and interpreting the present political and economic issues men are prone to *personalize* the conflict and competition. For example, for the Allied peoples of World War I, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany was the personal devil responsible for the war. In World War II it was Hitler. Contrariwise, during the first conflict the Germans attacked Lord Grey as a warmonger; and in the second one, Winston Churchill of Britain got similar verbal treatment. So, too, the troubles of the postwar years have been blamed on the ideological descendants of Karl Marx in Russia and elsewhere. On the other side, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been blamed for blocking peace among the nations. The name-calling on both sides is but a repetition of the age-old practice of viewing our problems—world-wide, local, or personal—as due to the evils and faults of other men.

Single or multiple causation. A fourth tendency of people who want to know their world, especially when it threatens them with a serious problem which demands a solution, is to seek for and find a single, particular reason or *cause* for events, situations, or conditions which on scientific grounds are caused by a number of prior events, situations, or conditions. This common way of assuming a single cause we call *particularism*.

The student should not fall into any such easy explanation of social events. For example, when it was the habit to explain everything in terms of "the survival of the fittest," a German scholar contended that the thick skulls of the Australian aborigines were due to the fact that the men handled their women with such violence as to break all the thin heads. As a result only thick-skulled women remained to reproduce. Another German, J. Lippert, argued that man took the idea of a mill for grinding, with its upper and nether millstones, from the upper and lower molars in his own mouth. The theory that the white man's technical superiority over the colored races

is due to his superior heredity is another such view.

All such theories rest on the effort to find a simple single cause for what is the result of several and complex causes. The chief error in particularism rests on the human tendency to use the process of abstraction, to simplify the basic reasons for events.⁶

While these examples are drawn chiefly from primitive man, similar explanations are found all around us. Overproduction is often cited as *the* cause of the business cycle, though others hold the cycle due to excessive amounts of credit and money in circulation at a given time. War has variously been blamed on man's innate pugnacity, on the satanic designs of criminal men, and on an assumed inevitable principle of the struggle for existence. The rise of prices is often blamed on the absence of rationing by the government, delinquency on the motion pictures or radio, and divorce on a sharp reduction in the birth rate.

While some particular cause named may be one among many which bring about a given condition, most social as well as personal problems have multiple, not single, causation. And no satisfactory solutions will appear until men everywhere give up such tendencies to simplify and abstract. They must turn to a careful description and analysis of the pertinent facts, both those prior in time and those currently associated with a given problem.

In our sociological analyses, then, we must try to discover not only the rational but the illogical bases of given conduct. Ethnocentrism, division into right and wrong, finding persons to blame, and particularism represent, each in its own way, a mixture of rational and irrational elements. When we have the facts of a given social-cultural situation or event, we should be in a better position to give them systematic meaning. While we have a long distance to go before we have a very solid body of knowledge such as we find in chemistry or

⁶ Some of these examples come from the excellent discussion of particularism by W. I. Thomas in his *Source book for social origins*, pp. 22-25. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909.

physics, nonetheless we must keep on trying to get at social-cultural data objectively. To give up the search, of course, is to admit defeat at the start, and we would then fall back — as mankind has done so often in the past — on magic, supernaturalism, and other fantastic means of solving personal and group problems. In an age of nuclear fission and undreamed-of bacterial and chemical warfare, such primitive devices will hardly do.

Yet, in the end sociology, like any other science, must pay its debt to the society and culture which make it possible. Put in simple terms we ask, sooner or later, What about *social action*? That is, what can sociology tell the lawmaker, the reformer, the educator, the businessman, the labor leader, and the statesmen of the world about man and his conduct which will lessen human conflict, make for more adequate well-being, or whatever other values we consider ideal and worth striving to get?

While our major aim is *analysis* rather than *action*, we shall not avoid, on occasion, giving attention to proposals for improvement; and when we discuss the place of planning in the modern world, we shall concern ourselves directly with the meaning of planned action and what we may hope from it. (See chapter 32.)

Sociology and Related Sciences

Before concluding this introductory discussion, we must look briefly at the relations of sociology to certain other scientific disciplines. Many special phases of the relationships will come into our treatment as we proceed. At this point we give only the basic orientation.

Biology and sociology. The social life of human beings has at least two important roots in *animal biology*. One of these is the inheritance or continuity of the essential bodily structures and functions which man has in common with the animals, especially the higher mammals — the monkeys and apes. This is evident in the bodily constitution and major drives for survival, deter-

mined chiefly by heredity. The other has to do with the fact that being a mammal, man is dependent at birth and for a considerable time thereafter on other members of the same species for survival. That is, as a mammal, and particularly as the highest form of the mammal, man is a *social species*. His survival as an independent organism, as well as his reproduction or continuation of the species through progeny, is absolutely dependent on relations with other members of the same species. This process, called *interaction*, is fundamental to all society. It has its roots in the dependence of the newborn on the older generation, especially on the mother or some substitute.

In view of such facts, sociology must take into account the racial history of man and examine the dogmas about both racial and individual differences in order to discover the errors of popular myth and legend which are the basis, in part, of ethnocentrism. Also, we must deal with populations in their struggle for survival. That is, we must study the numbers of mouths to be fed in relation to food which nature provides to satisfy the basic needs. Then, too, we shall note that man's forms of social life, beginning with that of the family, have prototypes in lower mammalian species, particularly those species close to us, such as the monkeys and apes.

So, too, sociology draws heavily on medicine, which, of course, rests on biology. Many important facts regarding diet, health, and disease have more or less direct bearing on group as well as individual behavior.

In addition to these topics, biology has contributed much to sociology in the study of the relations of plants and animals to man's survival. What is called *human ecology*, the science of man's adaptation to his fellows and his resources in spatial terms, draws heavily upon both plant and animal ecology.

Sociology and anthropology. Literally, *anthropology* means "the science of man," from the Greek *anthropos* (human being,

man) and *logy*, from *logos* (word, or discourse). Sociology means "science of society," from the Latin *socio*, from *socius* (literally companion, but in broader sense meaning group or society). These precise definitions give a clue to the difference as well as the likeness of the two fields. Anthropology includes such subfields as *physical anthropology*, or human anatomy; *archeology*, or the study of prehistoric remains of man and his handicrafts; *linguistics*, or the science of language, at least some branches of it; and finally *cultural anthropology*, which deals with man's folkways, institutions, and other more or less habitual and transmissible ways of doing and thinking. Some British writers call this subfield *social anthropology*. Obviously it is with respect to this last-named phase that anthropology overlaps, or has much in common with, sociology.

This is not the place for entering into a technical discussion of the fine points of likeness and difference between sociology and cultural anthropology. The major difference has not been in method or theory so much as in the subject matter of investigation. Until recently the cultural anthropologist has confined himself largely to the study of nonliterate and non-European peoples and their cultures, whereas the sociologists of Europe and this country have devoted themselves almost entirely to studies of their own particular countries. Today sociology and cultural anthropology are becoming more closely interrelated. But the other subfields of anthropology represent distinctive areas of interest and investigation of only occasional concern to sociology.

Economics and politics. Economics deals with the manner by which man produces, distributes, and consumes or uses material goods and services. In many aspects of these operations economics and sociology overlap. Such matters as management-labor relations are often the topic of sociological study, especially as they exemplify co-operation and/or conflict of groups. Levels of standards of living certainly have wide so-

ciological bearing. Also, such a question as to whether capitalism and free enterprise are more conducive to the production of wealth and human satisfactions than socialism is equally interesting to sociology and economics.

In like manner, political science, or the science of government and statecraft, deals with many problems with which the sociologist is also interested. To mention one of the most important of the joint concerns, war as an institution and as an expression of group conflict and co-operation has been studied by scholars in both these fields. And today the expanding governmental controls are producing wide sociological effects which reach beyond such matters as administrative practice and bureaucracy.

History and social science. Many historians do not consider history to be a social science in the sense of aiming at formal systematic theory and generalization. While they use scientific methods as far as possible in collecting and interpreting their data, they do not try to formulate hypotheses, generalizations, or laws of historical processes. And often those writers who try to generalize, such as Oswald Spengler or Arnold J. Toynbee, are said to be sociologists or philosophers insofar as their theories of history are in question. Actually there is a lot of meaningless chatter about this topic. Certainly all the social sciences draw upon historical data for their analyses, since only a fact in a certain time and place may be examined and interpreted.

Psychology and social science. Psychology is most intimately bound up not only with sociology and cultural anthropology but with all the social sciences. Traditionally psychology has dealt with the individual and his motives, mental mechanisms, and behavior in contrast to sociology, where the emphasis has been on the group and the institution. In point of fact, however, the two academic disciplines have much in common, as anyone who will examine standard textbooks in the two fields will discover for himself. For sociology and

its closest kin, social psychology, the chief concern has been the study of interaction: (1) of individuals with each other, (2) of the individual and his group, and (3) of groups with each other. The stress in *individual psychology*, as it is frequently termed by way of contrast, is the study of the person as such, his motivations, the mechanics by which he learns his way in the world, and the nature of his mental and behavioral processes. Yet most present-day psychologists realize that the individual grows up in a social-cultural environment, as well as a physical one, and that what he learns is constantly being influenced by parents, brothers and sisters, friends, teachers, and all others with whom the person comes into contact as he develops from early childhood through adolescence to maturity.

A word of advice may well be offered about the terminology of the two fields. Since psychology is still largely oriented to the individual, it uses concepts such as *motives, ideas, attitudes, values, and habits*, and the various mechanisms or processes which relate these to each other. Among others of these are conditioning, inhibition, frustration, tension-reduction, and many of

the older concepts derived from an earlier psychology, such as association, memory, forgetting, conceptualization, and the like.

Sociology, in contrast, talks about customs and traditions, the mores, institutions, and technologies which are oriented to group and cultural approaches to human behavior. Actually both psychology and sociology deal with individuals. If one were asked for the key linkage it would be the concept *interaction*. After all, groups are but individuals in interaction, and culture (*i.e.*, folkways, institutions, and technologies) is entirely *learned*.

The point is that there is ample work for all the social sciences and psychology to do; and while there may be occasional overlapping, the emphases are different. Yet, in the end, as to method and systematic generalization, we may look forward to a growing integration and unity among the sciences which deal with man and his social conduct. We are far from such a stage now, but sociology, it is hoped, will aid in giving the student the beginnings of this larger overall understanding of what makes people do and think as they do in their relations with their fellow men.

Interpretative Summary

1. Sociology is a systematic and orderly study of man in society. Its fundamental descriptive concepts are society, culture, and personality.
2. As an emerging science, sociology tries to use the same methods as are used in the more established sciences. It suffers some handicaps by virtue of the nature of its data and from the lack of adequate techniques for studying the same objectively.
3. Sociology, like the other social sciences, is further handicapped by the persistence of irrational attitudes and values about the nature of man and of society. Such irrationality, however, must be taken into account in any scientific analysis since it is itself a potent element in culture and conduct.
4. Sociology has close relations, as to interest, standpoint, and method, with biology and especially with the other social sciences. Actually it overlaps with much of cultural anthropology and social psychology.
5. Strictly speaking, as a science sociology has no place in any particular program of social action. While sociology does and should tackle important problems set before it by practical people of the everyday world, in its methods of investigation, its analysis, and the interpretation of its findings it must keep itself free from bias and wishful desires for particular answers on the part of those who ask its services. If it does so, it will much more effectively and richly repay its debt to the society and culture which make social science possible in the first place.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What are the formal steps in a scientific study? In tackling problems scientifically do people always proceed in this formal way? If not, why not? Cite any instances of this, your own or other.
2. If you are assigned to prepare a term paper on a given topic, the data for which are in books and documents in the library, can such an undertaking be considered a scientific study? Is working on a problem in the laboratory necessarily scientific? In short, what are the chief standards of sound science everywhere?
3. What are some serious pitfalls into which we are likely to fall in attempting to understand objectively our own society and its culture? That of others?
4. Prepare a short illustration of one of the following:
 - (a) Ethnocentrism
 - (b) Personalization of causation
 - (c) Particularism

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Lowell J. Carr, *Situational analysis; an observational approach to introductory sociology*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.

Designed to introduce the students into certain methods of studying social situations around them. A good method of training in science.

Columbia Associates in Philosophy, *An introduction to reflective thinking*, especially chapters 1, 2, 4, 7, and 8. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923.

An excellent and well-written story of the nature of logic and science with illustrations of their use from various fields: physics, biology, psychology, history, and others.

Ernest Dimnet, *The art of thinking*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1928.

A readable account of logic and its help in everyday thinking.

George A. Lundberg, *Can science save us?* New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1947.

A stimulating essay pointing out the prospects and difficulties of using social science to help present-day mankind settle some of its most pressing problems. Some sharp comments on the unscientific and wishful mind.

R. H. Thouless, *How to think straight, the technique of applying logic instead of emotion*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1939.

A handy and well-written discussion of the difficulties in thinking, with suggestions as to how to overcome these. See especially appendix 1.

❧ Part One ❧

Society, Culture, and Personality

The Major Forms of Group Life

SOCIOLOGY deals with three basic features or variables: society, culture, and personality. *Society* has to do with the interactions of individuals, of groups, and of an individual and a given group or groups. *Culture* refers to man's techniques, customs, traditions, institutions, values, and ways of interpreting the world of nature and of man. The study of *personality* is concerned essentially with describing and analyzing the motivations, habits, attitudes, and ideas of the individual with reference to himself and others.

Obviously these topics are also of interest to psychology, cultural anthropology, and the other social sciences. It would make for a neat division of work if we could say that sociology deals with society, cultural anthropology with culture, and psychology with personality. But in view of the way these three fields of study have developed in recent years, no such clear-cut separation of interest can be made. Yet, as pointed out in chapter 1, sociology and anthropology have stressed the first two variables, psychology the last. Nonetheless, the student of sociology must understand the chief features of all three and their interrelations.

We must not forget that man represents a social species. Everywhere and at all times the individual lives out his days in direct or indirect contact with his fellows. He could not long survive without some reference to others. Even the fictional lone man on a desert island could not carry on without habits learned socially, or without solace in his daydreams about his former friends, or without actual plans to rejoin them. In our earlier years, with our parents and brothers and sisters we make up a family. Among many primitives the individual is also tied up to a clan or other wider kinship group. Later, as husband or

wife, a person helps form a new family. Children and most youth belong to some school group or other. Many of us are associated with congeniality groups, clubs, or fraternal orders. Most of us are members of some church. As adults we work with others at a job or profession. And all of us belong to certain more or less well-defined status-giving groups called class or caste. In Western national societies a large fraction of normal adults takes part, at least periodically, in political and civic actions at local, state, or national level. Besides these more regularized and recurrent associations of people, from time to time we have contact with others as members of crowds, audiences, and those intangible but important associations of common interest which we call public or publics. In all these the essence of group life lies in the interaction of persons with each other in terms of some common, like, or antagonistic interests.

What we do, that is, the roles we play with regard to others, varies greatly. A student has habits in a fraternity that are quite different from his habits in his own family. As a wage-earner a father has a wide range of contacts which have little or nothing to do with his home life. A married woman as member of a bridge club plays a role which has little in common with her function as a wife and mother. And so it goes: Each particular group sets the pattern of the thoughts and actions of its members, and within such social order we carry on as personalities.

Prehuman Social Life

Social life did not begin with man. It is found in many animal species. Among certain insects such as the bees, ants, and termites, there is a group life marked by a

remarkable division of labor and organization. Some ant species keep plant lice, or aphids, in captivity, which they milk for purposes of securing food. The ants tend these plant lice carefully, moving them when they move and seeing that other ants do not carry them off. Birds show interesting features of life in association in their joint nest-building, in division of labor in seeking food, in the gradation of power by which some birds dominate others — the "pecking order" — and in a wide variety of vocal gestures to indicate love, anger, or fear. But it is in the higher vertebrate animals, especially the mammals, that we find the beginnings of the type of social life which, in basic form, resembles our own.

This fact is useful to sociology because it shows that *society or group life is older than man and his culture*. This is an extremely important point. It is well for us to know and recall that most of the primary forms of human social life have their prototypes in the collateral and related higher mammalian species, especially the monkeys and apes. These reveal patterns of mutual care, protection, co-operation, group solidarity, play, conflict, of leadership and followership, gestural interstimulation and a good deal of social learning, one animal from another.

Social life among the apes. The following summary from various studies of apes, especially the chimpanzee, will bring out some of the facts.¹ However, the student should realize that in describing prehuman societies the use of terms applicable to human society has distinct limitations from a strictly scientific standpoint. Unfortunately we lack a vocabulary to portray ape societies which is different from that used in human sociology.

¹ Among other studies of monkeys and apes, see C. R. Carpenter, "Societies of monkeys and apes," *Biological Symposia*, 1942, 8:177-204; Wolfgang Köhler, *The mentality of apes*, 2nd rev. ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1926; R. M. Yerkes and Ada W. Yerkes, *The great apes*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929; and S. Zuckerman, *The social life of monkeys and apes*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1932.

(1) The basic grouping of ape society resembles in form the essentials of the human family. There are usually an adult male, several adult females, and the offspring. Rather commonly, too, other males, "bachelors," attach themselves to such familial groupings. Their presence and especially their sexual interest in the females result in frequent fighting between them and the chief male. In any case the sex relations of male and female — though periodic in character — represent one basic pattern of interaction. In the sex relations of the apes we find gesture, play, pursuit, and surrender. Since these situations recur over and over again, certain habitual forms of stimulus and reaction arise. These represent prototypes of certain human behavior.

The second aspect of family life arises in the relations of the mother-ape with her offspring. The newborn could not survive at all were it not for the food and care which the mother gives her baby-ape. This is a dependency-protective form of relation. The recurrence of the need for food and care on the part of the young means that here, too, there is a certain ordering of social habit for both mother and offspring. The chief features of this are dependence, protection, and co-operation. The habits derived from such social situations doubtless carry over into later reactions among adult apes.

(2) Thus co-operative and friendly relations are not confined to those between the mother-ape and young offspring. Both in natural habitat and under conditions of captivity — as in the experimental ape farms and large zoological parks — adult apes with their young band together in foraging for food and for protection. Experimental observations show that together they will build up a rough pile of boxes from which to reach bananas hanging from the top of the cage. Also, adult apes will pair off, not only with reference to sexual activities but in play and for mutual protection.

Near proof of a rudimentary sense of solidarity is shown when one of the number of apes that have been living together is isolated from them. When such a member is removed by a keeper and shut up in a near-by cage but still in sight of the others, the latter will set up a great vocal hubbub. Yet, curiously enough, this continues only so long as the isolated member continues his wails and remains in sight. Once he is silent and out of sight, the

other apes pay little or no attention to him. When the isolated ape is returned to the group there is often an outpouring of emotional response of "joy."

Per contra, a stranger-ape introduced for the first time among a group of apes already habituated to each other is likely to be attacked. This is especially so if he competes for food or mates. Gradually, however, the new ape may make "friends" with one or two, and in time be more or less accepted by the others.

(3) Both among the young, between young and old, and among adults there is a great deal of interaction which resembles what we call play. There is a give-and-take of vocalisms, pursuit and tussling, and mutual grooming for salt particles, bits of dry skin, and/or vermin. Köhler reports that at times his apes engaged in rhythmic movements which looked like crude dancing.

(4) Certainly the prototype of leadership and followership is seen in the dominance-and-submission patterns which are found in apes as in monkeys and lower primates. These relate to sexual activities, feeding, and protection. The larger males tend to dominate the females and other males. However, under conditions of sexual periodicity, the female may temporarily make a dominant sexual approach to the male. Big apes have been known to protect smaller ones from the onslaughts of other apes. In matters of securing food as well as mates the struggle for dominance constantly recurs. So, too, there is often a hierarchy of dominance-submission, so frequent in other animal species and in man. One ape will boss another, the latter in turn dominate a third who is weaker or younger, and so on down a ladder of control.

(5) Day-by-day activity in an ape society is facilitated not only by direct physical contact one with another but by vocal, manual, and other gestures. Apes use a wide range of sounds to communicate with each other.

However, this is not true language in the human sense. These gestures are expressions of emotional states which serve, by a process of learning (conditioning), to set up counter-responses in other apes. The animal gesture is essentially an oncoming act or a part of such a total act which elicits a response in another before the act of the first animal is completed. Such oncoming acts or gestures become signs or indicators of the subsequent acts in a series. Thus, the warning cry of a mother may lead the young ape — through trial-and-error

learning — to avoid a false step. Vocal and other gestures make for a rapid give-and-take activity in the play of the animals, as they do in children and adults among us. The vocal response associated with the discovery of something to eat serves to point out the food to other apes. The latter, in turn, respond to such vocal signs and join others in seeking a share of the food. In this way vocal and other gestures extend and make more complex the interactions of these lower forms. But we must repeat: *This is not true language*. There is no vocal sound or sounds for a given object (percept) or for qualities, quantities, attributes, relationships, or classes of objects (concepts).

There is a basis in the ape as an organism for a repetition of kinds of sounds for kinds of situations. Yet there is no traditional accepted way of passing them down from parent to offspring. And certainly, since there is no direct association of vocalism with objects or ideas, there can be no language. This means there can be no culture, since language is absolutely fundamental to the existence of culture.

(6) In addition to rudimentary vocal and other gestural communication, apes show the rudiments of tool-making and tool-using. They pick up sticks to knock down food objects or to fend off attacks. Some of them have even learned to put two sticks together, as a smaller one into a hollow larger one, to fashion a still longer stick with which to get at food otherwise out of reach. But again this is not the same as human tool-making and tool-using. They do not keep such sticks for future use, nor do they instruct the young in how to use them. Such use of objects external to the body is only the rudest and crudest prototype of what we find in man, even at a most rudimentary level of culture. Along with true language, the thing that distinguishes man from the apes is his tool-making and tool-using capacities.

There are other prototypes of human conduct among the apes. Some apes are capable of rather complex learning, as in the case of conditioning certain of them to secure water and food by operating simple vending machines with tokens or chips. Apes also learn to tell the difference between chips which can be used to get varying kinds of rewards. And, most strikingly,

they learn to accumulate chips as rewards in themselves so long as in the end the chips "pay off" in food or drink.

Despite these remarkable similarities between apes and men, the life of the latter is infinitely more complex than that of the apes. This is due, primarily, to the fact that man has more brain capacity — about in the ratio of 660 cc. for apes to 1400 cc. for man. The apes, as smart as they are, are tied to their immediate environment in a way in which man is not. Only in the most cursory way can an ape anticipate tomorrow. He is much more a creature of his emotions and immediate drives for food, sex, and protection than is man.

Nevertheless, the apes, and to a lesser degree the monkeys and gibbons, have many of the basic forms of social relations. We may say, in short, that *they have society but not culture*. For sociology, as for other social sciences and psychology, this is a crucial fact. It must never be forgotten that as a mammal, the individual — animal or human — is born into a social group. Without the aid of this group, in the person of parents or others, the newborn could not survive. Moreover, the higher the mammalian species is, the longer will this dependence of the offspring on the older generation be. Then, too, the adult life of the higher mammals is all carried on within a social matrix — mates, children, close associates, or enemies.

Though the apes have no culture, they possess social learning. The old train the young through nursing, grooming, and protecting in many important habits making for survival. Later they extend this learning through their contact with apes other than the mother or close "familial" tie. There is perhaps some continuity in this social tuition from generation to generation. But it rests first of all on the inherited factors in the organism. Second, the recurrence of situations in the family or band of apes produces further similarity of reaction. But such social learning as grows out of these circumstances is not to be confused with cultural learning. (See chapters 5, 9.)

Forms of Human Association

Human social life takes on a variety of forms, some closely knit and persistent in time, others temporary and loosely organized. As a foundation for much of our subsequent discussion and analysis, we must define and illustrate these forms and their basic classifications.

Race, society, community, state, and nation. *Race* is often thought to be one of the most inclusive of human groups. Actually, race is a biological rather than a strictly sociological term. Scientifically it has to do only with physical, not social-cultural, traits. In popular speech, however, race is often confused with the more important concept of society. (See chapter 11.)

In its broadest generic sense *society* has to do with every kind and degree of relatively direct and indirect contact entered into by man with his fellows. Its simplest form is a twosome. Its complex form is seen in a great country like Russia, India, China, or the United States. Social relationship may be conscious or unconscious. Also, it may take co-operative or oppositional or other direction.

We must distinguish between *society* in this broad sense and *a society*, which has a certain locus, permanence, and history. More narrowly considered, *a society* refers to the broadest grouping of people who have a certain common set of habits, ideas, and attitudes, that is, a social and cultural content, living in a definite territory, and often set off from other societies by attitudes and actions of indifference or antagonism. Within any given society there exist all sorts of interconnected groupings of men for more specialized social purposes. These we shall examine shortly.

The term *community* has been used in a variety of meanings. In its simplest sense it applies to a group of people of all ages having a more or less common culture and living in a limited region in which they find a geographical center for most of their common interests and actions. Ordinarily

the community has a more restricted boundary than a society, though we may speak of a national community or a world community. When men live in small groups as tribesmen or villagers, isolated from other groups by physical barriers and differences in language, customs, traditions, and laws, a community is strictly synonymous with a society. In current sociology the term community usually refers to a locality-grouping of people within a larger society, such as a nation, who carry on among themselves through subsidiary associations the most essential economic, political, educational, religious, and recreational-esthetic activities.

For our purposes we may distinguish between the *primary community* and the *secondary community*. The former is characterized chiefly by limited range of contact, by what we call primary groups; the latter by wide and often impersonal relations, by what we call secondary groups, and it is, in fact, far less closely bound together. In short, a community represents a certain set of common patterns of behavior within which there exist a large number of smaller social units or subgroups, such as the family, neighborhood, vocational and other groupings of people who give the definite tone or character to the community. This will be clearer as we examine these associations in detail in later chapters.

Before going on to a description and analysis of such smaller groupings, we must characterize two other larger societal units — the state and the nation. The *state* refers to the governmental or political order, which today includes the concept of sovereignty of self-determining power and various agencies — legislative, judicial, and administrative. A state may grow up from a society, or it may superimpose its power by conquest on another society. A *nation*, or more properly a *national society*, is really the same associative unit which we defined above as "a society" but one centered around an idea of national unity, supported by a given culture and usually by a common language. As a rule it has a certain territo-

rial basis, but sometimes certain minority groups have been described as nationalities. It is important to indicate that in Western history, at least, the nation has not always been identical with the state. For example, during the 18th and 19th centuries the Polish national society was divided among Russia, Prussia, and Austria. Today, with the trend toward totalitarianism, state and nation tend to be considered more or less synonymous. And even without reference to this fact we often use the combination-concept *nation-state* to include both features.

Primary groups. A fundamental structural division in associative life may be drawn between primary and secondary groups. The primary group is characterized by intimate face-to-face contacts and direct interaction, set up by common locality. The social stimuli are distinctly personal: voice, facial and other gestures, touch, smell, taste, and sight. These are the first groups into which the individual is inducted. The features of the primary group will be made clear if we note briefly certain of its more specific types.

With few exceptions the *family* is the first group into which the infant is introduced. It is made up of two different generations or age-groups, parents and children, who live in a condition of social interplay. It originates in the sexual life of the mother and father, but as a social unit it may be thought of not merely as a two-some of man and woman but as parents and children, who have certain obligations toward each other. The family is the only social group in which the biological functions of procreation and nursing are integrated with the social-cultural pattern of conduct. In the family the child acquires all his fundamental habits — those of bodily care, those of speech, those of right and wrong, those of obedience or disobedience. He learns submission to authority and practices rivalry and/or co-operation with his brothers and sisters. Affections and dislikes run deeply throughout the family. The family is thus *primary* not only as to

its form but also in time, since it is the first group to which the infant is exposed and in which he gets his fundamental training. In this sense the family is basic to all other groups.

The *play group* arises out of contact of the children of the same family or neighborhood. It is more or less spontaneous in its formation, developing out of new situations not necessarily found in the family. In the first place, the children in the play group meet other children of like age. The pattern of parental authority is ordinarily not present. In these associations the child learns to give and take with other children. There may be quarrels and division; but there is also, as the child grows up, co-operation in games and teamwork. The child's play habits, however, are often influenced by his home training. For example, his aggressiveness or docility in the play group may well be a reflection of patterns he has acquired at home. Also, the kinds of games children play derive from the culture. Some societies do not possess game patterns for their children.² For the most part, the play group affords him early training in meeting his equals, in learning to co-operate, and in struggling to express his own wishes — things not always learned or permitted in the family.

Another primary group is the *neighborhood*, where there is also direct face-to-face relationship. Neighborhoods are characterized by habits of lending and borrowing, barter or even simple financial transactions, by the social control of gossip, and by face-to-face insistence on sticking to the moral codes. We must not, however, confuse the neighborhood with the primary community. K. L. Butterfield distinguishes between the two:

"A neighborhood is simply a group of families living conveniently near together. . . . A true community is a social group that is more or less self-sufficing. It is big enough to have its own centers of interest — its trading center, its social center, its own church, its own schoolhouse, its own garage, its own li-

brary, and to possess such other institutions as the people of the community need. It is something more than a mere aggregation of families. There may be several neighborhoods in a community."³

Three other primary groups should be mentioned: the congeniality group, the comradeship, and the gang. The *congeniality group* is featured by a more or less conscious association of individuals — children or adults — based on common interests and habits. Such grouping usually develops wherever persons who find themselves frequently thrown together discover a sense of congeniality and friendliness in doing many things together. Ordinarily the congeniality group confines itself to leisure-time activities. It is informal in character. Unlike the true club, it has neither officers nor formal rules. Often it does not even have a name. It affords an outlet for sympathetic and free relationships, sometimes regardless of race, religion, or politics. It persists only so long as the persons come into direct contact with each other.

The *comradeship* is an elemental form of association of but two persons, built up from intimate face-to-face contact, and appears at all periods from childhood to old age. The pairing-off may be between members of the same sex or it may cut across sex lines. There is a common sharing of experiences, of heartaches and joys, a planning of life, an expression of ideals, ambitions, and desires without fear of ridicule by unfriendly mouths. It affords a most free and untrammelled mutuality. In American society it is often the basis of romantic love leading to marriage, but it need not take on a sexual aspect at all.

The childhood *gang* arises out of the play group. In the course of contact with other play groups or gangs, or with expressions of adult authority — parents or police — the gang becomes integrated and formalized in a more permanent fashion. In this sense the gang takes on some of the features

² See Margaret Mead, *Growing up in New Guinea*. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1930.

³ See Introduction to E. L. Morgan, *Mobilizing the rural community*. Massachusetts Agricultural College, Extension Bulletin no. 9, 1918, p. 9.

of definitely institutionalized secondary groups. It sometimes becomes a formal club, organized, however, by the members themselves and not by adults interested in providing recreation or education for youth. Because of this origin, it is usually classified as a primary group. In its conflict-relations the gang typifies an institutionalized group quite unlike the associations of comradeship, congeniality, and the usual play life.

These groups are primary in several senses. They are the first groups in which the individual builds up his habits and attitudes. They are fundamental to the development of the social self and give one the basic training in solidarity and co-operation. However, they are not entirely free from rivalry and competition. There is always some difference of view and action. Self-assertion comes into play, although it is disciplined by the common sense of union. As we shall see, culture gives the content and direction to these activities.

Secondary groups. Secondary groups are characterized by much more deliberate and conscious formation than are the primary forms. They represent almost entirely partial and specialized interests or needs. In fact, they are sometimes called "special-interest groups." They do not necessarily depend upon face-to-face contacts. Actually, direct relations are common but not absolutely essential. A scientific association may exist for years without the members ever meeting together in person. Secondary associations are illustrated by the nation, the political party, the religious body, the trade union, various economic organizations of employers, all sorts of clubs, lodges, art and scientific societies, and philosophic "schools of thought."

Secondary groups generally outlast any given generation. Although they usually represent particular interests, these very interests or needs persist through time and often demand more organization than do the primary groups. There develop traditions, codes, special officers, and fixed methods of carrying on their functions,

which we call social institutions. Some writers, in fact, classify secondary associations as institutional groups.

Most of the habits and attitudes built up in the primary group carry over to one's participation in secondary associations. Although Western society is more and more characterized by the growth of secondary associations, the primary contacts are not lost. We shall not discuss in detail the variety of secondary groups at this point, since in Part Three, where we deal with social institutions and processes, we shall examine the major ones in considerable detail.

Impermanent primary and secondary groups. In addition to these two broad classes of associational life, many groups form and re-form without much continuity or persistence. Such associations arise upon certain occasions that are peculiarly transient in character. They depend on face-to-face and shoulder-to-shoulder relation and usually form around more temporary objects or situations. Street *crowds* that collect to watch a dog fight or to listen to a soapbox orator are examples. Then there are the more emotional temporary crowds which we call *mobs*, which are marked by violent behavior. So, too, *audiences* are usually temporary or recur only for limited periods, as in a college course.

These associations we call *primary impermanent groups*. They are marked by their temporary character, by lack of permanent organization as well as by a certain passing attention and behavior. They do not express themselves in any very highly ritualized or habitual form, except perhaps in the *audience*, which is a kind of institutionalized crowd.

Other types of impermanent groups do not depend on person-to-person contiguity. Such are the readers of newspapers who develop toward some event or discussion a common feeling of solidarity. The so-called *publics* with which social psychology is concerned are of this character. There are many fluctuating impermanent groups built up around matters of public interest persisting for only a short time, such as an

election, a prize fight, a kidnaping episode, a foreign war, and the like. These we may call *secondary impermanent groups*.

Mass society and the machine age. Societies and communities before the Industrial Revolution, which began about the time the United States was founded, were largely dominated by primary-group patterns. Although ancient Chinese, Hindu, Near Eastern, and Greco-Roman societies developed some large cities, they did not know machine technology as we know it today, nor did they experience any of the widespread effects of secondary association. In contrast, the modern world under the impact of scientific technology tends more and more to be dominated by secondary associations, especially those of the special-interest and extended-contact type. The machine process, not only in industry but in business and politics as well, has made for high division of labor and hence greater interdependence of individuals and groups. Yet this interdependence takes on a rational, impersonal, segmental character. The interconnections and the totality rest chiefly on external, more or less mechanical relationships of persons and groups. The warm personal intimacy, the cohesiveness, the sentimental ties of the primary group have been lost. In their place is an extreme individualism, marked by personal isolation.

In short, in spite of the increased density of people in modern communities, in spite of increased day-by-day contact, there has emerged a vast mass of segregated, isolated individuals, interdependent in all sorts of specialized ways yet lacking in any central unifying value or purpose. The *laissez-faire* doctrine that "pure competition" of individuals would produce, of itself, a perfectly balanced economic society is but one hope and rationalization of this trend. Like trends are evident in the high stress on rational thinking in science and education. It is seen in the wide yet relatively indifferent citizen-membership in the nation-state. Political democratization is but one phase of it and corresponds to the high specializa-

tion and interdependence of functions in the industrial-business world.

Some writers in social science have characterized this whole product of highly divided and atomized secondary associations of men in our modern world as *mass society*.⁴ We shall have occasion later to point out its bearing on society and culture. At this point we may summarize some of its most important features and implications:

(1) The stress on rationality, specialization of labor, impersonality of contacts, and self-assertiveness has led to a loss of warm intimacy of individuals and an emotionalized sense of unity and solidarity such as we find in the primary group or in those older secondary associations that drew their social support largely by resting on basic primary contacts of members. (2) Such a condition tends to foster a sense of personal insecurity, loneliness, normlessness, and incompleteness of response. Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), a French sociologist, used the concept *anomie* to characterize this aspect of mass society. Hence (3) there arises a strong desire for social-cultural relations which will restore at least some of the needed emotional warmth, integration, and sense of security. (4) There is a widespread stress on equality of wants and satisfactions among the masses.

(5) Further characteristics appear in the fact that in spite of the rationality implied in the machine process, in the high division of labor, and in the individual rewards — wages, profits, and prestige — there is a marked increase in the irrational and emotional in thought and conduct. This is evident in the increased desire of people for crowd contacts, as witnessed in huge congregations at sports, political rallies, prize fights, in motion-picture houses, and in less frequent but violent mob action, such as race riots and lynching parties.

(6) In these mass situations suggestion, persuasion, emotional appeals, vicarious adventure, and vicarious security are provided. There is a mixture of the rational and the irrational that carries the individual away and, for the nonce, provides him the sense of intimacy, solidarity, and completeness in common with his fellows which he lacks in his more routine but specialized day-by-day contacts.

⁴ See Karl Mannheim, *Man and society in an age of reconstruction*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1940.



BROOKLYN DODGER FANS IN ACTION

Wide World Photo.

(7) Usually such mass security is relatively temporary; it does not afford the permanence and continuity which the human being craves as a foundation for his life. It is here that the demagogue — be he political, religious, or otherwise — gets in his agitation. New leaders and would-be ruling groups arise with all sorts of appeals and promises to provide for the masses the very solidarity, permanence, and economic and emotional security which they want. The full dinner pail, 1000 years of peace and power, a planned and beautiful society, a new heaven and a new earth (where there will be no wants and no problems), these and like shibboleths are heralded abroad.


(8) Moreover, the most effective of the modern demagogues not only indulge in propaganda and indoctrination but also organize to assume dominance and leadership over the masses. This takes two forms: the close-knit group of would-be revolutionists and manipulators, and the more extended organization of the masses themselves. The latter not only serves to provide great satisfactions for the otherwise unorganized and more or less amorphous mass of mankind but also functions as a channel or device for co-ordi-

nating the crowd and public interests and activities to the ends laid down by the rising leaders.

This integration of mass following and interest into a dynamic functioning order is symbolized in the use made of the crowd-audience in festivals, pageants, parades, and organized mass demonstrations. The use of the device in Italy, Russia, and Germany is well-known. One writer thus interprets the psychological effectiveness of organized Soviet-Russian crowd behavior:

"In the Bolshevik system of marching crowds there are two sound psychological factors. First, when you march, when you advance in solid ranks, stepping disciplined to music, you cannot fail to feel that you are part of something moving; that you yourself are an instrument of progress, however humble; that you and the millions like you that form your nation are going somewhere, moving forward, all together."⁸

⁸ Walter Duranty, "Vast crowds that gather in lands of the dictators . . . in Russia," *New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 3, 1935. By permission.



Wide World Photo.

UNITS OF THE MOSCOW GARRISON MARCH IN REVIEW ON MAY DAY

While America has not witnessed such highly co-ordinated "marching men,"⁶ our baseball, football, and race-track crowds and our huge political audiences provide somewhat the same kind of emotionalized reactions. With us these are not channelized toward political ends but diffused into a variety of interests. The pictures on this and the preceding page illustrate mass behavior in the United States and elsewhere.

We-group and others-group. The primary and secondary associations represent a basic structural and functional classification. Another important division, chiefly of functional nature, is that between the "we-group" or "in-group" and the "others-group" or "out-group." This separation is found in all societies, primitive and modern.

The *in-group* is any association towards

⁶ See, however, Sherwood Anderson's obscure but somewhat prophetic novel *Marching men*, New York: The Viking Press, 1917 as a literary fantasy of what might be developed.

Of course, such organized mass movements as the Ku Klux Klan and Coxey's Army might serve as prototypes of more deliberately planned mass-revolutionary organizations. A large demobilized national army, after a war, would serve as a nucleus for this.

which we have a sense of solidarity, of loyalty, friendliness, and co-operation. It is characterized by the expressions "we belong," "we believe," "we feel," and "we act." Toward the other members of our group we have a definite sense of obligation, especially in a critical situation which would threaten them and us. We would protect them, as they would protect us. In the in-group we express our deepest sentiments of love and sympathy. We feel at home with those around us. We are familiar with their manner of acting and thinking, and the other members with our own. We understand their gestures; their words are our words. Often enough the very term and accent are unique and themselves a badge of common membership. In short, our lives center largely around the in-groups to which we belong. The degree to which one's life centers in any particular we-group, of course, depends upon whether such a group satisfies the principal needs and interests of the individual.

The *out-group* is that association of persons toward which we feel a sense of disgust, avoidance, dislike, competition, ag-

gression, fear, or even hatred. It is the group toward which one has no sense of loyalty, mutual aid, co-operation, or sympathy. Rather, one is prejudiced against the members of the out-group. The family across the street is inferior to our own. Our neighborhood is better than the one "across the tracks." Our race or religion is much superior to another's. One's antagonisms, one's prejudices, one's hatreds are usually focused around the others-group. The trade union opposes the employers' association. Toward members of the union the individuals feel a sense of solidarity, loyalty, helpfulness, and co-operation. Toward the employer and especially toward the strike breaker there is intense bitterness. So, too, rival art groups criticize and ridicule the art of others.

In ordinary times and within the larger national community, and especially with reference to the state, the attitudes toward others-groups are somewhat milder and more restrained than in time of war, when another nation or state becomes for us the out-group. Then all the violences of destruction and death to the enemy come into play. In these cases it is even virtuous to plunder, enslave, or kill the members of an out-group.

This pattern of in-group *vs.* out-group is a widespread feature of social organization wherever opposition or aggression comes into play. As we noted in chapter 1, ethnocentrism is as common among civilized as among savage and barbaric peoples. All values are scaled to those of one's own group. Each society or smaller group nourishes its own importance, believes itself superior to all others, exalts its own gods, and derides the gods of other peoples. There develop certain symbols of common unity, such as a tribal name and, with civilized societies, in addition to national or state name, maps, flags, insignia, songs, and myths.

One caution must be noted. We do not assume that for every we-group to which one belongs there is a corresponding out-group. Moreover, not every group in which a person does not participate as a member is necessarily to him an out-group. There

are outside groups toward which we are totally indifferent. The comradeship or congeniality group does not imply any attitudes of hostility toward an others-group, and many religious organizations have no such notion. The we-group *vs.* others-group is a functional, not a structural, relationship; and whether any association becomes for us an out-group depends on the relation of this group to some particular group of which we are a member. The attitudes of out-group *vs.* in-group are fostered by opposition — competition or conflict.

In concluding our discussion of forms of human association, we must indicate certain interrelations between the we-group and the others-group, and between primary and secondary groups. Figure 1 shows a two-way relationship of these groups, reflecting also the community and wider society at the same time. It illustrates how almost every primary and secondary group may, upon occasion, develop an oppositional relationship with some other group. It should be noted, too, that this opposition may extend from one group to another of different character. For example, economic groups often come into in-group:out-group contact with reference to the state. At other times the religious order may fall into opposition with the state or with the economic order.


Differential participation. Group life is not something static or fixed but a dynamic, constantly changing series of contacts among individuals. True, some relations are more stabilized than others; but even the most highly fixed forms, such as one finds in social rituals, do not escape the effects of individual differences. The intensity, range, and nature of the person's contacts with others we may call *participation*. It represents varying degrees of an individual's concern with others, which may be intimate and closely knit or diffuse and segmental. In fact, as we grow up we tend to move from the former to the latter.

During the early years, the person is bound up entirely with primary groups. Later he comes into contact with secondary

FIGURE 1

OPPOSITION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY GROUPS WHEN DIVIDED INTO IN-GROUPS AND OUT-GROUPS

(Only a few possible lines of opposition are indicated.)



associations. In short, participation ranges from the family and occupational groups which absorb much of our attention to those associations which touch us only slightly and in which our participation is distinctly segmental.

Since there are degrees of participation, it is possible for us to have a wide and varied scope of partial activities, some of which may be quite contradictory to others and yet, because they do not converge, may be carried on rather independently. For example, a man's family life may be marked by sympathetic and kindly attitudes and habits while his business contacts are marked by aggressive and selfish methods. Familiar to all of us are those men who have reached financial power through unscrupulous business dealings and yet find much public approval for their piety and contributions to church and charity.

So, too, one group may interrelate with another for some common purpose. A church organization may co-operate with a governmental institution like the juvenile court to foster and promote boys' clubs to prevent delinquency. Or an employers' as-

sociation may link itself with some phase of the educational order to promote a community enterprise.

Yet, there is not only integration but also opposition in society, as we have seen from discussing the relation of the in-group to the out-group. Conflict or competition becomes also a feature of group activity and of the members of the group.

Continuity and persistence of society. Human associations reveal a certain continuity and persistence, first, because they serve to provide for recurrent biological needs such as sustenance, reproduction, and individual and group protection. Second, association furnishes outlets for derived or learned needs, including companionship, play, curiosity, worship, and education. The nature and degree of the recurrence of these needs, in turn, is related to the emergence and persistence of social rituals and institutions. We shall see in the next chapter that basic culture patterns themselves continue because they arose and were developed with regard to the fundamental biological and social wants of man.

Interpretative Summary

1. Man is a member of a social species and cannot survive without membership in some group or other.
2. Though much more complex, human social life is continuous with the social life of the higher mammals to which man is related by his racial history.
3. There are many groups among men, which for purposes of description and analysis have been classified as either primary or secondary.
4. Primary groups are primary in time and in influence upon the development of the personality. For most of the time since prehistoric days primary-group organization has dominated the social life of man. Many of our continuing attitudes and values reflect this fact.
5. Secondary groups arise out of special and segmental interests, tend to be voluntary as to membership, and persist only as they develop institutions to channel and maintain their activities.
6. Crowds are temporary forms of primary groups; publics are relatively amorphous and impermanent forms of secondary groups.
7. The wide extension and domination of secondary-group organization has resulted in what is called mass society.
8. In terms of functioning relations involving co-operation within the group and opposition to other groups, we may classify certain intergroup relations in terms of the in-group and the out-group. In-group solidarity is much stimulated and supported by virtue of opposition to the out-group.
9. Individuals do not participate to equal extent or depth in all the groups to which their actions relate. They do so differentially.
10. There are continuity and persistence in the form of group life. These depend on new generations of individuals and the continuity of culture.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. How does the social life of the apes resemble that of man? In what ways is it different? How do you account for the difference?
2. Illustrate the shift from primary to secondary organization of society.
3. Define society, personality, culture, participation.
4. Distinguish between the following pairs of terms:

society — race	primary community — secondary community
culture — society	in-group — out-group
primary group — secondary group	nation — state
family — neighborhood	public — crowd
5. Define mass society. Name and illustrate its chief characteristics.
6. Is a democracy easier to develop and maintain in a primary community than in one dominated by secondary groups? Discuss, pro and con.
7. List the principal primary and secondary groups of which you have been or are at present a member. Rearrange your list (1) with reference to degree of your interest in the groups, (2) as to degree of permanence and continuity, and (3) as to degree to which each group was or is definitely oriented toward an out-group, and name the out-group in each instance.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

C. H. Cooley, *Social organization*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

A classic study of the major forms of group life but oriented almost entirely to Euro-American society and its culture.

Emil Lederer, *State of the masses, the threat of the classless society*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1940.

An important analysis of the trends toward mass society with illustrations chiefly from recent and contemporary European history. The author was a distinguished economist.

J. Ortega y Gasset, *The revolt of the masses*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1932.

On somewhat the same topic as Lederer's book but more flashy and impressionistic.

Judah Rumney, *The science of society*. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1938.

A brief but incisive book which discusses, among other things, the major features of social organization.

Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb, *Sociological analysis: an introductory text and case book*, chapters 9 and 10. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949.

Selected papers and comments on group life, social relations, and collective behavior. See especially papers by Lundberg and Lawsing, Hartshorne, Merton, and Pruden.

The Nature of Culture

ASSOCIATED with the various forms of human interaction there are everywhere certain recurrent, accepted, and expected ways of thinking and acting. Such ways common to a society or group we call *culture*. This chapter will examine the chief features of these products of social relations.

Some Basic Considerations

As used in the social sciences, culture refers to much more than awareness of how to act at a tea party or interest in the fine arts. In conjunction with the terms *society* and *personality*, culture is a basic concept in sociology.

Definition of culture. E. B. Tylor (1832–1917), an English anthropologist, defined culture as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”¹ In psychological words, culture consists of commonly accepted and expected ideas, attitudes, values, and habits of individuals which they learn in connection with social living. For the individual in the early years of life, culture is an enormous aid in training him to get on more effectively in his world. Each new generation of people does not have to begin “from scratch,” as slang has it, but profits from those around it who, in turn, learned how to adjust to the physical and social world largely from their progenitors. Later, as members of the new generation, it becomes their obligation to pass on to the next generation what they have learned from the past and what they themselves have added to the cultural whole.

Such cultural ways of doing and thinking are related to the following fundamental and recurrent needs: (1) for food and liquids, (2) for bodily protection and shelter, (3) for reproduction, (4) for companionship with others, and (5) for some kind of group or community controls. Borrowing from another anthropologist, Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942), we may call these the *basic imperatives* of culture since they rest on fundamental biosocial requirements.² Yet, man “does not live by bread alone,” as the Bible well puts it, nor merely for purposes of procreation, protection, or communal relations. Everywhere, also, man expresses himself in religion, in art, and in recreation. So, too, he develops some kind of view or philosophy of his place in the universe, however vague and tenuous this may be.

The meaning of culture will be clearer if we contrast the natural, physical environment of man as an animal with the cultural world into which he as a human being is introduced and in which he passes his days. The natural environment is that found in the physical-chemical world of land, water, clouds, rain, wind, and the plant and animal kingdom — in short, everything that comes from the hand of nature, inorganic or organic. The cultural environment is the creation of man himself as he has learned how to manage both nature and himself. The English philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) called this the *superorganic* world. Some social scientists have objected to the term superorganic. But, as A. L. Kroeber puts it, this does not mean that culture is “nonorganic,” that it is an entity independent of mankind, or that it operates

¹ E. B. Tylor, *Primitive culture*, 1871, p.1. Reprint of 7th ed. New York: Brentano's, 1924.

² See Bronislaw Malinowski, “Culture,” *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 4: 621–646. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

"outside the laws of matter and energy."³ The point is that it is a composite product of mankind which may, from one angle, be studied as a body of institutions and forms of behavior showing continuity and change without always directly relating it to society or particular individuals. (See below on participation in culture.)

Yet, viewed from the standpoint of interaction of individuals and groups, culture is a psychological product which is learned and passed on, not by the mechanisms of biological heredity but by human instruction. While such primary associations as the family, play group, and small community have their roots in prehuman species, with man himself the ways of acting and thinking in these primary groups, and in those which derive from these, are largely culturally acquired.

Some basic factors in culture. For the purposes of this book we may note the following features of culture: (1) It arises out of *society*, especially as the actions of its members are affected (2) by their fundamental *needs* for sustenance, sexual activity, shelter, companionship, social order and control, and those related desires having to do with play and artistic, religious, and philosophic thought and expression. Furthermore, these ways of thinking and doing become (3) more or less *formalized* and *integrated* into accepted and expected patterns which (4) are *transmitted* both consciously and unconsciously from person to person and from group to group. This, in turn, (5) gives culture its *continuity*. In regard to its historical growth we must note, too, that culture tends to be *cumulative* and yet (7) *variable* in form and content despite the uniformities related to biosocial needs. Finally, (8) it is more or less constantly in a state of flux or *change*. In this chapter we shall deal descriptively with the form and content of culture. Cultural variability will be discussed in chapter 4. Later other aspects will be presented.

Some confusion of terms. To avoid misunderstanding we must clarify certain concepts used in discussing culture. First, what is the relation of culture to civilization? As a general term, culture refers to that mass of man's learned thought and behavior which lies outside those products of social conditioning which we call personal-social. (See chapter 5.) *Civilization*, from the Latin word *civis* (meaning town dweller), implies growing aggregations of people with more complex culture. It is marked by written language, advanced technologies dependent on the use of metals, plow agriculture, complex economic and political systems, varying levels of science, and more or less systematic philosophies. Such cultures developed in pre-Christian times in China, India, Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome of the Old World and in Central America and in Peru in the Americas. Our own Euro-American civilization of today is chiefly an extension of and addition to that of Greece and Rome.

Second, what about the terms primitive, preliterate, nonliterate, and native or aboriginal as applied to societies and their cultures? In general, *primitive* in this context means "not civilized" in the sense indicated above. That is, such cultures lack written language, technologies based on the use of metals, and have relatively simpler economic and political systems. In proper anthropological sense, primitive does not mean inferior racial stock or lack of potential learning ability in such societies, nor the existence of forms of thinking called prelogical or illogical as contrasted with logical thought and action. But men everywhere are both logical and illogical. Nor does primitive mean infantile and childlike as these terms are applied to the young of our own society. Among some writers the term *preliterate* has been substituted for primitive. But, as M. J. Herskovits well contends, the term *nonliterate* is probably even more satisfactory since it does not imply any idea of fixed stages of mental and cultural evolution.⁴

³ See A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology; race, language, culture, psychology, prehistory*, new rev. ed., pp. 253-254. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948.

⁴ M. J. Herskovits, *Man and his works; the science of cultural anthropology*, p. 75. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

Occasionally the terms *native* and *aboriginal* are used as synonyms for primitive, pre-literate, or nonliterate, and when this is clear in the context no serious objection can be made to their use. Yet even these terms may imply some hidden sense of racial superiority on the part of individuals who live under civilization when they apply them to nonliterate peoples.

In the third case, many earlier writers used the terms *savage* and *barbarian* in contrast to civilized. But such terms are no longer in good scientific repute, since they, too, came into use when anthropologists argued that mankind must inevitably pass through certain definite stages of cultural growth. However, some writers, notably Robert Redfield and his students, have worked out a set of distinctions among peoples and their cultures in terms of complexity and content. The most rudimentary in form and content of culture is the *tribal*, *aboriginal*, or *primitive* as illustrated by peoples still living in what the archeologists call the Last Stone Age. The second is called the *folk* or *peasant* society, which is more advanced in culture but which yet retains many of the features of tribal or primitive culture, as Redfield uses the latter term. These peoples make use of metals, engage in economic exchange, and have more complex political organization than the first. Peasant cultures provide a modicum of literacy and often have definite political and economic relations with peoples in the next category. The third category is that of *urban* society and its culture. This is marked today by machine technology, complex economic and political systems, urbanization, and high levels of sophistication.⁵ We shall have occasion

later, in contrasting urban and rural societies and cultures, to examine some of these differences.

Form and Content of Culture

For purposes of description and analysis, culture may be examined in terms of its traits and patterns of certain universal features and of various larger overall systems or organizations of patterns of particular societies as they emerged in history.

Traits and patterns. Some anthropologists break down the larger totalities of culture into small elements or units called *culture traits*. Psychologically these represent single combinations of acts and ideas related to a particular need or situation. For instance, fire-making may be thought of as a culture trait involving the use of certain implements and the necessary skill. With a non-literate man this may be a device of rubbing two dry sticks together over a small pile of tinder. With civilized man it may mean the use of matches or a mechanical lighter. So, too, ways of saluting another person such as a man's lifting his hat to greet a lady, a mode of decoration, or parts of a ritual illustrate single traits.

Yet an analysis of culture by traits is open to the same criticism as is made of trying to understand an individual by listing and correlating sets of personality traits such as tactfulness, honesty, punctuality, and the like. While useful up to a point, such a way of studying either a culture or a person fails to take into account that both culture and person operate as totalities of larger combinations. These we call *patterns*.

A *culture pattern* is an organization of traits or elements into a functioning whole with respect to some situation. Thus, among the Ojibway Indians the cycle of many acts in preserving their beds of wild rice and their methods of harvesting, storing, and preparing the rice for food represents a pattern. Plow agriculture, so important for man's economic advance, consists of the plow itself, the animals or machines which draw it, the type of plant used, how

⁵ See Robert Redfield, "The folk society and culture," in Louis Wirth, ed., *Eleven twenty-six: a decade of social-science research*, pp. 39-50. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. The concept *urban culture* fits the contemporary scene; but if advanced machine technology is made its *sine qua non*, then another term must be found for such societies as those of ancient classic Greece and Rome, which had many urban patterns but lacked the modern factory system. See also Redfield's *The folk culture of Yucatan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.

the seeds are put into the ground, and so on through a wide range of activities. The belief in, and worship of, one god, which we call monotheism, is another complex pattern made up of a wide variety of specific ideas, emotions, and habits. In civilized society the ordering of exchange in what the economists call "the market" represents a somewhat systematic patterning of a wide variety of separate acts.

Various combinations of divergent cultural patterns, in turn, form even larger configurations of culture. Among the North American Indians, patterns of maize culture were tied up with the making and use of pottery. There is no sound reason for this association of habits. Willow or grass baskets might have been used for holding and cooking maize, as some Indian tribes did successfully cook their food in this way. So, too, as L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929), an English philosopher, has shown, wife purchase is connected with certain pastoral patterns while it is not found among the hunting peoples which he studied. In our own society machine production is linked to capitalist ownership, but in Soviet Russia machine production is associated with state ownership. Sometimes these linkages of culture patterns seem to have a certain logical basis in experience, as between impersonal relations fostered by factory labor and specialization, but many of them appear to result from the mere accidents of history.

Universal patterns. Within the wide variations in culture patterns there are certain uniformities as well. These common denominators of thought and action we call the universal patterns of culture. This uniformity we should expect since the basic ends of culture are the same everywhere, that is, to help men to satisfy their wants. Everywhere man as a species has similar needs, goals, capacities for learning, and modes of response. The fundamental ones of these have to do with sustenance, sex, and protection. From these, in turn, learned or derived motives, means, and goals are established, such as those relating to play, art, religion, and folklore.

In actuality the basic impulses are soon overlaid with personal-social and cultural conditioning, so that any sharp distinction between biologically oriented drives and goals and the derived ones tends to disappear. Table 2 presents the most general and universal patterns. Illustration of certain of these within nonliterate (primitive), folk or peasant, and modern, urban, industrialized societies respectively are also indicated.

Since various aspects of these patterns will be discussed in subsequent chapters, we shall not elaborate on the specific topics listed in Table 2. But the Table shows that everywhere man has similar forms of thought and action which are functionally important to his life. Within these very broad categories, however, there are amazing variations both as to priority of their importance and as to content of thought and behavior. (See chapter 4.)

Larger cultural systems. Although all societies except the most rudimentary show practically all the basic features of the universal patterns just noted, the way they are organized and interpreted may differ widely. Anyone who has read history wisely, or studied nonliterate tribes, or traveled outside his native country with some open-mindedness knows, for example, that the British, German, and French patterning of European civilization varies one from another. Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) recognized the differences in larger total-culture systems of the Orient and the Occident when he wrote: "East is East, and West is West," albeit his contention that "never the twain shall meet" may prove to have been a short-run prediction. The student of the North American Indians knows that the Zuni or Hopi have a quite distinctive organization of life in comparison to the Comanche of the Great Plains or the Kwakiutl of the Pacific Northwest. Such differences derive from divergent historical developments, geographic isolation, and a variety of accidental elements of time and place. Which of these takes precedence in producing variability in unknown.

TABLE 2

A. CLASSIFICATION OF UNIVERSAL CULTURE PATTERNS WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM
THREE CULTURAL LEVELS

UNIVERSALS	Illustrations from		
	<i>Nonliterate</i>	<i>Peasant</i>	<i>Industrialized</i>
I. COMMUNICATION			
A. Language: Form and Content	Variety of types of linguistic families — spoken only	Same — both spoken and written	Same — both spoken and written
B. Gestures and Other Forms (See III, B)	(All peoples use art forms as well as expressive gestures as means of communication.)		
II. IMPERATIVES OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP SURVIVAL			
A. Technology and Economic Systems			
1. Tools and methods:			
a. Sustenance	Stone ax; bow and arrow; spear; net; trap; dibble	Plow; hoe; rake	Gang plow; combined harvester and thresher; refrigeration
b. Transportation	Manpower chiefly: pack; boat	Domesticated animals added to manpower; wheeled vehicles, boats	Railroad, automobile, steamship, airplane, machine power; domesticated animal becoming less important
c. Clothing, shelter	Bark, skins, leaves, grass; stone, mud huts; simple weaving	Textiles, leather, handmade; stone, mud, and brick houses	Variety of textiles; leather, etc.; steel, brick, wood, plastic housing
d. Personal health	Herbs; simple care; magic and religion	Herbs; simple medication; magic and religion	Modern medicine and surgery; some magic
2. Economic systems:			
a. Forms of property: real and personal	Ownership varies: individual, kinship, communal	Same	Individual, and/or state
b. Inheritance	Kinship, <i>e.g.</i> , in father's or mother's line; communal	Same	Individual chiefly, but heavy control by the state
c. Forms of exchange	Simple barter	Barter and some use of market	The market, using money and credit systems
B. Family Patterns			
1. Family forms	Chiefly monogamy; maybe polygyny or polyandry	Same	Chiefly monogamy
2. Courtship and marriage	Wide variation; simple regulations, as rule	Same; state and/or church may control	Wide variation; state and/or church control
3. Child training	Wide variation	Same	Same
4. Dissolution	Wide variation	Same	Same

TABLE 2 (continued)

UNIVERSALS	<i>Nonliterate</i>	<i>Peasant</i>	<i>Industrialized</i>
C. Social Control			
1. Mores	Wide variation	Same	Same
2. Conventions, public opinion	Some, but less than in modern society	Same	Increasingly important as mores break down
3. Political order:			
a. Legislation	Simple councils or group decisions	Simple councils, some relation to larger government	Single, dual, or multiple party systems
b. Administration	Absent or most rudimentary	Most rudimentary; tax collector, police	Complex and varied
c. Legal system	Absent in many, yet found in some	Rests on local and outside government	Complex, and increasingly important
d. International relations	Absent	Only as part of larger political order	Increasingly important
i. Treaties	Absent	Only where political order existed	Widespread
ii. War	Rudimentary	Same	Highly organized
D. Transmission Systems			
1. Education:			
a. Formal	Very little; some through family or tribe	Little; family, some by church or state	Highly organized, chiefly by state
b. Informal	Chiefly family, kinship, and tribe	Family, community, and other primary groups	Family and other primary groups; also secondary groups
2. Other means: folklore, art, religion, ritual	(Used by all peoples, in varying amounts, as means of transmitting certain phases of the culture)		
III. DERIVED IMPERATIVES			
A. Play and Leisure	Variations in nature and amount of formalized play	Same	Stress on both formal and informal; mass recreation — commercial and noncommercial
B. Esthetics			
1. Graphic and plastic	Wide variation	Same	Highly developed
2. Drama, music, dance	Wide variation	Same	Highly developed
3. Folklore and other literature	Wide variation (oral)	Same (oral and maybe written)	Highly developed (oral and written)
C. Religion and Magic			
1. Forms of belief	"Good" and "evil" spirits or forces; no "high gods"	Same; occasional mixture of advanced culture elements	Formal theology and creed; "high gods"
2. Rituals and practices	Variation in kind and amount	Same	Variation, but often highly organized

TABLE 2 (continued)

UNIVERSALS	<i>Nonliterate</i>	<i>Peasant</i>	<i>Industrialized</i>
D. Mythology and Philosophy	Simple	Same	Systematic and complex
E. Science (in civilization only; rudiments found in technology of simpler societies)			

IV. STRUCTURED INTERACTIONAL PROCESSES

A. Opposition

1. Conflict	Variation	Same	Variation, but highly developed
2. Competition	Variation	Same	Variation, but highly developed

B. Differentiation

1. Age: role and status	Wide variation	Same	Same
2. Sex: role and status	Some variation	Same	Same, trend to more equality in some
3. Occupational	Relatively simple	Same	Highly specialized

C. Stratification

1. Forms of class	Some variation	Same	Wide variation
2. Forms of caste	Absent in many	Same	Absent for most part

D. Accommodation

1. Coercive	Variation	Same	Same
2. Compromise, etc.	Variation	Same	Same

E. Assimilation (Limited by frequency and nature of contact of culture groups when and where synthesis of different societies and cultures takes place)

Those patterns of culture of a particular society which most distinguish it from other societies we call the *ethos* or national character. William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), a pioneer American social scientist, defined ethos as "the totality of characteristic traits by which a group [*i.e.*, a society] is individualized and differentiated from others." Thus, Sparta and Athens, Judea, India, China, and industrialized, capitalistic western Europe or the United States represent distinctive patterns and values. Moreover, as Sumner says, "The ethos of one group furnishes the standpoint from which it criticizes the ways of any other group."⁶ Accompanying its tremendous industrial and populational growth from

1870 to 1930, American culture became dominated by a number of characteristic features, among them the following: (1) belief in individual material success and general national progress; (2) an amazing faith in universal literacy and education to solve our social and personal problems; (3) belief in the virtue of sheer size or bigness, witnessed in our eternal building of ever-larger skyscrapers, larger industrial plants, bigger corporations, and larger school plants; (4) rapid movement through space, seen in increased mobility of our population and enhanced means of communication and transportation; (5) novelty or constant change to something new and more exciting, as in sensational news, exciting drama, speed racing, crazes, and fads; and (6) sense of power or the craving for

⁶ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 70, 73. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1907.

domination, especially in terms of physical bigness — the booster and the “bigger and better” spirit in almost every important feature of our public life.

Since 1930, in the face of economic depressions and changes in population growth and in the face of international events, some of these elements have undergone alteration. For example, there has emerged a growing belief and practice that the state has the responsibility to provide the means of economic security for masses in the face of serious illness, old age, dependency, or prolonged unemployment. And participation in two world wars has given the citizens of the United States a new view of their potential and actual role in world affairs. The former political isolationism has gradually been abated.

In contrast to this, in the Orient, at least before Western civilization and its values reached there in the 19th century, quite different patterns controlled men's thinking and acting. There was no belief in progress in our sense. Mere physical size had no special merit. Certainly no virtue inhered in rapid movement. Rather, calm deliberation or mental rumination of the scholar was the height of man's desires. In India, among large numbers of the population, instead of desire for personal material success and continued identification of the self with individual striving, the fundamental desire expressed in religious form was desirelessness, a forgetting of self, the elimination of the wish to be somebody or something.

When two such contrasting cultures come into contact with each other, conflict is very likely to ensue if one group tries to impose its will upon the other. This, aggressive Western peoples have tried to do in Asia and have partially succeeded, only now to be confronted, in the words of the Arabian proverb, with their own chickens coming home to roost. The Orient has awakened under the stimulation of new culture patterns and, in time, may try to crush the Western powers who first dared to push a new ethos upon an old one.⁷

⁷ The interest in contrasting cultures and their ethos has led to attempts to derive certain principles

The ethos of any great body of people, therefore, becomes a clue to many matters of importance to sociology and the social sciences, especially those concerned with cultural change. The ethos is the heart of any culture; and in our contact with other societies, as in our analysis of our own or other cultures, we must adopt a relative and not an absolute view. Otherwise we shall never come to grips with the problems of a World Society, which lie about us on every hand.

Subcultures, differentials, and participation. So far we have dealt with culture more or less as standard descriptive units either as separate patterns or as universals. We have also noted that the topic may be approached in terms of total-culture systems. When we study the place of culture in the life of the individual or of a group of individuals, it is clear that there are wide ranges of participation. Where there are relatively simple culture patterns, one person might take part in practically all of the culture, or at least know about it. But even in simpler societies, differences in thought and conduct are linked to age, sex, and occupational differences. In a complex industrialized society it is quite impossible for one person to participate actively in all the many phases of the culture. One person cannot even read or otherwise learn about the *whole* culture except in a most superficial manner.

The way in which the cultural acceptances and expectations play upon the individual will vary in terms of the demands of

of change to aid in accounting for such variations. Among the most important of these, in recent times, are: Oswald Spengler, *Decline of the West*, 2 vols., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928; P. A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, 4 vols., New York: American Book Company, 1937-1941; D. C. Somervell, *A study of history*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947 (an abridgment of the work of Arnold J. Toynbee); and F. C. Northrop, *The meeting of East and West*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. Two American anthropologists have also attempted some generalizations about cultural systems. See Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934; and A. L. Kroeber, *Configurations of culture growths*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944.

the total-culture system. In discussing the nature of such demands on the individual, Ralph Linton notes three levels of expectancies: universals, alternatives, and specialties.⁸ *Universals* refer to those core features of culture which are generally and widely accepted and required by a society, such as the codes and practices of the governmental, economic, and religious systems. *Alternatives* are those types of activities in which the individuals concerned have certain choices or where there exist certain permissive rights. For instance, while the universals in our country demand a legalized marriage under the law, whether a couple is married by a priest, minister, or a justice of the peace is a matter of their choice or that of their social class. *Specialties* are the particular features of some given role or occupation. The physician has not only a special knowledge and skill but also a vocabulary and a value-system that set his profession apart from others.

The organization of these cultural demands will vary with groupings as related to locality, age, sex, occupation, class, and other forms of human association. From the angle of the total-culture system we may designate such more particular configurations as *subcultures*. For example, everywhere the roles and statuses of women differ from the roles and statuses of men. Certainly children do not and cannot participate in a culture to the same extent as do

adults. When we speak of the distinctions between classes or castes, we do so really in terms of the features of each as a subculture. Rural-urban contrasts rest on a similar base of subcultures.

Yet even the fact of subcultures does not mean that the individual is completely at the mercy of the larger culture system or of the part-cultures within it. It would be a fatal error of judgment to assume that "personality is the subjective aspect of culture," as some have done.⁹ So completely to identify the individual with his culture is to neglect the effects of biologically inherited differences in original drives or impulses, in mental and emotional capacity, and in the influences of personal-social conditioning. The person is not a mere sponge which absorbs something called culture. Rather, he is a selective agent who participates in the cultural world in his own way. Some phases of this "way" will be highly similar to the ways of those around him. Other aspects of his participation will be marked by a high degree of uniqueness and autonomy. In brief, the personality is the product of one's organic make-up and his variability in emotions, learning ability, and drives as these operate within the framework of both personal-social and cultural conditioning. Some implications of personal variation will be clear as we turn to explore more closely what is meant by variability of culture.

⁸ See Ralph Linton, *The study of man*, pp. 272-274. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936.

⁹ See Ellsworth Faris, *The nature of human nature*, chapter 3. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937.

Interpretative Summary

1. Culture is a precipitate of human society. It arose, and is largely continued, because it satisfies man's basic and acquired needs. Its invention and continuity rest on man's superior brain in comparison to lower forms of animal life, which do not have culture though they may have society.
2. The two crucial features of human culture are language, and tool-making and tool-using.
3. Culture is transmitted from generation to generation and from group to group, usually growing or cumulating through time.
4. Culture may be described and analyzed in terms of units or traits, patterns, or larger features such as universals and total-culture systems.

5. Within any large social-cultural system there are subcultures, that is, configurations of patterns which pertain to groups within the larger social-cultural matrix.
6. The individual's participation in culture is usually partial and selective; at least, this tends to be so in all but the simplest societies.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define culture, culture trait, culture pattern, culture system, ethos.
2. Distinguish between material and nonmaterial traits. Is this a sound distinction?
3. Upon what grounds does Malinowski posit his idea of "basic" cultural imperatives?
4. List the distinguishing features of (a) *nonliterate*, (b) *folk*, and (c) *urban* cultures respectively.
5. What new elements are entering into American life today which may in time alter our ethos?
6. What is meant by differential participation in culture? Illustrate.
7. Discuss pro and con the statement that "personality is the subjective aspect of culture."

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Franz Boas, *Anthropology and modern life*, new rev. ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1932.

One of America's most distinguished anthropologists critically examines present-day culture.

John Gillin, *The ways of men: an introduction to anthropology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948.

A general introduction to anthropology representing an effort to examine the dynamic features of culture in terms of behavioristic learning theory.

Alexander Goldenweiser, *Anthropology: an introduction to primitive culture*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1937.

Gives a wide coverage of the field, much concrete material, and has a good theoretical orientation.

Clyde Kluckhohn, *Mirror for man; the relation of anthropology to modern life*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1949.

Written for the layman, this book provides some stimulating comments on present-day culture. There are ample comparisons with other cultures too.

Variability of Culture

THE CONCEPT of universals in culture, discussed in chapter 3, is a scientific construct or abstraction drawn from the more obvious facts of wide variation in the culture of particular tribes and people. No one knows the story of the origins of culture, although some inferences have been drawn from rather scanty physical remains. Yet most anthropologists believe that culture began with the human or humanlike race or races of about a million years ago. (See chapter 11.) In any case there must have been a modicum of uniformity in these crude beginnings since the basic elements in all culture derive from man's need for food and liquid, protection, and reproduction as these are implemented by universal mechanisms of adjustment (learning). Assuming some such uniform drives and mentality in the species *homo sapiens* at the outset, we are confronted with the many variations in the particulars of culture.

No satisfactory reason has yet been given for these differences, but among other highly probable and plausible "causes" may be noted the following: (1) Geographic conditions provided as well as limited many phases of food-getting, shelter, clothes, and technologies associated with the material culture. Eskimos do not build frame houses or hunt tigers. Nor do Malaysians put up igloos or know anything about hunting seals. (2) Long geographic isolation of societies surely must have had effects on language and growth of other cultural elements. (3) Variations in the rate and kind of inventions would make for differentials in culture form and content. (4) Contacts of people through barter, trade, war, or peaceful infiltration would serve to stimulate cultural growth, both as to likenesses and as to differences. (5) Leadership is important, and the size of the group would

influence the range of individual differences in intellectual potentials. A society of one million people is, on the theory of chance, going to produce more potential geniuses or first-rate minds than a tribe of one thousand. Leadership, both in invention and in the management of men and institutions, is partly a matter of sheer number of first-rate people available, regardless of the absolute size of the population. If we assume 10 per cent of any population, large or small, to represent the number of potential leaders, the latter group would have but 100 at best; the former, 100,000. Furthermore, a biological factor might enter in. Unless rigidly limited by a caste or class system or other institutional barriers to free mating, interbreeding in a large population increases the range of variation in characteristics, including native intelligence, in contrast to the situation in a small population. Over long periods of time such biological factors might play a part in the relative production of high-grade men, fit for leadership.

(6) Then, too, we cannot neglect the place of what may be called "accident" in history. Changes in climate, resources, cataclysms of nature — such as earthquake, flood, or fire — or loss of a war, or attainment of a victory, and any number of other humanly unpredictable events may give a turn to culture the effects of which remain to induce subsequent modifications.

Cultural variability with its attendant differences in value systems and total life organization of individuals may be illustrated from both nonliterate and civilized peoples. With regard to the former we shall describe three contrasting tribes. With regard to the latter, rather than try to offer contrasts in so-called national character of sample societies, an attempt will be made, in summary

form, to present the modal contrasts of the authoritarian and the democratic culture system of the present.

Variations Among Nonliterate Peoples

For purposes of contrast, we have selected one of the Arapesh groups of New Guinea; the Zuni, a pueblo-dwelling tribe of the American Southwest; and the Kwakiutl, an Indian tribe of the Pacific Northwest. The first represents a culture of mixed individualism and co-operation, the second a highly organized co-operative society, and the third a society where intense personal competition dominates the social-cultural life.

The Mountain Arapesh. The Arapesh, a Papuan-speaking people, are divided into three loosely organized groups: the Beach, the Plains, and the Mountain tribes. We are concerned with the last. There is no formalized tribal organization; and though they do not designate themselves by a special name, they do form a society of their own, distinct from those Arapesh who live by the sea or on the leveler land which lies between the mountains and the ocean.

The basic value of the Mountain Arapesh centers around personal growth and sustenance, with particular reference to the rising generation. Individualism in the highly self-centered form known to us is foreign to this people. On the other hand, whatever co-operation they practice, though extensive, is largely an informal sort. Certainly there are no elaborate institutions of co-operation such as are found among the Zuni. (See below.)

The community is made up of families who live in small hamlets whose chief relations center around marriage, feasting, and occasional mild clashes at arms with other hamlets. This warfare is set off by the seduction of a man's wife (with her consent) by a man from another hamlet. Much of it takes the form of a ceremonial game of exchange of insults. But there is some fighting, and occasionally a few lives are lost. Peace is restored by means

of interhamlet feasts at which former enemies become friends again. Such conflict is generally regarded with distaste.¹

There is no political organization in the sense of tribal chieftain, hierarchy of communal controls, and more or less elaborate rules. Their mores are not complex. There are, however, interhamlet contacts, chiefly those relating to marriage, organized feasts, and the occasional "fighting" just noted.

The economic life centers around gardening, raising pigs, and hunting. The land is in the hands of the patrilineal families or small localized clans. There is no individual ownership of land. In fact, the Arapesh think of themselves as belonging to the land and not the land to them. They consider themselves guardians of this property which they till in order to rear their children and thus provide group continuity. In actual practice a man may operate parcels of garden or orchard scattered over considerable territory. He works these in informal co-operation with his relatives and close friends. But these groupings seldom persist. Margaret Mead thus describes the method of land use:

"Each man plants not one garden, but several, each one in co-operation with a different group of his relatives. In one of these gardens he is host, in the others he is guest. In each of these gardens three to six men, with one or two wives each, and sometimes a grown daughter or so, work together, fence together, clear together, weed together, harvest together, and while engaged in any large piece of work, sleep together crowded up in the little inadequate shelter, with the rain dripping down the necks of more than half of the sleepers. . . .

"The men spend over nine tenths of their time responding to other people's plans, digging in other people's gardens, going on hunting parties initiated by others. The whole emphasis of their economic lives is that of participation in activities others have initiated, and only rarely and shyly does anyone tentatively suggest a plan of his own."²

¹ See Reo F. Fortune, "Arapesh warfare," *American Anthropologist*, 1939, 41: 22-41. The author notes that on the basis of his evidence Margaret Mead's contention that "warfare is practically unknown among the Arapesh" must be rejected.

² From *Sex and temperament*, pp. 19, 22 (*From the South Seas*), by Margaret Mead, copyright 1935 by Margaret Mead, by permission of William Morrow & Co., New York.

In short, not only is there a strong pattern of mutual aid but there is little or no sense of possessiveness such as we find in our own society. "The distinction between 'mine' and 'thine' is not the point emphasized, but rather the need to be careful of other people's things."³

The tools and household implements of the Arapesh are simple; their houses rather crude structures. They possess little or no artistic handicrafts though they do make mats, baskets, belts, and like objects.

Their religious life centers around belief in a world of ancestral ghosts who are in close touch with mundane events. In fact, the concern of the parents with growth and survival of the next generation is bound up with their idea of a certain continuity of the living and the dead. There are no gods in the sense of more advanced peoples; but there are special supernatural beings such as the *marsalai*, who appear in the form of a colored snake or lizard and occasionally as another animal. The ancestral ghosts are themselves linked to the *marsalai*, who take a hand in disciplining infractions of the codes which involve matters of sexual behavior, care of ancestral lands, and other proper group values. There is occasional use of sorcery, a practice borrowed from other tribes. A sorcerer from outside may be hired to make magic against an opponent.

The family is organized along patrilineal lines, that is, descent is reckoned in the male line. Marriages are chiefly monogamous, though polygyny is permitted. The relations of the culture to the personality are well brought out in the whole conduct of the parents with reference to their offspring. Both parents are considered to be biologically and socially responsible for the child's birth and upbringing. There are severe taboos on sexual relations during both pregnancy and the first year after the birth of a baby. The parents and relatives watch over and direct the child in a warm, friendly way, but there is little formalized infant training. Girls are early taught certain tasks. Boys are left pretty much to themselves. They go about with the father or relatives at work or in hunting, but their training in skills or work habits is informal and slight. On the whole, children grow up without any sense of possessiveness, with little stress on individuality and personal ambition such as we find in our own society.

During his training the child is permitted considerable latitude in emotional expression so long as it does no injury to others. Temper tantrums and other negative reactions follow on teasing and ridicule. Parental disapproval of fighting among the children is rebuked, however, on the grounds that one should not injure one's kinfolk. The child's early training is marked by warmth, congeniality, and strong sense of emotional security derived from others. There is early instruction to fear and avoid any situation which would make a rift in his friendly contacts with his fellows.

This does not mean that there is no hostility or aggression but rather that it is not prominent, nor is it highly institutionalized in our sense. There is some mild rivalry, but the role of "big man" or leader with reference to certain festivals and like community events is not looked upon as particularly desirable. In fact, those destined to become leaders have to undergo specialized training designed to bring out in them qualities of initiative and aggression. But even they look forward to the day when old age will allow them to give up their positions. There is only a mild amount of in-group *vs.* out-group struggle between hamlets or with reference to other tribes.

While the Mountain Arapesh lack our culturalized aggression, they also lack our good sportsmanship. They are poor losers in any struggle to which they are exposed, and it would be a mistake to think that they lack hostile impulses entirely. However, in contrast to many nonliterate and civilized peoples, individuals in this society do not possess a sense of self-importance and of self-reliance. Among the Arapesh a member easily develops an anxiety that he may lose the warm dependency of his family, relatives, and friends. It may well be that psychologically their lack of aggression, lack of sense of self-importance, and potential anxiety are all bound up together. Self-assurance and absence of anxiety may well be some of the benefits the person derives from his aggressiveness in other societies. The basic inner sanction is sense of shame and fear of loss of love and of health. These are thought of as penalties for hostility toward others.

The Zuni. The Zuni are one of several pueblo-dwelling tribes of the southwestern United States. The tribe consists of thirteen matrilineal clans, but the clan has only

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

slight political or religious purpose. Descent is counted in the maternal line, and women have an important place in the economic and household organization. Zuni life centers around co-operation and a rich ceremonial religion.

This people's chief sources of production and wealth are agriculture and sheep. The land is poor and the rainfall sparse. The economic life is organized around co-operation. Land is held by the tribe, but those areas cultivated by any family are considered to be under its control. The work is done in common by the men of the household, and the produce is turned over to the women. The main crops are wheat, corn, alfalfa, melons, beans, and other garden truck. Not only does co-operation control the family unit, but the existence of the whole tribe is bound up with a willingness to give mutual aid. Competition among individuals in our sense has no tribal sanction.

Sheep raising has been introduced since the white man's arrival. The flocks are owned by individual men, but the herding and other work are performed in common, and the wool, lambs, and mutton are shared by the family and the community.⁴

The handicrafts, especially pottery making, are in the hands of the women. And with respect to both sheep and pottery, trade with outsiders is becoming more and more an important item in Zuni economy. The former self-sufficiency is gradually disappearing.

While the household is the central operating unit, relatives and friends join in various agricultural and sheep-raising endeavors; and the food for all those participating is furnished by the hosts, who benefit from the aid of others. In fact, various seasonal feasts provide a form of distribution of food with reference to planting, harvesting, grinding corn, and so on. But the individual attains no personal prestige from such activities.

The family life revolves around matrilineal descent and maternal control of the household. The husband has little to say except to provide the economic necessities. The children are controlled and trained by the mother and her brothers. Their father is in

many ways a stranger to them. He, in his turn, will be occupied with training his sister's children. Individual authority and responsibility, however, are largely absent in the household. Aside from necessitous duties, the men spend much of their time in work outside the house or in connection with the religious activities.

Marriages are easily arranged and easily dissolved. They usually depend on personal sentimental choice, and property considerations play little part. There are more men than women in Zuni, and women are not dependent on men for livelihood. The men as a rule do the courting and, if a girl consents to marriage, there follow certain rituals of grinding corn, eating, and exchange of gifts which consummate the marriage. The man takes up residence in the wife's household. If a marriage is not successful, a wife may divorce her husband by simply placing the man's few personal belongings outside the entrance to the house. This serves as a public announcement that she is through with him.

In addition to the system of matrilineal kinship, maternal control of the household, and economic co-operation, much of the community life revolves around religion. There are a powerful priesthood and a wide variety of religious cults. The basic cult is related to the ancestral group. But there are also other major societies, including the cults of the sun, the rain makers, the katchinas, the medicine cults, and the bow priesthood. The head of the sun cult is the most powerful of the priests and is responsible for the welfare of the community. The rain-making ceremonials are important for economic survival. The katchinas are mythical people living at the bottom of a lake who come annually to Zuni to dance. Every adult male, as well as a few women, belongs to the katchina society. The chief priest of the katchinas has great prestige. He embodies the characteristics of beauty, dignity, and kindness — three basic virtues of this people. The medicine cults, to which both men and women belong, are the most dangerous and violent. The members have to do with disease and its cure. If one is ill, he must join; or if one has been cured by a medicine man, he is obliged to join. The bow society deals with war and with the overt executive needs of the community. In earlier times, when the Zuni occasionally indulged in warfare, the bow priests were leaders in the battles. Now the cult serves as a protection

⁴ It is interesting to note that the trend is toward more and more individualism with respect to ownership and use of the profits from sheep raising. This itself reflects the diffusion of the white man's economic ideas and practices to the native population.

against the revenge of the ghost of an enemy who has been killed.

While the priests must perform the extensive ritualistic formulas, the ceremonies are carried on collectively and for the good of the entire community. Within this larger framework individuals may make use of their own dances, prayers, and sacred formulas. Also, in some public ceremonies there are foot races. Some of these are purely ritualistic, and no winners are announced. But one race — the 25-mile stick-kicking contest — is highly exciting. Wagers are made, and public interest runs high. Sides are chosen, with from two to six runners on a side, and the contest is on. Yet when one side has won, though the bets are paid, no great prestige accrues to the man who kicked the stick over the goal line. In fact, a man who consistently wins is prevented from participating in future contests, so that others may have a chance.

The general community controls take the form of gossip, especially effective with reference to extra-marital affairs. The chief power device is shame and ridicule. There is no black magic, and suicide is unknown. The deviant is the person who is overly aggressive and selfish. Occasionally open aggression will lead to public punishment of a severe sort.

The training of the individual reflects these basic values. The child is not punished but is allowed much freedom during his early years. There is some anxiety among the children regarding the supernatural world. And while they later find out that the *kacinas* are really their relatives and friends dressed for a ceremonial occasion, there is probably a residue-effect of this early fear. With the boy especially, the emphasis is put upon his reaching maturity at an early age. He is soon given economic responsibilities and begins to be initiated into various secret societies. Between the ages of five and nine the boy becomes a member of one of the *kacina* groups, and at puberty he is taken into the adult societies. The girls are given less attention; they remain with their mothers and learn the arts of household management. Only later do they get into various societies; and at marriage, of course, they take over their own responsibilities of household management.

In Zuni, then, the individual is submerged in an intricate and closely knit system of obligations to his fellows: in the family, in the economic order, and espe-

cially in a wide range of cults. The stress is on a quiescent and co-operative mode of life. Rivalry and other oppositional impulses are channelized through quarreling — chiefly within the household — through gossip, and in such mild institutional forms as foot racing and betting. The individualism so stressed in Euro-American culture is unknown among the Zuni and other Pueblo tribes of our Southwest.

The Kwakiutl. The culture of the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island stands in sharp contrast to that of the Mountain Arapesh and that of the Zuni. The outstanding features of this society and its culture are the high valuation put upon rank or caste and the almost insatiable ambition of the chieftains for personal glory. This motive is expressed in the strong hostility pattern of much of the life among this people.

The Kwakiutl consist of a series of tribes, divided into bilateral families. These are ordered in terms of two more or less fixed castes: the nobility and the commoners. Earlier there were slaves, taken in war, but their role in the social structure was slight. The nobles are themselves divided into a graded series of rank. The aristocratic status is dependent upon the possession of titles and crests. However, prestige is not fixed merely by birth or the number of titles and crests but must be constantly revalidated and reaffirmed by the institution of the potlatch. In order to understand this central theme, we must examine briefly the familial, economic, political, and religious folkways of this people as they existed in the past.

The family lines, or *numaym*, claimed descent from a mythical ancestor, and each *numaym* possessed certain titles and privileges as well as particular traditions and myths. The nobility consisted of the first-born sons and daughters, the commoners of the younger siblings. One might inherit titles from either paternal or maternal ancestry. At the head of each *numaym* was a chief with certain limited political power. Each *numaym* had its own village, and the houses were large and roomy, sufficient for four related families — one for each corner — the arrangement itself reflecting the ranking.

Certain lands, fishing rights, and households were owned by the numaym; other like property was held by the whole tribe. The larger family-kinship group co-operated in the accumulation of food, shelter, and property generally, but each separate family prepared its food and managed its own household affairs. But the numaym as a unit was concerned with the competition for prestige of their own noble chieftains. Marriage itself was viewed as a phase of the struggle for prestige. A man always made an effort to marry a woman of as high a status as possible.

The economic life of this tribe also revealed the intense competitive spirit. The region was rich in natural resources; it abounded in fish and game; there were quantities of berry patches; and the great cedar and pine forests provided materials for houses, canoes, tools, and implements. The material culture was well advanced. The organization of fishing, hunting, and berry picking was individualistic, but half the catch or picking was turned over to the head of the numaym, who was to provide for any persons in his family line who might be in need during the winter months.

The potlatch was the central interest of Kwakiutl life. It consisted of an elaborate exchange of property among rival chiefs. There was a constant effort among the nobles to outdo each other in the gifts which they presented to each other. The one who could give away the most property to his rival was considered the top man for the nonce. The members of the nobleman's own family, of course, participated vicariously in whatever glory their headsman obtained. They also co-operated in accumulating property with which to defeat a rival. The gifts consisted of blankets, boxes, canoes, and copper monies. The latter were large plates of hammered and etched copper. The standard of value was the blanket; one copper, however, would represent a great many blankets since its value at a given transaction was determined by the amount paid for it when it was last sold. Each rival made a point of paying a higher price than the previous buyer; hence a copper would increase in value as it passed from rival to rival. The recipients were obliged to accept such gifts and be prepared to repay the value received at the end of the year by return gifts at 100-per-cent interest. Should a man fail to repay with such interest, he lost his prestige; he was said to be "flattened" by his rival. The victor, in contrast, thereby rose in status.

This exchange system might go on for some time until a grand potlatch was arranged, at which time two rival noblemen, perhaps from different tribes, came together with their supporters and their property. A great feast was prepared, and the chief who gave the festival then proceeded to demonstrate his superiority to his rival and to all and sundry gathered there. There were long and insulting speeches. And exchanges in the form of offers to purchase were made by each rival. The bidding for coppers would continue until finally one or the other took possession. The purchase of a valuable copper not only added prestige to the individual and his family name but represented an important economic investment because at the next sale it would bring an even higher price.

In the most elaborate festival of all, the exchanges were discontinued and the would-be superior chieftain would throw his coppers, blankets, boxes, and other valuables into the fire lighted in honor of the occasion. This was the greatest demonstration of superiority which one nobleman could show to another.

Not only was the economic life organized around such exchanges but, as noted above, marriage was also a struggle for prestige. It was a device to secure titles from the wife's family line. The prospective son-in-law would overwhelm his prospective father-in-law with gifts which constituted in effect a bride price. On the birth of the first child the father-in-law must repay this gift by names and crests. After the birth of two or more children the father-in-law would have paid back all, at about 300-per-cent interest. Now the potlatch was considered returned, and the marriage was thereby annulled. The daughter might or might not remain with her husband, and a new cycle then ensue. Rather than have the wife return to her family, the husband would now begin another series of like gifts. If there were four such cycles, a wife would attain real greatness, and the marriage would be considered final. Usually such father-in-law and son-in-law exchanges served to enhance the prestige of each in turn. In some instances there arose open conflict, and a failure to make exchanges would result in divorce, the wife being sent back to her own numaym.

Not only through the potlatch and through marriage could a man enhance his status. If he murdered another, he took over the victim's prerogatives, titles, and dances. But the right to use the victim's privileges must always

be validated by property exchanges. Moreover, the victim was usually avenged by his own numaym, and a system of family feuding would arise. In the past, open warfare sometimes broke out around the motive to gain more names and crests. After the white man took over control, of course, homicide and open warfare were suppressed.

The Kwakiutl divided the year into two grand divisions: the secular period of six months and the sacred, or religious, period of six months. The property potlatching was confined to the secular, and the social organization revolved around economic and marital endeavors. But the pattern of gifts and the struggle for status went on during the religious half of the year also. In this case the religious-magical powers were the media of the struggle and the basis of social organization. A series of religious societies served as the framework in which the rivalry took place. There were two castes: the seals or nobles, and the *quequutsa* or lower rank. The latter were those who had not been initiated into the seals. Ceremonial dances, like coppers, were owned by individuals and were used at the religious festivals in order to gain the wanted prestige. These dances were passed down the family lines much as were the titles and crests. In common with a widespread feature of North American Indian life, each individual obtained his religious power directly from contact with a guardian spirit. But among the Kwakiutl the contact simply served as a validation for the ceremonial dance inherited from the family.

During the religious ceremonies there developed intense emotionalism and even frenzy. The initiation ceremonies were particularly violent. While all the members of the respective religious castes or classes might take part in these ceremonials, the aim was not collective security and well-being, as dances are with the Zuni, but only individual prestige and power.

In addition to dances a man might enhance his power by becoming a magic-worker or shaman and take to curing others of disease. But the ill person was quite secondary to the bitter rivalry of shamans for prestige. Sometimes there was a marching of powers over a patient. The main aim was to heap ridicule upon each other in order to rise in status. Sometimes this opposition became so intense that a group of shamans would combine to kill another. The cures were paid for, and the

shaman in turn used this method to secure property to be used, like that of a secular chief, in potlatches to further demonstrate his prowess and high rank.

To summarize: Among the Kwakiutl the training of the individual revolved almost entirely around a central theme of competition. Property was highly valued, but only as a means to status. The nobles and shamans, in particular, had what we would consider a mania for high prestige. Psychologically there was a pressing sense of insecurity and shame whenever one was defeated. The main value for the growing boy or girl was the stress on individual attainment of prestige, and in this struggle the child had the help of his family and friends. The chief aim, however, was personal success and glory, and everything the noble or shaman did was subordinated to this aim. The constantly recurring anxiety for power was the central motive. Failure led to shame and in extreme instances to suicide. While the commoners were not as fully caught up in this system as were the aristocracy, nevertheless they got considerable vicarious response from the success or failure of their own chiefs.

Comparisons: likeness and difference.

These three accounts, which have necessarily omitted many details, present a picture of certain rather striking diversities. In terms of our values the Mountain Arapesh represent a combination of mild individualism and informal co-operation. The aim of the parents is to provide a sound economic base upon which their children may build for the parents' old age and the children's own future in due course. There is a lack of self-assertiveness; personal achievement is directed toward care and protection of others, especially the next generation. There are warm kinship ties with others and, to a less extent, with members of the community. The major external sanctions are the threat of withdrawal of help and affection, and the use of sorcery from sources outside the group. The chief internal (subjective) sanction is a faith in an ordered universe which does not even accept the fact of

death. There is a strong sense of guilt and anxiety over loss of love or health, both considered evidences of a penalty for aggressiveness toward others. Children are cherished and considered as the center of life but are not hurried into maturity.

Among the Zuni, too, there is only mild self-assertiveness as we know it. The individual's security is found in close and co-operative relations with others tempered by sense of shame. There is little place for personal pride or personal ambition. Real property has no important place, but achievement is in terms of selfless participation in an intricate social order. Shame is the chief external sanction, and fear of being shamed the principal internal control. There is no suicide. Children are pressed toward adulthood and full participation. Hostility finds an outlet through gossip, quarreling, and some foot racing and wagering, but there is no strong and ever-present stimulus for personal aggression.

The Kwakiutl stand in sharp contrast to both these societies. There the emphasis is on aggression directed to building a strong self-assertiveness. The whole life centers around the struggle for high status, and every aspect of life is concerned with surpassing one's rival. Property is highly valued, its use and dissipation giving evidence of superiority. The external sanction is principally shame for failure to surpass one's rival. Suicide from angry shame is accepted as normal. Fear of shame and of loss of position are the internal controls. Children are pushed toward adulthood amid great stress to compete for high status. Religion consists of a belief in a series of powers which man uses in his game to secure high rank.

Each of these tribes shows how the major elements of culture, food, shelter, sex and reproduction, and social control, as well as secondary items such as religion, art, play, and philosophy may differ as to content and acquired aim. While the basic imperatives are everywhere present, and while the major secondary aspects of culture are also at hand in each, the particular meaning and direction of the total culture differ. In one

instance there are individualism and mild co-operation, in another there are strong co-operation and neglect of what we consider normal individuality and personal effort. In still a third, what we would consider extreme individualism is the very essence of the tribal life. In short, diversity of culture is possible, so long as the major biological and social imperatives are cared for: food, shelter, reproduction, and social control.

With these examples of deviations in culture among nonliterate peoples at hand, let us turn to examine certain contrasts in civilized life, where cultural variability is also to be found.

Cultural Variability Under Civilization

In spite of the uniformities induced by machine technology, science, and worldwide systems of communication, and in spite of the emergence of mass society as an accompaniment of industrialization and urbanism, there remain striking differences among civilized societies.⁵ The very complexity of the modern world makes for differences as well as for likenesses. This is a fact which naive persons looking for, or soon expecting, a peaceful and unified world often overlook.

In the subsequent discussions of aspects of present-day institutions, processes, and

⁵ There is a growing literature in this field. For Germany see Erich Fromm, *Escape from freedom*, New York: Rinehart & Co., 1941; E. H. Erikson, "Hitler's imagery and German youth," *Psychiatry*, 1942, 5: 75-93 (reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in social psychology*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1947); R. M. Brickner, *Is Germany incurable*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943; Peter Nathan, *The psychology of fascism*, Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1943; P. Kecskemeti and N. Leites, "Some psychological hypotheses on Nazi Germany," Library of Congress document no. 60 (mimeographed), Washington: Library of Congress, 1945; Howard Becker, *German youth: bond or free*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947. For Japan see Ruth Benedict, *The chrysanthemum and the sword; patterns of Japanese culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946. For the United States see Margaret Mead, *And keep your powder dry; an anthropologist looks at America*, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1942; and Geoffrey Gorer, *The American people; a study in national character*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1948.

problems, we shall have many occasions to indicate this variability. Here we shall sketch in bold strokes some of the more important phases of social-cultural life which reveal significant divergences.

Rather than try to deal with so-called national character comparatively, we shall present certain contrasting features of what seem to be the chief contenders for future dominance of the world's culture. While it is easy though often misleading to divide complex cultural data into two parts, there is some basis in fact for assuming that, in the by and large, the two most significant

cultural systems today are the authoritarian, totalistic on the one side and the democratic, individualistic on the other.

Table 3 is a tentative first approximation to a comparison of the modal democratic and the modal authoritarian political, economic, and social orders. Included are brief but highly tentative statements regarding aspects of personality make-up which seem associated with these culture systems. This latter has bearing on the growing interest in the relation of culture to personality, a matter to which we shall refer at various points later.

TABLE 3

TENTATIVE SKETCH OF AUTHORITARIAN AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE SYSTEMS

(Illustrations drawn from contemporary world)

Authoritarian Patterns

Democratic Patterns

I. FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL SOCIETY

Central ideal or theory: for general welfare but by special authoritarian means, *e.g.*, communistic, classless society (Marx, Lenin, but also latent racialism in Pan-Slavism in U.S.S.R.); society and state co-ordinated under Master Race and Leader (Nazi); divine right to rule world (Japan).

Central ideal or theory: free society of free men, with individual choice of government and leaders, *e.g.*, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" (French Revolution); "self-determination of peoples" (Woodrow Wilson); ("Britons never, never, never will be slaves").

II. NATURE OF THE POLITICAL ORDER

1. Dominance of state over society by small minority or elite, *e.g.*, state and society coterminous under control of Nazi Party (Germany), or by military elite (Japan); *e.g.*, society and state not coterminous in theory (Marx) but in practice under complete control of Communist Party (U.S.S.R.).

1. National society basic and of larger scope than state; state, the "servant not the master of the people." The state government organized to permit free choice of representatives. Doctrine of certain inalienable rights.

2. May or may not have formal constitution; theory and practice may diverge sharply, *e.g.*, Nazis, U.S.S.R. Some division of power and function present, although executive branch tends to be stressed and legislative and judicial functions to be subordinated to the executive. Hence, law likely to be determined by executive, not legislative, branch; rule by decree common. Bureaucratic administration likely to flourish.

2. May not be written constitution (Britain) or may be (U.S.A.). Division of power varied, *e.g.*, sharp division, and checks and balances of executive, legislative, judicial (U.S.A.); duly elected "responsible" executive tied closely to elected House of Commons (Britain). Government by law, not executive fiat or decree. Some growth of administrative at expense of legislative branch (U.S.A.; Britain; France).

TABLE 3 (continued)

Authoritarian Patterns

Democratic Patterns

III. PUBLIC AND POLITICAL CONTROLS

1. All machinery of public control in hands of single party or elite (Nazis; U.S.S.R.) or military class (Japan). No rival parties permitted.

2. Hence no free assembly, no free speech or press permitted. No openly accepted public discussion or opinion formation, unless it be simulated by party in power as a propaganda-control device. Masses indoctrinated with ideas by party.

3. State police, with network of secret agents, rigidly enforce laws and decrees of ruling group. Deviations in idea or action considered subversive, ferreted out, and ruthlessly suppressed.

4. The most effective controls occur where the authoritarian pattern is in the mores. Growing state controls over every aspect of daily life, however, added to these basic patterns. Resistance may occur in terms of older culture and lack of inner conviction where there is imposition from the outside. Various forms of silent sabotage may flourish despite secret police.

1. Public-control machinery nonpolitical (societal) as well as political. Multiple-party system permits fluctuations in dominance of government (elections), but permissive role and status for minority also.

2. Freedom of assembly, speech, press and other fundamental rights ("natural rights") guaranteed in law and in the mores. Citizens participate in government through representatives and through force of public opinion. Tendency for government to be under pressure of special-interest groups which may try indoctrination of masses, but no dominant group.

3. Police powers restricted by constitutional and statute law and judicial precedent, *e.g.*, writ of habeas corpus, no search and seizure without warrant, trial by jury, as devices to prevent police state from arising. Only under grave crisis, such as war, are these liberties restricted.

4. Much of social control lies outside the government in mores and public sentiment. Resistance to what are thought infringements of individual freedom is in the mores. Strong opposition to methods of the police state.

IV. THE CLASS STRUCTURE

1. At top is dominant elite, *e.g.*, Revolutionary Party (Nazis; U.S.S.R.) or older class (Japan), with graded classes beneath it. Class rule by virtue of some mystic power or right or purpose, *e.g.*, movement to classless society possible only by dictatorship of Communist Party (U.S.S.R.); rule of world through success of divine mission (Japan); Master Race created to conquer and rule world (Nazi). Trend to fixity of class structure.

2. Recruitment by membership in superior race, class, or by conversion to theories, aims, and actions of dominant elite, *e.g.*, Master Race and adherence to Nazi Party; zeal as Communist Party member at first, later as

1. A relatively flexible class system. No theory of a dominant class or of a rigid class-structured state or society; but variation in terms of history, *e.g.*, color-caste system (U.S.A.; Union of South Africa). Elite usually the successful in business, politics, and professions, but high degree of vertical mobility.

2. Recruitment: Individual initiative, merit, and persistence usually determine position on social scale, but there are variations, *e.g.*, class structure more fixed and important in Britain than is true elsewhere (U.S.A.). Nonetheless

TABLE 3 (continued)

Authoritarian Patterns

family member of such party (class principle); member of old-established class (Japan). Recruitment for middle levels of class structure, *e.g.*, professions, managers, and technicians, may be on merit basis but must show outward conformity to government rules; some of these may move into top elite by conversion or as reward of duty. Lower classes recruited by state by tests, education, or by forced draft of labor.

Democratic Patterns

family wealth, status, and differential opportunity for higher education affect initiative, merit, and persistence. There is much upward mobility and a strong faith that it will continue (U.S.A.); this less true elsewhere (Britain; France).

V. LEADERSHIP

1. Leadership and patterns of social dominance tend to be formalized and to reflect class structure; little opportunity for leadership otherwise; *Führer* principle (leader, guide) rationalized as basic to state and society (Nazi); leadership completely controlled by Communist Party (U.S.S.R.); controlled by military and wealthy classes (Japan).

2. Graded system of social dominance, following the pattern of recruitment set down by elite. Competition for role and status within the limits set by elite.

1. Leadership patterns follow open-class system; political, economic, religious, professional, and other social dominance largely determined by mass support. No concept of divinely bestowed leadership, either by race or by membership in dominant class.

2. Gradation of dominance reflects variations in the subculture of particular groups. Recruitment through competitive process in various fields of activity, modified, as with class membership, by wealth and status of family or group.

VI. BASIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Tendency for the state to dominate and/or control the economic system: capital, labor, and natural resources, often in theory in the name of the people; complete state control (U.S.S.R.); less complete but dominant (Japan; Nazis). Controls imply planning, rationing, and minute regulations of economics by administrative means.

In Western societies, capitalist free enterprise, the profit system, and private property rights fully accepted. Recently considerable variation toward either monopoly and cartels (U.S.A.; Germany) or toward nationalization (socialism) of many basic industries (France; Britain). Also growing regulation by government even without nationalization (U.S.A.).

VII. EDUCATION

1. Almost complete control by dominant elite and largely in their interest. Instruction and training directed toward two major aims: acquisition of skills and knowledge with regard to economic, political, and military needs; and indoctrination in basic ideas and values, *e.g.*, race, folk, leadership, *Lebensraum* (living space), and divine mission (Nazis; Japan); mixture of Marx-Lenin-Stalin ideologies

1. Both public and private education accepted. Government controls chiefly with regard to funds, minimal standards as to training of teachers and as to curriculum. Aims are skill, knowledge, free citizens capable of voluntary role in the cultural order generally. Political and moral indoctrination present but usually vague and indirectly conveyed to student, except in times of national crises.

TABLE 3 (continued)

Authoritarian Patterns

with Pan-Slavic nationalism (U.S.S.R.). The school stresses the authoritarian pattern as a means of insuring obedience to the state pattern.

2. No acceptance of thesis of free research and scholarship as an individual or social right. Science tends to orthodoxy in line with dominant group (Nazis; U.S.S.R.; Japan).

Democratic Patterns

The school usually stresses the democratic pattern and is an important agency in training in the give-and-take of competition for political and economic rewards later. Ideal training concerns freedom and responsibility as dual aspects in success.

2. Free science considered a basic value, as being a phase of culture related to civic rights of free speech and free press, free enterprise, and individual liberty.

VIII. RELIGIOUS LIFE

Religion may or may not be a deliberate agency of state and ruling class. Established religion must not infringe on aims and actions of state. Sometimes active propaganda against traditional religion (Nazis; U.S.S.R.), sometimes it is bent to aims of elite (Japan).

Free choice of religion by the individual. Church bodies exercise great influence on morals and public opinion. In time of war such bodies usually actively support the government, at other times oppose war (U.S.A.; Britain; France).

IX. OTHER SECONDARY GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONS

1. Political or economic associations, aside from those dominated by the ruling elite, forbidden; trade unions and managerial organizations either under close state supervision (Nazis) or a part of the politico-economic order itself (U.S.S.R.). Groups devoted to recreation, art, and similar aims tend to be absorbed by ruling elite or forbidden. Voluntary associations viewed as potentially dangerous to totalistic state-societies.

2. To bolster its rule and provide social-emotional outlets, the state provides recreation, mass demonstrations, and other public festivals (Nazis; U.S.S.R.; Japan).

1. No legal restriction on number of political parties, economic groupings, other special-interest groups, or any having to do with art and recreation. Whatever controls there are — aside from those relating to property, public safety, and public morals — rest in the mores and public opinion. The culture fosters a wide variability in such associations.

2. The mass aspects, whether political, religious, recreational, or otherwise, are seldom used by the state as a form of indoctrination and control except on national holidays and during periods of war. Participation in these is voluntary.

X. THE FAMILY AND OTHER PRIMARY GROUPS

1. Since family is basic to all social-cultural learning, it is most important seedbed of training in authoritarian patterns. This serves as foundation for adult participation in state-society. However, many aspects of family culture are most difficult for state to control. If the elite builds its programs for regulating family life along lines of the older family-

1. Aside from long-standing laws regarding marriage, guardianship, inheritance, and divorce, there is little or no interference by the state in family life. The child is inculcated at the hands of other family members with the ideas, attitudes, and habits of the culture. This is more or less informal, but values of individualism, competitiveness for role and

TABLE 3 (continued)

Authoritarian Patterns

culture patterns, it is likely to be more successful than if it tries to depart from them, *e.g.*, stress on paternal and patriarchal controls and masculinity (Nazis; Japan). Sometimes a combination of patriarchalism and familism may be used (U.S.S.R.). Sometimes the stress on reproduction only does not yield much, *e.g.*, Nazi and Fascist programs to increase birth rate. To push its program, the state may put very young children into formal schools, as a device to offset home influences that do not support state's programs. It may also give medical and other care to prevent disease and death and in this way influence families to a more favorable attitude toward the state.

2. Other primary groups also fall under the aegis of the state whenever it is thought they might not contribute to its main purpose and function. But, again, neighborhood, play groups, and many aspects of the primary-community life are difficult to control.

Democratic Patterns

status, and host of moral codes as to honesty, steadiness of purpose, and work are transmitted. Class values also carried over which influence child's economic, political, and educational life later. However strong the patriarchal masculinity pattern may be, it is softened and qualified by maternal, democratic, and humanitarian training. While there is enormous variation in degree of real training in democracy in the home, in general, the democratic pattern is fairly apparent in comparison to that found in authoritarian families. In industrialized democratic societies, growing specialization of functions and stress on *expertise* have tended to break down traditional family structure.

2. Practically no state control over other primary groups. They are deeply imbedded in the democratic folkways. Only where urbanization dissipates older primary-group patterns may the state step in with recreational programs. Such aids are usually sponsored by private agencies.

XI. THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS SOCIAL-CULTURAL WORLD

1. Chief elements of authoritarian ethos to which individual is expected to adapt are: (a) power-authority pattern, often with strong masculinity-military features (Nazis; Japan); (b) couched in absolutist principles, *e.g.*, divine mission of state or party (Nazis; Japan; U.S.S.R.); to which (c) unerring obedience and complete conformity are required; all of which (d) must be expressed in actionism, *e.g.*, conquest by arms (Nazis; Japan) or by conversion and arms if necessary, especially rationalized as defense (U.S.S.R.). In short, the ethos is a fixed absolutist one, centered in external evidence of power.

2. Some pertinent features of initial training are: (a) an early stress on conformity and obedience to discipline, though with some mixture of indulgence and affection; (b) as the child matures, there is increased emphasis

1. Chief elements of democratic ethos to which individual is expected to adapt are: (a) individualism and personal growth in which (b) power manifestations derive in terms of personal attainment and freedom associated with responsibility; this means (c) that power is shared with others and (d) is not unlimited for anyone, leader or led. Conformity and obedience, then, follow only where there is freedom, responsibility, sharing, and limitations of power. Any (e) dynamism or actionism is bound up with efforts to extend similar rights and duties to others; and (f) instead of boasted masculinity-military ideal, a humanitarian component is expected.

2. Pertinent features of initial training are: (a) mixture of love and dependence with mild discipline and rare appeal, if any, to authority; discipline grows out of the social situation in which child grows up. As child grows

TABLE 3 (continued)

Authoritarian Patterns

on absolute authority, *e.g.*, largely in the father-image (Japan; Nazis); (c) this is reinforced by early induction into ideals of state and dominant elite, such as divine mission of party, nation, race, or folk (Nazis; Japan; U.S.S.R.). Pertinent skills, knowledge, and values instilled toward this end.

3. Adolescence, as a transitional stage, brings further training for work roles and further indoctrination in the ideals of power, manliness, and military codes, and absolute righteousness of state and its programs. These may be associated with romantic ideals of collective strength and identification with strong leader. If there is any individualism, it is directed into roles built around such identification.

4. The adult largely the product of childhood and adolescent training. Rewards come with conformity, evidence of skill and knowledge which contribute to the success of the state or other collective image. Failure to comply brings severe punishment. The sanctions, for the individual, often take the form of shame, to be externalized in form of face-saving. Heavy stress on external evidences of conformity may lessen the internalization of sanctions. Hence, manifestations of personal conscience and sense of guilt at failure may be weak or absent. There is often a strong tendency to project the blame for failures on others or on the environment. Scapegoating — a form of *projection* — may be institutionalized.

5. Suggestive measures of degrees of adult balance and integration are to be found in the common forms of maladjustment. High incidence of suicide under some absolutist-authoritarian regimes (Japan; Germany). Another is an extreme form of self-pity (Nazis) and sadism (Nazis; Japan; U.S.S.R.).

Democratic Patterns

up (b) there is more stress on democratic participation, and authority-image tends to be diffused to various ideal-images; and (c) these democratic ideals and accompanying practices are reinforced by induction to ideals of peace, sharing, humanitarianism, and good will to others. However, there is stress on interpersonal competition for role and status; success on the basis of individual initiative and merit becomes strong motive. But freedom of competitive action associated with responsibility for one's own acts.

3. Adolescence further trains in getting up the ladder of personal success (U.S.A.). This is qualified where the class structure is more fixed (Britain; France). Along with the drive for success goes the threat of danger to one's ego if one fails and if one is too different. There is collective support and reward if one succeeds, but also blame if one fails (U.S.A.); (less of this type of response in Britain).

4. Adult life under democracy continues patterns begun earlier. The struggle for success tends constantly to push the individual to further striving; the levels of aspiration tend to exceed those of achievement. The stress is on rewards or results of goal-attainment, seldom on activity itself. The rewards for success are very great, but the anxiety and personal distress associated with failure make for high sense of insecurity. Compensatory devices such as boasting, overwork, drinking, and gambling are common. The stress on individualism also tends to produce a certain loneliness and corresponding demand for belongingness. The herd pattern is common but chiefly not integrated into a collective or group ideal as with authoritarians. The personal sanctions are at times face-saving and shame; but conscience and sense of guilt are basic. The internalization of personal responsibility and duty as the counterparts to freedom and individual initiative mean that failure leads to heavy self-punishment.

5. Adult maladjustments chiefly grow out of the sense of guilt and personal blame. Among upper social strata breakdowns deriving from anxiety are common; among the lower classes "conversion" symptoms, such as functional paralyses of muscles and limbs, are more likely to occur. Some suicide also present.

Interpretation. Such comparisons as those given above rest on the theory that culture systems may be studied in terms of the comparable modalities of behavior associated with their major social institutions. These comparisons are, at best, first approximations. In time we may be able to secure much more adequate data on such topics. Moreover, such summaries are likely to gloss over the many similarities in culture systems and tend to stress the differences. In actuality there are no completely contrasting large cultural systems today.

To interpret such thumbnail contrasts with any degree of adequacy, a number of cautions must be observed. First of all, ideal values and norms of a society may be recognized by members of the same, but this does not mean they live up to these ideals. It is the old trouble about the *ideal* vs. *the real*. Yet, since expectancy is a critical feature of culture, individuals everywhere operate within a framework of verbally expected ideals as well as in terms of actual behavior. The latter may be marked by various degrees of deviation from the norms. Second, no system has a monopoly on authoritarian or democratic patterns. All we have to do is look around us to find families, businesses, and other groups in which the autocratic pattern is clear. The same may be said for national societies often designated as authoritarian. Yet, in terms of relative importance given to these contrasting patterns, some societies may be said to fall into one class and not the other.

Bearing these cautions in mind, the most important contrasts seem to be the values and actions concerning power, rigidity or flexibility of basic philosophy, and the concept of the individual or person. Power manifestations under authoritarianism tend to be concentrated differentially within the class structure but with the final authority at the top. This is the "papa-knows-best" attitude, so fundamental in such a system. This view the apologists for democracy reject. They believe that a more satisfactory social order is one where power is not too concentrated and where, above all else, there are various checks on its expression.

In keeping with this contrast, of course, the meaning of conformity varies in the two systems. In the one it tends to be complete and unquestioning. In the other there is conformity insofar as this is essential to group accomplishment, solidarity, and continuity. Moreover, where matters of conformity are in doubt, a key attitude is expressed in the inevitable question, "Why must I do it?" Under authoritarianism the attitude is more likely to be "Yours not to reason why, yours but to do and die." This attitude is aptly shown in a letter written by a German soldier to his sweetheart at home in June, 1944:

"Hang it all, I am not a pessimist. But now and then it seems to me that we have too many enemies. Let us forget it. Politics are not for the two of us. Don't you think so too? Let those make politics who are 'called.' We are small fry only, so enough of that. . . ."⁶

Concentration of power and complete conformity are associated with the doctrine of absolutism so central to all authoritarians. They incline to a totalistic philosophy with all the rigidity it implies. They become zealous over the culturalized day-dream of 1000 years of peace, organized and ordered under a Master Race. Or one of a wonderful classless society, all sweetness and light, where the practice will be from each according to his abilities and to each according to his wants — as if abilities and wants were ever equated!

In carrying out such absolutist ideals those in power may be ruthless since the end is so sacred that it justifies any means. In contrast, democracy is not considered to be a fixed and final theme. It is a way of life full of concessions and compromises, checks on power, and limited satisfactions, alternating between advances and retreats in attacking its problems. For the individual

⁶ From Kecskemeti and Leites, *op. cit.*, p. 17. By permission. The word "called" implies the Lutheran sense of "calling." See Max Weber, *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*, trans. by T. Parsons, chapter 3. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930.

this means fair-mindedness, willingness to live and let live, and an effort to understand the other fellow. To authoritarians their philosophy is the final and perfect word; to the democratically minded person there are no final answers, no divine missions or fixed perfections. Yet the absolutists always hold fast to their uncompromising idealism. Commenting on the history of such absolutists, George Santayana, the philosopher, wrote:

"... These people all died because they would not co-operate, because they were not plastic enough and would never consent to lead the life dear or at least customary to other men. They insisted on being utterly different and independent and inflexible in their chosen systems, and aspired either to destroy the society around them or at least to insulate themselves in the midst of it and live a jealous, private, unstained life of their own within their city walls or mystical conclaves. . . ."⁷

This comment has a certain contemporary ring, although Santayana had quite a different period of history in mind when he wrote this. The whole scheme of concentrated power and absolutist authority which demand such complete conformity implies a view of the individual incompatible with that of liberal democracy.

The independence and integrity of the individual with his rights and duties to make his own way in the world is a crucial concept under the democratic thesis. The authoritarians imply, if they do not explicitly state, that the individual in mass society is incapable, really, of taking care of himself. They take the position that the state, as the most potent agency today, should plan and direct all the essential institutions of a society so as to assure the individual security and a fixed world. This implies some form of state socialism, state capitalism, state communism — call it what you will. They all rest on an authoritarian philosophy.

The divergences are reflected in the contrasting views regarding the individual. Such views, too, have their roots in the respective cultures. We assume that the socialization of the child and adolescent will determine his adult personality. And we assume that the culture will largely determine the form and content of said socialization. On the basis of these two assumptions, we may examine the contrasting systems for clues to the values each puts upon the individual.

In both, the child is valued as a potential asset to society. In the authoritarian, however, his training takes the form of emphasizing the authority-obedience pattern from infancy and childhood on. While there is usually a mixture of love and indulgence with discipline and severe regimen, the latter tends in time to be reinforced at the expense of the former. Out of such training the individual comes to be viewed as a unit in a closely knit collectivity.

In the democratic system, also, the first months and years are marked by a mixture of discipline and affection, but with a continuing stress on the latter. To this is added, as the child grows up, more and more stress on individual attainment with a recognition of the balancing of individual rights and responsibilities.

In short, under authoritarianism the person is given a role and status within the more or less fixed hierarchy of the total collectivity. The basic decisions as to public policy and program, as well as much of what is elsewhere considered private affairs, are made for him by the ruling elite. The individual is regarded as not quite capable of making any fundamental social judgments. There is little belief in the right to independent self-propulsion. In fact, the authoritarian elite usually has to bolster its own use of power with such justification as, "Thank God, we are not as other men." Yet they sense, at least unconsciously, that they are like men in the mass, hence their rationalizations in some such terms as racial or class superiority, or of political mission of a special party, or in some other handy and face-saving way.

⁷ George Santayana, *Character and opinion in the United States*, p. 215. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. By permission.

In contrast, the ideal of democracy is the integrity and inviolability of the person. He is supposed to stand on his own feet by taking on duties as well as privileges. He is assumed to be capable of voluntary participation in policy-making as well as in the execution of the affairs of his community, large or small. If he wishes to have a private life tied in with noncommunity or non-political affairs, this is also his own business, not that of others to interfere in except in the interest of public security and morality. While, in actuality, this ideal is not often fully attained, it is nonetheless the basic value and the one toward which the dynamic of any democratic system must move.

Yet the democratic emphasis on interpersonal competition for role and status and its expectancy of voluntary choice and personal responsibility produce strains in the individual. These may cause anxiety and feelings of insecurity. On the other hand, the rigidity of the authoritarian system may induce incompetent docility and the development of devices to circumvent public policy without exposure to the authorities. Above all, the system rests on an appeal to fear. And it is very doubtful if an effective industrial society can be maintained in such an emotional climate. In truth, both systems produce certain stresses and maladjustments as well as advantages.

Interpretative Summary

1. While among men everywhere we find certain universal culture patterns related to the satisfaction of basic and acquired needs, as these are culturally defined, the manner in which these are met in detail varies greatly from society to society.
2. In fact, relativity and variation are as important in the phenomena of culture as are likeness and universality.
3. The causes of cultural variability are multiple but hard to trace in detail since much of the basic deviation took place before man had advanced to the stage of writing and keeping records. But among other important factors were long geographic isolation, which meant lack of culture contact; varied adjustments to different kinds of climate, topography, and resources that in time induced new culture patterns; crises of physical disasters such as floods, fires, or epidemics, and social-cultural crises such as wars; contacts with sharply different cultures that induced modification in earlier cultures but not identity with the diffusing culture.
4. Cross-section accounts of three contrasting nonliterate societies and their cultures were given to illustrate variability. One showed rather individualistic, mildly co-operative patterns (Arapesh); one was a co-operative, nonaggressive type (Zuni); and the third, a highly competitive-aggressive one (Kwakiutl). These also show how the culture canalizes and limits the development of individuals within any given society.
5. For contemporary civilized societies a tentative scheme of contrasting modal features of authoritarian and democratic culture systems was presented. While the actualities do not always match the ideal norms as given, basic differences in their respective ethos are clear. Such a rough-and-ready classification provides a first approximation for working out culture-personality relations.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define cultural variability. Is it important to consider this factor in sociology?
2. What relation has cultural variability to the basic and derived cultural imperatives?

3. How may we account for variability in the modern world, especially in the face of the unifying effects of modern technologies?
4. How does the culture provide the fundamental structure for the personality or life organization? Illustrate from the Arapesh, the Zuni, the Kwakiutl, and modern societies.
5. Show how culture controls or directs such psychological expressions as aggressiveness or co-operation. Illustrate from Zuni, Kwakiutl, and our own society.
6. How do you account for the divergence between cultural norms and ideals and the actual everyday conduct of individuals exposed to these norms and ideals?
7. Write a short but critical essay evaluating the comparisons between authoritarian and democratic societies made in Table 3, pages 49-54.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

John F. Embree, *Suye Mura, a Japanese village*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

A sociological description and analysis of primary-group life in Japan and the impact of modern industrial culture on the peasant way of life.

John F. Embree, *The Japanese nation; a social survey*. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1945.

A brief but good discussion of modern Japan, showing the interplay of Oriental and Occidental cultures in that country.

Francis L. K. Hsu, *Under the ancestors' shadow; Chinese culture and personality*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.

A study of the impact of ancestor worship on Chinese family and social structure.

Ralph Linton, *Cultural background of personality*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945.

An anthropologist analyzes the importance of cultural conditioning on the individual.

Robert Redfield, *The folk culture of Yucatan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.

A study of the effects of varied and changing culture patterns on the lives of certain Mexican groups.

Social-Cultural Processes

THE THREE previous chapters consisted chiefly of cross-sectional accounts of the major forms of social life and the major elements of culture. Now we must look at individuals and groups in their dynamic contacts with each other. These relations may be described as forms of social-cultural processes, indicating how people compete, co-operate, or otherwise interact. Although we shall discuss them more fully in later chapters, it is well to introduce, at this point, some basic facts regarding these processes.

We stated in chapter 1 that the description and analysis of any dynamic factor involves the study of change, modification, or alteration of individuals, groups, or cultural elements through time. We relate a shift from a condition at a given point in time to another condition at a later point in time. The static view, on the other hand, is concerned with the cross-section of a given condition at a given moment.

Interaction: The Basis of Social-Cultural Processes

Interaction is the key factor in all associative life. Hence, the concept is crucial to any study of the dynamics of society and culture. Furthermore, the repetition of certain forms of interaction provides one basis for the continuity and order in our social-cultural world. Of major importance, here, are opposition, co-operation, and differentiation of role and status. Still other processes relate to growth or cumulation of culture. Let us begin by examining the nature of interaction.

Direct and communicative interaction. Interaction may be defined as a reciprocal contact between two or more persons. From

the standpoint of behavioristic psychology it consists of interstimulation and response. When person A stimulates person B, not only does A alter or otherwise influence the thought, emotion, and action of B, but B, in turn, influences the thought, emotion, and action of A. In terms of psychology, interaction is essentially action between individuals. Yet, where individuals are closely knit together in purpose and action, we may consider them as interacting as a body or group rather than as individuals.

Such reciprocal contact is seen in the relations of an in-group with an out-group. In fact, social contacts take three forms: (1) There is person-to-person interaction, as when the infant first learns the ways of adjusting to the expectations of his mother, or later, as a young adult when he seeks a mate. (2) There may be person-to-group or group-to-person relations, as when an individual finds himself in opposition to the moral codes of a community, or when a club puts pressure on a member to force him to conform. (3) There is group-to-group interaction, as when two political parties co-operate to defeat a third, or when two nations are at war.

Without interaction there would be no social or group life. The mere placing of individuals in physical proximity, although it usually results in at least a modicum of interaction, does not weld them into a social unit or group. It is when persons or groups of persons work or play or talk together with reference to a common end, or when they compete, quarrel, or frown at each other, that associative life, properly speaking, is at hand.

Interaction is of two kinds: *direct* or *symbolic*. The former consists of activity involving movement in space of the entire person and may be seen in such conduct as

pushing, fighting, scratching, biting, or in conjoint effort to get a job done or to accomplish some recreational action together, or in physical fondling, sexual intercourse, or other forms of intimate bodily contact. Symbolic interaction or communication consists of vocal or other gesture and true language, spoken or written. The symbol is a representation of an object, act, quality, or relationship. It stands for, or in place of, some implied or expected overt response.

Communication is highly important for any elaboration of associative life and is particularly so in our modern world of segmental and secondary contacts. It may either take the form of direct person-to-person speech and gesture or take place through some medium of long-range contact such as the printed page, the telephone, the telegraph, the motion picture, or television. In our present-day world of secondary mass society, communication by these mechanical means is highly significant.

Primary and secondary areas of interaction. The basic patterns of interaction are laid down in primary groups and are carried over into the secondary. For instance, the reactions of the child to parental authority furnish an important basis of the later adult attitudes of obedience to law and leadership in public life. Interests and values laid down in the home, neighborhood, and locality largely determine the chief values and interests in later life. Aggressive and/or co-operative habits and attitudes built up among family members at play or in other primary association are often displaced into activities in trade unions, employer-worker relations, and matters involving national patriotism. Such patterns are also the basic roots of one's responses in audiences, street crowds, mobs, and in public or noncontiguous associations. Finally, the primary-group patterns, as well as those additions built up in more stable institutionalized secondary groups, play a part in directing the nature of the individual's participation in the general mass society noted above. Yet, in the mass impersonality, specialization, rationality, and

stress on narrow self-interest induce emotional insecurity, irrational considerations, and a consequent lack of stability. It is when the mass is integrated by some dominant class or some institutional form that it acquires stability and a more permanent set of interests and values. Unless it is organized in some fashion, mass society is likely to reveal recurrent outbreaks of chaotic and highly emotional and relatively untutored emotionalism. And the particular form of this organization of mass society is a vital matter to our democratic-value system itself.

Personal-social and cultural interaction.

The roots of interaction rest in the biosocial nature of man as a member of a social species. The infant's powerful need or drive for food is satisfied normally only at the breast of the mother. This constitutes the first direct interaction and is, in a sense, basic to all others. But another basic relationship arises in the protection which the mother gives the newborn. Although the need for food or the need for bodily protection derives from the internal and external condition of the infant, in the process of reaching the reward of food or sheltering comfort the infant begins to modify his reaction. In these modifications we find the first features of learning. Much of this biosocial adjustment is reflexive and rudimentary, but before long a great deal of conditioning or learning comes into play.

As the infant grows up, this conditioning becomes increasingly important. And what he learns stems more and more from the culture which is brought to bear upon him by his mother, father, brothers and sisters, and other members of the household. As the child extends his contacts to playmates, neighbors, and later to the school and other community groups, he acquires more and more habits, attitudes, and ideas which come from the culture of his larger society. For example, for many years it was customary for middle-class American mothers to arrange the feeding of the infant on a fixed schedule, say every four hours. This program was in the culture. So, too, the time and manner of toilet training represents

another item from the culture. From the beginning of the second year on, most children begin to speak. And the words, the pronunciation, and the sentence structure are largely determined in advance by the culture of his class and society.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that all social learning from infancy on is culturally predetermined. There is ample evidence that this is not the case, especially with regard to some of the earliest contacts of the child with his mother and other persons. To return to the instance of a four-hour feeding schedule. While this was fixed in middle-class culture, the nature and amount of accompanying fondling of the child by the mother, the mixture of much sweet indulgence with some severity and avoidance on the part of the mother were not defined in advance by cultural norms. The habits and attitudes which arise in the child through this accessory learning are socially learned but are not, strictly speaking, acquired from the culture. So, too, dominance-submission patterns which emerge from play with other children, the interplay of love and hate, and other patterns of the personality surely have some of their source in such social but noncultural or precultural situations.

This type of social but noncultural learning the author calls *personal-social*. The word *personal* indicates the individual feature and the word *social* that it nonetheless arises in a social situation.¹ Personal-social conditioning is most effective in the early

years of life. And for this reason its effects on the emerging personality are important. Many aspects which make for individual differences are thus derived. So, too, it is likely that some if not all of the fundamental temperamental qualities, anxieties, patterns of aggression, and the like rest on personal-social conditioning. Also, such features of personality as are indicated in terms like introversion or extroversion probably have some of their source here.

Obviously, most of the personal-social relations are later overlaid with cultural influences. But some observers have contended that though culture patterns regarding infant training may differ rather sharply, the personal-social conditioning is so important that it is not until after the first year, at least, that culture influences come into play. On the basis of his studies of white, Hopi, and Navaho children, Wayne Dennis concludes:

"The onset of distinctive cultural patterns naturally varies from child to child, but I feel, at least so far as Hopi-Navaho-American comparisons are concerned, that distinctive patterns of behavior do not emerge until after one year of age. This corroborates the view that the characteristics of infancy are universal and that culture overlays or modifies a more basic substratum of behavior."²

It is not easy to state just where personal-social conditioning ends and cultural conditioning begins. The distinction between the two forms of learning is really one of degree. But from the standpoint of logic and for purposes of study they need to be viewed as separate processes. This is especially so because there has been a certain tendency to regard all social learning as cultural learning. Culture is of the greatest importance in shaping individual and group behavior, but it is not so completely deterministic as some have contended.³

² From Wayne Dennis, "Does culture appreciably affect patterns of infant behavior," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1940, 12: 316. Reprinted by permission. This paper is reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in social psychology*, pp. 40-46. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1947.

³ This is not the place to enter into a discussion of this topic. And it must be admitted that it is

¹ As the author has said elsewhere, though not the happiest term, it covers the essential point. See his *Social psychology*, 1st ed., 1930, pp. 5-12, and 2nd ed., 1944, pp. 9-10, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Edward Sapir used the term "precultural" to cover much the same idea. See his article "Personality" in the *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 12: 85-88, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932. E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke discuss much the same problem in terms of "psychogenic conditioning." See their book *The family*, p. 244, New York: American Book Company, 1945. Some psychologists object to their terminology because the word *psychogenic* is used in a somewhat different sense in books on psychology, especially those dealing with child or personality development. John Dollard has also discussed this topic in "Culture, society, impulse, and socialization," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1939, 45: 50-63.

One further important distinction may be offered. Certain personal-social conditioning arises within the larger framework of a situation more or less defined by the culture. In these cases personal-social learning is somewhat akin to what some anthropologists call "permissive" behavior. Some of the acts of a mother toward her baby in the course of nursing him might be considered as of this permissive sort. Moreover, there are social situations not defined in advance by the culture even as permissive, and in them the personal-social factors will dominate the interactions of individuals concerned. The spontaneous play life of children is one instance of this. And even adults under conditions of stress, such as floods, fire, earthquake, and aerial bombing, may find themselves stripped of adequate cultural definitions and fall back on personal-social reactions. This is also the case in much mob and panic behavior.

However, the fact remains that it is in the earliest months and years of life that the personal-social elements have their greatest place in human relations. In examples such as those just cited from physical disaster or mob action, individuals may temporarily lose much of their culturalized habits and attitudes. But they hardly lose them all. Various culturalized ideas, attitudes, and habits will come into play in the immediate situation which, though perhaps not always ethical, will see one through the crisis. But studies of behavior under such conditions have also shown that the adult may return or regress to reactions which are actually the products, in large part, of infantile personal-social conditioning. In mob action, for example, violent aggressions and anxieties may be unleashed which are normally kept under control by the heavy hand of conscience, which is culturally derived.

Finally, it is quite likely that personal-social conditioning also plays a part in originating new culture patterns. The latter

extremely difficult to set up empirical research to test the assumption about differences in these two types of social learning. Dennis' work is of great importance, since it is one attempt in this direction. Supplementary evidence is also at hand from the studies of feral man to be dealt with in chapter 9.

arise in large part, of course, from combining elements from known culture items. But some of the creative features of the new probably derive both motivation and content from the results of personal-social learning.

Sources of personal-social and cultural learning. Both personal-social and cultural conditioning depend on two sources: the individual organism and the nature of the interaction. As to the first, there are individual differences in physique, in native intelligence or capacity to learn, in emotional-temperamental make-up, and in motor responsiveness. The sickly child may secure special attention in terms of his non-cultural but nonetheless social contact with his fellows. Variations in native intelligence rest on differences in sensory-motor capacities and in the neural organization of the central nervous system. These variations are, in turn, reflected in differences in the power and speed of learning. Such factors control the effectiveness of both forms of learning. So, too, the emotional-temperamental aspects of the person rest on differences in endocrine balance and other determinants of the emotional reactivity. These will, in turn, influence conditioning. And, as time goes on, the effects of these are cumulative. We know that what is learned today affects what is learned tomorrow. One reason why personal-social conditioning is important is that *it represents learning at the most primary level of interaction and forms something of a base on which later cultural conditioning takes place.*

The nature of the interaction also influences social learning. Much of the precultural conditioning is of an intimate and emotional nature. It also is much more spontaneous and accidental than most of the cultural sort. The essence of culture is acceptance and expectancy. This means that culture canalizes or directs the forms which interaction takes, whether it be of close interpersonal, person-to-group, or group-to-group kind. Sometimes this culture patterning of conduct is highly fixed, as in social rituals, military drill, and in the rigid

demands of the law. Sometimes it is more flexible, as in the case of the alternative choices permitted. But compared to personal-social conditioning, culture, on the whole, operates on the individual in a somewhat predetermined manner of acceptance and expectation. Failure to conform, moreover, leads usually to some kind of punishment, mild or severe, at the hands of those who are in the process of transmitting the particular culture pattern to the child. The mother may put soap into the mouth of her little boy for saying a nasty or vulgar word. A leader in a sorority ridicules a pledge for failing to dress in fashion. On the other hand, we provide ample rewards to those who quickly acquire the cultural ways. The "proper" child is paid off by money and much affection. The fashionable student gets a beau. The honest business or professional man increases his clientele and thereby makes more money.

Yet, to repeat, though culture plays a large part in the development of the personality, the person is never completely the creature of his culture.

Some Major Social Processes

Data on social processes have been organized in various ways. Sociology is still too undeveloped a science to warrant any finality as to the precise nature of the social processes. However, it is widely recognized that a number of universal yet distinctive processes come into play. For example, we need a concept for the fact that the newborn individual is inducted into society and its culture at the hands of others, who were born at an earlier date and have themselves acquired the ways of mankind. While such training begins in infancy, it does not cease throughout life. Such a process has been called socialization or, more recently, enculturation.

Also basic to man's survival is his struggle for material goods and other rewards, culturally defined as desirable. The chief forms which such opposition takes we call competition and conflict. Yet all life does not consist in striving against another individual

or a physical situation. People may combine to gain a goal or reward. This we call co-operation or mutual aid. Then, too, the individual acquires a variety of distinguishing responses which set him off from others in terms of his age, sex, and occupation. This process is differentiation, and it derives largely from the oppositional-co-operative relations of individuals and groups. In fact, opposition, co-operation, and differentiation make up a base line from which still other more specialized forms of process arise, such as accommodation, stratification, and assimilation.

The elements of the basic social processes are to be found in the subhuman species, as we noted in chapter 2. With man, of course, such basic processes are more complex, chiefly because he has developed a culture. In fact, culture continually directs or canalizes as well as defines the meaning of the social processes. Moreover, the anthropologists have introduced a number of processual concepts of their own as aids in dealing with their materials in a dynamic frame of reference. For example, such terms as diffusion, convergence, and acculturation have specific meanings among students of anthropology. Yet some of the data classified and analyzed in these terms are covered in sociology by different concepts. In this book we shall not hesitate to draw needed concepts from anthropology as we draw them also from social psychology. There is nothing sacred about scientific terms. They are but tools or aids to understand the better what goes on about us.

Let us first examine the broad descriptive concepts which indicate the manner in which the individual becomes a functioning member of a society and its culture. Then we shall take up three important processes which come into play both early and late: opposition, co-operation, and differentiation. (For the latter two, see chapter 6.)

Socialization and enculturation. Socialization may be defined as an *interactional relationship by means of which the individual learns the social and cultural requirements that make him a functioning member of his society.*

Psychologically these relations involve habits, traits, ideas, attitudes, and values. Sociologically it means that he learns to conform to the cultural acceptances and expectancies expressed in such terms as mores, folkways, traditions, and group techniques. It also means that he develops a sense of oneness and gets roles and statuses in his in-groups. With these he acquires the corresponding attitude of opposition to any out-groups with which his in-groups have such contacts. More narrowly, socialization has been applied to the induction of the infant and child into the ways of society and its culture. Though this is a restricted view, certainly the most important socializing takes place in the early years of life.

Yet, in view of our distinction between society and culture, and between personal-social and cultural conditioning, the term is not entirely satisfactory. Certainly it has been used to include both phases of social learning: noncultural and cultural. However, if it is so understood there can be no serious objection to its use as a broad general concept. Some help in this matter has come with the introduction of the term *enculturation* by M. J. Herskovits to cover some aspects of cultural conditioning which he feels are not adequately covered by the concept socialization. He considers socialization as dealing with the adjustments of the infant and young child to the cultural-social demands of his family and other groups. But for him it is but one part of the larger process of enculturation, which includes the whole gamut of cultural conditioning, conscious and unconscious. This includes not only such matters as learning the basic control systems of a society, roles and statuses, but also art, religion, and other expressive patterns. So, too, inventive and creative responses of individuals arise within the framework of this enculturative process.⁴

⁴ See M. J. Herskovits, *Man and his works; the science of cultural anthropology*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. This is not the place to take up the theoretical implications of the concept of enculturation. But the concept does stress the anthropologist's usual insistence that cultural influences play on the person, not only in inducting him into the essentials of his culture in his early life but also in

For our purposes, however, we shall continue to use the concept socialization in its broad sense of conditioning of the individual to his place in the social-cultural world. The initial phases occur, as noted above, in the child-mother contacts and in the child's relations with his playmates and with adults other than members of his family. Later, in adolescence and, in fact, all through life the individual continues to feel the impact of his society and its culture upon him. We shall have occasion later to say more about this matter. Let us now analyze the first of the basic processes, opposition, which includes both competition and conflict.

Oppositional processes. Opposition as well as co-operation is to be seen in every society, although its form and direction are qualified by the culture of the time and place. Opposition may be defined as a struggle *against* another or others for a good, goal, or value; co-operation is joint striving *with* another or others for a good, goal, or value. *Felt scarcity* or desire for a good or value — money, power, affection, and so on — is basic to both opposition and co-operation. But *felt necessity* is not only biologically but culturally defined. Hence, what men fight for, or co-operate together for, is determined in large measure by their conditioning.

For purposes of analysis, opposition may be divided into competition and conflict. *Competition* is a less violent form of opposition in which two or more persons or groups struggle for some end or goal but in the course of which attention is focused chiefly on reward rather than on the competitor. In conflict the person or group thwarts, injures, or destroys the opponent in order to secure the wanted goal or reward. That is, in conflict interest is often first directed upon frustrating the individual or group and secondarily on the ultimate end. It is assumed or expected that once the opponent is *hors de combat*, the reward will fall to the victor.

impressing that culture more or less continuously. While the initial enculturation is both conscious and unconscious, later cultural learning usually takes place more definitely at the conscious level.

Obviously, in real life competition shades off into conflict. For example, rivals for the hand of a girl may indulge in fisticuffs in their efforts to secure the maiden's favor, and for the nonce they are more interested in knocking each other about than in courting. Or a business firm unable to compete with another under the usual rules of the game may employ gangsters to beat up the competitor's workmen or to destroy his goods with a view to forcing the opposing firm to withdraw from the struggle.

The origin and setting of the oppositional processes may be made clear by examining, first, struggle as a phase of the whole biological adaptation to environment; second, the relation of motivation and interaction to basic human conflict and competition; and, third, the influence of culture in giving form and content to competition.

The struggle for existence in nature. The limitations of food, space, and other factors essential to life make some form of opposing and co-operative interaction inevitable in both nature and human society. This pattern of opposition has been called the "struggle for existence."

The struggle for existence is a much misunderstood expression. People often imagine it refers only to violent conflict between animals or men for food or mates. Charles Darwin (1809-1882), who made the term popular, showed clearly how it involved not only opposition — conflict and competition — but also a resulting interdependence of individuals and species and a balance of relations very broadly associated with co-operation and differentiation. Darwin himself stated:

"I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including (which is more important) not only the life of the individual but success in leaving progeny."⁵

⁵ The full title of Darwin's volume is so expressive of his whole contribution that it should not be forgotten: *On the origin of species by means of natural selection or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for*

Since animals tend to reproduce in geometric ratio, there is always a struggle for food and space. As Darwin put it:

"A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic beings tend to increase. Every being, which during its natural lifetime produces several eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and during some season or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical increase, its numbers would quickly become so inordinately great that no country could support the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom; for in this case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from marriage."⁶

The struggle for existence takes place in three directions: (1) in the struggle with members of one's own species; (2) in the struggle with one's foes or members of other species; and (3) in the struggle against physical conditions. The first is illustrated by competition for food among men, each seeking his own survival at the expense of others. The second is seen in the combat or conflict of the hawk and the ermine, of the stag and the hounds, of the carnivorous against the herbivorous animals. The third is witnessed in the adverse climatic and geographic conditions against which the plant and the animal species must wage their warfare.

The interdependence of individuals and species is best evidenced when they are not too closely related to each other in the scale of nature. Out of this interdependence is built up an established order and regularity. So, too, the struggle for survival, including

life. The quotation is from p. 58 of *The World's Classics* series. New York: Oxford University Press, 1902.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59. Malthus' doctrine of population and food supply profoundly influenced Darwin's viewpoint. See chapter 12.

competition and conflict, lies at the basis of much of our human social order. Struggle also affects differentiation and division of labor, the formation of caste and class, accommodation and assimilation, and the development of institutions and various forms of social control.

Motives and oppositional interaction.

While the place of struggle in the larger operations of nature is well-recognized, when we come to examine opposition among men in society a number of difficulties arises. If we are to consider processes as basic and as more or less the common and universal foundation of all social forms and culture, then we must try to relate processes to motivation, on the one hand, and to rewards or goals, on the other.

The first clue to this matter is found in those activities which have to do with the relationship of the drive-reward cycles to sustenance, shelter, protection, and mating, and later to the derived motives for security, mastery, prestige, companionship, knowledge, and so on. Other persons enter, directly or indirectly, into almost all cycles of activity. Certainly in the matters which concern social science the *social act* is basic. These social relations may take the form of opposition — competition or conflict — or of co-operation. However, it is not necessary to posit an instinct of conflict or of competition, at least not in the older manner of some biologic entity that willy-nilly finds expression in man. Rather, the roots of these basic processes are to be found in the biosocial cycle from drive to satisfaction. (See chapter 8.)

Frustration and opposition. More specifically, the sources of competition and conflict appear to lie in the frustration or interference which comes into play between the motive and the quick attainment of the goal or reward. Not only are drives accompanied by emotions, but the blocking of the movement from drive to consummation sets up intense emotional-feeling states that serve further to stimulate the individual to strive toward his goal. Rage, fear, and love are

particularly associated with man's efforts to get what he wants.

If the individual is thus frustrated in his efforts to secure the wanted reward, he may proceed in various ways to avoid, offset, overcome, or get around the interference. The more usual ways in which this is done are: (1) He may make a highly emotionalized direct attack upon the object or situation which blocks his way. (2) If this fails, he may acquire the necessary skill and knowledge needed to attain the goal. And in this learning he may seek and obtain help from others. (3) If he fails to learn the needed techniques, or does not even try to acquire them, he may find a substitute for the original goal. This is well illustrated in compensation which may take the form of some overt object or some daydream or fantasy. (4) The individual, of course, may give up the effort either to reach the original reward or to secure a substitute. Rather, he regresses to an earlier state or avoids the situation. In the face of serious or prolonged crises some people make no effort to adapt themselves to their surroundings. Perhaps the most striking illustrations of this are found among the low-grade feeble-minded and in certain forms of mental disorder, especially in severe cases of schizophrenia. This is often marked by regression to infantile reactions. Yet even normal people do or may on occasion revert to childish means of overcoming their problems.

In the first three of these, at least, frustration is usually followed by some sort of aggression or strong persistence of effort. If this is highly emotionalized, especially with a marked rage and fear component, we call it overt aggression. This is an important feature of conflict. If the effort is marked by milder and reduced emotional-feeling tone, we may term it sublimated aggression.

Nevertheless the manner of handling frustrations is not independent of the nature and strength of the motive itself. The more powerful the drive, the more likely will the individual keep trying to satisfy it, either directly or by substitution. The most potent motivations, of course, are those for sustenance, protection, and mating, which are

the foundations of the cultural imperatives.

Whether related to the more pressing drives or to those which are secondary and learned, opposition has its roots in a social matrix. More rudimentary forms of social struggle are evident among the mammals. Among human beings, however, drives and interactions are overlaid at most points by cultural conditioning. For this reason it is not easy to delineate the original drives and early social acts of opposition.

While the degree of frustration which young children experience varies tremendously in different societies, there is little doubt that felt scarcity in the earliest months, in reference to either sustenance or affection or both, produces certain patterns on which later cultural conditioning is imposed. In other words, personal-social conditioning is basic, first, to dependence on and/or resistance to parental authority; second, to dominance; and, third, to sibling rivalry. As adults the direction and meaning of our competition and conflict may be culturally determined, but the fundamental form is everywhere set by such relatively noncultural but nonetheless social training.

Culture and competition. While culture itself is rooted in the very nature of man's basic drives and interactions, the particular goods — material or nonmaterial — for which he strives vary greatly, due to historical factors, accidents or circumstance of the time and place, and local adaptation to resources. In our own society we take competition and conflict so much for granted that it is difficult for us to understand a tribe or nation in which there is little or nothing of this sort of thing, at least in relation to the major survival interests of the group.

In fact, an examination of the far-ranging variabilities of culture makes it clear that whole societies may become conditioned to forms of economic and community life generally which are competitive or co-operative, depending on the nature of the central ethos or value system of the tribe in question. An excellent illustration of such variability is found in the survey of the culture of thirteen widely separated native tribes prepared under

the direction of Margaret Mead.⁷ Although in interpreting these surveys Mead found that the suggested division of social systems into competitive or co-operative was not entirely feasible, her analysis is helpful in indicating the relation of these two basic processes to the tribal structure and to the life organization of the individuals within these societies.⁸ Among other significant findings of this survey we may note the following:

(1) No matter what the nature of the cultural system was, strong self-esteem and sense of power could be found in individuals living therein. (2) There was no relation between the form of the system and the problem of sustenance and material resources. That is, there is no reason to assume that lack of food necessarily makes for either competition or co-operation. (3) The concept and valuation of individual success is determined more by the broad and general group emphasis on either competition or co-operation than upon the particular state of technology or the plenitude of food. (4) "There is a correspondence between: a major emphasis on competition, a social structure which depends upon the initiative of the individual, a valuation of property for individual ends, a single scale of success, and a strong development of the ego" [social self].⁹ This is the sort of pattern that characterizes our own society. And (5) "There is a correspondence between: a major emphasis upon co-operation, a social structure which does not depend upon individual initiative or the exercise of power over persons, a faith in an ordered universe, weak emphasis upon rising in status, and a high degree of security for the individual."¹⁰

It must be emphasized that in none of these tribes do we find either competition or

⁷ See Margaret Mead, ed., *Co-operation and competition among primitive peoples*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937. For a critical review of the psychological, sociological, and anthropological treatment of opposition and co-operation see M. A. May and L. W. Doob, *Competition and co-operation*, Social Science Research Council bulletin no. 25, 1937. The latter makes no adequate distinction between competition and conflict.

⁸ Mead posits a third category of "individualistic," which lies between the more distinctly competitive and co-operative cultures. While her particular interpretation is open to some question from a social-psychological point of view, the problem need not concern us here.

⁹ Mead, *op. cit.*, p. 511. By permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

co-operation wholly lacking. Such fundamental processes are correlative to each other. As economists long ago pointed out, competition rests on certain implicit agreements and co-operative attitudes to follow certain rules in the oppositional relations. Yet where one social-cultural organization tends to stress one process, the other process may be found to be less institutionalized and hence less recognized. But it is not likely to be entirely absent. As pointed out in chapter 4, the highly competitive Kwakiutl chieftains need the co-operation of their families and friends to support them in their contests and potlatches. So, too, we saw that the Zuni are not completely free of certain forms of person-to-person hostility.

Ralph Linton and Abram Kardiner, who have done so much to develop this field of personality-culture relations, cite an example of the effects of a basic change in economy upon social organization and individual traits.¹¹ Among the Tanala of Madagascar, the Betsileo tribe found it necessary to shift from the cultivation of dry rice to that of wet. This was due to effects of soil erosion among other things. The system of dry-rice farming was marked by communal ownership of land, a high degree of co-operation, and equal distribution of produce under an extremely authoritarian rule of the fathers. Under this somewhat rigid but paternalistic control the individual, though passive and obedient to authority, was well-adjusted. The shift to an economy of wet-rice farming brought in its wake some startling changes. Communal ownership gave way to individual ownership. There was a mad rush for favorable acres in near-by valleys. The individual became important, and he soon began to feel in sharp competition with his fellows over matters of rights as well as duties. The former family organization broke down, and there was a sharp increase in such deviant conduct as crime, homosexuality, black magic, and neuroticism. While in time the new social organization became somewhat stabilized, the rapid shift in a basic feature of the culture illustrates clearly how much given institutions influence the life organization of individuals.

It is clear, then, that competition may take a wide variety of forms. It may be central to some aspects of a cultural system and not to others. Moreover, under the impact of invention or of political revolution or of shifts in the resource base of an economy, striking changes may occur in the interplay of competition and other social processes.

Conflict. Conflict takes the form of emotionalized and violent opposition in which the major concern is to overcome the opponent as a means of securing a given goal or reward. In contrast to competition, which, at least in its stricter impersonal aspects, is unconscious and more or less continuous, conflict is an intermittent but highly conscious process. Of course, in many situations competition and conflict are interrelated, the conflict often arising at critical points in the more prolonged competitive process.

The sources of conflict lie in the frustrations which the individual experiences in his primary-group training. As an adult the fighting pattern may be transferred, by means largely of cultural definition, to a wide range of situations. In other words, the conflict will be affected by the nature of the group and its particular culture. The objects of conflict may be property, power and status, freedom of action and thought, or any other highly desired value. In a society characterized by militarism, warfare is considered a desirable form of existence. Where economic interests loom large and there are many individuals or groups striving for material gain and power, conflict of economic interests may and does supplement the competitive process. If sectarianism is rife, we may expect conflict to take on a religious tone. In other words, the culturally determined values of a society will set the stage for its particular struggles.

Not only is the form of conflict modified by the particular societal order and the culture, but everywhere there arise regulations to govern it. In the feud there are certain accepted methods for killing the other fellow. Lynching follows a certain tradition.

¹¹ See Abram Kardiner, *The individual and his society*, chapters 7, 8. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

Where the conflict is infrequent and where no adequate techniques are worked out, more violent and unpredictable sorts of conflict arise, as in race riots. In war, of course, there are all sorts of rules more or less agreed upon by the belligerents during the interludes of peace. Litigation and the conflict of impersonal ideas have the most severe rules of all. The former are those laid down by the law, which in theory is impersonal and just to all. In the struggle of philosophic and scientific ideas the rules are those of logic and scientific method. All personal interest of a subjective sort is supposed to be absent.

At its most rudimentary level conflict results in the elimination or annihilation of

the opponent. In human society, however, most conflict ends in some sort of agreement, or accommodation, or perhaps in the fusion of the two opposing elements. There is a cycle in the whole process somewhat as follows: (1) a felt need for some object which is limited in its supply; (2) struggle with others for this object; (3) the resolution of the conflict by annihilation or reduction of the opponent to ineffectiveness or by some form of accommodation or other method of adaptation. As we shall see, the structure of society is profoundly influenced by this balancing of forces in opposition.

(For Interpretative Summary, see the end of chapter 6.)



Social-Cultural Processes

(continued)

THIS CHAPTER will deal with co-operation and differentiation as two other major processes. Then will follow a discussion of such derived or secondary processes as stratification, accommodation, and assimilation.

Co-operation and Differentiation

As already noted, co-operation as well as opposition is a basic feature of human interaction. These ambivalent patterns appear to underlie all other more specialized social processes. As Albion W. Small (1854-1926), one of the founders of sociology in America, put it: "Struggle and co-operation are correlates in every situation," that is, there is either "conjunction" or "conflict" of interests.¹ Yet the interplay of these two processes is not always appreciated. Some writers consider opposition the fundamental form of interaction, others believe that co-operation is the basic social process. For example, some use the term co-operation as a synonym for almost all social contact, contending that opponents in fighting must "co-operate" in order to exchange blows, or that traders "co-operate" in their market relations, or that the compromise of disputes between laborers and employers represents a form of co-operation. Such broad and loose use of the concept co-operation makes it practically identical with our use of the terms *interaction* and *social*, and thus too vague a concept for effective description and analysis. We limit co-operation to a more specific aspect of human intercourse, having to do with mutual aid or an alliance of persons or groups toward some common

goal or reward; in short, as some kind of conjoint rather than opposing action.

Co-operation. The roots of co-operation, as of opposition, are found in nature. While Darwin indicated that both were essential in the adaptive activities of plants and animals in the struggle for survival, it was Prince P. A. Kropotkin (1842-1921), a Russian geographer and social philosopher, who stressed the place of mutual aid as particularly important in nature and in society.²

Students of plant and animal adaptation use the concept co-operation to apply, first, to certain mutual support or interdependence that develops when different species live together in a given place; and, second, with reference to mutual aid or helpfulness among members of the same species. The former is sometimes known as *symbiosis* or *commensalism*. Symbiosis means literally "living together." It is a form of biological partnership and may occur among plants and/or animals, depending on the circumstances. This mutual aid and interdependence in nature looms so large that special disciplines of botany and zoology are devoted to it. We call these respectively plant and animal ecology. W. G. McGee's report on the ecological relations of plants and animals in a desert environment is a classic picture of symbiosis:

"A mesquite springs up on the plain; within two or three years the birds resting in its branches drop the seeds of cacti, some of which, like vines, are unable to stand alone; and the cactus and the mesquite combine their armature of thorns for mutual protection.

¹ Albion W. Small, *General sociology*, pp. 357, 203. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905.

² See P. A. Kropotkin, *Mutual aid, a factor in evolution*, rev. ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1917. The first English edition appeared in 1902.

Then wind-blown grass seeds lodge about the roots, and grasses grow and seed beneath the sheltering branches; and next small mammals seek the same protection and dig their holes among the roots, giving channels for the water of the ensuing rain and fertilizing the spot with rejectamenta. Meantime the annual and semi-annual plants which maintain a precarious existence in the desert take root in the sheltered and fertilized soil beneath the growing cactus and mesquite, and in season it becomes a miniature garden of foliage and bloomage. Then certain ants come for the seeds, certain flies and wasps for the nectar, and certain birds to nest in the branches. In this way a community is developed in which each participant retains individuality, yet in which each contributes to the general welfare. So advantageous is the communal arrangement that few organisms of the drier portions [of this region] pursue independent careers. . . . Thus do a large part of the plants and animals of the desert dwell together in harmony and mutual helpfulness; for their energies are directed not so much against one another as against the rigorous environmental conditions growing out of dearth of water."³

In this instance the plants and animals retained their independence of function while mutually aiding each other. In some cases the interrelations are much closer, each species member depending specifically on the other for food or protection. A good example of this is the relation of certain polyps to the hermit crab to which they attach themselves.

Sociology has drawn upon biology for some of its concepts of certain processes which describe the relations of men and groups to each other against the background of geographic and other environmental factors. We shall examine some of these in chapters 10, 12, 13, 14, and 15.

Intraspecies co-operation. The second type of co-operation, namely that between and among members of the same species, is of high importance among human beings. It is this phase of co-operation, in fact, which gets so much attention in social

psychology. Yet students of human society should not neglect the interspecies forms of mutuality and interdependence.

With reference, however, to intraspecies forms of co-operation, some striking prototypes of human behavior in this area are seen among the mammals, especially among the monkeys and apes. The roots of co-operation rest first of all in the dependency of the newborn on the mother. From this arise other interdependencies. Primary is the child's need for food as it is related to the relief of the lactic tensions set up in the nursing mother. Other interdependencies emerge in the protective situations of mother-ape and infant as when the parent carries the offspring from place to place. Later in the play life co-operation as well as opposition comes into operation.

Students of ape societies report various instances of co-operation among adult members. Wolfgang Köhler tells of the conjoint, though awkward, efforts of a number of chimpanzees to pile up a number of boxes in the compound so as to reach bananas suspended at the top of the wire netting. While such teamwork was not, from a human standpoint, efficient — the piles of boxes constantly fell apart as the apes clambered upon them — the action reveals a social pattern of mutual helpfulness in which each contributed his individual effort to a perceived common goal. Köhler also reports that one ape might take care of and protect and feed another that is ill.⁴

Various experiments have also shown that apes may be taught to work together at tasks similar to those they have learned to do when alone. Thus, M. P. Crawford trained pairs of apes — previously conditioned to pull on ropes — to act together in pulling a foodbox which was too heavy for either ape to pull by himself. Only when the pair would work together would they get the food reward for their efforts. On the whole, the degree of co-operation was influenced by the responsiveness of the partner, by the extent of friendly contacts in other situations, by strength of individual drive toward food, by dominance-submission relations elsewhere, and by intelligence.⁵

⁴ See Wolfgang Köhler, *The mentality of apes*, 2nd rev. ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1926.

⁵ See M. P. Crawford, "The co-operative solving of problems by young chimpanzees," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1937, 14; no. 2, serial no. 68.

³ W. G. McGee, "The beginnings of agriculture," *American Anthropologist*, o. s., 1895, 8: 365. By per-

Similar but more complex patterns of mutual aid are found among human groups. Such habits and attitudes begin in infancy and childhood within the family, the play group, and the neighborhood. Upon the basis of what the child acquires in these primary groups he will develop a wide variety of co-operative action patterns as an adult. (See chapter 9.)

Psychology of co-operation. Dependence and love provide the background of sympathy and identification without which there can be no co-operation, and individual differences in ability in the face of various potential roles provide the groundwork for that division of labor which makes interdependent functions in co-operation possible.

We cannot have co-operation without the development of sympathy. And sympathy depends upon the capacity of one individual to imagine himself in the place of another. Co-operation, therefore, rests upon the identification of one person with another, looking toward the same common result. The ego or self expands to include others within itself. The more selfish impulses are inhibited or blocked in the demands of the situation for mutual helpfulness. There results from this a like-mindedness or similarity of purpose and plans.

Yet, for rudimentary mutual helpfulness to develop into more deliberate form, people must first of all be directly motivated to seek a goal that may be shared. Second, they must acquire some knowledge of the benefits of such activity; hence the need for education to foster co-operation. Third, they must get a favorable attitude toward sharing both the work and the rewards involved. And, finally, they need to equip themselves with the necessary skills to make the co-operative plan go.⁶

Like opposition, co-operation arises from the orientation of the individual to the in-group and to the out-group. While com-

petition, rivalry, and conflict may arise in the in-group, it is evident that the in-group could not persist were it not for co-operation. The solidarity of the in-group is expressed most strongly through mutual aid, helpfulness, and loyalty to the group-accepted symbols. Such co-operation is most in evidence when the in-group stands in sharp opposition toward some other body of persons, the out-group. The very strength of the in-group feeling of solidarity rests in part upon the fact that antagonistic feelings are directed toward some out-group. The intensity of the we-group feelings seems correlated with the intensity of antagonism to the others-group.

Co-operation also imposes various forms of restraint upon the participant. The self cannot have its way entirely if it is working co-operatively with another self. If the self-assertive trends get too strong, the co-operation may easily cease and be replaced by struggle. Co-operation always implies inhibition of certain ego-centered drives. As we advance to higher, that is, to more conscious and complex, forms of co-operation, this fact becomes more evident. From the restraint so imposed there arises a moral strength which stands in contrast to the impulsiveness and lack of self-control found in uninhibited conflict. In the struggle of one group against another this is highly important, as it is, also, in controlling the relations of persons to each other within the group itself.

The function of co-operation is well summarized in the following words of C. H. Cooley (1864-1929): "Co-operation . . . arises when men see that they have a common interest and have, at the same time, sufficient intelligence and self-control to seek this interest through united action: perceived unity of interest and the faculty of organization are the essential facts in intelligent combination."⁷

Co-operation and culture. We need not posit an instinct of sociability or gregarious-

⁶ See M. A. May and L. W. Doob, *Competition and co-operation*. New York: Social Science Research Council Bulletin, no. 25, 1937.

⁷ C. H. Cooley, *Sociological theory and social research*, p. 176. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1930. By permission.

ness in order to explain co-operation. The facts of interaction, especially in reference to the family alone, furnish sufficient ground upon which to construct the co-operative social order which we find everywhere. Beyond the family the neighborhood, the play group, and the whole set of secondary groups call for co-operation. Human co-operation is a form of interaction of two or more persons or groups striving toward some goal or reward which may be shared in material goods, in prestige and power, or in some other accepted satisfaction. But culture gives it pitch and direction.

With reference to our own society there appears to be far more conditioning of the child, youth, and adult in competitive and conflict attitudes, habits, and ideas than in those involving co-operation. Yet our society and culture are not entirely given over to conflict nor to raw competitive individualism. Within the class, the team, the trade union, the employers' association, the religious fraternity, interdependence and mutual aid are absolutely essential. But in all these the fundamental values are frequently those of the competitive-conflictive ethos or spirit.

An illustration of a different cultural view of co-operation may be cited. S. D. Porteus, a psychologist, tells the story of his difficulty in getting certain natives of Australia to work individually and competitively on some intelligence tests he put before them. The natives turned to him for help to do the task and were clearly upset emotionally when he refused it. Porteus had been adopted as a tribal brother on an earlier occasion, and the natives simply could not understand how a person in such a relationship to them could refuse to co-operate with them in a task put before them.⁸

Surely from an ethnocentric standpoint forms of co-operation found in other societies, primitive or modern, may strike us as being absurd and the individuals therein as lacking in ambition and initiative. In fact, there is some evidence that undue

emphasis on co-operativeness may serve to reduce personal aggression and drive for leadership, at least as we define these behavior traits in our culture.⁹ Also, some of the handicaps to the spread of economic and political co-operative movements in capitalist countries seem to derive from lack of aggressive leadership, intense emotional appeal for a cause, and from failure to correlate the co-operative patterns of in-group nature with the ambivalent ones of opposition. These deficiencies may well reflect the absence of general cultural support for co-operative, nonaggressive leadership and organization.

Nevertheless, co-operation is never completely absent. Among men as among animals there is a good deal of nondeliberate mutual aid, especially in times of danger to life. Even in our highly individualistic, competitive world men have also been conditioned, in primary-group situations especially, to interdependence and aid to each other in times of stress. Certainly such patterns are distinctly culturized for us through our Judeo-Christian religion. Again it must be recalled that competition and conflict are closely related. For example, in one situation members of a group may be highly co-operative toward each other and definitely conflictive toward other groups. The *ethos* of the particular culture will define the nature and degree of such co-operation and conflict.

Differentiation. Another universal process is that of differentiation. It emerges wherever special functions develop in terms of such variations as age, sex, or other elements. The roots of differentiation lie in opposition and co-operation. Again there are certain prototypes of this process among the lower animal forms. The social training of the young among monkeys and apes by

⁸ See S. D. Porteus, *Psychology of a primitive people; a study of the Australian aborigine*, pp. 308-309. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1931.

⁹ See Gardner Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental social psychology*, rev. ed., p. 519, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937, for a review of studies made in Kiev, Russia, which indicate that young children conditioned to the collectivist spirit appear to be less likely to develop leadership in the play situation than those who were not so trained at home.

the mother rests on age differences. So, too, the sexual behavior of these species represents specialization in activity, the male, in general, being more aggressive, the female more passive.

Certainly all human societies show variations in conduct, especially in role and status. These rest, essentially, on differences in age, sex, intelligence, occupation, and capacity for dominance or leadership. While the particular function of the individual in terms of his years will vary, all societies give a place to childhood different from the one they give to maturity or old age. Everywhere women bear children and care for them while the fathers and husbands carry on certain strenuous activities remote from the close attachment to home and hearth. Everywhere we find some individuals who dominate others in varying social situations. Except in the most rudimentary societies, there is always some division of labor.

Since we shall discuss these differences in detail in chapters 25, 26, and 27, we need say no more about them at this point except to repeat that differentiation, along with opposition and co-operation, may be regarded as a universal social process. However, as we shall see, its direction and content will vary with the particular culture.

Derived Social Processes

Society is an array of individuals and groups constantly adjusting and readjusting to each other and to the physical environment. As noted above, conflict does not usually go on continuously. Even competition, which is more persistent, may lead to some more co-operative relations. Accommodation is one form of the working arrangements which may arise among opposing individuals or groups. So, too, out of differentiation and accommodation may come a stratified class structure. In other instances of opposition, there may occur in time a mingling or synthesis of the cultural elements of formerly hostile groups, or assimilation. Accommodation and assimilation may be operative in what most anthropologists call acculturation. Yet, in the

emergence of accommodation and assimilation, co-operation and differentiation may also have a part. In a sense accommodation is a form of antagonistic or enforced co-operation; and, broadly speaking, some aspects of accommodation and stratification also involve a mutual recognition of differences in function. This section will examine the more important of these derived processes.

Stratification. Not only does differentiation in terms of age, sex, and mentality affect division of labor and various roles of individuals, but groupings in terms of relative position or status on a scale of rights and privileges are to be found in practically all but the simplest nonliterate peoples. Such a grading of people we call stratification. However, the concept refers both to the process by which people are arranged along a scale of status and also to the institutions that result from such grading. As a process it has to do with the forms of interaction involved in the status relations within what we call class or caste. When we deal with stratification from the institutional side, we concern ourselves with the important features and functions associated with the class structure. These include codes, rules, rights, duties, social myths, and the symbols of identification and difference as they characterize status.

Since an entire chapter will be devoted to the nature and function of the class system in terms of stratification, we need say no more about it here. (See chapter 28.)

Accommodation. As a rule accommodation has been used in two senses, as a condition of institutional arrangement and as a process. As a *condition* it refers to the fact of equilibrium between individuals and groups and the rules of the game which have been developed. The "proper" etiquette, the "agreements" developed between conflicting economic groups, and the techniques, traditions, and arrangements which define the relations of persons and groups are forms of accommodation.

As a *process* accommodation has to do with the conscious efforts of men to develop such working arrangements among themselves as will temporarily suspend conflict and to make their relations more tolerable and less wasteful of energy. It concerns the movement toward the accommodated state. It is a means of resolving conflict without the complete destruction or absorption of the opponent, or without either entirely losing the former identity. It takes place at a conscious but not necessarily rational level and for the most part is arrived at by formal and external regulations or arrangements.

The intent or aim of accommodation may vary somewhat with the circumstances. (1) It may act to reduce the conflict between persons or groups as an initial step to synthesis of differences into a new pattern; that is, it may lead to assimilation. (2) It may serve to postpone outright conflict for a specific period of time, as in a treaty between nations or in a labor-management agreement. (3) It may permit groups marked by sharp social-psychological distance to get along together. In this particular it is closely related to stratification as seen in class or caste systems. So, too, (4) it may prevent what is considered in terms of cultural norms to be an undesirable amalgamation or biological inbreeding of two groups and their subsequent assimilation.¹⁰

Sometimes the accommodation is viewed by the parties thereto as mutually beneficial. In other instances the arrangements are more or less imposed on one group by another with superior power and prestige. In any case the cultural acceptances and expectancies will play a part in the relation of the underpinning of accommodation to what takes place in the superstructure.

In spite of a balancing of opposing interests in order to secure social peace, there often remain incipient or potential conflicts. The persistence of prejudices, myths, legends, and other culture traits of opposition and conflict as a part of the total accommodative residue is evidence of this.

Some new crisis, some new situation for which the accommodation of the past is not prepared, is all that is usually needed to set aflame the latent conflict. For this very reason it is important that in the accommodative process provision be made for building up and strengthening those ideas, attitudes, and habits that foster the continuation of these accepted relations. In the event of a new crisis, these may limit the emotional extremity to which the new conflict will go.

Forms of accommodation. Accommodative arrangements between groups or individuals may take a variety of forms. These run a course from coercion through compromise and conciliation to toleration. While we shall have occasion later to see how these come into play in certain processual situations, let us note the chief features of each form of accommodation.

Coercion is a type of accommodation in which action and thought in social relationships are determined by constraint, compulsion, or force. Coercion implies the existence of the weak and the strong in any conflict. It takes two forms, physical or direct application of force, and psychological or indirect. For example, slavery is an arrangement in which the basic social interaction is one of domination by master and subjection by slave. A slave is one who is not free. Yet there can be no slaves if there are no free men. Slavery implies absence of political rights, compulsory labor, and property rights of the master in the slave as an individual.

Various political dictatorships represent other instances of coercive accommodation in which a strongly disciplined minority seizes the reins of power and inflicts its control on whole populations. It is a mistake to assume that such despotism is never welcome as a means of settling conflicts. Where older values and practices are lost and where there rages a multiple struggle between warring interests, the masses come in time to look for a strong man who will bring order and peace. Such a person was Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), who stabilized France after its bloody revolution. So, too, Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) did something of this sort for Italy after World War I. It was similar with

¹⁰ See M. J. Vincent, *The accommodation process in industry*, p. 4. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1930.

Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) and the rise of Nazism in Germany. And under Nicolai Lenin (1870–1924), Joseph Stalin, and others, the Communist Party unified a discordant Russia and in time welded it into a powerful nation-state.

Of course, coercion is not confined to slavery, conquest, revolution, and international relations. It may occur in situations involving racial, religious, industrial, or other conflicts. No doubt the basic conditioning of the individual to the use of force and dominance in bringing about a resolution of a conflict lies in the family and other primary groups to which the individual is first exposed.

The socially disintegrative effects of coercion in the modern world are apparent. Despotism and exploitation go hand in hand. Since coercion rests on force, it is very easy in the accommodative process for the dictator to confuse the use and the abuse of this same power. Power, like jealousy, grows by what it feeds on. Such constraint, too, breeds fraud. The masses and officials often develop all sorts of devices of petty graft or deceit for escaping the rigorous rules of conduct laid down by the dictator and his party. Outer conformity by no means implies inner conviction. Hypocrisy is an easy outgrowth of coercive measures. This was amply shown in the rise of underground movements, black-market operations, graft, and fraud during Nazi domination of parts of Europe (1938–1945). This counterbalance to coercive accommodations, in fact, is seen wherever the police state takes over. It is a nice problem as to whether a highly complex industrial and political order can be erected on the basis of accommodative patterns of outright force and domination.

Compromise, unlike coercive accommodation, implies a fair degree of equality in bargaining power of two contestants. It may be defined as a conscious method of settling a conflict in which all parties agree to renounce or reduce some of their demands in the interest of peace. Readiness to compromise means that groups and individuals are able to view themselves somewhat dispassionately and to see themselves as others see them. Intransigent attitudes generated in the heat of conflict give way to more reasonable considerations. Examples of compromise are seen in international agreements and more often in management-labor disputes as to wages, hours of work, and other conditions of employment. So, too,

in a political democracy, warring parties or factions resolve their differences in forms of compromise. This is especially the case when they are about evenly matched as to voting power.

Arbitration is but a special device for bringing about compromise when the contending parties themselves are unable to end their struggle. Disputes are settled by a third party who may be chosen by the opposing sides or appointed by some larger agency of power, as in the case of legalized compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. *Mediation*, closely akin to arbitration, means the introduction of a neutral agent into a conflict situation whose efforts are bent to bring about a peaceful settlement. But the mediator has no power to settle the conflict. His function is advisory only. The use of arbitrators or mediators is common in industrial and religious disputes in our society.

Closely related to compromise is *conciliation*, which is an attempt to reconcile the disputants as a means of bringing about an agreement. While in the industrial conflicts of modern capitalist society arbitration is frequently linked with both mediation and conciliation, the standpoint is somewhat distinct in the latter. In our modern industrial system certain forms of conciliation have grown up as a permanent program for settling disputes between owners and workers. Such organizations are variously called "works councils" or "shop committees," which may or may not exist independently of trade unions. In these organizations representatives of the owners and workers set up institutional devices for handling disputes as to wages, hours, and other working conditions. Conciliation has also been used in racial and religious struggles. As in other situations, the attitudes and values of each side will limit the means of accommodation used. Conciliation always implies a milder response to an opponent than in the case of coercion. In the end conciliation, like toleration, opens the door to assimilation of contending groups.

In a world of human beings, in which emotions and feelings and not reflective thinking play such a large part, compromise will continue to be an important method of settling conflict. There is no reason to abandon the position that the cultural and social world is one of balance and change,

not some absolute entity in which there is but one course to follow. While some strain may remain after a compromise, while one does not have everything one wishes from it, it does have certain advantages in a world of temporizing. In our earliest social relations all of us learn to get along with half measures. To operate in the social world on the all-or-none principle is extremely difficult. We soon discover it will not get us the things that we wish. In a world of contending wishes and interests and a limited supply of goods, material or otherwise, compromise seems inevitable.

In any case, discussion between the parties to a conflict is an essential aspect of accommodation as it is expressed in compromise, arbitration, mediation, and conciliation. Deliberation as a means of settling differences is linked to the culture patterns of democracy, individualism, liberalism, and the scientific attitude. It means that conflict is reduced in intensity from overt force to the level of verbal give-and-take. This allows for a more objective consideration of many phases of the struggle and in the end should lay the foundation for a consensus of attitudes and opinions so essential to any agreement which is worked out by the contending groups. One of the problems of international accommodation is the continuing difficulty in reducing accommodative relations from those of coercion to milder forms. (See chapter 24.)

Another form of accommodation is *toleration*, or better, *tolerant participation*. It is an outgrowth of the live-and-let-live policy just noted. It is a form of accommodation without formal agreement. Sometimes it is not entirely deliberate and conscious but grows up from long-continuing avoidances developed to soften hostilities. There have been many instances of this type of arrangement, such as among various language and nationality groupings in central Europe and among some of our Southwest Indians, as between the Navaho and the Pueblo group. Some of the color-caste relations between Negroes and whites, and between other majority and minority groups, gradually take on this form of relationship:

While accommodation is usually discussed from the angle of group relations rather than interpersonal ones, there is always a body of ideas, attitudes, opinions, and habits of individuals which comes into play in these situations. The psychology of coercion-domination is surely distinct from that found in conciliation or toleration. In the former there is more evident aggression on the part of the more powerful and more evident submissiveness on the part of the weaker. The individual who is identified with the superior group takes on views of himself and his fellows quite unlike the members of the submerged group. Some aspects of this will be noted when we discuss the class structure of society. (See chapter 28.)

Assimilation. If person-to-person, person-to-group, or group-to-group relations remained at the level of accommodation, there would occur no fusion of groups, large or small, and their cultures. To bring this about involves more fundamental changes in the entire culture system and correspondingly in individuals than we find in the somewhat externalized arrangements of accommodation. *Assimilation* means the common blending and sharing of folkways, mores, laws, and ways of life generally of two or more groups or societies or peoples that formerly had distinctive patterns. Assimilation takes place only where there is more or less continuous and direct contact. It is slow and halting, although the world's history and prehistory are full with examples of such merging of cultures. Among other striking cases was assimilation of Anglo-Saxon and Norman cultures in Britain in the two centuries following 1066, when the Normans invaded England. The so-called American "melting pot" is a contemporary instance. This assimilation is still going on although class and other differences tend to impede it.

Assimilation does not take place on all fronts with equal effectiveness or speed. The time factor and the particular cultural elements involved are both qualifying influences. It goes on much more easily at some points of culture contact than at others.

The process itself will be influenced chiefly by the following factors: (1) the racial characteristics as interpreted culturally; (2) the social heritage or culture of the migrant; (3) the native culture and society into which he is introduced; and (4) certain personality clashes of members of both groups. For example, immigrants from the British Isles to the United States have so much in common with the Americans of old stock that assimilation is easy. Those who come from northwestern continental Europe require more time than the British, yet they also have much in common with the older American stock. In contrast, peoples of southern and eastern Europe who come to the United States possess many more divergent culture traits which retard the rate of assimilation and produce many social and personal problems.

In contrast to accommodation, which is largely conscious and segmental in relation to the total personality, assimilation depends on relations of unconscious and largely primary sort. For the individual, accommodation involves only those segments of his personality which center around the points of contact with another group, such as concern a job, a religion, or a class or caste relationship. In assimilation the process, when completed, reaches into the unconscious and deeper and wider areas of the personality. It touches all the fundamental values, attitudes, and habits.

Assimilation and amalgamation. So far as interpersonal relations go, full assimilation almost always implies intermarriage of members of the originally divergent groups. Without biological *amalgamation* complete assimilation is hardly possible. When persons of the different cultures intermarry, family life is bound to be affected. The children will be exposed to training from both cultures. This cannot but result in some integration of the elements of each culture into new ideas, attitudes, values, and habits. While the first-generation children may also have some conflicts from disparate features of the two cultures, in subsequent generations such conflicts tend

to disappear as the merger is carried still further.

Yet it is well to note that mere intermixture of races will not induce assimilation. Amalgamation must itself become a part of the mores and laws to make it an effective agent of assimilation. For instance, in the United States there has been considerable racial crossing between whites and colored, but there certainly has been little true assimilation in spite of much common culture. For most important relations, accommodation and stratification rather than assimilation have been the rule. On the other hand, with our migrant groups, most of whom have a common racial origin with the older American stock, intermarriage is a definite indication of a fusion of cultures. Moreover, the very fact that male immigrants tended to outnumber female immigrants, especially those in the childbearing age, created a situation that favored the marriage of foreign-born men with women of native or mixed parentage. Also, the decline in the in-take of new immigrants in recent decades has facilitated amalgamation and the emergence of a distinctive American culture made up of a variety of earlier elements.

Assimilation and acculturation. In recent years, with the rapprochement of sociology and anthropology, the concept *acculturation* has come into wide use. The term has been used loosely by some to mean socialization and even diffusion. But most anthropologists now use it as the resultant effects of the interaction of two or more cultures which are in more or less constant contact. As the anthropologists view the matter, the effects may involve a more or less complete absorption of one culture by another, or a more or less equal merging of elements from both or several cultures. In one pertinent discussion of acculturation Ralph Linton stresses such factors as first-hand contact, continuity of contact, the importance of the time element, and such steps in the process as the initial acceptance of a new cultural feature; its spread among other members of a society, and the

"modification by which it is finally adjusted to the pre-existing culture matrix."¹¹

As discussed by the anthropologists, then, acculturation covers a wide range of relations between two or more formerly distinct culture patterns or cultural systems. From the standpoint of many American sociologists, the term has been used to cover what has customarily been included under the terms accommodation and assimilation. Thus, A. L. Kroeber discusses "acculturation with and without dominance and assimilation," citing examples of the accommodative relations of Christian and Mohammedan societies at points of recurrent contact, of the "hybrid" patterns of Japanese and Occidental elements in modern Japan, and of American Indian and Spanish culture patterns found in Latin America.¹² In contrast, large segments of the classical culture of Greece and Rome became synthesized or assimilated with Hebraic and Germanic patterns with the rise of the Christian-feudal system of the Middle Ages and have continued down into our own time.

¹¹ From Ralph Linton, ed., *Acculturation in seven American Indian tribes*, p. 470. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940. On this topic see also Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and M. J. Herskovits, "A memorandum for the study of acculturation," *American Anthropologist*, n. s., 1936, 38:149-152, and M. J. Herskovits, *Acculturation; the study of culture contact*, New York: J. J. Augustin, 1938.

¹² See A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology; race, language, culture, psychology, prehistory*, new rev. ed., pp. 425-437. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948.

The whole question of the degree of acculturation, that is, the interplay of accommodation and assimilation, is crucial to our modern world, not only in the relations of nations with each other in peace and war, but also in the relations of classes to each other within national states. We shall return to this topic in chapters 24 and 28.

Other social-cultural processes. In addition to the universal and more or less recurrent processes which we have so far discussed, there are others which are directly related to the development, cumulation, and change of society and its culture. These we ordinarily deal with in terms of invention and borrowing. Yet sociology owes much to the anthropologists for having provided us with a number of concepts which enable us to deal more adequately with various details of how culture grows and changes.


We shall reserve our discussion of these concepts until chapter 30, where various aspects of social-cultural change are presented. As we shall see, many of the processes already discussed also play a part in growth and change of culture.

So, too, in treating the interrelations of individuals and groups with the geographic environment, sociology has developed a number of other dynamic concepts, especially those borrowed from plant and animal ecology. They will be introduced in discussing community life. (See chapters 14 and 15.)

Interpretative Summary

1. Interaction is the basic concept in dealing with social relations of individuals or groups.
2. Interaction may be physical or symbolic.
3. Interaction takes place in terms of personal-social or cultural contacts. The former are chiefly confined to the early months and years of life.
4. Socialization is a broad concept to cover the process of inducting the individual into his social-cultural world.
5. Enculturation is a more specific term to stress the continuing impact of culture, both in the formative years and throughout life.
6. But in order to understand the many facets of human relations, there have come into use concepts for more particular but universal processes. There are the constantly recurrent ones of opposition, co-operation, and differentiation. While these are influenced as to direction and emphasis by cultural, that is, historical, factors, they are found in all societies in varying amounts. From these, in turn, emerge others which,

FIGURE 2
BASIC SOCIAL PROCESSES
 Interpersonal — Intergroup



Socialization begins with induction of new members into society and culture, but it is continuous.

PERSONAL-SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LEARNING

(Enculturation becomes increasingly important with time.)

Time Sequence → life career line of the individual

though not found everywhere at all times, nonetheless are widespread and potentially universal. That is, given certain social-cultural conditions, they are certain to appear. Such are stratification, accommodation, and assimilation. The latter two are sometimes combined under the concept acculturation. Figure 2 is a tentative scheme of the chief interrelations of the major and the derived processes.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

(for chapters 5 and 6)

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define interaction and distinguish between direct and symbolic forms. Illustrate each.
2. Distinguish between personal-social and cultural forms of interaction.
3. Define and illustrate socialization.
4. Define opposition, co-operation, and differentiation.
5. Comment critically on the view that these represent three basic and universal forms of interaction.
6. How does culture determine with whom and for what we co-operate? Could co-operation be made compulsory, say, at the hands of an all-powerful state or church? Would it be effective and satisfying?
7. According to Darwin, what are the basic "reasons" for the struggle for existence in nature? Do any of these factors operate in human society?
8. What is meant by saying that competition and conflict are social acts?
9. Illustrate from your own experience instances in which personal competition has played a part in your relations with the family, church, a job, a companion.
10. Distinguish between conflict and competition. Illustrate.
11. What are the biological and psychological roots of conflict?
12. How does culture give direction and meaning to conflict? Illustrate.
13. What is meant by "derived" social process? Illustrate.
14. What is meant by stratification?
15. Distinguish between accommodation and assimilation; between assimilation and acculturation; between amalgamation and assimilation.
16. What, if any, are the psychological and cultural inadequacies of coercive accommodation? Under what conditions is it effective?
17. Why did peoples of northwestern Europe become assimilated to American culture more readily than did those of southern and eastern Europe? What aspect of the process does this illustrate?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes of chapters 5 and 6, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

C. H. Cooley, *Social process*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918.

One of the sociological classics on the topic; full of rich insight.

J. L. Gillin and J. P. Gillin, *Cultural sociology*, chapters 20-22. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948.

A good discussion of interaction, accommodation, and assimilation, with interesting concrete examples.

W. H. Hamilton, "Competition," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 4: 141-147. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

A critical review of the concept and its use in the social sciences by a distinguished economist.

H. D. Lasswell, "Conflict, social," *ibid.*, 4: 194-196.

An incisive analysis of the concept and its use in the social sciences by a distinguished political scientist.

W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology*, chapters 12, 13. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940.

A brief but incisive discussion of co-operation, competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation.

Robert E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology*, chapters 4-6, 8-11. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921.

A combination of source materials and theoretical discussions, this is still the classic discussion of social processes in English.

Robert E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World traits transplanted*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1921.

One of the best analyses in English of the processes of interaction involved in the immigrant adjustment to American culture.

Robert L. Sutherland and Julian L. Woodward, *Introductory sociology*, 3rd ed., chapters 22-25. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1948.

A competent discussion of interaction and particularly of competition, co-operation, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. Good concrete illustrations.

Hereditv, Maturation, and Environment

INDIVIDUALS vary greatly among themselves. Some are tall; some are short; most cluster around a mode. In matters of intelligence, some students are quick to learn, others rather slow; but most of them are neither very bright nor very dull, rather, they are what we call average or mediocre. The fact of individual differences is well-known, and this applies — in most matters — to members of the same family as well as to people not related by blood.

On the other hand, individuals are greatly alike. All of us possess the same general physical characteristics as to bodily form and organs. As we shall note in chapter 11 on race, in spite of certain broad physical differences, the human species is basically the same everywhere. We all have the same fundamental needs for sustenance, shelter, mutual protection, and sexual expression, though perhaps we differ among ourselves in the intensity of given drives. In similar manner, except for the most evident biological handicaps, everyone has some capacity to learn to get along more or less effectively in his surroundings.

Moreover, if we look at blood relatives, at parents and children and at brothers and sisters, we find that in many matters they resemble each other more closely than they resemble nonrelatives. We say that a girl "is the picture of her mother" or we comment on the resemblance of brothers and sisters in color, stature, and perhaps in mentality or temperament. Similarities are even more striking, of course, in identical twins, who are so much alike that we say "we can't tell them apart."

In trying to explain these things we say that "like produces like," that such resem-

blances depend on inheritance from the parents. But it is also true that many likenesses are produced by the world around us. Like climate and diet may induce many similarities in a population. Common speech and common ways of thinking and doing certainly make for resemblance in both appearance and behavior. And per contra, variations in climate, diet, and culture tend to produce differences. It may be contended that if parents dressed their identical twins differently some of the assumed resemblances would disappear. Individual differences, of course, are not merely the result of outside forces but are also the product of biological inheritance.

The discussion of the relation of heredity to environment has given rise to a lot of nonsense. Behavior traits in others or in ourselves which we do not like, we blame on something called original nature or heredity. "Well, you might expect as much; he's just like his father, and you know there is bad blood in that family" — so one person characterizes another who has done something which is not socially approved. Privileged economic classes find support for their domination from writers who argue that business success is due to sound family stock. Crime, delinquency, insanity, poverty, even unemployment have been explained away by popular notions of heredity. Race and immigration problems have been settled on assumptions of profound biological differences in races and nationalities by those who wish to believe in a new form of scientific predestination.

Just as there are persons who hold that heredity is largely responsible for all our geniuses and inventors, or for all of our

criminals and fools, there are others who discount almost entirely the place of heredity and believe environment is more important in social life. Many contend that, given the proper environment, one may make a child into almost any sort of personality, to order, as it were. Many would-be reformers and dreamers of a social Utopia, or ideal society, assume that the proper organization of environment would completely overhaul original nature and make children and adults into perfect beings only "a little lower than the angels." Naturally, they imagine that their own ideas rather closely conform to what this proper environment should be. Doubtless the truth of this whole matter lies somewhere between these extremes.

In addition to these two views, some writers have recently stressed maturation, or growth from within, as an important factor in establishing the fundamentals of human thought and conduct.¹ While maturation is not assumed to take the place of either heredity or environment as a cause, it is held to be sufficiently important to warrant consideration in any discussion of the constitutional foundations of behavior.

Relations of Heredity, Maturation, and Environment

Properly speaking, original nature means the make-up, the combination of physical and behavior traits with which the individual begins life at birth. Human nature is sometimes used as a synonym for original nature, but human nature is more correctly used to refer to those personality traits which the individual develops and acquires as a member of society which has a given culture. (See chapter 9.) Original nature at birth is the product of biological inheritance, maturation, and certain prenatal environmental forces. Moreover, after birth the relative influence of these various factors is altered.

¹ See Arnold Gesell, "The ontogenesis of infant behavior," chapter 6, and Myrtle B. McGraw, "Maturation of behavior," chapter 7, in Leonard Carmichael, ed., *Manual of child psychology*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1946.

Definitions. As already noted, *heredity* refers to the tendency of "like to beget like," to the fact that any given generation resembles its ancestors in make-up, that likenesses between closely related families of organisms are, on the average, greater than between organisms more distantly related. That is, heredity has to do with the means by which the potentiality to have like traits or structures is carried over from parents to offspring through biological mechanisms.

By *environment* we mean those forces, situations, or stimuli which influence the organism from outside. There are really two environments, internal and external. The former consists of the liquid media, the lymph and the blood plasma, in which the cells live and operate and without which they could not survive. The reproductive cells are dependent on this internal environment just as are all other body cells. The external environment, with which we in sociology are chiefly concerned, consists of (1) the geographic elements of land, water, climate, and the like, and (2) the social-cultural forces which arise from interaction of persons and groups with their attendant culture patterns.

Maturation refers to the organic changes in the tissues and organs of the body which take place as the individual gets older, but which occur without regard to external stimulation. Again, it is not a mystic force but operates through antecedent changes due to the interplay of the organized cells within the liquid internal environment. Maturation relates to bodily changes which are not due to direct impact of the external environment through learning.

Cells, chromosomes, and genes. In common with other higher animals the human organism is composed of a vastly complicated but ordered system of protoplasm. The basic unit is the cell, made up of a nucleus and the surrounding cytoplasm. The nucleus is the active agent in determining form and function, the cytoplasm provides sustenance and other requisites to the nucleus and is the foundation of specialized

structures. The higher forms of animals contain two kinds of cells, the somatic or "body" cells and the reproductive or sexual cells. The former are highly organized and specialized in structure and function. They make up the various organs of the body. The sexual cells are concerned with the mating of male and female in the production of a new individual.

Within each nucleus are various biochemical units, among the most important of which are the *chromosomes*. These, in turn, consist of still smaller units called *genes*. There are literally thousands of genes within the cells, somatic and sexual. They represent the basic physical unit of heredity, performing their functions both with respect to the development of the given individual and with respect to the transmission through the generations of the inherited features of the human species.

The number of chromosomes vary in the different species. In man there are 24 pairs of these minute bodies, one chromosome of each pair coming from one's female heritage, and the other from the male. It is within these paired chromosomes that the genes lie. All the genes of the egg and of the sperm differ from one another. But for each gene in the egg there is a corresponding gene in the sperm. These paired genes are called *allelomorphs* and are located in a similar position in the corresponding chromosomes. If the two *allelomorphs* are identical, the individual is said to be pure or *homozygous*; if they are not identical, he is hybrid or *heterozygous*. An individual may be hybrid in some genes and pure in others. In the course of cell division, by means of which the organism grows up, the gene-strings divide longitudinally, one split half going to each of the newly formed cells. In this way the number of genes and chromosomes remains constant.

The genes are biochemical substances, probably chiefly protein in nature. Their size is estimated to be slightly larger than that of the hemoglobin molecule. It is well to bear in mind that the genes are chemical in character, and that some of them are highly stable, others relatively mutable. Some of them are rather easily influenced by changes operating in the media around

them; others do not seem susceptible to such influences.

Since we are concerned with the transmissive functions, we must note that in the sexual cells — the female ovum and the male sperm — growth and division take place in such a fashion that but one of each of the chromosome pairs (and thus but one representative of each gene) gets into each germ cell. In the maturation of germ cells the chromosome pairs are divided haphazardly, so that on the theory of chance a parent can transmit only half of his genetic constitution to his offspring. Moreover, except in the case of identical twins, each offspring of the same parents represents a different combination of genes. This fact makes for individual variations even among brothers and sisters.

Mechanisms of heredity. It was not until modern times that man uncovered some of the basic principles which underlie reproduction. Genetics, or the science of the genes, really began with the research of an Austrian monk, Johann Mendel (1822–1884).

We owe to Mendel a very great debt for demonstrating by experiment certain basic mechanisms of heredity now rather generally accepted. Mendel reported his findings in a little-known scientific paper in 1868. Unfortunately the importance of his discovery was lost to the world at that time. It was not until 1901 that three biologists, especially Hugo de Vries (1848–1935), working independently, came upon the same principles that had been worked out by Mendel. Moreover, it was these workers who recovered from obscurity the significant work of Mendel.

In the years since the rediscovery of the mechanisms of inheritance, a great deal of research has been done in the field of plant and animal heredity. But it takes thousands of individuals of known parentage and dozens of generations of offspring to follow up the details of the operation of these mechanisms. And so far no actual experimentation has been done on human heredity, largely for the following three reasons: It

takes too long for one generation to reproduce. The fact of 48 genes makes possible so many chance combinations that research workers cannot make satisfactory analyses. And, finally, the strong humanitarian taboo on experimenting on human beings has not been overcome. Yet since the rules or "laws" of heredity apply to all forms of plant and animal life, the fundamental facts can be studied in the lower forms. The chief animals and plants which have yielded the most striking results are the vinegar fly (*Drosophila*), maize, wheat, snapdragons, poultry, and tobacco and cotton plants, in about that order. While it would carry us too far afield to treat the results of such experimentation in any detail, we must note the major facts with regard to dominance, segregation, sex-linkage, multiple-factor causation, and mutations.


(1) *The law of dominance* is a statement of the fact that in breeding two varieties of the same species which possess different traits, such as color, one feature tends to appear more frequently than the other, or is said to be dominant. For example, in crossing the black Andalusian fowl with the white, in the first hybrid or "first filial" (F_1) generation all of the offspring will appear black or bluish-black. If this group is intermixed among themselves the second filial (F_2) generation will show one quarter pure black, one quarter pure white, and one half bluish-black again. The pure blacks are called *dominant* on the

theory that they carry a double-determiner in the genes. The pure whites are called *recessive*. Those which combine both dominant and recessive, as in F_1 , are called *simplex*. Dominance or recessiveness depends upon whether the mature germ cell carries a double-determiner of the particular trait, one from each parent, or whether it carries but one. In subsequent generations the pure dominants if interbred will tend to reproduce themselves, the pure recessive likewise. The remainder will be reassorted, like the simplex elements of F_1 . Figure 3 shows the manner in which dominant and recessive traits are inherited.

There are many well-established instances of recessive inheritance among human beings. These include inability to taste phenyl-thiourea (the gene is dominant for the tasters, recessive for nontasters), inability to oxydize phenyl-pyruvic acid (probably one cause of low-grade feeble-mindedness), black-urine disease, albinism, baldness, color-blindness, and hemophilia. The last three are both recessive and sex-linked.

(2) *The law of segregation*, or independent assortment, refers to the fact that many traits tend to separate out independently of each other at each new mating. To use a simple illustration of merely two traits of a plant, say height and color, we should find that height separates out in the mixing independently of the separations carried on by the determiners of color. The manner of separation rests upon the way in which the traits are linked together in the parent stocks. For example, suppose we cross certain varieties of tall yellow, tall green, short yellow, and short green peas. One set of pairs is repre-

FIGURE 3
THE INHERITANCE OF DOMINANT AND RECESSIVE FEATURES



DD represents the pure dominant. RR represents the pure recessive. D(R) represents the impure dominant of the next generation, in which the recessive character is latent. This is the simplex generation. The numbers in each case represent the proportions of each generation. F_1 , F_2 , etc., refer to the respective filial generations.

TABLE 4

POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS ARISING IN THE SECOND FILIAL GENERATION, F_2 , FOLLOWING A CROSS BETWEEN DOMINANT TALL YELLOW AND RECESSIVE SHORT GREEN PEAS

POLLEN ♂	OVULES ♀			
	Tall Yellow	Tall Green	Short Yellow	Short Green
Tall Yellow	Tall Yellow Tall Yellow	Tall Green Tall Yellow	Short Yellow Tall Yellow	Short Green Tall Yellow
Tall Green	Tall Yellow Tall Green	Tall Green Tall Green	Short Yellow Tall Green	Short Green Tall Green
Short Yellow	Tall Yellow Short Yellow	Tall Green Short Yellow	Short Yellow Short Yellow	Short Green Short Yellow
Short Green	Tall Yellow Short Green	Tall Green Short Green	Short Yellow Short Green	Short Green Short Green

Characteristics printed in bold face represent dominance; those in light-face type represent recessiveness. Thus, tallness and yellow color are dominant over shortness and green color, which are both recessives.

sented in the male, the pollen; the other in the female ovules. This process is shown in Table 4.

(3) Still other traits are transmitted in certain linkages with the sex-determining chromosomes. The female cells, somatic and sexual, carry two sex chromosomes, called XX, whereas the male cells possess but one X chromosome and an inert Y chromosome. After the cell division which prepares the reproductive cells for mating, each mature ovum will carry one X chromosome, while only one half of the male sperms will have a like chromosome, the other 50 per cent of the sperms having only the inactive Y chromosome. As a result, in the random union of female egg and male sperm, about equal numbers of offspring will have XX and XY. The former will have one X chromosome from the mother and one from the father. These will become the girls. The latter will have one X chromosome from the mother and only the Y chromosome from the father. These will become the boys.

As noted above, certain recessive genes are associated or linked to the sex chromosomes. Take the case of hemophilia, a condition marked by deficiency in the clotting power of the blood. This defect is found only in the male but is carried only by the female. The latter does not show it since her second normal X chromosome will cover over or hold in abeyance the overt expression of the

recessive trait. When, however, one of these hemophilia-affected X chromosomes stands alone, that is, in the male offspring, the individual develops the given defect.²

Multiple-factor traits. The genes do not operate in a vacuum but always in reference to each other and to the surrounding milieu. The processes behind dominance, segregation, and sex-linkage are more complicated than the somewhat simple mechanical pictures indicate. There is no necessary one-to-one correspondence between what the biologists call a "character," that is, a given organ or trait, and a given gene. Such a belief harks back to an older theory that the hereditary units in the germ plasma contained minute but exact replicas of all the full-grown organs of the human system. H. J. Muller cautions us in these words: "So complicated is the manner in which the products of the different genes react to each other that no final product and no characteristic of the adult body is due to any specific gene, but in the production of

² While it is theoretically possible for a woman to have hemophilia, there is no record of true hemophilia in the female. It is said that if two "hemophilic genes" get together they would so interfere with normal development as to prove lethal. See Amran Scheinfeld, *You and heredity*, p. 131. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939.



Wide World Photo.

ALBINO TROBRIANDER, SHOWING MUTATION IN SKIN COLOR

every organ, tissue, or characteristic, numerous genes take part."³

The genes are not some mystic force which, like good fairies or bad demons, arrange the organs of the body or manage behavior by pulling strings like the producers of a puppet show. As H. S. Jennings well says:

"The genes . . . are simply chemicals that enter into a great number of complex reactions, the final upshot of which is to produce the completed body. The characters of the adult are no more present in the germ cells than is an automobile in the metallic ores out of which it is ultimately manufactured. To get the complete, normally acting organism, the proper materials are essential; but equally essential is it that they should interact properly with each other and with other things. *And the way they interact and what they produce depends on the conditions.*"⁴

³ H. J. Muller, "The method of evolution," *Scientific Monthly*, 1929, 29 : 485.

⁴ From H. S. Jennings, "Heredity and environment," *Scientific Monthly*, 1924, 19 : 230. By permission. *Italics in the original.*

It is particularly important to recognize that many features are really the result of a combination of various gene factors. It has been shown that the color in wheat grains, for instance, is progressively more intense according to the presence of additional dominant factors. As Olive D. Maguinness put it: "The conception of multiple factors is of extreme importance for an appreciation of the inheritance of quantitative characters (*e.g.*, size characters — where there is continuous variation, as in human stature — as distinct from peas, where there are either tall or dwarfs)."⁵ Among human beings such multifactorial traits include such matters as "size, height, weight, amount of glandular secretion, skin-pigmentation, and the hereditary factors in intelligence."⁶ As a rule when individuals differing sharply in

⁵ From Olive D. Maguinness, *Environment and heredity*, p. 78. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1940. By permission.

⁶ National Resources Committee, *The problems of a changing population*, p. 355. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1938.

such quantitative characters are mated, the offspring are a blend between the two extremes. In turn, if two such hybrids mate, the grandchildren will be intermediate but show a wide range of features resembling the two grandparents. In like manner a cumulative effect of recessive genes may produce defects that may seriously handicap not only individuals but family strains. (See below on feeble-mindedness.)

The developed organism, then, is the result of single or multiple genetic influences operating on the cytoplasm of the cells to produce specialized tissues and structures. Moreover, in the process of fertilization and in the initial stages of development there may be considerable shifting and mixing of the genes which make for variation in the resulting individual. If the resulting changes are of a striking kind we refer to them as mutations. Finally, environmental factors such as heat, pressure, nutrition, and the like help give direction and pitch to the developmental process.

Mutations. It is apparent from observations made of natural breeding and from experimental genetics that many mutations or changes in species-form emerge during the reproductive process. T. H. Morgan and his fellow workers have produced over 200 such changes, small and great, in the fruit fly with which they have been experimenting for many years.

Many of these mutations are of a recessive character. Some are very slight and do not seem to persist. Others are rather marked and appear to persist indefinitely. These mutations occur rather more frequently than earlier biologists imagined possible. This new experimental evidence is important because it throws some light on the manner in which through the geologic ages changes in the species may have come about. Moreover, it shows definitely that no matter how pure or homogeneous a race or species may be at the outset, in the course of time, even without crossing with other species, varied characteristics develop. Animal and plant breeders have long known this empirically. Once a new and desirable trait turns up,

they select out the individuals who carry it and develop new types to serve their purposes. Seedless oranges, seedless grapes, dairy or beef stock, race horses or draft animals are all the result of mutations which have been retained by careful control of later breeding. Man has not yet dared to apply rigorously such methods to himself. At best he has tried by eugenic methods to eliminate certain weak traits to prevent their reappearance in subsequent generations.

In contrast to the trial-and-error method of natural mutations, recent experiments have demonstrated that by applying X-ray treatments to the germ cells, the rate of mutations can be profoundly altered. Germ cells have been exposed to X-ray treatment before fertilization. Sometimes monstrosities have been produced; at other times less marked mutations, though often in the nature of defects, have appeared. As one writer puts it, "The X-ray method has, therefore, a distinct advantage over the natural method, in that the geneticist can now produce gene mutations and breakages in the chromosomes at will, and in comparatively large numbers."⁷ Treatment with radium also effects numerous mutations.

The development of nuclear physics, moreover, has made the facts about the possible effects of radioactivity on mutation more than an academic question. On the basis of what was already known from experiments of plants and animals, one of the first questions asked after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan concerned the possible influences of resultant radioactivity on human reproduction. While rumor and legend have already added their bit to the situation, it is too early to be certain as to what effects these two bombs may have had, or to tell precisely what may happen in case of future use of atomic weapons. For one thing, most students of the matter contend that effects of radioactive substances may not appear until considerable time has elapsed after

⁷ J. T. Patterson, "X-rays and somatic mutations," *Journal of Heredity*, 1925, 20 : 265.

exposure. In fact, it is believed that effects may not appear till later generations.⁸

Environment, Maturation, and Development

The most persistent mutations come about as a result of alterations which occur during the initial stages of fertilization and development of the new organism. However, other changes almost as striking may be produced in still later stages of growth. These changes throw light on the relation of the environment to the intrinsic genetic factors, a matter often neglected in considering the place of heredity. Modifications through atomic radiation or by altering temperature, gravity, pressure, and chemical composition illustrate the interplay of environmental and hereditary forces in organic development. We cannot discuss these in detail, but mention will be made of illustrative studies.

Standard environment and development. A standardized, common environment plays an important part in normal development. The standardized environment

⁸ See H. J. Muller, "Changing genes: their effects on evolution," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 1947, 3: 267-272, 274, and a popular account of his ideas in *Time*, 1947, 50: 44-45. Other popular comments are: E. P. Morgan, "The A-bomb's invisible offspring," *Collier's*, 1947, 120: 18-19; Amran Scheinfeld, "Monster children of the atom bomb," *Science Digest*, 1947, 21: 10-14. On other observations and experiments see "Genetic effects of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki," *Science*, 1947, 106: 331-333; "Offspring of Bikini," *Newsweek*, 1947, 29: 54; Henry Wallace, "Radioactivity and plant growth," *New Republic*, 1947, 114: 11; "Radioactivity produces changes in plant cells," *Science News*, 1947, 52: 281; "How atomic bomb may affect posterity," *Life*, 25: 83-85; and L. F. Randolph and C. H. Li, "Cytogenetic effects in corn exposed to atomic bomb ionizing radiation at Bikini," *Science*, 1948, 108: 13-16.

The impact of nuclear physics on experimental genetics has been very great. Already the use of radioactive substances to sterilize dairy cattle has been tried. (See *New York Times*, January 11, 1948.) Also, the differential resistance to such effects will be the subject of many experiments in the future. In this connection see D. M. Whitaker, "Man is more vulnerable than bugs to radiation," *Science Newsletter*, 1948, 53: 71, in which the author makes this forecast: "If man should eliminate himself from the earth, which is highly unlikely . . . these lower forms may still be expected to persist on earth."

in which the fertilized egg develops accounts in part, at least, for the regular and orderly physical features which we see in one generation after another. As C. M. Child has shown, alter these conditions and one is likely to get a different type of individual.⁹ The following experiment on fish is in point:

"Stockard, exposing the eggs of a marine fish, *Fundulus*, to sea water with the addition of certain magnesium salts and of some other substances, obtained developing young showing marked difference from the characteristics usually shown, notably the development of one-eyed fish. Sometimes this single eye was on one side of the head, giving a cyclopean form. It seems that in these fish the two eyes will develop in their usual places if the eggs are exposed to untreated sea water, but that various modifications of eye development and location appear if the sea water contains an unusual amount of certain magnesium salts. If, now, the sea water regularly contained larger amounts of these magnesium salts, should we not have these unusual forms of the eye as the usual characteristics of the species? In that case, by removing some of the magnesium salts we should obtain 'abnormal' forms bearing two eyes, one on each side of the head. *We cannot too strongly emphasize the fact that many of the so-called abnormalities are normal developments under particular conditions.*"¹⁰

Again we must stress the point that genetic factors can operate only within an environment and that the findings regarding heredity have no meaning if such forces are ignored. Recent studies on the effects of endocrine substances on development give further confirmation to the place of the enveloping environment, in this instance that within the organism itself.

Endocrine glands and development. The endocrine, *i.e.*, the ductless, glands have much to do with growth. The chemical substances from the cells surrounding the sex

⁹ See C. M. Child, *Physiological foundations of behavior*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1924.

¹⁰ W. D. Hoyt, "Some aspects of the relation of species to their environment," *Science*, n.s., 1923, 18: 432-434. By permission. Italics not in the original.

glands proper evidently secrete substances which influence the development of the secondary sex features. If the male or female sex glands are removed, the usual secondary sexual features do not develop. So, too, the pituitary gland influences the sexual development. The thyroid, in turn, affects metabolism, heart action, and temperature. An interesting experiment of J. F. Guder-natsch may be mentioned.

He fed very young tadpoles pieces of thyroid gland. The tadpoles very quickly changed into frogs. In this way some mature frogs no larger than ordinary flies were produced. In contrast to this, if they were fed on the thymus gland, they grew to be large, dark-colored tadpoles but did not change into frogs.¹¹

The endocrine glands themselves are necessarily affected by the genes; but as they begin to function, they in turn affect development. Internal as well as external conditions always influence growth, even though the presence or absence of these factors in the organism depends on the genes themselves.

Maturation. It is evident that growth is also influenced by chemical and physical changes which go on within the organism without direct reference to the external environment. Studies of organic growth prior to birth have suggested the importance of such factors, though it is difficult to segregate the precise elements in embryonic and foetal development.¹² Observations made on animals and children, from birth on, afford clearer evidence of the place of maturation. For example, studies have shown that the pecking behavior of chicks and the flying ability of various undomesticated birds are dependent not so much on training as upon the fact that the organism has developed to a point which makes such activity possible. In human beings the matter is

illustrated by the fact that learning itself is dependent on the growth of the neuro-muscular system, that walking also can take place only after the bones, muscles, and nerve connections make it possible, that talking is also dependent on neuro-muscular maturation as well as teaching. The contrast in certain motor performances of the ape Gua and the child Donald, described in chapter 9, reveals the same fact, namely, that until the organism is ready the acquirement of overt action is not possible.

Relation of heredity to environment. What, then, may we say about the relation of heredity to environment? It is clear that heredity is not some unique factor acting independently of environment, but that the genes are organic chemical agents of some sort which, operating together in an internal environment, determine the appearance of various traits, some of which, in turn, may be profoundly altered after birth while others, like eye color, hair color, skin color, and facial features, vary little or not at all. The essential point is that heredity is not a magic force which determines skin color or the presence or absence of any given trait. Rather, it determines "*the way an individual reacts in various environments.*"¹³

We are coming to realize, furthermore, that many common features of physical make-up and of behavior must be understood not only because the individuals have a common heredity but also because they live in a standardized environment. No one would be so bold as to claim that heredity does not count in the development of the individual. It is rather that heredity and environment, abetted by maturation, correlate at every point in the production of the new individual. In the period of embryonic and foetal growth, environmental factors within the womb are important — pressures, temperature, gravity, and chemical influences playing a part. There is, of course, no evidence that ideas and attitudes of the mother will carry over to the child, as the

¹¹ J. F. Guder-natsch, "Feeding experiments on tadpoles, II," *American Journal of Anatomy*, 1914, 15 : 431-480.

¹² See Leonard Carmichael, "A re-evaluation of the concepts of maturation and learning as applied to the early development of behavior," *Psychological Review*, 1936, 43 : 450-470.

¹³ From L. D. Dunn and Th. Dobzhansky, *Heredity, race, and society*, p. 17. New York: Penguin Books, 1946. Italics not in the original.

superstitious believe, but the physiological environment of the womb is certainly important in development. After birth, external physical and social-cultural factors come more and more into play. Hence we must realize that the child and the adult are the joint products of heredity and environment co-operating all along the line. As Leonard Carmichael puts it:

*"The fact as it appears . . . is that no distinction can be expediently made at any given moment in the behavior of the individual, after the fertilized egg has once begun to develop, between that which is native and that which is acquired. The so-called hereditary factors can only be acquired in response to an environment, and likewise the so-called acquired factors can only be secured by a modification of already existing structure, which in the last analysis is hereditary structure. Facts too obvious to bear citation show that the somatic structures that can develop out of a fertilized egg are in some measure dependent upon the physical and chemical structure of the given germ itself. The characteristics which develop out of such a germ, nevertheless, are not predetermined. They are, on the contrary, determined by an environment acting upon the present nature of the individual at every stage of development from fertilization to death."*¹⁴

From this standpoint, which does not sharply set off heredity from environment, we turn to examine some of the problems involved in human heredity. If the precise nature of the interplay of biological inheritance and internal and external environment is difficult to determine among the lower forms of life, it becomes increasingly so when we turn our attention to man himself.

Some Aspects of Human Heredity

Aside from the fact that the human organism is, in the broad sense, the product of hereditary, maturational, and environmental influences that have played upon it from

the time of conception to birth, we may ask more specifically regarding those aspects of human structure and function which are chiefly influenced by heredity.

Some important organic foundations and heredity. For our purposes at this point we may classify certain of the more fundamental aspects of human structure and function under the following:

(1) There are important morphological or bodily features illustrated by distinctive racial, subracial, and familial strains. These tend to become relatively stable if the population concerned remains biologically isolated and of necessity practices a certain amount of inbreeding. (2) Also important are certain factors which appear to influence vitality, longevity, and the resistance or susceptibility to certain diseases. Certain races, subraces, or families may develop immunities to some disorders through either mutation or environmental adaptation or both. (3) Innate drives which determine human motivation certainly rest upon deep-seated inheritance. The universality of needs for sustenance, sexual expression, and social protection and care give witness to this. (4) In like manner the basic feeling-emotional tendencies are inherited, and they doubtless serve as the basis for the later development of important temperamental traits. And (5) there are the fundamental adaptive capacities themselves, the foundation of what we call intelligence, or learning ability.

In considering these broad categories it is well to bear in mind that some of them are much more fixed in the biological inheritance than others. For example, the basic drives and feeling-emotional reactions apparently are but slightly influenced as to strength by any particular mixture of race, subrace, or family stock. On the other hand, such things as skin color, height, weight, and other morphological features are subject to considerable variation through genetic mixture. Finally, the data as to how intelligence is affected by mating are extremely confusing. As we shall see, in this field the interpretations have been so colored

¹⁴ Leonard Carmichael, "Heredity and environment: are they antithetical?" *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1925, 20 : 257. By permission. Italics in original.

by popular and scientific preconceptions that it is difficult indeed to obtain any clear picture of the actual interplay of heredity, maturation, and environment with respect to man's mental functions.

One thing is certain, family strains — in spite of racial or subracial differences — are very largely the result of ages of hybrid mixing in varied degree. In some instances, such as the possession of kinky hair, long biological isolation has apparently stabilized this as a dominant trait, just as similar isolation elsewhere made possible the long persistence in other populations of such recessive characteristics as blue eyes and blond hair. Although the proof is none too clear, it may be that certain special talents as well as the more evident defects are passed down in family lines. But, in comparison to our present "pure-breed" plants and animals, human beings are a very mixed and mongrel lot.

However, extensive hybridization results in a wider range of variability as to traits or features within each generation than would appear in more homogeneous strains. Such biological foundation to variation makes possible many divergent kinds of adaptation, provided the environment permits it. With reference to this point it is well to remember that the individual differences we observe around us are also, in part, the result of differential social-cultural training. The inherited plasticity of the organism operates to enhance or retard such variability.¹⁵

Also, it must be realized that stability of thought and reaction is not entirely the result of hereditary influences. Certain standardization of the environment has a definite place in inducing such fixity, first, in the earliest physical development before birth and, second, in postnatal life through the imposition of more or less fixed social-cultural patterns on the individual.

We cannot go into a discussion of the interrelations of heredity and environment

with reference to all these aspects. Some features of race difference will be discussed later. (See chapter 11.) Also, certain aspects of the drives and feeling-emotional tendencies will be discussed in chapter 8. In the remainder of this chapter we shall deal only with data bearing on heredity with reference to disease and with regard to differences in intelligence.

Physical handicaps and diseases. Hemophilia and color-blindness are evidently the result of recessive sex-linked genes. But these are only special instances in which hereditary factors play a clear part. Amran Scheinfeld, in his admirable summary and interpretation of human heredity, notes nearly 90 defects, handicaps, and diseases which are more or less definitely believed to be due to direct genetic influences.¹⁶ He lists 14 of these as "prevalent or common," about 38 as "fairly common," and the balance as "rare." Yet it is difficult to know to what extent some of the defects and diseases are definitely hereditary. Certainly adequate data as to the place of biological inheritance in many of such major diseases as cancer, nephritis, and tuberculosis and such mental diseases as schizophrenia are not at hand. In considering these matters, all too often research workers fall into the common error of assuming a one-to-one correspondence between a given defect or disease and some particular gene or gene combination. For example, while one exhaustive study of the incidence of mental disorders reports that "the frequency of mental diseases among the close relatives of patients with mental disease exceeds that of the general population, . . ." in no type of family mating of either manic-depressive or schizophrenic patients (the two disorders chiefly on view here) did the frequencies of the mental disease among the

¹⁵ See F. H. Hankins, "Organic plasticity versus organic responsiveness in the development of the personality," *Publication of American Sociological Society*, 1928, 22 : 43-51.

¹⁶ See Scheinfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-200. Scheinfeld uses the term "black genes" in referring to the hereditary causes of these disorders. The phrase is colorful but may be somewhat misleading, since in large numbers of instances the causes are doubtless due to cumulative and multifactorial influences as well as conjoint maturational and environmental effects.

offspring conform to the usual Mendelian ratios for simple inheritance.¹⁷ Other studies have reported finding a much higher incidence of mental disorders "in the other members of pairs of identical twins, one of whom is affected, than among pairs of dissimilar twins."¹⁸ But these results must also be qualified because of their failure to take into account such factors as time of incidence, duration of disease, symptoms, and the possibilities of the effect of social-cultural conditions.

There have been many other like studies, but none of them has successfully clarified the respective place of inheritance in contrast to environment. In fact, since from our standpoint the two forces operate together, it would be pretty difficult to segregate one set of influences from another in any fractional manner. At best we can say that there is evidence that genetic factors are relatively more important in inducing mental breakdowns such as epilepsy, dementia praecox, and manic-depressive psychoses than are environmental forces. The frequent attempts to fit the results into simple Mendelian mechanisms do not appear successful. On the other hand, the statistical evidence that certain families produce more than their expected share of cases of mental disease must make us cautious about assuming that it is only environmental conditions that induce them. We shall be on safer ground if we take the position that multiple-genetic factors may be operating and that a

certain general predisposition to such disorders is inherited. The mental collapse of individuals under great stress, such as combat conditions in wartime, lends credence to the view that the differential breaking point of the intellectual-emotional functions may, in part, derive from hereditary rather than environmental factors.

The inheritance of mental defect. There has also been a great deal of discussion in the literature of intelligence measurement and of social pathology regarding the probable inheritance of feeble-mindedness. Nearly every college student sooner or later hears about the Jukeses, the Kallikaks, the Nam family, or the Hill Folk. The case of the Kallikaks is typical.

There were two lines of descent from Martin Kallikak, one through an illegitimate son, had by an allegedly feeble-minded barmaid; the other from his wife, said to have been of normal mentality. The reports on Martin's descendants state that those coming from the illegitimate son, whose descendants had mixed with other feeble-minded families down the generations, produced a high percentage of defectives. The subsequent generations of the mating of the two normals, Martin and his wife, are said to have been in overwhelming proportions normal.

While the story of the Kallikaks once received much credence, careful students are inclined to be skeptical. First of all, the data are quite unsatisfactory as to the strict facts. There is evidence of a common tendency among the informants to account for antisocial actions such as drinking in terms of "bad blood" rather than low economic and general cultural status. But perhaps the most serious interpretation of this family history was to claim that feeble-mindedness is due to some kind of unit recessive trait, and normal intelligence to a unit dominant trait.¹⁹

Certainly intelligence as the psychologists define it is not dependent on some single genetic factor. For the most part intelligence has been defined in such terms as

¹⁷ See H. M. Pollock, B. Malzberg, and R. G. Fuller, "Hereditary and environmental factors in the causation of dementia praecox and manic-depressive psychoses," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 1933-1935, 7: 450-479, 8: 77-97, 337-371, 553-599; 9: 129-142, 287-296. This is one of the most careful and exhaustive studies in this field, but the full confirmation of the authors' interpretations must, of course, await more carefully controlled studies. It must be noted that the very concepts of manic-depressive and schizophrenic pathology are a compound of widely varied symptoms and behavior manifestations. Such mental diseases are not definite entities, as the authors themselves point out.

¹⁸ *The problems of a changing population*, op. cit., p. 159, in summarizing A. J. Rosanoff, et al., "The etiology of the so-called schizophrenic psychoses with special reference to their occurrence in twins," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 1934, 91: 247-286, and other studies of mental diseases in twins referred to in this summary.

¹⁹ See H. H. Goddard, *Feeble-mindedness*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914.

these: (1) the ability to reason from cause to effect, (2) the ability to do abstract thinking, that is, to form concepts and to use them in logical judgments, (3) the capacity to learn, (4) the ability to adjust rapidly to a new situation, and (5) the capacity to manage one's own affairs with ordinary prudence and success. All of these definitions imply at least some social-cultural influence, and none of the methods of testing intelligence now in use has perfected any way to measure strictly biological or organic foundations of intelligence, whatever it may be. All the tests are couched in culturally learned verbal concepts or skills and at best are only indirect measures of native learning ability.

An examination of intelligence-test results reveals a continuous, graded series of scores, quotients, or measures ranging from superior through normal to subnormal performance. There is usually, in a random sample, a great deal of overlapping of the measures of defectives with normals; in fact, no sharp boundary exists except as arbitrarily set by statisticians. If this gradation be true, how is it possible to fit simple Mendelian principles to the facts? Karl Pearson, in criticizing studies which defend such notions, wisely remarked:

"No justification whatever can be derived from our data for talking of the mentally defective as lacking 'a factor necessary for full mental development,' or speaking of a 'unit character upon which normal development depends,' or of feeble-mindedness as due to germ-plasm lacking a unique 'determiner.' All such descriptions are the work of theorists who have allowed theory wholly to outrun their knowledge and have dogmatized instead of setting quietly to work and measuring mental capacity of children segregated in special schools."²⁰

Relative weight of heredity and environment in mental development. On the other hand, we must not neglect pertinent evidence which indicates the relative impor-

tance of inherited as against acquired abilities, traits, and performances. Some suggestive materials on this topic have come from a number of studies of siblings (children of the same parents) reared in different foster homes, and of identical twins brought up in the same and in contrasting environments.

Two important studies of the effects of foster homes upon children were made in Chicago by F. N. Freeman, K. Holzinger, and B. C. Mitchell, and in California by Barbara Burks.²¹ The Chicago sample consisted of 401 children placed in foster homes at the average age of four years who were tested at the time of entering and again, on the average, about seven years later. Most of these children came from inferior homes. On the whole, those placed in better homes did better than those put in average or poor homes. The average Intelligence Quotient (ratio of chronological to mental age) for the 114 in the better foster homes was 107; for the 101 placed in the relatively poor homes it was 89. The Burks study, though carried out in a different manner, also showed that the foster children improved in their IQ standing when placed in homes where the adults and own children were of higher intellectual status as estimated by intelligence and other tests.

While the interpretations of the investigations of foster children differ with the standpoint of the workers and their methods of study and treatment of the data, the following concluding comment of R. S. Woodworth in his survey of studies in this field provides a cautious evaluation of the whole topic. He writes:

"The most striking feature of these results is the small share that can be attributed to inter-family differences in environment. Not over a fifth, apparently, of the variance of intelligence in the general population can be attributed to differences in homes and neighborhoods acting as environmental factors.

²¹ The results of these investigations are reported in National Society for the Study of Education, Yearbook for 1929, *Nature and nurture: their influence upon intelligence*. Bloomington, Illinois: 1928. For a critical summary, see R. S. Woodworth, *Heredity and environment, a critical survey of recently published material on twins and foster children*, Bulletin no. 47, Social Science Research Council, 1941.

²⁰ Karl Pearson and G. Jaederholm, "Mendelism and the problem of mental defect," *Questions of the Day and of the Fray*, no. viii, p. 36. London, 1914. By permission.

The reason is probably to be sought in the large degree of uniformity of environment produced by the schools and other public and semipublic agencies. It is still possible that raising the intellectual level of the environment would raise the general level of intelligence, while not by any means annulling the individual differences due to heredity.

"The gains of foster children and of other children in changed and improved environments have been much less striking than might have been expected. About 5 or 10 points in IQ is all that can be claimed for the average gain, with much individual variation above and below this average. Even this amount of gain is not established beyond doubt — nor, to be sure, is it proved that still better environments would fail to register much larger gains. Somewhat larger gains and losses have indeed been indicated in some of the identical twin pairs who received very unequal educational opportunities."²²

Studies of identical twins are really most enlightening. Since such twins come from the same fertilized egg, they are presumed to possess identical genes. Actually, identical twins are not strictly identical, varying slightly in such traits as eye color, hair color and hair form, in skin color, and in fingerprints. But they are far more alike than ordinary siblings or nonidentical twins. H. H. Newman says that identical twins are in about "90 per cent" of measurable traits precisely alike.

There have been a number of reports on identical twins reared apart. These cases, of course, represent no real experimentation, but provide only those data which observers can discover from interviews, tests, and documentary sources. As to differences in IQ, the data show wide variations. In some instances this was practically the same though the individuals were brought up in sharply divergent situations. So, too, in social-emotional traits, there were some likenesses and many deviations. In short, there is ample proof that upon the same genetic foundation rather striking variations in adult thought and behavior may be

erected. The following brief summaries of six pairs of identicals raised in divergent surroundings will serve to illustrate some of the important findings on this topic:

"Case I. A pair of twin young women, one with very much more formal education than the other, but with a much more varied social experience, showed after twenty-odd years of separation the following condition: They were practically identical physically and in intelligence, but were extremely different in temperament — in personality.

"Case II. A pair of twin young women, one reared in London, England, and the other in a small Ontario town. They had about the same amount and kind of education. When tested, the colonial girl was very much more intelligent and in much better physical condition. In temperament-personality, they were extremely similar.

"Case III. Two twin young women separated over 20 years, reared in about the same social and physical conditions, but one had far more education than the other. Physically and temperamentally they were extraordinarily similar, but the more educated twin was strikingly more intelligent.

"Case IV. Two twin young men separated over 20 years, one reared in cities of some size, the other reared in country villages, both with high-school education. The city boy was in much better physical condition and was slightly more intelligent. In temperament-personality, they were as utterly different as two persons chosen at random.

"Case V. Two twin girls, separated for 28 years, but visiting each other from time to time. One has always lived on a farm, the other has lived in a small town and has spent most of her time indoors. The farm girl stopped school after the grades, the town girl went through high school and has studied music for 20 years. These girls differ equally strongly in all three respects: physically, intellectually, and temperamentally. They show the most pronounced effects of environmental differences of any of the pairs studied.

"Case VI. Twin girls, separated for 37 years, both married and with four and six children, respectively. One married a man who has always made a good deal of money, the other married a poor man. The life of one has been easy, that of the other very hard. Both nearly completed high school. There is very little difference between them in IQ,

²² From Woodworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86. By permission.

only minor differences in temperament, but a very striking difference in physical condition. The twin who has had an easy life seems hardly over thirty while the one who has had a hard life seems eight or ten years older."²³

It is clear from these cases as it is from the statistical data that there is just about as much deviation in identical twins reared apart as is found among ordinary brothers and sisters or even nonrelated members of the population. Of course, we must not assume that all the variation is due to environmental influences. We must never forget that though the genetic factors at the outset of life may have been identical, organic alterations may well have begun in the prenatal period and earliest years and continued to operate throughout life.

Additional light on this whole matter of heredity and environment has likewise appeared from quite a different quarter. Mandel Sherman and Cora B. Key, in a careful study of intelligence tests of isolated mountain children from Virginia, reported a definite correlation between standing in the tests and exposure of the children to culture. Those who lived in remote and inaccessible sections with little schooling and in a simpler culture do distinctly less well in the tests than the children with more schooling and in communities of complex culture. Moreover, it is apparent from their study that the effects of the former in the early years are not easily wiped out by later exposure to better opportunities.²⁴

Our discussion of human heredity has made clear the difficulty in trying to segregate inherited from acquired factors in human behavior. Yet we can make some ap-

proximation as to the relative weight of heredity in the total individual. Clearly the basic drives and feeling-emotional accompaniments rest on deep-seated hereditary foundations, not only in our species but also in the whole mammalian series. Second, it is evident that physique is definitely determined in large part by biological inheritance. So, too, there appear to be certain distinctive physical handicaps or abnormalities and certain diseases in which genetic forces play the major determining part. On the other hand, it is only within broad limits that so-called functional mental breakdowns seem predetermined by hereditary weaknesses. There may well be something in the theory of general predisposition to mental disorders dependent on probable cumulative effects of certain genetic factors, but beyond that we cannot go at present.

Regarding the place of heredity in determining the range and nature of intelligence or adaptive capacity, it is extremely difficult to make any completely satisfactory judgment. Much of the discussion of this topic is qualified by conscious and unconscious prejudice. Yet when one makes an honest effort to strip these confusing elements away, one is impressed again and again by the imposing evidence that there are constitutional limitations to learning capacity and that these limits must of necessity be in large part determined in the first instance by heredity. While cultural isolation and other lack of educational opportunity among many whites and Negroes produce mental retardation of a serious sort, for the most part in our relatively free society individual differences in intellectual performance — given equal educational chances — do reflect, at least indirectly, variability in the genetic source of adaptive potentials.

While our main attention in the chapters which follow will be given to the impress of social and cultural influences upon individuals and groups, we shall have many occasions to qualify our discussion in terms of the place of the underlying inherited constitutional foundations of all behavior and all adjustment.

²³ H. H. Newman, "Identical twins," *Scientific Monthly*, 1932, 34 : 171. By permission. For a fuller account and additional cases, see H. H. Newman, F. N. Freeman, and K. J. Holzinger, *Twins; a study of heredity and environment*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934; and H. H. Newman, *Multiple human births; twins, triplets, quadruplets, and quintuplets*, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1940.

²⁴ Mandel Sherman and Cora B. Key, "The intelligence of isolated mountain children," *Child Development*, 1932, 3 : 279-290. For a convenient summary of a number of similar studies, see Anne Anastasi, *Differential psychology*, chapter 3. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937.

Interpretative Summary

1. Man as a member of an animal species, *homo sapiens*, is subject to the laws of biological inheritance. These laws are fairly well established for plants and lower animals. Adequate facts about human heredity are more scanty and less certain.
2. Through the operation of heredity certain structural features (upon which function rests, of course) are determined before birth.
3. Especially important for man is the quality of his brain and nervous system. For example, the functional capacity of the cerebral cortex in large part sets the upper limits of learning ability. This ability largely determines the individual's social-cultural adaptation.
4. Maturation of tissue during the foetal period and especially after birth but prior to maturity will further influence man's adaptation.
5. Also, the degree of standardization of the environment, first the biological one of the growing organism and, later, the physiographic one will determine in part the use man will make of his adaptive or learning ability.
6. The social-cultural environment will further, and sometimes very greatly, influence social-cultural learning. Numerous studies of underprivileged children, children reared in foster homes, and other data confirm this fact.
7. The basic fact is that the influences of heredity, maturation, and environment (learning) act together in the production of the human personality.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define heredity, environment, maturation, gene, chromosome.
2. What are the basic mechanisms of heredity?
3. Define dominance, recessiveness, and mutation.
4. What place has the internal environment in directing or controlling development? How may it modify the hereditary potentials?
5. What particular human characteristics are most clearly determined by heredity in the first instance? Name some human traits that are chiefly the product of training.
6. What criticisms may be offered regarding the validity of Newman's findings on identical twins raised apart, on foster children, and of Sherman and Key's study?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

H. S. Jennings, *The biological basis of human nature*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1930.

An excellent discussion by a distinguished biologist.

A. Weinstein, "Heredity," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 7 : 328-335. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

A balanced review of the concept as used in biology.

David D. Whitney, *Family treasure; a study of the inheritance of normal characteristics in man*. Lancaster, Pa.: Jacques Cattell Press, 1942.

A richly illustrated book on human heredity.



The Foundations of Personality

Sociologists, like cultural anthropologists, are interested in the topic of personality because they cannot understand either society or culture without also giving some attention to the individual as such. The present chapter deals with the biological and psychological foundations of personality. More specifically, it will discuss constitutional foundations, motivation, learning, and mental organization.¹ The next chapter will treat the place of interaction, especially socialization and its various aspects in relation to personality.

Biopsychological Foundations

For our purposes we may treat the biological and psychological bases of personality together.² As noted in chapter 7, the basic organic features of the individual

come from his ancestors through hereditary mechanisms and as a result of maturation. These constitutional factors determine his capacities for human adjustment.

Receptive-neural-reactive system. As an aid in the adaptation of the individual to his environment, the co-ordinated operation of the sensory organs, the nervous system proper, and the response organs is of special importance. The sensory organs are the basis for taking up stimuli from outside or inside the body: the eyes, the ears, the touch, smell, taste, and kinesthetic and equilibrium senses being the most significant. The response organs are muscles, tendons, and glands. Between these two as a facilitating, inhibiting, and co-ordinating agent is the nervous system proper. Structurally it is divided into the central and the autonomic systems. The former consists of the brain and the spinal cord, from which pass strands of neural tissue—the nerves—to the sensory and the response organs respectively.

This is a vast and highly complex organization. Yet in his senses, muscles, and glands and in the co-ordinating neural processes, sensory or motor, man is but little superior to his close animal relatives, the apes. It is the much higher development of the brain, especially the cerebral cortex, which sets him off from them. Man's complex brain makes possible elaborate forms of learning which lie behind the higher mental processes: perception, concept formation, judgment, and reasoning. The development, transmission, and growing continuity of culture and all the elaborate forms of group life depend on this higher brain organization.

The autonomic system is supplementary to the central system and controls the internal reactions of glands and smooth

¹ For orientation in the field of personality study: G. W. Allport, *Personality: a psychological interpretation*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1937; Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., *Personality in nature, society, and culture*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948; Ralph Linton, *Cultural background of personality*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945; Gardner Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental social psychology*, rev. ed., New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937; Gardner Murphy, *Personality, a biosocial approach to origins and structure* (same press); L. F. Shaffer, *Psychology of adjustment*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1936; Muzafer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, *The psychology of ego-involvements*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1947; Ross Stagner, *Psychology of personality*, 2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948; Kimball Young, *Personality and problems of adjustment*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940.

² For a review of general psychology see, among others, E. G. Boring, et al., eds., *Foundations of psychology*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1948; J. F. Dashiell, *Fundamentals of general psychology*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937; N. L. Munn, *Psychology; the fundamentals of human adjustment*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946; F. L. Ruch, *Psychology and life*, 3d ed., Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Company, 1948; R. S. Woodworth and D. G. Marquis, *Psychology*, 5th ed., New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1947.

muscles. While the central nervous system is the structural foundation of the intellectual processes and learning, the autonomic system is important in reference to the basic organic needs and the expression of the emotions and feelings.

The endocrine system. This system is made up of ductless glands which secrete chemical substances called hormones. From the glands which produce them, the hormones pass via the blood or lymph to other parts of the body, the structure and/or function of which is thereby altered. These aid in bodily growth, help maintain internal stability, and supplement the work of the nervous system. For psychology their effects upon drives and emotions are most

important. Table 5 lists the principal endocrine glands and summarizes their chief functions.

For the study of personality three functions of the endocrines are of high importance: (1) Physical make-up itself is partly due to hormone influences, and deficiencies may produce individuals atypical to the norms of a group. Examples are the extremely fat, the extremely tall, dwarfs, and individuals whose secondary sexual features depart from the norms of their sex. How a group or society regards such individuals will greatly affect their personal development. A fat boy may be the butt of unkind jokes, or a young woman whose body build resembles in many features that of the male may be looked at askance. In other words, any sharp departure from the norms of physical make-up, which

TABLE 5
THE ENDOCRINE GLANDS AND THEIR CHIEF FUNCTIONS

<i>Gland</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Functions and Effects</i>
THYROID	In neck, astride the windpipe	{ Influences bodily growth, basal metabolism, action of kidneys, sweat glands, brain, and other endocrines. Cretinism a common result of extreme thyroid deficiency.
PARATHYROIDS	Four in number, close to thyroid	{ Affects calcium metabolism; also nervous tensions.
PITUITARY	Four small lobes, near base of skull	{ Often called the Master Gland. Produces several distinct hormones. Stimulates growth, including that of nervous system; affects sexual function — especially female periodicity, bodily metabolism, and temperature. Overactive anterior pituitary induces gigantism; underactivity, retention of infantile features. Dwarfism associated with pituitary deficiency. Pituitary also affects thyroid, adrenals, and sex glands.
ADRENALS	Really two distinct structures, cortex and medulla, near kidneys	{ Cortex produces hormone essential to survival, but precise influence not fully known. The medulla produces adrenin, which co-operates with autonomic system to alter respiration, heart action, release of blood sugar from the liver, and in general helps energize body to meet physical emergencies. Particularly important in emotional expressions of fear, anger, and sexual activity.
GONADS (SEX)	Interstitial tissue in sex glands themselves	{ Stimulates growth, especially secondary sexual characteristics; affects sexual activity, especially female periodicity.
ISLETS OF LANGERHANS	In the pancreas	{ Influences metabolism and use of blood sugar. <i>Diabetes mellitus</i> results from deficiency of the hormone called insulin.
THYMUS	Two lobes near apex of chest	{ No specific endocrine known, but apparently gland promotes early growth.
PINEAL	Pea-sized cone suspended from upper brain	{ No specific substance known, but believed to influence growth.

are determined by the culture, will induce problems of human relations. (2) The emotions are much influenced by the endocrines, but again how the culture sets the stage for emotional development will not only affect interpersonal relations but may even influence the action of the glands themselves. Repeated expression of rage or fear probably acts to condition the readiness with which the adrenals come into play in given situations. (3) The sex functions, in particular, are much affected by the glands. Yet, here too, cultural definitions of what is normal will affect the way in which they come into operation. The continued frigidity of married women in some societies may eventually exert influences on other bodily reactions quite removed from direct expression of sexuality. So, too, the distinctive roles and statuses of the two sexes, as defined differentially by cultures, not only rest in part on the sexual-endocrine functions, as in childbearing, but are perhaps influenced by the impress of cultural demands on the respective sexes. It may well be that the hurry and anxiety induced by living in a highly competitive urban society act to reduce the sexuality of the human male.

The nervous and endocrine systems are the basic determinants of the personality at the biopsychological level. The dynamics of the person from this standpoint involves certain levels of reactivity as these are related to motivation and influenced by learning. First of all, there is the whole organization of reflexes which controls the various sustaining systems. Second are the patterns of learned responses or habits which develop in relation to motives and goals. Third is the arena of thinking, which arises with the elaboration of the controls of stimulation and response made possible by the functions of the cerebral cortex in particular. Our chief concern is with the second and third of these as they relate to personal life-organization.

Original drives. What impels a person to action? The original impulses have been called variously instincts, wishes, prepotent reflexes, and more recently drives. In keeping with current practice we shall use the concept *drive* as a convenient abstraction to

cover the factors which incite behavior in the individual.

The impulses which appear at birth or shortly thereafter we term the unlearned, original, or native drives. However, drives are not directly observable; we infer them from certain activities. At the outset these activities are related to physiological requirements for survival, such as need for oxygen, temperature regulation, sustenance, sleep, and several others. Then, too, there are feeling-emotional reactions associated with some or all of these. In addition there are other movements, such as random thrashing of arms and legs, and vocalization whose inciting "cause" is not always obvious.

Drives, however, do not appear out of the nowhere into the here. They are caused by prior conditions. Some of the impulses to activity come from inside the individual. Others originate outside the body. For the former we posit a condition of tension in the tissues associated, in turn, with some biochemical change in the body. A most obvious instance is that of hunger, which is set up by internal changes in energy balance. One of the direct effects of such disequilibrium is to set up peristaltic movements of the stomach. Since these are important to digestion itself, it means that the organism is constructed — at the anatomical-physiological level — to "anticipate" ingestion of food to "satisfy" the bodily requirement for additional energy. The peristaltic action stimulates the internal sensory nerves, whose effects produce the sensation of hunger. We say the organism is thrown into a state of tension leading to agitation, restlessness, and the seeking of a stimulus (food) to relieve the tension.

Drives derived from stimuli considered as being outside the body, such as contact with sharp or noxious objects, are of somewhat different character. The drive may be thought of as the bodily response to such stimulation. The tensional or agitational aspects would appear chiefly when some blocking or frustration occurs between first sensing a pain or unpleasant odor and the

TABLE 6

SUMMARY OF BASIC OR ORIGINAL DRIVES

A. NEEDS SET UP BY TENSIONS WITHIN THE ORGANISM

1. For oxygen
2. For temperature regulation
3. For elimination of bodily wastes, *e.g.*, from bladder, bowel, lungs, sweat glands
4. For rest and sleep
5. For sustenance (hunger and thirst needs)
6. For sexual reproduction (depends on later maturation, especially during puberty)

B. REACTIONS SET UP BY STIMULATIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE ORGANISM

7. To avoid tissue injury, *e.g.*, pain from sharp objects, noxious chemicals
8. To approach pleasant stimulation, *e.g.*, fondling, light tickling, and warmth-giving objects

C. FEELING-EMOTIONAL AND EXPRESSIVE REACTIONS

9. Reactions of feeling or emotion associated with any of A or B
10. Random movements of limbs and vocal apparatus

escape or avoidance reaction which follows it.

As to what incites random movements of limbs and vocal apparatus little is known. Some of these reactions become directly associated with other drive-incited reactions. But much random movement goes on at first without any obvious stimulation. It probably rests upon some general condition of the body state at such times as after waking from sleep and when other drives are not dominating the reactions. For convenience we have summarized the original drives in Table 6.

Tension-reducing goal. Drives, of course, do not exist for themselves. They serve to set up reactions directed toward some objective, goal, or reward which functions to reduce the tension that caused the drive in the first place. Such a course from tension to drive to tension-reduction may be viewed as a cycle of activity. These cycles may be short or long. A simple example of the former is the quick withdrawal of the hand from a hot stove. A somewhat more complex one is the relief of hunger pangs of a baby at the breast of its mother. Cycles of longer span are largely those where learning has modified the processes from tension-drive to tension-reduction through reward. Whether long or short, simple or complex, there must be a completion or *closure* of

the cycle. Otherwise the individual will likely retain a sense of incompleteness and frustration. It is common knowledge that individuals, if well motivated to do a given job, tend to be displeased, restless, or unhappy if they are not able to finish it.³

In completing the cycle, that is, in reducing the tension, the untutored child reacts pretty much at an animal level. But such responses are not likely to last long. Under the guidance of the mother and/or others the growing child's patterning of the cycle may be considerably altered. The time of nursing, the amount of food taken, and a number of new elements in the process may come into play. In other words, socialization begins, and the original reactions are modified. These effects are such that seldom do any of the original drives appear in later life in their native form, except under conditions of mental breakdown.

Acquired drives or motives. The impulses or incitements in the life of the adult seem so remote from the biologically derived drives that some writers insist on using another concept for those acquired through social learning. They use the term *drive* for the original or native impulses only. Those which arise out of learning they term

³ See M. Ovsiankina, "Die Wiederaufnahme unterbrochener Handlungen," *Psychologische Forschung*, 1928, 11: 302-379.

motive.⁴ There can be no objection to this, except that the failure to arrive at some consensus on terms is bothersome to the student of behavior. (See chapter 1.) More serious is the implication, in some psychological quarters at least, that one may sharply separate original drives from motives or acquired drives. This heavy stress on learning tends to negate the solid core of biological fact. Despite personal-social and cultural conditioning, man is still a member of an animal species. All human learning rests firmly on the fundamental drives and reaction tendencies which man shares with the other animals. There seems little use in discussing original drives or original nature only to follow this by bland statements which imply that, after all, the personality is the product of learning only. This is a particularistic view, resting on extreme environmentalism, which is likely to mislead the careful student of human and social behavior. True, the impact of conditioning on conduct is enormous, but all the basic needs of mankind remain tied to sustenance, sex, and bodily protection. For this very reason, these are, as we saw in chapter 3, the roots of the first order of cultural imperatives. What culture does is to canalize original drives, provide all sorts of substitute drives, and furnish new ways to reach one's goals. But it cannot wipe out hunger nor do away permanently with sexuality nor enable people to live without provision for protection.

In this book the term drive will be used to cover both native or basic impulsion and those overlaid and modified and elaborated by social-cultural influences. Where the matter is not clear from the context, the adjective "native" or "acquired" will be used. Among adults the number and kind of motives are so great as to render it somewhat bootless to try to classify them. However, one of the most insightful and long-accepted listings in sociology was that of W. I. Thomas, who postulated the following four wishes as fundamental: (1) the de-

sire for security, (2) the desire for new experience, (3) the desire for [intimate] response, and (4) the desire for recognition.⁵ The psychologist L. F. Shaffer gives us the following motives: (1) subsistence, in which he includes need for food, liquids, and shelter; (2) mastery or the desire to dominate a person or situation; (3) conformity; (4) sexual motives; and (5) mixed motives, made up of combinations of these.⁶

Certainly we must reckon with such developed motives as revolve (1) around physical needs for sustenance, shelter, protection, and provision for bodily requirements generally, no matter how these are qualified and modified by culture; (2) around social interactions, more particularly such as mastery or power, companionship and sense of conjoint participation, and for sexual interstimulation and response; (3) around desires to know and to experience new reactions and objects, including curiosity, inventiveness, exploration, and perhaps even man's efforts to explain his world; and (4) around goal-seeking itself: ideals, purposes, values projected often into the distant future, which are exemplified in philosophy, religious beliefs, utopian dreams, and the deep emotional values regarding life itself.

Yet even this extremely broad grouping neglects many important considerations. So much of what we do is determined by unconscious factors, by sheer habit, that efforts to classify much of our routine motivation falls far short of satisfying us. Still for broad purposes of describing and comparing human thought and conduct such classification may serve a useful purpose.

The feelings and emotions. Closely bound up with the drives and their satisfactions are the feelings and emotions. They also have their roots in the inherited constitution of man and are especially influenced by the endocrines. But, like other inherited features, they are qualified and modified as

⁴ See Shaffer, *op. cit.*, and Stagner, *op. cit.* No such sharp distinction is made by Murphy, *op. cit.*, or Sherif and Cantril, *op. cit.*

⁵ See W. I. Thomas, *The unadjusted girl*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1923.

⁶ Shaffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-108.

the individual comes into contact with his fellows. Technically, *feelings* refer to the general tone of thought or action as we find it pleasant or unpleasant, satisfying or distasteful. The term feeling is also used to refer to a combination of perception and the general tone just noted, as "I feel he's a nice chap though I don't understand him." Obviously feelings are linked closely to drives and motives as well as to securing or not securing the reward or situation which will complete a given cycle. *Emotions* are those larger overall states of the individual which arise under conditions induced by "startle," "surprise," "intense stimulation," or "great need." The emotions have both a perceptual and an associative as well as a physiological aspect. That is to say, they get linked to specific or general objects and associated with drives, rewards, manner of seeking satisfactions, or bringing about avoidances. These are expressed in such words as love, anger, fear, or even in such more specific terms as filial love, parental affection, phobias, worry, irritations, and the like. But no matter what object, or its image, with which these states are associated, they always are marked by physiological changes in which the autonomic nervous system and the endocrines play an important part.

The feelings and emotions are tied up at every point with the course from drive or motive to the tension-reducing reward or consummation of a cycle. In the earliest months of life they appear to take on a rather undifferentiated mass-activity character of excitement or startle or distress-delight. They are linked to hunger and eliminative and defense needs, and they are particularly in evidence when a child is unable to find a ready release from his tensions. And, finally, the pleasantness state is usually present if and when the satisfying object is obtained.

Although the feelings and the emotions become more specific to drives and to situation, they continue to serve as an undercurrent to everything one does. True, in highly intellectual pursuits they seem to be held in abeyance. (See below on objective

thinking.) Yet even these coldly deliberate processes may and usually are set in motion by some dilemma we seek to end because of some emotionalized desire to do so. Most of our everyday life, however, does not consist of flights into logical thinking for its own sake but has to do with handling material objects and interacting with people; and in this matrix of experience, emotions and feelings are usually active or, at least, lie just below the surface of expression. It is well to bear this in mind because the major habits, ideas, and values of man in society carry with them a certain feeling-emotional tone, and it is chiefly these things that men live by and die for.

Learning or adaptive capacity. In contrast to maturation, the term *learning* is applied to changes occurring within the organism as a result of its exposure to the external environment in certain specific ways. The effects of such contact are embedded in the tissue of the nervous system.

This learning, with its cumulative residues, builds up a complex set of neural patterns in the brain that more and more extends the time between stimulus and response, or between motive and goal. The simple unlearned reflexes of the first period of life are modified and overlaid by habits and internal processes which make for more adequate adaptation. Man comes to plan, readjust in advance of overt action, and otherwise elaborate his responses to the world outside. The key feature of these internal activities is *anticipation*. In fact, many behaviorists discuss the function of the internal organization under the concept "anticipatory responses." On the basis of his higher and more complex forms of learning the individual may be said to go out to meet his environment. It does not completely dominate him; he seeks to dominate it.

The older psychology used what are sometimes called "mentalistic" terms to describe these processes, such as association, memory, concept-formation, and the like. Behaviorism eschews such terminology, but it has its own concepts for much the same

things.⁷ Since our view is an eclectic one, we shall not hesitate to use any terms which seem logically defensible when adequately defined. We want only to understand the psychological roots of personality, and any concepts which will help us to do so are satisfactory.

We must not forget, however, that learning is dependent upon the maturation of neuro-muscular tissue. Training or teaching before the organism is ready for it is useless.

For instance, before a child can be trained in the dry habit, certain muscles and nerves having to do with the inhibition of bladder reflexes have to mature to such a point as to permit this conditioning. Another homely example is that of walking. While a doting parent may urge an infant to try to take its first steps, walking definitely depends on growth of bone, tendon, muscle, and neural tissues adequate to locomotor co-ordination. When this stage is reached, of course, exercise or trials are necessary to perfect the movement. Yet after one has learned to walk, one may go on to acquire all sorts of additional skills involving feet, legs, and sense of balance, such as toe dancing or tight-rope walking. In contrast to walking, where so much depends on maturation, we usually say that a child definitely must learn to talk. Even here, however, the pronunciation of certain syllables and words must wait upon the growth of the jaw, teeth, and other parts of the vocal structure. Yet learning predominates in speech development.

In this connection a word should be said about the effects of exercise upon adaptation. It has been shown experimentally that

⁷ While there is much argument in favor of discarding the mentalistic vocabulary of the older psychology, the worship of new terms has resulted in a kind of reification which has the same odor as sometimes emanated from the use of the other vocabulary. The behaviorist position is clear in such books as C. L. Hull, *Principles of behavior; an introduction to behavior theory*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1943; E. R. Hilgard and D. G. Marquis, *Conditioning and learning*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940; and Karl Muenzinger, *Psychology, the science of behavior*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942. By way of contrast the most widely used general textbooks, such as Munn, Ruch, and Woodworth and Marquis (see footnote 2 above), use concepts from both the older and the new psychology.

activity of the muscles definitely increases, not their number — which is fixed by heredity — but their size and strength. While no one has yet found out how to study the matter experimentally, the inference is strong that the brain tissue also may be influenced by its use. Certainly it may be affected by undue fatigue, drugs, and narcotics as well as by gross injury. In any case, the tissues of the brain must be sufficiently matured before learning can take place.

Learning has been classified as deliberative and conscious, or as nondeliberative and unconscious. While everyone is exposed to both kinds, a great deal of our day-by-day learning, especially in the formative years, is of the nondeliberative variety. This includes many of the factors entering into socialization. However, the findings of psychologists regarding the deliberative type apply to much of the unconscious kind also. The paragraphs below review some of the pertinent factors in human learning that are important in the development of the personality.

The crucial feature of all learning is the *association* of elements together to form a new response pattern. But the forms of learning vary. Learning takes place in four principal ways: by trial-and-error, conditioned response, insight, and reason.

Learning by *trial-and-error* is very common. A man is lost in a large city or, under laboratory conditions, may be asked to solve a maze test. In these situations the principal steps in the correct solution involve *exploration* of the situation, many *faulty reactions*, but a gradual *elimination of error*, leading finally to *solution*. The correct response may be fixated by practice.

Learning by the *conditioned response* is also widespread. Its essential feature is the linkage of an unconditioned stimulus-response sequence with a novel or conditioned stimulus by repeated trials in such a way that the conditioned stimulus will in time elicit the unconditioned response. The classic experiment is that of Pavlov and his dog which he trained to salivate at the sound of a bell.

Examples in human life of this kind of learning are many. The essential features are

reinforcement by reintroducing from time to time the original conditioning, and the time relationship of the two stimuli. The latter may be simultaneous or successive, within certain limits. Likes and dislikes, fear and favor, avoidance and approach responses and attitudes are often built up in this way. Furthermore, one conditioned stimulus-response combination may serve as the basis for a *second-order conditioning*. For example, the new conditioned stimulus-response pattern may act to inhibit the first. Or the second may be one which simply builds on the first. Inhibition is more likely if the two stimuli are of antagonistic origin. For example, children conditioned to fear a dog have been "cured" by reconditioning them, under stress of the hunger drive, not to fear such an animal. The new rewards may be candy and verbal praise. This is a case of competing motivations, hunger against fear. Also, second-order conditioning is the basis of negative learning, as exemplified by a parent stopping thumb-sucking by rubbing a bitter-tasting powder under a child's thumbnail.

Then, too, sometimes conditioning induces generalization of experience. Thus, a child conditioned to fear of a dog may later show fear at the sight of a muff, cotton wool, or other furry or fuzzy object. Conditioned reactions also permit differentiation or discrimination of stimuli. For instance, an animal is conditioned positively with food to a certain number of beats of a metronome, but not to another series of beats. If, then, in subsequent experimental situations the difference between the respective number of beats in each series is reduced, the animal will arrive at a state of confusion. He becomes unable to react positively to the original conditioned stimulus — beats of a certain number. This illustrates the "nervous breakdown" of experimental animals. Again there are counterparts in human beings.

Insight or insightful learning consists of a sudden solution of a problem without recourse to overt trial-and-error or conditioning. Sultan, one of the apes observed by Wolfgang Köhler, is often cited as an illustration. (See chapter 2.) In front of his cage but outside his reach was some food. However, two sticks were placed in the cage near the bars. The ape used first one, then the other to try to reach the food, but neither was long enough to be of help. He then flew into a rage. After it passed away, he rather suddenly took

up the sticks and put the one into the hollow end of the other and made a longer stick, which enabled him to pull in the food. (The sticks were so prepared as to permit joining.) Köhler considers this a case of insightful learning.

Just what the brain mechanisms are in these cases, no one knows. But there is no reason to throw away the essential and solid principle of association, although the association was made quickly and outside the range of other forms of learning.

There are plenty of instances of human learning by insight. Most theorists invoke the operation of the nondeliberative or unconscious mechanisms. These are assumed to provide the answer to a problem without the individual having to go through the tedious steps of trial-and-error, conditioning, or reasoning.

Reason or rational learning uses deliberate and logical methods in the formation of new associations. It involves foresight, or seeing the steps to the goal before taking them, ability to anticipate possible errors in advance of making them, and the use of various empirical and logical techniques in deriving principles of operation pertinent to the solution of the problem. While the elements of reason in learning rest in common-sense experience, the more advanced phases of rational learning rest on culturally accepted ways of handling data by logic and science. The invention of the syllogism, for example, was an important advance in this field. The invention of experimental controls and especially of mathematical logic were others which came later. In planning and executing a research project, rational learning has a distinctive place. (See chapter 1.)

Laws and conditions of learning. On the general and widely held assumption that all learning rests on association, psychologists have attempted to state the more general principles of learning. Two of these are *contiguity in time and space*, and *assimilation*. The association of knife and fork within the larger context of eating is an instance of the contiguity of space. Contiguity in time may be that of a simultaneous happening or of a sequence of time. The appearance of a stern father and the subsequent falling of silence over his children at play is a case of association of time. Assimilation


involves building the new into the old to form a somewhat different organization of habit, idea, or attitude.

Various factors condition the effectiveness of learning: *frequency*, or the linkage of two things to be associated; *intensity* or *vividness*, especially involving emotion; and *recency*. Those things acquired last are more likely to be remembered than matters learned much earlier. *Motivation* is also highly important. Without adequate motivation neither children nor adults gain much from exposure to learning situations.

The place of motivation in learning is neatly shown in Levine and Murphy's study of rates of learning and forgetting controversial literature.⁸ They gave individuals of either decided procommunist or decided anti-communist views certain materials to memorize. Some of these praised communism; some of them were negatively critical. The procommunist group not only learned the anticommunist materials rather inadequately but also forgot them rapidly. The reverse was true of the favorable matter. Those subjects who were anticommunist in attitude and opinion not only learned the anticommunist passages more completely but remembered more of them when tested later. Figure 4 shows the results on one passage of anti-communist material.

FIGURE 4

LEARNING AND FORGETTING OF CONTROVERSIAL LITERATURE BY TWO GROUPS OF STUDENTS KNOWN TO HAVE EXTREME VIEWS, FAVORABLE OR UNFAVORABLE, REGARDING COMMUNISM⁹



⁸ See J. M. Levine and Gardner Murphy, "Learning and forgetting of controversial material," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1943, 38 : 507-517.

⁹ Reprinted from Levine and Murphy, *op. cit.*, by permission of the authors and the American Psychological Association, Inc.

Social situations also affect learning. While there are some variations in experimental results, due partly to differences in experimental procedures, materials used, and samples of subjects, in general these studies show the following: (1) *Praise* tends to be more effective than blame in motivating efficient learning. (2) With regard to whether *punishment* or positive *reward* is the more effective in learning, the results are somewhat equivocal. As a rule, punishment leads to a more rapid elimination of errors than happens if it is not used. Yet, in certain learning situations, punishment combined with reward has been shown to be more effective than positive reward or punishment alone. There may be sound principle in operation when parents punish a child for an infraction of their rules only to follow this with a bit of kindness or a more substantial reward, such as candy or money. (3) Many studies have shown that *competition* among students serves to stimulate them to better and more work at given tasks than a no-rivalry situation will. This case, however, beautifully illustrates cultural context and prior learning which would not be true among the Pueblo Indians of our Southwest. (See chapter 4.) (4) *Suggestion* and *imitation* definitely act to facilitate learning. The mere presence of co-workers, not necessarily under conditions of rivalry, acts to speed up performance. Then, too, the use of pace-setters in industry is based on the fact that suggestion and imitation come into play as one tries to keep up to levels set by another. Certainly in everyday life the effort of political and other leaders is to facilitate learning at both the conscious and the unconscious level. In fact, prestige-imitation is one of the most effective and widespread means of influencing the masses of mankind.

Some aspects of internal organization. In discussing the nature and operation of the internal and anticipatory processes, many psychologists distinguish between experience and behavior.¹⁰ The latter — which has

¹⁰ The behaviorists do not like such distinctions. (See Hull reference in footnote 7.)

been our concern chiefly up to this point — refers to overt action of the individual which can be observed by another. This may be communicative behavior, such as speech or gross bodily reaction, as in playing games, fighting, and the like. The former has to do with what goes on inside the individual — perceptions, ideas, emotions, and feelings — which is not directly observable by others. The individual may or may not report his inner experience.

To understand personality we must take both experiential and behavioral elements into account. In fact, a strictly behavioral view of personality would be incomplete. We need to know about motives which are usually hidden. We want to know about a person's opinions, ideas, and attitudes as cues to his basic values and his overt conduct. In this subsection we shall look particularly at perception, memory, concept-formation, and the two fields of thought: logical thinking and fantasy thinking.

Perception has long since been defined simply as sensation plus meaning. Sensation refers to the fact that the receptor features are always involved. We talk of visual, auditory, tactile, and other perceptions. They represent our contact with the objects of the world about us. The meaning aspect of perception has to do with the effects of residues of previous learning, including the organization of ideas about objects which the receptor processes have brought us. It deals also with frames of reference, norms, values, and purposes as these enter into meaning.


Perception relates to the here and now. It involves awareness or consciousness of objects which technically are *percepts*, that is, a combination of sensory elements and the meaning. It is the latter which largely dominates the perceptual activity. As G. T. W. Patrick put it, "We see things not as they are, but as we are." In other words, what the individual will see, hear, taste, smell, and so on depends on past behavior and past experience. The impact of cultural learning on perception is of great importance, and we shall have many opportunities to note this fact in later chapters. One

telling demonstration of this may be cited here.

J. S. Bruner and C. C. Goodman devised an experiment which showed how a number of ten-year-old boys estimated coins of differing sizes and money value.¹¹ In one part of the study the subjects were asked to compare the size of coins (1¢, 5¢, 10¢, 25¢, and 50¢) with pasteboard disks of identical dimensions. Figure 5 shows graphically that culturally valued objects, the coins, are judged to be larger in size than the disks. Also, the greater the money value of the coin, the greater the variation of *apparent* from *actual* size. The one exception to this is the half dollar, where the overestimation fell below that for the quarter. This may well be due to the children's lack of contact with a coin of this high money value.

FIGURE 5

SIZE ESTIMATIONS OF COINS AND DISKS OF THE SAME SIZE MADE BY TEN-YEAR-OLD BOYS¹²



Another part of the experiment compared the estimation of coin size by children from poor and rich families respectively. The results are given in Figure 6. While both groups overestimate the size, the former clearly overvalue the coins to a much greater degree than the latter. Again there is a discrepancy as to the judgment of the half dollar in both groups. The variation in the degree of overestimation of the dime as compared to the nickel may be due to differences between relative size and the money value of the two, though the curve for the poor children does

¹¹ J. S. Bruner and C. C. Goodman, "Value and need as organizing factors in perception," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1947, 42: 33-44.

¹² From Bruner and Goodman, *op. cit.* Reprinted by permission of the authors and the American Psychological Association, Inc.


not show the sharp break that the one for the rich children shows.

In still another phase of the experiment it was shown that overestimation also occurs when one makes judgments of size from memory. While the discrepancies in relation to particular coins were more in evidence in contrasting the rich and the poor, on the whole the results confirm the same general pattern of judgment as when the coins were actually perceived.

The memory process concerns the revival of past perceptions. These we call *images*, and, like the perceptions on which they are based, images follow the receptor fields: visual, auditory, tactile, and the rest. However, the memories of most people are couched in visual or auditory terms.

FIGURE 6

SIZE ESTIMATIONS OF COINS MADE BY WELL-TO-DO AND POOR TEN-YEAR-OLD BOYS¹³



Studies of memory, in particular, have been most fruitful in showing the importance of the nondeliberative, unconscious learning. It is difficult to study unconscious learning when it is going on. But investigations in recall have shown how vast is the material we have taken up from our world and retained all unwittingly to ourselves. We owe a great debt to psychiatry and especially to psychoanalysis for having shown us how much of the personality make-up derives from unconscious learning. So many of our motives, our

likes and dislikes, and our values have their roots far beneath the surface of directed and conscious learning.

Concepts or ideas are abstractions from behavior and experience to which we attach a name or symbol. The processes of differentiation and generalization are involved in their development. The term covers a wide range of mental patterns: classes of objects or actions, qualities or relations of objects or actions, principles of logic or of conduct, opinions and beliefs, and a vast array of abstractions from behavior and experience covered by such ideas as goodness, evil, truth, honesty, fidelity, loyalty, patriotism, and the like.

In the operation of the mental processes, language clearly has an important function. Since ideational processes are carried on largely in verbal terms, words act as the currency or symbols of thinking itself. The names of objects, situations, qualities, relations, and the like enable us to deal with our problems in thought in an ever-widening range of possible actions — past, present, and future.

The development of science rests on our capacity to deal with the world in terms of ideas. Yet it would be a mistake to think that only logicians and scientists use concepts. The man in the street has a host of them which helps him to order and control his world. Sometimes his ideas are not very sound from the standpoint of logic and science, but they serve his purposes nevertheless.

Of particular importance to sociology and social psychology are those widely held false concepts which we call *stereotypes*. These arise from illogical association of percepts and ideas, from the fault of generalizing from one case (an instance of particularism), and from a host of other sources. However, stereotypes are a basic feature of culture and are transmitted from parents to children, from children to children, from teachers to pupils, from demagogues to the masses, and otherwise throughout the entire social fabric. They become important tools in defending class and caste status, in keeping the sexes segregated along

¹³ From Bruner and Goodman, *op. cit.* Reprinted by permission of the authors and the American Psychological Association, Inc.

lines of role and status, and in countless other social situations.

There remain three other components of the personality which are closely bound up with the inner organization. These are traits, attitudes, and values.

Traits are certain more or less permanent features of our inner make-up whose overt manifestations may be observed by others. We say of others that they are honest, persevering, tactful, ambitious, aggressive, sympathetic, and so on through a long list of trait names. In a sense, traits are specific or general static features in our life-organization which become dynamic in our attitudes.

An *attitude*, like a percept, bridges the gap between inner experience and overt conduct. It may be defined as an internal mental set, or tendency to respond, for or against, toward or away from, in favor of or in opposition to some person, group, or situation in advance of the full opportunity to do so. Social attitudes constitute some of the most important elements in our whole adaptive process. Our thoughts about and reactions to our family, our class, our religion, our nation are chiefly determined by the attitudes we have toward these matters. Social-cultural training has much to do with the building of these into the personality.

A most important feature of personality is the value system. A *value* is a combination of idea and attitude which gives a scale of preference or priority to motives and goals as well as to a course of action from motive to goal. The values high in one's scale tend to be emotionally charged. These are the things we want most in life. Items in the order of preference on which we place little value or interest are usually not marked by emotion and feeling. For example, some people rate security and safety much higher than the risks of change and development.¹⁴

The individual seldom determines his value system unaided by others. The cul-

ture usually sets up ideal values which are passed on to the growing child and adolescent by parents, teachers, preachers, and other carriers of the culture. As we pointed out in chapter 4, the authoritarian way of life in contrast to the democratic way conditions individuals differentially with respect to authority and obedience, individualism and collectivity, and in other matters considered of high preference in the contrasting cultural systems. In the democratic scheme of things, however, it is generally assumed that the values are arrived at with more freedom of choice and more understanding of their meaning than is the case under the authoritarian. This difference itself represents a variation in the values regarding the integrity and capacity of the person to make up his own mind as to what is good for him and what he wants out of life.

The field of thought. Our inner experience may be viewed as operating in a more or less organized way along a continuum of thinking. At the one extreme is highly logical and scientific thought, which is impersonal, objective, and verifiable by the rigid canons of analysis and interpretation. At the other is fantasy thinking, which is illogical, wishful, and highly personal in orientation. Most of our everyday thought fluctuates between these two poles. For purposes of description we may consider our forms of thought as clustering around the two modes, one the directed or logical, the other the wishful or fantastic.

Directed or logical thinking is an outgrowth of everyday contact with the physical and social world of events, where genuine cause and effect are apparent. The child associates events outside, enabling him later to prepare for their reappearance. He learns a relation, for example, between rain clouds and the preparation for a shower by donning overshoes and slicker, or he learns how to count, to make change at the store, and to follow complex instructions. Directed thought is evident in the development of all sorts of skills. It is the foundation of science and engineering. It is highly important in handling social relations, as in the management

¹⁴ See suggestive essay by Hadley Cantril, *Understanding man's social behavior. Preliminary Notes*. Princeton: Office of Public Opinion Research, 1947.

of people and in the development of rational devices of industry, business, and law.

Wishful or *fantasy thinking*, in contrast, develops from the fact that imagination itself offers us much satisfaction, even in reference to many fundamental wants. It is characterized by the failure to associate the symbol or word with the concrete object in such a way as to modify directly the external object. For example, the child, denied sweetmeats, daydreams of having all the candy he can eat, and up to a point of intense hunger such imaginative response may be pleasant and satisfying. Or a person may wish his enemy dead and get considerable satisfaction from the thought, although nothing really happens to the enemy. Fantasy thinking is always personal. It is the world of dreams, daydreams, and free-flowing imagination, relatively unchecked by the logic of events outside.

Not only do people indulge in fantastic associations, but they sometimes act upon them. The suspicious person not only imagines that others are talking behind his back but begins to treat the suspected person with distrust and hostility. As W. I. Thomas says, "If men define situations as real they are real in their consequences."

Obviously some wishful thinking is so unique, so remote from social reality that it leads to complete isolation from society, as in the psychopathic patient in a mental hospital who imagines that he has billions in wealth, or that he is God or Caesar or Napoleon.

Yet all sorts of fantasy thought-patterns become fully integrated to culture. Primitive magic often resembles the fantasy of the insane patient who, if he had lived in

a society favorable to such thought, might actually have become a powerful medicine man. It is very easy for us to ridicule non-literate peoples for their "queer" ideas and practices. But even with modern applied science having so greatly changed our world today, there remains a great deal of wishful thinking deeply rooted in our own culture. Our worship of the words "loyalty," "nationality," "country," "freedom," "capitalism," the widespread belief in astrology and medical quackery, and the debasing of sound scientific ideas in the minds of the masses — all show that culturalized fantasy thinking is powerful among us.

Fantasy, moreover, plays a part in the creation of myths and legends, so important in social control. Neurotics will report divine messages, win large followings, and form new religious cults. Even in our economic, political, and family life there is much of this sort of thought, while art and recreation are largely the products of fantasy thinking.¹⁵

This whole area of fantasy is as much a part of man's social life as logic, or as tools and weapons used in everyday life. It is idle to say that such thinking and acting are pathological, for what is "pathological" depends on how behavior and thought are defined in the culture of the time and place. Fantasy thinking is not only natural but evidently as essential to man's life as his more directed logical thought and behavior.

¹⁵ For a more extended discussion of the social-cultural importance of fantasy thinking, see Kimball Young, *Social psychology*, 2nd ed., chapter 8, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1944; and Kimball Young, ed., *Social attitudes*, chapter 5, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1931.

Interpretative Summary

No one is born with a personality. It develops and operates on the basis of biopsychological structures and functions as these are influenced by society and its culture.

To uncover the foundations of personality we must understand the special place which the sensory-neural-muscular systems and the endocrine system play in its development and maintenance.

Moreover, personality in operation rests on two aspects of the individual's psychological make-up: (a) his *behavior* or overt responses, which include the verbal-gestural and the gross bodily movements in space; and (b) his *experience* or dynamic inner, mental organization (which arises from the internalization of learning effects).

4. More specifically, then, the chief biopsychological factors to consider with regard to personality include: (a) the original drives and acquired motives with their respective goals; (b) learning as it affects changes in motivation and goals and enables the individual to extend and elaborate the means of moving from motive to goal; (c) the internalization of learning and its effects, which means that attention must be given to the perceptual, memory, and conceptual functions, to attitudes, traits, and values, and to their relation, in turn, to the larger organization of the field of thought along a continuum from fantasy to objectivity.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is the function of the central nervous system? Of the autonomic?
2. What is the function of the endocrine system? Illustrate.
3. Define drive. Distinguish between innate and acquired forms of drives (a) as to complexity, and (b) as to object toward which they are directed.
4. Define learning. Name and illustrate the chief kinds or ways of learning. What does the study of learning processes contribute to sociology and the understanding of personality development?
5. What place have the feelings and emotions in human adjustment?
6. What effect has social-cultural learning on our perceptions? Illustrate.
7. Define and illustrate concept, trait, attitude, value.
8. Distinguish between logical and fantasy thinking. What is the function of each in individual life-organization? In culture?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Alfred Adler, *Practice and theory of individual psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1924.

A good introduction to Adlerian psychology.

András Angyal, *Foundations for a science of personality*. New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1941.

A stimulating treatment from a biological approach.

A. A. Brill, ed., *The basic writings of Sigmund Freud*. New York: Random House, 1938.

A collection, with an introduction by the editor and translator, of Freud's more important books.

H. J. Eysenck, et al., *Dimensions of personality*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1947.

Reports a wide range of research dealing with methods, rating schemes, abilities, and other aspects of personality study.

H. A. Murray, et al., *Explorations in personality*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938.

An important research and theoretical contribution to the field, though couched in somewhat difficult terminology.



Socialization and the Personality

THE PREVIOUS chapter dealt with the biopsychological foundations of personality. In this one we examine the place which social and cultural learning or conditioning¹ has in the development and operation of the personality. The emphasis will be on the dynamics of interaction. We begin with a discussion of the effects of isolation on personal development. Then we turn to examine the interactional determinants of personality.

Effects of Isolation

In order to bring sharply before us the impact of social-cultural learning on the development of the personality, we shall review some cases of individuals who lived under conditions in which there was an absence of the usual human relations. By way of contrast we shall also tell the story of what happened when a young chimpanzee was reared in the same household with an American child.

There are many legends and certain more authenticated historical instances of so-called feral or "wild" individuals who grew up without human tutelage. These stories fall into two classes: one, the given individuals were reared by bears, wolves, or other animals; the other, they lived alone in woods, caves, dungeons, attics, with no or very little contact with other human beings. In the first class is the legend of the founders of Rome, Romulus and Remus, who were

allegedly suckled by a she-wolf. Of recent date is the much-publicized story of Kamala and Amala, the "wolf children" of India. These children, when about 8 and 1½ years of age, respectively, are said to have been found by the Reverend J. A. L. Singh and his companions in a wolf den near Midnapore, India. The story of these children has been the subject of much debate.² Although adequate verification is not at hand, it is claimed that Kamala was changed from a raw-meat eater, a howler, and animal-like being which got about on all fours to a human child who could eat cooked foods, walk erect, talk, play, and perform simple social tasks. Kamala is said to have died at the age of about 16 or 17 years. (Amala died shortly after being found.)

In the other class of stories are accounts of the Wild Boy of Aveyron, a completely untutored lad found in the woods of France in 1799 and later studied by J. E. M. G. Itard (1774-1838). Whether inherently feeble-minded or the victim of his long isolation is not established, but he showed only slight improvement in mental ability when he was given human instruction. Kaspar Hauser (1812-1833) is another case. He is said to have been put into a dungeon at an early age and to have remained there for years with few or no social contacts. In 1828, when he was rescued and taken to Nuremberg, Bavaria, he was completely bewildered by his surroundings. He could not

¹ Although many psychologists do not agree with some behaviorists that all learning rests on some form of conditioned-reflex mechanisms, the term *conditioning* has come into wide usage as a synonym for learning. But the student should not get the idea that this usage here implies that the learning is necessarily of the conditioned-reflex type described by Pavlov and his followers. It may rest on trial-and-error, insight, or reasoning, as the case may be. (See chapter 8.)

² A popular criticism is found in Bergen Evans, *The natural history of nonsense*, pp. 90-99. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947. The published account is found in J. A. L. Singh and R. M. Zingg, *Wolf children and feral man*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942, which also has a review of other instances of feral man. Arnold Gesell's *Wolf child and human child*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941, contains a shorter account and comparisons of the behavior of Kamala and Amala with Gesell's studies on children in American society. Despite some doubts these cases deserve consideration.

distinguish between material objects and human beings; his conduct was infantile and asocial. Although he seems to have known a few words, he had no speech in the proper sense. While he has been the subject of much folklore, his mental and social retardation seems clearly to have been the result of long segregation from normal social contacts. But much more telling instances of isolation are those of Anna and Isabelle (pseudonyms) and of Laura Bridgman and Helen Keller. The former provide information about the effects of prolonged segregation with a minimum of normal human contacts. Bridgman and Keller suffered a form of isolation resulting from absence of important sensory-perceptual capacities.

The case of Anna. On February 6, 1938, the *New York Times* and other newspapers carried a story of a strange child aged 5 who had been confined in an attic room of a farmhouse in Pennsylvania for nearly five years. She lacked any of the ordinary traits of a child of like age. She was removed to a county old-folks' home and then to a foster home. Later she was placed in a private school for defectives. She died on August 6, 1942. The following summary is based on a variety of observations made by experts.³

Anna was the second of two illegitimate children of a young woman in her twenties. After six months of being moved from place to place, she was brought into the household of the mother's parents. In order to escape the anger and aversion of the maternal grandfather, Anna was hidden away in an upper room. She was fed almost entirely on a milk diet; she was not bathed, trained in any personal habits, nor ever caressed or made the object of any but the scantiest attention. She spent most of her time in a crib or half-reclining, half-sitting in a chair tilted against a coal bucket.

Observations made at the county home and later in the foster home show some of the

effects of such extreme isolation. At first she reclined in a supine position, immobile, indifferent to those around her, and completely apathetic. She appeared to be deaf and dumb. Her social contacts were purely perfunctory or "openly antagonistic." As a result of a sound diet and massages her physical condition improved rapidly. Gradually she began to develop mental and social traits normal to very young children. She acquired visual discrimination as to color, improved in posture and in motor co-ordination, including the ability to chew solid food. Yet after four months she had not learned to speak. By the end of six months, however, she began to walk. In time she learned to control her elimination. She also gradually showed interest in the people around her.

After nine months in the county home she was placed in the care of kindly and understanding foster parents. Within a month following this, definite advancement was evident. Her walking and other motor habits improved still further, and she became increasingly responsive to verbal commands and remarks. In August, 1939 she was placed in a private school for defectives. Although she could now walk, could feed herself, was fairly neat, could recall people and understand simple commands, she could not speak. She had, in short, the mental and behavior characteristics of a normal infant of slightly more than one year of age.

Even two months after her arrival at the special school, she had not learned any words. She had, however, begun to notice her hands "as if she had seen them for the first time." Five months later, in April, 1940 a clinical psychologist reported that she was large for her age, normal in hearing and vision, now able to climb stairs, and as having reached the "babbling stage" of speech reactions with some promise of further linguistic development. On the Merrill-Palmer scale she had a mental score of 19 months; on the Vineland Social Maturity scale, a score of 23 months.

On July 1, 1941, the school reported that she had grown in height and weight, could bounce and catch a ball, and had made progress in adjustment to group life with other children. Finally, she had begun to talk. The report concluded "that there was nothing peculiar about her except that she was feeble-minded — 'probably congenital in type.'"⁴

³ See Kingsley Davis, "Extreme isolation of a child," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1940, 45: 554-565, and Davis, "Final note on a case of extreme isolation," *ibid.*, 1947, 52: 432-437.

⁴ Davis, *op. cit.*, 1947, p. 434.

Two months before her death another report indicated further advancement. "She talked mainly in phrases but would repeat words and try to carry on a conversation." She was neat and tidy in her personal habits; walked and ran fairly well; and "although easily excited, she had a pleasant disposition."⁵

It is evident that the child's development was adversely affected by isolation. But her failure to make much headway after she was placed in more normal social circumstances does raise the question as to whether she may not have been feeble-minded. But before taking up this and related topics about her case, let us see what happened to Isabelle.

The case of Isabelle. A somewhat comparable instance of isolation is that of Isabelle, who was about Anna's age and also an illegitimate child who had been kept away from society. She was found in November, 1938 in Ohio, nine months after Anna's case had been uncovered. Her mother was a deaf-mute who, with her child, had been secluded in a dark room away from the rest of her family. Isabelle was removed from this environment and placed in the hands of child specialists. The essential facts of her story are these:⁶

When found at 6 years of age, Isabelle was rachitic, probably from improper diet and lack of sunshine. She got about "with a skittering gait." She could not speak but made certain croaking sounds. Her communication with her mother had been by means of simple gestures. "Her behavior toward strangers, especially men, was almost that of a wild animal, manifesting much fear and hostility." At first it was thought that she was deaf. Later, when it was found she could hear, she was given various intelligence tests and pronounced feeble-minded. Her first score on the Stanford-Binet was 19 months, practically a zero point on the scale. On the Vineland Social Maturity scale her initial score was 39 — an age level of $2\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Nevertheless, in the face of this poor performance, the individuals who had taken

charge of Isabelle began a systematic program of training. Davis summarizes the story of Isabelle's progress in these words:

"... It seemed hopeless at first. The approach had to be through pantomime and dramatization, suitable to an infant. It required one week of intensive effort before she made even her first attempt at vocalization. Gradually she began to respond, however, and, after the first hurdle had at last been overcome, a curious thing happened. She went through the usual stages of learning characteristic of the years from one to six not only in proper succession but far more rapidly than normal. In a little over two months after her first vocalization she was putting sentences together. Nine months after that she could identify words and sentences on the printed page, could write well, could add to ten, and could retell a story after hearing it. Seven months beyond this point she had a vocabulary of 1500-2000 words and was asking complicated questions. Starting from an educational level of between one and three years (depending on what aspect one considers), she had reached a normal level by the time she was eight and a half years old. In short, she covered in two years the stages of learning that ordinarily require six. Or, to put it another way, her IQ trebled in a year and a half.

"When the writer saw Isabelle a year and a half after her discovery, she gave him the impression of being a very bright, cheerful, energetic little girl. . . . Today she is over fourteen years old and has passed the sixth grade in a public school. Her teachers say that she participates in all school activities as normally as other children. Though older than her classmates, she has fortunately not physically matured too far beyond their level."⁷

Interpretation of Anna and Isabelle. Both children showed definite effects, both physical and mental, of prolonged insulation from normal social contacts. It is obvious that Isabelle made much more progress in catching up with her age-mates than did Anna. The former achieved mental normality within two years, the latter was still markedly deficient even after nearly five years of social-cultural training. In view

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 435-437.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 436-437. By permission of the author and *American Journal of Sociology*.

of this it would be easy to say that the latter was feeble-minded and the former normal in native intelligence. Such a simple view needs some qualification.

First of all, the personal relations of Isabelle with her mother, though atypical, were much closer than those of Anna and her mother. Anna was both a physically neglected and a psychologically rejected child. There is no evidence of the latter in the case of Isabelle, though her contacts with her mother were severely limited by virtue of the latter's handicap. And, of course, her relations with other individuals were apparently nil. Nevertheless, Isabelle seems to have had some emotional security, which is so important a foundation for later social learning. Anna had none. Second, once returned to society, Isabelle had much more expert attention than Anna had. It must not be forgotten that the first diagnosis of Isabelle was that she, too, was definitely feeble-minded. There is no report on the intelligence of Isabelle's mother. Anna's mother was a big, strong, peasant-type person with an IQ of 50, or of middle-grade moron classification. (The mother was tested when she was 32 years of age, shortly after Anna was taken away from her.) Nothing is known of the intelligence of either father.

While we need to be cautious about the meaning of such tests as possible evidence of hereditary deficiency, the probability of inherited defect in Anna's case cannot be ignored. Even though in less expert hands than Isabelle, Anna remained definitely retarded in socialization and mental growth.

Whatever may be the real facts in the matter of inherent deficiency, both girls are excellent examples of the retarding influences of isolation and of the fact that social-cultural tuition can do much to offset these influences. It must not be forgotten that, though retarded to the end, Anna made real advancement. She learned to walk, to control her eliminative processes, to do many relatively skillful things with her hands, to talk, and to take part in social actions with others. This shows that within the limits set by her probable deficiency she was ca-

pable of becoming a functioning member of society. Isabelle, of course, made much more progress; and if nothing untoward happens to her, she should become a normal adult.

The case of Helen Keller. Another type of isolation is found in deaf, blind, and mute individuals. Their physical handicaps serve to prevent their communicating and participating with others in normal ways. For this reason their cases are also valuable to the study of socialization. The story of Helen Keller, who is both deaf and blind, is rather generally known, but there are some details of how she overcame her troubles that throw light on the process of socialization.⁸

Miss Keller was born in Tuscumbia, Alabama on June 27, 1880, of upper middle-class parents. At the age of 19 months she lost both her sight and her hearing as a result of an illness. She had walked at one year and had learned a few words, including water, which she called "wah-wah." She retained this one word through the years before she learned to talk again.

Her handicaps cut her off from the usual world, though her other senses were unimpaired and she continued in good health. As she grew up, she communicated by a system of gestures, in the building up of which she made extensive use of her hands. She learned to shake her head for "No" and nod for "Yes." A pull meant "Come" and a push "Go." If she wanted a piece of bread, she would make gestures of cutting the slices and buttering them.

Her sense of being different was a constant trial to her. She writes: "I do not remember when I first realized that I was different from other people; but I knew it before my teacher came to me. I had noticed that my mother and my friends did not use signs as I did when they wanted anything done, but talked with their mouths. Sometimes I stood between two persons who were conversing and touched their lips. I could not understand, and was vexed. I moved my lips and gesticulated frantically without result. This made me so

⁸ This summary and quotations are taken from Helen Keller, *The story of my life*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1902. By permission.

angry at times that I kicked and screamed until I was exhausted."⁹

A strong social-emotional dependence on her mother continued at least till Anne Mansfield Sullivan came to teach her. Helen flew into a rage on the slightest provocation and, incidentally, acquired a lot of tricks to annoy others, such as locking people out of their rooms. These were probably attention-getting devices. She was also very jealous of her younger sister and occasionally tried to harm her.

Helen's parents had read of Laura Bridgman's experience at the Perkins Institution. On the basis of professional advice, they secured the services of Miss Sullivan to try to help Helen to talk. She arrived at the Keller household on March 3, 1887, when Helen was in her seventh year. Miss Sullivan soon realized the difficulties ahead of her. In a letter to a friend, she confided: "The greatest problem I shall have is how to discipline and control her without breaking her spirit. I shall go rather slowly and first try to win her love."¹⁰

On the day of her arrival Miss Sullivan gave Helen a doll which the children at the Perkins Institution had sent as a gift. Miss Keller reports: "When I had played with it a little while, Miss Sullivan slowly spelled into my hand the word 'd-o-l-l.' I was at once interested in this finger play and tried to imitate it."¹¹ Later Miss Sullivan gave her a piece of cake and spelled "c-a-k-e." From this beginning Helen soon learned to spell out many nouns: *pin*, *bat*, *cup*, and a few verbs such as *sit*, *stand*, and *walk*. "But my teacher had been with me several weeks before I understood that everything has a name."¹²

Gradually Helen got the association of touch and object. The crucial occasion was about a month after her teacher's arrival. They were in the well-house together and Miss Keller relates: "Someone was drawing water and my teacher placed my hand under the spout. As the cool stream gushed over one hand she spelled into the other the word *water*, first slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the motions of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness as of something forgotten — a thrill of returning thought; and somehow the mystery

of language was revealed to me. I knew then that 'w-a-t-e-r' meant the wonderful cool something that was flowing over my hand. . . .

"I left the well-house eager to learn. Everything had a name, and each name gave birth to a new thought. . . ."¹³

Her progress from then on was rapid. She learned 30 words in the same day, such as *door*, *open*, *shut*, *give*, *mother*, *father*, *sister*, and *teacher*. By the end of August she had a vocabulary of 365 words and by the end of the first year of instruction one of 900.

During this year she became less emotional and began to develop a more distinctive social self. The latter fact is shown by her teaching the finger language to Percy, a little Negro boy, and even trying to teach Belle, the Kellers' dog. Helen would take Percy's hand, or the foot of Belle, and spell out the letters "d-o-l-l." She then expected Percy and the dog to spell them back to her. She was learning to identify their response with her own by means of action and imagination.

The next step was to teach Helen to talk. This was a long and arduous process. Helen would feel Miss Sullivan's throat and lips with her fingers, and then she would try to put her own lips and throat organs in like position and make the necessary sounds. As anyone knows who has ever heard Miss Keller speak, there is an unreal and ghostly quality about her vocalisms, though she is entirely understandable.

Later she learned to write and to use the typewriter. Along with learning the use of manual and vocal speech and to write, Helen was given instruction in the usual school subjects. Later she attended Radcliffe College.

In contrast to Anna and Isabelle, Helen Keller was born under most favorable circumstances. Her infancy, till the time of her serious illness, was apparently normal. The loss of both sight and hearing, however, handicapped her during some of her most formative years. Her conduct during these years remained infantile in many respects although her native intelligence enabled her to make some satisfactory social adjustments. Her success in overcoming her handicaps is a tribute to the sound methods of her teacher and to her own

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

strong will, as well as to her high intelligence.

Ape and Human

If the stories of Anna, Isabelle, and Helen Keller are a striking demonstration of the fact that what we call human nature rests on society and culture, the next account is also proof that society and culture are limited as to what they can do if an adequate hereditary background is not present. This is brought out in the observations of an ape and a child living together in an American family.

The story of Gua and Donald. In June, 1931 Professor and Mrs. W. N. Kellogg of Indiana University brought into their home a female baby chimpanzee 7½ months old which they named Gua. Their plan was to rear this ape in company with their own 10-months-old son, Donald. The ape and the child lived in the same household and were more or less exposed to the same daily training and kindly care until March, 1932. The regimen included postural training, walking, feeding, teaching bodily habits, play, and all the other types of habits to which a young child in our American society is subjected. There was little or no punishment in connection with their training, but a persistent effort was made by word and deed of the adults to facilitate development. In connection with the daily routine, the Kelloggs made systematic tests, observations, and comparison of Gua's and Donald's capacities, traits, and activities. They measured physical growth and strength, their hearing, seeing, and other senses, their social-emotional adjustments, and put them through a number of critical learning tests involving manual skill, memory, recognition, and language.

A full appreciation of this interesting study can be had only by reading the Kelloggs' book.¹⁴ Here we shall summarize the

chief likenesses and differences between child and ape.

While Gua and Donald had similar reflex organization, Gua was more mature than the child in a number of items, such as strength of the grasping and rejecting responses. Also, the ape always showed more vigorous emotions, especially to fear-arousing situations.

In motor dexterity the ape was in many ways far superior to the child, especially in climbing, in pulling open drawers, and in escaping danger. At 7½ months the ape easily climbed into a high chair; the child was 18½ months old before he could do this. Gua learned to walk erect on her hind feet some time before Donald managed walking alone; she early learned to run and also to skip — the latter something that Donald never acquired in this period. On the other hand, Donald showed a steady improvement in more precise tactile and manual dexterity.

In our society the fundamental training in habits of elimination ordinarily begins toward the end of the first year, and both ape and child were put upon regular schedules shortly after Gua's arrival. From the outset the child was superior to the ape in bladder control. This was probably due in part to the fact that the water intake of the ape was much larger, and her frequency of urination was about one third greater than the child's. In bowel control the child was also at first superior to the ape, but the latter — after four months — equalled the child's record of success. In this instance, too, the ape defecated from four to seven times in 24 hours; the child's usual reaction was but twice in this same time span.

So, too, in sensory-perceptual responses the ape and the child were much alike. Gua disliked too-bright illumination but had remarkable visual acuity and was much more responsive to noises — slight or loud — than the boy. Both reacted vigorously to tickling, and the observers report not only smiling on the part of the ape but a whispering sound which they termed laughter.¹⁵

Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, *The ape and the child*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933.

¹⁵ There has been some discussion as to whether or not the apes laugh. Certainly they show facial responses similar to human smiles at pleasant stimulation, and the slight vocalization which the Kelloggs term laughter may be considered biologically akin to true human laughter.

¹⁴ It would have been a sounder observation had the ape and the child been reared together from birth on. Also, the presence of other children might have modified some of the effects on both the chimpanzee and the child. The material here is from W. N.



From The ape and the child, W. N. & L. A. Kellogg. By permission.

DONALD AND GUA PLAYING TOGETHER

At play, ape and child were much alike. Both enjoyed various playthings and spent much time handling, biting, and chewing on their toys. At first the play was largely of the solitary kind. Even in the first months, however, Donald showed a more persistent tendency to explore and manipulate his environment. Later a number of simple social games emerged, such as tag and conjoint playing at a sort of peek-a-boo. Still later, imitative play began, and in this—as in exploration and manipulation—the child was, on the whole, superior to the ape. One of the most striking evidences of this superior imitativeness was Donald's direct mimicry of the ape. In all sorts of exploratory activities and especially in using the lips to touch objects and in chewing and biting, the ape set the pace for the child. Both were interested in the human face, especially the mouth.

The most striking likenesses and differences appear in the social-emotional reactions. From the very outset the ape and the child evinced much interest in each other. On the first occasions of their being put together, Donald made more evident advances than did Gwa; but shortly the latter attempted certain exploratory kisses, and within a short time they held hands, slept together, and developed

a mutual protective attitude, such as holding on to each other when riding in a small wagon or a baby buggy. When Gwa screamed in fear, Donald would also start crying, although the particular stimulus which set off Gwa's reaction would not in itself affect Donald directly. The picture above shows one of their many joint activities.

Yet the differences in social reactivity were striking. Gwa never did get used to older children or to strange adults. Though in the early months Donald was closely attached to Gwa, later he showed an intense interest in both children and grown-ups. With reference to adults, Gwa early and throughout showed a strong and abiding affection for and dependence on the Kelloggs. She ran to them when frightened; she showed strong negative emotions when they left the house. Gwa was not only more obviously dependent on adults than was Donald but also more docile and tractable in her learning. Gwa was more responsive to vocal commands, approvals, and to facial gestures of approval or disapproval. Later, before sympathetic audiences, Gwa frequently indulged in a kind of exhibitionism or show-off play—a type of activity which was not evident in Donald at that age.

The emotions are closely associated with such social activities. Gua revealed a much more emotionalized reactive system than Donald to such stimuli as tickling, toys, strong lights, strange noises, fire, gloves, toadstools, and to strange persons. She evidenced marked displeasure and fear at being left alone. Jealousy was also more evident in Gua than in Donald. Her craving for affection and attention from others was much stronger. On the other hand, Donald at 15 months showed distinct bashfulness — an evidence of emerging sense of self. Gua never did reveal such an attitude.

To test their intelligence, a large number of the Gesell infant tests were used. In many of these the ape showed a more rapid rate of learning. In many rudimentary memory tests the ape was superior to the child, but in matters requiring minute manual dexterity the ape was inferior. In creeping, age of walking erect and alone, and in showing interest in own reflection in the mirror, the ape outshone the child. Gua learned to eat with a spoon at 13 months, a habit Donald did not acquire till he was 17½ months old. Likewise, the ape managed to drink from a glass at an earlier age. Also, she was more successful in using a toy to get at objects placed behind an obstruction. Yet, taking all the Gesell tests together, the learning of the two was closely parallel.

In vocal communication and the beginning of higher mental powers as seen in the rise of language the child was clearly superior. Both soon learned to follow correctly all sorts of vocal commands to perform simple motor tasks, and Gua early showed great sensitiveness to vocal indications of approval or disapproval from adults. Surprisingly enough, the ape was at first more correctly responsive to human commands than was the child. She learned to comprehend simple verbal reactions by pointing to a picture of a dog on the command: "Show me a bow-wow," and she learned to utter certain distinctive bark-like sounds to indicate "Yes" when asked: "Do you want an orange?" Later the child surpassed the ape in verbal comprehension. On the other hand, in spite of nine months of living with human beings and being subjected to kindly and patient teaching, *Gua never acquired a single human word*. That is, she could not use names for objects. Donald, on the contrary, began before the first year using words for objects. He called Gua "Gya" almost from the start and later acquired

about the usual vocabulary and simple sentences for a child of his age. There is little doubt that had the ape remained in the Kellogg home, her human companion would soon have outstripped her in acquiring the essential qualities of communication and conduct which so sharply distinguish the socialized *homo sapiens* from the anthropoid. These include such items as true language and the use of concepts, memory couched in symbolic form, the skilled use of tools and other material objects, and above all else the self-image which plays such an important part in human personality.

Meaning of these cases. These studies serve admirably to introduce us to some of the basic matters with which sociology deals. First, they indicate the fact that we must recognize the constitutional or bodily capacity of the individual with reference to its adjustment. Second, they show that learning lies within the frame of social contact. Anna, Isabelle, and Helen Keller had — as nearly as we can tell — a capacity to learn. Certainly they were physically like other human beings. Yet none developed full human traits in the absence of human contacts. Gua, on the contrary, was clearly a normal ape so far as learning ability goes, and yet after more than nine months of constant exposure to human society and culture she failed to develop traits of a strictly human kind.

Apparently much of Gua's adaptation was due to the fact that biologically the ape is prepared for fairly complex social life. She benefited from human society up to a certain point. On the contrary Anna, Isabelle, and Helen Keller, though having some differences in potential intelligence, had no adequate stimulation to develop their capacities. To put it otherwise, nature put a brake on Gua's mental and social-emotional growth. It was environment which blocked the three girls. Anna and Isabelle had the potentialities to acquire culture but failed to do so because they were not given an opportunity. Helen Keller was exposed to a rich culture but could not absorb it till later because of her peculiar handicap in communication.

These cases, then, show the importance of hereditary equipment which makes possible learning, especially those phases associated with language and the higher thought processes. Second, opportunity for learning must be given, no matter how sound the biological heredity is. If, on the other hand, the latter is deficient, all the social-cultural training in the world will not produce behavioral effects beyond the biological limits of learning.

Interactional Determinants of Personality

The present section will discuss socialization, in American society, as it bears upon the rise of ideas, attitudes, and habits, and as these, in turn, become organized into larger (molar) aspects of the personality, especially the social self. Moreover, we shall introduce certain necessary concepts relating to interpersonal interaction — among others, identification, projection, compensation, rationalization, and displacement. So, too, we shall note the importance of role, status, and social-cultural expectancy.

Affection and discipline. Two areas of interaction are most important for much of the later growth of the child's personality. One has to do with the nature and amount of love and care which first the mother and then others give the child. The other has to do with the nature and amount of discipline and control which the mother and others exercise over the child. Both patterns begin with relation to feeding, bodily care, and protection and extend from there to other matters. The affectional pattern is marked by indulgence and sympathy and is probably the root of co-operation. Discipline is necessary, also, because it concerns the direction and control, by the mother and others, of the child's feeding habits, those related to elimination, cleanliness, and a host of others. From these beginnings the individual develops his roles and statuses, his rights and duties, and many additional important features of his participation as a member of society.

The basic child-mother contacts. In most societies the mother is the most important person anyone will ever meet. It is she who sets the pattern of the bulk of one's ideas, habits, and attitudes. In the acts of nursing, bathing, clothing, and caring for the infant, the mother and the child come into intimate contact, particularly involving the most rudimentary sense of touch, which underlies every other form of primary relations. These touch relationships are ordinarily closely linked with the emotion of love. Together, touch and affectional expression are fundamental to adult love, sympathy, and co-operation.

Such elementary senses as taste and smell also enter into these first contacts. As sight and hearing are brought into play, they become associated with these more rudimentary relations. The mother's odor, taste of the milk at her breast, color of hair, eyes, skin, shape of her mouth and form of her neck, bosom, arms, and hands, her posture, her walk, and her voice and facial gestures are powerful stimuli. They become associated with the goal and tension-reducing activities of securing food, bodily care, relief from fatigue, and other basic wants. Not only are these pleasant physiological reactions associated with intimacy, but in our society the mother extends her care to rocking the child while feeding, or swinging it gently to sleep, and offering it toys and all sorts of things not directly essential to the satisfaction of basic needs. The child quickly learns to expect this additional attention, and in time he may cry not because he is hungry or cold or in pain but because he craves the mother's comfort.

The mother, however, also imposes regularity of feeding and care. That is, she imposes upon the child requirements of the social-cultural world from the day of birth. He must learn to manage his bodily and social needs along the lines laid down by her authority. While a large part of this is the reflection of the culture, some patterns such as overaffection, undue anxiety, sense of rejection, and hostility have their beginnings, in part, in personal-social learning. (See chapter 5.)

The child likewise comes into contact with physical, material objects. He learns to avoid getting hurt, to shun fire, to select among the stimuli those which are beneficial and not harmful. Even here the social impress is apparent, since the mother and others interpret his experience with the material world for him in terms of their own culture.

One of the fundamental processes which comes into play in this whole operation is *identification*. It is a learned reaction. *The act of one person serves as the stimulus for another whose response is similar to the stimulating act of the first person.* Identification makes it possible for one person to take over or accept ideas, attitudes, or habits of another. Psychologically, this mechanism depends on imagination — on the capacity to develop within the internal subjective world the image of another. It is the key process in imitation. It is the basis of sympathy, and in it are mixed large elements of the emotion of love.

Other group influences. The mother, of course, is not the only person to whom the child is conditioned; father, brothers and sisters, and other relatives and servants also assist in defining the child's behavior for him. Other primary groups also play a part in building up the individual's conception of himself and in widening the range of his role and changing the nature of his status. Play affords the child an opportunity for developing attitudes and habits of give-and-take from his equals rather different from those he had in the home, dominated by parental authority. So, too, the neighborhood and the primary community influence the growth of the personality. The adults outside one's home often represent somewhat other conceptions of moral behavior, different status, and a wider range of thought and activity than are present in the closely knit home life. Through these associations the child is introduced into the school, into the church, often into organized recreational and club life, into the economic system of trade and occupations; and, finally, as a citizen he participates in

political life. Naturally, the child's responses in these situations will reflect, in part, his home background. No matter how diverse later secondary contacts may be, the basic habits and attitudes acquired in the primary groups, especially the family, will not easily be dissipated.

Frustration and substitutive mechanisms. The discipline imposed on the growing child often runs counter to some of his most powerful and native drives. That is, there is a blocking of goal-attainment and hence a failure of tension-reduction. However, as noted in chapter 5, the child learns various ways to deal with frustrations. In this learning the direction and advice of others as well as the child's own reorganization of his perceptions and experience come into play. The child may try the more elemental ones, such as intensification of attack, as in temper tantrums, before he finds out that wheedling, whining, or other verbal method may prove more effective. Two widely used devices are compensation and sublimation.

Compensation is the substitution of some other idea, attitude, or habit in the face of overpowering inability to develop those one would really like. It is a means of overcoming some feeling of frustration or sense of inferiority. Sometimes this inadequacy is a matter of organic defect, as in the case of the crippled boy who becomes a star sports reporter. At other times the inferiority depends upon felt incapacity of an intellectual or emotional sort, as in the person dull in mathematics who takes up art in its place. The fundamental function of compensation is the preservation of the self from the feeling of inadequacy.

Unfortunately compensation has been used very loosely to cover all sorts of cases not properly distinguished from others. Demosthenes is said to have suffered from a speech defect and, in overcoming this by practice in public speaking, to have become the greatest orator of his day. This is not compensation in the strict sense. If a person plays a poor game of golf, tennis, or bridge, we do not speak of compensation when he

improves his playing. But the fat boy, dubbed "Burch" or "Tubby" because he cannot run or jump with others, secures his ego satisfactions by becoming the best scholar in the classroom. This is compensation.

Sublimation is another form of substitution, where the new stimulus and response revolve around some object which is approved by our own society. Sublimation differs from other forms of substitution largely in this added factor of moral approval. In teaching the child primary-group ideals and practices, the sublimation of the native responses and especially of the less moralized early attitudes is significant. For example, profanity is a substitute for fisticuffs, but it is not recommended on moral grounds. On the other hand, innuendo, satire, and irony are often used and even accepted in polite circles in place of profanity or open attack. So, too, the spinster denied normal family and love life may secure intense satisfaction by taking up child-welfare work, which is ethically appropriate in Western society.

Not all frustrations are met by direct or indirect attack or by substitutive behavior such as compensation or sublimation. As the child's internal world develops, what the older psychology called his imagination comes into play, not only to help him meet the external situations but also to provide him flights into fantasy. Daydreaming is a very widespread and often useful means of meeting frustrations. Denied sweetmeats, the child dreams of rock-candy mountains. Or he may work out into his play, alone or with others, his fantasies of power, as in playing a soldier or hero; or of love, in playing at romance, and so on. Literature and the other arts illustrate culturalized forms of fantasy which are important in helping individuals to balance their emotional budgets. (See chapters 20, 21 on religion, play, and art.)

Then, too, one may find recourse in spatial escape from frustrations, as when a husband deserts his wife and family, or when a person with money takes off on a tour abroad. In other instances people find sur-

cease in alcohol, drugs, vice, or crime. So, too, confronted with a difficult situation which one cannot handle, one may regress to forms of behavior of an earlier period. A child may take up whining again, after having lost the habit, if he comes to believe this will get him something not otherwise obtainable. The more serious illustrations of regression, however, are found among the insane.

Aggressive reactions to frustration are clearly the chief roots of oppositional reactions, just as indulgence and love are among the roots of co-operation. Since these two processes — opposition and co-operation — play such a large part in society, let us see how they come into play in the life of the growing child.

Interplay of opposition and co-operation. Two questions may be raised with respect to these basic processes: opposition and co-operation. First, is one prior in time and more basic than the other? Second, what place has learning in the development of each? We really have no way of testing the former, but strong emotional-feeling tone of the anger sort apparently is potentially present almost from birth on. Yet Charlotte Bühler found no tendency among babies to rivalry or dominance during the first six months of life. Likewise, there were no co-operative trends till much later. During the second half of the first year, however, rivalry begins to appear. Judging by play activity, the infant and young child manipulate the available environment pretty much on an individualistic basis, and even when there is a chance to play with others they indulge in what is called "parallel play" rather than forms involving direct interaction. Nevertheless, in this period children will show resentment and aggressive reactions when toys are taken from them or when their more or less solitary play is too greatly interrupted. There begins in such cases some definite conditioning to conflict. In this sense, it may be said that the first training in antagonism begins previously to conditioning in co-operation. Nevertheless the child's dependency relation to the

mother provides him with patterns of identification that later will be transferred to sympathetic help with reference to other children.¹⁶

The available evidence from child study shows that the simpler forms of opposition and co-operation and friendly patterns appear about the same time, usually after the third birthday. There are marked individual differences in the time and form of these, dependent upon intelligence, upon social-emotional (temperamental) qualities, and upon the situation. The close linkage of the ambivalent habits of hostility and of mutual aid and co-operation is to be seen in young children, just as it is clear in adult life. Lois B. Murphy has reported, for example, that among the nursery-school children whom she observed the correlation of sympathetic responses and co-operation was .78, which is to be expected. But she also discovered the correlation between sympathy and aggression to be .41. This means, as her cases show, that many youngsters who were most sympathetic and co-operative with their close friends were at other times aggressive toward them or were unduly harsh and violent toward others, especially toward those who threatened to disturb them or their playmates.¹⁷

Approached from a somewhat different angle, it was also shown that a child's aggressiveness or sympathy varied considerably, depending upon the nature of the group with which he was playing. To cite only two cases, Beulah at four years of age and Janet at four and a half years: A series of ratings on sympathy, fear, aggressiveness, intelligence, and other traits was made from observations of these children while they participated in two different groups: Janet in Groups P and H; Beulah in Groups P and W. Janet was but slightly more aggressive in H than in P but showed marked improvement in sympathy and co-operation in the change to H.

¹⁶ See Gardner Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental social psychology*, rev. ed., chapter 8, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937 for a review of this whole field.

¹⁷ See L. B. Murphy, *Social behavior and child personality*, p. 251, and chapter 8 especially. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. A correlation of 1.00 means a perfect matching in two sets of events or two variables; that is, as one changes, so does the other and in the same direction. A correlation of .78 is considered high; one of .41 is medium but still significant.

Beulah, while more sympathetic and co-operative in her second group, W, was also much more aggressive as well. In both children the change in behavior is distinctly related to the increase in their sense of security and the disappearance of fear.

As the child grows older he expands the area of his social contacts; these early patterns of opposition and co-operation are attached to new groups and new situations. Further training in co-operation becomes particularly important as he learns to play team games demanding a specific role, but one integrated to the roles and skills of his teammates. When one team is matched against another, the child gets both training in co-operation with his own side and correlated training in competition or conflict with the other. Moreover, the growth of the social self parallels the extension and training in these particular interactional processes. If opposition and co-operation are basic social processes, they are also basic factors in the rise of the self and in the construction of what we have called the personality or life-organization.

The rise of the sense of self. The responses of family members and others furnish the child with patterns for his own behavior. The picture of the mother in his imagination becomes an object which he seeks to imitate. Moreover, his own image of himself emerges from her reaction to him. He lives in her, and her responses to him get associated with his own feelings and reactions to her and to the objects which she brings to him. Both pleasant and unpleasant feelings and emotions with respect to the mother may form a part of this image.

In this manner the child associates his own activities with the demands or responses of others, thereby building up a picture — that is, habits and attitudes or roles — as to what he should do in their presence. C. H. Cooley (1864–1929) referred to this as "the reflected looking-glass self."¹⁸ *The self arises when the individual*

¹⁸ See C. H. Cooley, *Human nature and the social order*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902 for one of the important descriptions and interpretations of the social-cultural origin of the self.

takes the view and action toward his own act and thoughts that he learns or infers that others take toward them. Put otherwise, the sense of selfhood develops out of the social act or interaction at that point when the individual is capable of considering himself — that is, his whole congeries of habits, thoughts, feelings, and emotions — as an object to himself.

The matter is illustrated by the habit of the child of assuming the mother's words, tones, pronunciation, bodily gestures — in fact, by taking over into himself the mother's functions. The actions of another person with respect to him, or those about him, is taken up and linked with his own reactions. In this way the ability to play a role is developed. The child acts, we say, first one part, and then another. He or she is fireman, airpilot, mother, father, brother, sister, or anyone else depending upon actual or imagined contact with such other person. The child can do this because he has associated their activities with his own motives and goals. The role-taking is a part of the whole expressive behavior related to the expectancies of others. The playing at a role in time becomes the actual role. If a parent constantly tells Johnny that he is "no good" or is a "black sheep" or, on the contrary, builds up in the boy an expectation of "good" conduct, the child will come in time to match these patterns. One's role, in short, depends on one's acceptance of the definition of behavior by others.

The first roles which the child plays are largely specific in character and tend to reflect individuals in the groups of which he is a member. Later, however, roles tend to take on a generalized character as the child discovers from others and from identification that their responses are not entirely whimsical or specific to each new situation, but that broad and repeated patterns of conduct come into operation in a variety of situations. The learning mechanisms here are obviously discrimination and generalization. In this way the many separate roles or selves give rise to a central core-self. The source of this development lies, however, not only in identification with others

but in the fact of recurrent needs and situations around which stable, that is, predictable, habits are built. This core-self is often symbolized by one's name and by the merging perception that it is, after all, one's own body that is reacting.¹⁹

The generalized sense of self is really the extension of generalized attitudes, traits, and ideas which become co-ordinated together into the total sense of selfhood. In actual life, individuals continue to display a variety of selves. As William James (1842-1910) put it, "A man has as many selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind." Of course, this is not quite accurate, but it does bring out the various roles people may play.

Most people have a more or less integrated central self and a series of partially deviant selves or patterns that serve them in adapting to varied situations.²⁰ In any case, it is the generalized self which makes possible consistency, continuity, and hence predictability of the behavior of an individual. The uniformities of needs, situations, and cultural expectancies all operate together to produce some sort of unity in the personality. What the moralists call "character" illustrates the matter. Honesty, truthfulness, integrity, dependability, fidelity, and all the other virtues are but traits of a certain ideal person who is consistent and predictable in his interactions with his fellows.

¹⁹ It would carry us too far afield to pursue all the details implied in this discussion, but G. H. Mead, whose contribution to this subject is classic, took the position that the sense of bodily unity or bodily self arose only *after*, not *before*, the role-taking derived from others had begun to be important. On the whole topic of the rise of the self, see G. H. Mead, *Mind, self, and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

²⁰ The literature on dissociated personalities is enlightening, since it gives us some clue to the wide range of potential self-organization. Most of us probably possess potentialities for quite different selves from those we expose to our fellows under ordinary circumstances. On this topic consult William McDougall, *Outline of abnormal psychology*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926; Morton Prince, *The unconscious*, 2nd ed., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921; and for a review and comment on some of these matters, see Young, *op. cit.*, chapters 27, 28.

On the other hand, no one is completely predictable or completely like another. It would be a mistake to assume that personality is merely a replica of cultural conditioning or of identification with others. In terms of inherited individual differences, in terms of variation in contact with persons, in terms of the nature and scope of cultural conditioning, each person is also *unique* and autonomous with reference to others and with reference to any ideal type or standard set up by others.²¹ In fact, the deviation of man from the norm and the expected is what makes for inventiveness, for leadership, and that variety of life which we, in an individualized society at least, prize highly. As we have noted, however, some cultures tend to force men into a common mold, and, in any discussion of cultural training, social solidarity, and planning, the problem of allowing for individual variation and uniqueness must be taken into account.

Definition of the situation and social expectancy. The interpretation or meaning which others provide us about stimuli or objects with regard to which we may or do react is called the *definition of the situation*. Through identification and other aspects of social learning the individual takes up these definitions as his own or develops divergent ones.

Each group sets up its definition of situations and lays out various roles for the members. The lad who swears like a pirate with his tough young friends is usually a different boy at home. This process begins in the family and other primary groups and continues throughout life. Primary groups still have the largest responsibility in setting the role of the individual. For example, whether a person takes a submissive or a dominant attitude, or whether or not he fully accepts the group definition later in

life, may well depend upon fundamental training for his role in the family or in the play group.

The manner, then, in which the individual defines the situation, that is, gives it meaning, will depend largely upon how those around him interpret the same for him. Obviously the child's acceptance of the definition by those in authority may mean a conflict with his own definitions, which follow his own wishes for power, for love, and for having his own way. As we come into relations with the wider community and its numerous secondary groups, there often develops a wide division between our more personal wishes or definitions of the situation and the more utilitarian definitions of the community or its subgroups. A good deal of the struggle between the individual and the social order depends upon the conflict between his pleasure-seeking wishes and the group demands of conformity to the social code. (See below.)

The pressure to follow the patterns laid down for us by our fellows is universal. The fact of *social expectancy* is basic both to the playing of roles and to social control. The Chinese word for rude means "other than expected." The meaning of another's acts is linked with this expected thought and action. Expectancy lies at the root of the sense of solidarity and participation itself. "We-feeling" is but another way of stating that the members think and react as their fellows expect them to do. The citizen as citizen must be patriotic or be cast out as a traitor. The class-conscious proletarian has had built up for him ideas and attitudes which he must reflect if he is to remain in the party. Every group, class, profession, cult, and party with any strong sense of solidarity illustrates the same thing. The images of expectancy of what others will do and of what you will yourself do are important in the whole field of anticipatory behavior described above.

Status in the group. Closely tied up with role is the status of the individual. Role and status have often been used almost interchangeably in sociology, but there is a

²¹ G. W. Allport, in his *Personality: a psychological interpretation*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1937, stresses the unique and autonomous features of the personality. The student of personality will be concerned with both the unique and the common and general aspects of the personality, if he is to do justice to the matter.

difference. *Status* has to do with the position, the standing, of the individual within the group accorded him by his fellows. It does not imply high standing only but position along the social scale. *Role* is what you do. Obviously, it is concerned with activity. Status is the resultant place on the prestige scale. Then, too, since the attitudes of others are reflected back to us, we naturally assume the position which others give us. Along with role, status is one of the major components of the self. Taking into our own life-organization the standing and prestige which others accord us furnishes the basis of much of our action both in primary and in secondary groups.

A person may have a low status in one group and a high status in another. A major or a colonel in the army in wartime may, when peace is declared, become a subordinate in a banking house or profession.

Status is of particular importance in the division of labor or differentiation in leadership and in reference to class structure. (See chapters 27, 28.) In public life, in particular, role and status together constitute in large part what Macfie Campbell aptly calls the "official" personality. It is this particular self around which most of the legends and myths of our public heroes develop.

Preservation of the ego by excuse. People are trained to justify their conduct. *Rationalization* is giving good and socially acceptable reasons for conduct instead of the genuine ones, which are often unconscious. Rationalization is always personal and subjective. Rationalization would "explain" our motives. The real motives for our conduct go back to fundamental drives and those others which are early acquired. These are often quite completely suppressed through the process of social learning, so that as adults we have no exact idea why we do as we do.

At the outset the child does not resort to rationalizations. He does not wish to eat his spinach or cereal and says so, or simply refuses to eat it. An adult might say that it does not agree with him or that he secured his vitamins or his carbohydrates in

another form. When the child does not act to meet social approval of mother, father, and others, he is punished. If he does follow their instructions, the parents furnish the child with "reasons" for so doing. Thus, the eating of spinach is said to be "good" for one's health. Throughout the whole early training period parents constantly furnish rationalizations for the child as a means of re-forming his habits and native reactions to conform with socially approved behavior. In adult life in our country, rationalizations are very common, and in defending our conduct nothing is more important. Rationalization is a defense mechanism constructed to keep peace with ourselves and with our fellows.

Authority and divided-reaction patterns. Not only do care and kindness come from the parents, but the demands of authority are early laid upon the child. The inhibition of action by disapproval is important in the growth of the self. While the mother begins the expression of power over the child in our society, it is usually the father who wields the final authority. Although our own culture more or less demands that the father praise the baby and show some outward marks of affection, as the child grows up the father takes over from the mother the task of discipline. But affection and love between father and child are as evident as the child's fear of paternal punishment. Out of this contact the child constructs the image of the father, which defines his own behavior in the presence of the father. In Western society the child gradually builds up two rather divergent patterns. One is that of the father and the mother as the givers of good things, as kind and loving. The other is that of stern parents who demand conformity, which is unpleasant to the child but which he must accept or suffer punishment at their hands. The child is often confused in regard to his parents because of these conflicting images. On the one hand, he loves his parents and wishes to please them. On the other hand, he hates and fears them. The parental image, therefore, is really split in two, one

representing the lovable object, the other symbolizing the parental power and authority. This division reflects an important feature of most personalities: ambivalence of thought and action.

Ambivalence is the simultaneous attractiveness and repulsiveness of an object, person, or action. Approach or withdrawal are elemental reactions to any stimulus. And our habits are built up along these same lines. Ambivalence is illustrated in the duality of love and hatred, of acceptance and disapproval by others, of "true" and "false" ideas. In the development of the self-image, the pleasant feelings and emotions toward certain sorts of conduct are set over against the unpleasant feelings and emotions toward other aspects of the same situation.

Identification obviously plays an important part in the action of approach and acceptance, since these involve sympathy and love. The tendency toward withdrawal or avoidance tends to unpleasant reactions — to set up fear and hatred. In this process another mechanism, projection, comes into play.

Projection has to do with thrusting outward upon some other person or object our own wishes, ideas, and attitudes. As the child suppresses his fear and hatred of his parents, our culture provides him with substitutes: Satan, evil people, or out-groups which he can hate. It is seen in the adult suspicious of others, who imagines that they talk about him behind his back. It is clearly brought out in the foisting upon children of thwarted ambitions of the parents, as when a man long desirous of being a musician but unable to study music forces his son or daughter to undertake a musical career.

Projection and identification therefore go together. Although they operate largely at an unconscious level, they are perfectly normal and essential aspects of interaction. They are especially important in the balancing of our ambivalent drives, habits, ideas, and attitudes. In later chapters we shall have ample occasion to note their operation in various group situations.

Personality and Cultural Direction of Processes

The personality is closely bound up with the nature and direction of one's attitudes toward in-groups and out-groups, and with respect to the moral values which his culture imposes upon him.

Ambivalence of attitudes and displacement. The individual may develop ambivalent attitudes and reactions to any object or situation, personal or material. There may be marked identification and affection on the one hand and strong, aggressive response with accompanying fear and anger on the other. It is clear that the beginning of these opposing forms of reaction lie within the family and other primary groups. Not only do parents induce antagonistic as well as co-operative and affectionate responses in the child, but brothers and sisters do the same. Often the sibling rivalry for power is more intense than the emotionalized resistance to parental controls. Yet, while the family situation may permit considerable open antagonism, it also demands a certain degree of congenial interaction among the children, sometimes purchased by inhibition of strong aggressions.

We may well ask, What becomes of these inhibited attitudes? They are not lost but remain to break out elsewhere, and our social organization and culture furnish the means and the rationalization for such redirection of hostility. One mechanism of this is *displacement*. For instance, as the child grows up, his play group may fall into competition and conflict with another, giving his aggressive tendencies freer play. Furthermore, his suppressed dislike and hatred for his parents, his brothers and sisters, or other members of the household may be projected upon the members of the opposition play group, gang, or other group. Furthermore, the older family members themselves induct the child into these antagonistic attitudes by talk about the family across the street which is not "as good as ours," or about the neighborhood "across the tracks," where the children are dirty,

the parents worthless, and generally not fit to associate with children and adults of our "better," "superior" neighborhood. Then we learn from the church and the home that our religious organization is superior to another, that Christians are better than heathens. In school, at church, and at home we not only learn the glories and superiorities of our country but learn to fear and dislike other nations. These attitudes are all founded upon fear, rivalry, jealousy, and opposition within the family and the primary groups. Later they may be displaced to the out-groups.

The sense of nearness or remoteness in regard to other persons or groups is often called *social distance*. Toward members of our own congeniality group, our family, our comrades, our neighbors, our race, or our nation we feel intimate and friendly. Toward members of other families, communities, nations, and races we feel much more remote, much more distant, much less intimate and kindly. The degree of intensity of in-group *vs.* out-group feeling may be measured along a scale of social distance.

Integration of personality in group life. The balance or co-ordination of a person's desires or tendencies depends upon the nature of the group participation. In the early years the identification of the child with the parents and family situation is rather complete. But as his group contacts reach outward, the intensity of the identification decreases. The identification in the family circle is intimate and deeply emotional; that as a member of an international scientific association may be highly impersonal, intellectual, and but very slightly emotional, except perhaps as the membership enhances the ego. There is a kind of scale of identification from a deep and abiding sort with one's mother, father, or as an adult with one's mate and one's children, through the various primary and secondary groups to those rather illy defined publics or crowds of which we may be but temporary members. Moreover, in the secondary groups and mass society our


identification is likely to be largely to group symbols rather than to persons.

Yet identification covers but half the process of integration. Man is not only filled with love, sympathy, and friendly reactions of approach and co-operation; he is also filled with hatred, dislike, and antagonistic reactions of competition and conflict, or withdrawal. Once again the ideas, attitudes, and habits built up toward the others-group are important. Our integration or balance is accomplished by the interplay of these two sets of opposite patterns, such as love and hate, like and dislike, sympathy and disgust, approach and withdrawal, co-operation and competition or conflict. These dual patterns run throughout our social order at every point. They are reflected in culture because they exist in man and in his reactions to his fellows.

The integration of the personality is thus made possible by reason of the relation of the individual to persons and symbols of the in-group and the out-group. We can at the same time love our fellow members of the in-group and co-operate with them, and with equal good grace and social approval despise and be aggressive toward members of the out-group. In some instances, the more rudimentary action patterns are permitted or at least not taboo. Certain groupings — comradeship, congeniality, criminalistic or orgiastic gangs, religious cults fostering intense emotionalism, or mobs — may afford the individual a chance to express his elementary personal desires rather fully. Or again, the antagonism to the out-group, the hatred and even physical violence permitted with moral approval of the we-group, affords one a fine opportunity to express the more biological but pleasant aggressive impulses. In short, the out-group offers us an object upon which to project the hatred and violence we would really like to wreak on members of our own in-groups. This is exactly what intense conflict does for us. War, labor-employer disputes, religious controversy, even sports — all afford an opportunity to strike a balance between two otherwise opposite tendencies within us. It is evident that the

FIGURE 7

OPPOSITE SOCIAL-CULTURAL OUTLETS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING AMBIVALENT PERSONAL ATTITUDES



social order has grown up in reference to, or out of, these deeper patterns of the individual's interaction with his fellows. Figure 7 gives a schematic view of typical factors in this interplay of identification and opposition as it relates to the individual impulses, attitudes, and habits.

Moral training. Not only does the very in-group *vs.* out-group patterning of society serve to separate as well as to co-ordinate the individual's drives and attitudes, but there often arises another situation in which ambivalence plays a part. One aspect of socialization has to do with inducting the individual into the moral order; that is,

he learns the taboos, rituals, regulations, laws, and standard practices which are considered right and proper for him to follow. Obviously, the demands of culture in these matters frequently run counter to deep-seated motives and attitudes resulting from early personal-social conditioning of the biological impulses. Again, the inhibition of impulses does not mean their elimination from the personality, but rather that they find substitutive or other outlets.

As a result of moral training, then, the individual may find himself pulled between two opposing poles. One of these has to do with his own immediate pleasures, the satisfaction of his more elemental physio-

logical wants and acquired personal desires. The other has to do with the moralized motives which man develops as he learns from his primary and secondary groups the objects and values which preserve society and give public approval. The first set of patterns, although affected by social interaction, is more rudimentary and often depends upon social-personal rather than cultural conditioning. It leads to a personal hedonistic (pleasure-seeking) definition of the situation.

Yet the person may resist the dominant moral forces of the community. Clearly his hedonistic definitions are not unaffected by interaction with other persons, but the purpose or object of this interaction is distinctly the wish for personal pleasure. He may, however, find some group which will permit him such satisfactions and, if he does, he gets an integrated pattern since he can at once indulge himself and secure a certain social approval in so doing. Conformity to the utilitarian, moral code, of course, provides one much approval and status; and for this reason, in the long run, the moral forces in a culture have distinct advantages over those which run counter to them. This is an important point in social control. While an individual may indulge himself in a certain amount of deviant conduct, on the whole he will find that he cannot keep this segregated from a large area of other human relations, and he will either have to give up such indulgences or find that the social expectancies and approvals of others will in time be influenced by reason of the same.

Moral views and moral action. One has but to open one's eyes and ears, however, to realize that men's professions of morality often do not correspond any too closely with their moral actions. What men say, what they profess, is often at considerable variance with what they do. Verbal reactions seldom have to correlate perfectly with overt reactions, except in exact science and its application. Verbal profession of moral codes will satisfy hundreds of situations where overt conduct is not demanded.

A second matter concerns the strain within the personality set up by divergence between profession and practice. In a society like ours, where Christian morality has a difficult time of it to match with sharp business practices, where the making of money outweighs most other considerations, the verbal code is frequently a matter of mouthing a ritual or a phrase. The tolerance we show for the man who makes millions by dishonest stock manipulation or by gambling and vice indicates that in American society, at least, the workaday moral code is rather different from that taught by religion and tradition or that found embodied in the law. In a society like ours there is perhaps less strain between belief and action than we imagine, although psychiatrists and clinical psychologists report many specific cases in which neurotic or more serious mental breakdown was due, in part at least, to an unresolved conflict within the patient between his high moral training in religion and his patterns of somewhat unethical and cruel competition to make money or attain political success.

In this whole matter rationalization plays its part. When the action does not fit the profession, we consciously and unconsciously find excuses. Rationalizations usually come rather readymade to us from our culture, and the simple mechanism of projection also lends its aid to lay the blame for our conduct on someone else or on some phase of the situation. Even the man in the street who has picked up the mythology of modern science may "blame" his conduct on his disordered glands, on his "unconscious mind," or on the economic or social order.

Although moral codes differ in various societies, the strain between verbal profession and overt conduct is relatively common. In closely knit religious communities with a simple economic order and direct primary-group controls — such as were developed in Europe and America after the Protestant Reformation — one often finds an amazingly high correlation between the culture norms of conduct and the daily conduct of the communicants. In a

complex, highly diverse society like that in western Europe and America today, such integration of personality and social order is rare indeed.

Disintegration of personality. Ideas, attitudes, and habits which are built up in reference to objects and values do not always co-ordinate within the individual in such a way as to make for a harmonious self. There are, of course, no perfectly balanced, adjusted persons in every situation, but most normal persons work out some plan of action and thought which enables them to get along. Those persons who are not able to strike any adequate sort of compromise tend to fall into some kind of personal disorder.

Aside from the obviously deranged persons who are the object of study and treatment by psychiatry, there are many persons who fail to work out a satisfactory adaptation to the social world around them. For example, a child from a broken home may suffer a nervous breakdown because he cannot adjust to changes brought about by

death or desertion of one or both his parents. Or a woman may develop a mental conflict in attempting to be a conventional wife and to engage in a profession at the same time. Or an individual may turn to delinquency, crime, or alcoholism as a means of seeking some compensatory satisfactions for frustrations, as we noted above. Then, too, exposure to highly deviant cultures may induce a confusion and even personal disintegration. The migrant from a peasant country to a highly industrialized one and, especially, his children often have difficulty in shifting their attitudes and values from the old culture to the new.

For the most part, to repeat, individuals strike some sort of working balance between their motives and their goals. But in the face of continuing crises there are always some who seek security in projecting before themselves and others ideal institutions which somehow will produce ideal and completely integrated personalities. This is a kind of fantasy, and we shall return to consider it when we take up social-cultural planning.

Interpretative Summary

1. Socialization (including enculturation) is the chief means by which the personality is developed and sustained.
2. What socialization may accomplish, however, depends upon the organic foundation of the individual.
3. The importance of socialization is shown by case studies of individuals who experienced unusual degrees of isolation, due either to lack of social-cultural conditioning or to serious physical limitations, or both.
4. The family is the matrix of the personality; and of the family members, the mother generally plays the most important role in the early training of the child.
5. In child training there is usually some mixture of affection and indulgence with discipline and authority. But the relative proportions of each varies with the cultural norms.
6. Various interactional mechanisms, but especially *identification*, *projection*, *compensation*, and *rationalization* are important in the development of the personality.
7. The sense of self arises when the individual learns to take the attitude and view toward his own acts and thoughts which he learns or infers that other persons take toward them. This means the capacity to view one's self as others do, including the application of cultural expectancies to one's own conduct.
8. The social processes of opposition and co-operation play important parts in the emergence and integration of the self. How the individual handles hostility and affection depends very much upon cultural conditioning.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What effects on normal human development did isolation have upon Anna, Isabelle, and Helen Keller?
2. List the reactions, learned and unlearned, in which Gua and Donald resembled each other closely. List those in which they differed.
3. Why did Gua fail to learn true speech?
4. Name and illustrate the three basic factors which determine man's superiority over the apes.
5. What do studies of feral man and apes contribute to the understanding of man in society?
6. Describe the stages in the rise of the social self. How does the generalized self emerge from the specific selves? Illustrate.
7. How do identification and projection operate together in parent-child relations?
8. Why is the principle of expectancy so important in interaction? Illustrate the same (a) in mother-child contacts, (b) in teacher-pupil relations, and (c) in the relations of citizens to national solidarity.
9. Give illustrations of the manner in which habits and attitudes with regard to the in-group and the out-group provide a basis for personality integration (a) at the primary-group level and (b) at the secondary-group level.
10. Write a life history of yourself or of someone whom you know well. Describe the growth of personality and show the interplay of personal-social and cultural influences.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Neal E. Miller and John Dollard, *Social learning and imitation*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

A full discussion of socialization from a behavioristic standpoint.

T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in social psychology*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1947.

A useful compilation of original papers dealing with various aspects of personality among other topics. See especially sections I, II, III, and VI.

Edward Sapir, "Personality," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 12 : 85-88. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

An insightful discussion of the topic by one of the first cultural anthropologists to understand the relationships between the individual, society, and culture.

Muzafer Sherif, *The psychology of social norms*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936.

An important book in bringing together the work of the laboratory psychologist and that of the sociologist and anthropologist so as the better to understand the thought and action of the individual in his society.

❧ Part Two ❧

Place and People

Geographic Factors in Social-Cultural Life

CERTAIN effects of the physical environment on man are self-evident although they vary from hour to hour, day to day, and season to season. If a person walks down the street on a hot summer afternoon, he is likely to get on the shady side in order to seek relief from the intense sunlight. The rigors of winter demand more clothes and warmer houses. And to build such shelters man has usually had to draw upon materials near at hand: mud for huts in some places, stone in others, and ice or snow in the arctic regions. So, too, residence in places of rich soil and adequate rainfall produces social effects different from those that are produced by living on a rainless and windy desert or in the hot and humid regions of the tropics.

Such daily and seasonal effects of the weather, water supply, and the soil are obvious enough. And out of such repeated experiences arose popular and often erroneous folklore and pseudo-science about the effects of geography on human thought and action. For example, we often hear individuals argue that the Latins, living in warm climates as they do, have "hot blood" and are given to quick anger and high-sexuality. In contrast, the Finns and Swedes, who live in cold latitudes, are said to be stolid in temperament and slow to action. These notions illustrate, in fact, the place of widely accepted but faulty beliefs which we noted in chapter 1 when discussing popular explanations of conduct not supported by science. But these and similar views must not mislead us. Geographic factors do have an important part in individual and group living. Some of these factors will be examined in this chapter.


Important Geographic Factors Which Influence Society and Culture

Man is affected chiefly by such geographic factors as climate and location, natural resources, and the use of physical energy. The first two have to do with the nature and distribution of land and water masses with their respective climates. The latter two have to do with the soils, minerals, and plant and animal life as they influence man's daily struggles for survival.

Climate. Someone has remarked that climate we have with us always, although the weather changes from day to day. That is, climate refers to general or average conditions of temperature, rainfall, wind movement, and amount of sunshine. Weather is the state of these factors from moment to moment, hour to hour, or day to day.

With respect to *temperature* geographers divide the earth into three zones: tropical, temperate, and arctic. (See Figure 8.) Man's settlement of the earth has been limited by the conditions in these and by the seasonal variations. Primitives in relatively small numbers do manage to get on in the northern arctic regions. In the tropics, unless the humidity is too great, we find rather more populous nonliterate and higher-culture peoples managing very well; but without doubt the most striking advances in the history of culture have taken place in subtropical and temperate zones. Down to the present the congestion of population seems most evident in these latter regions. The location of the important large cities in the Northern Hemisphere illustrates this. They fall between the limits

FIGURE 8

TEMPERATURE REGIONS OF THE WORLD¹

of average annual temperatures of 60° Fahrenheit (St. Louis, Lisbon, Genoa, Rome, Istanbul, Shanghai, Osaka, Kyoto) and 40° Fahrenheit (Quebec, Oslo, Stockholm, Leningrad). Along the central axis of this zone, 50° Fahrenheit, we find Chicago, New York, and Vienna.

Another distinction is often made between *oceanic* climates, with mild winters and cool summers, and *continental* climates, where the extremes of heat and cold are very sharp. The former are found especially along the western margins of the various continents, the latter in the interior of the world's great land masses.

Seasonal variation in temperature is important. Extreme fluctuations in the seasons, of course, are wiped out in the averages, but in the tropics the variation is little from month to month or season to season. In the arctic the short summers and long winters make human adaptation in the latter difficult. It is in the temperate zone, where temperature changes with the seasons —

but not too violently — that we find, for the most part, the largest congestion of population and the most complex culture.

Daily variation in temperature also seems important. Ellsworth Huntington, the geographer, states that human power is more efficient where the temperature fluctuates somewhat noticeably from day to day. Uniform high temperature and high humidity produce low output of energy. He has also shown that daily variation in temperature stimulates energy output, that a fall in temperature is rather more stimulating than a rise, if the fall amounts to as much as four degrees.²

Rainfall obviously affects organic life. There are wide variations in the amount of precipitation in various regions. In the Great Basin west of the Rocky Mountains the average annual rainfall varies between 10 and 15 inches; in Wisconsin it is between 30 and 35; in New York, 36 to 42; and in Alabama, between 55 and 60 inches. The sharpest contrasts are found between such areas as the tropical seacoast of Brazil (where

¹ From *The working world*, by R. H. Whitbeck, L. Durand, and J. R. Whitaker, copyright, 1939. By permission of American Book Company. Original map prepared by A. E. Parkins.

² See Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and climate*, 3rd ed., pp. 141, 142. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924.

annual precipitation reaches 133 inches at the maximum) and parts of Java and India (where it is over 100 inches) and areas where rainfall is below 10 inches: central Australia, parts of Tibet and Mongolia, the Sahara, Nevada, and Arizona.

Temperature and rainfall together make for differences in types of agriculture and hence in man's social life. With rainfall adequate, wheat and corn grow best in the zone of mean annual temperature between 39° and 68° Fahrenheit; rice between 68° and 86°; while the date palm shows little or no growth below 64°. Important soil bacteria necessary to growth do not become active until soil temperature reaches 45° or more, and most crop plants do not grow below 42.8°.


The extent and variations in windfall and sunshine also affect man's adaptation to his physical environment. Seasonal and less frequent variations in wind are linked with alternations between rain and sunshine. Thus, in the Eastern Hemisphere the monsoons of the eastern tropics bring heavy pre-

cipitation at certain seasons, while in the large land masses of the interior dry winds are associated with extremes of heat and cold. So, too, the amount of sunlight affects the growth of plant and animal life as well as influences man's adjustments to weather.

Climate primarily determines the nature of a region's soils and the kinds and qualities of plant and animal life which they will support. Extremes of cold or dryness limit the production of agricultural products, while excessive heat and heavy rains of the equatorial zone make for luxuriant growth of plants and animals. Allowing, of course, for invention and diffusion, it is in the climate of the middle latitudes characterized by frequent changes in weather and by adequate resources that man has shown his greatest achievements.

Land and water surfaces. The total area of the earth is 196,950,000 square miles. Of this slightly less than three fifths is water. Of the land masses, Eurasia makes up over a

FIGURE 9
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN HEMISPHERES OF THE WORLD ³



³ Prepared by L. Robert Tschirky.

third; Africa, one fifth; and North and South America together, one quarter. The polar regions and the off-continent islands, including Australia, make up the balance — a little less than one fifth. If the student will imagine the globe as cut into northern and southern halves, rather than in the traditional eastern-western hemispheres, he will note that Eurasia and North America are the world's great land masses, making up more than half of the total. In contrast, the proportion of water coverage to land mass in the Southern Hemisphere is much higher than in the Northern. (See Figure 9.)

The *topography* or configuration of a land mass may influence what its inhabitants do. This includes such matters as the size and shape of a given land mass, its relief or varieties of altitude, nature of its coastline, and distribution of its lakes, rivers, plains, deserts, and mountains. For example, large size and compactness, sometimes referred to as depth, may make for a defensibility from attack when the means of warfare are of a certain type. A highly indented coastline with ample rivers flowing into the sea and forming good harbors may foster shipping where an unindented and mountainous coastline may not. Western Europe possesses such an advantage in contrast to the Pacific coastline of South America.

Altitude definitely influences man's habitation. In Europe and America there are few cities of any size at altitudes above 5000 feet, except in the tropics, where altitude produces a cooler climate than along the seacoast. For example, from Mexico to Chile, aside from certain ports, the most important cities are more than 6000 feet above sea level. Mexico City, with 1,750,000 people, has an altitude of 7500 feet; and Quito, with 120,000 inhabitants, is 9500 feet above the sea.

In mountainous areas food production is often difficult. In Switzerland grazing is possible on rather precipitous slopes, but on most of the denuded mountains of northern China nothing will grow. In Japan only 15 per cent of the land is under cultivation, 75 per cent is mountainous, and the remaining area is either required for nonagricul-


tural purposes or is otherwise unfit for cultivation.

Soil resources and their use. At present the nature and quality of the soil constitute the most valuable of all natural resources because the soil furnishes mankind its subsistence in the form of plant and animal products. It also provides most of the materials for the world's clothing and shelter and an increasing fraction of the raw materials for equipment, as seen in the use of plastics. Figure 10 shows the natural vegetation of the land surfaces of the earth. Estimates indicate that about three fifths of this surface is of varying degrees of fertility, one third is steppes or grassy plains, and the remainder is made up of infertile deserts, mountains, and ice-covered arctic regions.

Good soil teems with bacteria absolutely essential to plant life. The types of soil, however, differ; and these types will determine, within certain limits, the kinds of crops which may be grown. Sandy soil, for example, favors certain fruits and market gardening. Clay lands are favorable to grasses and some grains. Loams, being intermediate between the two, afford the widest variations in use. Obviously land utilization will be influenced not only by soil type but by topography, temperature, and rainfall. The growing seasons differ in specific regions and will thus also qualify kinds of agricultural activity. Thus, for the north temperate zone of this continent wheat and maize will mature only in average temperature zones between 39° F. and 68° F. Rice, by contrast, requires temperatures from 68° to 86° F. Corn will grow in the cotton belt and wheat in the corn belt, but land-use custom will tend to determine which crops are raised.

So, too, in the tropics land use varies greatly in terms of rainfall, altitude, and temperature. Except at the highest altitudes the growing season in the torrid zone is continuous. The lower altitudes, marked by heavy rainfall, support the mixed forest-grass-land vegetation of the tropical savannas. The cooler uplands are good for coffee. Along the equator the rainfall is so heavy that forest and other plant coverage grow at incredible rates. Only by unremitting toil are cultivated crops possible. Yet parts of the Malayan-East Indian region support a dense

FIGURE 10
NATURAL VEGETATION ZONES OF THE WORLD ⁴



population. And in some sections there, commercialized agriculture has made highly profitable the growing of rubber; cinchona, from which quinine is derived; and coconut trees, from which we get copra. So, too, in these regions the struggle for survival has driven the population to intensive cultivation of rice even in mountainous sections which so far defy the use of mechanized farming. In short, agriculture is only possible and profitable because it is in these regions that population pressure is such as to provide ample and cheap labor. (See chapter 12.)

The social life of peoples will be influenced by the land-use patterns in terms of soils, topography, temperature, and rainfall. Life in the wheat areas of the Middle West, for instance, is quite different from that of the dairyman of New York or Wisconsin or that of the market gardener of the Atlantic or Pacific seaboard. The wheat farmer has an intensive period of hard work of plowing and planting, with a long stretch during the growing season when he has little to do, followed in turn by strenuous harvesting. The dairy farmer has a constant routine of


care of his cattle, day by day, the year round, and certain seasonal work as well. The market gardener is continuously busy during the planting, growing, and harvesting seasons but, like the fruit grower or wheat farmer, may have some periods of relatively little farm activity.

In the past, as long as there was plenty of unused but good land available, people tended to exploit their soil and water supplies unwisely.⁵ As old lands were used up, they moved onto fresh soil and began the same inefficient cycle. This happened in parts of ancient China, India, and Europe until the farmers learned better ways of farming. In the United States, soil exploitation has been most costly. For example, in our own South, decades of unwise cropping of cotton and tobacco used up the soils to such a degree that the cost of fertilizers necessary to restore productivity became so great that any margin of profit was cut to the

⁴ From Whitbeck, Durand, and Whitaker, *op. cit.* By permission of American Book Company. Original map prepared by G. T. Trewartha.

⁵ For an incisive analysis of man's wasteful exploitation of his land resources, see Fairfield Osborn, *Our plundered planet*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1948. See also G. V. Jacks and R. O. Whyte, *Vanishing lands; a world survey of soil erosion*; New York: Doubleday & Company, 1939; and William Vogt, *Road to survival*, New York: William Sloane, Associates, 1948.

FIGURE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF EROSION IN THE UNITED STATES¹



minimum or actually disappeared. A more recent instance of like exploitation is the wheat farming of the grasslands of the great Western Plains. In years of relatively good rainfall, combined with good prices, wheat crops there have been most profitable. In the intervening years, when the rainfall is scanty, serious depletion of the topsoil results and widespread economic distress is common. The dustbowls of the plains are witness to these facts. Figure 11 shows the extent of erosion in the United States.

Such "destructive occupation" of the land, as Jean Brunhes, a French geographer, calls it, is an important factor in the relation of population to food supply. As cheaper fertilizers and improved methods of farming are developed, such misuse of the land may cease; but only in recent decades in the United States have we undertaken public programs to remedy the wastage. The Tennessee Valley Authority is the most telling example at present.

¹ U. S. Dept. of Agriculture.

Man's destruction of forests has also been a serious factor in many regions, not only in wastage of timber but in subsequent economic loss by erosion and by failure to replant the areas. The classic example of ignorant deforestation is the large mountainous area of north China, now barren of all vegetation and useless for growing timber and, even more important, offering no ground-cover for snow or for retention of moisture. European practice has been more intelligent in this matter. In the United States we have been woefully extravagant in our use of timber resources in the past, but we are slowly learning our lesson.

Changes in the use of land resources is amply illustrated by noting certain differences between the situation at the time of the original settlement of the United States by the whites and the condition today. For the year 1630 estimates indicate that of the two billion acres in continental United States, about 48 per cent of the land surface was in dense primeval forest; 38 per cent in grassland;

11 per cent in shrubs and vegetative cover in relatively arid regions; and less than 3 per cent in desert. In this vast area there lived about one million Indians, who had become so adapted to nature that there was little or no destructive exploitation of the land resources. Today estimates indicate the following approximate percentages: About 8 per cent of the land surface is in forests still available for timbering; another 10 per cent in cut-over forests now growing, which will be available in the future; and 3 per cent is in cut-over timber which is dying out. In addition, farm woodland comprises 8 per cent. Farm cropland makes up 25 per cent, open grazing land 17 per cent, and farm pasturage 22 per cent of the total. The balance is represented in land taken up by cities and towns, highways, railroads, and other withdrawals made by man.

It is evident that in 300 years profound alterations have been made in what geographers call the "natural landscape." The exploitation of our natural resources has gone hand in hand with the expansion of our capitalist-industrial order. We could not have advanced as we have without this. Yet our industrial progress has been purchased at the cost of tremendous wastefulness, especially in the matter of forests and soil coverage.

Of the world's population, 80 per cent still depend on agriculture as a means of getting a living. Yet the most significant aspects of the 20th century derive from the rise and expansion of modern industry. In fact, although only 20 per cent of the world's peoples depend directly upon modern industry for a living, this fraction is rapidly shaping the habits, attitudes, and ideas — in short, the culture — of the other 80 per cent. (See chapter 12.) Therefore we must examine man's use of other natural resources, particularly those providing energy and minerals so important in the productive processes of modern industry.

Before discussing the importance of these today, a word must be said about the meaning of "natural resources" such as coal, water power, iron, oil, natural gas, and non-ferrous metals. For our purposes a resource must be defined in cultural terms. The mere existence of a physical thing does not make it a resource until man has learned to use it for some human purpose. The

American Indians who roamed over the coal deposits of the Alleghenies or hunted through the iron range in the upper Great Lakes region had no knowledge of, or use for, coal and iron. Nor did the Algonquin or Iroquois, who must have looked in awe at Niagara Falls, dream of making use of its water power.

Energy-producing resources. Among other things which distinguish modern industry from earlier forms of manufacture and transportation is the replacement of the muscular efforts of man and his domesticated animals by mechanical or chemical power. Today the flow of raw materials, no matter what their nature or source, is toward places where the use of industrial power is highly developed. Wealth and industrial strength, with associated political power, increase most rapidly in those regions and nations so favored.

The chief sources of industrial energy are coal, oil, natural gas, and water. Of these, coal remains the fundamental one, though oil has, in recent decades, become more important relatively. For instance, in 1910 in the United States about 86 per cent, and in the world at large about 90 per cent, of the needs of energy came from coal. Today coal supplies approximately three fifths of the world's energy requirements; oil, a little more than one fifth; water power, about one eighth; and natural gas, the remainder. The major coal deposits of the earth, as is true also of iron ores, are centered in rather narrowly defined areas of the United States, western Europe, and Russia. About 50 per cent of the world's coal is to be found in the United States.

Not all countries and regions are using their coal resources at equal rates. Japan has been depleting her meager coal reserves at a very rapid pace; and there, as elsewhere, the continual and increasing pressure of exploitation means, in time, mounting costs of operation and hence of price in the market. As to current production, the United States is using about 29 per cent of the world's total; Germany about 25 per cent; Britain about 17 per cent; and the

Soviet Union approximately 8 or 9 per cent. Looking into the future, North America has nearly 68 per cent of the world's coal reserves, Asia about 17 per cent, and Europe only 10 per cent. Neither South America nor Africa has any substantial coal resources. The rate at which reserves will be used up, of course, depends upon the extension of present industrialization. We may expect a slowing-down of the rate of industrial growth in this country, Germany, and France, and a faster rate of decline in Britain. In contrast, we may expect a certain acceleration in the Soviet Union, at least in the short-run future.

Oil is second to coal as a present-day source of energy; but its present rate of exploitation may alter its relative importance. The steady increase in the production of oil in the United States is evidence of this. For example, in 1859, when the commercial exploitation of oil began, this country produced but a scant 2000 barrels. In 1860 production sprang to 500,000 barrels, and in 1861 to more than 2 million. By 1880 it had multiplied twelvefold over the 1861 figure. In 1900 it was just under 64 million barrels, and by 1915 it had reached 281,104,000. In 1929 the production slightly exceeded one billion barrels. Production fell off to three quarters of this in 1932 but rose to 1,352,000,000 barrels in 1940. During World War II production in this country exceeded 1,500,000,000 barrels annually.

Today there is every evidence that our oil reserves are rapidly diminishing; and some experts say that, at present rates of production, we have but twelve to fourteen years' supply ahead. In the meantime, the petroleum resources of Mexico, Venezuela, and Trinidad — to note the three other chief western sources — are being rapidly depleted. In like manner Soviet Russia and her satellites have begun to sense the pinch of her available supplies. Today all of the major world powers are looking more and more to the Near Eastern sources: Arabia, Egypt, and Iran in particular. Even the East Indian reserves seem limited.

The importance of water power as a source of industrial energy has probably

been overemphasized in this country, due chiefly to the fact that questions of developing hydroelectric power, in particular, have become entangled in state and federal politics. And with reference to its utility generally, Howard A. Meyerhoff, the geologist, points out four important facts which must be borne in mind in discussing water power as a source of industrial energy: First, since it is annually renewed by rainfall, it is indestructible; second, it is industrially useful only within the limits of economic transmission; third, its industrial usefulness is limited because, for many reasons, it cannot as yet compete in terms of cost with coal and oil. And as to the United States, in particular, it could furnish not more than one fifth of our normal energy needs at best.⁷

Regarding the second point, for example, the distribution of the potentials of water power are interesting. Of the estimated world total of 675 million horse power, slightly more than 40 per cent is to be found in Africa, 22 per cent in Asia, and 11 per cent in South America. It is clear that in Africa and South America such power will long remain unused since these continents do not possess either coal or iron, on which modern industrialism rests. As to Asia, only in Japan has water power been systematically used. In fact, "more than three fourths of the installed generator capacity in all Asia is in Japan."⁸ Even in other continents much of the water power is accessible only in remote mountainous sections. Exceptions such as Niagara Falls, the Alpine streams in northern Italy, and the Dnieper in Russia, where proximity to centers of industry is evident, should not mislead one in estimating the importance of water power. In short, the greatest concentration of water-power reserves are in regions of minimum accessibility.

Natural gas has a very uncertain place as a source of industrial energy. Only in the

⁷ This and some other pertinent facts in this section have been drawn chiefly from Howard A. Meyerhoff, "The present state of world resources," in Ralph Linton, ed., *The science of man in the world crisis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

⁸ Meyerhoff, *Ibid.*, p. 237.

United States and Russia is it used commercially to any extent. Since much of the world's natural gas is produced in regions with scanty population and little or no industrialization, its practical utilization has, up to now, been definitely limited. In Russia methods have been developed for gasifying thin but otherwise unworkable coal seams. Such sources elsewhere may in time find industrial use. But, as with water power, the utilization of such energy depends on proximity to the major centers of industrial development.

The following comments drawn from Meyerhoff will serve to summarize this section:⁹

1. Industrialization is the most advanced in those countries which have an abundance of coal or can get it from their neighbors.

2. These same nations also consume most of the world's petroleum, irrespective of its origin.

3. They also make the most extensive use of water power and of natural gas.

4. Aside from the ten or twelve "favored nations," only China has the potentials for extensive industrialization. The others lack coal, and their oil and natural gas will likely be exhausted within a hundred years. Barring the discovery and use of new forms of industrial energy, only water power remains a potential for these presently undeveloped regions, unless atomic power is made available for peacetime use.

5. Again excepting China, the present relative position of industrial nations both economically and politically to each other and to the rest of the world is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. Other nations and regions will probably remain fundamentally agricultural and/or extractive in function and hence dependent upon the industrial areas.

6. Of the major industrialized nations, only in the United Kingdom are manufacturing, trade, and transportation overwhelmingly developed to the virtual exclusion of agriculture. In all the others there is a sound and effective balance between industry, farming, and the extractive func-

tions. The fact that the United Kingdom must import so much of her food and her raw materials is one reason why her industrial and political future vis-à-vis the other strong industrial nations is so problematical.

Mineral resources. When man invented the smelting of copper and especially iron ores and began to fashion more effective tools and weapons, he made one of his great forward steps in culture. These more durable and malleable metals were much superior to the earlier stone and wooden materials which man had used for nearly a million years of his existence prior to the Metal Age, which began about 5000 years ago. In fact, the higher civilizations of antiquity in Egypt, Babylonia, India, China, Crete, and Greece represent a combination of the invention of writing, the rise of more complex social organization, and the use of metals. Yet, unlike the present age, these ancient civilizations were not dominated by a material culture centered around the use of iron and coal. The Industrial Revolution, based on iron and coal, began about 1760, and its effects on the material foundation of our everyday living have been continuously more and more significant.


In the earlier phases of the Industrial Revolution, the close proximity of coal and iron made possible the rapid industrialization of Britain and northwestern Europe, and later of this country. Even today nearly 80 per cent of the known iron-ore deposits and an equal percentage of the world's coal are located in rather narrowly limited sections of western Europe, the British Isles, and North America.

In fact, in 1940 nearly nine tenths of the world's iron ore came from the following seven regions listed in the order of importance: the Lake Superior district, Lorraine in France, Drivoi Rog in the Ukraine, the Kiruna district of northern Sweden, the Midlands of England, the Magnitogorsk district of the southern Urals, and the Birmingham district of Alabama.

At present, cheaper and more effective means of extracting iron ores and the

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

FIGURE 13

SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE CHIEF POWERS IN MINERALS ¹¹

availability of relatively cheap transport make it possible for well-established centers of heavy industry to draw upon iron ores and other metals mined at long distances from such plants. As in the case of oil, iron and other mineral resources flow toward the chief centers of energy, particularly coal.

Not only are industrialized nations seeking new iron resources over the earth, but there has been an increasing heavy drain on the reserves, especially as a result of two world wars within thirty years. Some idea of the colossal use of iron and other minerals is seen in the fact that "more metal has been mined since 1900 than in all the earlier history of man."¹² Industry is drawing on less rich iron-ore deposits. Especially is this true of the Ruhr and Saar plants, which draw on high-grade iron ores from Spain and Sweden to supplement their local supply.

The extent of remaining reserves is somewhat difficult to estimate. This country probably has about 5200 million tons, perhaps enough for another quarter century or so unless we dip more heavily into the lower grades. Western Europe has altogether about 8100 million tons available. The Soviet Union alone has probably as much as or more than this latter figure. In con-

sidering reserves, however, some thought must be given to the development of substitutes for steel in the form of such lighter and durable metals as aluminum and in the use of plastics. Bauxite and magnesium and other deposits from which aluminum and aluminum alloys are derived are fairly plentiful, and soybeans — an important source of certain plastics — can be grown in widely separated temperate regions. Yet for a long time to come, the production of iron and steel will remain the heart of modern industry. Moreover, the present large centers will continue to be the chief producers.

Though coal and iron dominate the industrial scene, there are other mineral resources of high importance though in lesser amounts. The base metals — copper, lead, and zinc — unlike iron and aluminum are relatively rare, and present sources are being rather rapidly exhausted. Among other metallic minerals essential to modern industry are such alloys as nickel (for heavy steel), chromium (for stainless steel, gears, projectiles), tungsten (for making cutting tools), antimony (for hardening lead, etc.), and zinc, copper, platinum, and gold. There are also important nonmetallic minerals aside from coal and petroleum, such as asbestos, fluorspar (flux in steel mills), mica, potash, phosphates, sulphur, and others. The world distribution of some of these is shown in Figure 12. Figures 13 and


¹¹ Redrawn from Army Service Forces manual M104, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹² Meyerhoff, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

14 show the relative amounts of a variety of resources — mineral, food, and others — controlled or held by the major nations as of 1940. Postwar boundary changes, of course, call for some alterations in the proportions, but from a regional rather than a political standpoint these figures reveal varying degrees of industrial self-sufficiency.

FIGURE 14

SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF THE CHIEF POWERS IN MISCELLANEOUS RAW MATERIALS¹³



The amount and availability of natural resources in relation to society and culture become acute in periods of international conflict. They also have important bearing on peacetime relations among nations. But before discussing this matter, we must examine the potential effects of the air age and of atomic science as they relate geographic factors to society and culture.

The Air Age

The rapid development of air transport has profoundly altered the nature and place of many geographic factors in social-cultural life. The continuing improvements in kinds of fuel, types of planes, and rates of speed all point to still further changes. One of the most obvious effects, of course, is the lessening importance of the former barriers of mountains, seas, and dis-

tance. The shrinkage of travel time in the United States illustrates the point. It is about 2600 miles from New York City to San Francisco. By wagon travel, averaging 25 miles a day, it would take 104 days to make the trip; by automobile, averaging around 275 miles a day, it takes about 10 days to cover the distance. At an average speed of 30–35 miles per hour for a 24-hour day, a train can do it in 3½ days. By airplane it takes between 12 and 18 hours.

Air-age geography. A second and more significant effect is the alteration in the global setting of travel and transportation. Although from childhood on we are told that the earth is round, the maps we study as well as our daily movements over the ground mean that in practice we think of the earth as flat, that is, two-dimensional. Regarding the larger world, outside most of our daily experience, we learned about eastern and western hemispheres or we saw the world spread out on Mercator's Projection, which, of course, greatly exaggerates land mass and distances near the poles. Today, in the air age, the globe can no longer be thought of as two hemispheres — one East, one West — separated by large bodies of water, nor can it be thought of in Mercator's terms. It must be thought of as a monosphere — as one world. The airplane has annihilated distances. For instance, in Europe the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and the Baltic are mere fishponds traversible in a few minutes. The Atlantic is like the pre-air-age Mediterranean, passable in less than a day's time. Only the Pacific still retains some of the features of an ocean, in the traditional sense, but island hopping and long-range stratospheric air travel have rapidly shrunk its former imposing distances. While atmospheric conditions such as wind directions, frequency of storms, tendencies to cloudiness, and the like still alter somewhat the course of airplane movement, for the most part it is not controlled either by land or water conditions on the surface of the earth. The airplane can fly in any direction. It has made geography truly three-dimensional. The


¹³ Redrawn from Army Service Forces manual M104, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

political, economic, and social implications of these facts are enormous. (See below.)

The relationships of land to water mass today — with all the social-economic-political implications — have been greatly altered. Figure 15 shows some of the more important of these in terms of possible airplane movements, especially as related to certain strategic corridors in present and future world relations in peace or in war.

FIGURE 15

THE STRATEGIC CORRIDOR AREAS IN FUTURE WORLD RELATIONS ¹⁴



These are the connections (1) between Europe and North America via the Iceland-Greenland-Labrador air bridge or its modification by movement from Baffinland or Greenland directly over the pole; (2) between North America and the Orient by the Bering Strait-Aleutian-Kurile air bridge; (3) between Asia and Australia by the Malayan-Indonesian bridge; (4) between North and South America by the Panama-Antillean corridor; (5) between Europe, Africa, and South America by the Gibraltar-Canary-Cape Verde-San Roque bridge; and (6) between Europe, Africa, and the Near

East by the eastern Mediterranean island-and-peninsula connections.

The dominant locations of the future will likely be those land masses contiguous to the arctic: Canada and the United States on the one side, and Soviet Russia on the other. In fact, George T. Renner suggests that we will have two heartlands vis-à-vis each other across the arctic region (one in central Eurasia, one in North America) and that world regions — continental or insular — lying beyond these will of necessity play lesser roles in future world affairs.¹⁵ (See below on geopolitics.)

Obviously the new juxtaposition means shifts in the relative importance of certain cities or localities as the portals of intercontinental trade. London, New York, Le Havre, Shanghai, Yokohama, Hamburg, San Francisco, and Calcutta may become less important; and Winnipeg, Fairbanks, Minneapolis, Arkangelsk, Omsk, and Moscow may begin to be more significant. New urban centers along Hudson Bay or the North Siberian rim of Asia may be built to meet the new needs. Of course, continued improvement in range and speed of flying may lessen the importance of cities or sections along the rim of the Arctic Ocean.

Some effects of the airplane on men's activities. In farming, the airplane is extensively used to dust growing crops against pests, to provide a cover of smoke against frost, and to move garden and greenhouse products to distant markets. In forestry it has been most helpful in spotting forest fires. And in mining it provides transportation to distant and otherwise inaccessible fields. The resort industry benefits from the airplane, which makes possible vacations in more and more remote sections without undue loss of time in travel. Yet the use of the airplane for business travel is still one of its chief functions. For instance, in 1948 nearly 13 million passengers were carried by airplane in the United States alone, and of these the overwhelming majority were on missions of business. In addition, American

¹⁴ From *Human geography in the air age* by George T. Renner, 1942, p. 128. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-154.

airlines alone carried more than one million passengers on international flights.

Yet the use of the airplane as a carrier of freight will be its most important peacetime function for some time to come. To date its utility in this connection has been limited by unit cost. It is well-known that water-traffic costs are much lower than those by rail, automobile, or airplane. So far the costs of the last as a transport have been prohibitive. However, the development of new and cheaper fuels, the enlargement of the size of the planes, and especially the use of gliders — the freight cars of tomorrow — all envisage future extension of use.

Still other effects are becoming evident. Insularity, both geographic and psychological, is bound to feel the impact of air trade and travel. Both domestically and on the larger international front, regional divergences should be less significant. After all, community life, whether large or small, depends on communication and exchange of goods; and the airplane is removing the last barriers to previous isolation, so far as the mechanical features go. Yet it is the persistence of the attitudes, values, and habits of men built up in the centuries of the premodern age which must be overcome if we are to get a world community. But we know that changes in material conditions often precede alterations in the deeper and emotionally determined values and action-patterns. The first steps, of course, in breaking down the isolation of certain regions may be taken at home. Alaska is a case in point. Today passenger, mail, and freight services have brought Alaska nearer to the rest of the United States and have given Alaska herself a unity which she has not had before.

The movement of goods and persons over long distances is not the only implication of the air age. We may look forward to the use of the airplane for the short haul, both of passengers and freight. Such use will mean altering the layout of our cities so as to provide portal facilities in centers of business and industry. It will also influence the relations of suburban communities to the

nuclei of economic and social life in the large cities. While it may be some time before the privately owned plane or helicopter will replace the privately owned automobile as a means of travel and recreation for the average man and his family, the prospect is not entirely fantastic.

Yet the political implications of the air age are the most striking and often get the most public attention. Certainly the airplane both in peace and in war has destroyed the protection of the ocean, mountain, or desert barriers which once served to keep men and nations apart. It is a commonplace to note that the political organization of the world has not caught up to the physical, economic, and social implications of air-age transport. Since it is with respect to war, in particular, that this fact becomes most serious, we shall return to the topic when we discuss the place of geography in peace and in war. Before doing so, however, we must comment on other and related changes due to the discoveries and inventions of nuclear physics.

The Atomic Age

The research findings in nuclear physics have many implications for peace and for war. As must be expected, along with solid knowledge, all sorts of stereotypes, myths, and legends have grown up about the potentialities of an atomic age. The discussion at this point centers around the relation of the use of nuclear fission to the availability and distribution of certain natural resources and the use of atomic energy. In connection with the airplane, atomic weapons have an important place in war. And surely the peacetime use of nuclear fission, assuming adequate controls of the use of atom bombs and other lethal weapons, will greatly influence future society and culture.

Atomic age and geography. As we know, atoms are the building blocks of the physical universe; that is, all matter consists of atoms in certain combinations called molecules. Other than sunlight and water power, our common sources of energy, such as the com-

bustion of coal and oil, are the result of certain rearrangements in the electronic structure of the atoms of particular substances.

Similar processes supply energy in the living body. Such combustion is a kind of self-propagating affair. In the manner of starting a fire: a match lights the paper and kindling which, in turn, ignites the coal nearest them, which still later ignites coal adjacent to it but farther from the paper and kindling in the first place. Nuclear fission — the chain reaction — is analogous to this.

Uranium and thorium are, at present, the chief elements used in nuclear fission. The former is derived from pitchblende, a brown-blackish mineral with pitchlike luster. The latter comes from thorite, said to be very rare. The chief world distribution of known sources of uranium is shown above in Figure 12. Surely the search for still other deposits is bound to go on at an increasing rate as this new source of energy becomes more widely used.

The potential uses to which the principles of nuclear fission may be put are almost beyond human imagination. Stories of the damage to life and property done by the two bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 — one at Hiroshima, the other at Nagasaki — are widespread. The explosion of an atomic bomb produces at least four deleterious effects: first, an enormous release of energy; second, the rapid rising of temperature; third, terrific blast effects; and fourth, more or less prolonged radiation. As to the release of energy, the physicist M. L. Oliphant reported in 1946 that a bomb of critical size, containing between 22 and 66 pounds of fissionable material, would release energy equal to that produced by an explosion of from 200,000 to 600,000 tons of TNT. The astounding rise in the temperature of the air around an explosion comes from the kinetic energy imparted to the fragments as the fission takes place. In the immediate vicinity of the exploding bomb the temperature is of the order of tens of millions of degrees Centigrade. A huge fireball is produced by the explosion, and temperatures at its edge probably run to from 8000 to 9000 degrees Centigrade. In fact, this fireball is really a small sun radiating heat and light and various damaging rays.

The blast effect is of two sorts: positive or outward, and negative or inward. The former comes from the enormous pressures set up by the superheated gas made by the explosion. The latter is an aftereffect resulting from the rapid cooling of the gas. Radiation effects are also of two sorts: those set up during the explosion itself, and the residual type which lingers in the vicinity of the explosion for varying periods thereafter. Various radioactive rays are let loose which may have lethal effects on plant and animal life. (See chapter 7.)

This is not the place to review, even briefly, the destruction wrought at Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and later as a result of the tests at Bikini and elsewhere. But it may be pointed out that the damage done by these first trials at atomic bombing are undoubtedly minimal compared to what may be done as the bombs become more deadly and are used in great numbers on single targets.

The peacetime use of the principle of nuclear fission opens up vast possibilities. In time we may expect its application to the production of energy for purposes of industry, though difficult tasks of costs and engineering will have to be completed before we may expect its widespread use. In the meantime steady advances are being made in applying other products of nuclear fission, especially the radioisotopes. These permit further experimentation into the processes which cause many plant and animal diseases and into ways to improve the productivity of the soil. Scientists are also attacking the factors which produce human cancer with the aid of their knowledge of nuclear fission.

Yet even such improvements in developing new resources and benefiting mankind otherwise are not without certain hazards. Workers in laboratories and industries concerned with various aspects of nuclear physics, whether at the experimental level or applicational level, are exposed to the dangers of radioactivity. Among the most serious are burns derived from contact with radioactive matter. While various precautions are taken as more and more is known

about the subtle effects on human beings, it may take some time before the handling of certain phases of necessary processes will be made sufficiently foolproof to permit widespread industrial, agricultural, and medical applications.¹⁶

Geographic Factors in Peace and in War

The political, economic, and social relations of modern nation-states are being continuously affected by technological advances. The use of the airplane and the application of the principles of nuclear physics are only two of the most impressive of many changes in our own day. These relations of nations may be stated in terms of relative power, that is, the ultimate possibility of imposing the will of one nation or an alliance of nations upon that of another or alliance of others. Such power is at its highest when there is a combination of population or manpower, rich and varied resources, industrial techniques, high standards of living for the bulk of the population, the will to live, and the concentration of power in the hands of the political state.

The conditions of power. The power-potential of any nation-state is of two kinds: the total potential which it can muster, given time to do so, and the immediate or effective potential available at a given time and place. "The strategic position of a state in relation to other states at any given moment (in peace or war) as distinguished from its total power position, is determined by its effective potential."¹⁷ In a time of large political units — at best seven or eight of the total sixty-odd so-called "sovereign states" today — geographic factors have an important place, though they are not all.

¹⁶ For a suggestive forecast of some of the effects of the application of nuclear fission on society and culture, see W. F. Ogburn, "Sociology and the atom," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1946, 51: 267-275.

¹⁷ Army Service Forces manual M10301, p. 4, *Geographic foundations of national power*, section I. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1944.

"The power potential of a state resides in the human and material resources at its disposal, its people, its land, and the various things that the people have made or acquired from other people. The human resources comprise not only manpower but certain qualities and institutions which make manpower effective: character, skill, governmental organizations, and, extremely important, national cohesion or ability to stick together in the pursuit of the larger national policies in spite of differences in minor interests and opinions. The material resources comprise all the material things that the people use or could use in carrying on a war: their natural resources in land, soils, and minerals, their roads, railroads, cities, factories, tools, etc., as well as their military equipment."¹⁸

Obviously the geographic factors must be tied up with such important human elements as population and national pride, *esprit de corps* or morale, and aims and values. These human factors we shall discuss elsewhere. (See chapter 24.) At this point let us note some of the important geographic factors:

Geographic position, or location with respect to other nations, is important. In the past Europe has represented a variety of power centers, characterized for hundreds of years by struggles, political and economic, among the various nations seeking dominance. The United States, lying strategically athwart the Atlantic-Pacific traderoutes, long remained in a favorable position of isolation, protected by distance and aided by the friendly British seapower. Thus she was able to keep relatively aloof from power conflicts, either in Europe or in the Far East. Today, in an air and atomic age, this situation no longer obtains. Japan, too, due to her rapid industrialization and friendly relations with the British and the Americans, was able to expand her power-potentials in east Asia until she came into conflict with Western powers, first with Russia in 1904 and then with the United States and Britain in World War II. So far, neither China nor India has developed sufficient power-potentials to provide a threat

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

to other countries. In time this situation may be radically changed, especially as regards China.

Other positional factors are those of size, shape, and depth. This being an era of large nation-states, where large *size* is combined with population and available resources, the state so situated has distinct advantages. The United States, for example, in contrast to Brazil or Australia — both of which are as large as or larger than the United States — represents such an advantage. Neither Australia nor Brazil has the resources, the industry, or the population to be effective. In the past *shape*, also, has had its place. Compactness of land mass, associated with a richly indented coastline, facilitates mobilization of labor, industry, and military forces in times of emergency. Yet if compactness is not associated with large size, such concentration will increase the vulnerability of the country, especially to aerial attack. Again, elongated countries like Norway, Italy, Chile, or Czechoslovakia have boundaries, either water or land, which make defense difficult.

In fact, *depth* is a third factor which, linked to the other two, makes for easier defense. Depth, of course, derives first from size and second from shape. The size, depth, and shape of Soviet Russia were certainly factors in her successful resistance to the Nazi German invasion of 1941-1942.

Yet depth may also be a drawback. In the past when it became the defender's turn to attack, he often fell heir to many of the same disadvantages previously experienced by his enemy. In an age of aerial warfare the safety of depth may be limited, although dispersal of strategic industries, military establishments, and the like may checkmate the threats of such attacks. Space and its ally, time, have been hard to overcome in the past. In the future effective power-potentials, including speed in mobilizing one's weapons in force, may alter this traditional advantage.

Natural resources, particularly soils and minerals, constitute a power-potential of the first order. In this connection modern war sees a heavy emphasis put upon the need for national self-sufficiency, that is, a country's ability to sustain itself at any given level without access to outside supplies.

However, in many cases, access to outside sources is crucial. England's survival has depended in large part upon the availability of resources from other regions and countries. See figures 12, 13, and 14. An examination of these figures will show that Soviet Russia and the United States, on the whole, are far ahead of the other leading nations in the possession of or close access to most of these resources.

Geography and politics. Clearly, geographic factors enter into political relations of nation-states at many points. The degree of industrialization and the manpower available, in terms of numbers and skill and knowledge, will determine the power-potentials of any country. Some aspects of the populational factors will be dealt with in chapter 12. Finally, there are the human factors of national morale and national aspirations which have so much to do with peace and war. (See chapter 24.) But even in these matters there is a geographic component. That is, national territories, including all their topographic and man-made features, and related in terms of boundaries and frontiers, are one of the important foci of national patriotism. The whole development of nationalism as a powerful creed and the basis of political, economic, and social practices is bound up with the psychology of space. The map itself is one of the potent symbols of any country, and if it represents large space it is likely to be considered all the more important. There is no doubt that the British boast that "the sun never sets on the Union Jack" long filled the average Britisher with what he considered justifiable pride. The map, in short, represents a spatial symbol of no mean importance and must be included with other patriotic symbols, such as the flag, the national anthem, a country's heroes, and its folklore, as a basis of national morale.

Theorists of geography and politics have not been unaware of these relations. In recent times the most striking of such theories is that of geopolitics, or political geography, developed by Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) in Nazi Germany.

The roots of geopolitics lie in the imperialistic ambitions of Germany in the final quarter of the 19th century. The essential position was stated in 1897 by Frederick Ratzel (1844-1904), geographer and journalist, in his *Political Geography*. He defined the state as a living organism bound to a particular "living space" or *Lebensraum*. He contended that a virile nation-state, like an animal or plant, must of necessity grow by extending or die. His idea of a *frontier* as the point of conflict with other states for territory was a handy rationalization to the Pan-Germanism of his day.

While the Germans got the word geopolitics (*Geopolitik*) from a Swedish political scientist, Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), the geographic phase of it, at least, was fathered by Ratzel and his followers. Another support for this theory on the political and economic side came chiefly from economists who followed the thought of Frederick List (1789-1846). List, who had lived in the United States for some years, was much impressed by its rapid industrial growth and came to believe that this was due largely to the system of protective tariffs and the exclusion of threats of serious competition and conquest from Europe by virtue of the Monroe Doctrine. He held that the state should regulate the economic system closely, that protective tariffs and manufacturing would make for domestic self-sufficiency and, hence, for a powerful nation.

List laid the foundations of what later was called the autarchic state, one with a closed economic system. This he believed was the only kind of political-economic organization possible for Germany if she was to survive. Under such a scheme he believed Germany could expand till she controlled all of middle Europe from the North and Baltic seas to the Adriatic and eastward to the Black Sea. Although he did not originate the concept *Lebensraum*, he certainly had the idea in mind.

It was a contemporary of Ratzel, in fact, who first used the term *Lebensraum* in its modern sense. This was Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), one of Germany's

greatest political theorists. Borrowing from G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), the philosopher, Treitschke held that the state is the basic power in society and that a dynamic people could not help but go in for military and territorial expansion. He did much to make the leaders and even the masses of Germany space-conscious. That is, they came to believe that they were hemmed in by enemies who stood in their way of natural expansion.

Finally it was an English geographer, Halford J. Mackinder, who planted the most telling roots of geopolitics. In 1904 Mackinder, who had been influenced by Ratzel, announced the theory that world history had been largely made by landlocked peoples, especially from the central sections of the great land mass of Eurasia. From thence mankind has spread out to dominate the outlying regions of the earth. In fact, Eurasia and its appendage, Africa, he called the central world island. The core of the great Eurasian land mass he termed the "heartland." This would be about the area covered by the European section of what was then Imperial Russia. The American continents, Australia, and the off-continent islands, he said, were mere geographic satellites and would always be dependent on the central world island. This view stood in sharp contrast to one commonly held that it was seapower not land power which made possible extension of political power over the world.¹⁹

As a good Britisher, Mackinder went on to contend that Great Britain could maintain its farflung empire — held together largely by her navy — only by keeping close and friendly alliance with Russia. After World War I he extended his thesis in his book *Democratic ideals and reality* (1919). He seriously warned his countrymen of their need to prevent any strong alliance between Russia and Germany since the merging of two such powerful nations would spell the death knell of British power.

¹⁹ This was the view defended by Admiral A. T. Mahan (1840-1914) in his widely read book, *The influence of seapower on history, 1660-1783*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1897.

The dogma of geopolitics. From these two sources, then (one geography, the other politics), was born German geopolitics. After the defeat of Germany in 1918 Haushofer, in company with many other German leaders and groups, began to give serious thought to geopolitics. He accepted Mackinder's thesis that the center of the Eurasian land mass was the major source of world power. In line with this belief, he contended that the British Dominions and Empire would decline and that a vital people such as the Germans were destined to dominate the world. Earlier Pan-German theories about a powerful *Mittel-Europa* (Middle Europe), reaching to the Adriatic and the Near East and southern Russia, furnished an additional background for his ideas. It was easy to compound a theory of race, state, and geography that would put Germany in the center of a vast continental region reaching across all Europe and into Asia and Africa. She would be the political, military, and industrial center of this world; the outlying districts would be the furnishers of raw materials and the market for Germany's goods. In order to accomplish this grandiose scheme Haushofer took the position that there must be a close collaboration between Germany and Russia, and this in the face of what then seemed insurmountable ideological barriers. As might be expected, he thoroughly approved the German-Russian Pact of 1939-1941.

Haushofer's geopolitics was a hodgepodge of science, pseudo-science, and the practical aims of German imperialism, often dressed up in high-sounding mystical words. He developed a large following, however, and, more seriously, through his personal influence on Hitler, affected Germany's military plans for World War II. It was as propaganda, however, that geopolitics had its most telling effect.

Along with racialism, geopolitics became a potent shibboleth of Nazi Germany. It gave the Germans an emotional excuse for international aggression by telling them that they had divine rights to land and resources, not only that which they held in 1932-1939, but, more importantly, a right

to the *Lebensraum* in the Eurasian heartland proper. Hitler put the matter thus in *Mein Kampf*, which so long was the bible of the Nazis:

"The foreign policy of a folkish state is charged with guaranteeing the existence on this planet of the race embraced by the state, by establishing between the number and growth of the population, on the one hand, and the size and value of the soil and territory, on the other hand, a viable, natural relationship.

"Only a sufficiently extensive area on this globe guarantees a nation freedom of existence."²⁰

Here we find the magic linkage of *Boden und Rasse* (space and race) which rests upon Haushofer's concepts: first, of territory as a living organism in relation to its plant and animal life; and second, of the political state as a living organism superior to the individual.

The point about geopolitical theory was not its truth or falsity from a scientific viewpoint, but rather that it served as a vital rallying cry in international conflicts, not only in Europe but in the Far East as well, where Japan followed much the same line of argument. As an idea or belief it is as much a part of culture as a stick or a stone or a rocket plane. In fact, it will be interesting to see in the next decades whether Soviet Russia, which contains Mackinder's heartland, does not develop its own geopolitical theory as a propaganda device to convince its own people, if not others, of a divine imperialist mission. Tied to a racialist Pan-Slavism, such a view may easily become an important ideological weapon to rationalize Russia's further expansion of territory and power. (See chapter 11.)

Geography Largely a Limiting Factor in Society and Culture

In concluding this chapter, we must return to the topic raised at the outset: Just

²⁰ From Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 935, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939. By permission of the copyright holder, Houghton Mifflin Company.

what place does geography have in explaining man's social behavior? Certainly the particularism of earlier geographers must be critically reconsidered. There is little or no evidence, for instance, that, unaided by culture, the desert makes for the invention of religious mysticism, or the tropics for an inferiority of racial stocks. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the place of climate, topography, and natural resources in man's existence. Especially is this true with respect to his material culture, such as his goods-getting, housing, manufacturing, and transport. Yet even in these matters the geographic factors are chiefly limiting rather than directly causative. The following illustrations bring out the manner in which cultures may vary even though the geographic conditions are the same.

The Eskimo represents a remarkable adaptation to a highly unfavorable environment; and if we knew only his culture, we might assume that all arctic inhabitants follow much the same pattern. Take housing: Is anything more natural than that he build snow huts from the bountiful supply at hand? If we but glance across the Bering Sea to the Chuckchee of northeastern Siberia, in a similar climate, we find these people in winter months living not in snow houses but in large, clumsy tents of hide stretched over heavy supports. Again, the Chuckchee use the domesticated reindeer for draft purposes, while the Eskimos use dogs to draw their sleds. The Chuckchee apparently borrowed the use of the domesticated reindeer from their neighbors, the Tungus, living to the south of them. The Eskimos did not domesticate this convenient animal themselves and only in recent decades have learned, in certain areas, to use the reindeer.

Again, even though the Pacific Northwest Indians have developed woodworking to a high art, why have not the northern California tribes, with equally ample woodlands, done the same? The answer lies not in the natural environment but in cultural divergences.

The American Southwest offers another striking contrast. The Hopi are intensive farmers; the Navahos do but little farming, living a pastoral life. The Hopi live in terraced sandstone houses; the Navahos in conical earth huts. The former possess high art in pottery making; the latter show very

crude workmanship. The Hopi men do the weaving; the Navaho women handle the loom. The former are strictly monogamous; the latter permit polygyny. The family organization of the former has strong mother-in-law taboos and gives the maternal uncles great power over their sisters' sons, while the Navahos have no such rigid taboos nor the same form of social organization. There are also marked differences in religious and magical practices. Finally, the Navahos, like the Plains tribes, have been much more warlike while the Hopi have a more peaceful history.

In a similar way, in the same sections of South Africa the Bushmen are seed-gatherers and hunters, live in crude windbreaks or caves, and use the bow and arrow. In contrast, their neighbors, the Hottentots, are a pastoral people, living in mat-covered portable huts and using the spear as a principal weapon, although they have the bow and arrow. While these tribes have many myths and other features of culture in common, the striking differences in material traits cannot be gainsaid. Once more we have to seek the explanation largely in the history of their culture and not in the physical world in which they reside.

Another difference in culture within the same environment must be noted. The Paiutes, or "Digger Indians," living on the edge of the Great American Desert, considered the Rocky Mountain locust a particular delicacy. The locusts infested these areas periodically in great numbers, and the Indians took advantage of these occasions to drive them into brush enclosures, roast them, and have their fill. When the Mormon colonists settled the Great Basin, beginning in 1847, they were greatly troubled during the first decade by veritable plagues of these insects, which ate up every living blade of grass, wheat, or corn. These white people did what they could to destroy the pests, but they were unable to bridge the cultural chasm between themselves and their Indian friends and bring themselves to take up a new dietary habit. Had their own food taboos been less severe, they, like the Indians, might actually have made something of a blessing out of what seemed to them a curse.

These examples, however, must not be thought to show that culture is the all-powerful and only determinant of social

behavior. It is perhaps the most important; but the natural environment, as well as social contacts of noncultural sort, influences adjustment. To refer again to the Hopi and Navaho Indians of our Southwest: Despite the rather striking differences in the two cultures, both peoples are circumscribed by the fact of a sparse resource base. The former have, apparently through some kind of limitation of births, kept their population in fair degree of balance with the food supply and other resources. This is not so with the Navahos, whose high birth rate during the past several decades, abetted by improved medical care, has led to a serious pressure of population on the resources.

The effects of natural environment, then, are often indirect and secondary but nonetheless ever-present. Even with modern technology, agriculture is limited by soil, climate, and topography. If one wishes to grow bananas, he has his best chance of success in the rainy tropics. If he tries it in a semiarid section of the tropics, the added labor and costs of irrigation will not make it worth while. And one could not raise bananas in a humid, continental temperate zone because killing frosts would destroy the crop. So, too, occupations and businesses obviously revolve around the extraction and processing of mineral resources. Coal miners are found in western Pennsylvania with steel workers near by, but no such division of labor is found in central

Texas. So, too, with the coming of the air age we must recognize that air currents and degrees of cloudiness and storminess in various regions will affect air transportation, as it will affect the location and function of certain cities.

In general, however, we may say that primitive man was more closely dependent upon his immediate geographic conditions and resources than is modern man living in an industrialized society. In other words, as man has advanced to more complex forms of culture, he has overridden many of the handicaps of the "natural landscape," putting in its place, with increasing effectiveness, the "cultural landscape." Not only has he changed the face of the earth itself and devised new and more rapid means of communication and transportation, but he has partially overcome poor soil by fertilization, provided more adequate water supply for crops by irrigation, insured himself against changes in temperature and humidity, and by the use of refrigeration in transporting and storing foodstuffs removed earlier handicaps in the use of seasonal foods. In brief, culture history runs a course from the most rudimentary societies, isolated and tied rather closely to their immediate physical environment, to modern times, in which there is little left in the environment of the ordinary man that has not been altered by his culture, although the degree of such modification does vary.

Interpretative Summary

1. There are many misconceptions, both popular and philosophic, about the direct effects of geography on culture and conduct.
2. Nonliterate man is much more directly dependent upon geographic conditions for survival than is man living in advanced industrial societies.
3. Today the geographic factors serve chiefly as limiting variables in regard to culture and conduct. Still climate, topography, soil, and other resources remain important.
4. Yet as soil and energy-giving resources are exhausted, without adequate substitutes being found or invented, even modern man may be increasingly affected by shortages in natural resources.
5. The air and atomic age is presently influencing man and his culture. Former political isolationism is no longer tenable. And the threat of war hangs over the world because of the persistence of former ideas and practices related to self-sufficient sovereignty.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Illustrate the chief effects of climate and topography on man and his social-cultural adjustments. How is man learning to make life in tropical climates more bearable?
2. Distinguish between the "natural landscape" and the "cultural landscape" as these concepts are used by geographers.
3. What is the social-cultural meaning of a resource?
4. How is the daily life of farmers influenced by their patterns of land use?
5. What is meant by man's "destructive occupation" of the land? Illustrate.
6. What natural resources does the United States lack in order to continue its industrialized culture? What substitutes are being developed for some of these?
7. What function has the government, if any, in restraining undue exploitation of natural resources? Has the state any "right" or "duty" to conserve natural resources? Discuss pro and con.
8. Define geopolitics. How do you account for its emergence in Nazi Germany as a political and propaganda argument?
9. What does E. A. Ross mean by stating in his *Principles of sociology*, 1938, p. 87, "As civilization develops . . . ideas, dogmas, and doctrines play a greater role, climate and scene a lesser role"?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Lucien Febvre, *A geographical introduction to history*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925.

A classic analysis of the relations of geography to history.

C. D. Forde, *Habitat, economy, and society; a geographical introduction to anthropology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1937.

A well-written and amply illustrated discussion of the relation of geography to culture.

Ralph Linton, ed., *Most of the world: the peoples of Africa, Latin America, and the East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949.

A collection of special papers by experts on various world areas. There is pertinent material on such geographic factors as climate, topography, and various resources.

Ellen Semple, *Influences of geographic environment*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1911.

A revision and expansion of Ratzel's *Anthropogeographie*, vol. I. While Ratzel influenced the rise of geopolitics, he was also a distinguished student of geography and culture.

Franklin Thomas, *The environmental basis of society*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1925.

A good critical review of various theories of geographic determinism.

U. S. Department of Agriculture, *Soils and men, Yearbook of agriculture*. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1938.

An extremely useful handbook by experts.

Race and Racism

MAN is a member of the animal species known to science as *homo sapiens*, or man — the wise. While some people may question how wise man really is, there is no doubt that in the animal kingdom man only has the mental capacity to produce and maintain culture. Strictly speaking, the study of race belongs to physical anthropology. But the persistence of widespread ignorance and misinformation about what race is and what it is not requires that the student of sociology know the more pertinent facts about the topic. It is especially important to avoid confused thinking about the relation of race to culture. Many people seriously believe not only that the races differ greatly in mental equipment but that historically the higher civilizations are the direct product of superior races. There is no basis in fact for this belief.

False ideas about race are particularly widespread in our own Western world. In general, members of the white race, especially those of Germanic and Anglo-American culture, look down on the colored races as distinctly inferior to themselves. Examples are easily found. Thus, in one of our southern states, during a political discussion about permitting Negroes to vote, there was much talk that the Negro is inherently unfit to take part in political democracy. One man in high office at the time stated that only the white man was capable of participating in a democracy, that "the yellow people, the brown people, and the blacks are mentally unfit for directors in our form of government."¹

As many public replies to this statement pointed out, this view is almost identical with that held by Adolf Hitler, Alfred

Rosenberg, and other Nazi bigwigs. And, while the student of human biology knows that such views are nonsense, as a social-cultural belief and basis for action, these ideas cannot be lightly dismissed. Racism is but a special instance of the ethnocentrism discussed in chapter 1.

We shall return to examine in more detail certain aspects of racism but only after we have presented some objective facts, such as the definition and criteria of race, the origin of races, the relation of race and culture, and the data about psychological differences among the races.

The Nature and Distribution of Races

The word *race* has been very loosely used. People speak of the Nordic race, of the Jewish race, of the Danish race. The Nordics are a subrace of the whites. The Jews are not racially homogeneous but are a loosely organized cultural group. The Danes represent a language group, associated in Europe with a particular nation-state. Popular beliefs confuse physical traits and culture, especially language and political differences. Yet, despite such confusion, people do learn to distinguish among the major races: white, black, and yellow. The most obvious differences are color of skin and nature and color of hair. But, as we shall see, other external traits must also be noted in any scientific classification of race.

Definition and criteria of race. Man represents not several but only one animal species, *homo sapiens*, and this species includes *all* the peoples of the world. Strictly speaking, a race is a subspecies of man having a definite combination of identical or highly

¹ From a letter printed in the *Atlanta Constitution*, "The pulse of the public," February 3, 1947, signed "Tom Lindner."

similar physical traits which are inherited from common ancestors. In varying degrees, such a combination of physical traits serves to distinguish one subgroup or race from another. And the combinations tend to be genetically transmitted from one generation to another, provided all the conditions which originally gave rise to the traits of the subgroup remain relatively unaltered. As a rule, the subspecies or race inhabits or did live for long periods of time in a more or less limited geographic region. Finally, it is most important to note that the chief criteria by which races are determined are inheritable but at present *nonadaptive* traits. That is to say, such bodily features as skin and eye color, facial and head form, hair color and hair form, and amount of hair, which are among the chief criteria of race, have little or nothing to do with the success or failure of a given subspecies to survive physically or to develop or borrow culture. Moreover, within each major racial stock — white, black, and yellow — there are a number of subraces. In addition there are so-called "composite" races that cut across any classification of the three major races.

When one asks, what are the acceptable and basic physical features which serve to set one race off from another, it is at once apparent that there are no definitive and mutually exclusive features which serve this purpose. However, a number of criteria have been worked out by physical anthropologists which help us in telling the principal racial stocks from each other. Table 7 lists those traits most commonly used for purposes of racial classification as they apply to the three major races.

Among these fifteen traits it is evident that some combinations are more accurate than others in setting one race off from another. In general, stature, skin color, and eye color are of little value. On the other hand, hair texture, hair form, degree of hairiness of the body, and nasal index are generally considered sufficiently valid to enable a well-informed person to tell in which race anyone will fall.

Yet there is a good deal of individual as well as group variability. At best there are

broad categories representative of average or modal tendency of the various statistical distributions of any given trait. It is well to remember that a race is always a number of individuals, "not some ideal form of which you could take a picture."² Within each major racial stock there are a number of subraces. That is, relatively large numbers of individuals, while generally classifiable as within a given race, also possess in addition sufficient distinguishing physical features to warrant further subdivisions. Briefly the facts about the subraces of the major racial stocks are as follows:³

The subraces of the white race are: (1) *Mediterranean*, found around the whole Mediterranean basin and through migration in the New World, tend to be of medium or stocky build; long-headed; brunet in skin color, with dark straight or wavy hair, and dark eyes. (2) *Celtic*, found mostly in Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and parts of England, and in this country and the British Dominions through migration, tend to be tall and slender; long-headed; from light-brunet to fair in skin color, with dark or reddish straight hair, and blue or gray eyes. (3) *Nordic*, in Scandinavia, Britain, the Baltic area, and through migration here and in the British Dominions, tend to be tall and slender; long-headed; with fair skin, straight or wavy blond hair, and blue eyes. (4) *Alpine*, chiefly in central Europe, some in the Balkans, the Baltic area, and the Near East, and in the United States through migration, tend to be from medium to stocky in build; broad-headed; brunet in skin color, with dark straight or wavy hair, and dark eyes. (5) *East Baltic*, in Finland, the Baltic area, Poland, north Germany, and in this country now, tend to be from medium to short-stocky in build; variable in head form; fair in skin color, with blond or brown straight or wavy hair, and gray or blue eyes. In addition there are two "composite" subraces: (6) *Armenoid*, of Turkey and the Near East, some in central Europe and the Balkans, and in the United States through migration, are usually stocky in build and have from long to medium head form; olive or swarthy

² William W. Howells, *Mankind so far*, p. 216. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1944.

³ The data on subraces are taken chiefly from E. A. Hooton, *Up from the ape*, rev. ed., part V, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

TABLE 7

CHIEF PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR RACIAL STOCKS

TRAITS	WHITE		BLACK
	(Caucasoid)	(Mongoloid)	(Negroid)
Skin color	Pink, white, olive, ruddy	Yellow to yellow-brown to red-brown to brown	Dark-brown to black
Stature	Medium to tall	Medium tall to medium short	Tall to very short (in Negrito)
Head form	Wide variations from long to broad and short	Predominantly broad, medium height	Predominantly long; low to medium height
Hair color	Light-blond to dark-brown, rarely dead-black	Dark-brown to black	Black
Hair form	Usually wavy to straight, sometimes loosely curled; never woolly	Straight	Woolly or frizzy
Body hair and beard	Moderate to profuse	Slight or none on body or face	Slight or none on body; sparse or no beard
Hair texture	Fine to medium, seldom coarse	Coarse	Coarse
Eye color	Blue to dark-brown; never black	Medium-brown to dark-brown to black	Dark-brown to black
Eye form	Lateral eyefold occasional	Medial epicanthic fold; slit-like slanting in some	Vertical eyefold common
Face	Narrow to medium broad; tends to be high	Medium broad to very broad; tends to be medium high; malars high and flat, usually with fat pad	Medium broad to narrow; tends to be medium high
Facial protrusion (prognathism)	Usually lacking	Slight	Often marked
Chin prominence	Pronounced to medium	Medium	Slight
Nose	Bridge usually high and narrow, sometimes medium	Bridge usually low to medium; form medium broad	Bridge usually low; form medium broad to very broad
Lips	Medium to thin; little eversion	Medium	Thick; eversion common
Forehead	Somewhat sloping	Upright	Upright

skin; dark wavy hair, and dark-brown or medium-brown eyes. (7) *Dinaric*, found chiefly in Yugoslavia and the Dinaric Alps, and in this country through migration, tend to be stockier in build than the Armenoid but are like them in head form and usually have brunet skin, wavy brown hair, and brown eyes. (8) Also, the *Ainu* of northern Japan, now almost extinct, are usually considered a subrace of the white.

The subraces of the black race are: (1) *African* or *Forest Negro*, found in Africa south of the Sahara, in the Upper Nile region, and sporadically in east Africa, and the New World today, tend to be variable in body build; long-headed; from black to dark-brown in skin color; with black woolly or frizzy hair, and dark-brown or black eyes. (2) *Nilotic*, found in the Sudan and scattered among New World Negroes, tend to be taller and slender and to have black or bluish-black skin; otherwise they are similar to the Forest Negro. (3) *Negrito* (the pygmies of the Congo, Malaya, and New Guinea) are very short; thick-set in build; medium in head form; with dirty-yellowish or brown color of skin, black woolly hair, and from dark-brown to black eyes. All three subraces are characterized by broad noses.

The subraces of the yellow race are: (1) *Classic Mongoloid*, found in Siberia, the Amur region in north China, sometimes in Mongolia and Tibet, tend to be medium in build; broad in head form; from yellow to yellow-brown in skin color, with black, straight coarse hair, and from medium-brown to dark-brown eyes with Mongolian fold. (2) *Arctic Mongoloid*, in arctic regions of northeast Asia and North America, usually have a small but variable build and medium head form; otherwise they are much like the Classic Mongoloid, except that the Mongolian eyefold is incomplete. (3) *American Indian* of the New World, probably a composite but chiefly Mongoloid, are quite variable in build; also variable in head form; with yellow-brown or red-brown skin, usually black straight hair, and from dark-brown to black eyes, with Mongolian fold lacking. Then there is (4) a composite of *Mongoloid*, *Indonesian*, and *Malayan*, found in south China, Burma, Indo-China, Japan, Malay, Thailand, the Philippines, and East Indies, who are usually short in build; quite variable in head form; with dark yellow-brown skin, black straight hair as a rule, and from medium-brown to dark-brown eyes.

There are wide variations in these subgroups, and the combinations follow no uniform pattern. Thus, in Europe we find long-headed dark peoples as well as long-headed blonds; and, as we shall see, attempts to found a racial theory on what are subraces is nonsense.

But the three major races and their subdivisions by no means exhaust the problems of classification of *homo sapiens*. For example, the Australians and Tasmanians seem to be a mixture of a very archaic white type and a Negrito-like race, with some Melanesian-Papuan traits thrown in to further confuse the experts. Another composite race is the Dravidian of India. Upon a white base, chiefly Mediterranean, we find a mixture of Australoid, Negrito, and Mongoloid traits. Then, too, there are the Polynesians, scattered widely over the central and south Pacific islands, who are a mixture of brunet whites and Indonesian, Mongoloid, and Melanesian-Papuan traits.

In short, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a "pure race." There are handy taxonomic labels to set large groups off from each other. Certainly there is no single set of categories to enable us to separate one subrace sharply from another within the larger overall grouping by race. Each subrace seems to be distinguishable only by varying the combination of physical traits.

The Racial History of Man

Having summarized the important data about races, subraces, and various composite subgroups, and having shown the extensive overlapping in matters of traits, we shall review some of the important steps in the development of *homo sapiens*. This will give us an understanding of how man came to be what he is physically. Then we shall examine the relation of the early development of man to the emergence of human culture.

Man and geologic time. The biological history of man is long, tortuous, and tedious. However, an examination of Figure 16 will show that in terms of the total span of plant and animal life on the earth,

FIGURE 16
ESTIMATED GEOLOGIC TIME AND FORMS OF LIFE⁴

GEOLOGIC TIME		TIME IN YEARS <small>Determined by the disintegration of radioactive minerals</small>	STRUCTURAL STAGES	DOMINANT LIFE
CENOZOIC	Quaternary	? 1,000,000	Modern Man	AGE OF MAN
	Pleistocene		Primitive Man	
	Pliocene		Man-like Apes	AGE OF MAMMALS
	Miocene		First Anthropoids	
	Oligocene	60,000,000	First Primates (Lemuroids & Tarsioids)	
	Eocene		Early Placental Insectivorous Mammals	AGE OF REPTILES
	Paleocene		First Mammals	
MESOZOIC	Cretaceous (Upper Cretaceous)	135,000,000	Mammal-like Reptiles	AGE OF AMPHIBIANS
	Comanchean (Lower Cretaceous)		Primitive Reptiles	
	Jurassic	180,000,000	First Amphibians	AGE OF FISHES
PALAEZOIC	Triassic		First True Fishes	
	Permian	450,000,000	Earliest Fish-like Vertebrates (Ostracoderms)	AGE OF INVERTEBRATE LIFE
	Pennsylvanian (Up. Carboniferous)		Unknown Invertebrate Ancestry of the Vertebrates	
	Mississippian (Lo. Carboniferous)			
	Devonian	550,000,000		
	Silurian			
PROTEROZOIC	Ordovician	550,000,000		
	Cambrian			
ARCHAEOZOIC	Pre-Cambrian Time	+1,850,000,000 Years		

man represents but a very short period of the whole, only a million years or so of nearly 2000 million of total geologic history. The first great step toward man was taken with the appearance of the earliest mammals, about 150-165 million years ago. Like many lower animal forms, the mammals are divided into male and female sexes; consequently any newborn individual has

drawn upon two, not one, hereditary strains for his basic physical traits. (See chapter 7.) But more importantly, and unlike lower forms, the female mammals carry their

⁴ From H. F. Osborn, *The hall of the age of man, chart I*. Guide Leaflet series of the American Museum of Natural History, no. 52. Revised by W. K. Gregory and G. Pinkley. New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1938. Reprinted by permission.

young for given periods of time within their bodies prior to birth. This gestation period permits the growth of structures and functions which will prepare the new member for more effective adaptation to his material and social world after birth.

Yet even this period of preparation does not enable the newborn to fend for himself, once he is born. As we have already noted in discussing interaction and socialization, the infant is absolutely dependent upon the mother for survival. In other words, mammals not only are bisexual and bear their young alive but are a biosocial species.

Yet these three features — bisexual origin of the new generation, preparatory gestation period, and social care of the newborn — mark only the first act in the human drama. The second act begins with the coming of the primates, the earliest forms resembling our present-day lemurs and tarsiers, simple long-tailed monkeylike forms. This was about 60 million years ago in what the geologist calls the Eocene period. (See Figures 16, 17.) They probably emerged from animals that had already taken to tree climbing for food and protection, although they also were ground animals.

Just what caused these early forms to take to the trees we do not know. Probably it was a matter of natural selection; that is, they could get food that slower, strictly ground animals could not get. Also, by living mostly in trees they could escape those ground animals that might use them for food. In any case, swinging in trees and grasping had important effects on body form: the torso tended to lengthen out, and the arms and feet (both used by these forms for grasping as well as locomotion) became more specialized. Certainly the freeing of the forepaws for the development of the prehensile hand meant that food could be picked up, torn into smaller fragments, and held to the mouth in eating. This, in turn, led to changes in the structure and function of the mouth and throat. The mouth was no longer needed for grasping and rending food, and there took place a gradual recession of the snout. So, too, the vocal ap-

paratus became more and more used to express emotions, as in the presence of food, prospective mates, or danger. And such emotional vocal expressions, though basically derived from bodily changes of the individual, came to have social importance. That is, they came to serve as signs to others in the finding of food, as love calls in mating, and as indicating danger ahead.

Since these animals were not strictly tree forms, the elongation of the torso, arms, and legs was associated not only with swinging and grasping but also with walking on their hind legs. Thus a tendency to assume an erect posture became another characteristic of evolving primates. Also, along with the recession of the snout and the refinement in the bone and muscle structures of the face, came a shift of the eyes from the side of the head to a more frontal position. Bifocal vision developed, and the grasping and handling of sticks, food objects, and other things became increasingly more effective since the eyes could guide the hand toward any given object and aid in its manipulation. So, too, visual range was increased by walking on the hind legs and moving about in trees. Of course, there were some losses. Smell, being essentially a ground sense, apparently became less important in pursuit of food and mates while vision became more important. Touch, on the other hand, probably became more specific and refined as hand-eye co-ordination became more extensive and specific. Hearing continued, of course, to be a major sense perception and became increasingly important in the biosocial contacts because vocal expression of emotions came to serve as rudimentary gestures or signs in the contacts of one with another.

Yet all these remarkable changes would have meant little had not another taken place. This was the concomitant further development of the forebrain or cerebrum. This is the seat of the animal's learning capacity and hence is the directing agent in vocalization, in hand-eye co-ordination, manual manipulation, and the ever-widening range of adaptation which the primate makes to his environment. It is only in

the arboreal early primates never had completely left the ground. They had to descend occasionally for water and for some food. But as to why they made a more or less permanent shift to a ground habitat is not fully known. It may be that pressures of animal population on food resources forced some of them into areas of less heavy woodland and more open grassland in search of food and shelter.

The most significant aspect of this return to the ground rests in the fact that some time in the Miocene period, about 30–35 million years ago, the first simian or apelike forms and the first hominid or manlike forms began to diverge from some generalized and common ancestors of both the apes and man. The simian line gave us the gibbon, orangutan, chimpanzee, and gorilla species. From the other have come a number of human species. Of these modern man, *homo sapiens*, is the only one still extant. A well-accepted reconstruction of the geologic history of monkeys, apes, and men by J. H. McGregor is shown in Figure 17. The fossil remains of both branches are found all the way from South Africa, through southern Asia, to the East Indies and Australia. None of these earlier forms have been found in the New World.

The cause of this divergence of simian and hominid forms is not known. It prob-

ably resulted from a combination of mutations making for specializations in one direction or the other.

The manlike forms developed a true foot for locomotion; posture became more and more erect; there was a recession of the heavier bony features of the face; and, especially important, was the further development of the forebrain. Differences in cranial capacity give us a rough measure of differences in cerebral development. Thus, that of the fossil ape *Proconsul* is estimated at 520 cubic centimeters. This is somewhat higher than the average for the orangutan, chimpanzee, and gorilla, which ranges from 400 to 500 cubic centimeters. Modern man has a cranial capacity three times the latter figure.

The coming of man. Physical anthropologists believe that the earliest manlike forms appeared in Asia or possibly in Africa in the Miocene or even perhaps in the Oligocene period. Yet so far no fossil specimens from those geologic periods have been discovered. It is not till the Pleistocene — covering the last one million years of geologic history — that we find fossil evidences of the first truly human forms.

For our purposes it is not necessary to review the evidence regarding these developments. Suffice it to say that most phys-


TABLE 8

SOME IMPORTANT EVIDENCES OF THE ADVANCING ORDER OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN SPECIES ⁶

Family: *Hominidae*

POPULAR NAME			CRANIAL CAPACITY	WHERE FOUND
Java	Pithecanthropus	erectus	900–1000 cc.	Island of Java
Peking Man	Sinanthropus	pekinensis	1150 cc.	Near Peking, China
Pittdown	Eoanthropus	dawsoni	1350 cc.	Sussex, England
Heidelberg	Homo	heidelbergensis	?	Mauer, Germany
Neanderthal	Homo	neanderthalensis	1300–1600 cc.	Europe; North Africa; Near East; Uzbekistan, Russia
Solo Man	Homo	soloensis	1300 cc.	Island of Java
Modern Man	Homo	sapiens	1400–1600 cc.	World-wide

⁶ Data from Howells, *op. cit.*, p. 180; Hooton, *op. cit.*; and John Gillin, *The ways of man; an introduction to anthropology*, pp. 82–87, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948. Cranial capacity of Heidelberg not estimated.



Pithecanthropus

Piltdown

Neanderthal

Cro-Magnon

American Museum of Natural History, New York

RECONSTRUCTION OF PREHISTORIC MEN

ical anthropologists today believe the variational tendency in nature resulted in the emergence of a number of different species of the biological family *hominidae*. Table 8 reviews the advancing order of these developments. Also, the picture above shows reconstructions by experts of some of the best-known types of early men.

Appearance of modern man. Although we have various fossil records of the earlier species of man, this knowledge still does not give us a clear picture of the sources of modern man nor of the stages through which he passed to form the modern races, subraces, and various composite types which we noted above. There is, for example, still some dispute as to whether the major races of man emerged from a common ancestry or perhaps derive, in parallel fashion, from some of the forms noted above. This is not the place to enter into this controversy. Certainly some facts are pretty well established. We know that the main body of the white and yellow races came from Asia. The center of dispersion of the whites was in the general region of present-day Iran and Afghanistan. The main migrations were into India and especially to the north-westward, where they trod close upon the Neanderthals in the Lower Paleolithic and beginning of the Upper Paleolithic period.

Some may have moved eastward, accounting for the Ainu and the white admixture in the Polynesians. The yellow race "pretty clearly arose somewhere east of the whites and north of the mountains."⁷ As to the age of the Mongoloids we can but conjecture. Howells suggests that there may have at one time been a close relation of the whites and the yellows, probably far back in the Lower Paleolithic, "a race distinct from the darkest-skinned peoples but not yet divided into Whites and Mongoloids."⁸

The probable origins of the Negroid and Australoid peoples are much more difficult to infer. As to the latter, they may have come from Asia and may represent, contrary to the general fact of a single species noted above, certain other human species as well as true *homo sapiens* stocks. Some of these early men may have become isolated in Australia, where they never got beyond Stone-Age culture. The Negroes present a more difficult riddle. While most of them are found in Africa, others are located far away.

⁷ Howells, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 297. As Howells points out, the American Indians, usually considered derived from an unspecialized Mongoloid type, have many features in common with the whites — skull form, height, and other traits. The Ainu and Polynesian admixture with the whites might have resulted from a much later intrusion of whites from mid-Asia, eastward, after the earlier separation of American stocks from their Asiatic progenitors.

in Melanesia, *e.g.*, Negritos and in Papuan mixtures. How may we account for such a distribution of Negroid stocks? Perhaps the original home was in India or south-east Asia, from which center they spread at a relatively recent date, that is, recent in time as conceived by physical anthropologists.

Race and heredity. It is not known just how or exactly when the living races began to develop their more specific differentiating physical traits. But a knowledge of the workings of heredity will help us to make at least some strong inference about the matter. As is true of all basic structures of the body, the various traits which are used to tell one race or subrace from another race or subrace — color of eyes, hair, skin, hair form, and the rest — are determined by the genes, or carriers of inherited physical traits. Hence we must next ask, How did such distinguishing traits arise?

There seem to have been four main factors at work in the development of different races: mutations, natural selection, inbreeding, and isolation. As we know, *mutation* means some relatively sudden chemical-physical changes in the genes which are capable of being passed on to the next generation. Since the genes are relatively stable, mutations are not very frequent. However, once a new trait or series of traits appears which may be passed on to the offspring, the factors of natural selection come into play. That is, the particular new feature either aids in survival or else does not interfere with survival. With reference to the first divisions of the apelike from the manlike forms, a series of mutations may have taken place, such as increase in brain size, alterations in the form of the feet, and others which, under the forces of natural selection, enabled the manlike forms to advance ahead of the apelike forms.

On the basis, perhaps, of a number of mutations and natural selections — resulting in variations in adaptive capacities of given individuals and generations — other factors may have come into play. One of these is inbreeding, that is, mating of individuals closely related by ancestry. In-

breeding, since it draws on similar gene pools, results in the reduction of variation in given traits and hence in a tendency to uniformity.

Geographic isolation and relatively small numbers of individuals probably made for inbreeding among early human forms. Such a condition, in time, would reduce the extent of individual differences and tend to perpetuate certain common traits. It may well be that such distinctive features as color, hair form, and eye form developed and became stabilized through long generations of rather close intermixture of human groups which had become isolated from each other by barriers such as mountains, deserts, and the sea. As E. A. Hooton puts it, "Obviously the longer the geographical and genetic isolation, and the more specialized the physical environment, the more homogeneous and physically peculiar the evolving group will become."⁹ This initial differentiation (due to mutations, natural selection, inbreeding, and isolation), however, may later have broken down due to increase in population of given groups with a resulting pressure on their food and other resources. This would, in turn, initiate contacts of such groups with other groups that had likewise for a long time been living in isolation. From this contact racial mixture must have resulted. This, in turn, would lead to a higher degree of variability and a whole assortment of new physical types, some intermediate between the forms in the parent racial stocks but, in general, revealing a mosaic of traits specifically inherited from one parent racial stock or the other. However, if such mixture were followed by another period of isolation, inbreeding, and natural selection, the mosaics and blends of traits would again tend to be stabilized. Such is probably the source of various composite and mixed racial groups.

In the past few hundred years, the mobility of mankind has led to further mixture but usually without quite as severe isolation and inbreeding as marked the past. For ex-

⁹ Hooton, *op. cit.*, p. 445. By permission of the publishers, The Macmillan Company.

ample, the white man has spread his genes among the colored races everywhere, as witness the mulattoes in the Americas and in Africa, and the Eurasians in the Far East. Yet, social-cultural factors may come into play which tend to have the effect of earlier geographic isolation. Thus, the legal and moral restraints upon Negro-white marriage in the United States and in South Africa have led to a certain stabilization of the mulatto types which had appeared earlier from periods of slavery wherein miscegenation did take place, usually outside the sanctions of marriage. Furthermore, this stabilization results from the assortative mating or sexual selection which places a premium on intermarriage among the lighter-skinned Negroes. Similar stabilization is found among some Eurasian groups. So, too, among the white population of the United States there is taking place a mixing of subracial strains, derived originally from the subraces of Europe, that may result, in time, in a new and relatively homogeneous subrace of our own. Nevertheless, assortative mating along community, economic, religious, and class lines prevents a completely random mixture. (See chapter 18.)

In summary, we may say that races are groups or populations which differ in the commonness of some of their genes, particularly those which influence color, eye, nose, facial form, and other nonadaptive features. True, the amount of pigmentation, which determines skin color, may have some adaptive function in the tropics. But it is interesting to note that dark-skinned peoples are found in temperate and arctic zones, where dark pigmentation has little or no adaptive usefulness. But despite certain distinguishing genes, human beings everywhere possess far more genes which are alike. Those which determine the basic structure of the body and its organs are more or less identical in all mankind. The nonadaptive features of color and external form have at present no important bearing on man's motives and learning ability, and it is motive and learning which determine man's place in society and his participation in culture.

The Races of Man and the Beginnings of Culture

There is every reason to believe that the origin of culture derives from the fact that man is a social animal. Social species are those whose very existence depends on interaction among their members. It is important to repeat that these social essentials are not peculiarly human but are a basic fact in the existence of all mammalian species, but especially of the primates: monkeys, apes, and man. (See chapter 2.) Yet it is not man's social qualities which set him apart from all other animals. Rather, it is his capacity to invent and maintain a culture, that is, language, folkways, and institutions. Such capacity results from his superior brain, particularly upon the high development of the cerebral cortex.

The origins of language and of the higher thought processes are lost in the dark recesses of prehistory, but there is no doubt that both are the products of social life and superior cerebral capacity. The crania of known specimens of earliest men, such as *Pithecanthropus* and Peking Man, support the conviction that they had the cerebral ability for language. While their speech may have been rudimentary by our standards, there is no reason to doubt that they had true language and high mental operations, compared to their apelike contemporaries. Moreover, it is well to note that neither the fossil remains of apes nor living apes show such advanced cerebral development in the very areas of the brain which control the speech and higher thought mechanisms.

Earliest stages of cultural growth. Geologists and anthropologists tell us that the first evidences of human culture are found in the last phase of the Pliocene or earliest part of the Pleistocene, that is, in geologic deposits laid down about one million years ago. This long stretch has been divided into three major cultural periods: (1) the Old Stone Age, or Paleolithic, itself divided into Lower and Upper; (2) the New Stone Age, or Neolithic; and (3) the Metal

Ages, comprising the Copper, Bronze, and Iron ages. We live in an extension of the last-named. At first, the advancement of culture was halting and slow. This is evidenced in the fact that the Lower Old Stone Age occupied about 950,000 years, or 95 per cent of man's total existence. The Upper Old Stone Age began about 50,000 years ago, and the Neolithic probably 13,000 years ago. The first phases of the Metal Ages appeared about 5500 B.C.

During the Lower Paleolithic, the Northern Hemisphere experienced four major southward extensions of arctic ice, which altered climate and topography considerably. The intervals between — the interglacial periods — were marked by milder temperate climates. It is quite likely that some of the cultural changes and advances were made in an effort to meet these periodic variations in climate.

Be that as it may, there are definite evidences that human culture was associated with such early forms as the Peking and Piltown races. A variety of stone implements have been found along with fossil remains. While no human artifacts were found on the site of *Pithecanthropus*, stone implements have been found in like geologic strata not far away. This is, at least, contributory evidence that he possessed a culture. The stone tools consisted chiefly of rude core implements with chipped edges, used for cutting, scraping, and boring holes. And while only such stone artifacts have remained, there is every reason to believe that the races of the earliest Paleolithic also used wood for spears and digging sticks, and bone for making points. Man must have learned the use of fire fairly early. Also, early Paleolithic man must have eaten both animal and vegetable foods. The sites of Peking Man show evidences that he used fire and had a diet consisting of both animals and plants, if we are to judge by the bones of deer and the seeds of the hackberry found there.

These early people must also have worn crudely fashioned garments, probably of skin. And there is every reason to believe that family and kinship groupings formed

the main basis of their social organization. Such groups may have moved from place to place, seasonally with respect to available food and sometimes to a new locality as food resources declined. Yet there is no reason to assume that early Stone Age man was a stupid wanderer, "the mythical man of pack or horde, drifting aimlessly."¹⁰

The major economy, however, was the gathering and foraging of seeds, roots, and other plant foods and fishing, trapping, and otherwise securing fish and game. Moreover, it is well to recall that for a good 95 per cent of mankind's sojourn on this planet, his survival depended upon this "gathering economy," as Vere Gordon Childe calls it.¹¹

From such beginnings the Heidelberg, Neanderthal, and Solo races greatly improved and extended the use of stone and other tools and weapons. The *coup de poing*, a cleaver or hand ax made of a core of stone with sharpened edges, became an important implement. Then, too, chips or flakes struck off from the parent core were retouched to become scrapers, borers, engraving tools, and the like. Toward the end of this long period — estimated to be 100,000 years or more — bone anvils and bone implements appear in the deposits. Also, by this time man had learned to fasten a stone ax to a stout stick by hafting. This extended his manual control by a foot or more and enabled him to strike a much more forceful and accurate blow in attacking an enemy or a wild animal and in cutting or splitting a tree. During the Neanderthal-culture period the use of fire apparently became very widespread, probably related to the need to keep warm in what had become a cold climate. Religious practices must have arisen, since formal burials are clearly indicated. So, too, are found the first remains of man's art.

At the end of the fourth glaciation, estimated to be anywhere between 35,000 and

¹⁰ Carl O. Sauer, "Early relations of man to plants," *The Geographical Review*, 1947, 37: 4. This entire article is an excellent summary of the relation of early races to their economy.

¹¹ Vere Gordon Childe, *What happened in history*, p. 17. London: Coddett Press, 1947.

50,000 years ago, the first representative of *homo sapiens* began to press upon Neanderthal Man in northern Africa, western Asia, and in Europe. Students know the newcomer best as Cro-Magnon Man, but there were others, such as Combe Capelle and Brunn. These peoples have many features resembling the present white race. Another, the Grimaldi race, was evidently more closely linked to the Negro. There is some evidence, too, that the intruders mixed with the Neanderthals in some places. To this day, physical anthropologists say they find in isolated areas of Europe occasional individuals with marked Neanderthal characteristics. In any case, the end of the fourth glacial period marks the beginning of the Upper Old Stone Age, by which time the gradually accelerating rate of cultural growth was beginning to pay ever-larger dividends. The Upper Paleolithic reveals amazing specialization in the use of stone implements, tools, and weapons of all sizes and shapes. Likewise, bone was increasingly used for a wide variety of purposes. By this time, too, man had developed great skill in painting with mineral colors, in sculpturing, in carving on ivory, and in the production of articles for personal adornment, such as bracelets, beads, and rings. His religious life had become more elaborate, too, if we may judge by the burial sites and the religious-magical objects found among the other material remains of the time. Yet, despite such notable advances, man of the Upper Old Stone Age did not have polished stone implements, the bow and arrow, pottery, or agriculture, which latter depends upon domesticated plants and animals. He was still a gatherer of plants, a forager, a fisherman, and a hunter.

By the end of the last glacial epoch, about 14,000 years ago, Europe, the Near East and north Africa were peopled by a variety of racial types, showing considerable local differences in culture. But mankind was astir, both in its migrations and in inventive-ness. In the transition to the next stage, the bow and arrow, canoes, netting, and basketry appear. Also the first domesticated

animal, the dog, became an aid and comfort to man. As the curtain rises on the New Stone Age, or Neolithic, the drift of peoples in western Eurasia was definitely northward, and other white stocks were pressing in from the east and southeast.

The Neolithic revolution. All students of prehistory agree that the New Stone Age marks one of the greatest forward steps in human culture, comparable perhaps only to the Industrial Revolution, which has so profoundly influenced contemporary life. The Neolithic began in the Near East and the Nile Valley about 13,000 years ago. It was diffused to central and western Europe three or four thousand years later. The period gets its name from the fact that men had begun to polish some of their stone tools, thus giving them a sharper cutting edge. Also, they had invented the arts of pottery and weaving. But these are not the important changes. It was the domestication of plants and animals which laid the foundation of man's subsequent history. The development of agriculture greatly altered the character of man's social life and culture. Man's control of the planting, growth, harvesting, and later use of cereals, root crops, and other plants and his domestication of cattle, pigs, and later sheep provided him a more abundant food supply. The domestication of plants meant farming; that of animals, in some cases, led to herding, or pastoralism. Often there was a mixture of agriculture and the use of such domesticated animals as the pig, cow, goat, and sheep. This new economy, in turn, meant a more rapid growth in population. (See chapter 12.) It meant also that man finally had a more settled abode, at least as agriculture came to dominate his economy.

Man's management of domesticated plants and animals forced him into new sets of habits. He founded villages and thereby created the need for new forms of social control, especially as his numbers increased. And while the distinguishing features of civilization — the wheel, trade, writing, mathematics, and science — appeared later, in the Bronze Age, these latter

inventions and discoveries would have been impossible without agriculture, settled life, and the consequent leisure.

We are not certain just where domestication began. It may well have been on the Iranian plateau, spreading from there to the more fertile regions of the Tigris-Euphrates and Nile valleys. Certainly evidence is accumulating which should enable archeologists to work out the transitional stages from the end of the Upper Paleolithic to the Neolithic.¹²

It is certain that herding and agriculture brought a great increase in population and in time put people on the move again, but this time in family and village groups in search of new lands to till. Neolithic groups moved westward into Europe and north Africa and eastward deeper into Asia. Racially early Neolithic men were "all of one generalized basic European or 'white' type, medium-sized with long heads."¹³ As they moved into Europe they probably came into contact with groups descended from earlier invasions of modern man, such as the Cro-Magnons.

The Metal Ages. While groups of Neolithic farmers and herders were spreading out over Eurasia, related racial groups living in the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates valleys, who had greatly extended the culture based on agriculture, made still further cultural advances. About 5000 years ago they learned how to smelt certain minerals, first copper, then tin — an alloy to make bronze — and finally iron. The Age of Metals was born. Along with this went the invention of the wheel and of writing, and the extension of trade in surplus goods. In fact, most of the features of culture and social organization which characterize the dawn of civilization have continued down to the present.

¹² In 1948 Robert J. Braidwood found the remains of a Neolithic agricultural village in Iraq dated as between 8000 and 6000 B.C. The population was probably between 300 and 400 persons. The houses were of mud walls. Among other things which he found were grain, grindstones, flint tools, stone axes and hammers, and reed mats and baskets. (From press release furnished by author.)

¹³ Howells, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

During the Bronze Age the first round-heads, or Alpines, begin to appear in Europe; and by the time of the Iron Age the Nordics were on the scene. Later other Alpines appeared, and during the Middle Ages such Mongolian peoples as the Huns and Turks pushed their way deep into Europe. In short, the sources of the subraces of modern Europe correspond with the cultural developments in the Neolithic and Metal Ages, although certain stocks of *homo sapiens* were evidently present at the close of the Upper Paleolithic.

In concluding this section, we must emphasize that while the emergence, continuity, and extension of culture rest upon the higher brain capacity of individuals who belong to human species, there is no reason to believe that *homo sapiens* alone first developed culture. At least he must share with other human species the early steps in cultural development, and surely he is the beneficiary of the beginnings of culture at the hands of other human, but not modern living, species, such as the Pithecanthropus, Peking, Piltdown, and Neanderthal races.

Race, Psychology, and Culture

The preceding section was introduced to show that the first development of culture took place along with the emergence of the first truly human species. That is, it arose from races with sufficient brain capacity to invent and use language and tools and to develop a more elaborate social organization than that of their apelike relatives. In the present section we shall discuss the question of possible racial and subracial differences in potential and actual intelligence, that is, in culture-building and culture-using capacities.

As we noted in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, there persists a strong conviction among many white groups, but especially among those of northwestern European extraction, that the colored races are definitely inferior to the whites. The extent and nature of such beliefs in the United States is brought out in E. L. Horowitz's summary of the results of a public opinion poll of

white respondents conducted by *Fortune* magazine in 1939.¹⁴

Among other things certain sectional but apparently stable views appeared: (1) Three fifths to three fourths of the white respondents believe the Negro to have a lower intelligence than the whites. The higher percentage is found in the southern and mountain states, the lower in the Pacific states. (2) As to the "reason" for this inferiority, the poll showed that of those who stated that the Negroes are inferior to whites in intelligence, slightly more than one half of the respondents from the South believe it rests on heredity. In contrast, slightly less than three tenths of those from the Pacific states held this view. People in other sections of the country had views on both questions which were intermediate to these extremes.

Such views that other races are inferior to the whites are culture traits, not instincts. The opinion survey but reveals the white American's ethnocentrism. Similar prejudices arise not only between peoples of differing color but sometimes among peoples of different countries although racially they all come from the same racial or subracial stock. (See below on racialism.)

In the face of such beliefs, what have anthropology, history, and psychology to say on the matter of the mentality of races and subraces? Is there any sound foundation for popular notions that some races are inferior to others?

"Racial psychology" and culture. To this day there persists a widespread belief that nonliterate peoples have remarkable sensory powers of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, far in excess of those of the white man. But equally common is the accompanying belief that nonliterates lack the capacity to reason clearly and logically. The first notion has been thoroughly scotched by means of a long series of studies by psychologists who measured the sensory and motor capacities of nonliterate. How-

ever, it has also been shown that even in these apparently simple psychological processes cultural training may influence the responses. What members of a race or group see, hear, or otherwise sense is partly determined by what they have been taught by others of like group and culture, as well as by their inherited capacities.¹⁵

Yet the recognition that in the simpler mental and motor responses, nonliterate and modern man do not differ has not destroyed the other conviction that in the higher mental functions there are sharp differences. This latter belief has been used by many writers who take the position that the high civilization of present-day European and American peoples rests upon an inherent intellectual superiority of members of the white race. It is often asked: If the colored races are equal in ability to the whites, why did not the African tribes develop a high culture, such as emerged not too far away from them, first in the Fertile Crescent and later in Greece, Rome, and modern Europe? Or, again: If the Mongolians are as intelligent as the whites, why did not the inventions which make possible modern technology occur in the Far East?

To the student of prehistory and history, such questions are silly for a number of reasons. First, they completely ignore the facts of slow *cumulation* of the important elements in culture. As noted earlier, many fundamental features of culture, such as use of fire, making of tools, development of language and thought forms, weaving, art, religion, arose from races now extinct. Even the important advances of the Neolithic may have come, in part, from other than present-day races. True, the beginnings of civilization, including use of metals, the wheel, written language, money, commerce, and complex art, religion, philosophy, and early science, were largely developed from certain ancestors of present Mediterranean peoples. Yet there is every reason to believe that other races also played a part. Certainly so

¹⁴ See E. L. Horowitz, "Race" attitudes," chapter 3, part IV in *Characteristics of the American Negro*, Otto Klineberg, ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.

¹⁵ See Heinz Werner, *Comparative psychology of mental development*, chapters 2 and 3, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940; also F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

far as the Nordic or Slavic subraces are concerned, they remained in the Neolithic cultural stage long after the Mediterranean peoples had made great advances in culture. In fact, the Nordics and Slavs are the beneficiaries in modern times of the vast cultural contributions of other races and subraces.

Another factor which influences cultural growth is the degree of *isolation* of one race or group from another. For example, the barriers of the sea long insulated the Australians from the main streams of Asiatic culture. So, too, during the period of high Mediterranean culture, the African tribes remained isolated from the same. They had learned the art of metallurgy, had developed a rather complex social organization, and had created some distinctive art forms. Nonetheless their isolation prevented them from participating in the European culture until very recent times. By the time this contact was made the cultural divergences of Europe and Negroid Africa were sharp.

A third factor which affects the advancement of culture is its *directionality*. In the Western world concern with physical welfare led to an increasing body of skills and knowledge centering around mechanical and scientific inventions and discoveries. Such a cultural base has largely determined the interests and run of attention of those who are its beneficiaries. Modern Euro-American culture is heavily loaded on the side of science, technology, and activities centering in material goods and services. In contrast, the Oriental peoples followed along philosophic and artistic lines which had been laid down long before. Only in relatively recent times have they begun to take over our technology. Yet there is no evidence that the Mongoloid peoples are innately more given to the mystic philosophy of a Buddha or the moral schemes of a Confucius than are members of the white or Negro race. Nor can an objective student of comparative cultures make out any particular moral superiority of one race over another. If there were anything to the notion that races do have distinctive moral capacities, and there is not, one could chalk

up a lot of low scores for the white race, whose history has been marked by bloody and almost continuous conflict.

In short, no competent student of race, culture, and history now holds that racial differences have had any particular place in the cumulation and continuity of human culture. Peoples of varying racial extraction have participated and do participate differentially in culture in terms of what they have received from the other peoples or what their own ancestors invented and passed on to them, or what those of any given generation invented and used. The striking variability in human culture over the earth is the result of the effects of prolonged isolation, differential inventions, deviant social organizations, and various value systems. It has nothing to do with the physical features that mark one race or subrace off from another. There may be national or culture-group psychologies, depending on the variations in the components of any given cultural totality. (See chapter 4.) But there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as "racial psychology." It is an unfortunate cliché or stereotype pulled out of its proper biological meaning and given cultural and psychological meaning. Yet the persistence of much foolishness about the matter forces us to examine our topic from another angle. Let us see what psychology has to contribute to the problem of alleged mental differences among races and subraces.

Tests of intelligence and races. Such measures as the Intelligence Quotient, or IQ, and a wide variety of other individual and group tests, both verbal and nonverbal, have given us an opportunity to compare races and subraces in matters of ability. A summary of some of the important findings on selected ethnic groups is found in Table 9.

These studies and others make it perfectly clear that there are differences in intelligence, as measured by such tests. On the average, American whites make better scores than do Negroes and American Indians on the various tests. Also, judging by measurements made of men in the

United States Army during World War I, the foreign-born of British and northwestern-European extraction do better than those from central, eastern, and southern Europe. Only the Chinese and Japanese equal the white norms.

TABLE 9

SUMMARY OF VARIOUS STUDIES OF
RACIAL AND SUBRACIAL GROUPS¹⁶

ETHNIC GROUP	NO. OF STUDIES	RANGE OF IQ	MEDIAN IQ
American Negroes	24	58-99	84
American Indians	11	69-97	78
Mexicans	8	78-96	85
Italians	15	76-96	85
Chinese	11	87-104	97
Japanese	9	81-114	99

While the average differences are clear, the range of ability in each group is extensive, and the overlapping is marked in every instance. That is, in every race, subrace, or nationality there are to be found a small proportion of very bright individuals and also some very dull and feeble-minded ones. But for the bulk of the members of each group there is no significant difference in terms of ability. Nevertheless the divergences in mean, or median, intelligence scores is striking, and one may ask, How are these to be explained? Are they due to inherited biological factors in the various races and subraces? Do they mean that the psychologist has invented a method of determining biologically founded racial differences superior to anything the anatomist has found? Is there any support for racialism here?

In trying to answer these questions, a number of social-cultural, that is, learned, factors must be taken into account. These include motivation, rapport between the tester and his subjects, language, education, and social-economic status. Surely until such factors have been eliminated or con-

trolled, we must be extremely cautious in accepting the idea that differences shown by the tests reflect differences due to biologic inheritance. Let us examine these factors.

The importance of *motivation* in appraising performance on the tests is clear. Do the individuals tested really put forth their best efforts? The matter is related both to the general culture setting and to the immediate test situation.

Our schools — where most of the tests are given — reflect the American emphasis on competition and speed. Among the American Indians, the Negroes, and among some children of immigrant background, it has been found difficult to arouse interest in such rivalry. Over and over again those who have tested Negro children and adults have commented on the fact that many times the subjects showed little or no strong desire to perform at top capacity in the tests. In fact, J. S. Price reports finding definite improvement in test scores of a group of Negro freshmen in college when he challenged them to do the best they could in order to show what members of their race could do.¹⁷

The absence of a competitive attitude among Hopi school children is reported to have affected their performance in tests unfavorably. As already noted, interpersonal rivalry is sharply frowned upon among the Zuni, Hopi, and other Pueblo-dwelling tribes of the Southwest.¹⁸

A particularly telling illustration of the place of motivation is found in Otto Klineberg's study of the factors of speed and accuracy as reflected in the behavior of various racial groups in certain test situations. Language factors were not under consideration.

Klineberg gave a number of performance tests to white children aged from 7 to 16 years and to American Indians and Negroes of about the same ages. Among the Indian groups studied were children from the Yakima tribe in the state of Washington and from

¹⁶ From Otto Klineberg, "Mental testing of racial and national groups," chapter 6, p. 255, in a symposium volume by H. S. Jennings, et al., *Scientific aspects of the race problem*. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1941. By permission.

¹⁷ See J. S. Price, "Intelligence of Negro college freshmen," *School and Society*, 1929, 30 : 749.

¹⁸ See Laura Thompson and Alice Joseph, *The Hopi way*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945; also Klineberg, *op. cit.*, chapter 6, p. 258.

Haskell Institute; the Negroes came from New York City and from West Virginia. The white children were from the same regions as the colored. Klineberg's results show distinctly that in speed the white children excelled the Indians and Negroes. Interestingly enough, however, those Indians and Negroes who had lived in more complex and urban cultures dominated by the white man's stress on speed did better than their racial fellows who came from the rural South or from the reservations of the Far West. In other words, as the colored races take on the habits which to the white person are "normal," they approach him in this "normal" trait of speed. It seems reasonably sound to conclude that cultural factors play a larger part in determining speed than do innate racial differences.

In the matter of accuracy there is no superiority of the whites over the colored races, and in some instances the colored boys and girls excelled the white children in this test.¹⁹

Rapport between the tester and the subject is also important. For example, despite careful handling, the Negro child in the South may suffer anxiety if not outright fright in the presence of a white psychologist who administers the test. The impress of the color-caste system is too powerful to be completely offset by a few kindly words.

H. G. Canady reports that when a group of Negro school children were tested by a Negro psychologist they showed an average increase of six points in IQ as compared with their performance on the test when it was given by a white psychologist. In contrast, white pupils when tested by a Negro psychologist revealed a decrease of six points on the average in their IQ's. It is pretty clear that children and adults alike do better on mental tests when they are at ease and have confidence in the tester.²⁰

Races and nationality groups are distinctly handicapped in taking tests framed in a *language* with which, at best, they are only partially familiar. There is much evidence that bilingualism tends, on the whole,

to affect adversely a child's performance on intelligence tests in which the language factor is of prime importance.²¹ Another handicap of language-cultural sort is found in many tests which call for concepts completely outside the culture of the testee.²²

Level of education has been shown definitely to affect the level of success on intelligence tests. To raise this problem is to ask once more, What do the tests really test? In this country the assumption was often made that the mental tests measured something innate called intelligence. Yet it is becoming clear that intelligence reflects not only inherent learning power but also the social and cultural milieu to which the individual is exposed. While the long-standing controversy over the biological inheritance of intelligence continues, it should be clear that until the psychologist can control the factors of language and past learning, that is, culture, he is not in a position to support whole-heartedly the theory that heredity fixes the limits of learning or intelligence at a definite point. No one doubts that individuals differ in their capacity to learn or that there is a slight percentage of the population which is physically and mentally atypical — the low-grade feeble-minded. But this is a far cry from the wholesale notion that intelligence differences in races, as measured by the tests — themselves cultural products — rest chiefly upon hereditary grounds. Race, sociologically, means nothing without respect to culture; hence all so-called "racial testing" is really cultural testing.

Certainly so far as the American Negro in comparison with the American white is concerned, we must be very careful in accepting intelligence-test results at their face value. The oft-repeated fact that some samples of southern white soldiers of the World War I period did more poorly on the army intelligence tests than did comparable samples of

¹⁹ From Otto Klineberg, "An experimental study of speed and other factors in 'racial' differences," *Archives of Psychology*, no. 93, Jan., 1928, p. 15. Taken from Velma Helmer, *The American Indian and mental tests*, unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Kansas, 1926.

²⁰ See H. G. Canady, "The effect of 'rapport' on the IQ," *Journal of Negro Education*, 1936, 5 : 202.

²¹ See Klineberg's review of this topic in his chapter "Mental testing of racial and national groups," *op. cit.*, pp. 260-263.

²² See Klineberg, "An experimental study of speed . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 15. It was shown that when test items dealt with Indian, not white, concepts the latter were inferior to the former.

northern Negroes is usually interpreted as reflecting differences in education. The southern whites came from areas with limited school facilities, the northern Negroes from sections where educational opportunities were good. Until it can be shown that Negroes have the same educational and other opportunities afforded the whites, we must not assume that the intelligence measures show innate differences.

Akin to the educational variability in effect are those of *social-economic* status. It has been amply shown that children and adults of higher social-economic classes do better in mental tests than do those of the lower strata. The implications of this fact in the study of race differences are obvious. All too often studies of Negroes, Mexicans, American Indians, and Orientals have failed to control the factor of social-economic level. Again, until these factors are controlled we must not accept uncritically assertions that inferior social-economic status derives from inferior ability. It is contended that if individuals in such a class were brighter or more intelligent they would not be where they are. But until full freedom of opportunity to move upward in status is assured we can hardly defend that position. Surely as far as the colored races in this and in many other countries are concerned, equality of occupational and social opportunities are definitely not at hand.

Innate intelligence and race. We may now return to the question put at the beginning of the present section: Are there any marked differences in mentality by which we may distinguish between the races or subraces? Our brief review of the scientific literature on this topic answers with a rather definite "No." While it may be extremely presumptuous to say at this moment that all races are equal in all mental abilities, we can say with good assurance that objective studies report no sharp differences in average mental potentiality among the major races. On the other hand, such matters as motivation, schooling, economic status, standards of value, and attitudes of co-operation which are learned and not biologically in-

herited have profound effects on test performance.

Using a simple theory of mental heredity, many have said that northern Negroes are superior to southern ones because the smarter Negroes come North, that urban children are smarter than rural children because only the duller people remain on the farm, that the immigrant stock coming to America from 1880 to 1914 got increasingly worse biologically. These differences seem clearly to reflect opportunity and culture rather than racial ability. The stickler for marked hereditary race differences is faced with the enormous task of explaining in his naive biology some of the most complicated activities known to civilized man, some of which have been acquired only in the last few generations. Unless he wishes to believe in a simple Lamarckian theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics, he must burden the doctrines of biological heredity and mutation with some amazing responsibilities.

It is not that differences in intelligence are not now presently found among the races and subraces. They are. The problem is what *causes* these differences. It is clear that individual variation in ability within each race is very great. Moreover, much of this difference probably rests on heredity; but alleged average differences between races as such seem to rest upon environmental, that is, cultural, rather than upon hereditary influences. For sociology the fact of individual differences in any group, large or small, is highly relevant with regard to such processes as competition, co-operation, and differentiation, in matters of social status, and in innumerable other social situations. But this is a totally different thing from trying to explain variations in mental ability or cultural attainment of races in terms of biologically (hereditarily) determined differences in ability of races as such.

Racialism

Yet, no matter how fully the scientist understands the facts just summarized, many individuals and groups the world over

continue to believe in the dogma of race differences. *Racialism* is a dogma, a body of beliefs, in short, a social myth which holds that race determines the psychological abilities and cultural traits of the individual and/or group. Moreover, it usually implies or contends that there are sharp differences between races in these matters and that the superior race has a unique ability, talent, or mission to control and dominate the inferior races. Racialism is a basic form of ethnocentrism and has a history that goes back a long way.

While such ideas are almost as old as tribal relations on the in-group *vs.* out-group pattern, present-day racialism was born of the intense nationalism which arose after the French Revolution. It was in Germany that this idea struck its deepest roots. Yet the concept of superior races with special missions is not unknown elsewhere.

The background of racialism in Germany. Unlike their neighbors in England and France, the Germans were late in developing a unified nation-state. Well into the 19th century the German-speaking section of Europe remained split into various kingdoms, principalities, and "free cities." However, certain ideas born of the French Revolution and, more especially, the terrific defeat of the German forces by Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) greatly stimulated nationalist sentiments among the Germans, who despite their political diversity had an otherwise fairly common culture. While certain strong military and political leaders helped build a strong Prussia in the post-Napoleonic period, others lent support to German nationalism by fostering racialism.

In the last quarter of the 18th century, Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), a philosopher, had taken the view that Germany had a special national destiny. Such a belief was furthered by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), another philosopher, who bolstered German morale after Germany's defeat by Napoleon. He contended that the Germans were an *Urvolk* (a primeval people, race, or folk) with a precious heritage

in their language, literature, and culture generally. And by 1821, when Prussia was again becoming strong, another philosopher, Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), was lecturing to his students that the Prussian state represented the highest cultural unfolding in all history. He was sure that Germany was destined to be the world's leading power.

Interestingly enough, however, the core of modern German racialism really came from outside. A French nobleman, Arthur, comte de Gobineau (1816-1882), published in 1853-1855 his essays which we know in translation as *The inequality of human races*. He defended the thesis of sharp racial differences between the whites and the colored peoples. Moreover, he wrote: "I was gradually penetrated by the conviction that the racial question overshadows all other problems of history, that it holds the key to them all, and that the inequality of the races from whose fusion a people is formed is enough to explain the whole course of its destiny."²³ He also maintained that the blond Nordics of northern Europe were superior to all other whites.

Although this book got little attention in France or Britain, it was well received in Germany. The whole idea of Teutonic superiority struck a responsive chord in literary, political, and military circles, and a veritable cult of Gobinism arose. Richard Wagner (1813-1883) took it over and fitted it into his dramatic operas which glorify Germanic mythology. Later a Germanized Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927) took up the cult and made it the basis of his book *The foundations of the nineteenth century* (1899), in which he argued that all the basic advancements of Western culture were due to Germanic inventiveness, leadership, and racial superiority. Also, the imperialistic program known as Pan-Germanism found considerable support in Nordic racialism.

This whole theory attracted all classes in Germany since it united everyone into a blood kinship which cut across the class lines so evident in that country. But such positive views as these usually demand some antithesis. Men often the more easily unite when there are negative as well as positive appeals, and the Jewish population

²³ From Gobineau's dedication "To His Majesty George V King of Hanover," 1854. See *The inequality of human races*, p. xiv, translated by A. Collins. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.

provided the necessary out-group stimulus for the hostility of the German racialists. A rising wave of anti-Semitism in Germany served as a foil for Nordicism and the Pan-German movement.

In this connection note should be made that many German biologists who accepted Darwinism held firmly to the idea of sharp differences among what we now know to be but subraces or blends of subraces. All too often even these trained men confused nationality with race.

Actually, there is no such thing as a pure Nordic subrace in Germany. The Germans are a mixture of Nordic, East Baltic, Alpine, and other stocks. Nonetheless this false racial thesis of Nordicism continued to be associated with an expansive nationalism. In the hands of the Nazis it became a powerful political and economic weapon.

Racialism in Nazi Germany. In *Mein Kampf* Adolf Hitler presented us with the chief lines of Nazi racialism in Germany. But he seldom used the term "Nordic," preferring the somewhat older concept of "Aryanism."²⁴ This latter term is somewhat broader than the earlier one, and under Aryanism the Nazis embroidered the older Teutonic race doctrines with many new features. Hitler set the tone of the Nazi racialist view in these words: "What we see before us of human culture today, the results of art, science, and technique, is almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan." In contrast, "All great cultures of the past perished only because the originally creative race died off through blood-poisoning."²⁵

²⁴ The precise sources of Hitler's ideas on race are not clear. "Aryanism" was used by philologists in their study of Indo-European languages — many of whom contributed to the racial myth. The term Aryan has some advantages since it is a broader concept than Nordic. Thus, Hans K. F. Günther, a leading Nazi racialist, estimated that only 50% of the German population is Nordic, the balance being Alpine, Dinaric, East Baltic, and smaller groups, which he combined to form the Aryans. On the other hand, some Nazis, especially those concerned with the mystic ideology of race, continued to employ the term Nordic.

²⁵ Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Hitler in this section and later are from the American edition of *Mein Kampf*, prepared by a committee of

In the hands of Nazi writers race, folk, and a mystic soul were combined into a philosophy which had much appeal to the German people. They were assured that they had a divine mission to conquer and rule the world. But there is nothing particularly unique in such ideas. Such rationalization might easily be coupled with any folk culture since it voices a deep sense of unity in the primary group and their close dependence for survival upon the land. This folkish racism in a highly urbanized society such as Germany is significant. It indicated a strong mass appeal of a central idea of in-group tribalism. It served to offset the effect of mass society. (See chapter 2.)

The general line of Nazi racialism is so well-known that we need not go into more detail here. Moreover, its cruel application to the Jews of Germany and elsewhere in Europe is a ghastly comment on so-called civilized morality.²⁶

Nazi racialism strikes the informed student as so much unscientific folderol. But this is not the important matter from a sociological standpoint. What is important is that a large mass of otherwise educated and advanced people could be and was indoctrinated with this kind of social myth. Such a belief gave the individual German an identification with a superior race — somehow divinely set apart — and with a culture destined to rule the world. However, the Germans have no monopoly on racial dogma. Racialism is widespread and variously associated with common language, nationalist ideas, and larger cultural systems.

Anglo-American racialism. Both British and American societies have long been saturated with a firm belief in the innate superiority of the white race. And though the

American editors. Quotations here are from pp. 396-398. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1939. By permission.

²⁶ The tragic story of concentration camps, slave labor, and death in the gas chamber is too well-known to need review. But it appears clear that the more fanatical Nazi leaders really aimed at the extermination of the Jewish populations under their control. It is estimated that about 5 million Jews died or were killed as a result of the Nazi program, 1933-1945.

racialism which grew up around this idea never became so vocal or so highly organized as in Nazi Germany, nonetheless it has long been a factor in the thought and action of people in Britain and in the United States. It certainly had a place in British imperialist expansion.

All through the 19th century literary men, historians, and publicists defended British overseas expansion in terms of a superior white race. Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), Charles Kingsley (1819-1875), and Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) were three of the most widely read rationalizers. The phrase "the white man's burden" became at once a shibboleth and a justification of British rule over native peoples. And the taboo on miscegenation of English and the native peoples certainly has a tinge of the thesis of racial purity.

As to the United States, the colonists and pioneers carried over from Britain a marked contempt for colored races, as witnessed in the treatment of the native Indians and the Negroes. But the association of racialism with our growing imperialism became more explicit after the War Between the States.²⁷ During the last two decades of the 19th century the concept of the "Yellow Peril," arising from the migration of Chinese and later Japanese to our shores, further stimulated our consciousness of race. After World War I public attention was focused on "the immigration problem." The myth of the country being a happy melting pot was dissipated. There was a call to shut the gates on peoples of alien blood who, it was contended, were incapable of being Americanized and hence of learning to be proper participants in our democracy. The Nordic theory became a popular rationalization of this view.²⁸ Attention, however, was directed not only to "inferior" European stocks but to the future

likelihood that the colored races might overwhelm the whites by weight of sheer numbers. The spread of the revived Ku Klux Klan soon after the close of World War I was but an overt demonstration of the serious concern of many Americans with this alleged problem. Such movements as the Klan do not spread unless there is some underlying public anxiety upon which it may be built.

Pan-Slavism and racialism. During the 19th century a variety of pan-movements emerged in Europe and elsewhere.²⁹ Pan-movements are essentially social-cultural movements designed to promote the solidarity and integration of groups who believe they are tied together by race, common language and culture, or even by geographic proximity. Some of these have a religious core, as Pan-Islamism; some continental solidarity, as Pan-Americanism; some are pan-racial. Most of them, however, have strong nationalistic aims. Moreover, pan-national movements are often linked to pan-racialism.

Pan-Slavism was one of the oldest of the 19th-century movements of this character and also one of the first to associate it with a racial dogma. The leaders often expressed as much concern over the destiny of the "Slavic" race as any Nazi ever did over the future of the "Aryans." As is evident from an earlier section of this chapter, there is no scientific basis for assuming a separate Slavic race. Neither is there a central linguistic tie, as is the case in Pan-Germanism. Nevertheless the belief that the Slavs are a distinctive people with an important mission has deep roots.

The source of Pan-Slavism, in part, was the long struggle of the central and eastern Europeans with the Germans. In the 17th century, for example, several writers appealed to the czar of Russia to take the leadership in blocking the threat of the Germanic peoples against the Slavs on the grounds of common race and culture. In the 19th century many

²⁷ See, for instance, John Fiske, "Manifest destiny," *Harpers New Monthly Magazine*, March, 1885, 70 : 578-590. This article has a racialistic tone, especially with reference to the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon backgrounds of American culture.

²⁸ The Nordicism of that period was publicized in such books as the following: Madison Grant, *The passing of the great race*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 4th rev. ed., 1921; William MacDougall, *Is America safe for democracy?*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921; and Lothrop Stoddard, *The rising tide of color against white world-supremacy*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920. The last-named is concerned more particularly with the white *vs.* the colored races than with Nordicism as such.

²⁹ See Hans Kohn, "Pan-movements," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 6 : 544-553, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933; also L. L. Snyder, *Race, a history of modern ethnic theories*, chapter 16, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1939. The latter has an extensive bibliography.

books appeared alleging a racial, linguistic, and common geographic origin of all Slavic peoples. Also, many novels and poems of the time were filled with claims about the uniqueness of the Slavic "soul" or "race." Writers and political agitators, at various Pan-Slavic conferences and elsewhere, called for Slavic unification either through federation of Slavic peoples or by outright absorption by Russia.

Yet the movement never became well-organized due to lack of leadership and especially because of persistent fears that Russia would use the "call" simply as a device for complete political domination of the regions. The period of World War I saw some efforts to stimulate Pan-Slavic unity as a means of stopping the German *Drang nach Osten* (drive to the East) but with rather indifferent success.

Since the rise of Soviet Russia to a position of great power, Pan-Slavism has taken a somewhat different form. On the one hand, the rise of several new states after World War I stimulated latent nationalism. Then, too, in some quarters there was renewed fear of Russia and her brand of communism. On the other hand, the spread of communism under Russian guidance has in part been linked with the continuing Slavic racialism.

While an organized Pan-Slavic racialism has not become the official propaganda line of Soviet Russia, it is quite possible that it may. The czars used Pan-Slavism as an appeal in their efforts to unify the divergent peoples of pre-Soviet Russia. There is no reason why the Communist Party dictators of present Russia should not dress up Slavic racialism in such a fashion as to rationalize their present and future political controls. Whether the Soviet leaders will take up such a program depends, of course, upon the drift of world events, which cannot be predicted.

Racialism in other countries. The Latin countries of Europe have experienced less racialist interest than either the Germanic or the Slavic nations. Nevertheless France saw a cult of *Gallo-Romanism* in the latter half of the 19th century with an emphasis on

the Keltic and Mediterranean rather than Frankish (Germanic) sources of the French population. Italy witnessed a mild racialist program, largely stimulated by Mussolini's alliance with Hitler. So, too, Spain under Franco witnessed a certain revival of a latent *Pan-Hispanism*, based on the idea of unity of spirit and stock of migrants who originated in Spain but whose descendants are now scattered over the world but are especially located in Latin America.

The Near East has seen a number of similar developments: *Pan-Turkism*, *Pan-Islamism*, and *Pan-Arabism*. The first was definitely born of supernationalist sentiments among the Turks. The last has a milder pronationalist tinge but is aimed essentially at a federation of Arab states. It has been further stimulated by the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel. It cuts across racial and nationalist interests. Pan-Islamism, on the contrary, is ostensibly concerned with religious unity of all Islam. It, too, has been revived by postwar events, such as the emergence of India as an independent state. For a time the Moslems of India made appeals to fellow Islamites in their conflict with the Hindu majority in India.

In addition to these cases, racialism has spread to both Africa and the Far East. There have been several varieties of *Pan-Africanism*, the best-known in America being that of Marcus Garvey, who planned a Negro empire in Africa as a means of solving the race problem in this country and elsewhere. More significant at the moment, however, is the growing racialism in the Far East. Japan has a long tradition of racial superiority and, linked to militarism and political-economic expansionism, this became a potent rallying cry to assume the leadership against white control in Asia. In the future similar theses may arise in India and China. It is not entirely improbable that future struggles between Euro-American and Asiatic forces may be rationalized around the competing ideologies of white or colored-race dominance of the world.

In any case, it is well to bear in mind that racialism is a culture concept of great appeal and power and that it may continue for a

long time, even in the face of the cold objective facts of biology. The persistence of racialism is but another proof that science is a highly specialized and rational area of knowledge and that thoroughly unsound ideas may, contrary to objective evidence, become the core around which a whole

society and culture may be integrated. Should strong racialism become the main focus in future cultures, Hitler's remark that "All that is not race in this world is trash"³⁰ may take on more meaning than many of us would care to acknowledge.

³⁰ Hitler, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

Interpretative Summary

1. Strictly speaking, race is a *biological*, not a sociological, concept.
2. Yet, as a widely accepted stereotype for a group with particular psychological and cultural features, sociology must describe and examine the place of race in various societies.
3. Human and comparative anatomy has given us a number of physical traits which may be used in a rough-and-ready classification of races and subraces, such as, among others, hair form, head form, hair texture, and skin color.
4. Yet most of these features are at present nonadaptive in a biological sense. Moreover, they are descriptive, not explanatory, concepts.
5. The notion of "pure race" is practically impossible to demonstrate. Rather, there is much overlapping of traits as well as much interracial mixture.
6. In the racial history of man the development of brain capacity to invent and use language and tools was most important.
7. During the Pleistocene several human races appeared. Of these only *homo sapiens* remains.
8. While there are individual differences in mental ability among members of every race, subrace, and mixed race, there is no sound evidence of average or type differences in mental potentiality between such racial groupings. Culture, not race, accounts for the present differences in mental performance as uncovered by observation and measurement.
9. Nevertheless racialism continues to be one of the most potent social beliefs or myths in modern times. It is likely to continue as a shibboleth of nationalism for some time to come.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define race. What are the criteria of race? Why are common-sense criteria so largely unscientific? Which criteria are scientifically the soundest?
2. What are the major difficulties in distinguishing sharply among the major racial stocks?
3. Distinguish between race and culture.
4. What were the important organic changes in the primates which led to the emergence of *homo sapiens*?
5. What is wrong with the popular remark that man descended from the monkey?
6. What are the best inferences as to the appearance of man on the earth and as to his earliest movements and culture?
7. What are the best inferences as to the development of the separate races and subraces of man?
8. What are the chief contributions to culture of the Old Stone Age? Of the Neolithic? Of the Metal Ages?
9. Why is the expression "race psychology" misleading?

10. Discuss critically the evidence regarding inherent racial differences in intelligence.
11. Discuss the place of racialism as a powerful stereotype and social myth in modern times. Is it likely to persist for a long time? If so, why? If not, why not?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Jacques Barzun, *Race; a study in modern superstition*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1937.

A critical and well-written essay by a literary scholar.

Franz Boas, "Race," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 13 : 25-36. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

A full review by a great anthropologist.

Henry Pratt Fairchild, *Race and nationality as factors in American life*. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1947.

A well-balanced analysis of race problems by a well-known sociologist.

F. H. Hankins, *The racial basis of civilization*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927.

A sociologist examines the whole Nordic hypothesis and its cultural implications.

Otto Klineberg, *Race differences*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935.

A standard textbook dealing chiefly with the psychological aspects of the topic.

Problems of World Population

THE DISTRIBUTION of the world's people is very uneven. There seem to be too many in some places and too few in others. On the one side are those countries and regions where the rate of population growth has declined so much as to lead to relative stability of population. On the other are those where growth continues at a very high rate. The former condition is found in western and northwestern Europe, the United Kingdom and its Dominions, and the United States. The latter condition is found chiefly in the Far East, including all of southeastern Asia and some off-continent islands such as Java; in the Soviet Union; and in large parts of central and southeastern Europe. Some sections of South America may be included also. The former may be termed "stationary" population areas, in a stage of incipient decline; the latter as "expanding" or "explosive," but apparently in a stage of transition to slower rates of growth. Intermediate between these extremes are China and other sections of Asia, most of Africa, and much of Central and South America. These are largely preindustrial areas but with high potential growth.

The future relation of the stationary to the explosive populations is one of the greatest social challenges of our time. Wishful thinking will not provide the means to meet it successfully. Only applied science, coupled with intelligent national and international policy, will do. Short of war and conquest — which in the end would probably also be disastrous — the solution to this problem will mean great changes in our political, economic, and moral views and practices. The whole matter rests basically on the relation of population to food supply and other resources and on the extent of modern industrial organization, as these, in turn, are related to the political order.

The Pressure of Population on the Food Supply

Given time, culture patterns are always influenced by the size, composition, and distribution of the people who make up a given society. In the past 300 years the world has witnessed an astounding increase in numbers. This growth was definitely linked to the development of modern science, as this effected great changes in agriculture, commerce, and industry, and to the extension of European peoples and their culture over the globe.

Some facts about the increase. Growth of population depends upon the excess of births over deaths. After centuries of slight increase, the world experienced an amazing growth in numbers. The sharp upswing began to be apparent in the 18th century. In the 19th and 20th it became even more impressive.

In 1650 the estimated population of the world was between 465 and 545 millions. Within the next 100 years this had risen to about 720 millions. By 1850 it had reached 1100 millions. Estimates for 1950 put the global population at $2\frac{1}{4}$ billions, representing a doubling in the past century. It is worth noting, moreover, that nearly two thirds of this latter increase has taken place since 1900. The world has added 650 million people since the close of the Spanish-American and Boer wars and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese conflict. By 1975 there will be a half billion more mouths to feed.¹

¹ For a summary of pertinent estimates and data, see Kingsley Davis, "The world demographic transition," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1945, 45: 1-11. See also A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World population*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1936; and W. F. Wilcox, ed., *Interna-*

This growth did not occur uniformly over the earth. It was the white race which first showed the most striking changes. The total white population for the year 1000 A.D. — about the time of the First Crusade — is estimated at 30 millions. By 1800 this had risen to 210 millions. By 1915 the figure was 645 millions. In other words, in 115 years the white race had increased 2.5 times as much as it had in the previous 800 years. Or look at the story in terms of world regions in more recent times. In the past 100 years the population of Europe has more than doubled while that of the American continents and Oceania has quadrupled. Or note the facts about particular countries. Great Britain in 1821 had 21 million people. In 1921 she had double this number. In 1949 she had 47 millions. At the time of its founding the United States had just under 4 million inhabitants. In 1890 it had 63 millions, a more than 15-fold increase. Fifty years later it had more than doubled again.


Similar upsurges have taken place elsewhere in the world but not at such marked rate. However, as the population in many industrialized countries under Euro-American culture tends to become more or less stationary, the growth in other regions and countries becomes more striking. For example, at the present rate India, now with 420 millions, will more than double her numbers in another century unless limitations, physical or psychological, or both, are there imposed. And while the figures for China are but estimates, it is quite likely that her present 400 millions may also double in this period. In 1947 Japan had a population of over 78 millions. In 1900 it was half this. For some years she has been adding a million people a year to her total. Or to cite another case, at present rates the population of Soviet Russia — as of the pre-war area — will have increased from 170 millions in 1940 to 250 millions by 1970. If such a statistical projection of the present trend is correct, the Soviet Union will have more people at the latter date than all of north-western and central Europe combined.² Figure 18 gives estimates of the world's popula-

tional migration, vol. 2, p. 79, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1931. For estimates of fluctuations in population growth prior to the 17th century see J. C. Russell, "Demographic pattern in history," *Population Studies*, 1948, 1: 388-404.

² See Frank Notestein, et al., *The future population of Europe and the Soviet Union: population projections, 1940-1970*, p. 69. Geneva: League of Nations, 1944.

FIGURE 18

ESTIMATED POPULATION OF THE WORLD AND OF CONTINENTAL AREAS, 1650-2000³



tion growth since 1650, details for particular regions and countries, and some projections to the year 2000 A.D.

For the world as a whole, not only have the total numbers increased, but the annual rates of increase have also steadily risen. For 1750 it is estimated that the rate was 0.29 per cent per year. A century later the rate had nearly doubled to 0.51 per cent annually. In 1940 it was 0.75 per cent, "a rate that would cause a doubling of the population every 92 years."⁴ If the present world population should continue at the rates prevalent between 1900 and 1940, this would mean a population of 21 billions by the year 2240 A.D.

Today, of course, the rates of growth vary enormously between those in the stationary areas and those in the expanding regions. For instance, while the annual rate of increase in Soviet Russia — which was 1.25 per year between 1927 and 1939 — is declining slightly, it will be a long time before

³ Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 2. By permission of the Office of Population Research, Princeton University. The population figures are given on a logarithmic scale.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

it reaches rates comparable to those in western Europe. Today the rate in the Orient is about 1.5 per cent and may likely rise to 1.75. Thus, the problem of the future world population is one not only of absolute numbers but of what happens to the annual rates of growth in various places. (See below.)

Almost all of this tremendous increase in the world's peoples is the result of a *reduction in the death rate, not of a rise in the birth rate*. This cutting-down of the death rate derives from multiple causes.

Among the more important ones are: (1) Advances in modern medicine led to the reduction of infectious and contagious diseases, improvement in maternal and infant care, and to public sanitation. These advances all acted to cut the death rate. Only indirectly did they influence the birth rate. (2) The Commercial and then the Industrial Revolution acted to increase the production of manufactured goods and their transportation and distribution. Moreover, these changes in the economic patterns of culture gave jobs for an increasing number of people. (3) New lands in the Americas and elsewhere not only provided an outlet for the growing populations of Europe and Asia, but also, in time, furnished foodstuffs and raw materials to keep the industrial system going as well as to provide a market for goods manufactured in Europe. (4) Due to scientific advances, plant and animal stocks were greatly improved, and the application of commercial fertilizers and power machinery to farming greatly increased the production of the world's foodstuffs and other necessary things: fibers, lumber, and the like. But as we noted in chapter 10, there has been no essential betterment of the productive soil. Rather, this basic resource is being steadily wasted by man as he goes on increasing in numbers.

When one calmly views the facts of this striking growth of world population, it is only natural to ask: Can this rapid multiplication of peoples go on indefinitely until, in the words of E. A. Ross, who paraphrased Darwin, there is "standing room only"?⁵

⁵ See E. A. Ross, *Standing room only?*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1927, for an early but incisive recognition of the problem. He evidently took the title of his work from Darwin's remark,

Are there no limits to the number of people the world can support? Let us examine the question more closely, first by reviewing how various social thinkers regarded the matter in the heyday of the Industrial Revolution.

Theories of population and food supply. Changes in the commercial and economic life and the spread of political democracy in the 18th century sounded a note of optimism in Europe and America that found ready expression in the doctrine of inevitable social progress. This optimism found even more striking expression in the 19th century. As J. J. Spengler describes it, "... The common man, once looked upon as a creature of little dignity placed in the world for the service of the master classes, was coming into his own. A beneficiary, primary and secondary, of the redistribution of economic and political power under way, he was held in greater esteem than formerly; his wants, rights, and potentialities were receiving more attention than ever, and they would receive even greater attention as the democratic movement, and the values it stood for, gained in scope."⁶

Such men as the idealistic Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) in France and William Godwin (1756-1836) in England typified the growing faith of the period in the steady march of mankind toward perfection. Once poverty, misery, vice, crime, and war were removed by proper social arrangements, all would be well. Godwin went so far as to say: "Make men wise, and by that very operation you make them free. . . . There will be no war, no crime, no administration of justice as it is called, and no government. Besides this, there will be neither disease, anguish, melancholy, nor

"Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-five years, and at this rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally not be standing room for his progeny." See *Origin of species*, 1859, p. 59. London: Humphrey Milford, 1902.

⁶ J. J. Spengler, "Malthus's total population theory: a restatement and reappraisal," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 1945, 11: 245. This entire article, *ibid.*, 83-110, 234-264, is a most thoughtful discussion of Malthus and his period.

resentment. Every man will seek with effable ardor the good of all."⁷

Others were not so optimistic and saw in war, poverty, and the sordid conditions of the peasants and city masses generally a challenge to such unlimited faith in man's perfectibility. They realized "that man does not live in a *boundless* physical, social, and psychological universe; that limitations are imposed upon his behavior, and upon the outcome of this behavior, by this circumscribed physical milieu, by his restricted physiological and psychological make-up, and by the social and institutional controls which issue out of these physical and personal conditions."⁸ In fact, there arose two divergent schools of thought about the whole problem, one of optimism, one of pessimism.

In reference to population the controversy broke out with the publication of an answer to Godwin by an English clergyman, Thomas R. Malthus (1766-1834), entitled *An essay on the principle of population as it affects the future improvement of society* (1st ed., 1798).⁹ He contended that Godwin was wrong in blaming circumstances for our social ills. It was original nature that was at fault. The sexual urges leading to reproduction tended to people the world more rapidly than man could increase his subsistence.

In a time when romantic reformers were preaching doctrines of unlimited human progress, Malthus had gone to work making calculations concerning the relation of food supply to population increase. He contended that there is a "constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it"; that is, animal life is endowed with the capacity for rapid reproduction, but the food supply is restricted within definite limits. As he put it,

"Wherever . . . there is liberty, the power of increase is exerted, and the superabundant effects are repressed afterwards for want of room and nourishment." Applying this principle to human beings, he worked out the following formula: "Population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every twenty-five years, or increases in geometric ratio." Food supply, which he calls "means of subsistence,"¹⁰ "under circumstances the most favorable to human industry, could not possibly be made to increase faster than in arithmetical ratio." In other words, a population will increase every twenty-five years in the ratio of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, and so on while the food supply, at best, would increase in the ratio of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, etc. According to this computation, unless checked, in two hundred years — assuming about 22 years to a generation — a population would stand, in reference to food, in the proportion of 256 to 9.

With this thesis before him, based as it was not on mere fantasy but on statistics of population and food production of his time, he inquired as to the checks on population growth. These are of two sorts: positive and preventive. The *positive* checks arise from want of adequate subsistence and its effects, such as poverty, misery, disease, and deterioration of morality. The *preventive* checks are celibacy, deferment of marriage, and moral (that is, sexual) restraint, leading to reduction in the number of births.

Malthus argued that no devices of political or economic organization or of emigration would stop the positive checks from operating, only moral restraint of the biological passions. This did not imply, so rationalized the pious Malthus, that God has not our welfare at heart but, rather, that "natural and moral evil seems to be the instrument employed by the Deity in admonishing us to avoid any mode of conduct

⁷ Quoted by J. O. Hertzler, *Social progress*, pp. 46-47. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1928.

⁸ Spengler, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

⁹ The second edition, 1803, was called *An essay on the principle of population, or a view of its past and present effects on human happiness with an inquiry into our prospects respecting the future removal or mitigation of the evils which it occasions*. There is an edition of Malthus available in Everyman's Library. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.

¹⁰ Malthus confuses the reader by identifying food supply and subsistence. At times he discusses what we today call "level of living," which includes more than food. Elsewhere he uses "means of subsistence" to mean only food.

which is not suited to our being and will consequently injure our happiness."¹¹

Although a strong moralist at heart, Malthus admirably expresses the doctrine of laissez-faire individualism in the political and economic fields. There is nothing that we can do about this struggle of the individual for food and shelter except to apply the principles of piety and self-restraint, in connection with a sound system of private property, free enterprise which has a balance of agriculture and industry, and good government. His thesis of a *law* operating to restrict population was an expression of an 18th-century mechanistic conception of the universe operating under a determinism in nature which no one could escape.

Apparently Malthus never had in mind any modern means of birth control but defended sexual restraint as conducive both to high standards of living and to greater personal character as well. Many stupid and unjust accusations have been made against Malthus. He certainly did not advocate contraception as a means of gratifying personal desires without social responsibility. Above all else, his writing was timely. It gave a needed dash of cold facts to the glowing enthusiasm of the utopian dreamers of the time, who seemed so completely to ignore the natural and biological foundations of society.

Yet, the doctrine of progress and man's perfectibility might be easy to scotch, but it was hard to kill. Nineteenth-century enthusiasts arose on every hand to disagree with Malthus.¹² Significant expressions of optimism were found in the work of Karl Marx (1818-1883), who denied that population necessarily outruns the food supply. He held that the problem of excessive population results from the exploitation of the masses by the capitalist class. Once the injustices of faulty distribution of wealth were remedied, there would be food enough for all. Henry George (1839-1897), best known for his theory of the single tax on land values, argued "that nowhere can want

be properly attributed to the pressure of population against the power to procure subsistence in the then existing degree of human knowledge; that everywhere the vice and misery attributed to overpopulation can be traced to warfare, tyranny, and oppression, which prevent knowledge from being utilized and deny the security essential to production."¹³ He thought it was only a faulty economic and political order that "in the midst of wealth condemns man to want."

Throughout the 19th century, however, population continued to increase at a rapid rate. In spite of free land and increased industrial production with its call for laborers, poverty, misery, crime, and vice persisted. With a view to improving the condition of the masses, there arose in England about 1880 a movement known as *Neo-Malthusianism*. It aimed to educate the masses consciously to cut down the number of births. The leaders, Annie Besant (1847-1933) and Charles Bradlaugh (1833-1891), argued that the spread of contraceptive practices in order to reduce the birth rate would lead to an improvement in health, in family life, in the standards of living, and in morality.

But the critics of birth control were not far behind. As birth rates did decline, especially in the Western world, the cry of "race suicide" was heard. One of the most vocal exponents of large families and rapid increase of population was Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), who expressed the beliefs and attitudes of millions who saw in the declining birth rate a threat to man's very existence. They were afraid the white man's supremacy of the world might be the price of a Neo-Malthusian program.

The battle still goes on. In recent decades the world has heard the voices of such dictators as Hitler and Mussolini in Europe and the militarists of Japan crying out for larger populations in their respective countries. Since their downfall and in the face of postwar problems, many of our more serious students of the problem have issued warnings regarding the continuing growth of

¹¹ These quotations are from the 9th edition of his *Essay*.

¹² See W. S. Thompson, *Population problems*, 3rd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942, and Spengler, *op. cit.*

¹³ Quoted by E. A. Ross, *Tests and challenges in sociology*, p. 8. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1931.

population as it relates to food and other resources and to the nature and level of living of varying societies and cultures.¹⁴ In the face of differences of interpretation about present-day pressures of population, and especially in the light of sharp variations between the rates of growth in the Western as contrasted with the Eastern world, what are the facts?

Population and food supply. Without doubt population and food supply are related. But these are not the only factors to be taken into consideration in discussing the increase in world population. The densely crowded countries of northwestern Europe could not possibly have supported themselves on the food raised on their own land; but they furnished goods and services to other regions which, in turn, provided them with foodstuffs and raw materials. Technological advances gave work for millions in production, manufacture, and distribution of goods and services. So long as commerce between nations of the world went on freely, large massing of population in industrial centers was not serious.

Yet in spite of the tremendous improvement in agricultural production, most of which has come from mechanical devices and not from improvement in natural fertility of land, in spite of the rising consciousness of the need to conserve forest and mineral resources, in spite of the possibility of synthetic foods produced by applied chemistry, and in spite of increased industrialization, the population in many parts of the world is still pressing on the means of subsistence: foods, timber, coal, iron, and oil. We saw in chapter 10 that land and climate distinctly limit the range of man's habitation. Of the total land surface of the

earth little more than one third is available for raising food and other necessary articles of consumption. Yet the number of people which the world will support is, of course, definitely related to the standards of living. The earth would support at a bare subsistence level a great many more people than there are now.

When we translate the food supply of the world into equivalents in productive land, we find wide variation, first, in terms of productivity of the soil and, second, in standards of living. Now, assuming no further technological advances and assuming that there are between 15.7 and 16.4 million square miles of productive land in the world, that this land is everywhere as fertile as that of this country, and that we expect the American standard of material comforts to prevail universally, it is evident that the world might support 3 or 3½ billion people. If the productive land could be used as intensively as much of the land in central, western, and northern Europe is now used, the world might well support a population of from 4 to 5 billions at our standards of agricultural consumption. If, on the other hand, the world should be reduced to the lower level of food consumption of the Japanese or the Chinese, the earth would support approximately 10 billions.¹⁵

Culture and cycles of population growth. The prospect before the world of continuing to expand its numbers, at the expense of lowering its standards of living, must be faced in terms of value norms. The division in the world noted in the opening paragraph of this chapter is the crucial issue. Will the level of culture, especially the standards of living developed in the United States, western Europe, and the British Dominions spread to eastern Europe, the Orient, Africa, and South America? If so, the future growth of population will, in time, have to be contained within reasonable limits. If the growth in the latter areas goes on at the present potentially explosive rate, the entire world will likely be forced in the direction of a lowered level of living.

¹⁴ See, among others, W. S. Thompson, *Plenty of people*, New York: Ronald Press Company, 1944, and his *Population and peace in the Pacific*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946; F. A. Pearson and F. A. Harper, *The world's hunger*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1945; Radhakamal Mukerjee, *Races, lands, and food; a program for world subsistence*, New York: The Dryden Press, 1947; Fairfield Osborn, *Our plundered planet*, Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1948; and William Vogt, *Road to survival*, New York: William Sloane, Associates, 1948.

¹⁵ See Thompson, *Population problems*, *op. cit.*

Students of population have shown that so far as the Western world goes, there has been a cycle of rapid growth, followed by a stabilization and finally by a trend toward decline in numbers. Will the rest of the world follow suit? In short, is there a generalization or "law" as regards human population in relation to resources and culture? To point up this problem, let us review the situation with regard to the three classes of population situation noted above, page 184.

(1) The stationary peoples include the United States, the United Kingdom and the Dominions, France, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, and Italy, and probably the East Baltic area: the former Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. In general these countries have low death rates and low birth rates. However, the latter are declining more rapidly than the former; hence there is a trend toward a stationary population. In 1940 these countries had a total population of about 430 million, or one fifth of the world's total. This was the same proportion as they had in 1913. From now on they will have a lower and lower ratio of the world's people.

The birth rates in most of these countries have been cut in the past century from something of the magnitude of 30-35 per 1000 population to rates half this or less. Such low rates of increase, derived from low birth rates rather than high death rates, is unheard of in human history, except for small and special groups.

How did this come about? At the opening of the Industrial Revolution the birth rate in England was very probably in the neighborhood of 35 or more per 1000. A high rate continued for several decades. It was 32 as late as 1842. In fact, the increase in population under bettered conditions led many opponents of Malthus to imagine that time had disproved his case. However, by the mid-1880's a decline in the rate of growth had definitely begun in England and Wales. It was also clearly the case in France by the end of the century. In Germany the rate of increase remained rather high till about 1900, when it began to go down. In the United States the rate also remained rather high till after 1900.

Since the turn of the century, however, all the countries noted above have shown a steady decrease in the rate of growth. In some, notably France, Britain, and some of the smaller European nations, the population is practically at a standstill.

These declines in rates first appeared in the cities. And while cities grew rapidly throughout the 19th century, their increase in numbers came from immigration from rural areas or other countries rather than from natural increases of their indigenous population. Moreover, the decrease in rate began in the economically abler classes, but gradually the decline has reached all levels of the social-economic ladder. (See chapter 13.)

This decrease in rate has a number of causes: Improvements in medicine and sanitation cut the death rate. Betterment of wages and working conditions — associated with expanding industry — raised the levels of living and also the expectation for social mobility into higher and more comfortable conditions. More and more people began to view small families as a desirable asset and not as a handicap, as was earlier the case with the poorer classes. So, too, the Christian view about the sin and vice of voluntary control of births began to change. Neo-Malthusianism moved from a theory of a few reformers to an increasingly wide practice among all classes. Finally, the decline in birth rates has spread to rural areas, but again differentially with respect to income and social status.

This has been the essential story in all countries which have become industrialized and urbanized in the past 150 years. Will other countries follow suit? As industrialization expands in Soviet Russia and in east-central Europe, in India and China, and elsewhere, will birth rates decline? Will similar motives appear among the peoples of these countries as they did among those of the stationary regions?

(2) Whatever the future may answer in these matters, there is no doubt that populations continue to expand rapidly in a number of important areas: in the Soviet Union, Poland, the Balkan states, Spain, Portugal, South Africa (white), and Japan.

The same fact probably holds for French North Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, though the trends in birth-death rates in these areas are not clear. On the whole, this group of countries typifies the earlier stage of population growth in countries now in the stationary classification. Some of the expanding countries are further along in the cycle than others. But all of them have sufficiently sound control of the death rates to continue, except for unknown future difficulties, to expand for several decades after the stationary countries have come to a point of population equilibrium or even begun to decline.

As to absolute numbers, the population of the expanding countries totaled about 345 millions in 1940, or a bit less than one sixth of the world's population. And despite the temporary ravages of World War II, including not only deaths from military action but also effects of disease and famine, the peoples of Soviet Russia, Poland, and the Balkans continued to increase in the decade 1940-1949. As we noted above, the Soviet Union — which had about 40 per cent of the total population of the expanding group in 1940 — will actually exceed in numbers both northwestern and central Europe. Figure 19 gives projections to 1970 for three contrasted regions of Europe. In this connection W. S. Thompson remarks: "If the whole 'expanding' group were to grow at this [Russia's] rate, it would amount to about 630 millions in 1970 compared with 474 millions in the 'stationary' group, allowing for a 10-per-cent increase in the latter. This is not merely an exercise in arithmetic; *it is a highly probable development*. . . ." ¹⁶ It is clear that if present alignments of political power between Russia and the West continue, the latter countries are going to be hopelessly outnumbered. The implications of this for peace or war are significant.

(3) As of 1940 the remainder, or what have been called the "preindustrial" regions and countries, made up 58 per cent of the world's total. They are marked by high and relatively uncontrolled birth and death rates. The term "uncontrolled" is, of course, not quite accurate since Malthusian

checks operate periodically in the form of recurrent epidemics and famines. Predictions as to the future are not too certain. But if we assume that their condition resembles that which prevailed in most of the world just prior to 1800 and that they will become industrialized, it is reasonable to expect them to follow a pattern similar to that of the other areas of the world. This would mean rapid expansion under industrialization and sanitation, followed by declining birth rates and gradual equilibrium and, in the end, perhaps, decline in numbers.

Yet conditions in these regions are not precisely similar to those that existed in the 19th century, when the cycle began in western Europe and the United States. While far more efficient technologies for rapid industrialization are available today than in 1800, there are a dearth of resources and no new land for expanding agriculture. True, advances in medicine make it possible to reduce the death rate fairly quickly, though the size of the preindustrial population — well over a billion — makes the task the harder. And as to voluntary restriction of births, the whole force of culture in those regions is contrary to such practices. It is doubtful if ideas of reformers for a sane population policy will lead to the use of measures of birth control before the industrialized culture patterns and demands for higher standards of life have become widespread in all classes and ancient and sacred folkways have largely disappeared.

We shall return to this whole problem when we discuss proposed solutions at the close of the chapter. Before doing so, however, we must examine more closely the variations in rates of growth throughout the world.

Differential Rates of Population Growth


The variations in absolute numbers of people and in the rates of increase may now be discussed more fully. These will be examined, first, in terms of differences in density of population. This will be fol-

¹⁶ From W. S. Thompson, *Population and peace*, op. cit., p. 32. By permission. Italics not in the original.


FIGURE 19

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE MAJOR DEMOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF EUROPE IN 1940 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 1970 ¹⁷


NORTHWESTERN & CENTRAL EUROPE



SOUTHERN & EASTERN EUROPE



UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS



¹⁷ From Office of Population Research and *Foreign Affairs*, 1944, 22 : 396. By permission.

TABLE 10

HIGH AND LOW POPULATION DENSITY FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES ¹⁸

COUNTRIES OF HIGH DENSITY	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE	COUNTRIES OF LOW DENSITY	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE
Java	935.2	Australia	2.5
Belgium	712.4	Canada	3.6
England and Wales	710.1	Argentina	14.9
Japan	529.6	Union of South Africa	24.1
Italy	381.0	Soviet Russia	24.9
India	246.0	United States	47.5

lowed by a discussion of variations in the birth and death rates.

Density of population. As we noted, the world's population is not spread uniformly over the earth. Nor are all areas equally blessed with good climate, soils, and other resources which make them equally acceptable as places to live. For example, the wide steppes, the deserts, and the extensive mountainous sections of Asia make up at least one half of its mass. These regions support very few people. In contrast, the rich valleys of India and China support millions. In other regions there are ample soil and other resources but relatively few people. The United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union in Europe are such cases.

The density of persons per square mile is the usual measure of variability in the spread of people over a given land mass. Table 10 lists some sample countries of low and of high density.

Yet the sheer figures for density do not tell the whole story. They must be interpreted in relation to the categories of stationary, expanding, or preindustrial populations; that is, as to degree of industrialization, extent and kind of soil resources, and rates of growth. For example, Java and India are chiefly agricultural, and yet the pressure of numbers on the food supply is mounting year by year. For such populations a more sensitive measure of the man-land relationship is density per square mile of *arable* land. In Java it is about 1500; in India about 800. So, too, variations in quality of soil resources are important. Java is rich and India reasonably so, compared to

Australia. There is much desert land in the latter; and although the total population is low, the density per square mile of arable land is 140.

In contrast, highly industrialized countries, such as Britain and Belgium, are able to support very high concentrations of populations per square mile because their economy rests on industry, not agriculture. Both countries raise but a limited part of their own food. Rather, they export manufactured goods in exchange, by importation, for a heavy fraction of foods and raw materials. If they had to depend upon their own farming, both these countries would soon feel the pinch of famine. For example, the density per square mile of arable land in Britain is about 2500, in Belgium about 2200. The same is true of Japan, where the growth in numbers has been possible only because she was the only first-class industrial nation of the Far East. Her attempt to get more and more of the trade of that region is one reason for her entry into World War II. With a density of about 3200 persons per square mile of arable land, she certainly could not provide her own food.

Thus, it is clear that the whole matter of density can be understood only in terms of amounts and nature of basic resources — agricultural and otherwise — and extent of industrialization as these, in turn, are related to absolute numbers of people and rates of growth. Yet the future of many industrialized nations, especially in Europe, is not altogether certain, despite their stationary or declining populations. Without external markets they, too, may face a lowering of standards of living as soon as other nations become industrialized and no longer need their manufactured goods. England, in particular, faces this unpleasant prospect.

¹⁸ Computed from figures in *World almanac*, 1948. For India, 1941; for all others, either 1946 or 1947.

Birth rates. In discussing rates of growth it is necessary to distinguish between fecundity and fertility. *Fecundity* refers to the full potential powers of reproduction in a population. That is, it is the birth rate if every woman of childbearing age bore all the children she possibly could. Naturally fecundity is more dependent upon the age and reproductive capacity of the female population than of the male.

Fertility refers to the actual rate of reproduction. It also is affected by age and other factors. Fertility is measured by the birth rate, but we must distinguish between the crude birth rate and the refined, or specific, birth rate. The *crude birth rate* is simply the number of births per 1000 of population at a given period. The refined, or *specific, birth rate* is the births per 1000 women of childbearing age, usually considered to be from 15 to 44 years. The crude birth rate gives an estimate of the fertility of any population, but it leaves out of account matters in regard to age, sex, nativity composition, and various cultural factors.

Crude birth rates will serve to reveal the changes in population in various countries, especially during the period of great growth noted above. We do not know what the crude birth rate was before the 19th century. It probably exceeded 50 in most agricultural areas. Even today, accurate statistics of birth rates are not available for many parts of the world. But changes in birth rates in selected countries where such facts are known are revealing. R. R. Kuczynski thinks that the birth rate of the United States exceeded 50 in the years from 1790 to 1820.¹⁹ Other estimates place it at 35.²⁰

At the opening of the last century, the crude birth rate in Finland was 35 per 1000; in France, 31; in Scandinavia, about 31. The first available figures for England and Wales, for 1838-1842, give 32. Figures for other European countries before the second half of the last century are not available. But esti-

mates for the Balkan states give 40 and better. Poland for 1898-1902 reported 44. The first figures for Russia, for 1866-1870, give 49. The figures for India are at best rough estimates, but for 1888-1892 the crude rate was 35; for 1908-1912 it had risen to just above 38. However, by 1947 it had fallen to 27.9. For New Zealand, then a typical pioneer country, the rate for 1868-1872 was 41; and for Australia, for the same period, it was nearly 39.

Yet in recent decades the decline in the birth rate in what we have called the stationary countries is remarkable. Kuczynski estimates for western and northern European countries that from 1841 to 1936 it fell from 32 to 17. It is generally agreed that the first sharp decline occurred in the 1880's, to be followed by an even sharper and more obvious decline during and after World War I. In the United States before 1929 our figures for the entire country are but estimates.²¹ We know that the birth rate in 1920 was about one half what it was in 1820. In 1910 the crude rate of the United States was 26.6; for 1933 it was 16.6. In 1941 it began to rise. For 1941-1945 it was 20.2; in 1947 it was 25.9 — almost what it was in 1910. (See below.)

For long-range comparisons of population growth or decline the *net reproduction rate* is a better index than crude or refined birth rates. Such a rate is based on the average number of daughters that will be born per 100 females starting life together, if birth and death rates at different age levels remain constant. Thus a net reproduction rate of 1.00 means that, on the average, the survivors of a group of 100 females of the same age will give birth to 100 daughters. An index of 1.00 means that a given population is just replacing itself; one below means that it is not. Figure 20 gives contrasts in such rates for countries of stationary and growing populations. It also shows that while declines are pretty general everywhere, there remain sharp differences.


Net reproduction rates are influenced by a variety of conditions. For example, in the United States in 1940 we were adding to our population at about the rate of one million a year excess of births over deaths. This

¹⁹ See his article "Births," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, vol. 2, p. 569; also "The international decline of fertility," in *Political arithmetic*, ed. by L. Hogben, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

²⁰ E. B. Reuter, *Population problems*, rev. ed., p. 222. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1937.

²¹ In 1929 the entire country first came under the "registration area," i.e., all states now report births according to federal regulations.

FIGURE 20

CHANGES IN NET REPRODUCTION RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES ²²

was due to the fact that we had a very high proportion of women of childbearing age, derived in large part from immigration and first-generation offspring, who carried with them a culture pattern of high fertility. But such a situation was not likely to continue indefinitely unless there was a marked influx of young women of childbearing age or a sharp increase in the usual birth rates of those who would subsequently move into the childbearing age range.

In this connection, the birth rates for the decade 1940-1949 are interesting. The United States witnessed a sharp rise, and so did England and Wales and some other countries in the stationary class. This rather striking shift should not mislead us. For the United States it was due, first of all, to the increase in marriages following the depression of the mid-1930's. In our society periods of economic depression are marked by falling marriage rates, and people were

just catching up as the country became more prosperous. Then came World War II. There was a further rush into marriage by men of military age. This, in turn, meant more births. Even after the war was over both marriage and birth rates kept up. While the increase of children born in 1942-1948 will make a slight bulge in the age distributions for some decades, most careful students of population do not expect a continuation of such high rates in the next decade. (See chapter 19 on effects on education.)

While not strictly comparable, somewhat the same situation held for Britain and Australia during the war and the years immediately thereafter. Unfortunately comparable data from other countries are not easy to secure; but there are indications that the birth rates in Soviet Russia, Japan, and central Europe rose, despite the hardships of the war and early postwar years.

The specific birth rate within any nation is influenced by such factors as age, race,

²² Data from various issues of *Population Index*. By permission.

TABLE 11

INFANT MORTALITY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES. DEATHS UNDER ONE YEAR PER 1000
LIVE BIRTHS ²³

	1947	1936-1940	AVERAGE RATES FOR APPROXIMATE PERIODS	
			1921-1925	1885-1895
New Zealand	25	32	43	88
Sweden	25	42	60	108
Switzerland	39	45	65	160
United States	32	52	74	
England and Wales	41	56	76	148
Germany	64	63	122	207
France	66	71	95	168
Italy	82	103	126	190
Japan	—	112	159	155
Hungary	111	131	187	250
Rumania	184	180	209	205
Chile	161	234	265	

and nativity, marital status, occupation, social class, religious affiliation, and type of community. (See chapter 13.)

Death rates. Mortality may be measured by the *crude death rate*, which is the ratio between the number of individuals who die in a given interval of time and the median number of individuals alive during the interval, usually stated in thousands. Thus, a death rate of 12 means 12 deaths per 1000 of the population. Specific death rates may be computed for age, sex, and other factors.

Among primitive peoples the birth rates and the mortality rates are both usually high. And the births in many higher societies just about balance the deaths, so that the population remains practically stationary for generations. This was the case for long periods in the Orient and until three centuries ago was also true in Europe. In fact, in all countries outside western Europe, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the scattered European colonies,

until recently high death rates have accompanied high birth rates.

Yet recent decades have witnessed a rapid decline in the death rate. This trend has been going on in Europe for well over a century. There has been a similar decline in the United States. The annual average in 1906-1910 for the registration area was 15 per 1000. The death rate has fallen off considerably since then, except in 1918, when it was 18 because of an influenza epidemic. In 1920 it had dropped to 13; by 1947 it was 10.1. (See Figure 21.)

While the principal decline in the death rates has occurred among Western nations, the phenomenon is world-wide. Although the birth rates are also falling, the mortality rates in many regions are falling somewhat faster.

Medical science has most strikingly influenced the death rate in the early years of life. A noteworthy decline in infant and child mortality is evident in every civilized country. Table 11 gives a few samples only.

The decline in child mortality is usually attributed to the following causes: (1) improvement in child care at home, especially in feeding and sanitation; (2) decrease in the number of children born to the average mother, thus allowing for more adequate care of those who are born; (3) improvement in economic status of large sections of the population of the more advanced societies. In regard to the second factor, vari-


²³ Data for 1885-1895 from W. S. Thompson, *Population problems*, 1st ed., 1930, p. 140; for 1921-1925 from *Population Index*, 1938, 4: 197-198. Computations are made on the basis of varying periods, so that in some instances only approximate periods are covered. The sources give the precise dates. Data for the United States before 1922 are not complete. Data for 1936-1940 and 1947 from *Population Index*, 1948, 14: 275-276. For the United States, 1936-1940, for both white and colored; for Germany in the first column, the rate is for 1941-1942.

ous studies in France, in England, and in this country bear out the fact that infant mortality is much lower in small-sized than in large-sized families. Since small families reflect higher economic standards, it is evident that mortality is closely related to social-economic status. This, in turn, is a matter of levels of living. Where the bulk of the population lives near the bare subsistence point, the increase in numbers only adds to misery, poverty, and hardship, in spite of the medical care which may cut down infant mortality. In countries of high standards the maintenance of a sound population comes, in part, from proper medical care of childbearing mothers and their offspring and from adequate living conditions later. The sharp decline in infant deaths in this country shown in Figure 21 is due largely to great improvement in prenatal and postnatal care.

The reduction in infant and child deaths has increased the expectation of life, especially at birth. The gains in life expectation at various ages from 1900 to 1945 for this

FIGURE 21


TRENDS IN BIRTH AND DEATH RATES AND IN INFANT MORTALITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1947²⁴



²⁴ Data for 1920-1935 from U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Vital statistics - special reports*, 1941, 12: 508, 15: 4. For 1940 from *Population Index*, 1944, 10: 211-214. For 1941-1947 from *Population Index*, 1945, 11: 242-245; 1947, 13: 255-258; 1948, 14: 271-275. Data for earlier years from registration areas only.

FIGURE 22

GAINS IN LIFE EXPECTATION OF THE WHITE POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES FOR VARIOUS AGE LEVELS, 1900-1945²⁵



country are shown in Figure 22. Any number of studies show that the real advances are made in cutting down deaths of infants and children under 10 years of age. As the above figure indicates, the gains for ages above 20 years have not been so marked.

An additional marvel in the conquest of disease the world over is the reduction of death in all age groups. Malaria and yellow fever are being conquered; the bubonic plague has been practically wiped out; cholera occurs much less frequently than ever before; and such diseases as smallpox, diphtheria, measles, scarlet fever, and whooping cough are rapidly being eliminated so far as they seriously affect the death rate.

To repeat, the reduction of death rates in some countries, with no corresponding decline in the birth rates, leads to intensive population pressure, and thus to nationalist expansion. In the stationary countries the reduction of both birth and death rates has been accompanied by rising standards of living and a general enrichment of the non-material phases of culture for the masses.

²⁵ Data from U. S. Bureau of the Census, "United States life tables, 1930-1939 (preliminary)," etc., July 21, 1941, p. 1; and *Statistical Bulletin*, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1947, 28: no. 4, p. 4. By permission. The figures for life expectancy continue to rise. This is shown by the fact that for continental United States for 1946 the life expectancy at birth for all persons was 66.69 years. For whites it was 65.12 and 70.28 for males and females respectively. Comparable figures for the colored population were 57.49 and 61.02 years. See "Further progress in longevity expected," *ibid.*, 1948, 29, no. 11: 5-8.

Nothing like this has taken place outside these areas, although the benefits of medicine have been increasingly extended to these other regions.

International Relations and Population Problems

The survival of mankind has always rested on a somewhat precarious balance between numbers and subsistence. This balance is maintained largely by fluctuations in the death rate, as Malthus pointed out. However, the rapid increase in the world's population in the past 150 years, accompanied in some quarters, at least, by rising standards of living, would seem to make the Malthusian position no longer tenable. But a more careful study of the matter shows that the ghost of Malthus still stalks mankind and will likely continue to do so for a long time to come.

As was pointed out in an earlier section, as to growth potential the countries and regions of the world may be divided into three classes: the stationary countries, in which birth and death rates are now largely under control; the expanding, in which the death rates are falling more rapidly than the birth rates; and the preindustrial, marked by high birth and death rates, and hence those in which the Malthusian checks of famine and disease are in constant operation.

According to the most careful estimates, these differentials are likely to continue for a long time. To note a few facts: Of the present world population of about 2.2 billions, slightly less than one fifth falls in the stationary category. Somewhat more than one fifth is in the second group; and the balance, three fifths, are in the preindustrial group. At present rates of increase, by 2000 A.D. there will be about 3.3 billion people in the world. Of these the first category will make up but 13.5 per cent. The second group will represent about one fifth; those in the third, over two thirds. We know further that people in the first group enjoy relatively high standards of living while those in the other two range from moderate standards — by our Western val-

ues — to bare subsistence under constant conditions of near-starvation and disease. Clearly, in the race for food, the peoples living under peasant or folk culture without the advantages of modern industry will be crowding everybody else. There is, in fact, grave danger that the present standards of life of those who are now in the first category may be seriously lowered.

Students of world affairs are increasingly aware that the future peace and welfare of the world are closely bound up with these differences in rates of growth as they, in turn, are related to food and other resources, health, and extent of industrialization. The present section will examine some of these matters before discussing possible means by which the threats of war and other difficulties related to population pressures may be solved.


Income, food, and death rates. While it is difficult to secure completely accurate facts on the relation of death rates to standards of food consumption and income, certain careful estimates have been made.²⁶ These give a rather grim picture.

For example, taking figures from the 1930's as a base, it was found that about a fifth of the world's people lived in countries where the crude birth rate was under 15 per 1000. This represented a condition of good control of mortality. Included in this group of nations are those of northwestern and central Europe, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, and Argentina. A relatively controlled situation, where the death rates range from 15 to 19, was found in Spain, Portugal, France, most of eastern Europe, Uru-

²⁶ See "World's food supply," a report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Washington, D. C., July 5, 1946; "World food appraisal, for 1946-1947," a report of FAO, Washington, D. C., December 26, 1946; "Food, income, and mortality" in "Current items" section, *Population Index*, 1947, 13 : 96-103; and J. J. Spengler, "Aspects of the economics of population growth, parts I and II," *Southern Economic Journal*, 1947, 14 : 123-147; and 1948, 14 : 233-265. The last-named contains extensive bibliographic footnotes.

See also G. V. Jacks and R. O. Whyte, *Vanishing lands; a world survey of soil erosion*, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1939; I. W. Schultz, ed., *Food for the world*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945; Osborn, *op. cit.* and Vogt, *op. cit.*

FIGURE 23
CORRELATION OF FOOD, INCOME, AND DEATH RATES ²⁷



guay, and Japan. These countries had one eighth of the world's people. In the mortality range 20-29 per 1000 were found Soviet Russia, most of Latin America, the Union of South Africa, Algeria, Palestine, Malaya, and the Philippines. These people constituted about one sixth of the world's total population. In short, the countries with low death rates and those in a transitional stage from high to low rates made up about half the world's people. The other billion with crude death rates of 30 or more lived in China, India, the Netherlands East Indies, most of Indonesia, the Middle East, and all of Africa north of the Union except Algeria.

Now, the countries of high mortality are also those of low income and inadequate diet. The bald facts of the correlation of death rates, per-capita income, and daily per-capita calorie consumption are shown in Figure 23. The data on per-capita calories are taken from a survey of prewar food consumption in 70 countries made by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. This body considered an average per-capita consumption of less than 2250 calories as low and definitely substandard, in terms of Western values. Consumption of food and caloric content between 2250 and 2750 was considered as barely adequate, between 2750 and 3000 as good, and above 3000 as high. The data on income come from a survey of incomes

in 63 countries made by the Bureau of the Budget of the United States. Income is given in 1938-1940 American dollars. The statistics of death rates were compiled by the Office of Population Research at Princeton University.²⁸

It is clear at once that one half of the world's population "had available less than 2250 calories per day at the retail level." Moreover, 90 per cent of these people lived under conditions which produced annual crude death rates of 30 per 1000 or above. In these countries per-capita annual income ranged from \$19 in China (outside Manchuria) to \$84 in Costa Rica. As a writer for the above-named organization puts it: "This distribution of crude death rates on a global basis is essentially a distribution of the world's poverty, malnutrition, and starvation."

At the other extreme, less than one eighth of the world's people had food of the value of 3000 calories or more for every man, woman, and child. These were, as might be expected, the highly industrialized countries: Scandinavia, British Isles, Switzerland, France, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. In all these countries except France, the crude death rate in the early 1930's was 15 or under. In these countries good and ample diets, on

²⁷ From *Population Index*, April, 1947. By permission.

²⁸ See *Population Index*, 1947, 13: 96-99, for details and some of the difficulties in dealing with such data. The brief quotations in this section are from this source, unless otherwise noted.

the average, are available only because a highly developed economy permits exchange of manufactured goods for food and raw materials and because an economic surplus makes possible the application of scientific principles of health and sanitation. Economic well-being is measured in per-capita income. In this group of countries income ranges from \$171 in Argentina to \$555 for the United States.

Between that half of the world's population with substandard nutrition, low income, and high death rate and that small fraction with relative abundance of food, high income, and low birth rate there is a wide range of conditions touching nutrition, income, and mortality rates. In one subgroup are those above the 2250 caloric and below the 2750 mark. These include Japan, Manchuria, parts of the Middle East, Palestine, Union of South Africa, Poland, most of southern Europe and Brazil, and Chile. Nevertheless, the countries of southern and eastern Europe and Japan have reached a fairly adequate level of control of the death rate without, as yet, "achieving the nutritional adequacy that is normally thought to accompany that control." In the other subgroup, having between 2750 and 3000 calories, are countries which have achieved "a substantial degree of mortality control." In comparison to conditions in western Europe, the United States, and the British Dominions, the death rates of the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern Europe — most of them falling in this latter group — remained high. But the mortality rates were declining rapidly.

There are not only sharp average differences in calories purchased for food but in the matter of the kind and quality of the food itself. Under Western scientific standards, it is assumed there should be a balance among the various items which go into daily diet: proteins, starches, fats, mineral salts, carbohydrates, and vitamins. For example, when a country depends upon potatoes and cereals for 80-90 per cent of its calories, many of its people will suffer from mineral and vitamin deficiencies. If, in con-

trast, a country gets 35-50 per cent of its calories from high-protein animal products, there is far less likelihood of such deficiencies. Again, on this basis, the highly industrialized nations are best off. In the prewar period, for which the survey above was made, the United States and Britain relied on cereals and potatoes for between 30-40 per cent of their calories and on animal products for between 34-45 per cent. The balance came from other products. In contrast, in Italy between 60 and 70 per cent of the calories came from grains and potatoes and only from 10 to 15 per cent from animal products. In China people derived up to 90 per cent of their calories from cereals and starchy roots and but from 1 to 5 per cent from animal products.

Serious consideration of the conditions just described leads, sooner or later, to the question, What may or should be done? No end of proposed solutions has been offered, but none seems at the moment to be entirely satisfactory. One widely held view is that there is nothing much we can do except, as it were, "let nature take its course." The defense of this view is that because the present low-birth-rate and low-death-rate countries went through the so-called *vital revolution*, or cycle of growth and stabilization, the rest of the world's population will in time go through a like cycle. According to this view there will be first a decline in the death rate, which will mean a temporary further rise in numbers, to be followed by a decline in the birth rate. Then, from a combination of low death rates and low birth rates, there will result a declining rate of population increase. Finally there emerges a condition of stationary or decreasing population. This is what happened in the industrialization of the Euro-American culture areas. It is assumed it will happen elsewhere.

While we cannot be certain that there is a universal "law" of population growth and decline, certainly *time* is a most important factor now. As we have seen above, the world is really separated into two great population pools: one is contracting, the other is extending itself rapidly. In the one, the ratio of population to resources has been

brought under control. In the other, the Malthusian factors continue to operate. The real problem is how to reconcile this disparity. To meet the present difficulty a number of changes would have to be made.

Increase in food. One crucial and more or less immediate task is to increase the world production of foodstuffs to take care of the increasing but undernourished populations of many areas. For example, in 1946 "The world food survey" of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations set up certain minimum goals or "targets" of needed "calories per head daily at the retail level" for the 70 countries covered in their survey. These targets ranged from slightly over 3200 for North America to 2570 for India. The FAO set the time goal at 1960 and indicated "approximate per-cent increase over prewar supplies required to meet targets, assuming a 25-per-cent increase in world population." The size of such a job is staggering. Their plan calls for an increase in sugar production of 12 per cent, in cereals of one fifth, in roots and tubers of more than a quarter, in fats of more than one third, and in meat of nearly one half (46%). For pulses (*e.g.*, beans, peas) they envisage an 80, for milk a 100, and for fruits and vegetables a 163 per-cent increment. For the overall total the increase in food supplies would be 80 per cent of prewar production. The plan is more a picture of the gap between adequate subsistence and population than it is of any realistic goal likely to be reached.

It must be recalled that only 7 per cent of the globe is under cultivation and, moreover, that there are wide variations in the per-capita density of land used for food production. Thus, in eastern and southern Asia there are only 0.5 and 0.8 of an acre of cultivated land per person, respectively. Yet these are the very regions where the pressure of population on food resources is becoming most severe. By way of contrast, in North America there are 4 acres of cultivated land per capita. Moreover, the yields in the latter in terms of calories per acre are much higher. On the average, one farm

family produces enough to feed itself and four additional nonfarm families at a comparatively high nutritional level. In many less-developed regions, "two thirds or more of the population produces an inferior diet of 2800-3000 original calories for the country as a whole, and one farm family manages to produce just enough to feed itself and half of another family. Thus the output of food per man is ten times greater in the advanced countries than in the poorer countries. The conclusion is inescapable that food for the world can be produced in much greater abundance by fewer hands."²⁹

To bring about any marked increment in food production, however, is not an easy task. Optimists believe that the application of modern science to agriculture would go far to help bring this about. They note that less than one fourth of all the farmers in the world have begun to use the technology of agricultural engineering, agronomy, and plant and animal breeding. Optimists also like to point out the vast undeveloped lands still at hand. Actually, there is little good land to be either reclaimed or opened up to farming, and the costs of its development would be very high. Furthermore, the production from such additional land would probably not do more than counterbalance the enormous annual wastage by soil erosion from lands already in use and meet the demands of the increasing number of people to be fed.

Industrialization. The development of industry is usually considered an important next step in relieving population pressures. The argument is that the vital revolution, or cycle of growth which resulted in stabilization of population in the Western world, represents an essential pattern of change for the rest of the world. In the words of the FAO report cited above:

"The way out of this situation is to open up resources other than those of farming for the bulk of the population. . . .

"This calls for rapid, large-scale development of industry and trade, and of educational and other services. For that purpose,

²⁹ From "World food survey," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

large investments both of capital and of technical skill will be needed. The only alternative to this investment for the Western world is to restrict its own high production. The investment will be profitable because it will vastly increase the productivity and the purchasing power of millions of human beings. The improvement of agriculture in the less-developed countries will in itself result in large demand for tools, machinery, fertilizers, transportation equipment, processing equipment, and other material, as well as for consumer goods to meet the needs of more prosperous farm populations."³⁰

This sounds good, but a careful examination of the facts again shows the limitations involved in such a program. Among other factors to be noted are those of time, present resources for further industrialization, need for new capital, development of occupational skills, and a number of noneconomic cultural changes which are likely to accompany industrialization. J. J. Spengler, a careful student of the relation of economy to population and resources, has discussed this topic very fully. He writes:

"The evidence presented . . . lends no support to the easy optimism of those who see in industrialization a simple and ready solution for the overpopulation that already affects more than half the world. Countries marked by intense overpopulation must virtually raise themselves by their own bootstraps. They lack land, capital, and the opportunity to make up this lack. They can get only limited relief through trade and capital imports."³¹

So, too, the shift of large numbers of persons from peasant agriculture to skilled and semiskilled industrial occupations would not be easy. What W. E. Moore says about possible industrialization in the Balkans applies everywhere: "A quantitative abundance of labor does not guarantee the immediate availability of appropriate technical

skills, and the present location of labor supplies is not necessarily the location for industrial establishments that would be indicated on other grounds."³² As demonstrated by the experience of Soviet Russia, it takes time to train the workers of a folk or peasant economy to become factory hands.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that the ultimate shift to a slowly increasing or stationary population will be purchased by some short-run further increases in population. If, even under planning, the course of events resembles that of the past, the first sharp reduction of mortality will not substantially affect the birth rate. This latter change comes only as standards of living and demands for education and comforts for children rise. That is, the whole pattern of small-family culture must emerge. Certainly propaganda in favor of the practice of contraception may accompany a rapidly changing economy; but, if we are to judge by the experience of Japan and Russia, there is still a considerable lag before the kind of balance between births and deaths is worked out which characterizes the advanced industrialized peoples. (See below on Japan.)

Migration of excess population. One of the oldest proposals to alleviate, if not solve, the world's population difficulties is to get people to go somewhere else. In place of transferring capital goods and setting up new industries, or in addition to such a program, some contend that excess peoples should emigrate to other less crowded areas.

Almost all students of population today view any scheme to stimulate the migration of large numbers of people from crowded areas to less crowded ones with a jaundiced eye. It has been shown that, unless the country of migration origin is itself cutting its birth and death rates at the time of out-migration, emigration will only temporarily relieve the pressure. The places of those

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

³¹ Spengler, *op. cit.*, p. 265. By permission. One measure of the size of the problem of capitalization is shown by the differences in present per-capita capital equipment in the three areas into which students of population divide the world. The relative order of magnitude is 100 for stationary or advanced countries, 39 for the intermediate group, and 11 for the preindustrial.

³² W. E. Moore, *Economic demography of eastern and southern Europe*, p. 134. Geneva: League of Nations, 1945. By permission.

who go somewhere else will be taken by the newborn of those who remain at home. As Frank W. Notestein puts it: "... Emigration will not check growth in the most important areas of population pressure at the present stage of their demographic evolution. It would be unfortunate to waste the open spaces of the world in a fashion that could only intensify future problems of adjustment."³³

This view, however, is not universally held. Radhakamal Mukerjee, a leading Hindu sociologist, believes the contrasted areas of the world should develop "a complementary program of birth control and 'open door.'" The expanding and pre-industrial countries would take up the former, but in the meantime the industrialized countries would permit immigration to relieve the present pressures, of the Orient especially.³⁴ While few American students would take this position, there has been renewed agitation in some quarters to get the United States and other sparsely populated countries to permit rather extensive immigration again. The defense for this is that such in-migration will offset the present trend to stable or declining population, add to the labor force, and at the same time increase the consumers' market, thus aiding in the national economy.³⁵

The matter, again, is not one of simple pro or con. Any belief that widespread migration of large numbers from overpopulated areas to those with less people will solve the problem is probably highly illusory. The contention that the national economy of the stationary countries will necessarily decline has not been proved. Standards of living are still rising in these countries and

may continue to do so for some time to come. However, in the short-run future some alleviation of population pressures might be had by moderate emigration, if the latter were associated with concomitant changes to an industrialized culture in the countries from which the migrants come.

Under some circumstances the United States, the British Dominions, and parts of Latin America might take in a limited number of migrants. But the matter of quota controls might not be simple to work out. The program to permit the migration of a considerable body of displaced persons or wartime refugees from Europe to other countries was but a special case of attempting to relieve a temporary pressure of numbers.³⁶ Yet even a limited program of international migration is not a simple matter. What most sparsely settled but industrial countries need are not ditch-diggers or common laborers but highly skilled workmen. Yet this is the very class of people that the emerging industrial areas want to keep.

Other cultural changes. Any extensive program to modernize agriculture or develop industry in countries of population pressure will result in a variety of additional changes in the culture of these peoples. In the past, the declines in mortality, followed by declines in natality, meant the rise of the small-family system, increased standards of living and of comfort, learning some medical practices of health and sanitation, and a host of culture patterns associated with city life. The older moral and religious practices and controls gave way to more secular interests and habits. One of the most important of these changes is the acceptance of the idea and practice of birth control.

These are the familiar marks of a shift from primary-group to secondary-group organization of society. Yet the speed with which such changes occur varies greatly. Only in recent decades has the urban way of life reached the rural areas of the stationary

³³ Frank W. Notestein, "Problems of policy in relation to areas of heavy population pressure," in *Demographic studies of selected areas of rapid growth*, p. 150. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944. By permission.

³⁴ See Radhakamal Mukerjee, "Population theory and politics," *American Sociological Review*, 1941, 6: 784-793. Also his *Races, lands, and food*, op. cit.

³⁵ The publications of the National Committee on Immigration Policy of New York represent this view. See, among others, their pamphlets "Economic aspects of immigration," 1947; "Immigration and population policy," 1947; and "International migration and one world," 1948.


³⁶ On the refugee problem, see M. R. Davie, *Refugees in America*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

countries. The future course elsewhere is largely a matter of rates of change as these are qualified by the inertia of the indigenous culture of the particular country or region.

In this connection the case of Japan and its shift from rural to industrial economy is worth noting. It is now going through a process of change in mortality and natality rates in a manner not unlike that of the countries now in the stationary category. For example, in 1940 Japan's crude death rate was about 17 per 1000, and her crude birth rate about 30. These rates correspond to those of the United States around 1900. Life expectancy for males at birth, in 1935-1936, was 47 years, which again is about the figure for white males in the United States at the turn of the century. Also, the expected drop is taking place in both rural and urban areas, though at differential rates.

FIGURE 24

VARIATION IN GROSS REPRODUCTION RATES IN JAPAN
BY SIZE OF PLACE, 1920-1935³⁷



Yet there are some differences between the pattern of change in Japan and in the Western world. Large masses of the peasants who have moved to the cities there have not as yet altered their ways of life as markedly as did like rural migrants in Europe and the United States. These "urban peasants," to use Talcott Parsons' phrase,³⁸ keep much of their rural and feudal culture.

As Irene B. Taeuber, an expert on the demography of Japan, has pointed out, we

³⁷ See Irene B. Taeuber and Frank W. Notestein, "The changing fertility of the Japanese," *Population Studies*, 1947, 1:22. By permission. The "Big Six" are Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto.

³⁸ See Talcott Parsons, "Population and social structure," in Douglas G. Haring, ed., *Japan's prospects*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946.

cannot predict what will happen in the Far East and in other crowded areas from what has happened in Japan. Certainly "time is crucial" since the pressure of numbers in Asia is so intense.³⁹

The pattern of the vital revolution, with some of its cultural qualifications, is neatly summarized in the following words:

"Decline in fertility would seem to be an inevitable consequence of the pressures and the stimuli of an industrializing and urbanizing economy, whether the underlying culture be Western or Eastern. In Japan traditional values, oligarchic government, state education, state religion, militarism, and a carefully fostered feudalism in agriculture all operated to maintain peasant psychology intact and to avoid the disturbing social and psychological changes of the new economy while achieving its material advantages. Yet the broad outlines of the historical decline in fertility in Japan . . . might have been written of any country in the West. There are differences — but there are also differences in the demographic history of England and France, of Germany and Poland, of Rumania and Bulgaria. . . .

"The fundamental hypothesis that arises from the study of the changing fertility of the Japanese in the period from 1868 to 1943 is that decline in fertility is a necessary reaction to the conditions of living in a modernizing economy, whether the culture be Western or Eastern. This is still conjectural, for the Japanese constitute only a small fraction of Asia's thousand million people, and in many ways they are an atypical fraction. The facts of the transition toward low fertility in Japan do prove conclusively that the speed of the demographic transition itself is variable. The demographic history of European peoples did not predict the rate of the demographic transition that occurred in Japan; the demographic history of Japan cannot predict the rate of the transition that may occur in Mainland Asia."⁴⁰

Population pressures in war and peace. The basic pressure of numbers on food resources has long been taken for granted.

³⁹ See Irene B. Taeuber, "Migration and the population potential of Monsoon Asia," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 1947, 25:21-43.

⁴⁰ From Taeuber and Notestein, *op. cit.*, p. 28. By permission.

Only under the impact of modern science and technology has this been eliminated among certain peoples. The optimism associated with the rapid expansion of population, along with betterment of living during the first flush of industrialization, led to a belief in inevitable social-cultural progress. Mankind, it was thought, had really turned a corner since, it was believed, science could offset nature's way of balancing births and deaths vis-à-vis the available food supply. A century and a half later many students of world affairs are not so sure about these matters since more than half of the world's peoples are still living under the Malthusian shadow.

Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States — the bulk of the countries in the stationary group — have long since pre-empted the best lands of the earth. Though similar imbalances of peoples and means of livelihood have been known to history, today the problem of disproportion in numbers and means of survival is particularly acute. The "have-nots" are pushing on the "haves" for a better deal, which the latter tend to resent and resist. As a result there are a number of "danger spots in world population,"⁴¹ as W. S. Thompson aptly puts it. These are focal points of future friction between nations and peoples. Yet, as Thompson says, "It is not *actual* pressure but *felt* pressure that creates the international political problems arising from the differential birth rates of nations."⁴² That is to say, the problem is a psychological and cultural rather than a strictly biological one. Where people take disease, vice, poverty, and early death for granted, they are not likely to bestir themselves to raise their standards of living. The fatalism of the Orient bespeaks this, in part. It is

⁴¹ This was the title of a somewhat prophetic book by Thompson published in 1929. What he said then about the probable relation of population pressure to war was amply demonstrated 10 years after its publication. And another decade found the world facing the prospect of further conflict — on much the same grounds — because of difficulties in inventing a satisfactory form of international organization for control.

⁴² W. S. Thompson, *Population problems*, 2nd ed., p. 401. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1935.

where hope, not despair, is generated that felt pressures arise. Individuals and nations begin to sense the lack of sufficient food and feel discriminated against because they do not have free access to the world's resources. They view with an envious eye the great expanses of sparsely settled lands in Australia or the Americas. Or they may resent the high level of productive efficiency in such countries as Germany, Britain, and the United States, which in turn permits a way of life beyond the wildest dreams of the common man in these pressure areas.

Actually there are two main danger spots today: one in central and eastern Europe, the other in the Far East. For the short run, say two or three generations, the former may be a greater threat to world peace than the latter. There is some difference of opinion on this.⁴³ But certainly in the longer view the Pacific region, stretching from Hawaii to India and the Soviet Far East, may prove the more serious problem. Eastern and southeastern Europe have, in part, passed into that phase of the vital revolution where the death rate is falling much more rapidly than the birth rate, hence their explosive growth. But, if the principle of the vital revolution holds, these areas may be expected to move to a more equitable balance of mortality and natality. But, of course, the present population bulks so large that it will come to overshadow all the rest of Europe. (See Figure 19.) This situation will induce many problems of political and economic dominance and may lead to war. In contrast, Thompson believes that "the germs of another world war are inherent in the future development of the Pacific region, if this development is along the lines that have been followed in the past."⁴⁴ That is, if something is not done to plan and direct industrialization, population growth, and control of resources, conflict is pretty certain to arise.

Since World War I the discussion of world problems of population has given

⁴³ Contrasting views are expressed in Pearson and Harper, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-79, and in Thompson, *Population and peace in the Pacific*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ Thompson, *Population and peace in the Pacific*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

rise to the idea that there may be a proper or optimum balance of numbers and available resources. In the words of A. B. Wolfe, "an optimum population policy would aim to attain and maintain such a balance between population and resources that the per-capita real income of consumers' goods would always be at the highest possible level. The desideratum in an economic optimum policy is the standard of living, not populousness."⁴⁵

Obviously the matter of an optimum population is qualified on every hand by cultural factors, such as the level of technology, the use of resources, and the cultural norm as to what constitutes a satisfactory level of living for a people. Obviously a most desirable condition is an effective balance between agriculture and manufacturing. Also, the balance must be defined in noneconomic as well as economic terms. Any analysis and subsequent planning for an optimum would involve consideration of birth and death rates, expectation of life, basic ecological stabilities with reference to occupation and income, and to adequate urban-rural balance of numbers, the matter of personal security and satisfactions, and finally, questions of national or regional stability and power. In other words, a policy of optimum numbers is a matter both of quantity and of quality, of inherent abilities of people, and of adequate standards and values not only of food, shelter, and health but of educational, esthetic, religious, and recreational interests as well.

Theory aside, it is clear that population imbalances and felt pressures today are bound up with economic and political trends, which bring us face to face with the present political order. Strong nationalist states, many with imperialist ambitions, have dominated the world's resources and industrial development for more than 300 years. But it is very doubtful if the world can go on split into warring sovereign states which fluctuate between peace and war

but never arrive at any long-time equilibrium.

What does the future hold? While prediction in such complex matters is hardly possible, there are two important factors in the situation which must be borne in mind. First, what is the prospect of altering present political practices of the major nations in such a way as to limit the traditional extremes of nationalism and the doctrine of sovereignty? Certainly some modification is necessary in order to build an effective international organization for world peace. Second, any effective movement toward an international organization must take into account present-day differences between those large cultural systems which follow authoritarianism and those which try to act along the lines of representative democracy. (See chapter 4.) Since we shall discuss the wider issues of peace and war in chapter 24, we need but sketch in a few of the bolder lines of the world picture at this point.

It is well to bear in mind that the rise and spread of industrialization has been associated historically with the growth of both nationalism and the practices of self-determinative sovereignty. Is this linkage of political development with populational and economic changes the pattern which will repeat itself in the present danger zones of pressure? Certainly this was true of Japan. A similar trend toward nationalism became evident at the close of World War II in India, China, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia. And surely the Soviet Union's expansion into central and southeastern Europe has most of the features of nationalism and imperialism — no matter how it may be rationalized otherwise.

Thus, at the very time the countries in the stationary group were moving toward international controls, the other countries not yet in this category were developing intense nationalist attitudes and practices. This fact has been one of the handicaps to the development of an effective international organization under the San Francisco charter of the United Nations. Is it possible that mankind will have to await the arrival of

⁴⁵ From A. B. Wolfe, "The population problem since the World War: a survey of literature and research," *Journal of Political Economy*, 1928, 36: 87. By permission of the University of Chicago Press.

world industrialization and a workable equilibrium of births and deaths before it may hope to achieve a stable international order? Every reasonably well-informed person knows that in this matter, time is of the essence. Modern military weapons are so lethal that the threat of war will remain an ever-present danger unless every effort is made to bring about at least the first steps of an effective world organization.

Here the divergences between the authoritarian and democratic culture systems become serious. The former have dressed up much of their expansionism in nationalist and even democratic language. They have had a revolutionary dynamic which is tied to a rapidly growing population, sometimes considered an important feature of their drive for power. In dealing with such nations the separation of the substance from the shadow is not always easy. It may be difficult to develop a workable accommodation between the two cultural systems.

On the other hand, the democratic countries, despite their avowed intention to form some kind of world organization, are not always too ready to let go their own sacred sovereignties. The words of Thompson directed to the people of the United States have a meaning for the citizens of all countries:

"Our choice is not between *complete* national sovereignty and self-determination and subservience to an international organization but between adhering to an international organization to which we freely grant certain powers to deal with international disputes and remaining at the mercy of any nation which is shrewd enough, strong enough, or ruthless enough to get the jump on the rest of us."⁴⁶

Among other measures which would have to be taken in any internationally organized and executed plan are the following:⁴⁷ (1) There would have to be as rapid industrialization of the backward areas as could be worked out in terms of capital needed,

shifts in occupation of the labor force, and the development of markets. This would include shifting the colonial economy of exploitation of raw materials, such as rubber and minerals in many areas, to a more balanced economy involving also manufacturing of capital and consumer goods. (2) Agricultural production should be improved and expanded. This might involve both extension and reclamation of now unused land and the application of modern techniques of farming and of marketing of agricultural products. (3) These two, in turn, should be accompanied by the promotion of free international trade.

Associated with such economic measures should go (4) an improvement in the public health program so as to assure all individuals a reasonable chance for health and physical well-being. (5) In addition to good public health, or as a phase of it, provision should be made for the dissemination of the idea and practice of birth control. And (6) the extension to the masses of public education of such a character as to train them not only in industrial skills but also in full participation in a modern urbanized society.

It is apparent at once that to put such measures as these into effect would involve many basic alterations in the culture systems of the world. On the side of the democratic countries, for example, such vast forms of control as are implied in an international overall plan would seem to many to destroy the very essence of the democratic way of life. Or take another example: How long would it take to overcome the resistance to measures of birth control in cultures whose value systems do not now tolerate it? From what we know of the lag in cultural change in other situations, one cannot be too hopeful regarding such proposed solutions. Yet if the world is not to witness a general reduction in its standards of living or experience a series of devastating wars, serious joint efforts must be made to initiate as many of these steps as are presently feasible so as to reduce the trends toward overpopulation in the danger zones.

⁴⁶ Thompson, *Population and peace in the Pacific*, *op. cit.*, p. 360. By permission.

⁴⁷ See Notestein, "Problems of policy," etc., *op. cit.*, pp. 153-155.

Interpretative Summary

1. In the last three centuries the world's population has multiplied fourfold. It is now about 2.2 billion. At present rates of increase it will be above 3.3 billion by 2000 A.D.
2. At first this striking increase was especially evident in western Europe, the United States, and the British Dominions.
3. The increase in the latter areas was definitely correlated with the Industrial Revolution and its attendant betterment of standards of living, personal health, and sanitation.
4. Some students of the situation, however, view the world's rapid growth in numbers with considerable misgivings. Malthus tried to show that population tends to outrun the food supply unless population growth is checked, either by high death rates or by rational controls of man himself.
5. Today the countries of the world may be divided into: (a) those where the population is approaching a stationary condition, (b) those where growth is explosive, and (c) those where there are high death rates but also such high birth rates that the population is growing fast. Today four out of every five persons live in countries in the second or third category.
6. The stationary group of countries has gone through a vital revolution, or cycle of growth marked by certain stages: (a) decline in the death rate, which leads to rapid growth in numbers; (b) decline in the birth rate, which tends to cut down the rate of growth; and (c) the gradual arrival at a state of relative equilibrium of births and deaths.
7. Many students of population believe that countries in the second and third categories will also go through similar cycles, but not necessarily at the same rates or in just the same way as happened in countries now in the first category.
8. The countries at present experiencing an explosive growth are in the first phase of the cycle just noted. This is associated with industrialization and improvements in personal and public health.
9. Recurrent proposals to relieve population pressures by large migrations of people from crowded to sparse areas are not wise. Such measures would at best serve as temporary palliatives.
10. More significant solutions will probably have to await the invention and development of a sound political organization for the world. But this will involve considerable alteration in present-day practices of sovereign nation-states.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. How rapidly has the world's population grown since 1750? How do you account for this?
2. What are the essential features of (a) stationary, (b) explosive, and (c) preindustrial populations? Illustrate each.
3. What was Malthus' theory regarding population? What stimulated him to take up the subject of population?
4. In which of the countries referred to in question 2 above are the Malthusian principles operative? Why?
5. What was Neo-Malthusianism? Why did this doctrine arouse so much opposition?
6. How does population density reflect geographical and cultural factors?
7. Distinguish between fecundity and fertility.
8. Define net reproduction rate. Why is this considered one of the most satisfactory criteria of the rate of population increase or decrease?

9. What does W. S. Thompson mean by "danger spots in world population"? Where are they located, and why? In this connection explain Fairfield Osborn's statement: "The tide of the earth's population is rising, the reservoir of the earth's living resources is falling." (From *Our plundered planet*, *op. cit.*, p. 201.)
10. Contrast the biological and the social-psychological interpretation of population pressure. What is the heart of the problem of overpopulation in the modern world? What bearing has this on the struggle for land, resources, and the possible redistribution of the world's peoples?
11. How might a sound international organization help solve world population pressures?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

G. I. Burch and E. Pendell, *Human breeding and survival; population roads to peace and war*, rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1947.

A popular discussion of the relation of population and standards of living to democratic society. Contrast with views of Mukerjee, p. 203.

R. R. Kuczynski, "Population: history and statistics," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 12 : 240-248. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

An excellent review of the major aspects of human demography and the manner in which the data may be described and analyzed.

Paul H. Landis, *Population problems: a cultural interpretation*. New York: American Book Company, 1943, 1948.

A general text with a distinctive stress on the social-cultural implications of the facts of population.

T. Lynn Smith, *Population analysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948.

Another general text which summarizes systematically much current data. Considerable stress is laid on geographic and ecological factors.

A. B. Wolfe, "Population: theory," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, *op. cit.*, 12 : 248-254.

A full, interpretative review of theories of population with extensive bibliography.

Demographic studies of selected areas of rapid growth. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1944.

A collection of papers on population trends in eastern and southern Europe, Egypt, Near East, India, and Japan.

Postwar problems of migration. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1947.

A collection of papers on international as well as domestic problems of migration.

Differentials in Population

VARIOUS factors influence the composition of a given population. Thus, the distribution of people by age and sex in one society may differ from that in another. Birth rates may be affected by such things as place of residence, religious beliefs, social status, and amount of schooling. So, too, death rates are influenced by types of disease, age, race, nativity, occupation, and residence. Moreover, various programs have been proposed and, in part, put into practice with a view to controlling the quality of the population.

Sex and Age Distribution

Certain aspects of community life reflect variations in the sex and age composition and, in turn, are affected by such differences. If there is a disproportion of males over females, as was true in most pioneer communities, marriage rates will be affected, and there will be a high percentage of bachelors and few spinsters. If the proportion of children is high, the problem of education will certainly be different from what it would be if there were practically no children at all, as is true of certain sections of our large cities inhabited largely by adult males. Again, if the population has a disproportionate number of people in the older age groups, a host of conditions regarding the labor force and social status may arise which would not be found if the population were younger.

Differences in population groups. One way of showing certain basic facts in regard to age and sex distribution is to divide a given population in terms of male and female and within each sex to classify the frequency by five- or ten-year age intervals. In a growing society, of the kind we had in the 19th century, a graphic presentation of

such an analysis is called a "population pyramid." In most instances the proportions of the sexes were about equal. The fact that many children were born provided a wide base for the first five years; but infant mortality was also high. As the ages advanced there were fewer and fewer individuals relative to the total population, until the pyramid tapered off into the very small ratio of persons over 65 years of age. Figure 25, for 1900, illustrates such a distribution.

A population may grow by natural excess of births over deaths or by immigration from the outside. Just as a pioneer country at first draws most of its population from the outside, a rapidly expanding industrial country may do the same, as the United States did after 1880. The excessive importation of foreign-born adults into a community produces problems of accommodation and assimilation which will not be found where the population is recruited from births within the community.

From about 1820 to the opening of World War I this country experienced an increasing influx of foreigners. The intake was particularly large after the War Between the States, when our expanding industry called for cheap labor, chiefly men, from the age range of 20 to 50 years. In 1907, the peak year, over a million immigrants arrived on our shores. During the first 75 years of the 19th century most of our migrants came from northwestern and northern Europe. After 1880 the stream from southern and eastern Europe became ever larger, and the former source contributed relatively little, especially after 1900. Since the chief call was for a strong labor force, the age and sex distribution of the foreign-born tended to be skewed in favor of the males and concentrated in the middle range of age classes.

After World War I severe restrictive laws were passed to reduce the number of immi-

FIGURE 25

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1900 AND 1945, WITH PROJECTIONS TO 1975 ¹





FIGURE 26

AGE AND SEX DISTRIBUTION OF RURAL-FARM POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES FOR 1930 AND 1940 ²



grants to be admitted in any one year. In fact, the 1930's occasionally saw slight losses in numbers from out-migration. As a result the distribution of the foreign-born has become further concentrated in the middle ranges of age. This fraction of the American population is not only aging very rapidly but represents an ever-smaller part of

our total population. In 1930 the foreign-born made up nearly 13 per cent of the total whites in this country; in 1940, just under 10 per cent. By 1960, assuming no immigration after 1945, the foreign-born will make up 4.7 per cent of the total white population.


The situation in the rural areas of a country that is gradually becoming more industrialized is well indicated in Figure 26. There is a high percentage of children, but

¹ Data for 1900 from 16th Census. Estimates for 1945 and 1975 from P. K. Whelpton, et al., *Forecasts of the population of the United States, 1945-1975*, p. 53. Washington, D. C.; Government Printing Office.

² Data from 15th and 16th censuses, respectively.

FIGURE 27

PERCENTAGE OF CHILDREN AND AGED PERSONS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1940, WITH PROJECTION TO 1970 ³



the distinctive shrinkage in the age groups 20-29 shows clearly how the cities are draining the country districts of large numbers of young men and women. The American farm is already overcrowded. Agricultural production exceeds our needs, and ambitious young people follow the call to the city as a way out of their economic problems.

Some effects of an aging population. The populations of the countries in the stationary category, described in chapter 12, are growing older. That is, there is an increasingly higher proportion of individuals in the older as compared to the younger age groups. Falling birth rates result in a shrinking fraction of children in the population. This means, in turn, that as these youngsters grow to adulthood, the balance between the young and the old slowly changes. In the meanwhile the oldsters who have survived from periods of higher fer-

tility rates steadily increase the percentage of older people in the total numbers. For instance, the proportion of persons above 60 years of age nearly doubled or more than doubled in the 100 years since 1850 in such European countries as Switzerland, England, Germany, and Scandinavia.⁴ A common measure of this shift is the increase in the median age. For the United States, to cite only one example, in 1800 the median age was 16 years; in 1940 it was 29; and in 1975 it will be 34. A somewhat more adequate indicator of aging is the proportion of individuals under 15 years of age as contrasted to the percentages above age 65. Figure 27 compares the situation in selected

³ Data taken from John D. Durand, "The trend toward an older population," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1945, 237 : 144. By permission.

⁴ See Alfred Sauvy, "Social and economic consequences of the aging of western Europe," *Population Studies*, 1948, 2 : 115-124.

countries and regions in the stationary category with certain ones in the transitional or explosive class.

The reasons for such trends vary somewhat from country to country and from region to region, though, in general, they reflect declines in birth rates particularly. For the United States the facts may be summarized as follows: From 1865 to 1900 the number of births increased rapidly. Large numbers of these people will be with us for two decades more. Then, too, a large immigration has contributed its greatest numbers to these very same age groups. On the other hand, declining birth rates since 1900, and especially since 1920, have already influenced the number of younger persons in the total population.

While the shift in relative proportions of young and old in the United States has been going on since 1800, recent decades have seen the most marked changes. For instance, from 1920 to 1930 we added 16 per cent to our population; from 1930 to 1940 the increase was only 7 per cent. Even the upswing in births during the mid-1940's will have but slight effect upon the long-time trend, unless the recent increased rates continue, which is not very likely. As we know, the birth rates in the mid-1930's were about 17 per 1000; those for the decade later ranged from 21 in 1942 to nearly 27 in 1947.⁶

Although the loss of life from World War II in some countries was rather substantial — both from military action and from bombs, disease, and starvation on the home front — the overall proportionate losses were not excessive. In the words of John D. Durand, "... The effect of these losses on the future composition of the population will be slight by comparison

⁶ Population experts "explain" the sharp rise in birth rates in the United States during the 1940's in terms of such factors as: (1) the "recovery" from the postponement in marriages during the depression years of the 1930's; (2) the high prosperity of the war and postwar years with the resulting increase in marriages; (3) the high number of first births which came from such marriages; and (4) the fact that during prosperity there is usually an increase in births generally. That is to say, families are willing to have additional children since conditions seem favorable to supporting them.

with the great, continuous shifts caused by long-term changes in birth and death rates."⁶ The implications of these changes in age composition, for society and its culture, are many. We shall note only the more important.

One of the most obvious effects concerns the nature of the labor force, or actual and potential productive workers, the age range of which runs from 15 to 65 years. Of course, not everyone in this group is actively at work, but it is from people in these ages that the wage earners are recruited.

As to the next few decades, at least for the United States, the increase in the proportion of older persons will about offset the decline in the proportion of those in the younger age ranges. According to one estimate for the United States, "the number of persons 65 years old and over per 100 persons 15 to 64 years old will rise between 1940 and 1970 from 10 to 15. . . . At the same time, however, the number of children under 15 will fall from 37 to 31 per 100 of the population 15 to 64, so that the ratio for the two 'dependent' age groups to the 'productive' age group will stay about the same."⁷ However, there is also a steady upward shift in the proportions of potential producers in the age range 15 to 65 years. To quote P. K. Whelpton, "Between 1945 and 1975 the number of persons aged 20-44 is expected to increase between 5 and 20 per cent [and] the number of persons aged 45-64 between 35 and 50 per cent. . . ."⁸

The factor of age enters into various aspects of employment itself, such as the fact that older workers are the first to lose their jobs when a depression strikes a country. Moreover, the capacity to meet the demands of a new job declines with age. In keeping with these facts, older workers have more trouble than younger ones in acquiring new skills. They are less alert, slower in reaction time, and less adaptable. Also, aside from difficulties of retraining, older people are less willing to move into new communities or regions in the wake of new or expanding industries.

There are other problems. As the ratio of workers past 45 years increases in comparison to the younger members of the labor force, it will be difficult to keep the channels of

⁶ Durand, *op. cit.*, p. 146. By permission.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149. Durand took his data from the National Resources Planning Board reports.

⁸ Whelpton, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

promotion open. There may be less upward mobility of workers into supervisory and managerial jobs all along the line. The growing fixity of job status will be associated with the desire for security satisfied through the application of seniority rights and in other ways.

On the other hand, the recruitment of younger workers may become acute. As the proportion of individuals under 15 years declines, there will be fewer of them to replace those in the labor force who retire. Moreover, though youth may learn more quickly than their elders, they are often less responsible and lack the experience of the latter, even though machine techniques may make special skills less necessary for large numbers of new workers. Still, they should be more willing to move from occupation to occupation if changes in industry demand it.

If, however, a society believes that youth should have more and more education, a further extension of economic dependence will result, which will, in turn, influence the effective productive force. While such schooling may be defended as providing additional skills, it may well be that modern machine production will not need such skills but chiefly the willing hands of young people to replace the older workers.

Moreover, in the matter of recruitment, it may be that the increasing flow of women into the labor force may offset the effects of retirement of male workers or the inadequate replacement by younger men. So far, however, women's work is confined to a rather limited number of occupations.

As a population grows older there is increased pressure to make additional provisions for social security. It is well to note that, without altering the average number of years in the labor force, white men at age 25 years in this country in 1930 had a life expectancy of more than two and a half years above what it was in 1900. In this connection John D. Durand remarks: "... If past trends continue, by 1960 a 25-year-old man will expect nearly 1 year of life in retirement for every 4 years of his remaining working life."⁹ Aside from the economic costs the social-cultural implications of this fact are evident.

Other effects of an aging population may be noted: There will be some changes in consumer habits, such as an increase in the demand

for canes, wheelchairs, and toupees, and a decrease in the demand for diapers and infant toys. But these alterations will not seriously influence the total consumer volume. More striking are the trends, already under way, in matters of family size and housing. As the small-family pattern is extended, the demand for detached houses with play yards will decline, and for older people especially the demand will be increasingly for smaller apartments. Also, the need for more old-age homes and hospital service is already at hand. Moreover, the insurance rates for hospitalization and retirement will slowly rise.

With regard to education there will, in the long run, be less need for elementary- and high-school facilities, but for some time the colleges may grow. However, the upsurge of the birth rate in the 1940's will serve to postpone the rather sharp decline in school enrollments predicted on the basis of fertility in the 1930's. (See chapter 19.)

There are also political implications in the aging of a population. Controls are likely to remain in the hands of the elder statesmen unless there is an open break with tradition, as happens in time of political revolutions. The matter is neatly shown in Alfred Sauvy's figures on changes in the voting age in France. Of the French electorate, in 1850 only 15 per cent were over 60. Corresponding figures for 1947 were 23.2 per cent, and his estimate for 1970 gives 28 per cent. In the same striking manner, the percentage of electorate less than 40 in 1850 was 49.3; in 1947, just under 40; and by 1970 it will be 35.5.¹⁰

Equally noteworthy are the military implications of aging. As evidenced in Figure 19, the future manpower of the Soviet Union and of the countries in eastern Europe will greatly outweigh that of the western European nations, the United States, and other countries in the stationary category. Thus, in Soviet Russia as of 1940, there were 31 million males under 15 years of age; in the United States, there were slightly less than 17 millions. In fact, the former had more males in this category in 1940 than had the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany combined. This age group will furnish the potential military personnel of the next decade or two. While the amount and kind of industrial capacity as well as the nature of available weapons also count in modern warfare, there is no doubt that countries with aging populations will be

⁹ John D. Durand, *The labor forces in the United States, 1890-1960*, p. 45. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948.

¹⁰ Sauvy, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

at a distinct disadvantage in manpower in any conflict with countries of a much younger population.


Differentials in the Birth Rate

The composition of a population will be affected by both reproduction and *lethal selection*. The interplay of these two sets of factors must always be considered. Neither by itself tells the story of population.

The specific factors affecting differential birth rates must be considered against the background of the general decline in fertility. This decline in the United States is shown in Figure 28, which gives the number of daughters born per 100 total females of specified ages, 1920-1940. Except for the 15-19-year range, which is not a large child-bearing group in this country, there is a decrease in fertility in every age class. It will be recalled that fertility is measured by the replacement ratios, generation by generation, of women by their daughters.

FIGURE 28

FERTILITY OF WHITE WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, AS MEASURED BY DAUGHTERS BORN PER 100 TOTAL FEMALES OF SPECIFIED AGES ¹¹



Regional and community differentials. It is well-known that city families have on the average fewer children than have those who live on farms. Moreover, such variation in birth rates is not a recent event. It seems to have been true as early as the 18th century in Europe, and it became increasingly evident as the Industrial Revolution

spread, first in Britain and then on the continent. Today it is a condition practically world-wide.¹² It has been true in the United States for a long time. However, the extent of the differences between urban and rural areas probably varies in relation to age of population, degree of industrialization, and other cultural features.

For example, in 1800 for the white population there were 1000 children under five years of age per 1000 women from 16 to 44 years of age for the country as a whole. For the agricultural states, the number of such children was 1043; for the semi-industrial states, 962; and for the industrial states, 786. In 1940, for the agricultural states the number was 431; for the semi-industrial, 392; and for the industrial, 306.¹³

Not only have differences of this sort been long present, but in recent decades, at least, birth rates of communities in terms of size range downward from the high of rural-farm areas at one extreme to that of large cities on the other. P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser summarize the situation for 1940:

"... Among white women in 1940 the ratio of children to farm women was 658, more than 60 per cent above that of 402 for small towns (2500-10,000), and more than 120 per cent above that of 293 for cities of 500,000 and over. Among Negroes the spread was equally consistent but substantially larger, from 931 to 328. The poor showing of the large cities is explainable in part by the tendency of couples with children to live in communities outside the city limits. But even if these places are combined with the central cities, the fertility of metropolitan areas is still substantially below that of smaller cities and rural areas."¹⁴

While the general trend toward low fertility in the United States has long been apparent, the decline in the 1930's was very sharp. This was somewhat counterbalanced

¹² See A. J. Jaffe, "Urbanization and fertility," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1942, 48: 48-60.

¹³ See W. S. Thompson, *Population problems*, 3rd ed., p. 167. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942. He reports data from P. K. Whelpton.

¹⁴ P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, "Trends, determinants, and control in human fertility," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1945, 237: 113. By permission.

¹¹ From *Statistical Bulletin*, 1942, 23, no. 2: 5. New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. By permission.

of rural or urban location were not carefully controlled, it is difficult to tell how much the difference was due to urbanization and how much to variations in moral views. Certainly we cannot neglect the probability that moral values continue to play a part in influencing birth rates. B. D. Karpinos's study of differential rates of growth of whites in the United States shows that Utah, which has a high proportion of people of Mormon faith, has one of the highest net fertility rates of any state in the Union.²¹ The Mormons have, on the whole, strong scruples against birth control, and though there are differentials among them in terms of degree of urbanization, there is doubtless a residue of influence that stems out of their religious beliefs.²²

Social status and birth rates. Social status, or place in the class structure, is associated with differential fertility. In Western society, at least, social status today is compounded of such things as income, occupation, education, nativity, residence, and prestige on a scale of social rating and approval. Such more or less external factors have their counterpart in the ideas, attitudes, and values of the individuals concerned. (See chapter 28.) The literature on the relation of status to the birth rate is very extensive, and we shall review only the more important studies.

One of the earliest studies was that of Jacques Bertillon (1851-1922), a French stat-

²¹ See B. D. Karpinos, "The differential true rates of growth of the white population in the United States and their probable effects on the general growth of the population," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1938, 44: 251-271.

²² As was expected, Kinsey found some differences in degree of sexual activity — as he defined it — among religious groups. The Orthodox Jews and devout Catholics were less sexually active than those Jews and Catholics who reported little interest in their traditional religious faiths. So, too, there was some variation among Protestants in terms of strength of religious belief. There is probably some correlation between frequency of intercourse and pregnancies when contraceptives are not used. It is generally assumed that as people "lose their religion" they become more inclined to use some means of restricting conceptions. See A. C. Kinsey, et al., *Sexual behavior in the human male*, pp. 479-487. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1948.

istician, published in 1899. He compared the fertility rates for six economic classes in the populations of Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and London. In all cases he found a steady increase in the birth rate as he ordered his data from the "very rich" to the "very poor." And although the death rates were higher for the poorer than for the richer classes, his report shows that the former tend to reproduce themselves faster than the latter. A few years later Sir Arthur Newsholme and T. H. C. Stevenson, two English investigators, found much the same facts from a comparable study of London for the year 1903. Commenting on the long-range reproductive effects of the differences, they noted that the birth rate of the very rich "affects 9.7 per cent," that of lowest grouping "25 per cent of the total population of London."²³

A more adequate study was made on the basis of data of the census of 1911 for England and Wales. Rates were computed for completed families only, that is, those in which the women were beyond the childbearing years. Such data give a truer picture of what actually happens in families of different social classes. The results again confirm the previous findings. For example: 100 women of the upper and middle classes who were married between 1881 and 1886 and were over 45 years of age in 1911 had borne 422 children, while 100 women of the unskilled class, of like marriage and age range, gave birth to 609 offspring. A like number of miners' wives had had 684; and 100 farmers' wives, 632 children. By analyzing marriages and children in the order of fertility, it was further shown that the least fertile 25 per cent of marriages of completed families produced only 2.1 per cent of all births. On the other hand, the most fertile 25 per cent produced 52 per cent of all births.²⁴

Data from other European countries show much the same situation as that of Britain in 1911, with the interesting exception of France. French farmers have relatively fewer children than have farm families elsewhere. In a study of families which, by 1906, had

²³ See Sir Arthur Newsholme and T. H. C. Stevenson, "The decline in human fertility in the United Kingdom and other countries as shown by corrected birth rates," *Journal Royal Statistical Society*, 1906, 69: 34-87. These authors reported the Bertillon study as well as their own.

²⁴ Great Britain, Census Office: *Fertility of marriage*, 2 vols. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1917. See Thompson, *Population problems*, op. cit., 3rd ed., p. 176, for some of the basic tables from this report.

endured 25 years or more, coal miners, textile workers, and fishermen had the highest fertility, professional people and office workers the lowest. The farmer group, however, were not much below the latter and fell in about the same range as the merchants. This deviation in France from the usual condition is doubtless due to their culture. Farm families there wish to keep the number of children at a minimum in order to maintain the economic status of the family. But, in general, the lower the social-economic standing, the greater the number of children.

An analysis by Frank W. Notestein of the number of children born to women of selected social-economic groups in the United States, as based on 1910 data, shows much the same differentials. The percentage of women who bore no children, one child, or two children was much higher among the professional and business groups than among the farmer, semiskilled, and skilled workers. The reverse was true as to the proportion who bore three or more children.²⁵


It is well-known that in our culture, for the most part, occupational status and income are closely correlated. There are some exceptions, as in the case of college teachers and ministers, which we shall discuss in chapter 28. But these exceptions hardly alter the general fact that families classified by income show similar differences in fertility. The relation of income to fertility is, as might be expected, of the same order for the data collected in an exhaustive study of fertility made in Indianapolis, Indiana, by P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser.²⁶

In like manner, level of schooling is correlated with fertility. The interplay of income, educational standing, and the birth

rate was brought out in the National Health Survey of the United States made in 1935-1936.²⁷ Some striking differences are shown in Figure 30. Again there is evidence that low reproductivity is associated with groups having the highest economic-educational status. For this sample, which is reasonably representative, those with highest incomes or with highest education show fertility rates which would provide less than half or about half the number of offspring necessary to replace themselves in the next generation. It is but confirmation of the generally known fact that if American colleges

FIGURE 30

NET REPRODUCTION RATES OF THE WHITE URBAN POPULATION IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SURVEY, BY FAMILY INCOME AND EDUCATIONAL STATUS²⁸



and universities had to depend upon the children of their own graduates for future students, they would have to shrink their facilities or close up shop.

The inverse relationship between status and fertility has come to mark almost all countries, but especially those which fall into the stationary class in contrast to those which are expanding or explosive. (See chapter 12.) Beginning in the last quarter of the 19th century and continuing to the present, there has been a decrease in family size in all classes in the stationary countries.

²⁷ See B. D. Karpinos and Clyde V. Kiser, "The differential fertility and potential rates of growth of various income and educational classes of urban population in the United States," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 1939, 17 : 390.


²⁸ From Karpinos and Kiser, *op. cit.*, p. 385. By permission.

²⁵ Summarized in Thompson, *op. cit.*, 3rd ed., pp. 172-173.

²⁶ For a summary of part of this study, see Clyde V. Kiser and P. K. Whelpton, "Progress report on the study of social and psychological factors affecting fertility," *American Sociological Review*, 1947, 12 : 175-186. The full report appeared periodically in the *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, from 1943 on. The first large phase of the study is brought together in P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, *Social and psychological factors affecting fertility, vol. I: The household survey*. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1946.

FIGURE 31

BIRTH RATES BY SOCIAL CLASS, ADJUSTED FOR AGE,
IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1921-1931²⁹



However, the rate of this decline among the classes has not been uniform. A brief review of important studies which show this variation in rate of decrease is in order:

From an analysis of fertility trends in England and Wales from 1876 to 1934, J. W. Innes reports that while there was a general decline in fertility throughout the last quarter of the 19th century, the decrease took place more rapidly in the upper than in the lower classes. This was true down to 1911. From then on — at least for the next 20 years — there is some evidence that a lower limit of fertility has been apparently reached and that there is less absolute disparity between the birth rates of the classes than had formerly been the case.³⁰

In a further study for the decade 1921 to 1931, Innes showed that while the inverse relation between status and fertility did hold for the upper two classes, the divergence was slight. In contrast, the white-collar or clerical group not only was the least fertile in 1921 but by 1931, because of further rapid decline, it was conspicuously "the class of relatively lowest fertility."

Figure 31 presents the data in graphic form. It is clear that all classes declined in fertility, that the semiskilled did so more than any others, and that the two top classes were but slightly divergent from the skilled laborer and


semiskilled in 1931.³¹ A still later study compared the fertility rates of England and Wales for 1939 with those of 1921 and 1931. The authors conclude: "The comparison suggests that the proportion of all births contributed by occupations of low fertility has increased in recent years, but that the general pattern of occupational differences in fertility was probably unchanged in 1939."³²

A similar shift in the birth rate in terms of occupational status took place in the United States. (See Figure 32.)

There is some indication that in many Western countries trends began after World War I which qualify the earlier thesis of a constant inverse relationship of status and family size. K. A. Edin and others discovered such a trend in Sweden after 1919.³³ Since then two other studies of Swedish population trends have been made, the first

FIGURE 32

CHILDREN UNDER FIVE YEARS OLD PER 1000 NATIVE WHITE WOMEN AGED 15-49, MARRIED ONCE AND LIVING WITH HUSBAND, BY OCCUPATION OF HUSBAND, UNITED STATES, 1910 AND 1940³⁴



³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 72-96.

³² W. A. B. Hopkin and J. Hajnal, "Analysis of the births in England and Wales, 1939, by father's occupation. Part II," *Population Studies*, 1947, 1: 16. Summary of Part I. By permission.

³³ See K. A. Edin, "The fertility of the social classes in Stockholm in the years 1919-1929," in G. H. L. F. Pitt-Rivers, ed., *Problems of population*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932.

³⁴ From *Statistical Bulletin*, 1945, 25, no. 6: 8.

²⁹ From J. W. Innes, "Class birth rates in England and Wales, 1921-1931," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 1941, 19: 8. By permission.

³⁰ J. W. Innes, *Class fertility trends in England and Wales, 1876-1934*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938.

based on the 1930 census of marriages and children, the second derived from the 1935-1936 sample census. In the first, various cross-classifications as to duration of marriage, occupation, income, education of husband, and number of children were made. We quote from a convenient summary of the findings:

"... First, there was a clear-cut positive association of fertility and income in the higher-education groups of proprietors and salaried employees in nonagricultural pursuits. At lower educational levels, couples with incomes of 10,000 or more crowns were more fertile than those with incomes between 6000 and 10,000 crowns. Among wage-workers the usual negative association was the general rule.

"Second, fertility tended to be positively correlated with education among the proprietors and salaried employees engaged in professional service. In industry and agriculture the negative association persisted at incomes below 6000 crowns.

"Third, wage-workers were more fertile than the least-educated proprietors and salaried employees except among the better-paid agricultural workers."³⁵

The second study made even more elaborate cross-classifications including, in addition to such as are noted above, the extent and type of the wife's gainful employment and the shifts in the husband's occupation between the time of his marriage and that of the census taking. To quote a few of the more important findings:

"The average number of children born was highest among agricultural laborers and next highest among owners and managers in agriculture. Then followed, substantially lower but scarcely differentiated, owners and managers in other pursuits, industrial laborers, and other laborers. Salaried employees were lowest of all. . . . The relations of income and fertility were generally [indicative of] . . . higher fertility at the two extremes of the income classification than in the middle. . . ."³⁶

While recent changes in our own country indicate that the former sharp differences

between classes no longer hold, there is no widespread evidence that we have yet begun to recapture some of the lost fertility in the upper-status groups. Yet a sample study by Antonio Cioccio in Washington County, Maryland, from 1898 to 1938 shows some reversal. Whereas between 1898-1902 and 1918-1922 there was a decline in the birth rate from 14.6 to 8.5 in the highest social-economic class, since 1920 it has increased to about 11.³⁷

It is already apparent that within the broad classifications of the census or like enumeration schemes, there are many variations in fertility in terms of specific occupation, income, education, and of the value-systems of the people concerned.

F. W. Notestein and X. Sallume³⁸ found that such matters as age of marriage, rate of occupational advancement, knowledge of contraceptives, degree of interruption of normal home life, and other factors were doubtless involved in producing differences among specific occupations, classified into the usual broad categories of professions, proprietors, clerical workers, skilled labor, and so on. A second study by Clyde V. Kiser³⁹ compared birth rates for 1935 on the basis of the National Health Survey and found, in general, for native-white urban wives that "variations in fertility were more closely correlated with amount of income than with occupational status of the head [*i.e.*, husband] or with educational attainment of the wife. When analyses were restricted to wives of similar income status . . . the inverse relation of fertility to occupational status virtually disappeared except at the lowest income levels."

To summarize, the present trends with reference to fertility and social-economic status show that while in general the

³⁷ Antonio Cioccio, "The trend in the proportional contribution of the socio-economic groups to natality: a report based on the births in Washington County, Maryland, from 1898 to 1938," *Human Biology*, 1940, 12 : 188-202.

³⁸ F. W. Notestein and X. Sallume, "The fertility of specific occupational groups in an urban population," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 1932, 10 : 120-130.

³⁹ Clyde V. Kiser, "Intra-group differences in birth rates of married women," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 1941, 19 : 147-170, quotation on p. 165. By permission.

³⁵ From *Population Index*, 1940, 6 : 12. By permission.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13. By permission.

negative correlation of fertility and status continues to hold, the former sharp differences among the classes are disappearing. Moreover, there are evidences that in some instances the upper classes have embarked on a gradual upward trend. Finally, it is also clear that within the broad groupings found in the usual census data one may find wide variations with reference to more specific occupational, income, and educational situations.

Psychological factors influencing fertility. The shift from the large- to the small-family system in Western society is not merely a matter of changes in the material aspects of culture. The general fact of the inverse relationship between fertility and social status, income, education, and the emancipation of women depends on a complex of causes. The objective facts which we have reviewed have their counterpart in the ideas, attitudes, and values of the people themselves.

Among other psychological factors are those of individualism and ambition for a high standard of living and the probable strain of living in a highly competitive and hurried world. With regard to the first, attitudes about and practices of voluntary parenthood are important. The second has to do with the effects of daily activities upon sexuality and fertility.

As Kingsley Davis suggests, urbanized industrialized society by its very nature is destructive of older family patterns which developed under primary-group conditions.⁴⁰ Present attitudes and values may even go so far as to negate what W. S. Thompson calls "a sense of participation in the future" which the individual is supposed to have when he sees his children around him. Be this as it may, the culture pattern of the small family has become rather firmly rooted in those countries which fall into the category of stationary population. In the United States the implications of the small-family system have relatively recently become the topic of public discussion. Let us note the direction of this discussion by reference to a few studies.

⁴⁰ Kingsley Davis, "Reproductive institutions and the pressure of population," *Sociological Review*, 1937, 29 : 289-306.

What a person says and what he does are not always in complete agreement, yet some indication of the shift in attitude and practice may be had by asking what individuals think of the small-family system. Obviously their attitudes and values will be qualified by economic status, religion, and other cultural and personal background factors. Public concern on the matter has revolved around such questions as: What is the ideal size family? What about birth control? What about spacing the births of one's children? How strong are traditional taboos on such "interference with nature"?

Reported views as to the "ideal" number of children per family vary somewhat. Various Gallup polls report this to be around three. A survey of American women made for *The Ladies' Home Journal* reported that an ideal number would be 3.3 children. This agrees closely with John C. Flanagan's study of a homogeneous group of professional men and their wives which gave 3.2. Howard Bell's survey of youth in Maryland, made during the depression, showed that for his sample of over 11,000 young people, the ideal size was slightly more than two. It is worth noting that his respondents came from families whose median size at the time was 4.7 children. Harold T. Christensen's survey of student opinion among Mormon and non-Mormon college students reports that the former "desired an average family of approximately 4.5 children, as compared with about 3 for non-Mormons."⁴¹ As to personal background, both Flanagan and Christensen report that their respondents who themselves came from large families tend to put down a higher number as the ideal family than do those from smaller families.

In this latter connection it is interesting to note that the E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell study of middle-class families revealed that well-adjusted couples — as estimated by experts — had fewer children than less well-adjusted couples.⁴² While the differences were not highly significant and although the sample was small, the findings do suggest that if urban

⁴¹ See John C. Flanagan, "A study of psychological factors related to fertility," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 1939, 80 : 515-523. (He summarizes some of the other studies.) Howard W. Bell, *Youth tell their story*, p. 37, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1938; and Harold T. Christensen, "Mormon fertility: a survey of student opinion," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1948, 53 : 270-275.

⁴² L. S. Cottrell, Jr., "Research in causes of variations in fertility: social-psychological aspects," *American Sociological Review*, 1937, 2 : 685.

couples have accepted contemporary standards more or less fully, they may not feel any great sense of guilt about not having a large family.

Many "reasons" are given for desiring to limit the number of children. While some of these may be rationalizations to meet the social expectancies of one's class, many people have genuine views on the matter. Evidently the most common of all is the matter of income as related to the standards which most parents wish to provide for their children: good diet, clothes, and housing; advanced education, travel, and, in general, satisfactions which are part of the culture expectancies of a wealthy industrialized society. In addition to these Flanagan's sample gave, among others, the following reasons: wanting children so they could "enjoy them"; as a form of "self-expression"; because they sensed the "importance of social custom and social pressure"; and as a means to perpetuate the family. Also, those parents who held high values along religious and esthetic lines (on the Allport-Vernon *Study of values* questionnaire) thought the ideal family should be somewhat larger than those whose values ran to financial success or social power.

On the topic of birth control, a 1936 Gallup poll showed that 70 per cent of the respondents favored making birth control lawful; two years later *The Ladies' Home Journal* survey showed that for their sample of women 79 per cent were in favor of birth control. In terms of religion, Catholic women were evenly divided on the issue; of Protestants, more than four out of five were favorable. Not only do religious views enter into these opinions but, in general, the surveys show that younger women and men are more favorably disposed toward use of contraception than are older people.

Not only is there a growing belief in the value of the small family but there is evidence that planning for children has become more and more widespread. Nearly half of Flanagan's sample (45 per cent) said they had made definite plans as to the desired number of children shortly after marriage; also "the proportion making definite plans is substantially larger in the younger couples." The Indianapolis survey, however, has given us the most complete analysis of effects of planning for births. As might be expected, there was a positive correlation between the families who planned and their income levels. Whelpton

has summarized the findings for couples, selected in terms of certain demographic and other criteria,⁴³ in these words:

".... Approximately 90 per cent of all these couples had tried to plan the number and spacing of their children, and only 10 per cent had not tried. Among the latter, of course, are many of the couples who found that they were sterile or of low fecundity. If only the couples whose childbearing capacity appeared to be normal during most of their married life are considered, the proportion that tried to plan fertility rises to over 98 per cent. Classifying these couples according to the success of their efforts brings out important differences in family size. Only 40 per cent of the couples had 'planned' their last child or had 'planned' not to have any children; in this group there were 146 births per 100 couples. Over 30 per cent of the couples had not 'planned' the last child but said they had no more children than they wanted; in this group there were 199 births per 100 couples. Finally, about 25 per cent of the couples said they had more children than they had 'planned' or thought they ought to have; in this group there were 296 births per 100 couples. In contrast, there were approximately 700 births per 100 couples among the few couples that had not attempted to control family size. For the group as a whole, therefore, the attempts at the voluntary limitation of family size had reduced the gross reproduction rate to less than one third of what it otherwise would have been."⁴⁴

While this part of the Indianapolis study did not include the Catholic and Jewish population, it does show that for this carefully controlled group, consisting of nearly all the couples in that community which met the criteria, the practice of contraception and voluntary parenthood is now nearly universal.

It has been suggested also that the hurry and stress of urban living leaves less energy for reproductive functions and even makes for neurotic reactions which unfavorably influence

⁴³ These criteria were "husband and wife native white; both Protestant; married in 1927, 1928, or 1929; wife under 30 and husband under 40 at marriage; neither previously married; residents of a large city most of the time since marriage; and both elementary-school graduates." See P. K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, "Social and psychological factors affecting fertility, Part VI: The planning of fertility," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, 1947, 25: 209-210, footnote no. 2.

⁴⁴ From Whelpton, *Forecasts of the population, etc.*, op. cit., p. 25.

FIGURE 34
LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900 AND 1946⁵⁰





FIGURE 35
CHANGES IN INFANT AND MATERNAL DEATHS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN ABOUT TWO DECADES⁵¹



⁵⁰ From *Statistical Bulletin*, 1948, 29, no. 4 : 2. By permission.

⁵¹ From Jacob Yerushalmy, "Infant and maternal mortality in the modern world," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1945, 237 : 135. By permission. Figures for Mexico, 1922-1924 and for 1941, provisional. For England and Wales, material for 1936-1938.

or from congenital defects, that is, specifically inherited constitutional weaknesses, or to the nature of occupations and general environment.

The trends in death rates from various diseases throw light on the whole matter of vitality. Deaths from children's diseases, from tuberculosis, and from typhoid fever decrease rapidly as adequate medical care, sanitation, and higher standards of living become more common. In contrast, cancer, diabetes, cerebral hemorrhage, heart disorders, nephritis, and pneumonia tend to become more serious threats to life. Since death from these diseases affects the upper age levels especially, it is clear that medical science has by no means found for us that "magic" which will increase the span of life, and not merely extend the life expectancy of infants and children. It should be noted, also, that motor accidents have become a serious factor in our death rate.

The striking contrast in the place of certain diseases with reference to mortality is shown in Figure 36. Communicable diseases of childhood had little effect, since their spread is well controlled. The other chief diseases affecting youngsters were respiratory: pneumonia, influenza, and tuberculosis. Also note that chronic heart troubles take a certain toll. However, in contrast, the last-named is most lethal in the upper age ranges, followed closely by coronary diseases and cancer.


While the reduction of infant and childhood mortality rates means that we keep more babies and youngsters alive, we have in this same period reduced very considerably the number of children born each year. Moreover, the death rate in the upper age ranges will tend to go up, as already noted, unless some practicable way is found to eliminate the lethal effects of those diseases which attack older people. We are approaching a certain balance of births and deaths — the basic aspect of a stable population.

Warfare, of course, may and does affect the death rate. Perhaps the total impact of modern wars on population has been exaggerated,⁵² but there is no doubt that heavy

⁵² See Raymond Pearl, "Some biological considerations about war," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1941, 46 : 487-503.

FIGURE 36

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DEATHS IN EACH AGE PERIOD, FROM SPECIFIED CAUSES, FOR WHITE MALES, UNITED STATES, 1942⁵³



military losses from a prolonged war will influence the distribution of men in the 20-40 year bracket. In modern total war large numbers of civilians may also be killed. Then, too, there may be a rise in infant mortality and in the spread and effects of communicable diseases. These latter reflect the decline in the levels of living and the dislocation and disappearance of adequate public health services. During World War I, in addition to military losses, an influenza epidemic swept away large numbers of combatants and noncombatants alike. It is estimated that World War II resulted in military and civilian losses of 15 million persons or more, from all causes: combat, bombing, starvation, and disease.⁵⁴ In addition, it is estimated that between 11 and 12 million men and women were deprived for at least five years of normal married life and consequent expected reproduction as a result of Germany's policy of mass

⁵³ From *Statistical Bulletin*, 1945, 26, no. 10 : 7. By permission. (The original has six additional causes.)

⁵⁴ See Lord Beveridge, "The war Hitler won — the war of numbers," *The New York Times*, magazine section, August 18, 1946, p. 11.

deportation of labor from occupied countries. This, too, must have had some slight effect on the total fertility of Europe during those years.

Yet, World War II was probably less deleterious to life and limb of the total population than was anticipated. The most serious increase in acute diseases was in central and southeastern Europe, where typhoid and typhus became widespread. So, too, diphtheria became rather prevalent in some sections of the continent. Much help in combating some diseases came from new medical discoveries such as sulfa drugs, penicillin, and DDT. Moreover, the postwar recovery was rather rapid, except in areas where the dislocation and destruction of war had been particularly severe, as in certain cities in Germany.

On the other hand, it must be noted that wartime conditions may act to improve health. There is ample evidence that men in military service often gain weight and suffer less from disease, unless the climate and other situational conditions are extremely hazardous.⁵⁵ So, too, civilians may, under national indoctrination, take better care of their health; and though rationing may seem an imposition to some of the upper classes, for the mass it may well mean an improvement in amount and quality of diet. For example, medical men report that the British working classes were better fed, on the whole, during World War II than they had been before. Also, school physicians reported gains in height and weight of Britain's school children during that time.⁵⁶

Longevity and mortality. On learning that life expectancy at birth is now about 67 years for the white population of the United States, some people imagine that this means an increase in the so-called span of life, or upper limit of life, of those who do survive. This is not so. As Louis I. Dublin and Alfred J. Lotka say, "The upper limit of life . . . is much the same for most

of the inhabitants of the earth today, and has undoubtedly been much the same throughout historic time."⁵⁷ One will find centenarians in China, where the life expectancy at birth is about 32 years, as well as in New Zealand, where it is more than twice as high.

Yet the extension of the average length of life, or the expectation of life at birth, is one of the most striking features of countries which have learned to reduce their death rates. Certain correlates of such improvement have already been discussed: better and more food, good medical care, better housing. To cite only two additional instances of such betterment under industrialization: In Sweden in the middle of the 18th century, the life expectancy at birth was about 34 years; two centuries later it was about 65. For the Netherlands there were similar improvements: In 1840 the expectation of life at birth was about 37 years; a century later it was 65 years. As nearly as can be estimated, life expectancy in large parts of China and India is about where it was in Sweden in 1740.

Some students of population, however, have not entirely accepted the thesis that longevity is purely a matter of environment. It is said to be influenced also by family strains, that is, heredity. To show a positive correlation between the longevity of parents and that of their offspring may mean that both generations were exposed to favorable conditions of life. At the conclusion of one exhaustive report on the topic, the authors remark: "A good environment seems to be of greater weight than having long-lived parents" in determining an individual's "prospect for long life."⁵⁸ Raymond Pearl's study of this problem served to indicate that long-lived parents give their children a better chance of survival than do short-lived parents.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ See Louis I. Dublin and Alfred J. Lotka, "Trends in longevity," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1945, 237 : 123-133.

⁵⁸ Summarized in "Family history and longevity," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1942, 23, no. 2 : 9-10.

⁵⁹ Raymond Pearl, "Studies in human longevity, IV. The inheritance of longevity. Preliminary report," *Human Biology*, 1931, 3 : 245-269.

⁵⁵ See "Health of the army," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1948, 29, no. 8 : 1-2.

⁵⁶ Personal communication from Dr. A. T. M. Wilson, Tavistock Institute, London, England.

H. F. Dorn and A. J. McDowell, using Australian data, have reported a close correlation between longevity and the number of children born.⁶⁰ However, since it is so difficult to segregate the environmental from the innate factors, the results to date are by no means conclusive either way.

The studies of the relation of longevity to mental incompetency are suggestive as to possible biological selection in the matter of the death rates of the feeble-minded.

In an early study, L. P. Clark and W. L. Stowell reported the mortality of a large sample of feeble-minded children to be double that of normal children, and that of idiots and imbeciles to be six times that of normal children.⁶¹ Also, a survey of deaths of morons, imbeciles, and idiots from Massachusetts institutions over a period of 14 years shows that for all ages the feeble-minded have a higher death rate than "normals," especially, however, in the early, pre-reproductive years. The morons have a higher rate than the normals, and the imbeciles and idiots a much higher one than the morons. For example, at age 10, of 1000 normal females born, there are 831 survivors. Among an equal number of morons, there are but 722 survivors, while among equal numbers of imbeciles and idiots there are but 387 and 268 survivors respectively. This study showed further that while 54.2 per cent of all the females born survive the age of 60 years, but 22.5 per cent of the morons do, and but 18.5 per cent of the imbeciles and 5.2 per cent of the idiots. The differences are about the same among the males.⁶²

Race and survival. There are many misconceptions about differences in racial mortality. Wherever the differences appear, they seem so closely bound up with economic status, with sanitation, and with medical care that

it is extremely difficult to segregate special racial factors. For this country and others, it is clear that the Negroes have a higher death rate than have the whites. For the United States, although the decline in Negro mortality has been evident, the death rate for this colored stock is half again as high as it is for the white. The life expectancy of Negro males in 1940-1941 was 53 years at birth. From birth to age ten, the expectation of life of Negroes is about 10 years lower for males and from 12 to 10 years lower for females than for the same sexes in the white population. Yet the Negro is gradually moving toward the mortality rate of the whites of some generations ago. The greatest improvement in death rates with the Negro, as with the white, is apparently due to cutting down the infant and child mortality. A study by J. H. M. Knox and G. F. Powers has shown that where Negro and white infants are given the same medical care and diet, the differences in infant mortality between the races disappear.⁶³

Sex, marital status, and mortality. The popular belief that women are the weaker sex is not supported by modern biology and demography. Apparently a lethal selection begins almost from the start of life. It is known that more males are conceived than females, about in the ratio of 120 to 100. However, the prenatal loss of life for males is much higher than it is for females. For example, a study of prenatal mortality in certain states and cities of the United States for 1936 reported an average ratio of such deaths of 127 males to 100 for females. As a result of these prenatal losses, by the time of birth the sex ratio has been reduced to about 106 males to 100 females. But even this slight advantage does not last. The sex differences in mortality in the first year of life continue to show that females have more vitality than males. Thus, in the United States in 1940, of those under one year of

⁶⁰ From H. F. Dorn and A. J. McDowell, "The relationship of fertility and longevity," *American Sociological Review*, 1939, 4: 234-246.

⁶¹ L. P. Clark and W. L. Stowell, "A study of mortality among 4000 feeble-minded and idiots," *New York Medical Journal*, 1913, 97: 276-278.

⁶² Neil A. Dayton, Carl R. Doering, Margaret M. Hilferty, Helen C. Maher, and Helen H. Dolan, "Mortality and expectation of life in mental deficiency in Massachusetts — an analysis of the fourteen-year period 1917-1930," *New England Journal of Medicine*, March 17 and 24, 1932, 206: 550-570, 616-631.

⁶³ J. H. M. Knox, Jr., and G. F. Powers, "Effectiveness of infant welfare clinics from a medical point of view," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1922, 78, no. 10: 707-710.

age who died of the more serious conditions the excess of deaths among baby boys as compared with girls was of this order: from birth injury, 54 per cent; premature birth, diarrhea, influenza-pneumonia, and congenital debility, about 25 per cent; and from congenital malformation, 18 per cent.⁶⁴ Similar differences continue throughout life, with only minor exceptions.

The comparative mortality rates for this country show a rather consistent pattern of such feminine superiority. For the decade 1930-1939, for instance, the yearly death rates for white males was consistently higher than for white females. The nonwhites, largely Negroes, showed much the same differences, except for a very slightly larger toll of nonwhite females, ages 19-20 years.⁶⁵

These variations in death rates rest, in turn, upon the fact that diseases and other lethal crises affect men and women differentially. Thus, Antonio Ciocco has estimated that circulatory and blood diseases claim 50 per cent more men than women, nervous disorders about one third, and diseases of the respiratory and digestive systems about one quarter more.⁶⁶

Evidently in countries in the stationary category of population, sex, marital status, and mortality are also closely interrelated. In general, the findings of Lucien March, a French demographer, for the European countries still hold. He reported that married males have considerably lower death rates than single, widowed, or divorced men.⁶⁷

Similar differences have been reported elsewhere. While we have no adequate statistics on this matter for the entire United States, figures for particular states and data from

insurance-company findings are revealing. For New York state, exclusive of the City of New York, for 1929-1931 the death rate of single and widowed men was about double that of married men. The industrial policy holders of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company show similar differences. In the United States, where the husband and wife are the same age, the chances are 55 in 100 that the latter will outlive her partner. Where the husband is five years his wife's senior, the chances are 64 in 100 that the wife will survive him. Even where the husband is five years younger than his wife, the chances are 45 in 100 that he will leave her a widow.⁶⁸

Most of these facts of marital differences are not difficult to explain. Doubtless marriage acts as a selective agent. Only the more vigorous men tend to marry and take on marital responsibilities. There might be some such selection of the part of women, but in the past much less than among men. Second, greater regularity of living among the married, especially as it affects the men, is conducive to longevity. Thompson makes the point that on the whole marriage "apparently represents a better adaptation to life, physically and mentally, than does celibacy."⁶⁹ The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company study of the principal causes of death among whites who held industrial policies tends to confirm this interpretation. The report shows that there was a more favorable mortality rate for married than for single or widowed men with respect to tuberculosis, accidents, suicide, alcoholism, and syphilis.⁷⁰ On the basis of this, there seems little reason to doubt that such benefits accrue in part from normal family life.

Occupational mortality. The kind of work a person does will determine in part his exposure to various types of illnesses or accidents and thus come to play a part in affecting the chances of death. Obviously construction workers, truck drivers, and miners are more exposed to hazards of

⁶⁴ There is an excellent account of these facts in Amram Scheinfeld, *Women and men*, chapters 4 and 6. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1943. He drew his data chiefly from the United States Census Bureau reports and from reliable medical sources.

⁶⁵ See *United States abridged life tables, 1930-1939* (preliminary), Bureau of the Census, 1942.

⁶⁶ See Antonio Ciocco, "Sex differences in morbidity and mortality," *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 1940, 15: 59-73, 190-210.

⁶⁷ Lucien March, "Some researches concerning the factors of mortality," *Journal Royal Statistical Society*, 1912, 75, Part 5: 505-538.

⁶⁸ See "Why married people live longer," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1941, 22, no. 11: 4-7.

⁶⁹ Thompson, *Population problems*, op. cit., 3rd ed., p. 233.

⁷⁰ *Statistical Bulletin*, 1941, op. cit.

TABLE 12

HIGH AND LOW RATES OF MORTALITY FROM TUBERCULOSIS AND ORGANIC HEART DISEASES IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS ⁷¹

HIGH-RATE OCCUPATIONS		LOW-RATE OCCUPATIONS	
		Tuberculosis	
Miners (not coal)	284	Policemen	71
Iron-foundry Workers	162	Blacksmiths; Merchants	67
Plumbers	138	Bituminous-coal Miners; Stationary Engineers	65
Cooks	133	Watchmen	62
Hucksters and Peddlers	129	Railroad Engineers and Trainmen	44
		Organic Heart Diseases	
Barbers	120	Blacksmiths	81
Anthraxite-coal Miners	115	Railroad Engineers and Trainmen	80
Watchmen	113	Bituminous-coal Miners	78
Peddlers; Janitors	112	Fishermen; Seamen	77
Firemen	111	Cooks	64

working conditions than are bookkeepers or school teachers.

A study of a wide range of male workers, aged 15-64, who died in 1937-1939, brought out some interesting deviations in mortality rates as related to their occupations. By using a "standardized relative index of mortality" it was possible to compare the rank of any occupation in the list with relation to any other. An index of 100 means that a given occupation has the same relative mortality as any other, at all ages. Figures above 100 mean that the occupations were proportionately more deadly than those whose indexes were below 100.⁷² To bring out certain striking differences, Table 12 gives the high- and low-rate occupations for two diseases which strike hard at workers.

The general facts of occupational differentials in mortality for this country have been summarized as follows: "... Mortality rates are lowest among agricultural workers, and increase among other groups in the following order: professional men, clerks, and kindred workers, proprietors, managers, and officials, skilled workers and foremen, semi-skilled workers, and unskilled workers."⁷³ These are but general trends. As yet there

are no satisfactory detailed studies of occupational mortality for the whole United States.

Urban-rural differences. Most people believe that it is much healthier and less hazardous to live in the country than in the city. Certainly the contrasts in life expectancy support this fact. For example, in 1939 the life expectancy for white males at birth for the United States as a whole was 62.5 years; for the rural areas themselves, 64.1 years. Yet there is a variety of factors which must be taken into account, as the following summary on rural-urban and regional differences and for whites and nonwhites, for 1939, shows:

"... The average duration of life was generally higher in rural than in urban areas for each racial group. . . . For whites, cities of 100,000 and over had the lowest mortality in the earlier years of life, rural areas the lowest mortality in the older ages. Cities of less than 100,000 population occupied an intermediate position throughout the life span. Among nonwhites, on the other hand, the mortality of the large cities of the North was consistently higher than that of other urban places except at ages under 10, whereas in the South the mortality in the large cities was consistently lower than that in the smaller cities.

"The impact of racial status and its correlated differentials in income, living conditions,

⁷¹ See "Standardized relative index of mortality," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1947, 28, no. 8: 10.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ From National Resources Committee, *The problems of a changing population*, 1938, p. 188. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

and health facilities on mortality was omnipresent. In each region and in each residential area within each region, whether large city, smaller city, or rural area, the expectation of life at birth was higher for whites than for nonwhites. For the country as a whole the highest expectation of life at birth was that for rural whites in the North, 64.7 for males and 67.7 for females; the lowest, that for nonwhites in cities of less than 100,000 in the South, 45.2 for males, 49.6 for females."⁷⁴

Mortality rates themselves show the contrasts even more sharply. Thus, in 1940 the death rate among American white males was nearly 25 per cent higher in urban than in rural areas. For white females, the urban rate was higher than the rural by only one eighth. A detailed statistical analysis of selected causes of death among white persons by sex, in rural and urban areas of the United States, for 1940, as these reflect particular factors in the matter, is summarized in the following words:

"For almost every one of the causes of death . . . the rate is higher in urban than in rural areas. . . . For the diseases of the heart (other than rheumatic) — the leading cause of death — the death rate for urban residents was the higher by 40 per cent among white males and 29 per cent among white females. The excess was even more marked in the case of diseases of the coronary arteries and angina pectoris, amounting to 63 per cent and 37 per cent for males and females, respectively. Urban-rural differences of about the same magnitude were found in the death rates from cancer and from diabetes. Other diseases with death rates materially higher in urban than in rural areas are cirrhosis of the liver, ulcer of the stomach or duodenum, appendicitis, hernia, and intestinal obstruction, and the gall bladder conditions. . . .

"... The mortality from tuberculosis among white males [was] 20 per cent higher in urban than in rural areas; but among white females the situation was reversed. . . . Women in cities and towns bear fewer children than rural women, and hence are less subject to the complicating hazards of pregnancy.

⁷⁴ From "Recent life tables," *Population Index*, 1947, 13: 91-92. By permission. For original data see *United States abridged life tables, 1939. Urban and rural, by regions, color, and sex*. Bureau of the Census, 1943.

"Pneumonia and influenza as a group is the only cause . . . to show a lower death rate in urban than in rural areas for both white males and white females. . . .

"For suicide and for homicide the excess urban mortality was higher for white females than for white males, in contrast with the findings for causes of death previously considered. With respect to suicide, the excess urban mortality amounted to 13 per cent among males and to 49 per cent among females. . . .

"... Almost all the causes of death which show a marked excess in urban mortality are essentially diseases of middle and later life. It is in accordance with expectations, therefore, to find that at ages 35 and over the death rate, age for age, is higher in the urban than in the rural population. At the ages under 35, however, the reverse is true, which situation may reflect the less adequate medical and public health facilities available to those living in rural areas."⁷⁵

Selection and Quality of the Population

The possible improvement of population by biological means has been the topic of much discussion. Eugenics has been hailed by many as one method of bettering the quality of our stock and making possible a higher culture.

Selection through negative eugenics. The term *eugenics* comes from a Greek word meaning "well-born." As developed under the leadership of Francis Galton (1822-1911), it is an applied science which deals with the influences which tend to improve the innate qualities of men and to develop them to the highest degree. So defined, it covers both hereditary and environmental factors. Popularly, however, it has come to mean the improvement of racial stock by hereditary means; and the opposite term, *euthenics*, is sometimes used to refer to the

⁷⁵ From "Urban mortality higher than rural," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1948, 29, no. 2: 5-7. This article is based on I. M. Moriyama, "Age-adjusted death rates in the United States, 1900-1940," *Vital Statistics — Special reports*, June 26, 1945, 23. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of the Census. The urban areas comprise places of 2500 or more people.

betterment of man by changing his environment. Eugenics is conventionally divided into the "negative" and the "positive" phases. Negative eugenics aims to eliminate the unfit. Positive eugenics hopes to improve the stock by selective mating and reproduction among the fit.

One of the first problems of negative eugenics is to define and delimit the defectives. It is easy to determine the more obvious congenitally malformed, idiots, and imbeciles. All together, these probably do not constitute one per cent of the total population. So far as the idiots and imbeciles go, they are so few in number and their fertility is so low that the public alarm raised about them is unwarranted. As to the morons and borderline feeble-minded, much depends upon the definition of intelligence as to whether we say there are one, two, or possibly three per cent of the population in this class. But no matter how we may delimit the feeble-minded, no one would deny that their reproductive trends may constitute a serious problem in our society.

The three principal methods of dealing with the problem of low-grade mentalities have been colonization, sterilization, and contraception.

Colonization is a program of segregating the feeble-minded into colonies where, living under supervision, they will be at least partially self-supporting. The sexes are separated, and reproduction prevented. It is costly and inadequate for any but the lower-grade cases. Obviously, for the great mass of the feeble-minded and dull normal people who perform useful work in our society other methods of handling will have to be devised.

Sterilization is a method of de-sexing individuals to prevent reproduction. This form of social control is usually carefully restricted. In a democratic society, at least, the doctrine of individual rights is so deeply entrenched that we are loath to abandon this in matters of such personal concern. There are many reformers who imagine that once we sterilize large numbers of our defectives, we shall within a short period eliminate the problem of feeble-mindedness. This easy assumption is open to considerable doubt. If inherited feeble-mindedness results from effects of recessive

genes, latent feeble-mindedness is doubtless widespread among normal people.⁷⁶ Therefore any measures to sterilize the known feeble-minded can effect only a small reduction in the number of feeble-minded in the next generation. Sterilization may well be used on the obviously low-grade feeble-minded, but as a universal means of restricting the production of people of low mentality in the next generation, the device is distinctly limited.

{*Contraception*, or birth control, in one form or another has been long practiced by both primitive and advanced societies. There is no reason to believe that with clinical supervision the high-grade feeble-minded might not use contraceptive devices. With increasingly adequate and still rather simple means at hand and the removal of legal and theological bans on the establishment of birth-control clinics, the spread of birth-control information would soon show further effects on the birth rate, and possibly in the very classes which the alarmists so fear.

Selection through positive eugenics. The purpose of positive eugenics is to foster the propagation of the abler and superior stocks in the population. It aims to educate the public to what the eugenists believe desirable action. Again the problem is not simple. The proponents of eugenics make much of the need for superior stock and of the danger of decay from excessive reproduction among the lower classes. Yet the middle and lower economic groups have been for a long time replenishing the upper classes. In the light of this fact, there are two major problems which the advocates of positive eugenics must face.

Who are the superior people who ought to reproduce themselves? This question involves us at once in the age-long matter of heredity and environment. If "good" or "superior" stock is largely a matter of biological inheritance, we must devise better biological and psychological tests for determining and measuring this capacity than we have today. It is at present a fatuous

⁷⁶ See H. S. Jennings, *Biological foundations of human behavior*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1930. See also his article "Eugenics" in *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 5: 617-621. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

argument to defend the theory of physical and mental superiority of the upper-income classes in any given generation. A large fraction of our upper-economic groups in this country are but two or three generations removed from European peasant or urban workers of lower economic status. The extreme defenders of the hereditary doctrine want to have their cake and eat it too.

If, on the other hand, superiority is largely a matter of cultural opportunity, then the matter of producing sound stock is a matter of societal organization and social control rather than biological control. Any program to improve the constitutional foundations of the population would involve consideration of health, diet, income, education, and the like.

The problem of deciding who the "good" and "superior" stock are is not easy to solve. The history of culture informs us at every point that the class in power always considers itself superior.

The second factor of importance in positive eugenics is reproduction. Will these "superior" stocks be as fertile as others? Education and propaganda, with perhaps some financial subsidy for those not able to carry the burden of larger families, are necessary. In a society dominated more and more by high standards of living and personal comfort, it may be difficult to devise adequate external rewards for eugenic reproduction. Yet under authoritarian controls new motivations might be correlated with strong eugenic programs in the name of race and state.

Eugenics arose out of the belief that the control of heredity might improve the human stock, as the breeders of domestic animals have controlled and "improved" the stocks of our food-producing and draft animals. Yet the analogy between breeding domestic animals and the control of human reproduction is false. It completely ignores societal organization and culture, or, put in psychological terms, the personality, with its habits, attitudes, beliefs, and values. To talk about "natural selection" in human beings as if it meant the same as "natural

selection" in our flora and fauna is misleading nonsense of the worst sort.

Rather, the problems of selection and quality of population must be viewed against the larger background of the world situation described in chapter 12. The very discussion of quality itself reflects moral-humanitarian views which derive, in part, from our industrialized, urban, and scientifically oriented society. In fact, considerations of eugenics really arise out of improved conditions — as was already evident in the middle of the 19th century, when Galton first took up the subject. Ardent eugenicists believe that with the tools and institutions at hand, or which could be forged, we could improve the quality of the human stock, which in turn would improve the conditions for human happiness. Yet objective thought on the larger world problems of numbers will show how limited we are in thinking very seriously of bettering quality — except in a limited way — so long as uncontrolled fertility continues to fill up the earth with underfed people.

A much more serious threat is that the peoples in the stationary countries may be engulfed in a wave of numbers which will sweep away the standards they now have. Recall that it is possible, by reducing the standards of life to those of China, for the earth to support 8 or 10 billions of people. Such a condition would be one of recurrent famine, disease, and bitter conflict for the barest subsistence. Therefore it is more urgent that thought and action be given to developing a world-wide program to deal with the present pressure of population in resources. As pointed out in chapter 12, this is hard to do. Yet we of the West must make the effort if we are to survive.

In the meantime there is no reason why the people of the United States should not put their own house in order. To do so would provide an example for others. Among other things which might be accomplished are these: If we are faced with a stable population and with some lessening of foreign trade, we can still develop a larger home market as we raise our living standards still higher. This will depend, in

turn, on the improvement and extension of our industrial capacity, which will make possible an increase in production, a reduction in hours of labor, and a betterment of working conditions. Associated with higher production must be more equable distribution of wealth in the form of wages, profits, and other returns from human effort — both mental and physical.

Along with these material improvements should be the extension of health and sanitation services so as to eliminate present losses in certain urban, rural, and regional areas. Good health, of course, means not only good diet but adequate housing. So, too, education might come to be considered a more or less continuous process through-

out the whole of life, not merely a period of preparation for the young. The school, the community, and the political order might well be more closely tied together.

Under such favorable circumstances, then, programs might emerge for planned parenthood and for improving the human stock by encouraging births among parents best able to take advantage of their social-cultural opportunities. On the other side, we might well discourage births among those least responsive to their opportunities. Such a process of eugenic selection might result in a biologically sounder people who could take greater advantage of the benefits of a high level of industrial-urban culture.

Interpretative Summary

1. The age and sex composition of a population gives a measure of various influences that play upon fertility and mortality, such as the interplay of high birth and death rates, the effects of a declining natality and the aging of a people, the impact of male immigrant workers on a country with an expanding industry, and others.
2. An aging population means various social-cultural changes, such as less need for elementary schools, a gradual loss in the labor force, and added economic burdens in caring for more and more older people.
3. Among the specific factors in an industrialized society which influence the birth rate are size and nature of the community, religion, social-economic class, and educational attainment.
4. Factors which affect the death rate in our society are chiefly age, sex, race, marital status, occupation, and community.
5. The drift toward a stationary and aging population has been associated with a change in the relative seriousness of acute and chronic diseases. The former, especially those connected with childhood, take a relatively smaller toll; the latter, particularly heart diseases and cancer, take a relatively larger toll.
6. The change from the former large-family to the small-family system, which characterizes a population approaching stability, is facilitated by the spread of contraceptive practices and the deliberate spacing of births.
7. Agitation for and programs to improve the quality of the human stock reflect a high level of moral concern for the future. But these must be viewed against the larger fact that one half of the people of the world are still living under the shadow of Malthusian principles. At present, eugenic programs are confined largely to that one fifth of the world's population which already enjoys the highest standards of life.
8. As to the more immediate future, two steps may be taken. Support should be given to the development of a workable international organization for peace which, among other things, might undertake to help secure a more satisfactory balance of numbers and resources. Second, Americans and other peoples in the stationary category might put their own houses in order by further raising their industrial production, their standards of life, health, and education, and otherwise contributing to the general welfare.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is a population pyramid? How did the term arise? How does an influx of immigrant workers affect the form of the same? Or an aging population?
2. What has caused the decline in rate of population growth in the United States?
3. What are some of the social-cultural effects of an aging population?
4. How do you account for the trends in the fertility rate among Catholics as reported by Stouffer and by Whelpton and Kiser?
5. How might we account for the general inverse relation of fertility and social status? How do you explain the recent trends which run counter to this?
6. Outline possible public measures which might be undertaken to stimulate an increase in the birth rate, especially in the upper classes.
7. What is meant by lethal selection? Illustrate.
8. Why is there a decline in death rates in many countries today before there is a corresponding decline in the birth rate?
9. In the light of differential death rates in Western society in reference to infants, children, those of middle age, and those of old age, what to your mind are the pressing challenges of modern medicine?
10. As the middle and upper age groups increase relative to the younger age groups, what will likely be the effect on (a) competition for jobs; (b) conflict of age classes; and (c) social legislation for the aged?
11. What reason is there for believing that the death rate in this country is likely to show a rise in the next decade and after?
12. What are the chief limitations (a) of negative eugenics, (b) of positive eugenics?
13. Lorimer, Winston, and Kiser in *Foundations of American population policy* make the following generalizations: (1) "Contemporary American society is inherently self-destructive in the sense that it does not provide conditions and motivations that are adequate to assure the permanent self-replacement of the population on a voluntary basis" (p. 3). And (2) "Population trends are now largely determined by social conditions. They are, therefore, indirectly subject to social control" (p. 5). Write a brief critique and interpretation of these two challenging statements.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

H. P. Fairchild, *People: the quantity and quality of population*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1939.

A well-written general survey of population problems which will serve as a good introduction to the field.

Lancelot Hogben, ed., *Political arithmetic; a symposium of population studies*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.

A useful collection of technical papers, many of them by former students of the editor.

H. S. Jennings, "Eugenics," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 5 : 617-621. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

A review by a distinguished biologist.

Frank Lorimer, Ellen E. Winston, and Louise K. Kiser, *Foundations of American population policy*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940.

A thoughtful review of population trends in the United States with critical comments on steps which might be taken if Americans wish to get a good balance of population, standards of living, and a wise use of resources.

Gunnar Myrdal, *Population: a problem for democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.

An incisive essay pleading for public recognition of the need for adequate but high-quality population as it relates to preservation of democracy.

Frederick Osborn, *A preface to eugenics*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940.

A broad interpretation of eugenics to include programs not only to improve the human stock by better breeding and the elimination of the unfit but to better the whole economic and social base of society. More accurately, this is a plea for a euthenic program.

National Resources Committee, *The problems of a changing population*. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1938.

A valuable collection of facts and interpretations with reference to problems of our national society. The statistical data are from the 1930's and earlier.

Primary Communities

THE PRIMARY forms of human association are far older than the secondary. The family, band, clan, tribe, and small village long antedate urban society with its masses of people divided into many special-interest and often highly institutionalized groups. The initial forms of human society and culture, however, can only be inferred.

Apparently earliest men lived in relatively small bands, formed on family and blood ties. Their economy probably consisted of hunting, fishing, and seed and root gathering. Their social organization must have been most rudimentary.¹

Viewed in terms of culture growth, present-day primary communities stem from the Neolithic Revolution. As noted in chapter 11, the domestication of plants and animals and the development of agriculture led to more permanent settlement. This, in turn, brought changes in social organization and division of labor, and laid the foundations of rural culture patterns which have come down into our own time.

Today, from two thirds to three fourths of the world's people live in what may be called folk or farmer or peasant societies. Their culture stands intermediate between that of the band or tribe and urban patterns.² Folk culture has much in common with tribal culture as to solidarity of family life, place of religion, forms of moral control, and simple social order generally. Yet, in many regions at least, the farmer produces surplus goods for a wider market, makes use of the money economy of urban society, and takes part in a larger political order by paying taxes, voting, and sending his children to school. (See Table 2, pages 35-37.)

¹ For a very readable and extended reconstruction of the life of early man, see George R. Stewart, *Man: an autobiography*. New York: Random House, 1946.

² See Robert Redfield, *Folk culture of Yucatan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.

An examination of peasant culture in various areas of the world reveals a number of universal patterns as well as many local variations. One striking feature, in contrast to the situation in urban life, is the high importance of the family, not only as a reproductive and child-rearing agency but as an economic unit. In many societies it is not the individual as such but the entire family as a group which tills the soil, plants and harvests the crops, and does co-operatively the other necessary farm functions. Moreover, for a large fraction of the world, farming continues to be done on a self-sufficiency basis.

For the most part, too, the farm family is of the patriarchal type. The father controls all the important economic and other situations. So, too, forms of land ownership also play a part in peasant life. Both farmer-ownership and tenancy often exist side by side. In general, tenancy is associated with lower levels of living for the tenant as compared with those of farmers who own their own property. In short, while variations are found, farmer or peasant societies are characterized by strong family and community solidarity, close ties to the soil, and a high regard for traditional religion and the mores.

In our own time, however, rural culture is being more and more influenced by that of the urban, industrial world. The ways of life of the one fifth of the world's people who live in the stationary phase of population development are slowly intruding themselves on those who are in the explosive and preindustrial phases of population growth. (See chapter 12.)

The present chapter will begin by describing the ecology of rural life and the various forms of the primary community. Then we shall discuss the impact of indus-

trial and urban culture upon rural society and its culture. This will be followed by a section on the processes of opposition and co-operation in agricultural societies. The chapter will close by giving some attention to social participation and certain psychological aspects of rural life. While the data on which most of our treatment rests are drawn from the United States, comments on comparable situations elsewhere will be made where pertinent.

Ecology and the Types of Primary Community

Primary communities are not all alike. Indeed, they are only relatively primary insofar as the forms of association between people and groups are chiefly of the face-to-face type. The institutions and organizations which are present in primary communities vary widely with their ecological setting and their culture.

Ecology and land settlement. As an aid in describing and interpreting the underlying relations of man to his physiographic environment, sociology has developed the concept of *human ecology* from the studies of plant and animal ecology in biology. Human ecology has to do with the study of human groupings in relation to their spatial environment. With respect to rural life, the chief ecological processes are those of *invasion* and *succession*, and of *specialization* and *centralization*. The first two are illustrated by the original settlement of land and by subsequent movement away from the locality by old settlers and their replacement by new ones. The third is seen in the development of specialized types of farming, and the fourth by the centralization of services for those who live on farms: educational, recreational, and economic.

Obviously an adjustment to a locality is never static. Not only are there changes in spatial arrangements as such, but what a man plants, how he operates his farm, his relations with his neighbors, and his values and attitudes generally are largely determined by his culture. Geographic factors,

such as the growing season, type of soil, and rainfall, do, of course, limit certain aspects of his daily life.

While the basic social unit of traditional agriculture has been the farm family, how and where it settled have greatly varied. In some regions farm families are dispersed widely over a given rural area. In others they live in some hamlet or village and work the adjoining land. In all probability the majority of the world's farmers follow the latter pattern. While the concentrated village is the principal dwelling place of farmers in Europe and the Orient, exceptions to this general fact are found in Great Britain, France, Germany, the Low Countries, the northern part of Scandinavia, and sporadically in southern Europe. Also, though the village is the chief pattern in India and China, there are variations. In South America and Africa rural settlements are usually of the village type.

That the reasons for the variations are historical is well-illustrated in the United States. The nucleated- or clustered-village type was brought over to the colonies from England and the continent. But local differences began to evolve as settlers moved into the interior. Individuals and single families pushed over the Alleghenies and squatted on new lands, later to be validated by legal action. In the southern colonies the plantation system emerged out of commercial agriculture supported by slave labor. (See below.)

Later certain federal laws influenced the form of land settlement. In 1785 the rectangular survey was established; and public lands were divided, first, into townships of 36 square miles each. These were then subdivided into sections of 640 acres and quarter sections of 160 acres. In 1841, requirements were made that to obtain title to such land, the individual had actually to live on it. Still later, the Homestead Act (1862) provided for settlement and payment for public lands at low cost per acre.

The rectangular division of land made the gridiron form of farms and fostered the segregation of farmsteads from each other by considerable distances. As a matter of fact, much of the best agricultural land of the United States was settled under this pattern. It is a neat illustration of the manner in which a

culture trait, in this case a law, influenced the ecology of a community. However, there are some variations in the forms of farm settlement.

Nature of the primary community and neighborhood. Rural communities consist of people living in a limited area who have common interests and common or like ways of satisfying them. The importance of the psychological bonds in rural communities is emphasized in the following from Dwight Sanderson:

"The community includes not only individual persons but the organizations and institutions in which they associate. The real community is the devotion to common interests and purposes, the ability 'to act together in the chief concerns of life.' It consists of a recognition upon the part of individuals and their organizations of a common obligation to the general welfare. Thus the dynamic basis of the community is a common controlling idea, or ideal."³

Yet, as we noted in chapter 2, in the sense of face-to-face relationships the neighborhood is probably more primary than any group except the family. Neighborhoods may embrace a variety of activities and institutions, but this fact is not a distinguishing feature. The characteristic feature is that families live near each other and that they are bound together by intimate and personal relationships. The greater the number of bonds, the more distinctive is the neighborhood. Frequently neighborhoods are built up around a single organization such as a country school or a mill, but the community is formed around common interests and the means of satisfying needs or interests.

Historically neighborhoods have been basic social groups in rural America. In pre-industrial times the whole social life of open-country groups centered there. Most manufacturing was done at home, and the economic system was largely one of direct exchange of goods and services. In these

cases the neighborhood and the community were coterminous. Today many neighborhoods have disappeared as wider ranges of interaction have developed. Yet they are by no means extinct.⁴ However, the traditional rural neighborhood is changing its function as the bonds of mere locality are being replaced by special-interest groups which have reached out to serve rural areas. Wherever good highways and proximity to trading centers permit, urban services such as commercial baking, laundering, dry cleaning, and the like are influencing the patterns of both family and neighborhood life.⁵

Nevertheless to distinguish primary and rural communities from urban communities is not always easy. The United States census classifies all incorporated places of over 2500 residents as urban. All others are called rural. For the sociologist interested in the primary-group ways of life, this is an inadequate division between rural and urban communities. Some help was had when, in 1930, the Bureau of the Census began enumerating population for localities under 2500 population in terms of rural-nonfarm and rural-farm residency. This, at least, gave a more accurate figure of those who actually engage in farming. Thus, in 1947 there were about 27,550,000 people in the rural-farm population. In terms of the estimates for that year, these people made up slightly less than one fifth of our total population. Slightly more than one fifth (21 per cent) were reported as rural-nonfarm residents. Many of the latter are closely associated with agriculture since they live in small communities which provide various services to farm families, and their patterns of life have much in common with those of the farmer.

American primary communities, as they relate to agriculture, may be divided into

⁴ See J. H. Kolb, "Trends in country neighborhoods," Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station *Bulletin*, no. 120, p. 1. Madison: College of Agriculture, University of Wisconsin, 1933.

⁵ On loss of neighborhood and community ties, see Kenneth MacLeish and Kimball Young, "Culture of a contemporary rural community: Landaff, New Hampshire," *Rural Life Studies*, no. 3, Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1942.

³ Dwight Sanderson, "Locating the rural community," Cornell Agricultural Experiment Station *Bulletin*, no. 413, p. 5. Ithaca: College of Agriculture, Cornell University, 1939.

four kinds: the open-country, the village- or town-centered type, the agricultural village, and the plantation.⁶

The open-country community. Ordinarily we think of a community as composed of more or less definite institutions and organizations located within some relatively defined space. Yet there are some communities where the stores, garages, schools, and churches are dispersed rather widely. The people who live in this area and trade in these stores or send their children to the schools or attend the churches do, however, regard themselves as members of a community. It might, of course, be debated as to whether these should not be thought of as extended neighborhoods rather than as genuine communities. Into such an argument we need not enter. The point is that though widely diffused, such communities — if we may call them such — have names. They are thought of by the inhabitants as a distinct community, within which are to be found neighborhoods of the traditional type. Such communities are common in the South, in some parts of the Great Plains, and are found sporadically elsewhere. For example, Garnett identified 42 communities in four counties of Virginia, but only 23 hamlets or village centers of 100 or more people.⁷ Landaff, New Hampshire, is largely of this type. There are a church, a garage, and some occasional service agencies, but there is no nucleus, no fixed center of the community. Yet there is no doubt that Landaff is a community in the minds of its people and not just a neighborhood.⁸ Like Landaff, most communities of this type consist of single farmsteads scattered throughout the area and various service agencies located at more or less convenient points.

⁶ Writers in rural sociology differ among themselves as to just how to classify rural communities. But this classification, suggested by Allen D. Edwards, will serve our purposes. His inclusion of the plantation — often neglected by rural sociologists — is a helpful addition. See his "Ecological patterns of American rural communities," *Rural Sociology*, 1947, 12: 150-161.

⁷ Cited by Edwards, *op. cit.*

⁸ See MacLeish and Young, *op. cit.*

However, unless bound together by some emotional tie, such as a common religion, most of the open-country communities have a limited sense of unity and less sense of belonging together than is true in many primary communities. In short, identification with the community as an important object or goal of one's interests is not very strong. Also, most of these open-country communities are far from self-sufficient with respect to trading and use of services. As good roads have been built, people in these places go to larger localities to satisfy most of their economic and recreational needs.

There are scattered examples, however, of open-country communities which are closely integrated by virtue of religious, kinship, linguistic, and ethnic ties. Such are the Amish in Lancaster County in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. Somewhat similar are certain other pietistic denominations, such as the Mennonites. But for the most part, such integrating factors are not present in the open-country communities of the United States.

Town-country communities. Most rural inhabitants in the United States tend to be oriented toward some village or town. But the degree of centralization and the ratio of open-country to village or town members are highly variable. Where the gridiron land survey made for dispersal of farmsteads on rather widely scattered farms, the village may have grown up at an important railroad stop or at the junction of two important lines of traffic, rail or highway. The villagers may be both farmers and others occupied with giving services connected with the rural economy. But as villages grow into towns, and towns into cities, the relationships between open country and center may change. This is well brought out in the story of Waterville, New York. This community was first studied in 1906 by J. M. Williams. It was restudied later, in 1928 and again in 1930 and 1933.⁹

⁹ See J. M. Williams, *An American town*, 1906, privately printed; *Our rural heritage*, 1925, and *The expansion of rural life*, 1926 (both), New York: Alfred A. Knopf. The later findings are embodied in "A study of rural community development in

Waterville was first settled in 1792 by two families. Others soon followed, and during the next decade there was a steady stream of settlers who developed foundries, breweries, sawmills, gristmills, and tanneries. Many distinctive open-country neighborhoods appeared, each of which had its name and in which much of the local social life was centered. Any of the neighborhoods might have become the center of the larger community, but by 1806 Waterville had 300 inhabitants, and through fortuitous circumstances by 1820 it had become a village of a thousand persons. Among its services and organizations were three churches, five dry-goods stores, a bank, a large grocery store, a drugstore, two taverns, three foundries, two gristmills, two machine shops, a sheet-iron factory, a woolen mill, an organ factory, a distillery, and a school. Even though the community became village-centered, the many open-country neighborhoods were independent.

An important economic factor in the development of the community was the specialization of hop raising. From 1875 to 1895 more than nine out of every ten farmers depended upon this particular crop for their livelihood. Everyone talked of hops, and business was focused upon its production and marketing. Farms were no longer self-sufficient, and a money economy replaced the direct exchange of salt pork and butter. Success no longer depended upon hard work and savings alone but upon wealth secured by speculation as well as good management.

By 1892 the population of Waterville had reached its peak of 2055. By this time the simple virtues of the primary community had changed. Wealthy people vacationed in Florida, gave to the poor, bought comfortable houses, soft beds, good food, and fine horses. Class cleavages began to appear, and the old neighborhood lines were often dissipated. Friends who lived beyond the old neighborhood could be visited. No longer were neighborhood boundaries distinct. The village-centered community came to replace the neighborhood as the principal center of social organization. Waterville became the center for commercial, political, juristic, economic, social, and religious organizations of the entire

area. Stores, artisans, and factories located in the open country went out of business while Waterville prospered. Churches of the open country merged with those in the village, and by 1933 four village churches served the whole community.

With the centralizing of services in Waterville there came greater interaction of town and country people. Between 1928 and 1933 consolidated schools had replaced nearly all the old district schools. The increased orientation to the village-centered school itself served to loosen the bonds of the older neighborhood and strengthen those with the village itself. A community association had arisen, and in spite of certain class distinctions the focus of social organization was in the village. Moreover, at the very time the village was becoming increasingly dominant over the open-country sections, urban forces from larger villages and cities were beginning to affect the whole culture of Waterville itself. The rapid improvement of travel facilities, the coming of the telephone, newspaper, and radio stimulated business and social life to reach beyond the limits of the rural community. Indeed, many of the primary-group characteristics were replaced by secondary-group ones. Social life beyond the family group was based increasingly upon special interests.¹⁰

The history of Waterville may be duplicated, in its major features, in many other parts of the United States. Certainly, everywhere the earlier relations of farm families to village or town centers have undergone many changes. The coming of the automobile and hard-surfaced roads made it possible to buy goods and services at longer distances from the farm than formerly. So, too, the development of mail-order buying enabled farm families to get things which might not be easily available near by. Yet the school, the church, the grocery store, and the garage continue to provide important services within easy reach. The changes in availability also mean that farmers are not bound to a single community center but may and do use the services and goods differentially.

Waterville, New York," Cornell Agricultural Experiment Station *Bulletin*, no. 608, under the combined authorship of W. G. Mather, Jr., T. H. Townsend, and Dwight Sanderson. Ithaca: College of Agriculture, Cornell University, 1934.

¹⁰ Abstracted and adapted from Mather, Townsend, and Sanderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-39.

In another study made in New York, Dwight Sanderson states that farmers residing in the open country patronized the nearest local or primary-village center — about 2 or 3 miles away — for such things as groceries, automobile repairs, hardware, and feed. They went there, too, for church services and grange meetings. Their children attended school in this village. But 40 per cent of these same farm families also went about 3 or 4 miles to another small village to get similar services. In addition, three fourths of them traveled from 4 to 6 miles to a large or secondary-village center for such things as banking, drugs, purchases at chain stores, furniture, work clothes, shoes, hardware, moving pictures, doctors, high school, and lodge meetings. Their local weekly newspaper was published in this place. However, to get furniture, luxury goods, "good clothing," and various other things not obtainable elsewhere, 90 per cent of the farm families went from 15 to 30 miles to a city. In addition, one in ten families bought such things as clothing, hardware, and automobile parts from mail-order houses.¹¹

Similar surveys in other parts of the United States show much the same patterning. Thus, T. C. McCormick summarizes his findings in the rice area of Arkansas: "... The longest distances were traveled to obtain health, economic, and recreational services, and the shortest distances to attend educational, religious, and social events."¹²

Some believe that in time this shift to larger centers will eliminate the need for smaller places nearer the farmstead. While the relative importance of the hamlet and small village is growing less, these centers will probably continue to provide many goods and services for the farm family for a long time to come.

Agricultural villages. The settlement of farmers into more or less compact villages

is not at all the usual pattern in the United States as it is in so much of the world elsewhere. Yet its main features deserve some brief comment. The best-known instances of agricultural villages in the United States are those established by the Mormons when they settled in what is now Utah.

The basic pattern was developed by Joseph Smith and first tried out in Nauvoo, Illinois. The community was arranged on the gridiron pattern with streets, 8 rods wide, at right angles and square blocks of 10 acres each, divided into half-acre lots for single dwellings. The plan, however, was first applied fully when Salt Lake City was laid out by Smith's successor, Brigham Young. And as other communities were established up and down the central valleys of Utah, the same general pattern was followed, though the street widths and size of blocks were often modified.

The necessity for mutual protection from hostile Indians and co-operative effort to obtain water for their farms by irrigation were not the determining factors, for the farmers lived in the village or town and the farm properties which they worked were located adjacent to it. Rather, this was an interesting example of deliberate community planning. Between 1847 and 1877 over 360 such communities were established, reaching from southern Idaho through Utah into Arizona.

In keeping with the overall program for these communities, the Mormon Church set up a colonization scheme so as to make sure that in each new community sufficient carpenters, blacksmiths, and other specialized workers would be available as well as enough farmers. Since the entire orientation of these activities was to make themselves economically self-sufficient and independent of the "gentile" world outside, many communities were instructed to develop various industries in addition to their agriculture. Iron works were built in some places, woolen mills in others, salt plants in still others — usually in localities where the necessary raw materials were at hand. These local industries were to supplement the home manufacturing which — at least ideally — was as much a part of the family life as farming itself. Actually, the Mormon communities were planned to be more than strictly agricultural villages. They were to be the center of farming and local industry, and also the seat of all the major

¹¹ Dwight Sanderson, "Social and economic areas in central New York," Cornell Agricultural Experiment Station *Bulletin*, no. 614. Ithaca: College of Agriculture, Cornell University, 1934.

¹² T. C. McCormick, "Rural social organization in south central Arkansas," Arkansas Agricultural Experiment Station *Bulletin*, no. 313, p. 17. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas, 1934.

religious, civic, and other noneconomic but community affairs.¹³

Other examples of the agricultural village in the United States are found among the Spanish-Americans of the Southwest. Some are scattered in the mountainous areas, rather isolated from each other. Some are in the dry-farming sections of New Mexico and Arizona. But perhaps the most usual and most frequent are those found in the river valleys. The pattern of settlement of El Cerrito is fairly typical. Olen Leonard and C. P. Loomis describe it thus:

"The physical structure of the community is . . . a significant factor in the integration and stability of the village. The houses are compactly located to form the perimeter of a circle, with barns and corrals in the rear. Although such an arrangement interferes with efficient farming, it greatly facilitates living. The house is farther from fields and pastures but is closer to school, church, and neighbors. Such proximity of living has developed a sociability and an integration of group life. . . .

"The sense of community is strong with these people. Individuals are identified as much by the community in which they live as by family name. To be born into a community is to inherit an identification with it that is never forgotten."¹⁴

Another nucleated community widely distributed throughout the world is the "line village." This type is common in southern Louisiana, where French influence has remained great. Along the rivers where frontage is particularly valuable, houses occupy small areas near the river with the accompanying farmlands extending back in narrow strips.¹⁵

¹³ For a summary of some of the important features of the Mormon village, see Lowry Nelson, *Rural sociology*, pp. 56-61. New York: American Book Company, 1948. See also Nels Anderson, *Desert saints: the Mormon frontier in Utah*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

¹⁴ From Olen Leonard and C. P. Loomis, "Culture of a contemporary rural community: El Cerrito, New Mexico," *Rural Life Studies*, no. 1:28, Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1940.

¹⁵ See T. Lynn Smith, *The sociology of rural life*, rev. ed., pp. 217-219. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

It is worth noting that there have been many attempts to establish agricultural villages in the course of American history. Most of these were born of socialistic or co-operative movements of the 19th century. Few of them remain today. J. W. Eaton and S. M. Katz list 200 such settlements. Of these, in 1940 only 15 were definitely known to be in existence and three others were in uncertain condition.¹⁶

Certainly so far as the Mormon and Spanish-American villages are concerned, they are marked by a high degree of community solidarity and integration. Here it is not farming but religious and other elements in their culture which furnish the basis for a strong sense of belongingness. As to the attempts at socialist or co-operative settlements in this country, it is worth noting that most of them failed because those who took part in them lacked or lost the moral and religious zeal which the founders and leaders had expected.

Undoubtedly the agricultural village encourages a certain sense of solidarity and mutuality not found in the other forms of primary community. Walter A. Terpenning's valuable survey of European village and open-country types of rural community convinced him of the distinctive advantage of the former in fostering co-operation in work, community activities, in recreation, and in education.¹⁷

The plantation. The plantation represents still another form of primary community. Although it does not play a central role in American agriculture, T. J. Woofter reports that in 1935 there were 30,000 plantations in the South with five or more tenants on the average on each.¹⁸ As a system of agricultural production the plantation is

¹⁶ J. W. Eaton and S. M. Katz, *Research guide on co-operative group farming*. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1942.

¹⁷ See Walter A. Terpenning, *Village and open-country neighborhoods*, pp. 384-408. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1931. Terpenning's principal data came from Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, Ireland, France, and Britain.

¹⁸ T. J. Woofter, "Landlord and tenant on the cotton plantation," *Research Monograph*, 1936, vol. 5. Washington, D. C.: Works Progress Administration, Division of Social Research.

widespread. It is found in parts of Latin America — as in sugar-cane production in Cuba and in coffee-growing parts of Brazil — and in the production of rubber in Malaya and Africa. Allen D. Edwards defines a plantation as "a form of social organization in which labor, under unified direction and control, is engaged in the production of an agricultural staple which is usually sold on a world market."¹⁹

As a culture pattern, the plantation was introduced into the United States from the West Indies. Before the War Between the States cotton and tobacco cultivation in the South was largely organized under this system. The center of the large holdings consisted of the master's house, houses for his supervisors, outbuildings, and huts for slaves. The whole economy more or less revolved around this nucleus. And though slavery has long since been abolished, many of the earlier managerial features remain today. Sometimes the plantation is organized under the share-cropper system. In other cases the work is done by hired laborers.

C. O. Brennan's study of 215 southern plantations in 1920-1921 is interesting in this connection. While changes have taken place since that time, many aspects have not been greatly altered. The essential economic operations were in the hands of a supervisor or manager. He assigned the plots of ground for the various tenant families and more or less determined every important aspect of their farming activities. He fixed the working hours, determined the holidays, and controlled the disposition of the work animals and machinery. Where the work was done by hired hands, they were organized into work gangs under overseers or labor bosses.²⁰

In the South smaller plantations often operate as parts of a larger plantation community. But, whether large or small, the plantation is still the focus and center of life for large numbers of white and colored people in the South. The pattern of solidar-

ity and integration is tied to a class and color-caste system. Moreover, the influence often reaches beyond the plantation itself. Woofter remarks: "Plantation customs and ideology set the pattern for relationships in small farm units. . . . Large planters persistently emerge as the political and economic leaders of the cotton areas . . . and the plantation stands out as the basis for a hereditary oligarchy in southern community life."²¹

Modifications of the plantation system are found in some of the large-scale corporation farms of California and elsewhere. The vast vegetable acreage of the Imperial Valley is largely owned by corporations. The farms are run by managers and supervisors who hire laborers to do the work. The aim is high profit, and farming is made over into as efficient a system as is possible. Certainly the primary-group organization tends to disappear under such circumstances, except insofar as it continues to play a part in the noneconomic aspects of the lives of workers and managers.

So, too, the collective farms of the Soviet Union are but adaptations of the plantation system. We shall comment on them later.

Cultural Changes in Primary Communities

The continued extension of commercial farming with an eye to profits along with the introduction of machinery has greatly influenced the ecology and social organization of primary communities. In those countries where agriculture has come to operate under the system of money economy and the market, the self-sufficient farmstead, which still characterizes much of the world's agriculture, is disappearing. Self-sufficient agriculture has sometimes been associated with what is nostalgically called the "rural way" of life. No one has defined the "rural way" of life satisfactorily. O. E. Baker probably expressed what some people have in mind when they use this concept when he said, "... There is no way of developing responsibility in children

¹⁹ Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 158. By permission.

²⁰ See C. O. Brennan, "Relation of land tenure to plantation organization," *Department of Agriculture Bulletin*, no. 1269; Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1924.

²¹ Woofter, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

equal to the care of livestock, and no occupation that develops independence and self-reliance equal to agriculture."²² It also apparently assumes many noneconomic values and attitudes: love of the outdoors, sense of individuality and freedom, neighborliness, a solid familism, and traditional religious-moral views and practices.

In any case, the introduction of commercialization and mechanization into agriculture means that the urban ways of life more and more influence rural culture. Moreover, once the shift gets well under way, business and industrial views and methods come to affect not only production and marketing but the level of living, social participation, and personal adjustments in rural society. And there is not very much that any sentimental reformers can do about it.

Cumulative impact of industrialization.

Until rapid means of transportation and communication were introduced, with the consequent intrusion of urban culture into these rural and village areas, the small town and village communities were not very different from the farming regions around. Contact for the most part was face-to-face in character. There was a strong sense of independence, on the one hand, and a kind of rural solidarity on the other. There was a strong conservatism and a distinct prejudice against new ideas and practices except perhaps those bearing directly upon economic techniques.

The range of reaction was limited largely to the primary community. Contacts with the outside came through some reading of newspapers, perhaps, and through such institutions as the school, the political forum, and the church, although even these reflected the rural culture for the most part. However, it was the towns in the farming areas which experienced the first breakdowns of primary-group organization. The initial impact was usually in their economic functions. The trend from self-sufficiency

to specialization, money economy, and domination by the urban centers outside is well-illustrated in the Waterville community cited above. As the authors of the study say:

"... the little neighborhood cooper shop and gristmill had already given way to the larger lumber yard and flour mill of the village, but now these in turn were to give way before the centralized factories of the cities. One by one, the manufacturing establishments — gristmills, sawmills, foundries, tanneries, breweries — scattered along the banks of Big Creek ceased to operate. What Waterville *had done to the neighborhoods of the community*, Utica and Syracuse began to do to Waterville."²³

For the country at large we may add that what Utica and Syracuse did to Waterville, New York City and Buffalo, in time, did to Utica and Syracuse. Urban culture in all its aspects — economic, political, familial, recreational, esthetic, religious, and moral — is slowly but surely dissolving the age-long culture of the primary community.

Changes in agricultural production. One of the most striking effects of technology and a market economy on agriculture has been the increase in production. For example, in 1820 each farm worker produced enough agricultural products to support himself and about 3 other persons. In 1920 he could support himself and 9 others. In 1948 one farm worker supported himself and 13 others.²⁴ But a wide gap between commercial agriculture and self-sufficient farming remains. For the United States, approximately 90 per cent of the produce of farms sold in the market comes from about 50 per cent of all the farms. Associated with these general facts are some striking ones:

(1) For decades past there has been a steady stream of people leaving the farms of America for her towns and cities. Between 1940 and


²² Mather, Townsend, and Sanderson, *op. cit.*, p. 16. Italics not in the original.

²⁴ Martin R. Cooper and Glen T. Barton, "A century of farm mechanization," *The agricultural situation*, March-April, 1948, vol. 32, p. 9. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture.

²³ From O. E. Baker, Ralph Borsodi, and M. L. Wilson, *Agriculture in modern life*, pp. 271-272. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939. See Part Four of this book, "The future of rural life."


FIGURE 37

A. FARM OUTPUT, 1910-1947, WITH PROJECTIONS TO 1975, ASSUMING HIGH EMPLOYMENT TREND



1947, for example, nearly 2,500,000 families left the farm areas. As a result, in 1947 "only about 17 per cent of the nation's households were on rural farms," — a drop from the 20-per-cent figure as of 1940. (See Figure 53, page 301.) (2) There has been a steady decline in the number of farms. In 1940 there were 350,000 fewer farms than in 1920. Between 1940 and 1945 there was another loss of 237,000 farm units. (3) Yet the total farming acreage has risen steadily. In 1920 there were 956 million acres; in 1945 there were 1142 million, an increase of 12 per cent. (4) Along with these changes, farm production has risen steadily. Between 1910 and 1948 it rose about two thirds and at an accelerated rate. The 1948 production was 30 per cent higher than the 1935-1939 average. Figure 37A shows the changes in crop production per acre from 1910 to 1947 with projection of a continuing upward trend, if employment and industrial production generally remain high. "Even under favorable conditions, the trend is likely to be upward though at a slower rate."²⁵ (5) Moreover, from 1910, although the number of persons employed on farms has declined, the farm output per worker has risen steadily and at a faster rate for the decade 1935-1945. These data, for the period 1920-1947, are shown in Figure 37B.

While these facts show remarkable improvements, apparently the end of increasing production is not in sight, provided the conditions of prosperity continue. It is estimated, for example, that, as of 1939, more than 134 millions of acres could be added to cropland by such measures as drainage, more irrigation, breaking up cutover lands, and others. And all of these could be carefully

B. FARM OUTPUT PER WORKER COMPARED TO FARM EMPLOYMENT, UNITED STATES, 1920-1947²⁶

controlled if farmers used good land-use practices.²⁷

Causes of the increase. The increase in farm production has been made possible by mechanical, chemical, biological, and managerial advances. The basic soil and other resources are probably less adequate, rather than better, than they were.

Mechanical advances have been made in both the efficiency of equipment and the use of power. Although the steel plow, the cotton gin, and the reaper were important in the first mechanization of farming, the combined harvester-thresher, the tractor, the truck, the corn picker, the cotton picker, and the multirow tillage equipment, together with the use of steam, gasoline, and electricity, have further revolutionized farm practice and farm production. For example, from 1925 to 1948, the number of tractors on farms increased fourfold, from 600,000 to 3,000,000. In the same period of time, the number of horses and mules on farms declined from 22.5 million to about 9 million. It is estimated that by 1975 American farmers will have at least 5 million tractors but probably no more than 4 million horses and mules.²⁸ Such a shift, of course, means the release of land formerly used to feed the workstock. "The cropland and pasture released by this shift [to machine power] since 1918 was enough to feed about 19 million head of cattle and calves in 1947. The saving in grain was enough to feed about 25 million hogs to market weight."²⁹ Some


²⁷ See Sherman E. Johnson, "How much can we increase production," *The agricultural situation*, 1948, 32, no. 5, p. 9.

²⁸ See Cooper and Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

²⁹ Carl P. Heisig and C. W. Crickman, "Changes in farming after 1948," *The agricultural situation*, 1948, 32, no. 2, p. 9.

²⁵ See Glen T. Barton, "Bigger farm production ahead," *The agricultural situation*, 1948, 32, no. 7, pp. 8-9.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.



PICKING COTTON BY HAND: A SLOW AND TEDIOUS JOB

Ewing Galloway

further implications of these changes are informative:

(1) Production from the acreage released by mechanization accounted for one half of the increased output of farms between 1920 and 1940. (2) In 1945 "each man-hour of farm work meant 44 per cent more total production" than in 1917-1921, and half of this saving in man-hours "resulted from mechanization." (3) "A modern tractor and its equipment now saves about 850 hours of man labor compared with the time required with the animal power and equipment used a generation ago." Part of this saving is in lessening the time needed to care for work-stock, partly from speed-up in work that can be done in a given period of time. Using the same plow (2-plow unit), a 15-horsepower tractor will plow 8 acres a day. With the same equipment "5 good horses will plow only 4 acres" a day. In the wheat belt of the Great Plains an acre of wheat can be harvested in 3 hours of man labor or less. With horse-drawn equipment it took 8 man-hours per acre.³⁰

³⁰ These facts and short quotations are from Cooper and Barton, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

(4) However, there are still some differentials. For example, in 1946 nine tenths of the harvesting of small grains was done by power machinery. In contrast, but 43 per cent of potato and cotton planting and 45 per cent of the cotton cultivating were done by tractor machines.³¹ In regard to cotton, one of the next big steps in mechanization will be the widespread introduction of the mechanical stripper and/or picker.

(5) A summary view of the impact of mechanization on American agriculture shows, among other things, the following: In 1945 farmers had nearly five and a half times as much farm power, machinery, and equipment as in 1870, though farm output for human use was only four and a half times as great. During this period, farm employment increased less than 50 per cent. During the period 1910-1945 the "total physical production costs (inputs of labor, power, land, and other resources) per unit of farm output were reduced about 26 per cent." In the same time, physical costs of labor, power, and

³¹ Data for this paragraph are from A. P. Brodell and J. A. Ewing, "Farmers mechanize work at record rate in last decade," *The agricultural situation*, 1948, 32, no. 10, pp. 10-11.

*Ewing Galloway*

A MECHANICAL COTTON PICKER CAN REPLACE 40 TO 60 HAND PICKERS

machinery per unit of output declined about 30 per cent.³²

Chemical technology has affected agricultural production chiefly in the treatment of the soil and the control of pests and diseases. The use of commercial fertilizers and careful testing of soil requirements have markedly influenced the output per acre; and improved uses of sprays for plants and medicines for animals have also made the farm more productive.

Biological research has been of great importance in increasing yields of the major crops — corn, cotton, wheat, potatoes, and sugar beets. Many new disease-resisting varieties of plants are being introduced. For example, the introduction of early-maturing cotton reduced losses due to the boll weevil. Selective breeding of livestock and cross-breeding of plants are influencing both quantity and quality of agricultural production. Hybrid corn has marked a real advance in efficiency. It "upped corn yields in the Corn Belt nearly 20 per cent."³³

In addition to the changes in production brought about by mechanical, chemical, and biological improvements, the factor of management must not be overlooked. Methods of bookkeeping, of marketing organizations, and of careful ordering of agricultural operations have greatly increased production. Still, only part of the known techniques for enhancing agricultural output are now in use. For example, the applications of nuclear physics may cause as great a change in agriculture as it may in factory and transportation systems.

Levels of living. An excellent measure of technological advancement is the increase in the quantity and quality of goods and services which go to consumers. The availability of a wide range of consumable and semidurable goods at reasonable prices is a tribute to America's efficient productive system. Yet levels of living consist not only of material things, such as food, clothes, housing, automobiles, and radios, but also of education, availability and use of leisure time, and other intangibles.

³² See Cooper and Barron, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³³ Heistig and Crickman, *op. cit.*

TABLE 13

AVERAGE DOLLAR EXPENDITURES FOR MAJOR ITEMS OF CONSUMPTION OF FAMILIES OF TWO OR MORE PERSONS, UNITED STATES, RURAL-FARM, RURAL-NONFARM, AND URBAN, BY TYPE OF COMMUNITY, 1941 ³⁴

CONSUMPTION ITEM	TYPE OF COMMUNITY			
	U. S.	Rural-Farm	Rural-Nonfarm	Urban
Total	2057	1374	1470	2468
Food	660	601	513	729
Housing	430	236	279	542
Household Operation	88	35	54	120
Furnishings	111	73	89	128
Clothing	251	158	170	308
Automobile	187	104	152	223
Other Transportation	36	7	15	53
Personal Care	39	20	25	50
Medical Care	91	62	71	107
Recreation	74	27	36	101
Tobacco	37	17	26	48
Reading	18	8	11	23
Education	17	9	11	18
Other	18	17	18	18

Level of living may be measured by the goods and services possessed by a person or family. Since industrialized countries and their economic satellites live under the money economy, many of these things may be measured by income or money equivalents. Let us compare the incomes of farm and nonfarm people.

For the United States the net per-capita income of the farm population has been consistently much lower than that of the nonfarm population. In 1910, for example, the net income per capita of persons on farms was \$130; for nonfarm people it was \$482. In 1946 the incomes were \$620 and \$1326. However, it is extremely difficult to compute income of farm people as it relates to standards of living. Farmers raise and consume much of their own food. Urban people do not but have to use their incomes for such purchases. But bearing these factors in mind, the ratios of farm to nonfarm incomes are revealing. In 1910 the farm income stood to the nonfarm in the ratio of 1 to 3.7; in 1918 it was 1 to 2.2; in

1921 it had fallen to 1 to 6; in 1929, 1 to 3.9; in 1932, 1 to 6 again; in 1946, 1 to 2.1, the highest ratio in our history.

These ratios show that as compared to the nonfarm individual, the farmer or farm worker was best off in times of business prosperity — 1918, 1929, and 1946 — and worst off in periods of business depressions — 1921 and 1932. For the entire period, 1910 to 1946, "the average per-capita net income of people on farms has been less than half as much as the average for people not on farms." ³⁵ While net incomes generally went up during the prosperous period of World War II and thereafter, the gains of farm people were a little higher than those of nonfarm. A comparison of the per-capita net income for 1935-1939 with that of 1946 shows that for persons living on farms it increased 3.2 times; for nonfarm persons only 2.1 times. ³⁶

Differences of income available for family living are also shown in the amount spent for particular items and the types of services. Table 13 compares average dollar expenditures for major consumption items of families with two or more persons, classified by type of community for 1941. It is clear that

³⁴ Walter C. McKain, Jr., and Grace L. Flagg, "Differences between rural and urban levels of living. Part I. National comparisons," p. 5. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, January, 1948 (mimeographed). Their net income figures differ slightly from those of Norcross, cited below.

³⁵ Harry C. Norcross, "Net income per person on farms," *The agricultural situation*, 1947, 37, no. 10, p. 5.


³⁶ From McKain and Flagg, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

for all items the rural-farm families spend less than urban families. The rural-nonfarm families have an intermediate position.

Other detailed comparisons on selected goods and services are shown in Figure 38. Not only in household fixtures but in medical services and schooling, farm people are disadvantaged in comparison to rural-nonfarm or urban families.

FIGURE 38


HOUSEHOLD FIXTURES, 1945; EDUCATIONAL LEVELS PER PERSON 25-29 YEARS OF AGE, 1940; AND PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL SERVICES IN CHILDBIRTH, 1940; FOR RURAL-FARM, RURAL-NONFARM, AND URBAN POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES ³⁷



³⁷ From McKain and Flagg, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 10, 12.

FIGURE 39

PERCENTAGE OF FARM OPERATORS REPORTING SPECIFIED FAMILY LIVING ITEMS, UNITED STATES, 1920-1945 ³⁸



Yet the spread of some of these items to rural areas has been going on rapidly. This is brought out in Figure 39. The very striking diffusion in the radio is in keeping with its spread in urban areas. The radio has become an important source of news and information as well as entertainment for rural men and women alike. The men give first priority to the news and information, and the women to entertainment as a source of satisfaction.³⁹

Further improvement in amounts of household equipment, in accessibility and use of more and better dental and medical care, extension of educational opportunities, and other items which help make up a high plane of living will depend on general business and industrial prosperity. Only high nation-wide production keeps farm as well as other incomes at a high point. Better levels of living will also depend on the expansion of public and privately sponsored programs to improve health and education.

³⁸ From "Trends in farm family levels and standards of living." Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, August, 1947 (mimeographed).

³⁹ See "Attitudes of rural people toward radio service: a nationwide survey of farm and small-town people." Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, January, 1946 (mimeographed).

While "the pride of working with nature and producing food and fiber for the entire population"⁴⁰ and a certain sense of personal independence and satisfaction in working outdoors may serve to offset the material disadvantages of farm life, as urban values spread to rural areas we may expect more pressure from farmers to secure what they feel is their share of the national wealth.

American farmers are better off than any other farmers in the world today. But along with this, as mechanization and commercialization spread to agriculture, our farmers are also going to be subject to fluctuations in money and the market which investors in factories and businesses face in cities. They cannot expect to keep some of the older benefits of the rural way of life and at the same time participate fully in an industrialized and money economy. Changes in tenure systems, the rise of a farm-laborer group, and the emergence of sharper class differences in primary communities are all witness to this aspect of social-cultural changes in rural life.

Tenure systems. Ownership of one's farm has long been a high value to peasants and farmers everywhere. Land hunger is a common characteristic of those who till the soil. This is especially true where the pattern of economic self-sufficiency is common. Moreover, the relative acreage in self-sufficient farming is usually small. Yet the system of landlordism and tenancy is also widespread, especially where the feudal estates carried over to the modern age, as in parts of Europe, or where large grants of land were made by governments to individuals in the period of colonization of the Americas and elsewhere. And wherever commercialized agriculture has appeared, there has been a tendency to landlordism. This is clear in the grain areas of central, southeastern, and eastern Europe. The plantation system of the colonial areas is another example. This tendency meant a shift in the relative economic importance of small, self-sufficient owners to those who sought to make profits

by selling farm products in the world markets.

The situation in the United States has, in part, followed this trend. Today there are fewer farms than earlier, but the farms are, on the average, larger. In 1920 there were about 6.3 million farms with an average size of 150 acres; in 1945 there were only 5.6 million farms, but the average size had risen to 175 acres. That the trend is to rather large acreage is shown by the fact that in 1948 more than 40 per cent of all farms were 1000 acres or over.

As to tenure, the number of owners between 1880 and 1940 declined, and this decline in part reflects the increase in the average size of farm unit. In the same period the number of tenants increased. Between 1940 and 1945, due to prosperous times, increased mechanization, and other factors, the number of owner-operated farms increased while the number of tenant farms decreased somewhat.

The usual statistics on tenancy in this country, however, are somewhat misleading. Share-croppers, who are found chiefly in the cotton areas of the South, are counted as tenants. By most reasonable criteria they should be considered farm laborers who, instead of being paid in money wages, are paid in produce. Their situation is quite different from that of a tenant in the corn, wheat, or dairy regions who rents the land for cash. The decrease of 100 per cent in the number of share-croppers between 1940 and 1947 reflects the shift from the share-cropping to the hired-hand system of farming. This shift is being abetted, of course, by the coming of mechanical cultivators and harvesters in cotton. This change is symptomatic of the larger importance of the farm laborer in our agricultural economy.

Farm laborers. In 1947 about 4.1 million persons hired out to do farm work. Most of this labor was seasonal or part-time work. Of a sample of 3.4 million farm laborers of this total, only 30 per cent reported working 150 days or more in agriculture. In fact, only 1.2 million said that farm wage work was their chief occupation. Another 800,000 said farm wage work was their main occupation but that they also did some nonfarm work. Some of these two million represent the traditional hired man who lives with the

⁴⁰ McKain and Flagg, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

farm family, or near by, and who is relatively well-integrated into the community life. In addition, farmers employ about 900,000 seasonal workers recruited from school youth, housewives, and others, chiefly older persons.⁴¹

Yet there is a growing fraction of seasonal workers who have little other source of income than farm labor. They move from place to place as crops are planted and especially as they are harvested. These we call *migratory* labor. The exact number of them is unknown, but estimates for 1940 gave 325,000 in Texas; 200,000 in California; 75,000 in the Pacific Northwest; and 30,000 in Arizona. More thousands were scattered in the berry and truck-garden sections of the Midwest and the North Atlantic seaboard states, with about 30,000 additional in Florida and 93,000 in the sugar-beet areas throughout the country.⁴²

The migratory labor force in agriculture will doubtless grow in importance. So far as the primary community is concerned, this means that these individuals and their families will likely have less and less place in the group life of farmers and managers with whom they come into contact. Their relations are those of cash for wages. They have no roots in any given farm or community. Their children often get quite inadequate schooling. And in times of severe unemployment these individuals and families suffer from loss of income and fall back upon public and private relief agencies for help. The socialists would call these the farm proletariat.⁴³

In terms of the larger national picture, such people cannot be neglected nor ignored. They are an increasingly important

part of our total labor force. Sooner or later some kind of structuring of their relations with the wider community life will emerge, whether it be planned or unplanned.

Related to the increase of farm laborers, especially the migratory kind, is the emergence of labor unions among farm workers. This movement reflects the widening difference in income, work roles, attitude, and values between farm owners or high-income tenants and the laboring force. While mechanization of farming may, in part, reduce the need for the latter, it may also, when associated with large cash-cropping by individual or corporate owners, lead to more and more use of hired labor on the farm.

Status and agriculture. In the old days, a commonly assumed picture of social-economic mobility in rural America was that of the "agricultural ladder." It was said that a man might begin either as a hired hand or as a small tenant and as he made good move up the "ladder" to larger tenant or part-owner and then to full owner. There is no doubt that this was fairly common at an earlier date. The pattern continues in some areas today. But it never was completely universal in the United States, and it seems to be disappearing under the impact of farming for profits.⁴⁴ It is apparent that the present further spread of commercial agriculture is accompanied by shifts in the owner-tenant ratios. It is equally clear that we are witnessing the gradual emergence of an agricultural laboring class which will be of more importance economically and otherwise than it has been hitherto.⁴⁵ It is

⁴¹ See Louis J. Ducoff, "4.1 million drew wages in '47," *The agricultural situation*, 1948, 32, no. 7, pp. 13-14.

⁴² For a brief review of the topic of migratory labor, see Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-139. See also "Migrant labor, a human problem." Report and recommendation of Federal Committee on Migrant Labor. Washington, D. C.: Department of Labor, 1947.

⁴³ For a literary account of some of the problems of migratory labor in hard times see John Steinbeck, *The grapes of wrath*. New York: The Viking Press, 1939. See also Carey McWilliams, *Factories in the fields*. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1939.

⁴⁴ See Carl C. Taylor, Louis J. Ducoff, and Margaret J. Hagood, "Trends in the tenure status of farm workers in the United States since 1880." Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, July, 1948 (multigraphed). On the historical aspects of the ladder theory, see La Wanda F. Cox, "Tenancy in the United States 1865-1900: a consideration of the validity of the agricultural ladder hypothesis," *Agricultural History*, 1944, 18: 97.

⁴⁵ For a thoughtful analysis of one example of such a shift, see John W. Bennett, "Culture change and personality in a rural society," *Social Forces*, 1944, 23: 123-132. (Listed in Table of Contents of periodical, both for December, 1944, and for entire volume, as "The culture of a transitional rural society.")

but another evidence of the change in cultural shift from primary to secondary types of social organization.

Competition, Conflict, and Cooperation

Like any other of the larger social groupings, primary communities may be studied either from an institutional or from a processual standpoint. The course of social-cultural changes in technology and economy which we have just presented is a case in point. In the present section we shall deal with the oppositional and co-operative activities of individuals and groups which make up the total primary community.

Competition. The competitive pattern has always had a place in the primary as in the secondary community. Struggle for wealth, status, and other marks of power are more or less universal. But the intrusion of money economy and commercialism have served to make the small-community resident, whether farmer or not, more and more aware of the importance of competition in our society. There is more and more awareness that to make good as a farmer or as a person who serves the farmer as a small-town merchant or other, one must "be on his toes." One must adopt the urban ways of taking risks and seeking profits. The same view is seen in the competition for land, in the efforts to gear one's crops to the best chances of high returns from cash crops in the market, and in the further emergence of the devices of money economy and good managerial practices. In the days when self-sufficient economy was the chief pattern of farming, the competitive spirit along economic lines was less evident. Co-operative planting and harvesting, barn-raising, and other mutual-aid activities were a common thing among neighbors. These virtues of primary-group life tend to disappear in the face of anxious concern to escape failure by showing a cash profit at the end of the year.

Conflict. As we saw in chapter 5, conflict is a form of opposition that aims at putting

one's opponent out of the race, either temporarily or permanently, as a requisite to secure the goal or reward desired. This may take place at either conscious or unconscious level. When the groups in opposition focus their attention on the most dominant values of the community, we may speak of community conflict. It is illustrated in the struggle of rural *vs.* urban culture as a way of life.

The city has played a less important part in history than has the country. The bulk of the population has until recently lived on the land, and it is only natural that the dwellers on the soil should look askance at their city cousins. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) well expressed some of the feeling of the 18th century on this question when he said:

"The mobs of the great cities add just so much to the support of pure government as sores do to the strength of the human body. . . . Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most dependent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country and wedded to its liberties by the most lasting bonds. . . ." ⁴⁶

Urban-rural conflict is largely a cultural struggle resulting from the breakdown of isolation and the interplay of new forces of culture with the old. As a matter of fact, the present-day struggle arises, in part, as a reaction to the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the rural world.

One of the central and perhaps most important factors in this struggle is the economic, characterized by resistance of farmers to town and city merchants, their dislike of city bankers and high interest charges, and above all else the fear of low and insufficient prices for farm products and the accompanying antagonism to middlemen, merchants, and the entrepreneurs with whom they must deal.

During periods of economic depression, farmers come into open opposition with the urban business interests. Their inability to pay their debts leads them to advocate

⁴⁶ Quoted by C. A. Beard, "The city's place in civilization," *Survey*, 1928, 71 : 213.

cheap money or other devices to raise prices. Some farm groups may actually resort to violence, as they did during the depression following 1930, when armed crowds of farmers prevented sheriffs' sales of mortgaged goods, or when they actually invaded the courtrooms in Middle-Western county seats and tried to prevent legal judgments against their friends, or when they attacked milk trucks and destroyed fluid milk en route to city markets.

The rural dweller resents the heavy tax burden which he carries. Farmers frequently believe that rural areas are taxed to benefit the cities. Although this is not necessarily true, the stereotype influences their behavior. On the state and national fronts the American farmers wield great power, both by reason of our senatorial system and by reason of well-organized pressure groups.

For the most part, country people are more conservative in their religious and moral ideas than are city people. In the struggle of fundamentalism *vs.* modernism, the rural church members tend to support the former, while the urban members incline to more liberal views. Simply because the city symbolizes the "world" and "sin," rural folks sometimes prefer their small, poorly manned open-country churches to better-managed city churches which are easily accessible. The changing personal morality of the world outside is gradually encroaching upon the time-worn ideas and practices of country people. The rural young people, especially, are carrying this conflict directly into the homes of their parents.

In educational matters, too, the rural areas have been slow to fit the school system to a world of rapid communication and travel and to the modern economic and political order outside. The persistence of one- and two-room schoolhouses in some of our more enlightened states is but an evidence of the strong locality feeling which is aroused at every threat from the larger government to encroach on their traditional legal rights.

Yet the continued rapid intrusion of urban culture into country areas, in time, will modify the intensity of this conflict. If

modern business methods are thrust into agriculture, many of the older customs of the farmer will disappear; his ideas will become urbanized; and while the conflict may not disappear, it will shift into the arena of industrial, business, or other economic conflict in which the locality features will not count.

Sometimes the conflicts concern groups within the primary community. Such were the struggles between the cattlemen and the farmers who wished to enclose the range and plant wheat and other crops. So, too, there was a long and bitter feud in the West and Southwest between the cattlemen and the sheepmen for the use of the range itself. As is usual in these cases, in time the conflict meant either the elimination of one of the opponents or the resort to some kind of compromise.

On occasion, primary societies have experienced controversies between older American residents and immigrant ethnic groups who moved into a farming area. The strange ways and stranger tongue of immigrants often set up anxiety on the part of the old-timers. This may have been expressed in reference to religion, to education as related to parochial schools, and to farm practices. A reasonable generalization, however, is that where such conflicts become intense they also have an economic base. The intruders are said to have a lower standard of living, to work longer hours, to exploit nature and persons, and otherwise to depart from the accepted folkways of the community. The struggles between the Japanese and the white farmers in California is a case in which racialist dogmas also played a part.

Other examples of conflict which have touched rural life are movements such as the Grange, the "Populist Revolt," the Farmers' Union, the Farm Holiday Association, and others. They represent a struggle of farmers to secure what they consider a fairer deal with respect to prices of farm products, lower freight rates, lower interest charges, and related matters.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ See D. E. Lindstrom, *American farmers' and rural organizations*. Champaign, Illinois: The Garrard Press, 1948.

A more recent conflict which concerns rural life is the growing struggle between farm owners and farm laborers where commercialization of agriculture means, practically, the introduction of factory methods and the wage system into agricultural production. (See above.) The Pacific Coast region and the market-gardening and fruit areas everywhere have experienced most of this conflict. The wheat, cotton, and tobacco-growing sections are just beginning to feel the impact of this struggle.

Co-operation. In addition to the informal co-operation of farm neighbors, various economic organizations have been developed to counteract the felt pressure of the capitalist competitive system on the farmer. The nature and function of such organizations is set forth in a federal report on co-operatives in Europe: "A co-operative enterprise is one which belongs to the people who use its services, the control of which rests equally with all the members, and the gains of which are distributed to the members in proportion to the use they make of its services."⁴⁸

The economic co-operatives in Western societies have usually grown up with capitalism and not in political opposition to it. On

⁴⁸ From *The report of the inquiry on co-operative enterprise in Europe, 1937*, p. 19. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1937.

⁴⁹ Data for 1900-1938 from R. H. Ellsworth, "The story of farmers' co-operatives," Farm Credit Administration, circular E-23, p. 11. For 1939-1945, *United States Statistical Abstract*, 1947, p. 625.

the whole, however, co-operative organizations are not as common in the United States as in Europe. This probably reflects the higher productivity and generally higher level of living in this country than elsewhere. Co-operatives seem to emerge when the economic pinch is severe and to decline in number and force with the return of prosperity.

Farmer co-operatives are organized for both buying and selling. In 1943 American farm co-operatives reported 3,850,000 members. Over two thirds of these were in the latter category.⁵⁰

The basic pattern of economic co-operatives was set down in the 1830's in England under the stimulation of the social reformer Robert Owen (1771-1858). The first really successful effort of this sort was begun in Rochdale, England, in November, 1843; and the practice has spread widely under the title "The Rochdale Co-operative Movement." The basic aim is said to be democracy, not profits. Membership in the corporation is usually open to all on equal terms, usually in the form of low-priced shares. Democratic control is secured by the practice of "one man, one vote." That is, each shareholder has but one vote as to management, no matter how many shares he may own. Over and above operating costs, surpluses go back to the members in ratio to their total purchases. So, too, capital may be built up from surpluses as well as from

⁵⁰ Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

FIGURE 40
NUMBER OF ACTIVE CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS¹





FIGURE 41

CHANGES IN THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PRODUCTS AND PURCHASING IN FARMERS' CO-OPERATIVES, 1913-1946⁵¹



money paid in for shares of stock. Sometimes surpluses are used for education or other noneconomic purposes, as members decide. There are some variations in the details of organization and management but, on the whole, present-day co-operatives in the Western world at least, have not departed very far from the earlier pattern.

There are no accurate figures on the exact number of co-operatives of various kinds in this country, but Lowry Nelson lists 35,557 divided into nine categories.⁵² Figure 40 shows the growth of active co-operative marketing associations in the United States from 1900 to 1945, taken from various governmental reports.

The peak in number of organizations was reached in 1922, when there were nearly 12,000. Since then the number has declined although the average size of the associations has increased. In addition to marketing co-operatives, there are mutual fire insurance and mutual telephone companies, power and light associations, and various others concerned with financing, processing of farm products, for "supplying farm requirements" such as fertilizers, hatcheries, feed mills, grain elevators, machinery, oil, and gas. Others concern production directly, as in the case of irrigation companies, soil-conservation asso-

ciations, and organizations to improve dairy or other stock by sound breeding. Still others have to do with purchasing. Some of the chief products handled by co-operatives are shown in Figure 41. Dairy products and livestock have grown steadily in importance, while fruits and vegetables and grains have lost steadily. Note also that co-operative purchasing of farm supplies increased from less than two per cent of all co-operative activities in 1913 to over 14 per cent in 1945-1946.

There are some regional differences in the use of co-operatives. Nearly two thirds of the total associations are located in the North Central states where Scandinavian and Finnish influences have been strong. This is obviously a case of cultural diffusion from the Old to the New World. Producers' co-operatives are strong in the citrus and other fruit enterprises. Strictly speaking, such organizations should not be called co-operatives. These organized growers often have what is, in effect, a monopoly of the market. Certainly this is hardly the spirit in which most co-operatives developed.

Co-operative communities. More ambitious in aim and complex in organization than the usual consumer co-operative or producer co-operative are the attempts to build the entire agriculture and community life around co-operation. Sometimes these communities are thoroughly socialistic; some allow more individual latitude. Brief

⁵¹ For 1913 to 1937-1938 from Ellsworth, *op. cit.*, p. 23. For 1943-1944 and 1945-1946, *United States Statistical Abstract*, 1947, p. 624.

⁵² Nelson, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

PLACE AND PEOPLE

tion of historical instances of such communities was made above when we discussed agricultural village. Here we note a few principles of contemporary settlements.

In Mexico, after the Revolution of 1915, an effort was made to return to the rural localities the communal lands which, it was held, had been taken from them earlier by the large landowners. Places which had such communal property are called *Ejido*. Sometimes the land which was returned was parceled out to the peasants on an individual basis. In other cases collective cultivation has been tried, and efforts have been made to build community around such co-operative work.

In Israel (Zionist Palestine) various co-operative ventures have been developed. Some, like The Small-holders' Co-operative Settlement, combine individual ownership with various co-operative associations of more or less traditional type. Other settlements have large estates and employ hired labor but also use various co-operative devices. The *Kvutza* (plural *Kvutzot*), in contrast, was set up by the National Fund. The property does not belong to the members, either individually or as a group. Title rests with the national agency. But the economic operations are collectively carried out, and the villages are communally controlled.⁵³

The *Kolkhoz* (plural *Kolkhozy*), or collective farm of Soviet Russia, is often cited as a type of large-scale co-operative enterprise. However, it is well to note that all the basic controls as to tillage, crops, machinery to be used, and the disposal of the produce are in the hands of the highly centralized and authoritarian government. Certainly there is nothing in the organization or management of the *Kolkhozy* which resembles the Rochdale pattern of co-operation, the pattern which has tended to mark most of the co-operatives in Western Europe, the United States, and in the British Dominions. In fact, in addition to agricultural production it is also frankly "an instrument of proletarianization of the peasants."⁵⁴

⁵³ See Henrik F. Infield, *Co-operative communities at work*, p. 141, New York: The Dryden Press, 1945; and W. C. Lowdermilk, *Palestine, Land of promise*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. See also, Nathan L. Whetten, *Rural Mexico*. Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1948.

⁵⁴ See Infield, *op. cit.*, chapter 8, on the Russian Collectives. His account seems a little naive as to the wider political and economic implications of

The case of the *Kolkhoz* affords a good point on which to close this section since it raises a neat point about the nature of voluntary co-operation. Thus, if voluntary co-operation is considered to be a component of the democratic way of life, it can exist only to a limited degree, if at all, under authoritarianism. Whatever co-operation there is under the latter is likely to be of the "enforced" variety. Yet the democratic functions of co-operation may also be sharply limited in a society predominantly capitalistic, at least on the side of its economy.

In other words, if co-operation as a principle of social organization is to be more than an appendage to the profit system or than as a handy neighborhood organization to lighten the grocery bills, it must extend its area of operation and deepen its roots into the culture of the people to whom it would appeal. So long as it exists without touching the larger productive order, the profit system, and the political, educational, recreational, and artistic interests and organizations, it is not likely to become very important as a large cultural force. And while its ideals appear sound and worthy, and while a case could be made that democracy may only be salvaged by some sort of overall co-operative pattern, to date such a movement has lacked dynamic leadership and effective organization. As every revolutionist knows, without a powerful ideal, a close-knit organization, and a vigorous leadership no social-cultural movement will ever get anywhere. As presently organized, co-operative movements are at best mildly reformist, not revolutionary, in aim and method.

Participation and Interactional Patterns

The behavior of individuals who live in primary communities varies in terms of their ecological and cultural patterns. In the

that system. See, in contrast, Gregory Bienstock, S. M. Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow, *Management in Russian industry and agriculture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. The latter have a much more realistic account of the system.

present section we shall deal with some features of social interaction, largely noneconomic, which characterize primary groups. We begin with a discussion of isolation as it plays a part in rural life.

Isolation and the primary community.

Isolation means a limitation of the opportunity for stimulus and response. It grows out of a social situation which circumscribes the range of interaction. The limitations of contact depend chiefly on biological, psychological, geographical, and cultural factors. Psychological and biological factors are illustrated in the cases of feral man described in chapter 9. Our chief concern here is the effect upon the primary community of spatial or geographical isolation, which in reality is largely cultural.

The effects of isolation are evident in comparisons of the intelligence-test scores of urban and rural children. As a rule, school children in cities do better on the usual mental tests than do their country cousins. Moreover, there is a certain gradation in the test performance as one goes from larger cities to towns, to villages, to open country, and finally to sharply isolated communities. We note only two studies here.⁵⁵

G. A. Kempf and S. D. Collins report the following median intelligence IQ's for two counties in Illinois:

	A NORTHERN COUNTY	A SOUTHERN COUNTY
Urban	103.5	91
Rural	94.7	84

J. H. Hinds compared 581 high-school students in Texas on the Otis "Index of Brightness" (a measure something like the IQ) with the following results:

⁵⁵ See G. A. Kempf and S. D. Collins, "A study of the relation between mental and physical status of children in two counties of Illinois," *U. S. Public Health Report*, 1929, vol. 44: 1743-1784, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1929; and J. H. Hinds, "Comparison of brightness of country and city high school children," *Journal of Educational Research*, 1922, 5: 120-124. For an extended review of the literature on this topic, see Anne Anastasi, *Differential psychology*, chapter 19. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937.

	NUMBER OF PUPILS	MEDIAN INDEX
City schools	164	100.5
Affiliated town schools	290	98.0
Unaffiliated small-town schools	59	84.4
Rural schools	68	77.0

While it may be that there are some biologically inherited factors operating to produce certain of these deviations, in general these investigations, like others made in this country and in Europe, tend to bear out the thesis that a large part of the difference is due to the effects of cultural variability between rural and urban societies. Certainly the deviations along a continuum from highly isolated to city schools cannot be explained in mere biological terms. (See chapter 7.)

Combinations of geographic and cultural isolation induce variability in life patterns. As we observed in chapter 4, if the segregation continues over long periods, certain distinctions may arise which mark off one society sharply from another. On a smaller scale our own southern mountain whites typify the effects of isolation. Living for generations undisturbed by changes going around them, these people have continued a culture which still reflects the 17th and early 18th centuries. Habits, attitudes, and ideas are those of the colonist and pioneer, and there is a general suspicion of the outside world.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ See J. C. Campbell, *The southern highlander and his homeland*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1921; E. A. Ross, *World drift*, chapter 4, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1928; Percy Mackaye, *This fine pretty world*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924; M. T. Matthews, *Experience-worlds of mountain people*, Teachers College Contributions to Education, no. 700, New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1937; H. Kephart, *Our southern highlanders*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926. For comparison see O. W. Juneke, *Isolated communities: a study of a Labrador fishing village*, New York: American Book Company, 1937. Also, Peter A. Munch, *Sociology of Tristan da Cunha*, Oslo, Norway: I Kommisjon hos Jacob Dybwad, 1945, is an invaluable study of community isolation on an inaccessible island in the south Atlantic.

For a story of how the culture of a segregated and separatist religious group breaks down, see Jesse H. Ziegler, *The broken cup: three generations of Dunkers*. Elgin, Illinois: Brethren Publishing House, 1942.

Among the most interesting forms of isolation are the "cultural islands" of distinct groups that have persisted in the midst of highly secularized and technologically developed areas. By voluntary segregation the Amish, Mennonites, Dunkers, and other "plain people" who migrated from Europe have maintained certain cultural traits for centuries. Their clothing, agricultural practices, implements, and certain social institutions have been carried down with little change since the time of the Protestant Reformation. These groups have regarded the "simple life" as the "good life," and have fought doggedly to keep their children from being "worldly." The more conservative sects, particularly the House Amish, shun all technological innovations except some absolutely necessary to their economic success. Similarly, "agricultural islands" in which distinct occupational practices of bygone days have been retained, despite the methods commonly followed in the region, are found in several places in America. Walter M. Kollmorgen observed that the people of a German settlement in Cullman County, Alabama stand in striking contrast to the agricultural pattern of the region in that they practice diversified farming, own their own land, rotate their crops, abstain from borrowing money, work hard, and have a high standard of living.⁵⁷

Social participation. While the family and the neighborhood are the most primary of all associations, even primitive communities have some groups which serve the more special interests of their members. Tribal councils, secret societies, and formalized age, sex, and occupational groups cut across the

more elemental kinship and neighborhood contacts. In medieval communities there were always rather highly institutionalized groups, the church and the craft guilds being important examples. Nevertheless, in primary communities the number of such organizations is relatively small, and among those which do function the social contacts often tend to be informal. American rural communities differ widely in the number and kind of formal organizations.

In a small Pennsylvania community of under 2000 population, M. E. John found eight churches, two granges, a civic club, a chapter of Woman's Christian Temperance Union, a health club, a parent-teacher association, a band (65 members), a senior extension club for youth, a sportsman's association, a volunteer fire department, and three lodges. About three fourths of the population claimed membership in at least one of these groups. Of the persons in the community who had access to automobiles, nearly one third were members of three or more organized groups. Only one fifth of those without cars were affiliated with three or more groups. In addition to holding memberships in organizations, the people of this community attended annually a wide variety of special activities of secondary groups: 48 per cent attended plays, 40 per cent went to athletic contests, 38 per cent participated in patriotic programs, 31 per cent attended parties and socials, 30 per cent went to movies, 27 per cent ate at group suppers or banquets, 23 per cent visited fairs, 22 per cent heard musical programs, 7 per cent danced at public dances, and 8 per cent took part in miscellaneous other organizational activities. In addition to these formalized contacts there was a large amount of informal association, such as visiting, telephone conversations, and corner gossip.⁵⁸

The extent of participation in formally organized groups by farm adults is illustrated in an Ohio study, which found that of 566 men and women nearly one fourth were not affiliated with any group, one third were members of one group, nearly one fifth were members of two groups, and one fourth belonged to

⁵⁷ Walter M. Kollmorgen, "The German settlement in Cullman County, Alabama: an agricultural island in the cotton belt." Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, 1941. See also his "The German-Swiss in Franklin County, Tennessee: a study of the significance of cultural considerations in farming enterprises." Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1940 (mimeographed). On the Amish, see his "Culture of a contemporary rural community: The Old Order Amish of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania," *Rural Life Studies*, no. 4, Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1942.

⁵⁸ See M. E. John, "Forces influencing rural life: a study of a central Pennsylvania community," School of Agriculture and Experiment Station *Bulletin*, no. 388, pp. 20-23. State College: Pennsylvania State College, 1940.

three or more formally organized groups. When attendance rather than membership was considered, it was found that about one fourth had not attended a single function of an organization during the year, another one fourth went to meetings two or more times per month, while more than one fourth were active participants attending meetings every week. About 25 per cent had some leadership function.

In addition to formalized participation these persons engaged in a wide variety of informal activities, the most common of which was visiting. Nearly all families visited with friends or relatives at some time during the year, and about one third at least twice a week. Only one in twenty had such contacts less frequently than once a month. Telephone conversations were common and represented a form of visiting. Movies were attended by about one half of the families, but only one in twenty went as often as once a week. Several persons were found who had never been to a movie. Listening to the radio was popular, and reading served as a form of vicarious participation.⁵⁹

While social participation is both informal and formal, the former was probably much more dominant in earlier primary societies. Yet, despite the rise of many formal associations, such as the Grange and the 4-H Clubs, all kinds of informal interpersonal patterns remain. The nature of some of these is well brought out in a study by Leland B. Tate of a mountain community in Virginia.⁶⁰ As Tate puts it, these "include dozens of big and little doings." A few samples of these, listed alphabetically, following Tate, include: "attending auctions . . . family reunions, and funerals"; "back-sliding" . . . and "bootlegging"; "dancing . . . dreaming, and drinking"; "electioneering and exaggerating"; "fishing and fid-

dling"; "gambling" . . . and "gossiping"; "joking"; "opinionating and ordering"; "quarreling, quilting" . . . and "quizzing"; and "sitting up with the sick and the dead."⁶¹

Studies of more formal participation show a certain correlation among such factors as number of organizational memberships, leadership rules, income, and social status. People who belong to one formal association are likely to belong to two or three or more. W. A. Anderson's survey of Grange and non-Grange membership in two rural counties of New York brings out some of these facts:

(1) Farm-family persons who belong to the Grange have an average membership in four organizations altogether; non-Grange members, 1.2 organizations. (2) Non-Grange members have moved from place to place more often than Grange members. (3) Grange members have higher incomes, have "more household conveniences," "better communication facilities," and more often are "full farm owners" than those who are not members. (4) In matters of age distribution, class of farmland occupied, educational levels, and size and composition of families there were no statistically significant differences.⁶²

From what we have discussed up to this point it is clear that life in American primary communities is changing. Informal contacts are probably growing fewer, and there is more and more stress on formal but somewhat special-interest types of organization. The co-operatives, the Farm Bureau and Grange, and the 4-H Clubs, of course, reflect differentials in the scope of various farm associations. The church remains one of the oldest and most important of the integrating forces in the community. And fundamental to the whole social structure is the continuing important place of the farm family. Some conclusions of a study made in the heart of the wheat belt of Kansas bring out some aspects of the matter sharply.

⁵⁹ A. R. Mangus and H. R. Cottam, "Level of living, social participation, and adjustment of Ohio farm people," *Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin*, no. 624, pp. 37-38. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1941. See also H. R. Cottam, *Level of living, social participation, and social adjustment: a study of the standards of living of 299 Ohio farm families*. Ph.D. thesis, 1940. Madison: University of Wisconsin Library.

⁶⁰ Leland B. Tate, "Lebanon: a Virginia community," *Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin*, no. 352. Blacksburg: Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 1943.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁶² W. A. Anderson, "Farm families in the Grange," *Department of Rural Sociology, Mimeo-graph Bulletin*, 1943, no. 7. Ithaca: Agricultural Station, Cornell University.

PLACE AND PEOPLE

Farming in Ellis County has long been commercialized and mechanized, yet many of the older values remain. The churches remain the "centers of social values" and are the "foci of activity groupings." And though the earlier patriarchal pattern of the family is changing, family solidarity remains a crucial factor in home and community morale. Yet the fact "sharply fluctuating income" — associated with changes in price and production — profoundly affects both economic and emotional security. Psychological satisfactions alternate between those in prosperous and those in lean years. Awareness of the uncertainties of nature, coupled with uncertainties in the price of wheat, make for anxiety. In addition there has been a certain selective in- and out-migration. Many come in good times, only to leave poor. Some, like the descendants of the Russian-German immigrants, have gradually taken a larger place in the county. Their religious background and their more intelligent conservation and use of land resources have, among other things, made it possible for them to stay when others left. But whether of this stock or other, the inhabitants face a recurrent cycle of good and poor crops and a fluctuation in price levels. And since the birth rate is rather high and the economic opportunities somewhat limited, this, like other counties in the region, will continue to contribute many of its youth to other sections of the country, rural and urban.⁶³ (See chapter 16 on internal migration.)

Personal adjustment in the primary community. The extent to which the primary group affords an environment that leads to fewer personal frustrations and makes for greater contentment is not known. It has long been held that the face-to-face way of living permits a kind of interaction that is conducive to sound personalities. The degree of intimacy and the depth of interpersonal bonds permitted in such groups are believed to contribute to the satisfaction

of the basic social needs for security, companionship, and status in particular. But these are intangibles which are hard to measure. However, such broad indices as rates of crime and suicide and the incidence of mental disorders are somewhat helpful.

It is often said that suicide rates are a rough measure of satisfactory personal adjustment. On this basis, rural people are better off than urban. For 1938 the suicide rate for cities of more than 100,000 in comparison to that for places under 2500 stood in the ratio of 18 to 13 per 100,000 of the population.⁶⁴ So, too, crime rates reflect variations both in personal stability and community culture. In general, crime is much more prevalent in the city than in the country. The most striking differences are in such crimes as larceny (ratio of 5 to 1), auto theft (ratio of 4 to 1), and robbery and burglary (about 3 to 1). They are less sharp in murder, manslaughter, and rape (all three crimes in the ratio of about 1.2 to 1). (See Table 14, page 280, for details.)

Another broad measure is a comparison of rates of rejection of military draftees in World Wars I and II. In both wars the percentage of rejections was higher for rural than for urban men. In 1917, the percentage rejected was 21.7 for rural and 16.9 for urban. Using 1943 as an example for World War II, for full service only, the percentages were: urban, 41.6; rural, 46.2 rejected. The rejections for limited service only were slightly higher in urban than in rural areas, due perhaps to the fact that rural men eligible for this service were probably given deferments on the ground that they would be more useful working on farms.⁶⁵ For 1942-1943, the percentages of rejections for "mental deficiency by occupation" show that those engaged in farming, of any variety, had 53.4 rejections in comparison to 41.1 for those in all other occupations.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Calculated from *Vital statistics of the United States, 1938*, vol. I, p. 2, and vol. II, p. 93, and a release of the *Sixteenth census of population, 1940*, series P-3, no. 13, p. 2.

⁶⁵ From Frederick D. Mott and Milton I. Roemer, *Rural health and medical care*, p. 117. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948. The authors took their data from various governmental sources. The 1917 figures are not quite comparable to those for 1943 since they are based on selected large cities and certain all-state samples from localities of less than 1200 registrants. The 1943 figures follow the conventional census division. Unfortunately these do not show rural-nonfarm and rural-farm breakdowns.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶³ "Rural communities and organizations: a study group life in Ellis County, Kansas," Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, Kansas Agricultural Experiment Station, Circular 143, Manhattan, Kansas, March, 1948 (mimeographed). See also, Earl H. Bell, "Culture of a contemporary rural community: Sublette, Kansas," *Rural Life Studies*, no. 2, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1942.

These statistics and others tend to support the thesis, now being more widely accepted, that, in general, the rural population is less healthy than the urban. But, again, if such figures are broken down in terms of income level, educational status, race, and other variables, some of the overall differences might become less significant.

When we look into the mental health of people who live in primary communities, we soon become aware that it is the product of a variety of factors. The particularistic thesis that the isolation of farm life induces mental breakdown is as untenable as the opposite one — that farming makes for a high degree of sanity because farmers are independent persons who work outdoors. The figures on rural health, both physical and mental, are qualified by the extent and accuracy of the medical diagnoses; by availability of doctors and hospitals; and, with regard to mental health in particular, by people's attitudes. No one knows, for example, how many feeble-minded or mild psychotics are hidden away in American farm homes. While no doubt such secrecy is not unknown in our cities, there is less chance for such cases to go undetected by others. So, too, statistics as to increases in mental breakdowns must be qualified with respect to the general fact that we have an aging population. (See chapter 13.)

Of growing importance in measuring mental health are various personality tests and inventories. Most of these are of the paper-and-pencil variety and are open to question as to reliability and validity. Be that as it may, various studies show that in

general "rural children tend to rank somewhat lower than urban children in personality adjustment."⁶⁷ Many tests show that rural children are somewhat more introverted, have more sense of inferiority, feel more "withdrawn," and are less self-reliant than those of town and city. But it is also clear that these differences, in turn, are related to such factors as family income, level of living, nature and number of household appliances, educational opportunities, proximity to towns, social status, and others.⁶⁸

In spite of widespread changes of the kind we have described, the primary community is still a powerful factor in Western society. The individualism of the American farmer, the time-worn methods of managing farm business, the conservatism in education, politics, and religion — these and other items all stand out in spite of the recent changes. This pull of the locality as a focus for strong we-group feelings will continue for a long time to influence changes in the relation of the primary to the secondary communities. Much of American social behavior still has its roots in the forms of social interaction of rural life, and despite the impact of urban culture the rural influences will doubtless continue to be important.

⁶⁷ See Leland H. Stott, "Some environmental factors in relation to the personality adjustment of rural children," *Rural Sociology*, 1945, 10: 394-403. The article contains many references to the literature on this topic. See also, A. R. Mangus, "Personality adjustment of rural and urban children," *American Sociological Review*, 1948, 13: 566-575.

⁶⁸ See Leland H. Stott, "Family prosperity in relation to the psychological adjustments of farm folk," *Rural Sociology*, 1945, 10: 256-263, and citations therein to other literature. See also Mangus and Cortam, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-58.

Interpretative Summary

1. The primary-group organization of society goes back to prehistoric man.
2. The Neolithic Period of prehistory, marked as it was by domestication of plants and animals and settled villages, was one of the most important periods in the development of the basic values and institutions of the primary community.
3. In contrast, urban society and its culture are relatively a very recent development.
4. The ecological processes of community settlement and change are closely related to both geographic and cultural factors.
5. In the United States there are various types of primary community: (a) open-country, (b) village- or town-centered, (c) agricultural villages, and (d) the plantation.

6. The most profound changes in rural society and culture are due to commercialization and mechanization of farming.
7. Nevertheless, there remain many differences between farm and nonfarm populations — in income, household facilities, levels of living, educational status, and social participation.
8. People who live in rural neighborhoods and rural communities have many forms of interaction and participation which differ from those of highly urbanized society. Their relations tend to be more on a face-to-face basis, to be less specialized, and to be characterized by a stronger sense of mutual identification and the retention of older moral-religious values.
9. The future will likely see a synthesis of rural and urban cultural elements, but with a preponderance of the latter.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What was the Neolithic Revolution? Why was it important?
2. Define human ecology. Illustrate its applications to settlement and distribution of population and institutions in the primary community.
3. In what ways does the town stand midway between the open-country community and the larger city?
4. Summarize the chief implications of mechanization and commercialization of farming.
5. Compare the levels of living in country and city in terms of dollars and cents. Is the money-income difference really an adequate measure of the differences in levels of living, rural and urban?
6. Distinguish between a consumers' co-operative and a producers' co-operative.
7. How do you account for the fact that most producers' co-operatives in the United States concern agriculture, and not manufacturing and transportation?
8. What conditions in this country foster the spread of co-operatives; what retard the movement?
9. How does culture determine with whom and for what we co-operate? Could co-operation be made compulsory, say, at the hands of an all-powerful authoritarian state or church? Would such co-operation be effective and satisfying? Discuss this pro and con.
10. What indications are there that former rural-urban conflicts will tend to lessen in the future? That they may increase?
11. What does isolation mean in terms of intelligence, personality adjustment, and social participation in the culture?
12. What is meant by the expression "cultural island"? Illustrate.
13. How does the social participation of rural people differ from that of city folks whom you know?
14. What factors keep the American farmer from fully absorbing the urban way of life?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Albert Blumenthal, *Small-town stuff*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932.

A sociological analysis of a Montana town.

Pearl Buck, *The good earth*. New York: John Day Co., 1931.

A modern literary classic on rural life in China; but contains good social insight.

Knut Hamsun, *Growth of the soil*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921.

A modern literary classic on rural life in Norway; but contains rich understanding.

Wayland J. Hayes, *The small community looks ahead*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1947.

A sociological analysis of the place of the small community in the United States. Has an optimistic tone about the future, especially if Americans turn to planning.

John A. Kinneman, *The community in American society*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947.

A sociological analysis of both rural and urban American communities.

J. H. Kolb and Edmund deS. Brunner, *A study of rural society*, 3rd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946.

A standard textbook in rural sociology. Has good coverage of all phases.

Carl C. Taylor, *Rural life in Argentina*. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1948.

One of our leading rural sociologists describes and analyzes the rural society and culture of one of our important Latin-American neighbors.

Carl C. Taylor, et al., *Rural life in the United States*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.

A very good coverage; amply documented. The authors have all, at one time or another, been associated with the United States Department of Agriculture.

James West, *Plainville, U. S. A.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1945.

A carefully documented cultural and social-psychological study of a community in Arkansas by one who was brought up there.

Urban Communities

VARIOUS factors influenced the extent and nature of urban development. Many of the early cities were situated along trade routes or at strategic military points. These earlier centers, despite their size in some cases, remained essentially large rural towns until the Commercial and Industrial revolutions of the past three centuries made it possible for them to control, economically and otherwise, large hinterland areas. Urbanism, as a dominant form of social life, did not appear until technological advancement made possible the power machine, rapid transportation of goods, and easy communication.¹

The present chapter will discuss the modern city with reference to its ecology, its organizations and institutions, and with regard to certain distinctive interactional features.

The Ecology of Cities

As defined in the previous chapter, ecology concerns spatial and temporal relations of groups to groups, or of persons to groups, within the framework of the geographic and populational environment. Ecological relations may be studied from either the cross-sectional or the dynamic viewpoint. The first approach is illustrated graphically by a map which would show the distribution of business houses, theaters, and offices at the center of a city and the dwellings of people at the periphery and the lines of traffic connecting them. The dynamic approach has to do with changing interactions and functions through time. For example, the daily flow of traffic reveals changes of a short-run and recurrent kind. Residential mobility,

as when well-to-do families move out of a neighborhood and those of less wealth replace them, illustrates changes within a longer time span.

The spatial relations of people are always qualified by cultural definitions. In the United States the high stress on economic competition in the market sets the pattern for much of our urban development. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that catch-as-catch-can competition determines every aspect of ecological growth and change. A house and lot may be eyed by an enterprising merchant as a likely spot on which to build a retail store. But an owner whose ancestors settled on the place and on which the descendants have lived for generations may not be willing to sell. Here sentiment overcomes monetary motivation. Parishioners in some of our large cities continue to oppose selling their church buildings located in the heart of expanding business districts on quite irrational but strong emotional grounds. For instance, during the 1940's initial efforts made by the owners of Radio City in New York to buy the St. Nicholas Collegiate Church at the corner of 48th Street and Fifth Avenue were strongly opposed by part of the governing body of the church.

Yet the ecological standpoint and method have proved most helpful in understanding land use in both rural and urban communities. There is no fixed number of ecological processes, but in relation to most cities in the United States the following are important: (1) concentration or nucleation of people, (2) centralization of services, (3) decentralization, (4) segregation of population into various somewhat distinctive areas, (5) invasion of areas by certain groups, and (6) the succession of one group by another. These processes are all closely

¹ On the historical development of cities, see Niles Carpenter, *The sociology of city life*. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1931.

tied up with populational mobility: regional in- and out-migration, residential mobility, and daily movements within the community or area.

The location of cities. Before we take up the specific ecological processes let us look at the factors of site and development. These will furnish us a background for considering the various ecological processes.

The most obvious and the basic cultural factor in man's building a city is the general location in respect to lines of communication and transportation. Modern cities tend to grow up on trade routes, and trade tends to follow the lines of least resistance. Men float their goods down streams to remote markets. Land routes along valleys, over low passes in mountains, by way of a chain of oases in a desert — all represent man's efforts to overcome nature's hindrances with the least expenditure of energy and time. Wherever there is a break in this flow, cities are likely to arise: where the sea trade must be transferred to river travel, where the river trade goes over to land travel, or where there is a break in land travel due to topography, political barriers, or other factors. Paris, France, grew up where trade routes north and south met the Seine River. C. H. Cooley puts it thus: "Population and wealth tend to gather wherever there is a break in transportation."

With reference to each other and to their rural hinterlands, cities show a somewhat ordered relationship. Usually the larger the tributary or supporting area, the larger the central city. But factors of topography, population density, and nature of political and economic organization also influence the pattern of location and growth.²

If we examine a large map of any city, we note at once that its structure and growth are first of all dependent on the nature of the site itself. Richard M. Hurd remarks:

"The first step in studying the ground plan of cities is to note the topographical faults which normally control the shape of cities, by interfering with their free growth in all directions from their points of origin. These are of two kinds: water surfaces, such as harbors,

lakes, rivers, creeks, and swamps, or sharp variations from the normal city level, such as steep hills, deep hollows, and ravines."³

Where the land is flat, with no marshes or interfering contours, a city will tend to grow outward from the original center unless man-made factors such as highways, defense walls, and railroad trackage interfere. Topography gives the most obvious ground structure to a city. The towns and cities located on waterways must follow the lines of growth laid down by the water barriers. In the hill-and-valley type of topography, the valley tends to be the seat of easiest communication and of industrial and commercial locations, while residential sections move to the higher ground. If the hills are too steep, travel between homes and work is made difficult, so that even residential growth tends at the outset to follow the line of least resistance, other things being equal. The combination of a good harbor, hills, and valleys favors the growth of sea-port cities. Hurd summarizes the major influences of topography by saying: "Level land attracts business, moderate elevations attract residences, land below the normal level attracts transportation lines, and filled-in land is generally used for warehousing, manufacturing, and cheap tenements."⁴

Man-made topography. From the very outset the hand of man gives any town or city a direction of growth which ordinarily continues ever-afterward. The longer man has been settled in a locality, the less the influence of the natural topography becomes and the more constantly important becomes the man-made "cultural landscape." Man cuts down or through hills, drains and fills swamps, builds dikes, dredges river mouths and harbors, constructs canals, and otherwise alters the natural landscape.

The site of specific locality where the city grows up soon develops a structure or form,

² See Edward Ullman, "A theory of location for cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1941, 46: 853-864 on Walter Cristaller's interesting thesis on location of cities in relation to their larger regional setting.

³ From Richard M. Hurd, *Principles of city land values*, 4th ed., p. 33. New York: Real Estate Record & Guide, 1924. By permission.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36. By permission.

with the layout of streets playing the most important part. Unless there is a definite plan, when a city is founded the streets are laid out with respect to natural topography, and the best available land is taken for retail stores and for residential purposes. The ground plan is thus settled more or less once and for all. Thenceforth streets tend to become obstructions to further development. Streets constitute the lanes of traffic back and forth through the city. Cities with narrow or winding streets like Boston, Massachusetts, or cities with many diagonal streets like Washington, D. C. or Madison, Wisconsin, produce unusually serious traffic problems.

Unless modified by plan or by natural topography, cities tend to develop in either axial or radial fashion. Where the streets are laid out with regularity, in squares or rectangles, the city's growth is restricted usually to the direction determined by two main intersecting streets or thoroughfares. There are some distinct advantages and some disadvantages in the rectangular form. It allows the plotting of about equal-sized blocks, makes easy the division of the city into administrative districts, and permits of more adequate police or military control in case of a crisis. The disadvantages of rectangular blocks are those of population movement. There are no advantageous main thoroughfares to facilitate circulation between the center and the periphery, although within the center itself movement may not be too difficult.

The radial pattern arises where there is a natural center at the end of a number of converging thoroughfares. As the city grows, it tends to follow these major traffic lanes, producing star-shaped cities like Tokyo, Nuremberg, and the older sections of London. This is perhaps the most satisfactory form of development.

Sometimes we find a combination of rectangular and radial patterns. Often there were originally a number of highways leading to the village or town, and as the city grew it was laid out in regular rectangular form superimposed on this system of highways. Washington, D. C. was deliberately

planned to combine the radial with the rectangular scheme.

It sometimes happens that streets are developed around certain sections of cities as walls have been torn down, moats filled in, or parks cut up. One does not see this sort of thing in the United States. In many European cities, however, certain streets are outgrowths of the natural evolution of the city. This is true of Paris, where there are at least four sets of circular streets which arose as old walls were torn down and new ones were built farther away, only in time to be razed and themselves turned to streets. The beautiful Ringstrasse in Vienna was cut out of a series of public parks which, in turn, had replaced older fortifications.

While the streets provide the basic ground structure to a city, railroad lines also contribute to it. For example, in Chicago rail lines have tended to break up and isolate certain districts from others, although for the most part the lines have followed either the lake shore or the Chicago River and its branches. Wholesale trade areas and, more particularly, industrial sites call for much trackage, and in these areas slums or disintegrated neighborhoods are likely to develop. Often railroad tracks located on the outskirts of a city later become a barrier to further growth as the city extends its boundaries.

It is, then, within the framework of location and man-made topography that the various ecological processes go on. Let us examine the principal ones, with special reference to American cities.

Concentration of people. The massing of people into a limited area is a distinctive feature of an urban community. While for statistical purposes the Bureau of the Census counts as urban all incorporated places of more than 2500,⁵ in terms of ecology and culture cities must be examined in terms of both varying size and function. For example, in 1940 in this country five cities

⁵ Under special rulings, unincorporated places of 10,000 with a population density of 1000 per square mile, and certain minor subdivisions not included in municipalities, and certain unincorporated towns are also counted as cities.

had populations in excess of one million, 92 had more than 100,000; 412 had more than 25,000; and 3464 ranged between the minimum of 2500 and 25,000. Approximately 29 per cent of all the people of the United States lived in places of more than 100,000 population.


In 1948 urban dwellers made up about 62 per cent of the total population, an increase of 5.5 per cent since 1940. From the time of our first census in 1790 to the present, our urban population has become increasingly dominant. Figure 42 gives a graphic presentation of this shift in 150 years of the country's history. During this time the urban population expanded about 300 times, while the rural population increased only about 15 times its size in this same period. Although not so phenomenal, foreign countries have also witnessed a rapid growth in cities since 1800.

The geographical distribution of cities over the world reflects various developments in commerce, industry, transportation, government, religion, and agriculture. Those most fortunately located have flourished and today stand as large metropolitan centers more or less dominating a surrounding hinterland area. For the most part, such growth has been a concomitant of industrialization. For example, in 1800 there were only 21 cities of over 100,000 population in the entire world; a century and a quarter later there were 537 such places.⁶ In the United States the majority of the large cities are located in the northeastern quarter of the nation; the heaviest concentration extends along the Atlantic seaboard from Boston to the Delaware River section, a second heavy density being around Pittsburgh and two like areas: one stretching from Cleveland to Detroit, and the other in and around Chicago. There are relatively less important concentrations around Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and at points in the Mississippi Valley watershed: New Orleans, St. Louis, Kansas City, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and in lower Ohio.

⁶ See Mark Jefferson, "Distribution of the world's city folks," *Geographical Review*, 1931, 21: 446-465; also his "The law of the primate city," *ibid.*, 1939, 29: 226-232.

FIGURE 42

INCREASING DOMINANCE OF URBAN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES ⁷



Density per square mile is a common measure of concentration. Where individuals are scattered over a wide area there is less probability of contact. Yet mere massing does not lead to intimate social relations, as every student of urban life knows. We must not confuse physical and social-psychological distance. Urban life represents not only a certain massing of people but a different kind of interaction. (See below.)

Wiechel, a German geographer, in an effort to correlate density and patterns of economic culture set up a gradation of concentration. He estimated that primitive hunting and fishing folk had a density up to 8 persons per square mile, those engaged in herding from 8 to 26, those in rudimentary farming from 26 to 64, and those in more advanced agriculture from 64 to 192. In earlier industrial regions or nations, the concentration was from 192 to 256 per square mile; and in modern industrialized countries it ranges from 381 to 512. As to cities proper, Wiechel classified small cities as having at their centers a density ranging from 2560 to 5120. The centers of moderate-sized cities reach to 12,800, and those of large cities go to 25,600.⁸ In some large metropolises density is extreme. For example, the Borough of Manhattan, New York, in 1948 had a

⁷ Data from the Bureau of the Census, 16th Census of the United States, series P-3, no. 21, Nov. 15, 1941. Estimate for 1948, courtesy Paul C. Glick, Bureau of the Census.

⁸ Cited in Mark Jefferson, "The anthropography of some great cities," *Bulletin of American Geographical Society*, 1909, 41: 537-566.

density of more than 86,000 persons per square mile.⁹

Yet a city is more than a large aggregation of individuals. As Louis Wirth remarks, "The city is not merely the point at which great numbers are concentrated into limited space, but it is also a complex of human beings exhibiting the most extraordinary heterogeneity in almost every characteristic in which human beings can differ from one another."¹⁰ Let us look at some of the more general characteristics of city dwellers.

Cities have more than their share of persons of middle age; they provide places of residence for persons not too old and not too young to hold jobs in industry; the ratio of old to middle-aged persons and the ratio of young to middle-aged are both lower in large cities than in small ones; there are more women than men in cities of moderate size, the lowest ratio being in places of from 50,000 to 100,000; in very large cities there is a slight excess of males; and foreign-born persons are found in increasing proportions from small to large cities. Perhaps more significant are the differential birth and death rates of cities of various sizes. Both birth and death rates are lowest in the largest cities.¹¹

Urban-rural differences in fertility are indicated in the net reproduction rate. For urban areas of the United States this rate was .74 in 1940 as compared with 1.44 in the rural-farm and 1.14 in the rural-nonfarm population. In other words, cities could be expected, according to 1940 birth and death rates, to replace through natural increase only about three fourths of their population. But, as pointed out in chapter 13, the upswing of births in the 1940's altered the net reproduction rates in both rural and

urban areas. Nonetheless the broad differentials remain. (See Figure 29, p. 216.)

The age-sex composition of the people within various areas within the city differs considerably. Each subculture of the community attracts or repels persons of particular age and sex. The "downtown" district usually has more males than females, while the residential suburbs have an excess of females.

Centralization of services. The concentration of services in strategic places is an important ecological process in urban life. These functions satisfy such common interests as work, education, government, religion, and recreation. Centralization is directly related to transportation and communication, for service centers are located where both roads and wires intersect. The focal point of most cities, or of any community for that matter, is the retail shopping center. Many additional commercial and other functions are provided in this central area. Large cities in particular may have centralized services for a wide hinterland. Organizational headquarters for a region, governmental offices for a state or nation, or other specialized functions may be located in a particular city.

R. D. McKenzie states that centralization may take place "first by an addition to the number and variety of interests in a common location, as, for instance, when the rural trade center becomes also the locus of the schools, churches, post office, and dance hall; second by an increase in the number of persons finding satisfaction of a single interest at the same location." The foci of centralization are in constant competition for patronage; and changes, either in the services or in transportation facilities, may upset any temporary balance which might have been attained at a given time. People come to think of distance not in terms of miles but as a matter of time required for movement. "As the regional concentration and fluidity of the population increases," says McKenzie, "territorial specialization of interest satisfaction follows. The urban area becomes studded with centers of vari-

⁹ Estimate of population by Department of Health of the City of New York, August 12, 1948. From *The New York Times*, August 13, 1948.

¹⁰ Louis Wirth, "The urban society and civilization," in *Eleven twenty-six: a decade of social science research*, p. 57. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940.

¹¹ W. F. Ogburn, *Social characteristics of cities*, pp. 1-3. Chicago: International City Managers' Ass'n., 1937. See also National Resources Committee, *Our cities, their role in the national economy*, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1937.

ous sizes and degrees of specialization, which is a magnet drawing to itself the appropriate age, sex, cultural, and economic groups. Time specialization takes place as well as place specialization."¹²

Decentralization. There is clearly a limit beyond which concentration and centralization cannot go. Competition for space in the central section of a city leads to such high land values that further expansion of business or other functions becomes unprofitable. And while the construction of more and more skyscrapers keeps adding space for offices, there are physical limits to such facilities beyond which they do not pay. The most obvious fact is that the higher the building, the more space must be used for elevators and other service fixtures, and hence the less for commercial purposes. Then, too, traffic congestion acts to reduce any gains which come from concentration of goods and services. (See below.) Loss in time and personal patience is, in the end, not offset by advantages of shopping in such centers or in further extending other kinds of enterprises. As a result, an opposite process of decentralization may set in.

One of the first and commonest evidences of this is the development of subfoci comprised of retail stores, gas stations, and garages in or near residential areas. Large cities everywhere are characterized by such subcenters which duplicate in many ways the structure and function of the original centralized area of the city. But there are other forms of decentralization. Industries may move out of a central position to the fringe of a city, or new industries may be set up on the urban periphery and thus foster a new subcenter. So, too, the decentralization of population and services is related to the development of suburbs and satellite cities.

Suburbs may grow up on the periphery of an expanding city as more desirable loca-

tions for families. Or, as transportation lines are built near by, smaller communities may become suburbs or satellite communities to a larger one. Sometimes these outlying communities become a part of the larger municipality itself. Sometimes they continue for a long time as independent political units. See Figure 43, which shows this fact for Chicago. Since suburban growth is closely tied up with the structure and function of metropolitan districts, further attention to this aspect of decentralization will be given in chapter 16.

Segregation. Almost every large American city has not only slums and wealthy suburbs but also settlements of minority and other groups. These may carry descriptive names such as Little Italy, Little Harlem, or Chinatown. Areas given over to vice or occupied by transient laborers, like Chicago's Hobohemia, also have unique features. Such separated segments of the total ecological structure have been called "natural areas," to designate the fact that they are the outcome of competition, conflict, co-operation, and group differentiation and accommodation.¹³ Similar variations are to be found in all great cities but may represent quite different culture groups: occupational, caste or class, religious bodies, or others.


The process of segregation may be set in motion by a number of factors. Neighborhoods settled by immigrant families or by migrants from rural districts may retain and/or develop cultural patterns which distinguish them from other groups. In the United States and South Africa, for example, color differences act as a special barrier-producing situation.

For the most part segregation is never complete as to culture group or occupation. There is usually a mixture of peoples, especially around the fringes of the area. Even

¹² From R. D. McKenzie, "The scope of human ecology," in E. W. Burgess, ed., *Urban community*, pp. 176, 177. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926. By permission.

¹³ The term "natural area" has been so variously used that it now lacks satisfactory meaning, except when specifically defined for a specific study or theoretical analysis. See Milla A. Alihan, *Social ecology: a critical analysis*, chapter 8, especially pp. 229-241. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938. See also Paul K. Hart, "The concept of natural area," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 423-427 for some very sound comments.

CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA, SHOWING LOCATION OF OUTLYING COMMUNITIES ALONG
RAILROAD LINES ¹⁴



where the Negroes are in the overwhelming majority one usually finds a few scattered white families. In his study of what he called "polyethnic" areas of Seattle, Paul K. Hatt found Jews, white Christians, Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, and Negroes living in close proximity.¹⁵ However, in some cities where large numbers of immigrants of like nationality reside, the areas tend to be more homogeneous. Sometimes, as in Harlem in New York City, there is something akin to a self-contained community with its own ecological features along class and occupational lines.

The slum represents one extreme, the wealthy residential area the other extreme of an urban bipolarity. In the slum we find, as a rule, greater homogeneity of income than in the areas inhabited by the well-to-do. Yet in terms of human activities the slum is often quite varied. Here are found all kinds of people who are compelled to live on a minimum income. "It also becomes the hiding-place for many services which are forbidden by the mores but which cater to the wishes of residents scattered throughout the community."¹⁶ The Bohemians or nonconformists, the underworld elements, the hobo flophouses are often found in or near slum areas. So, too, reformers and well-wishers found missions and settlement houses in these neighborhoods with a view to social betterment. This zone of slums may encircle the heart of the city. Interspersed throughout the zone are often light manufacturing and business concerns which have invaded the area because of cheaper rents on lands held against the day of an expanding central zone. In rapidly growing cities this section is marked by deterioration and is adequate neither for housing nor for business. Here are found high ratios of poverty, delinquency, and other indices of social disorganization as well as large numbers of families of recent foreign extraction, high birth and death rates, and density of people.

Between the upper economic and social classes and the slum and immigrant or Negro area we may find other examples of at least partial segregation. These are probably largely determined by economic factors. Workingmen's families tend to cluster in neighborhoods determined by income level, occupational interests, and other cultural factors.

Assimilation and segregation. The processes of merging two or more deviant cultures may be helped or hindered by segregation. In a way, the immigrant area serves as a cultural island for the newcomers. It gives them a certain sense of security in their old culture while it aids in introducing them to the new. The effects of spatial segregation and retention of immigrant heritages may be characterized as follows: (1) Continuity with the old culture is maintained. (2) The immigrant sees the new country and its culture through the eyes of his own culture, especially reflected in the ideas and attitudes of relatives and friends already on the ground. Naturally, the newcomer defers to the definition of the American situation offered him by his fellow countrymen already here. (3) This continuity of the old and the interpretation of the new through his fellow countrymen softens the severity of the change but profoundly influences the process of assimilation itself. (4) It is only as the immigrant is introduced into more and more of the features of American culture, and especially as his children come into contact with the school, with agencies of recreation, with American family life, and other intimate patterns, that the effects of these earlier contacts wear off and assimilation really gets under way. But the immigrant is not alone responsible for the retardation of assimilation.

The reactions of the established population to the immigrant are those of avoidance and prejudice. Fear of economic competition and misunderstanding of different culture patterns were common during the period when large numbers of immigrants were coming to the United States.

¹⁵ See Paul K. Hatt, "Spatial patterns in a polyethnic area," *American Sociological Review*, 1945, 10: 352-366.

¹⁶ McKenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 180. By permission.

But in time various accommodations were worked out which aided the shift to assimilation.

The rates of assimilation, of course, differ. Oriental immigrants for the most part have remained segregated, and their relations with the whites continue to be of an accommodative character. On the other hand, European immigrants, and especially their children and grandchildren, have gradually broken through the barriers of segregation to become assimilated. Improvement in economic status, public education, intermarriage, and moving out of the immigrant area itself have been most important factors in facilitating the process.

Invasion and succession. Ecological distributions seldom remain fixed, and in a highly dynamic society invasion and succession also come into play. The invasion of one group into an area occupied by another is the process which leads to segregation and finally to displacement or succession by the intruding group. In some cases lower economic classes invade the location being abandoned by the well-to-do. Sometimes the reverse is true, as when apartment houses spring up in neighborhoods which have long been occupied by families of low incomes but which afford easy access to work or have other attractive features. A good illustration of this is found along the East River in mid-Manhattan.

Succession tends to be marked by rather sharp changes in population types. Not infrequently in American cities there has been a long series of intrusions and displacements. The process is accompanied by continuous competition between groups.

Mobility. Population mobility is closely related to the ecological processes which have just been described. Mobility of this type refers to the actual movement in space of persons, not to social mobility, which has to do with changes in social status. Spatial movement is of three sorts: (1) the migration of people to a city, or away from it, to take up residence; (2) the changes in residence within the community; and

(3) the daily movement of people within the community.

(1) The cityward migration of population is evident throughout recent history. As noted earlier in this chapter, the proportion of the population living in cities increased rapidly up to 1930. During the decade 1930-1940, the urban increase was at a lower rate than the rural increase. Migration from farms to cities slowed down. In fact, in 1932, during the depression, there were actually more people moving to farms than from farms. But this was a temporary thing, and during World War II there was a high-level cityward movement. Then at the end of the war there was a slight farmward mobility, chiefly by returning war veterans. (See Figure 53, p. 301.)

In connection with this slowing-down of urban growth, it is well to bear in mind that a marked proportion of American cities actually declined in numbers between 1930 and 1940. Of the 92 cities containing 100,000 or more inhabitants in 1940, 31 per cent had declined in numbers. Of the 313 cities ranging between 25,000 and 100,000 nearly one fourth had experienced decreases, and of the 663 cities in the class from 10,000 to 25,000 population, 24 per cent had declined.¹⁷ World War II certainly altered the situation as of 1940. Industrial cities like Detroit, Portland (Oregon), Los Angeles, and others grew rapidly. How lasting these shifts in numbers will be is hard to foresee. Yet it looks as if the West Coast cities, at least, would retain much of their gain. (See chapter 16 on internal migration.)

(2) Residential mobility follows the spatial expansion of the city toward its periphery. It is plain that the rate of residential change is higher in hotel and rooming-house areas than in tenement sections, and higher in the latter than in districts farther out where people own their own homes. There is a definite inverse relationship between home ownership and residential mobility. Among the many implications of high residential mobility are the lack of participation in community organizations, the impersonal nature of human contacts, and the high degree of occupational specialization which mark the secondary-group organization of urban society.


(3) Living in cities not only stimulates residential shifts but, as Niles Carpenter says,

¹⁷ See P. M. Hauser, "How declining urban growth affects city activities," *Public Management*, 1940, 22 : 355.

"The erection of high buildings lessens congestion in density, but increases congestion in movement, by vastly adding to the number of goods and passengers that must be moved into or out of, and within the area affected."¹⁸ Some of the most striking facts about urban traffic congestion are these: (a) Between 1922 and 1944 there was an actual decrease in the total passenger-carrying capacity of public-utility equipment in the United States. It dropped from about 8.7 millions to about 7.6 millions, although this has been somewhat offset by improvements in facilities. For example, there has been a steady decline in surface railways and an increase in motor-bus and trolley-coach capacity. Subway and elevated lines have remained about the same.¹⁹ (b) Despite this loss, the use of transit lines has increased steadily, although the increase has been

FIGURE 44

RATIO OF DAILY TRANSIT RIDES TO URBAN POPULATION, RATIO EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE²⁰



relatively higher in cities under a million people than in cities over this figure. (c) The larger the city, the higher the proportion of the total population which uses various means of public transportation. (See Figure 44.) (d) In addition to such public transportation, privately owned automobiles carry additional thousands over our city streets. Every major city of the United States has been harassed by the problem of mounting congestion from such traffic as well as from other forms. Many

impractical schemes have been proposed to build multiple-deck expressways into and through the heart of our cities. Students of the topic know that the automobile, even under the most favorable conditions, is the most inefficient form of city transit. But this is not all. Even if all urban workers possessed and were to use their own cars on fast highways, they would have to find places to park them before they could "function at the point to which they . . . transported themselves."²¹ Again, daydreams about modern elevator or ramp garages have limited possibilities. "Crediting each vehicle with the average loading in city traffic of 1.75 persons," and assuming that a modern office building allows an average of 150 square feet of floor space per worker, estimates show that it would take practically as much floor space to park a person's car as he has in which to do his work. To provide parking space for workers, not shoppers, under the assumptions stated, would mean doubling "*the cubage requirements of present central area buildings.*"²² Congestion is also evident in pedestrian movement, as everybody knows. One has but to get into a mass of people on Broadway in New York at theater-closing time, at State and Madison at noon in Chicago, or, for that matter, be in the heart of any modern city to realize this fact.

The solution to the problems of daily congestion is slowly being worked out, either by design or in terms of hit-or-miss competition, through the decentralization and dispersion of functions of the central areas of our cities. But the habits of man and his enormous investments in capital and skills in these areas indicate that it will be a long time before adequate rationality in this matter will be attained.

Theories of urban growth. Various attempts have been made to state a systematic theory of ecological distribution and process. One of the best-known and most widely accepted is the concentric-pattern theory of E. W. Burgess. He constructed an ideal type or generalized hypothetical series of urban zones as shown in

¹⁸ Carpenter, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

¹⁹ See "Transit fact book, 1945" (pamphlet), p. 39. New York: American Transit Association, 1945.

²⁰ From "Moving the masses in modern cities" (pamphlet), p. 26. New York: American Transit Association, n.d. By permission.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 25. Italics in the original. By permis-

FIGURE 45


A HYPOTHETICAL PATTERN OF URBAN ZONES²²

Figure 45. According to this ideal construct, the center of modern American cities is the point of chief concentration of specialized services. The center, Zone I, is characterized by skyscrapers, department stores, big hotels, motion-picture houses, transit lines, and a high mobility of population as it goes about its business or pleasure. In Zone II are found rooming houses, some light industry, and certain other services. In general, the second zone is characterized by rather rapid change or "transition." In Zone III are workingmen's homes, with subcenters of local retail stores, schools, and occasional parks. In the fourth zone are better residences, and beyond this is Zone V, the suburban and commuter area.


Ideally, there is a gradation in terms of such features as service, income, and status from the center to the periphery. Burgess developed his theoretical construct from studies of urban communities, chiefly, however, of Chicago. Actually the distribution seldom conforms precisely to the hypothetical pattern. It is not assumed to do so. It was simply developed as a frame of reference for research and theory. Topography, waterways, lakes, harbors, and so on all

²² Modified from E. W. Burgess' original. See his chapter, "The growth of the city," in R. E. Park, ed., *The city*, p. 51. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925. By permission.

influence the direction and extent of such development. Certainly for Chicago, Lake Michigan cuts sharply through the middle of Burgess' circles, so that there we have a series of only half-concentric rings. Moreover, the Chicago River, the railroad lines, the highways, and the desirability of lake-front residences also affect the spatial distribution. (See Figure 43.)

A second formulation is the so-called sector theory of Homer Hoyt.²⁴ This theory, in brief, is that high-rent or high-income sections of the city tend to be found on the outer fringes of one or more quadrants or sectors of the community. These areas also tend to be farthest removed from factory districts. Also, the low-rent areas sometimes extend from the very center of the city to its periphery. (See Figure 46.) Sometimes, too, there is a rather sharp bipolarity between the high-income groups at one end of a residential continuum and the low-income families at the other.²⁵ The growth of population is marked by an outward movement of the high-rent areas along

FIGURE 46

THE SECTOR THEORY OF URBAN GROWTH²⁶

²⁴ See Homer Hoyt, *The structure and growth of residential neighborhoods in American cities*. Washington, D. C.: Federal Housing Administration, 1939.

²⁵ Hatt, "The concept of natural area," *op. cit.*

²⁶ This is a generalized figure taken from Hoyt's study of 142 American cities. Hoyt, *op. cit.*

any given sector, which may be initially determined by topographic or other factors. The places left by the upper-rent families as they move outward are taken over by families of lower economic status.

The Hoyt thesis fits into the idea of radial growth which gives rise to the star-shaped city rather than to one of concentric zones. Yet Hoyt's views and those of Burgess are not entirely incompatible. Much depends on the natural landscape and the initial changes made by man. Where there are no serious natural or man-made barriers — as in flat terrain — we do find cities which tend to conform to the Burgess theory.

Various criticisms of both these theories have been made. Milla A. Alihan raised some telling questions about the lack of clear-cut criteria in relating the concentric zones to various gradients, measured by indices of population, crime rates, and the like.²⁷ Her doubts about the assumed homogeneity of population and culture within the zones might be equally applied to Hoyt's view. On the basis of a careful review of a number of studies of American cities, Maurice R. Davie has also raised some serious doubts as to the applicability of the concentric-zone theory. He says it "clearly does not apply to New Haven" nor to Greater Cleveland, studied by Howard W. Green, nor to 16 "self-contained cities" examined by Harland Bartholomew. For Davie the Burgess thesis is too simple for the complex facts of urban development. It neglects the important man-made topography which follows the building of railroads and industries.²⁸

A more severe and far-reaching critique of both Burgess and Hoyt has been made by Walter Firey.²⁹ He stressed the need to recognize the place of sentiments and values as they affect urban growth and development and offers many strictures on the idea that economic competition for land is the important variable in determining

changes in business and residential locations. In his study of land use in Boston he attempts to document his thesis. Actually, as John James has pointed out, his findings do not entirely refute Hoyt's thesis. And despite the topographical character of Boston, some features of populational movement are not entirely incompatible with the zone theory. Certainly there are a nucleated center and certain gradients in social-cultural features as one moves from this center to the suburban areas.³⁰

On the whole, then, the concepts and tools of ecological research have been an aid to our understanding of how cities arise, grow, and change their features. Moreover, the importance of cultural factors must not be so overstressed as to lead us to ignore the place of either the natural or the man-made landscape of a given locality. Surely the ecological and the cultural are intertwined at many points. As Richard M. Hurd, one of the initiators of modern human ecology, put it, "Underneath all economic laws, the final basis of human action is psychological, so that the last stage of analysis of the problems of the structure of cities, the distribution of utilities, the earnings of the buildings which house them, and the land values resulting therefrom, turn on individual and collective taste and preference, as shown in social habits and customs."³¹

Urban Organizations and Institutions

As sites grow in size, the complexity of human relationships becomes greater. Problems of social regulation multiply as the cloak of anonymity covers up the informal controls which are so effective in primary communities. There life is relatively simple, and expected ways of behaving are controlled by a minimum of formal laws. But codification of laws is imperative in cities. To protect the cultural values of the

²⁷ See Alihan, *op. cit.*

²⁸ See Maurice R. Davie, "The pattern of urban growth," in G. P. Murdock, ed., *Studies in the science of society*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.

²⁹ See Walter Firey, *Land use in central Boston*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947.

³⁰ See John James, "A critique of Firey's *Land use in central Boston*," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1948, 54: 228-234.

³¹ Richard M. Hurd, *Principles of city land values*, 2nd ed., p. 18. New York: Real Estate Record & Guide, 1905. By permission.

community, institutions and organizations develop to insure their perpetuation. Since the most important social institutions will be discussed in Part Three, this section will review briefly certain facts about the urban aspects of some of these institutions and organizations. Some comparisons with rural conditions will be made.

Family. Although the urban family retains many of its primary-group features, an increasing proportion of the child-rearing functions of the family are being assumed by nurseries, baby clinics, schools, playground organizations, and other agencies. Furthermore, many of the traditional household duties, such as laundering, baking, and sewing, are transferred to commercial agencies. The shift to special-interest groups is evidenced in the divergent daily activities of various family members. Movies, lodges, labor unions, political associations, church groups, and a host of other organizations are readily available to city people, and each family member may choose those which most appeal to him. The individualization which stimulates mass reactions begins in the modern home.

A number of interesting data regarding the family reveal the varied effects of living in our cities. Fewer children per 100 women of childbearing age are born in the city than in the country. (See chapter 13.) Not only are net reproduction rates higher in rural than in urban areas but the larger the city, the lower is the reproduction rate. Large cities have a higher percentage of families without young children than smaller cities. The absence of children, however, seems to be made up for by lodgers, since the number of the latter is progressively greater from small to large cities. In contrast, farm households report very few lodgers. The larger the city, the greater is the proportion of young men who have never married; but the proportion of young women married remains about the same regardless of size.³²

Education. Urban facilities for education far outnumber those of the country. For example, in 1941-1942 the average annual cost per pupil for cities was \$114; for rural areas, \$80. And for the same year the city teachers were paid \$2013; the rural, but \$1018. On the other hand, country children attended school, on the average, about as many days per year as those in the city. The ratio was 146 to 152.³³ The inequality between rural and urban schools has been the subject of hotly contested state legislation for equalization through subsidization of rural areas. Part of the difference may, of course, be attributed to the greater specialization of the city and to its readiness to accept innovations, but a major factor is the variation in financial resources. So, too, cities not only excel in having the technical and professional schools and most universities, but they also lead in the innovations in curricula and in providing specialized training for handicapped persons. In both elementary and secondary schools the superior teachers and most up-to-date buildings and equipment are found in cities.

The church. Although cities are often considered "sinful," relatively more people are members of urban churches than of rural ones. At the time of the December, 1936 Census of Religious Bodies about half as many people reported attending urban churches as the number residing in urban areas, while less than one third as many people reported attendance at rural churches as there were persons living in places of less than 2500 population.³⁴ This does not mean, of course, that city people are greater participants but only that more of the churches which people attend are located in urban centers. It is a common observation that many rural people go to church in near-by towns. Actually, urban centers have only a little more than half as many

³³ See *Statistical summary of education, 1941-1942*, p. 12. Washington, D. C.: Office of Education, 1945.

³⁴ Estimated from Bureau of the Census, *Religious bodies, 1936*, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1941, and from the Census of Population for 1940, corrected to make valid comparisons.

³² See Ogburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 11, 12. A good deal of the data summarized in this section has been drawn from this book and from *Our cities*, *op. cit.*

churches as have rural areas, but the average number of members per church is greater, 541 as compared to 133. However, urban parishes are much influenced by changes in population and ecological patterns. It is not uncommon for members of denominations to attend church in neighborhoods long since abandoned by these people as places of residence. Also, it is evident that the secularism of city life gravely affects loyalty to one's church.³⁵

Functions of city government. In a myriad ways government touches the lives of city inhabitants. In the apt words of W. F. Ogburn, "It not only furnishes protection through the fire department, the police, and the courts, but it paves our streets, educates our children, collects garbage, determines what type of house may be built, provides recreation, lends us books to read, and sees that we do not get cheated in weight on purchases."³⁶ The shift from regulatory to service activities in city governments has caused their budgets to rise sharply.

For urban incorporated places of over 2500, the total government costs in 1912 were \$27.20 per capita; in 1942, \$49.18. In 1940, for cities over 100,000 the charges, including the interest and capital outlays as well as usual costs, averaged more than \$60 per capita. This was highest in New York City, where it was \$111.74, and lowest in Charlotte, North Carolina, where it was but \$26.11.³⁷

The medical facilities of cities are unquestionably better than those of the country, and large cities are better-equipped with public health services than small ones. Municipalities spend about twice as much per capita for such services as do rural counties, but public services are being extended to rural areas. The fact that the congestion of urban living is more conducive to infec-

tion from communicable diseases should not be overlooked in contrasting rural with urban conditions. Cities have higher rates for venereal diseases, tuberculosis, and epidemic diseases. They also show a greater incidence of alcoholism, drug addiction, general paralysis, insanity, heart diseases, and cancer. Differences between rural and urban areas, however, are not as great as the variations within zones of cities themselves, which fact reflects the importance of ecological factors.

With the restriction of informal recreation in large cities goes the necessity of municipal provision for leisure time. In the cities the form of recreation is more highly specialized and commercialized. Medium-sized cities have the highest ratio of park acreage to population, but large cities have more art galleries and symphony orchestras. The public expenditures for recreation in cities over 30,000 population increase with the size of the city.³⁸

Social welfare. Systems of public assistance or relief have been essentially an urban phenomenon although the necessity for aid to rural groups is being increasingly recognized. The need for public help came with industrialization and the breakdown of family and neighborhood responsibility in caring for the underprivileged.³⁹ This phenomenon is illustrative of the change from intimate primary relationships to impersonal and secondary forms of association. One of the significant shifts in recent years has been from private to public welfare. As governmental agencies — local, state, and federal — have more and more assumed responsibility for direct or indirect monetary aid, the private agencies have tended to give increasing attention to the personality problems of people in distress, both economic and emotional. That non-governmental welfare work continues to be important is evidenced in the place of the co-ordinated community chests in

³⁵ See, for example, "Brooklyn Protestantism, 1930-1945. A study of social change and church trends" (mimeographed). Brooklyn: Brooklyn Church and Mission Federation, 1946.

³⁶ Ogburn, *op. cit.*, p. 17. By permission.

³⁷ From J. Frederic Dewhurst and associates, *America's need and resources*, p. 418. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1947.

³⁸ *Our cities*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

³⁹ See Herbert H. Stroup, *Social work: an introduction to the field*. New York: American Book Company, 1948.

PLACE AND PEOPLE

TABLE 14

OFFENSES KNOWN TO THE POLICE, 1947 AND 1940, PER 100,000 INHABITANTS ⁴⁰

TYPE OF OFFENSE	POPULATION CLASS						
	Over 250,000		50,000-100,000		Under 10,000		Rural Under 2500
	1947	1940	1947	1940	1947	1940	1947 only
murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter	7.1	6.1	6.3	5.7	4.3	4.1	6.4
rape	16.0	11.4	9.9	6.7	10.1	7.5	13.6
robbery	85.7	74.7	43.0	37.8	24.8	22.2	19.2
aggravated Assault	85.8	50.3	88.8	63.8	37.2	27.4	36.6
burglary	450.6	397.3	392.3	364.8	248.2	234.1	145.6
larceny; Theft	1007.1	1039.0	1038.3	993.3	647.9	531.2	199.2
Auto Theft	197.1	203.5	186.8	168.1	116.1	94.7	57.3

merican cities. For example, in 1920 there were only 39 such organizations. In 1945 there were 772, and they raised over 220 million dollars. This was at the peak of the war years. Since then, though the number of community chests has increased slightly, the amounts raised by their annual campaigns have fallen off.⁴¹

Police and courts. The absence of informal, primary-group social controls is evidenced in the high crime rates of cities the world over. The National Resources Committee report on urbanism says: "The outstanding characteristics of urban delinquency and crime are the emphasis on crimes against property rather than persons, the greater tendency toward organized and commercialized crime and the wide opportunities for juvenile delinquency."⁴² The size of cities bears a direct relationship to criminality, particularly to crime against property. Differences in three classes of

cities and in rural areas are shown in Table 14.

Not only do crime rates vary in urban and rural districts, but the patterns of criminal conduct differ. Marshall B. Clinard's studies show, among other things, that rural criminals have greater mobility than rural nonoffenders, that their social attitudes tend to be impersonal, and that their offenses are usually committed in other than their home communities. "Networks of criminal relationships were found to vary directly with the amount of urbanization of the areas from which offenders came."⁴³

Rural criminals do not, as a rule, view their offenses as criminal in the way that such behavior is viewed in cities by offenders and nonoffenders alike. Urban crime is marked by a criminal social type and a subculture of criminal behavior, often rather widely taken for granted. In fact, both ecological and cultural factors are associated with urban criminality.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ From *Uniform crime reports*, 1947, 18 : 79. Also from George B. Vold, "Crime in city and country areas," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1941, 218 : 38-45. By permission.

⁴¹ See John B. Dawson, "Community chests," in Russell H. Kurtz, ed., *Social work year book*, 1947, pp. 103-110. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947.

⁴² *Our cities*, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴³ Marshall B. Clinard, "The process of urbanization and criminal behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1942, 48 : 202. See also his "Rural criminal offenders," *ibid.*, 1944, 50 : 38-45.

⁴⁴ On this topic, see, among others, Walter Reckless, *Criminal behavior*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1940; E. H. Sutherland, *Principles of criminology*, 3rd ed., rev., Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939; Ruth Shenk Cavan,

Business. The business organizations of large cities are obviously more specialized and more extensive than those in small cities. Some striking differences have been reported by Amos H. Hawley in his analysis of 1780 cities reported in the 1935 Census of Business. He found that the number of business enterprises per 1000 population decreased with the size of the city but that the larger the community, the larger the individual enterprise tended to be. Distance between cities affects the magnitude of selling, for overlapping hinterlands meant lower sales for each city concerned. He also discovered that the age composition influences the kinds of business. For example, communities in which the proportion of old persons is high have more than their share of drugstores and eating places. In general, cities with large numbers of foreign-born have lower average sales than those made up chiefly of native-born.⁴⁵

Industry. Specialization in industry has been an important impetus to the growth of cities. Usually the type of industry of a city is determined by the natural resources, but not necessarily so. Many textile mills, for example, are situated where large concentrations of people have already formed rather than in the places where raw materials are produced. Labor markets, transportation facilities, legislation, and other factors which might give competitive advantage are all important. Certain industries have moved from centers of cities to the open country or smaller towns adjacent to large cities in order to gain certain advantages, such as lower land values or cheaper labor. However, certain industries with large capital investments and requiring huge labor resources, find it more advantageous to remain in large cities. Industries of particular type, such as clothing, printing, and light manufacturing, have definitely favored the metropolitan centers.

Criminology, New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1948; and Clifford R. Shaw, *Delinquency areas*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.

⁴⁵ Amos H. Hawley, "An ecological study of urban service institutions," *American Sociological Review*, 1941, 6: 629-239.

Levels of living. Cities are characterized by high costs of living and crowded housing. But these facts do not tell the whole story. We must analyze income, cost of living, and housing to get an adequate idea of the level of urban living.

As pointed out in chapter 14, the average income in cities is higher than it is in rural areas. The various comparisons made there need not be repeated. (See pages 249-252.) Obviously dollars earned, as related to levels of living, must be equated to the purchasing power of money at any given time. (See chapter 22.)


During the depression of the 1930's both wages and prices declined. With returning prosperity they both began to rise again, probably with average incomes going up at a faster rate than costs. Bearing these facts in mind, note that in 1936 the arithmetical average income for all urban families, that is, in places over 2500, was slightly more than \$2000. In 1946 it was about \$3000. Combining the incomes of all nonfarm individuals not in families with those of families gave an average of about \$2600 for 1946.

In general the larger the place, the higher the average income. For urban places of less than 50,000 people, the median total income for families and individuals (in the sense used above) was about \$2500, and about \$3000 in cities of one million or more. Incomes in the localities which fell between these extremes had an intermediate position.⁴⁶ For differences in family income in terms of size of locality, see Figure 47.

Of the various indicators of levels of living, housing is one of the best. Yet the situation in the United States is not too satisfactory, at least as measured by the standards of experts and reformers. However, compared to other countries, we were much better off even before the devastation of World War II than such places as Japan, Germany, Russia, and parts of Britain. A survey of 1930 showed that we had proportionately twice as many bathrooms as Great Britain and Canada, four times as many as Germany, and twelve times as many as France and Sweden. We led in the proportion of homes with electric lights, central heating,

⁴⁶ See "Income of the nonfarm population: 1946," *Current population reports: consumer income*, Bureau of the Census, series P-60, no. 3, June 3, 1948.

FIGURE 47

DIFFERENCES IN FAMILY INCOME: METROPOLITAN, OTHER URBAN, AND RURAL, 1946⁴⁷

and other facilities and suffered far less overcrowding.⁴⁸

From the end of World War I till the end of the 1940's at least, efforts to meet the housing shortage in various countries have not been very successful. High costs of labor and materials, and overhead costs, make either private building, or that by corporations as an investment, unprofitable. The situation in the United States — as shown by a large sample survey by the Bureau of the Census — as of April, 1947 is summarized as follows:

"The survey indicated that about 2 out of every 3 dwellings in the Nation had all of the following designated facilities: electric lighting and running water; and flush toilet, bathtub or shower, and installed cooking facilities for exclusive use of the unit's occupants. The highest proportion of dwelling units having all designated facilities was in urban areas, about 83 per cent, while the rural-nonfarm and rural-farm areas had 54 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively."⁴⁹

The situation thus presented represents a minimum requirement. By standards of experts, much higher percentages of Amer-

ican homes are substandard. As of 1940, at least, careful estimates stated that "35 per cent of the total number of dwelling units in urban areas were substandard," . . . while "probably about two thirds of the . . . farmhouses of the country were substandard . . . and about a third of the [latter] needed to be replaced."⁵⁰

The manner in which housing needs will or may be met is uncertain. Since private capital does not find housing profitable, and since costs of construction generally have risen greatly, there has been increasing pressure on both local and federal governments to assume some of the responsibility for meeting the situation. After various tries at different agencies, the federal government now has the Federal Housing Administration, set up in 1934, and the Public Housing Administration, established in 1947. The former does not make loans but insures private lending institutions against losses on residential and property-improvement loans if the latter meet agency standards. The program of the latter is slum clearance and aid in construction of low-rent housing, in connection with local agencies.

Patterns of Interaction

So far, the expanding range of interaction has been treated in terms of the ecology of the city and of its social-cultural organ-

⁴⁷ From A Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education, *Higher education for American democracy*, vol. 2, p. 19. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.

⁴⁸ See Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

⁴⁹ From "Housing characteristics of the United States: April, 1947," *Current population reports: housing*, Bureau of the Census, series P-70, no. 1, October 29, 1947, pp. 1, 2.

⁵⁰ Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 163. By permission.

URBAN COMMUNITIES

ization from an external and institutional standpoint. The social and psychological nature of some of the changes in the interactional patterns will be discussed in this section.

A superficial observer might imagine that modern cities are by all odds the most favorable places for social interaction. And, truly, in terms of sheer physical crowding, the urban hurry and bustle that one experiences in a rush-hour bus or subway train provides physical, though highly superficial, social contacts. But mere contact is not the kind of interaction which satisfies human needs. It has often been said that persons may feel more lonely in large cities than anywhere else. There is a vast difference between the incidental and temporary nature of transitory physical contiguity in urban mass society and the shared experience and interstimulation of members of a small community and its neighborhoods. In fact, we may well ask what has happened to the customary neighborhoods under urbanization.

Neighborhoods in the city. In rural and small-town life the neighborhood continues to have a definite place. It is the area of borrowing and lending, or mutual aid, and of intimate gossip. In earlier periods it seldom had any very formal organizations. Yet urban influences affect both neighborhood and community life in rural and small-town areas. The rise of secondary-group organization of society means the introduction of all sorts of formal associations bearing on agriculture, education, religion, and recreation where there were none before. Yet in the open country and in the village the basic neighborhood pattern tends to remain. (See chapter 14.)

The city, especially as it grows larger, is characterized in part by the decline and even loss of neighborly interaction. Obviously residence in a city affords opportunities for contacts of intimate and congenial sort, yet, on the whole, personal relations tend to be superficial, less intimate, and less permanent than in rural or town life. Varied special interests and the segmentalization of living make for a wide range of

social outlets. Relations tend to be of a touch-and-go variety. There is an enormous choice, and usually only time and money are limiting factors. One is not dependent on particular people with reference to work or play.

A number of factors help account for the lessening of the importance of neighborhood contacts for the city-dweller. (1) There are a high division of work and an individualization of interest. (2) High residential mobility does not permit a sense of settling down to any one street or section of the city. (3) Easy availability of transit facilities for reaching work or friends reduces the need to seek contacts next door. And (4) a wide variety of voluntary associations outside the immediate environs of one's residence provides outlets for one's interests. Let us see what place the latter have in the lives of city people.

Voluntary associations. Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert list nine classes of more or less voluntary organizations in American cities: vocational, religious, political, educational, civic, fraternal, recreational, "art" groups such as music societies, and "anti-social" (underworld organizations and criminal gangs).⁵¹ The place of such associations varies with the size and culture of the city.

In his study of Boulder, Colorado, F. A. Bushee found 268 social organizations for adults. Yet nearly one third of the adults (29 per cent) reported no affiliation with any of these, and 25 per cent of those who did belong to an organization said that the church was the only one with which they were associated. Moreover, as so many other studies show, the higher the social-economic status, the more extensive the social participation in such groups. Two thirds of the adults listed as living in substandard homes had no memberships in any formal associations. Also, as is common, a higher ratio of women than men reported such formal participation.⁵²

⁵¹ Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, *Urban society*, 3rd ed., p. 277. New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1948.

⁵² See F. A. Bushee, "Social organizations in a small city," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1945, 51 : 217-226.

Apparently the larger the community, the lower the proportion of adults who become formally affiliated with voluntary organizations. While the sample was small and perhaps not truly representative, Mirra Komarovsky's study of 2223 adult residents of New York City is informative. Excluding possible formal church membership, she found 60 per cent of the working class and "53 per cent of the white-collar men" had no formal group affiliation, unless it was the church. For women, the corresponding percentages were 88 and 63. Again social-economic status plays a part. In all occupational categories except professional and for men and women "earning under \$3000 . . . the unaffiliated persons constituted a majority."⁵³

Community-wide organizations to satisfy some of the needs for social contact have long been a part of urban life. Settlement houses, various organizations for youth, and others represent an effort to provide socially healthy recreation and education for individuals who do not otherwise have these advantages. Some of their most effective work, moreover, is done on the neighborhood basis. How a given crisis may serve to stimulate formal organizations and at least temporarily revive neighborliness in large cities is illustrated in air-raid-warden organizations and "drives" for the Red Cross and other organizations. Sometimes out of these was born a certain friendliness which had not been apparent previously.

Yet, on the whole, the larger the community, the more likely are we to find a sense of isolation, loss of intimacy with others, and other marks of mass society. A central integrating set of values may be difficult to find. The opportunities for personal choice and a certain cultural pressure toward diffuseness counteract the chances for a more integrated focus of activity. "Purchasability of services and things" tends to displace "personal relations as a basis of association."⁵⁴ The roles of the individual

become so varied and so specialized that both competition and co-operation seldom involve the whole personality. One comes to feel oneself but a combination of bits and pieces, not an integrated participant in his society and its culture.

Yet we must not neglect the fact that the city also induces variability, inventiveness, and cultural change. Urban life may and does foster creativeness in basic as well as in secondary situations, in personal life organization, and with reference to larger social-cultural movements. The challenge is one of balancing the crowd-public or mass-society trends with those which give some institutional and participant stability and some opportunity for creativeness. So far we have not attained this co-ordination.

Maladjustments. The individual in the urban mass often faces the serious threat of insecurity and isolation. The absence of, or loss of, deeper and more whole-hearted contacts may induce a sense of social void and normlessness. If sense of insecurity, of loneliness, of disconnectedness in living becomes acute, personal disorganization frequently results. One convincing measure of the failure to adjust in our culture is the incidence of suicide.

The number of people who take their own lives varies with the business cycle, being higher during depressions and lower in prosperous times. But, even so, the rates for cities are higher than for rural areas. In general, too, the suicide rate increases directly with increase in the size of the cities.⁵⁵

Likewise, mental disorders are indicators of difficulty in making social adjustments. But, as shown in chapter 14, rural-urban differences in the incidence of mental breakdowns are hard to determine. Mental maladjustments are probably more the function of social-economic status, kind of emotional and intellectual balance, and absence of frustration and anxiety than of residence on a farm or in a city.

Yet it is well to note that the distribution of mental disorders corresponds in part to the ecological areas of our cities. The

⁵³ See Mirra Komarovsky, "The voluntary associations of urban dwellers," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 686-698. By permission.

⁵⁴ See Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a way of life," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1938, 44: 17. This entire article is a classic statement on the social psychology of city life.

⁵⁵ *Our cities*, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

URBAN COMMUNITIES

work of R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, for example, shows that the dementia-praecox or schizophrenic cases tend to be concentrated in the disorganized areas of the city. On the other hand, the manic-depressive insanities follow no sharply typical pattern, although slightly more cases come from the higher economic and social levels of the population.

While an ecological mapping of mental-disorder cases affords no causal explanation as to the inception of these difficulties, it does lay the foundation for further study of the kind of factors in urban life which tend to induce certain types of breakdown and particular frequencies of the same.⁵⁶

Integration. In spite of the dominance of secondary-group interests and of impersonal relations, most urban communities possess some degree of integration around primary-group norms and have some common goals and common values in life. But the loss of many primary integrative factors in city life has been the subject of frequent comment. It is difficult to measure such matters. However, Edward L. Thorndike and Robert C. Angell have both made attempts to do so.⁵⁷ A review of the study of the latter will serve to show a particular approach to this topic.

For selected cities Angell collected certain sociological data on education, employment of women, ratio of native to foreign-born, recreation, and other items. He also set up some criteria of social integration as defined in the form of indices of community activity with regard to welfare work and crime. On the bases of his data and his indices, he tried to classify the communities as "consistent" or

"inconsistent." The former conformed to his standard of integration or did not conform. The latter were those where there was a mixture of favorable and unfavorable elements.

From his findings Angell tentatively concluded that social integration in cities tends to be higher where (1) there is a long tradition of strong support of schools, libraries, and public recreation, (2) where fewer mothers are gainfully employed, (3) where there is a high proportion of native-white population, (4) where there is the least disparity among incomes by class groupings. The "inconsistent" communities typified certain rapid transitions from primary-group controls — as witnessed in certain smaller cities which had not been able to mobilize locally in the face of the depression of the 1930's — or they were communities (chiefly in the border states) with higher proportions of Negroes and high crime rates but in which there was considerable variation in the scope and nature of the welfare program.

While Angell's study is admittedly tentative, it suggests some ways for measuring the emergence of culture patterns of mass society. This is a vital matter in our present-day world, where the city has more and more come to dominate the entire culture.

Future Trends

There is evidence to show that we are approaching an end to the hit-or-miss growth of cities. The evident result of this historical process, with its overcongestion in central areas, its slums and "blighted" sections, and its general planlessness, has compelled various interest-groups and their leaders to take thought and action with reference to future urban development. Almost everyone seems convinced that the urban way of life is here to stay. Hence the possible control of its future direction and content becomes crucial.

Urban planning. Since the larger theoretical implications of social-cultural planning will be treated in chapter 32, we shall but briefly note some of the vital and more immediate issues of urban planning. The basic aim of such planning is the reorganization of the community so as to secure the

⁵⁶ See R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, *Mental disorders in urban areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. For some confirmation of the Faris-Dunham interpretation, see Clarence W. Schroeder, "Mental disorders in cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1942, 48: 40-47. The latter study covered Kansas City (Missouri), St. Louis, Milwaukee, Omaha, and Peoria.

⁵⁷ See Edward L. Thorndike, *Your city*, 1939, and his *144 smaller cities*, 1940, (both) New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. And Robert C. Angell, "The social integration of selected American cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1942, 47: 575-592; also his *Integration of American society: a study of groups and institutions*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1941.

PLACE AND PEOPLE

est economic efficiency and the most factory attainment of physical and psychological well-being of its inhabitants. To do this about any program must take into account three variables: space, people, and time. Any planning which neglects any one of these elements is bound to prove incomplete and inadequate.

As to the relation of space to people and their ways of life, planners will do well to keep in mind that any community — be it a city, region, or nation — operates best when it has as sufficient territory in which "all of its socially contingent functions find spatial culmination."⁵⁸ This "proportionality in allocation of space," as Firey calls it, or at George K. Zipf terms "integrality of territory,"⁵⁹ must, in turn, be correlated with cultural and psychological factors. All too frequently attention has been given to the spatial and physical aspects only.

Without going into details, we may list some of the important things which sound urban planning will take into account: (1) As to the physical aspects, any plan must concern itself with the accessibility of people to their places of work, play, and worship. To make this effective involves sane regulations and visible projects as to street, zone, and land-use planning from the standpoint of the whole community. (2) In connection with this, efficient systems of transportation must be provided. (3) The planners must consider housing, its location, cost, and comfort. This consideration will include programs for the clearance of slums and reconstruction of slighted areas, such as the shanty-town eliminations.⁶⁰ (4) Ample provision must be made for parks, playgrounds, and various recreational areas. (5) Adequate provision for the public control of disease and the improvement of health must be included. And (6) plans for effective decentralization must also be made. These will mean a correlation of city planning with metropolitan planning.

⁵⁸ See Firey, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

⁵⁹ See George K. Zipf, *National unity and disunity*, p. 33. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, 1941. This is a most suggestive book.

⁶⁰ For suggestive comment see Walter Firey, "Ecological considerations in planning for urban slums," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 411-23.

The physical changes just listed are but a means to the end of human satisfactions. Plans to improve the social-psychological factors are not easy to work out. In our diffused, if not confused, urban society it is very hard to motivate individuals with reference to total community needs and projects. Such things as special and segmental interests and habits, prejudices focused on class or group hostilities, and lack of common universe of discourse among various groups make it difficult to get personal identification with the symbols and activities of the community as a whole.

If we turn to the neighborhood, we find almost as much difficulty. In certain ways man has massed himself together physically only to find himself separated psychologically as he never was before. To accomplish anything constructive through the neighborhood we must locate felt needs for improvement and develop competent local leadership. In the past the need to help immigrant groups, racial minorities, and the otherwise underprivileged led to the development of settlement houses. So, too, the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Y.M.H.A., CYO, and others have helped meet community problems at the neighborhood level. More recently there has been much public concern with problems of delinquency and youthful crime. In New York City, for example, through the public school system, so-called Community Councils were organized to deal with problems of youth at the neighborhood level.⁶¹ A more far-reaching program is that set in motion under the leadership of Saul D. Alinsky in Chicago. The People's Organization was developed in the "Back of the Yards" area to deal with larger neighborhood and local community problems, such as housing, health, delinquency, and employment. This institution is really a federation of a number of more

⁶¹ See William F. Russell, "From 'trouble area' to neighborhood," *New York Times*, magazine section, April 13, 1947. For a report on another interesting community program, see Edwin Powers, "An experiment in prevention of delinquency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1949, 261: 77-88.

specialized neighborhood and community organizations.⁶²

Finally, it is important in a democracy that as far as possible individuals and groups have a hand in the planning and execution of any community projects which concern them. The imposition of plans and programs from centralized, autocratic agencies will definitely limit if not destroy the effectiveness of the best-laid plans. All too frequently this fact has been ignored by over-ardent planners. (See chapter 32.)

The dominance of the city. It is apparent everywhere not only that the city is growing in population at the expense of the country but also that urban culture is rapidly spreading to the rural areas. The growth of the city as a market for farm products and as a center of trade and financial control over the rural regions provides the economic background for this increasing dominance of the city. Along with rapid transportation, increased urban-newspaper circulation in rural areas, and the coming of the motion picture and the radio has gone a diffusion to the country from the city of a wide variety of urban attitudes, ideas, and habits. Whether he likes it or not, the country dweller is rapidly falling under the spell of the city.

Much has been written about the dangers to our whole culture and society from the overwhelming dominance of the city, and there has been considerable talk about decentralization of the city. Up to a certain

point this has been possible. For example, electrical power permits the shifting of light machine-industry into suburban and even rural areas. So, too, improved facilities for travel have increased the growth of suburban centers around the larger cities. These changes do not mean less but more urban domination, since the fundamental urban culture remains. Since the machine and modern commercial organization lie at the basis of urban life, we cannot escape the cultural changes implied in this life unless we drastically change the whole economic order. To give up this culture itself would likely mean a decrease in population, a decline in standards of living, and a return to a preindustrial life. There is no indication, at present, that we are headed in that direction.

Yet the problems raised by the city are to be faced in terms of the whole culture and not by any simple devices, no matter how plausible they may sound in a period of crisis. Rural isolation is over. The individualism of the American farmer may continue to handicap his adjustment to urban industrial culture, but in the end he must capitulate and adapt himself to the specialization and the commercial organization of agriculture. Unless he does this, the whole matter of agricultural production may some day be taken out of his hands by state or private corporations, manned by experts and technicians who will raise our food-stuffs in the pattern of modern factory production and not in that of the ancient folk community.

Interpretative Summary

1. Present-day urban culture was born largely of the Industrial Revolution, the effects of which began to be felt in England in the late 18th century, in western Europe in the early 19th century, and in the United States in the last quarter of the 19th century. The modern urban pattern is now spreading over the rest of the world.
2. Cities represent the most extensive physical and ecological modification of the "natural landscape" which mankind has attempted.
3. In a dynamic society, such as ours, various ecological processes — concentration and centralization, segregation, invasion, and succession — come into operation. Also, decentralization appears when cities get too complex and confused as to function and structure.

⁶² See Saul D. Alinsky, *Reveille for radicals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.

PLACE AND PEOPLE

Various theoretical schemes have been developed to help study and interpret urban ecological processes. Two of the best-known are the concentric-zone theory and the sector theory.

It must not be forgotten, however, that ecological processes are always tied to social-cultural processes.

The urban way of life is quite distinct from the rural. The psychological features of the former include such features as: high degree of impersonality, high mobility, high degree of specialization of occupation or other roles, sense of anonymity, loneliness, and absence of solidarity with others, large number of special-interest groups which have little direct relationship with each other, and the "money nexus." These are the features of *mass society*, as some sociologists use the concept.

This way of life is gradually invading the rural areas and may in time come to dominate them also.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

What factors determine the location of a city?

Name and characterize the chief ecological processes which operate in American cities. Discuss critically the concentric-zone theory of urban growth. Also the sector theory.

What elements in modern life do these theories tend to neglect?

In what ways is size of city related to social characteristics?

Compare the city and the country with respect to age distribution, sex ratio, foreign-born composition, suicide, characteristics of churches, and occupational distribution.

What is meant by the expression "the urban way of life" or "urbanism"?

Summarize the principal differences between farmers and urbanites in ideas, attitudes, and habits.

What are the most essential differences in interactional patterns of rural and urban people?

What conditions keep the American farmer from fully absorbing the urban culture around him?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested supplementary reading:

W. F. Ogburn and S. M. Neuman, *Human society*, chapter 12. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949.

A good treatment of urban and rural patterns and their interrelations.

Clair Drake and H. R. Cayton, *Black metropolis*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1945.

A thorough description and interpretation of basic problems confronting both the Negro and the white in Chicago, especially on the effects of segregation.

Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1929.

A classic study of the society and culture of a small Midwestern American industrial city.

Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown in transition*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1937.

A follow-up on the first book after ten years.

Lewis Mumford, *The culture of cities*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1938.

A philosophic and literary analysis of modern urban life, but highly suggestive.

Innes H. Pearce and L. H. Crocker, *The Peckham experiment, a study in the living structure of society*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1943.

An interesting and suggestive account of a neighborhood project in London, England.

Carolyn Ware, *Greenwich Village, 1920-1930*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935.

A study of a special cultural neighborhood in New York City.

W. F. Whyte, *Street corner society: the social structure of an Italian slum*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943.

A competent and insightful descriptive analysis of boys' groups in Boston, Massachusetts.

Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *Gold Coast and slum: a sociological study of Chicago's near north side*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.

One of the early studies of an interesting area in Chicago. It provides a contrast between life on a desirable lake front and a rapidly changing and deteriorating area near by.

Regions and Regionalism

THOUGH the modern city typifies the secondary organization of society in its fullest use, another important spatial division which we call the *region* has arisen in modern times. For the most part, the consideration of regions has been confined chiefly to geographic and cultural variabilities within political states. The international aspects of regionalism have only recently emerged as of prime importance in relation to probable world economic and political organization. At intranational as well as international regions involve more than economic and political matters. Population, language, degree of industrialization, and specific cultural divergences as well as likenesses have their place. In this chapter we shall deal with the region as a factor in our expanding world of interaction and culture. Certain other aspects dealing with planning will be discussed in chapter 31. After discussing the general topic of regions and regionalism, we shall take up metropolitan districts and larger geographic cultural regions within the nation-state. Some aspects of international regionalism will be dealt with in chapter 23.

National and International Regions

Areas larger than the primitive, peasant-rural, or urban community often possess considerable geographic and cultural unity. This fact has both practical and theoretical implications for social science.

Varied views about regions. Since ancient times geographers have attempted to characterize differences in large land and water masses. They talk of equatorial, temperate, and polar zones and of "natural regions," that is, any part of the earth's surface which possesses homogeneous physio-

graphic features. In modern times "regional geography" arose as a special discipline dealing with "the mutual relations between men and the natural environments of the regions or areas in which they live."¹

Historians, also, in tracing cultural changes have dealt not only with empires and nations but with regions both within and outside particular political boundaries. Such overall concepts as Oriental or Occidental ethos bespeak a vague regional division on cultural grounds. (See chapter 3.) So, too, the concept of "culture area" in anthropology has something in common with the concepts of regions and regionalism. While the anthropologists' main concern in this connection has been to uncover likenesses and differences in culture, nonetheless they often recognize certain physiographic foundations, at least to some features of their data.²

The students of human ecology tend to view the region as representing a certain adaptation or equilibrium among competing and/or co-operating forces involving plant, animal, and human populations as these are related to culture and social organization.

The businessman, like the economist, tends to view the region as a base for the use of resources and industry. In contrast, the politician and the political scientist are inclined to regard the region from the standpoint of effective governmental administration touching both economic and polit-

¹ Quoted from H. H. Burrows in Natural Resources Committee, *Regional factors in national planning and development*, p. 141. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1935.

² See Clark Wissler, *The American Indian*, 3rd ed., pp. 220-248, New York: Oxford University Press, 1938; and M. J. Herskovits, "A preliminary consideration of the culture areas of Africa," *American Anthropologist*, 1924, 26 : 50-63, for examples of such treatment.

ical considerations. The sociologist and the cultural anthropologist deal not only with the natural resources, the economic, and the political aspects but also with other social-cultural features of the region. In particular, they try to analyze the regional phenomenon as a phase of the larger society and its culture.

Definition of region and regionalism.

In view of such varied interests and standpoints, it is not easy to define region. The National Resources Committee, set up to study among other matters the problem of regions and regionalism, obtained the consensus of ten leading regional geographers and of two regional sociologists on the proper characterization of regions.³ They agreed (1) that a region is "generally considered to be an area exhibiting homogeneity in one or more aspects," (2) that it may be delineated in terms of "many factors" and hence that its areal extent will vary "with the factor or factors selected for generalization," and (3) that the concept should be applied not to small but to larger areas, although just how "large" an area should be considered a region is not stated. The experts further agreed that "regional boundaries are usually indefinite, being zones rather than lines," and that of necessity any boundaries drawn will to some extent be arbitrary. There was a good deal of difference of opinion as to how important regional factors should be or might be thought to be, with reference to national planning.

Viewed descriptively and more specifically, a region involves, among other, the following factors: (1) There is a physiographic foundation in climate, topography, natural resources, and plants and animals. (2) There is always a basic economic component linked to these "natural" environmental factors. (3) In terms of human settlement and of culture — especially the economic phases and social organization — the people in a region, in time, tend to take on certain distinctive characteristics of

thinking and acting. Finally (4) there may or may not be some governmental counterpart to the region. In the United States the governmental aspects have been entangled either in sectionalism or in a certain separatism of the various individual states. These political factors have interfered with or cut across the "natural" and otherwise "cultural" regions. On the contrary, France is an example of a country where, in spite of strong central government, regions have been linked rather closely with provincial and local administrations.⁴ With respect to the international scene, large "natural" regions have often been cut up by small political states which have periodically struggled over the full control of these areas. (See below.)

Regionalism essentially is both a theory of, and a program regarding, the place of the region in national and international culture. On the practical side, for instance, it arose in France and elsewhere as a reaction to undue centralization of economic and political power. In the United States, on the contrary, it seems, in part, to have emerged as a counteractant to the serious interstate barriers to economic and other unification of large "natural" areas.

Some of those concerned with national planning have characterized regionalism as "a clustering of environmental, economic, social, and governmental factors to such an extent that a distinct consciousness of separate identity within the whole, a need for autonomous planning, a manifestation of cultural peculiarities, and a desire for administrative freedom are theoretically recognized and actually put into effect."⁵ Viewed in this light, *regionalism* is a social-cultural movement involving a theory, a method of study and analysis of certain facts, and a plan for carrying out a political-economic program. Such movements have been confined chiefly to public and quasi-public agencies or associations within the national state. Serious regional research and

³ Data summarized from National Resources Committee, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-149.

⁴ See Hedwig Hintze, "Regionalism," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 13:208-218. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

⁵ National Resources Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

planning with a view to international organization may also, in time, emerge.

Metropolitan Districts

As certain cities grow in size and importance, the periphery of the supporting hinterland may expand so far that there emerges what have come to be known as metropolitan districts. These are essentially what Patrick Geddes aptly termed "conurbations."⁶ The extent of such an area is determined, in part, by the commuting of workers and retail buyers who move daily to and from the center by railroad or automobile. In the larger metropolitan districts, such as New York, Chicago, or Philadelphia, this may reach out more than 50 miles, although the modal distance is probably from 20 to 40 miles. It is interesting to note in this connection that nearly one half the population of this country lives within an hour's automobile ride of some city of 100,000 or more. But the influence of a metropolis reaches far beyond these immediate contacts, especially through the newspaper, the radio, and the economic functions.

The dominance of conurbations is more striking in Britain than in this country. Britain "is small and highly urbanized, comparable . . . with New England. . . . Its big cities are within 50 or 60 miles of each other."⁷ This means much overlapping among the various metropolitan districts and much less hinterland. The radii vary with the size of the city. For London it is 50 miles; for cities over one million, 40 miles; for those over 100 thousand, 25 miles.

Population base. For purposes of analyzing the characteristics of metropolitan regions the United States Bureau of the Census delimited such areas "in connection with cities of 50,000 or more, two or more such cities sometimes being in one district,"

but included in the metropolitan district "all adjacent and contiguous minor civil divisions (townships, etc.) having a population of 150 or more per square mile." It is "an area including all the thickly settled territory in and around a city or group of cities,"⁸ characterized by more or less integrated and common economic and other interests, including, in some instances, political administrative functions. Figure 48 shows the areas of high density of population in the United States, and it is within these that our metropolitan districts are to be found.

Such metropolitan regions seldom, if ever, fall within any such traditional political unit as a single county. In fact, they often cut across state boundaries.

The 16th decennial census of the United States reports 140 such metropolitan districts within the boundaries of which resided as of April 1, 1940 nearly 63 millions, or 47.8 per cent of the total population of the country. The number of corresponding metropolitan districts in 1930 was 133, and comparisons for these over the decade 1930-1940 reveal some important facts. The population in the central cities proper increased 5.0 per cent whereas that of the areas surrounding the central cities gained 15.8 per cent. But there were certain variations. In 95 of the 133 districts, both the central city and the outlying region increased, but usually at different rates. In two districts both center and surrounding section lost population, in two the center gained while the outlying district declined, and in 34 instances the center lost while the surrounding area gained.

A survey of 34 metropolitan districts made in April, 1947 provides an idea of how the war years influenced certain American conurbations. The greatest percentage increases were in the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News district (43 per cent), San Francisco-Oakland (39 per cent), Los Angeles (35 per cent), Seattle and Washington, D.C. (each 33 per cent), and Portland (Oregon) and San Antonio (each with 31 per cent). The only loss was in the Scranton-Wilkes-Barre district (15 per cent).


The extent of the mobility is measured by movement from one county to another and

⁶ See Patrick Geddes, *Cities in evolution*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1915. Geddes was one of the early students of city growth.

⁷ From *City region and regionalism*, pp. 232-233, 1947, by Robert E. Dickinson. Used by permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.

⁸ From the Bureau of the Census, 16th Census of the United States, series P-3, no. 26, January 15, 1942, p. 1.

FIGURE 48

POPULATION DENSITY IN THE UNITED STATES, BY STATES⁹

ranged from 6 per cent to 38 per cent. "In nearly all instances 10 per cent or more of the April, 1947 civilian population were migrants."¹⁰ And in some districts, it was found that more than one third of their residents were migrants.

Among other important social effects of this shift was the housing shortage, leading to doubling-up of families. At the time of the survey "about three fourths of these metropolitan districts had about 10 per cent or more of all married couples sharing the living quarters of others."¹¹ Moreover, there was evidently much migration within the districts themselves. In about two thirds of the 34 districts "less than 50 per cent of the April, 1947 population lived in the same house as in April, 1940."¹²

⁹ Data from "Population density in our country increasing," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1948, 29, no. 3: 9. New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. By permission.

¹⁰ From "Current population reports: population characteristics," series P-21, no. 35, August 24, 1947, p. 1, Bureau of the Census.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 2.


Some interesting comparisons of relative rates of growth in 13 large metropolitan districts are shown in Figure 49.

The rise of the metropolis with its supporting hinterland depends on a number of factors, but no adequate ecological analysis has been made of the changes. Clearly, improvements in transportation and communication have had much to do with the emergence of metropolitan regions, but it would be a mistake to assume that only daily commutation to and from work in the central city or cities accounts for the growth.

Cultural aspects. The cultural features of the suburbs which surround metropolitan districts are by no means uniform. Chauncy D. Harris analyzed the 1940 data on 352 suburbs of the 140 metropolitan districts which had more than 10,000 population each. Of these "174 are dominantly residential, 149 dominantly industrial," with the balance scattered in other categories. From

FIGURE 49

COMPARATIVE RATE OF INCREASE IN POPULATION
IN DECADES FOR 13 LARGE CITIES, THEIR METROPOLITAN
DISTRICTS, AND THE UNITED STATES¹³



his data Harris worked out a generalized classification of suburban areas, as follows: (a) *industrial fringe*, where "there are many factories but relatively few people," (b) *industrial*, with both factories and workers, (c) *complex*, made up of both residential and industrial features, (d) *residential*, and (e) *mining and industry*, representing a mixture of coal-mining and manufacturing.¹⁴ While suburban growth has been closely correlated with industrial development, between 1930 and 1940, at least, industrial suburbs declined in contrast to the residential type, which grew rapidly.

The varied reasons for moving into residential suburbs are brought out in Richard Dewey's study of Milwaukee County.¹⁵ The seven most important reasons given for moving from the city to the unincorporated areas

¹³ From "The trends of population growth of large cities and their metropolitan districts" (mimeographed). New York: Consolidated Edison Company, 1947. By permission. The 13 cities are: Baltimore; Boston; Chicago; Detroit; Los Angeles; Minneapolis and St. Paul together; New Orleans; New York City, including Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, and Elizabeth; Philadelphia; Pittsburgh; St. Louis; San Francisco; and Washington, D. C.

¹⁴ See Chauncy D. Harris, "Suburbs," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1943, 49: 1-13.

¹⁵ Richard Dewey, "Peripheral expansion in Milwaukee County," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1948, 54: 118-125.

outside were, in order of importance: "better for children," "less congested," "cleaner," "larger lot," "lower taxes," "forced to move," and "cheaper land."¹⁶ As Dewey points out, the movement to the "rural-urban fringe" is apparently motivated by the desire to retain the advantages of urban living "and yet to avoid some of the incidental disadvantages" of urban congestion.¹⁷

Suburban settlements are linked by many ties to the central city and reveal a wider diversity of cultural patterns than do so-called independent communities of like size. W. F. Ogburn compared a sample of suburbs or so-called satellite cities within certain metropolitan districts with an equal number of cities not lying within such regions. The former were found to be more variable in 72 out of the 91 criteria or characteristics on which comparisons were made. His conclusion was that "... the specialization process taking place in the cities goes further in the satellite cities" than in like-sized communities elsewhere.¹⁸

For example, he found that the average suburb city had higher proportions of persons engaged in clerical work, in the professions, in music, in writing, in legal work, in electrical occupations, in police work, and in retail and wholesale trade than the corresponding independent communities of similar size. He found lower proportions of persons engaged in mining, in transportation, in factory work, in hairdressing, and in medicine. Suburbs have a low proportion of elderly people. They spend more on schools, although school attendance is about the same as in nonsatellite places. Taxes and public debts, health and police costs are all higher. Recreation costs are a little lower. The suburban cities were found to have higher average levels of living, as shown in annual earning rates in manufacturing, retail trade, and in such items as median rental value of residence, median value of homes owned, and in the percentage of families possessing radios.

Yet it is well-known that suburbs include both wealthy classes and low-income

¹⁶ *Ibid.* See Figure 1, p. 121 therein.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹⁸ See W. F. Ogburn, *The social characteristics of cities*, pp. 47-55. Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1937.

families who seek to avoid high city rents by living in the suburban areas. Some of these latter supplement their incomes by gardening or raising livestock. Moreover, the agricultural censuses report large numbers of small farms located within most metropolitan districts.

Political lag in metropolitan districts.

The political boundaries — city, county, or state — do not correspond to these newly developed but extended secondary communities. (See Figure 43, page 272.) Our governmental units are largely the products of irrational historical factors, and recent cultural changes have made their relative inflexibility more apparent than ever. The emergence of politically independent suburbs and satellite cities has resulted in the piling-up of overlapping but separate and often competing units to perform governmental functions.

Between 1890 and the mid-1930's the number of incorporated places in metropolitan areas increased 159 per cent as compared with an increase of 106 per cent in the rest of the United States. The chaos of municipal government in the ten largest metropolitan districts is suggested by the facts that in these districts there are to be found 52 municipalities of more than 50,000 population; 173 ranging from 10,000 to 50,000; 326 incorporated places between 2500 and 10,000; and 369 such places of less than 2500 people.¹⁹ To cite only a few concrete situations: Aside from a "very large number of overlapping authorities, in 1930 there were 272 separate incorporated places in the New York-Northeastern New Jersey metropolitan district, 135 in the Pittsburgh district, 115 in the Chicago area, 92 in the Philadelphia district, and 56 in the Los Angeles district."²⁰ Some of the problems deriving from the interlacing of these many governmental units is well stated by the National Resources Committee in these words:

"Overlapping these cities and suburbs of the metropolitan districts are several layers of dif-

ferent sized, bewilderingly bounded governmental areas with separate legal and fiscal identities — counties, townships, school districts, and special districts of all kinds, including sanitary, sewer, library, health, park, forest preserve, street lighting, utility, water and even mosquito abatement districts. By 1935 California had provided by legislation for 47 different types of special districts, New York for 39, New Jersey for 17 and Illinois for 10. The result in certain metropolitan areas has been a puzzling maze of local government never before duplicated in the history of political institutions. . . .

"While metropolitan life overflows the artificial network of urban boundary lines, each little bailiwick of government preserves its independent island of authority, with odd results. . . . Criminals hop over jurisdictional lines which local police dare not cross without elaborate devices for administrative co-ordination which are only now beginning to develop.

"Similarly, urban planning, highway construction, transport facilities, parks and recreational preserves too frequently must await the pleasure of minor suburbs. . . . Equally serious is the political indifference and neglect arising from the retirement into the suburbs of large blocs of urban citizenry who . . . lose all civic concern in the city governing the core of their urban community. . . ." ²¹

Various means have been found to remedy at least some of the most inefficient aspects of this situation. In some instances city and county governments have been merged, as in Denver, Colorado. Federation of separate cities into larger units has also been a practice. In 1888, the 28 metropolitan boroughs of the County of London and the City of London proper organized a federation which has gradually increased its power as Greater London. The present City of New York came about from the unification of the five boroughs in 1898. No doubt the next decades will see increased co-ordination among governing agencies in our metropolitan areas.

With respect to certain administrative functions, the interplay of state and federal rights has led to the setting-up of joint boards of authorities. The Port of New York Authority is such an agency. It has

¹⁹ See National Resources Committee, *Urban government*, pp. 27-30. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1939.

²⁰ National Resources Committee, *Our cities: their role in the national economy*, p. 67. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1937.

²¹ From *Urban government*, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

PLACE AND PEOPLE

arge of the bridges that connect the states New York and New Jersey, and of the Holland and Lincoln tunnels. It also manages various airports, bus and motor-truck terminals, and certain shipping and storage facilities. On the other hand, the waters of New York harbor are under the jurisdiction of the federal War Department.

In many instances the metropolitan region reaches out to include a very extensive hinterland, and in terms of economic concerns the problems of the metropolitan district — in the narrower sense of the census definition — merge into those of still larger and more extensive regions.

Intranational Regions

Regional differences appeared almost from the inception of our country's history, and within a few decades the political aspects of regionalism overshadowed many other aspects of our national life. But geographic and economic factors are in some ways more important in determining regions than are the political. As important

as the political forces are, in the long run they tend to find some accommodation to the geographic and to the economic and other cultural conditions.


From a physiographic standpoint the United States has a rather varied land surface. (See the map below.) The western or Pacific third is broken with rough mountains, interspersed with valleys and deserts; the middle 40 per cent is the great Mississippi-Missouri-Ohio drainage basin — one of the world's richest resource areas; and the eastern one fourth or more of the United States consists of a lesser mountain range, fringed, from Long Island southward, by rather rich coastal plains and piedmont regions. Both Pacific and Atlantic seabords have excellent harbors.

Against the background of the topography of the United States just noted, physiographic regions may be delimited by combinations of such features as variations in average annual rainfall and water, soil, and mineral resources. Since the part these factors play in relation to society and culture generally was discussed in chapter 10,



RELIEF MAP OF THE UNITED STATES U. S. Dept. of Agriculture

FIGURE 50
PRINCIPAL MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES ²²



we need but make brief comments on certain regional differences with respect to the United States.

Relatively high rainfall, that is, over 60 inches a year, is uncommon. Only along the coast of southern Mississippi and Alabama, and in scattered small areas of the Rocky Mountains and the Appalachians does annual precipitation exceed this figure. A large part of the eastern and southeastern states and the western slopes of the Cascade Mountains in the Pacific Northwest get from 40 to 60 inches of rainfall a year. In the great west-central and western parts of the United States are to be found four rainfall belts: (1) 30-40 inches, in the region bordering the Great Lakes and in a relatively narrow strip stretching through most of Iowa, northern Missouri, and along the eastern sections of Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas; (2) westward of the latter is the 20-30-inch section, reaching from Minnesota's northern border to south-central Texas; (3) the Great Plains area with but 10-20 inches

per year, and finally (4) the arid Great Basin with less than 10 inches annually.

The original natural vegetative cover was closely related to the rainfall distribution. It ranged from heavy forest woodland, where precipitation was heaviest, through the tall and short grass lands of the central and Great Plains sections to the desert vegetation, such as sagebrush and creosote bush.


Water resources are associated with the flow of natural streams and the distribution of inland lakes. The chief drainage basins of the United States are shown on the relief map on the previous page.

The soil resources also vary considerably, but the best types for tillage are associated, for the most part, with areas of good or moderate rainfall and the rich valleys of our major drainage systems. (How man has depleted such resources is shown in Figure 11, page 142.)

The mineral resources are widely scattered, but the strategic ones, such as coal, iron, and petroleum, are in relatively easy

²² Prepared by Wilfred Webster. In 1948 uranium was reported in Colorado.

FIGURE 51
AGRICULTURAL REGIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ²³



transportation relations to the industrialized metropolitan districts. Figure 50 shows the location of the chief mineral resources of the United States. In both industry and agriculture there is a correlation of social and cultural developments and the resources, as we noted in chapter 10. Figure 51 shows the relationship between certain types of crops, soil, and climate and the culture of the inhabitants.

Chief industrial regions. The principal industrial regions are found, first, in a densely settled area stretching from Baltimore northeastward, near and along the Atlantic seaboard as far as Boston. From this section two lines of industrial development spread westward, one up the Mohawk Valley to Buffalo, the other stretching out to Pittsburgh. The latter is the center of a second exclusive area, given over largely to steel and heavy industry. At Cleveland

the line from Pittsburgh meets the one from Buffalo to form, with Detroit, a third highly concentrated industrial region, in which automotive plants predominate. The fourth important region lies in and near the Chicago metropolitan district. This includes both heavy and consumer-goods industries. Subsidiary manufacturing areas stretch down the Ohio Valley from Pittsburgh as far as St. Louis. And another thin and intermittent line reaches from central Virginia and North Carolina along the upper Piedmont to Birmingham, Alabama. On the Pacific Coast there are growing industrial areas around Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland.

During the period since the Industrial Revolution in the United States really began in earnest, there have been some changes in the chief locus of certain industries. Important shifts were made in lumber, cotton textiles, shoes, hosiery, iron and steel, aircraft, and ship building, and to a less extent in furniture and clothing. Lumber moved

²³ From the Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.

westward as the natural resources were used up. Cotton-textile factories tended to desert New England for the cheaper labor supply of the South, with proximity to the cotton crop as a subsidiary consideration. New iron and steel plants arose in the Middle West and South as new resource bases were located. Aircraft and shipbuilding both expanded rapidly on the Pacific Coast during World War II.

Yet the relative stability of our industrial economy is shown in the distribution of certain classes of wage earners. For example, of the 200 counties which in 1935 had the largest number of wage earners, it is worth noting that as early as 1870 nearly three fourths of all workers in industry and one third of the nation's population were located in these same counties.

It is not likely that heavy industry will shift very greatly until the sources of raw materials are exhausted or the population is concentrated in the South or the Far West. On the other hand, consumer-goods industries may likely continue to spread out, especially to sources of cheap labor. This movement will be aided by the development of electric transmission, making power easily available, and by improvements in transportation of raw materials, foodstuffs, and finished products. Moreover, the potential use of energy derived from atomic fission may make for decentralization; and, pending the application of this new method of deriving energy, the threats of war and war itself may lead to drastic alterations in the location of our strategic industries.

Clearly the economic balance between regions results from a number of factors: availability of raw materials and of labor, sufficient motive power, convenience of transportation, and relation to markets. Moreover, the extension of commercialized and mechanized farming, changes in the relative importance of agriculture and manufacturing in the national economy, and the shifts of industry from center to center have been associated with marked residential mobility of the population. Let us examine some important aspects of this form of mobility.


Internal migration. From the beginning of our national history there have been movements of our people from state to state and from region to region. In the pioneering phase this was chiefly from east to west and from the Old South to the New South-Southwest. In addition to these continuing shifts in residence, there has developed certain seasonal migration, which we discussed in chapter 14. At this point we are concerned with residential mobility. Three aspects of this may be noted: (1) the long-range trends of the total population, (2) the impact of war, and (3) the pattern of rural-urban migration.

(1) Down to 1910 the general westward movement continued, but between 1910 and 1920 there were some changes in the pattern. The exodus continued from New England and the Middle Atlantic and West North Central divisions. The South Central states had a slight in-migration in contrast to the out-going trend of the previous decade. The balance of the South tended to lose population. The East North Central section, especially in urban centers, showed a reversal of trend, due chiefly to the growth of industry in that division during World War I. The middle agricultural sections, however, drew no new people, largely because of the introduction of improved farm machinery. The Western and Pacific Coast states continued to draw heavily from other regions.

Between 1920 and 1930 the general form of these trends did not change a great deal, but there were some variations. New England, the Middle Atlantic, and the West North Central divisions still lost population while the East North Central attracted people, due to further development of industry. The South Atlantic and the South Central states lost heavily, due largely to the agricultural decline, and for the first time the Mountain states lost some residents, due to the drop in farm prices. But the Pacific Coast continued to gain at the expense of other sections.

In the decade 1930-1940 the West gained somewhat more than a million through net internal migration, while the North and South lost, respectively, about 600,000 and 555,000 persons. There were some reversals. The East North Central lost population for the first time in 20 years. The South Atlantic states gained some, as did the Mountain states again. The

FIGURE 52
INTERREGIONAL MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES ²⁴



Pacific Coast continued to gain from in-movement, the sources being, in part, the economically depressed areas of the Great Plains and the Dust Bowlers.²⁵

(2) The impact of World War II on internal migration was marked. A sample survey taken in March, 1945 revealed that about 15 million civilians were residing in a different county at that time from their county of residence on December 7, 1941 (date of Pearl Harbor attack). "In three years and three months

more civilians had moved from one county to another than in the whole five years between 1935 and 1940."²⁶ These interregional migrations followed pretty much the same general pattern as that of 1935-1940, except that the South-to-West mobility increased in relative importance while that between the North-eastern states and the North Central states declined somewhat.

The interregional migration among the four major regions of the United States is shown in Figure 52. The top map shows the movements, 1935-1940; the center map, those between 1941 and 1945; and the bottom map, "the 'lifetime migration' of the 1940 native population . . . based on a comparison of region of residence in 1940 with region of birth. . . ."²⁷

In addition to this heavy volume of migration from region to region, there was much mobility within regions, between states, and between counties within given states. During the wartime period this amounted to about 11.6 millions in contrast to only 5 millions in the five years just prior to the war. This migration was heaviest in the South, where it represented 12.2 per cent of the total civilian population in 1945; and in the West, where it was 11.8 per cent.

(3) Closely tied into this regional migration is that from farms to cities, note of which has already been made. Between January 1, 1920 and January 1, 1945 the average net movement from farms amounted to 600,000 civilians per year. These facts are graphically shown in Figure 53.

Yet because of the higher net reproduction rate among farm families, in 1940 the farm population was only about 4 per cent less than it was in 1920. However, it must be noted that "the numerical and proportionate contribution of the farm population to the total population is declining."²⁸ This is simply another way of saying that the differential in rural-urban birth rates is decreasing.

The extent of the migration between 1940 and 1947 is indicated in the following statement from the Bureau of the Census in April, 1948: "Approximately 70 million persons in

²⁴ From Shryock and Eldridge, *op. cit.*, p. 27. By permission.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Conrad Taeuber, "Recent trends in rural-urban migration in the United States," in *Postwar problems of migration*, p. 126. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1947.

²⁷ From Henry S. Shryock, Jr., and Hope T. Eldridge, "Internal migration in peace and war," *American Sociological Review*, 1947, 12: 28. By permission.

²⁸ See P. M. Haines, "Population," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1942, 47: 816-828.

April, 1947 were not living in the same house in which they lived in April, 1940. . . . Some 44 million persons [63 per cent of the total who moved] had changed houses within the same county, 13 million [18.5 per cent] had changed counties within the same state, and 12 million [17 per cent] had changed their state of residence between 1940 and 1947. . . . The net loss from farm areas through migration of about 3,200,000 persons, or 1 in every 8 who had lived on a farm in 1940, continued the long-term trend away from the land. . . . That such mobility continues is shown in another report. Thus in April, 1948, one out of every 5 persons "was living in a different house from the one he lived in a year earlier. . . . Of the 28 million persons who had moved to a different house, 19 million had moved within a county and 9 million had changed their county of residence." ²⁹

As to total population gains, including births and in-migration, from a regional standpoint the West was far in advance of the rest of the country in rate of increase. In these seven years her population increased 31 per cent, in contrast to the gains for the Northeast (4 per cent), the North Central (6 per cent), and the South (5 per cent).


Some striking changes in population by states from 1940 to 1947 are in line with these regional figures: California, Oregon, and Washington led the country in gains — 42.1, 41.8, and 35.8 per cent, respectively. On the other hand, Pennsylvania and New York gained only 6.1 and 5.0 per cent, respectively. Moreover, nine states lost population: Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana.³⁰

One or two additional facts are noteworthy. The median age of the migrants is lower than that of the nonmigrants. People in the age range 20–35 years are the most mobile. There were no significant sex differences among the migrants. The nonwhite population (chiefly Negroes) outside the South were more migratory in the period 1940–1947 than they were in 1935–1940.

There is every reason to believe that interstate and interregional mobility of popu-

FIGURE 53

MOVEMENT TO AND FROM FARMS, UNITED STATES, 1920–1947 ³¹



lation will continue in the United States for some time to come. Until there is relative equality of rural and urban birth and death rates, the cities will continue to draw upon the country for replacements in its population. What the situation will be as we arrive more definitely at a stage of stationary or even declining population is difficult to foresee. And it must not be forgotten that the United States might conceivably postpone the arrival at such a phase of population if the gates of immigration were opened again more widely. (See chapter 12.)

Other regional differences. The economic status of the population in the various regions is enlightening. In general it is low in the Southeast and the Southwest, high in the Far West and in the Middle West, especially around the Great Lakes, and in the Northeast. The Northwest region tends to fall into a median position with respect to the others. Certain basic facts are given in Figure 54, which shows the per-capita income in 1946 and the children under 20 years per 1000 adults for 1940.


²⁹ "Current population reports: population characteristics," series P-20, no. 14, April 15, 1948, p. 1, Bureau of the Census. And, *ibid.*, series P-20, no. 22, January 28, 1949, p. 1.

³⁰ Data taken from Bureau of the Census news release in *The New York Times*, August 9, 1948.

³¹ From "Farm population estimates, January, 1948," p. 3. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, June, 1948 (mimeographed).

FIGURE 54

REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN PER-CAPITA INCOME AND
IN THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER 1000 ADULTS ²²



Variations in educational opportunities are also impressive. The Southeast and the Southwest have high proportions of children to total population and to income. Yet their schools are in the bottom category as to per-capita expenditure and other items. On the basis of very broad division of the United States into North, South, and West, certain differences in proportions of items related to levels of living are revealing.²² (See Figure 55.) Again the South shows the most striking deviations from the other two large regions. And in the rural South the contrasts are, for the most part, more striking in comparison to rural areas elsewhere than are the southern urban to the urban sections in the North and West.

We have already noted that the Northeast is high in manufacturing and large cities. Still other characteristics may be noted: It contains a high proportion of foreign-born and children of foreign-born. The high level of living is accompanied by high taxes. The relative percentage of farms is lower than in other regions. The Southeast is marked by relatively few foreign-born immigrants or their children and by a very large proportion of our American Negro population, by a high percentage of share-

croppers, by a heavy church membership, low taxes, few libraries, few large cities, low divorce rate, and in general a more persistent rural culture, especially qualified by Negro-white caste distinctions. (See chapter 28.)

There are some striking metropolitan regions in the Southwest, especially in Texas and Oklahoma, which mean manufacturing, but for the most part it is a section of large commercialized farms, low standards of living, and few cities. In some ways the Southwest is our most distinctive region because of the persistence of the Spanish-American culture upon which the Anglo-American patterns were superimposed in the 19th century. The Middle West presents a combination of industry, business, and extensive farming, much of the latter being of a commercialized type. There is a high proportion of cities and of foreign-born, in the cities especially; governmental costs are high, and there are ample libraries. In all probability it typifies the most adequate balance between rural-urban life of any part of the country. The Northwest is a section of large and commercialized farms, chiefly devoted to cereals and livestock. There are comparatively few cities; there are relatively fewer foreign-born than in the Northeast or Middle states, but more than in the Southeast. In general, the West is rich in industry, farming, and forestry. There is a low birth rate but a high rate of in-migration from other states. Church membership is low and educational standards exceptionally high. There is a large percentage of males and of young adults. Taxes are high, but so are marriage and divorce and crime rates.


In considering all these differences we must remember that the mere combination of statistics from various states into a regional classification is meaningless unless the facts indicate a solid basis of distinctive culture. In order to have a cultural region we need not only a geographic foundation but some common interest, some symbols of solidarity, some sense of belongingness or we-group feeling. These intangible items are hard to identify and difficult to measure when they are discovered. Yet the New Englander does have a sense of difference from other Americans. Certainly the Southerners possess, in general, a certain pride and certain sense of solidarity among themselves. The Midwesterner has something

²² Data on income from *World Almanac*, 1948, p. 57, New York: New York World-Telegram, 1948, whose source was the Department of Commerce. Data on children from the 1940 census. By permission.

²³ The North includes New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central states. The South includes the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central states. The West includes the Mountain and Pacific states.

FIGURE 55

LEVEL-OF-LIVING ITEMS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL AVERAGE FOR SPECIFIED POPULATION GROUPS, BY REGIONS ³⁴



of this sense of region but perhaps less than these others. The agricultural resident of the Central Plains perhaps has still less. On the other hand, the resident of the Pacific Coast, stimulated in part by his geographic isolation, has tended to develop many common regional interests and common symbols. But within these larger and vaguer areas, the attachment to the separate states is often much stronger. The Virginian or the Californian is often prouder of his state than of his regional connections. In fact, the place of the separate states is so important that we must give it some attention with reference to the matter of regionalism.

Our dual political system — state and federal — has made for many complications in the development of a more sensible regional organization of the nation, along political, economic, and other lines. We shall discuss but three of these: (1) political

sectionalism, (2) state barriers to trade and like handicaps to regional development, and (3) overlapping, irrational federal administrative districting of the country.

Sectionalism in American history. Political sectionalism was born almost simultaneously with the founding of the nation. Sectionalism in American history resulted from a combination of certain economic interests with the dominant political party or faction in states which fell within the orbit of these particular interests. As we know, the most striking sectional conflict resulted in the War Between the States. The conflict was one between a slave-labor plantation economy and the economy of commerce, industry, and nonslave agriculture of the North. And it was the threat of further extension of the nonslave Midwest which was one of the more immediate "causes" of the open conflict. By 1860 the South had to make its last stand on its states' rights and revolt. Had it waited 20 years more, the South would have been altogether

³⁴ From Walter C. McKain, Jr., and Grace L. Flagg, "Differences between rural and urban levels of living: Part II, Regional variations," Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, June, 1948 (mimeographed).

too late even to try to become independent of its northern neighbors.

Yet the war did not end sectionalism. After the Reconstruction days it broke out again between the South and the North, but with the expanding Middle Western states playing essentially the determining role in the controversy between the other regions. In time, the sectional conflict took on the form of a political struggle between the agricultural Midwest, abetted by the Far West, and the manufacturing and banking North Central and Northeastern states. And in this situation the South played the role of supporting the Midwestern agriculturalists on farm programs at some points and, at other times, the industrialists.

During World War II and after, political sectionalism in the South became quite vocal. It was based, in part, on her further industrialization and the decline of her soil resources. In part, it represented a reaction against the rising demand for better treatment of the Negro.

The proponents of a more rational organization of regions much regret political sectionalism and criticize those who would confuse the two. In terms of cultural realities, the political patterns are often as important as the geographic and economic. The hard core of political reality is not to be gainsaid.³⁶ True, political sectionalism often tends to be a divisive and disruptive rather than an integrating factor in national unity — a fact which the proponents of regionalism are constantly stressing. Yet as long as we retain the senatorial system permitting two senators to each state regardless of its population, and as long as pressure groups continue, we are likely to see regional interests take the form, politically at least, of sectionalism. There will be shifts in this as farmers lose ground or as laborers in cities gain political power or as large-scale owners come into conflict with wage earners and possibly with agricultural

interests. But in any case it does not appear likely that sectionalism of the sort we have described will entirely die out until, at least, profound changes in our political order take place.

However, the impact of other political forces on the economic has become so marked as to overshadow certain phases of the older sectionalism. The rise of what are in effect interstate tariff regulations is a case in point.

State trade barriers. The recurrent and persistent power of localism and politics is well illustrated in the rise of what are called "trade walls" between the individual states of our country. In spite of rapid changes in technology, reflected in mass production and in rapid transportation and communication, the separate states have tended in many matters to set themselves apart as virtually independent political-economic kingdoms. Moreover, this trend toward state localism has occurred in spite of the fact that the federal Constitution explicitly prohibits the states from discriminating against, or levying tariff duties on, imports or exports from other states.

Among the most common governmental means of fostering this localism of the various states are these: (1) Many states require that all public supplies be purchased, whenever possible, from producers within that state. This includes such items as building materials, coal, butter, and public printing. Many states permit only bona-fide residents of the state to be on their payrolls.

(2) Another way to bolster state economic autonomy is through an elaborate system of licenses and requirements regarding selling, transporting goods, using automobiles and trucks, and so on. All sorts of qualifications are put into effect regarding the weight of truck loads, width of tires, use of trailers, and the like. In fact, the conflicting laws of various states serve to restrict truck transportation. (3) An elaborate system of quarantine laws against insects and plant diseases has been used not only to keep out diseases and pests but to prevent competition in such items as good fruit and nursery stock. (4) Many states require various kinds of grading of products, packaging, and the like, partially devised to

³⁶ See F. J. Turner, *The significance of sections in American history*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1932, for important papers on sectionalism in our history.

stimulate homemade goods and to keep out others. (5) Excise taxes have been levied on certain products, especially on margarine in order to protect the dairy farmers. (6) All sorts of devices — licenses, excise taxes, restrictions on nonresident manufacturers, and others — have been used to stimulate state wine and liquor enterprises. On the other hand, some states exempt manufacturers who export to other states. In this sense, the individual states imitate nations who subsidize exports while at the same time hampering imports by tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions.

Overlapping federal districts. Not only do trade walls tend to interfere with the development of natural economic regions — “natural” in the sense of effective combination of resources, processing, marketing, and consumption — but the federal government itself, by reason of its complicated and contradictory administrative units, has often tended to discourage rather than stimulate a sense of regional unity. Like other institutions, governmental administrative units are usually set up without long-range planning and develop from day-to-day and year-to-year decisions. The situation is illustrated in the 1935 report of the National Resources Committee on regional factors in national planning: Nine of the regular federal departments had 78 different systems of districting the country for purposes of administration. In addition, 23 other federal agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and Veterans Administration, had 30 other and different district systems.³⁶

Programs for regional organization. In spite of the welter of overlapping federal districts and the continuation of many state trade barriers, there are definite trends toward a more functional approach to regional problems. At this point we shall but illustrate a few of the more important recent developments, first, with respect to soil conservation and agriculture; second, as to various state

compacts; and third, as to certain federal projects.

(1) As one phase of a much larger national project to prevent soil erosion and to conserve water and land resources, the Soil Conservation Service was set up in 1935. One branch of this work called for the establishment of soil-conservation districts which aimed at co-operation among farmers, with the aid of local and federal agencies, to prevent wastage of land and water. These districts are set up, not with reference to county or state boundaries but rather in terms of drainage basins and other physiographic features. The program calls for mutual agreements among the land users as to use of contour and strip farming, rotation of crops, planting of legumes and grasses, building of dams, and other devices to prevent erosion and to build up the land resources. The pictures on pp. 306 and 307 offer a contrast between wasting areas and an attempt to conserve the land by more intelligent planting.


(2) Another interesting development, and one antedating the Soil Conservation Service, is the system of agreements among various states which have conjoint interests in conservation and use of resources. Under Article 1, Section 10 of the federal Constitution, which permits compacts among states with the consent of Congress, a variety of interstate agreements have been set up, ranging all the way from provision for the use of port facilities in and about the New York harbor and regarding various interstate bridges or tunnels to interstate debt settlements, crime prevention, regulation of public utilities, agreements respecting uniform legislation, and compacts regarding use of natural resources. The Colorado River Compact of 1922, among Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California, is an interesting case of interstate accommodation. The Tennessee Valley Authority, set up in May, 1933, represents the most ambitious regional project of the federal government to date. The aim of this agency is the full development of the water resources of the drainage basin of the Tennessee River, reaching principally into Tennessee, Alabama, and North Carolina.³⁷ In the words of the National Resources

³⁶ See *Regional factors in national planning*, op. cit., appendix, pp. 209-223, for listing and maps of districts. Since this report was issued some reorganization has taken place among federal agencies, but very little serious effort has yet been made to coordinate the various patterns of administration.

³⁷ See David E. Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the march*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. See also *Annual report of the Tennessee Valley Authority for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1948*. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949.




DISASTROUS EFFECTS OF EROSION: A GULLIED ALFALFA FIELD. CONTOUR PLANTING OF FORAGE CROPS ALTERNATED WITH TILLED CROPS WOULD HELP PREVENT THIS



Soil Conservation Service, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture

A FORM OF EROSION CALLED A "WATERFALL HEADER" IN A PASTURE, PROBABLY DUE TO OVERGRAZING AND LACK OF CHECK DAMS AND OTHER SOIL-CONSERVING DEVICES



Soil Conservation Service, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture

CONTOUR AND STRIP FARMING TO PREVENT EROSION AND TO BUILD UP LAND RESOURCES


Committee, "The Tennessee Valley Authority . . . has shown facility in adjusting itself to local situations, fitting in (1) by contractual arrangements with local authorities, (2) by administrative and financial arrangements, (3) by co-ordination of planning agencies, local, state, and national, and (4) by the serious attention to the social and economic possibilities of public works development."³⁸

Other regional projects, based in large part on drainage basins, have been widely discussed, and some concrete programs have

begun. Among these are the Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams of the Pacific Northwest, which are aimed at water conservation, the diversion of water to potentially huge areas of irrigated farmland, and the development of hydroelectric power. In other areas, as in plans for a Missouri Valley Authority, a centralized and separate program has not yet emerged. But it is apparent that the United States has launched out on certain regional developments that may vastly influence our future cultural history. While the wider aspects of planning will be treated in chapters 31 and 32, we may close this chapter with some comments

³⁸ From National Resources Committee, "Regional planning," pamphlet series, pp. 10-11. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1938.

FIGURE 56

POSSIBLE PLANNING REGIONS BASED UPON COMPOSITE PLANNING PROBLEMS ³⁹

on certain phases of regional planning in relation to important cultural and psychological factors.

Some factors in regional planning. There has been continuous and at times bitter debate regarding the standards or criteria to be used in setting up rational regional administrative agencies. Some have advocated that such regions might best be delimited around the major large metropolitan centers on the theory that these cities represent a basic functional relationship of center and hinterland with respect to a widespread series of goods and services. Objections to this regional plan are made on the ground that the data are too complex to be covered by a single criterion. Others suggest that regions be built up around administrative convenience, such as transportation facilities and proximity to state institutions and federal administrative offices. Obviously this is but a makeshift, following traditional federal practice, and does not necessarily create realistic regions.

Still another plan calls for combining groups of states. Actually, the earliest rec-

ognition of regional differences grew out of the traditional division of the country into the grouping of states into such geographic divisions as the Northeast, Southeast, North Central, etc. While recent proposals would not follow the traditional combination of states, such a scheme would still be open to the criticism that many states and combinations of states cut across too many regional differences in climate, soil, industry, and ways of life. As one commentator puts it: "States or groups of states are not particularly suited to function as planning regions."⁴⁰ Another proposal is to base regions on single functions and then to make certain combinations of single-function areas if this be administratively feasible. The division of the United States into drainage basins is one illustration of this approach. But, again, overlapping would not be avoided but actually increased were the country overlaid with a series of checker-board regional arrangements.

³⁹ *Regional factors in national planning, op. cit.*, p. 166. Possible regional headquarters are indicated on the map by dots.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

Perhaps the most practical, though not the easiest to determine, is the plan to develop regions around a composite of physiographic and cultural data. With respect to the former, items such as climate, soil, topography, flora and fauna, and mineral resources may be considered. On the cultural side population density, metropolitan influence, major types of productive operations, commerce, farm income, distribution of public relief, and voting habits of the people would serve as criteria. By weighting certain factors — such as land use and sectional consciousness — more heavily than others, and by various compromise devices, a regional map of the country was constructed as a possible basis for planning and administration. (See Figure 56.) It is evident that the boundaries of such multifactor and composite regions are not sharp, but from a functional standpoint this general plan permits certain detailed adjustments, especially on the peripheries of any given region.

The difficulty in setting up specific regional areas, then, is evidently bound up not only with physiographic and economic and political factors but with the whole social-psychological phase of the culture of the given population. All too frequently in considering regional problems attention has been given only to the economic or geographic factor or to the possibility, as in the interstate compacts, of dealing with the topic through agreements among competing states.

Planning for any kind of regional organization, then, must bear in mind that the economic and political ordering toward some sort of functional unit does not of itself produce the essential core of an extended community or society as we have considered them. If the region is to become a really vital part of our social-cultural world it must be supported by the deep-seated values and attitudes of its inhabitants. Among other items there must first be a sound and abiding identification with the region as one's own as a place of residence, occupation, education, and civic life. In connection with this there must arise some symbols about the region, just as people now often think of their nation as "my country" or of their own state by some name — "The Empire State," "The Sunflower State," and so on. This would include not only economic and political symbols but also those associated with family life, education, art, and religion.

Every would-be regional planner must recognize that the impersonal and monetary character of business-industrial relationships is such that, coupled with high population mobility and extensive division of labor, it is difficult to expect these deeper psychological roots to develop. The latter, after all, are partly the product of a certain isolation and stability of economic culture itself. Unless regions develop the supporting attitudes and values of solidarity and common action, the economic or political aspects will be largely superficial.

Interpretative Summary

1. The region, as a concept, arises from historical changes but frequently lacks many of the features which mark the primary or urban community.
2. The nation-state is the largest overall community which shows more or less integrated social-cultural features. Ordinarily we consider the region as falling within the bounds of the nation-state.
3. The metropolitan district has come to be one of our most important and distinctive regions. It comprises one or more central large cities and the surrounding suburban and satellite communities.
4. Intranational regions of larger scope are often vaguely defined. Moreover, the economic functions are seldom closely correlated with the political functions at local, state, or federal level. This makes for confusion and much duplication of service.

5. The separate states of this country also tend by their trade barriers to develop some in-group economic-political features which run counter to the more "natural" regions based on economic and noneconomic activities.
6. Regional organization has not advanced very far in this country, but it is under way in such things as Soil Conservation districts, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and others.
7. Regional planning must take into account such basic variables as physiographic features, nature and extent of agriculture and industry, and political and other noneconomic elements.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define and illustrate region; regionalism.
2. What are the chief difficulties in delimiting a region?
3. What are the criteria for the determination of a metropolitan district?
4. With reference to the United States, what political factors have retarded the development of regional organization? What factors have fostered such development? Illustrate.
5. What are the major regions in the United States, and on what bases may they be determined?
6. Define sectionalism. What relation has it historically to emerging regionalism today?
7. What are some of the basic things which must be taken into consideration in regional planning?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Robert E. Dickinson, *The regions of Germany*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945.

A good review of regional problems in Germany with comments on future needs for rehabilitation of Germany along regional lines.

Howard W. Odum, *Southern regions of the United States*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1936.

A full-length account of the resources and problems of regional aspects of the southern states.

Howard W. Odum and H. E. Moore, *American regionalism*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1938.

Much the same type of material as in the above, but with attention to the United States as a whole.

Postwar problems of migration. New York: Mibank Memorial Fund, 1947.

"Papers presented at the round table on population problems," October 29-30, 1946. See especially papers by Conrad Taeuber, Henry S. Shryock, Jr., and Philip M. Hauser and Hope T. Eldridge.

✧ Part Three ✧

Basic Institutions and Processes

The Family: Its Institutions

THE FAMILY is the basic primary group and the natural seedbed of personality. It may be defined as a social group consisting of one or more men living with one or more women, in the same household, and their own or adopted children, at least during their early years. It is an irreducible association of two generations, parents and children, sanctioned by the larger society. There may, of course, be marriage without children, also children without marriage. Although childless married couples usually set up a household, and although many of their contacts are not unlike those of parents, they do not represent a full-fledged family in the usual historical sense. Such grouping has been called a "marriage pair."

The family sometimes consists of a father and a mother and their married children and grandchildren living in the same household. Such a group involving three or even four generations of near blood relatives is often called the "joint" family, in distinction to the smaller two-generation family of parents and children, often called "the marriage group."

The functions of the family vary greatly in different societies. In the light of present-day discussion about its changing functions in America, it is well to bear in mind the divergent family patterns in other societies. For example, in some societies the men take their meals entirely outside the home. In others the family as an economic unit is decidedly subordinate. In still others children are passed around under what seems to us a curious system of adoption. Also, sometimes religious and ceremonial functions are in the hands of the family, as in early Rome or in ancient China.

Although there are many variations in family form and function the world over, there are certain general institutional fea-

tures: the basic relations of the family to the larger social order, the nature and forms of marriage, and variations in sex life outside marriage and the family. These we shall take up first. But family life has been greatly affected by industrialization and urbanization, and certain of these effects we shall examine in the final section of this chapter. In chapter 18 we shall describe and analyze the important interpersonal relations in mate selection, between the spouses, between the parents and their children, and finally with reference to family dissolution.

The Family and the Social Order

The precise steps in the formation of the human family are unknown. Certain theorists contend the original human grouping consisted of "group marriage," or an undifferentiated horde of males and females living together more or less promiscuously. The children of these unions were considered the offspring of the whole group. Still other writers have held that the original family was made up of mother and children, the father, aside from his sexual role, playing a very indefinite part. Actually, no such condition as these early theorists assumed has ever been found, even among peoples of the most elementary culture.¹

The family, the basic social structure. Everywhere the family consists ordinarily of father, mother, and children. Nowhere are mother and child alone recognized as a family. As B. Malinowski put it, "In all

¹ See R. H. Lowie, *Primitive society*, chapter 3, New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1920, and his article "Marriage," *Encyclopædia of the social sciences*, 10 : 150, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934; also B. Malinowski, "Marriage," *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th ed., 14 : 940-950, Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1929.

human societies the father is regarded by tradition as indispensable." This Malinowski called *the principle of legitimacy*.² In other words, in every society there is some form of regulation of family relations, fixing — with certain limits — not only the roles and statuses of the father and the mother but also making the child a legitimate member of the group. Moreover, the husband and/or the wife serves as a "link" between the child and the rest of the community. Although in some societies the function of the biological father is neglected, or even unknown, as among the Trobriand Islanders, the father or his surrogate has a family function, and the children have an approved role and status. Illegitimacy is seldom given group sanction except in certain modern countries. In many primitive tribes, as well as with ourselves, the disgrace of illegitimate birth is rectified by the obligation of the presumptive father to marry the mother. *Nowhere is the family complete without father, mother, and child.* Not only is such social status important within the family itself, but it connects the child to other groups in the community.

The family and lines of descent. The relationship of generations hinges, obviously, upon the matter of descent. While biologically each individual is the product of two streams of genes — one from each parent — in many societies lineage is counted in but one family line. Where, for example, descent is traced in the father's line, or is *patrilineal*, the child takes the father's family name, becomes associated formally with the paternal family and clan, and has little or no relation with the mother's relatives. Where descent is *matrilineal*, that is, counted in the mother's line, quite different customs are found. (See chapter 4 on the Zuni.)

The *bilateral* family system seldom permits the solidarity and continuity possible in a *unilateral* scheme. Here the adults come together without the restrictions and bind-

ing influences found in the unilateral cultures.³ In our own bilateral system, the children take their father's family name, reflecting older forms and patriarchal control.

Matrilineal families tend, in turn, to be matriarchal in control. Yet the popular storybooks give a false view. Although in these societies the mother does exercise considerable power over the children, it is more often her family rather than herself that regulates family contacts, as in the case of the Zuni.

Nature and Forms of Familial Institutions

Certain accepted and expected relations of the spouses to each other have developed sanctioned patterns of behavior. These serve to define and regulate the conduct of the parents to each other and to the children.

The nature of marriage. Sex relations and marriage must not be confused. Marriage is a group-sanctioned bond establishing the family relations, especially in reference to the offspring. Sex relations do not necessarily lead to marriage. Marriage in most societies is not generally entered into for sentimental or romantic reasons. It is not sexual gratification which is the primary purpose of marriage but, rather, the legitimacy of the offspring and their care and training through the early years. In the words of Malinowski: "Marriage on the whole is rather a contract for the production and maintenance of children than an authorization of sexual intercourse."⁴ In our own culture the sexual and romantic phases of marriage may become more important with the decline in the birth rate and the disappearance of economic and related functions from the family. (See below.)

² See his essay in V. F. Calverton and S. D. Schmalhausen, eds., *The new generation*, pp. 113-118. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930.

³ For a discussion of various ways in which many nonliterate peoples deal with kinship relations, see M. J. Herskovits, *Man and his works*, pp. 296-303, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948; and J. P. Gillin, *The ways of men*, pp. 430-442, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948.

⁴ Malinowski, "Marriage," *op. cit.*, p. 940.

In most societies marriage is a secular, not a religious, contract. Religious sanctions, true enough, are often added, but marriage is not universally supported by religion. Where religion has a part, as in Judeo-Christianity, it may serve to increase the emotional bonds and to put more weight behind the community controls over the family.

Marriage, either secular or religious in form, carries with it everywhere certain symbolism, certain subjective elements. It implies a welding of two lives together in reference to certain obligations and duties. In various parts of the world one finds symbolic rites, such as the bride and groom eating out of a common bowl, drinking from the same vessel, mixing clay or earth together from two separate lots, as external witness of the union. In our own society marriage symbolism is illustrated by the use of engagement and wedding rings.

Forms of marriage. Marriage is the institution which determines the particular relation of parents to each other and to the children. The phrase "form of marriage" means the number of consorts or mates which a man or a woman is permitted by the particular society. Traditionally the chief forms of marriage are monogamy, polygyny, and polyandry. To these may be added the more recent so-called companionate marriage.

Monogamy, the marriage of one man to one woman, is the common denominator of human marriage everywhere, the most widespread form of mating. It is generally agreed that monogamy permits the most satisfactory system of bearing and rearing children. Moreover, since the ratio of the sexes is everywhere about the same — barring some special circumstances, such as infanticide — we should expect monogamy to be rather universal.

Polygyny is a type of marriage in which two or more women are legally mated to one man. The children's descent may take patrilineal, matrilineal, or bilateral form, depending on the particular culture of the society.⁵

⁵ The only extensive instance of polygyny in recent times in Western society was among the Utah Mormons, from about 1850 till 1890, when it was

It is a mistake to assume that polygyny arises from any marked sexual urges of the male, since sexual gratification is nowhere perfectly correlated with marriage, monogamous or otherwise. In most societies there is ample opportunity for sexual gratification outside conventional marriage. Nor is there any society in which polygyny is universal. Even where polygyny is widely accepted, monogamy remains the most common form of marriage. Accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a "polygynous society."

Polygyny is really a form of multiple or interrupted monogamy. In most instances, each household is separate, and the husband rotates his attention among his wives. However, in some societies there are joint households where two or more wives and their children live together. In the latter cases, naturally, the economy of the household is different from that of separate establishments.

The most important motivations to polygyny are economic need and prestige. In Africa, for instance, additional wives are added to the household as the husband demands more help in order to increase his wealth. In the Trobriand Islands of Melanesia a chief's income derives from the annual endowments from the families of his various wives. Among the Tupis of South America prominent men keep several wives for their prestige value, as well as for domestic service and labor in the fields. The same thing is true in Madagascar, in large sections of Africa, and among the Kai of New Guinea. Often the first wife urges the husband to take a second and a third or even more wives, each new one lightening the burden of the others, adding to the economic benefits, and improving the social status of the husband. Also, the first wife frequently retains a certain dominance and favoritism over the other wives, who are secondary in status to her.

There is nothing degrading in polygyny. Within the framework of certain culture patterns, this system of marriage seems to work fairly well. And it must never be forgotten that although polygyny is permitted in the

officially given up by the Mormon Church as a result of legal and moral pressures from the outside. Estimates of the number of plural marriages in this group are of the order of 5 per cent of all marriages. For sociological accounts of Mormon polygyny, see Nels Anderson, *Desert saints*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942; and for a fictionalized account of one plural family, Maurine Whipple, *The giant Joshua*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941.

mores or in law, the great majority of marriages are monogamous.

In *polyandry* several men are legally bound to one woman. This is the least common of the forms of marriage, there being apparently but four or five localities in which it is found: in the Arctic among certain, not all, Eskimo tribes; in central Asia, especially Tibet; in the Marquesas Islands; occasionally among the Bahima of Africa; among the Nayars of south-west India; and among the Todas of southern India.

The so-called *companionate marriage* is a suggested form of marital relationship which is not expected ordinarily to lead to children and the family life traditionally associated with marriage.⁶ With no responsibilities for children, it is further suggested that such marriages might be dissolved by mutual consent. If, however, children are born to a couple who have entered such a contract, the marriage is then considered as binding as any other.

Marriage prohibitions. As we have already noted, no society permits absolute free choice of mates. Close degrees of blood relationship, age differences, class differences, and wider kinship relations limit this choice.

The *incest taboo* is without doubt the most universal restriction on mating. It is directed chiefly to prevent sex relations between parent and child, and between brother and sister. Yet it often reaches out to more remote blood relatives. The few historical instances of sanctioned incest, as among the ruling families of ancient Egypt, Peru, and Ireland, are not the result of primitive conditions and ideas but rest upon a form of sophistication coupled with belief in divine powers which would be dissipated by marriage outside the royal line.

While such incest taboos are universal, it does not follow that the taboo derives from a biological drive as do hunger, thirst, and sexuality. The taboo is a rather constant

and expected result arising from the very nature of the social interaction between parents and children and among the children themselves.⁷ Yet the depth of the taboo itself is some indication that the rules are sometimes broken. Social workers, psychiatrists, lawyers, clergymen, and others dealing with more intimate family problems realize that incest is not unknown in present-day society. Nor is it confined to any one class.

Exogamy is the type of union in which a person marries someone outside his own group, whether the group be family, clan, village, or other social unit. The opposite type of union, in which a man mates within his group, is called *endogamy*.

Tribal endogamy is almost universal. In the more rudimentary societies it is a natural outcome of isolation and strong in-group solidarity. Moreover, within the tribe or larger society where a clan system develops, or where professional or aristocratic ranks or economic status or a caste system arises, endogamy within these special groups is generally demanded.

Exogamy arises wherever groups of persons are believed sufficiently related to be forbidden to marry, with a consequent insistence on their mating in other groups within the wider community. It is found chiefly associated with wider kinship and clan relations. In our own bilateral system, formal exogamy is in little evidence. Aside from the incest taboos concerning sexual relationships within the immediate family or between close cousins, which are enforced by custom and by law, and aside from prejudice against white and colored mating, people are not obliged to select their mates either within or without carefully determined limits.

Means of securing a mate. The literature on primitive marriage reveals a wide variety of methods of procuring a wife or a husband,

⁶ This expression was first made popular by Judge Ben Lindsey in his book with W. Evans, *The companionate marriage*, New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1927. Traditionally married couples who have no offspring still constitute a family because their intention is to have children. In the companionate marriage there is no intention to have children.

⁷ L. H. Hobhouse, R. H. Lowie, and others hold incest taboos to be instinctive. Tozzer and others deny this. Social psychology indicates that the strength of early conditioning, with its powerful taboos, is sufficient to explain the matter. Certainly where parents and children are separated, or where brothers and sisters grow up in separate households without knowledge of each other and of their blood relationship, there is no evidence of the display of such an "instinct."

many quite unknown to us. The popular notion of the most primitive method of getting a wife is the picture of a burly cave-man who, after knocking a woman on the head, drags her off to his own camp site. This lurid picture is pure fiction so far as any living tribes are concerned.

Among other methods are those of *wife purchase*, *dowry* (still found in some advanced societies), and various forms of *preferential mating*. Everywhere these practices are hedged about with regulations. Preferential mating is illustrated not only in rules about incest, exogamy, and endogamy but in various kinship stipulations, such as cross-cousin marriages.

Other restrictions are those of the *levirate* and the *sororate*. The former provides that in remarriage one of the brothers of the deceased husband must marry the widow, or often that her remarriage is limited to the husband's brothers.⁸ In the latter, the wife's sister is supposed to marry the widower upon the death of his wife.

These illustrations of forms of marriage, mating schemes, and taboos afford evidence of cultural variability within the larger framework of the social-cultural imperative of reproduction and care of the rising generation. Moreover, as we shall see, these patterns are related to other aspects of the culture — economic, political, religious, and recreational.

Sex Life Outside Marriage and Family

The sexual life of man is not confined to the marriage situation. Everywhere there are variations in regard to premarital relations, and various extramarital patterns may exist parallel with more formalized family life.

Premarital relations. In some tribes pre-nuptial intercourse is not only permitted but expected, but there is no evidence of complete promiscuity in any society. Everywhere the incest taboos, kinship, age, and class rules limit the relations of the sexes

both before and after marriage. While many peoples encourage, or at least tolerate, premarital relations, such relations are considered as preparatory to marriage.

There is no uniformity in regard to permissive premarital relations. In closely contiguous tribes, for instance, one group may put a high value on chastity, while their neighbors consider it of no consequence at all. Some of the most lowly tribes, such as the Veddahs and other Negrito peoples, have as strong taboos against prenuptial sexual relations as are found in our own Christian society, where chastity is a high virtue. In the Christian culture the sense of sin and guilt associated with sex affects not only all premarital contacts of persons but profoundly influences subsequent marital relations as well.⁹

Among Christian peoples, however, rather striking differences often occur between theory and practice. Since the patriarchal system was carried over into Christianity, with all that it implies for male dominance and female submission, it was very easy for the "double standard of morality" to arise. In many Christian communities the unmarried male is permitted prenuptial sexual freedom, but only with women whom he would not marry. The marriageable women of the community, on the other hand, are held to strict taboos on premarital chastity. In such a society female virginity is rated high, but male continence is neither expected nor often desired, in spite of theological taboos.

Alfred C. Kinsey's report on the sexual behavior of American men shows a high incidence of premarital relations among his cases.¹⁰

⁹ For a discussion of some phases of this matter, see Margaret Mead, *Coming of age in Samoa*, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1928; and her *Sex and temperament in three primitive societies*, New York: William Morrow & Co., 1935. (See chapter 26.)

¹⁰ See Alfred C. Kinsey, et al., *Sexual behavior in the human male*. Philadelphia: W. P. Saunders Co., 1948. This volume gives a most extensive view of the sexual behavior of man in civilized society. Unfortunately the sampling method was not too sound, nor do the authors fully understand the importance and place of social-cultural conditioning with respect to sexuality in human society. For interpretations and comments on the Kinsey report, see, among others, the following: D. P. Geddes and Enid

⁸ On the levirate among the Hebrews, see Deuteronomy 25 : 5-10; also Genesis 38 : 7-8.

As was already well-known by common-sense observation and from clinical and other statistical studies, too, the extent of premarital sexual contact in American society is related to social-economic status. In general, the lower the economic position and the lower the level of schooling, the higher the incidence of premarital relations. For unmarried men, Kinsey's sample shows differences of about this order: two thirds of the college group, more than four fifths of the high-school group, and 98 per cent of those who did not go beyond the eighth grade report premarital sexual contact.¹¹

Forms of sex life outside marriage. In various societies we find customary provision for sexual relations outside the bonds of matrimony. *Concubinage* where practiced is a lawful form of cohabitation, differing from marriage in that the concubine has a much lower social status than the husband and his proper wives. Children of such unions are not accorded equal rights of action or inheritance with those of the legal spouse.

Prostitution, the giving of sexual favors for money, is not extensive among non-literates. It is largely a product of more complex cultures. It seems to accompany urbanization, mobility of population, commercial life, and specialization of labor. Today the whole system of commercialized prostitution seems to be disappearing from Western societies, as traditional taboos on prenuptial and extramarital cohabitation disappear. No one, however, can overlook the dangers of venereal infection, which have so long been associated with prostitution. The serious consequences of these infections in regard to childbearing and marital happiness are well-known.

As to the United States, Kinsey states that while more than two thirds of the white male population (according to his sampling) have

Corie, eds., *About the Kinsey report, Observations by 11 experts*, etc., New York: The New American Library of World Literature (Signet Books), 1948; Morris L. Ernst and David Loth, *American sexual behavior and the Kinsey report*, New York: Greystone Press, 1948; Albert Dornsch, ed., *Sex habits of American men: a symposium on the Kinsey report*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948.

¹¹ Kinsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 549-557.

at one time or another some sexual contact with prostitutes, much of this is only once or very occasionally. As in the case of other non-marital outlets, the resort to prostitution is qualified by age and education. Men of younger age and less education have a much higher proportion of sexual outlet through prostitution than older and better-educated men. However, for both unmarried and married men the percentage of their total sexual expression represented by contact with prostitutes rises with age, although the total sexual activity declines through the years.¹² Moreover, Kinsey is probably quite correct in his contention that in terms of overt sexual response, prostitution is less important than many assume, and, furthermore, that relations with prostitutes often provide congenial social relations quite aside from the sexual factor.

Sexual outlets, either before or after marriage, are not confined to heterosexual relations. They may take the form of masturbation, homosexuality, or any other form of overt response which will give sexual satisfaction. Yet any and all of these actions must be studied and understood within the framework of a given society and its culture. Man's sexuality cannot be equated to that of the lower animals who do not possess culture.

The Family and Industrialized Culture

Industrialization has greatly changed the patterning of family life in those countries with relatively stationary populations. (See chapter 12.) Yet the family life of the contemporary Western world, with which we shall be chiefly concerned, has been conditioned by influences other than those of modern industrialized culture. Let us see what some of these are.

Backgrounds. Our basic familial organization has its roots in the folk culture of western Europe. Under this system family control was patriarchal in form. In addition to the major functions of childbearing and child rearing, the family was the important economic unit of the community. Moreover, it performed other important

¹² Kinsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 599-600.

functions with respect to education, religion, recreation, and the induction of its members generally into proper attitudes toward civic and other culture expectancies of the larger society. (See below.) The Christian Church was superimposed upon the older primary-group organization of Europe. Its principal effects upon family life were expressed in the doctrine of otherworldly asceticism, in the doctrine of sexual sin, and in the low regard for women. Christian taboos against sex were supported by all sorts of notions about its being sinful, lewd, nasty, and debasing in character. Women were thought chiefly responsible for man's downfall in the first instance. Marriage, while not the highest state, was permitted; and the church made marriage one of the temporal sacraments — a concession to man's mortal nature, but withal a form of control to keep it within the bounds of the church. This view continued for centuries, until disturbed by romanticism, individualism, and economic changes.

Romanticism, which arose in the feudal upper classes, fostered the idea of free choice of mates on the basis of love. Later, romanticism became connected with the doctrine of individualism. Romantic love also had the merit of refining the attitudes of men toward their womenfolk. The Renaissance, with its general enlightenment and criticism of tradition, influenced both theory and practice in regard to sex. But the Reformation, in turn, especially its Calvinistic branch, laid heavy taboos upon sexual freedom. However, coincidental with the Renaissance, the Commercial Revolution, and the Protestant Reformation, there was a trend toward individualism. This was witnessed in business enterprise, in freedom of thought and expression, in the growth of the idea of the right of the individual to take part in the affairs of government, and in a general loosening of the older rigid class system. As individualism developed and as 18th-century rationalism began to have its effects — along with the persistence of certain romantic notions — the position of women was somewhat improved in spite of the continued power of Christian mores.


In practice the changes came slowly. Besides her major function of bearing and training children, the wife and mother was obedient to her lord and master and a heavy contributor to the economic activities of the household, at least in all but the highest social class. The wife had no property rights of her own, and in law she was treated as a minor. She could not enter into a contract to do work or perform other services, and wages paid to her went to her husband. She had no political rights or duties, such as voting or jury service.

The Industrial Revolution had profound effects. With it went the gradual emancipation of women from complete dominance by father or husband; the attainment, finally, of political rights such as the ballot; the gradual relaxation of the more severe Christian taboos on sex for both men and women; and the urbanization of population with its effects on the economics of the household and on the importance of the home in education, religious training, and recreation.

The contrasts in the economy of the household are striking. In pioneer and early rural America, the husband and wife shared a large number of economic responsibilities. The household was the center of many such activities in which the wife played a definite role. Spinning, weaving, and making clothes long continued to be her duty, and even as machine industry replaced home manufacture, she made the clothes for the family. Then, too, she took charge of the curing of meat, of preserving vegetables and fruit for winter use, and usually had the care of the milk, eggs, and garden produce. The household members were concerned with *making* a living rather than *earning* wages. Money economy had but slight place in the scheme of things. The following extract from the diary of a New England farmer of a few generations ago states:

"My farm gave me and my whole family a good living on the produce of it and left me, one year with another, one hundred and fifty silver dollars, for I never spent more than ten dollars a year, which was for salt, nails, and

FIGURE 57

TRENDS IN MARRIAGE RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1926-1947¹³

the like. Nothing to eat, drink, or wear was bought, as my farm produced it all."¹⁴

Today the family as an economic unit has less and less place, especially in urban localities. In rural-farm families some of the older patterns remain. But the commercialization and mechanization of agriculture are surely dissolving the older rural way of life not only in relation to its economy but also with respect to education, recreation, moral-religious, and civic matters as well. In our cities and among the nonfarm population generally, the former functions of the family in these matters have been rather strikingly dissipated. Moreover, the loss of these functions has been accompanied by a reduction in the average number of children per family.

In short, then, the interrelations of the various central and derived functions to each other have changed both as to amounts and as to relative importance. Childbearing

¹³ Data from *Population Index*, 1948, 14: 277. By permission. Most of these rates are only approximate since registration of marriages is not always complete and variations in the proportions registered in any one year may help account for the fluctuations. The first four rates are averages which serve to smooth out some of the yearly variations. The trends, however, do reflect both cultural differences and changes in rates through the depression, the war, and the first phase of the postwar years.

¹⁴ Quoted by L. K. Frank, "Social changes and the family," *Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science*, 1932, 160: 95.

and child rearing and interspousal relations have proportionately a much larger place in the total family life than they once had. In contrast, the place of the family as an economic unit and the home as a seat of economic activity have become steadily less important. Comparable changes have occurred in other functions.

Size and composition of the American family. In spite of some popular notions about the ill effects of divorce and of the emancipation of women upon the American family generally, not only is a high proportion of our population married but our young people wed at a relatively early age.

The number of marriages per 1000 population rose from 8.7 in 1887 to about 12.0 in 1920. During the 1920's the rate fluctuated around 10.0, but during the depression dropped to a low of 7.8 in 1932. It rose again to 11.0 in 1937, and by 1942 it was 13.1. It reached the peak of 16.3 in 1946. In 1947 the rate fell off to 13.9 and will likely decline still further. The main reasons for the increases in the 1940's are these: (1) There had been a lag in the marriage rate during the depression of the 1930's — a usual phenomenon — which left a potential marriageable group in the 1940's; (2) the war years brought prosperity, which is normally associated with a rise in the marriage rate; (3) the psychological climate of the war itself stimulated marriage; and (4) the age composition was favorable to a high marriage rate. To quote P. K. Whelpton, "One of the reasons for the record-breaking number of marriages in the United States during 1940-46 is that there were more men aged 20-25 and women aged 18-23 in these years than at any time previously."¹⁵ This high rate is not likely to recur again except for a few years when those born in 1942 and 1946 reach marriageable ages. The recent trends in marriage rates for selected countries are shown in Figure 57.

Not only is the marriage rate of the United States high, but Americans marry at early ages. In fact, the age of marriage has been dropping. Thus, the median age of first marriages for men from 1890 to 1940

¹⁵ P. K. Whelpton, *Forecasts of the population of the United States, 1945-1975*, p. 58. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.

declined from 26.1 to 24.3 years. The corresponding figures for women were 22.0 years in 1890, 21.3 years in 1930, and 21.6 years in 1940. The slight increase in the latter is probably due to the widespread postponement of marriage during the depression.¹⁶

The early marriage age in the United States results in a high proportion of the total population which is married. The situation is quite different in most other industrialized countries, where a more definitely aging population, less national wealth, and lower standards of living probably play a part in delaying entrance into matrimony. To cite a few comparative figures: For males, aged 20-24 and 25-29, who had ever married, the United States percentages were 28 and 64 respectively. For Eire, in contrast, the percentages for these two age groups were 3 and 17 respectively. In England and Wales, they were 14 and 53 per cent; in France, 21 and 64 per cent — much nearer our own. For females, aged 15-19 years and 20-24 years, for the United States the percentages who had ever married were 12 and 53 respectively. For Eire, 1 and 12; for England and Wales, 2 and 26; for France, 6 and 49.¹⁷

A survey of 30,000 households in 148 sample areas of the United States made in April, 1947 revealed that of persons 14 years old or over, 62 per cent were married. The war years had brought some increases in rates of those married. For example, "In 1947 about 63 per cent of all persons in this age group [20-29 years] were married, as compared with only 54 per cent in 1940. . . . The number of married persons in their twenties increased by about 20 per cent in these seven years, whereas the civilian population as a whole in this age range increased by only about 3 per cent."¹⁸

While the marriage rate has tended to keep up, or actually increase under some conditions, the average size of the American

family has been declining. At the time of our first census, in 1790, the mean (arithmetical average) number of persons per family was 5.7. One hundred years later it was 4.9. By 1940 the average had fallen to 3.8; and by 1947 to 3.67. The average family in the United States in 1947 was more than one third smaller than it was in 1790. It is estimated that by 1980 the average American family will consist of 3.1 persons.¹⁹ Since the two parents are a constant factor in the size of the normal family, it is clear that the number of children per family unit has grown steadily less. In the interval from the first census to 1940, the average number of children per family declined from 3.2 to 1.2.²⁰

The changes in family size, of course, are correlated with the various factors already discussed in chapter 13. Among others are: (1) childless marriage, the extent of which is clear in the fact that 15 per cent of American women who ever marry bear no children; (2) aging population, which means that more families with no minor children survive than hitherto; (3) the increase in the average span of time between marriage and the birth of the first child; and (4) the general decline in the rate of population growth. On this last point, Paul C. Glick writes: "Because of the steady fall in family size, the population has always tended to increase at a slower rate than the number of families. For example, there are now [1940] 175 per cent more families than in 1890, but the population has grown by only 110 per cent. Between [1940] and 1980 the number of families is expected to increase approximately 40 per cent, while the family is augmented by only 16 per cent."²¹

¹⁹ Paul C. Glick, "Family trends in the United States, 1890 to 1940," *American Sociological Review*, 1942, 7: 505-514.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 506. Note should be made of a slight change in the definition of a family by the Bureau of the Census. For the 1930 and 1940 censuses, a family was defined as "a group of persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and living as one household." In the 1947 sample census, a family was defined as "a group of two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption and residing together." The criterion in the first case was linked to that of a household. In the latter, a household may contain

¹⁶ See "Age at first marriage," *Population — special reports*, series P-45, no. 7, May 28, 1945, Bureau of the Census.

¹⁷ "Americans marry young," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1947, 28, no. 2, p. 9. The figures are from the latest available censuses.

¹⁸ "Characteristics of single, married, widowed, and divorced persons in 1947," *Current population reports — population characteristics*, series P-20, no. 10, February 6, 1948, p. 2, Bureau of the Census.

There are regional, nativity, and locality differences in these trends. Taking the country as a whole, Negro families have multiplied less rapidly than white families since 1890.²² Between 1930 and 1940 there was very little increase in the number of families in the Prairie states and heavy increments in the Far Western states and in Florida. "In general," says Glick, "the states with small increases in families represent the areas that have lost population by out-migration, and the states with large increases in families represent areas that have gained by in-migration from other states."²³

The distribution of families by rural-urban residence also shows a difference. Rural areas consistently have a higher ratio of population than they have of the nation's families, which is another way of saying that the average number of children per family is larger in the country than in the city.

The number of families is likely to increase, relative to size of the family, for some time. Yet if present population trends continue, "even the decline in size of family will eventually slow up as a minimum point in family size is approached. . . . If the birth rate should eventually become relatively stable, the average size of the family would no longer decrease and the changes in the numbers of families would more nearly parallel the changes in the size of the total population."²⁴

While a household is not to be confused with a family, either in a sociological sense or in the meaning of the Bureau of the Census, data on the composition of households reveal

more than one family, *e.g.*, a lodger and his wife, or a servant and his wife, unrelated to the head of a given household. These latter are considered as a separate family. On the other hand, "all persons in a household who are related to each other are regarded as members of the same family. Thus, if the son of the head of the household and the son's wife are in the household, they are treated as part of the head's family." See "Characteristics of families and sub-families in the United States in April, 1947," *Current population reports — population characteristics*, series P-20, no. 17, May 19, 1948, pp. 5-6.

²² Glick, *op. cit.*

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 507. By permission.

²⁴ Census release, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

certain features of and changes in the composition of American families. In 1940 the number of households was 34,949,000; in April, 1947 it was 39,138,000, showing an increase of 12 per cent. In the meantime the civilian population had increased but 8 per cent. The cityward drift of the population is shown by the additional fact that, for the latter date, about 83 per cent of the households were in urban or other nonfarm areas, as compared to 80 per cent in 1940 and 78 per cent in 1930. Corresponding declines had taken place in percentage of rural-farm households. Also, there were some regional differentials in these changes. In the seven years there was a net growth in number of households of about 12 per cent in the Northeastern states, about 10 per cent in the North Central area, and nearly 25 per cent in the West. There was no significant change in the number of households in the South, although the out-migration had been heavy. (See chapter 16.)²⁵

Changes in household economy. The shift from the economically self-sufficient family of an earlier day to that of money or cash economy is evidenced in the nature and amount of household duties and in the rising percentage of married women in the labor force. For several decades the amount of time spent by women in the average American home baking, laundering, canning fruits and vegetables, and making clothes has steadily declined. So, too, there has been a great increase in the use of power machinery in the home: vacuum cleaners, mechanical dishwashers, power laundry units, and the like. And, outside the home, the increase in the number of restaurants and lunchrooms also reflects, in part, the disappearance of formerly expected household duties. To cite one or two evidences: Between 1909 and 1939 the percentage increase in persons employed in laundering was nearly 105, although in the same 30 years the population increased but 45 per cent. From 1927 to 1939 the number of electric and/or other power washing ma-

²⁵ See "Household composition and characteristics in 1947, for urban and rural areas and regions," *Current population reports — population characteristics*, series P-20, no. 11, February 11, 1948, Bureau of the Census.

TABLE 15

STANDARDIZED PERCENTAGES OF LABOR-FORCE MEMBERS AMONG WOMEN IN
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, BY FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: APRIL, 1940²⁶

(Percentages standardized according to age distribution of all women of the given marital status and number of children for the United States total)

MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN	IN METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS OF 100,000 OR MORE	OUTSIDE METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS OF 100,000 OR MORE		
		Urban	Rural-nonfarm	Rural-farm
All women 18-64 years old	35.4	34.9	23.7	13.2
Single	74.9	69.8	57.1	36.2
Married, husband present				
Without children under 10	20.3	21.8	16.2	7.1
With 1 or more children under 10	8.3	11.9	8.1	4.4
Other marital status				
Without children under 10	48.6	51.9	42.3	36.6
With 1 or more children under 10	45.5	54.8	41.0	39.1

chines in use increased 65 per cent, while the population went up but 10 per cent.²⁷

The number of married women gainfully employed is another common measure of changes in the economic function of the household. For several decades past there has been a steady increase in the ratio of women to men in the labor force. (See chapter 26.) Moreover, the proportion of married women among all women gainfully employed has risen. For example, in 1890 there were just over a half million married women in the labor force, and they made up about 14 per cent of all women gainfully employed at that time. In 1940 there were over 4.5 million married women at work, and they constituted 35.5 per cent of all working women. Some significant details as to marital status, number of children, and urban-rural contrasts in the female labor force in the United States in 1940 are shown in Table 15.


²⁶ From John D. Durand, *The labor force in the United States, 1890-1960*, p. 71. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948. By permission.

²⁷ Cited in E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke, *The family: from institution to companionship*, p. 502. New York: American Book Company, 1945.

The relation of urbanism to the number of married women gainfully employed is evident in this table. Especially noteworthy is the case of married women with no children. Their percentage in the labor force was three times as high in the metropolitan districts and other urban areas as in the rural-farm sections. Of course, it must be noted that rural-farm women who labor on the farm but without pay are not counted in these statistics. Also, since the 1940 census was taken in April of that year, it missed the paid seasonal labor in agriculture in which women, both married and single, certainly shared. Nevertheless it is clear that the increasing entrance of married women into the ranks of those gainfully employed reflects distinctive changes in the economic and other functions of the family and home. The trend has by no means stopped. "Between 1940 and 1947, there was an increase of 50 per cent in the number of women in the labor force." ²⁸ For the first time on record, married women

²⁸ Paul C. Glick, "Family life and full employment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1949, 54: 520-529. Quotation from page 527.

FIGURE 58

TRENDS IN REPRODUCTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-1946²⁹

outnumbered single women among the gainfully employed. In fact, half of the women in the labor force in 1947 were married women. At that time, five sixths of these women had either no dependent children in the home or children who were of school age only.

Yet, despite these striking changes, for three fifths of the households which had both husband and wife, the man was the sole wage earner. In fact, in 1947 only one fifth of the married women living with their husbands were in the labor force. In contrast, 70 per cent of all divorced women were gainfully employed.

As to the kinds of work married women do, 40 per cent of them in 1947 were in skilled or unskilled pursuits. Moreover, a considerable fraction of employed married women were in occupations closely associated with those of their husbands.

The earnings of a family will obviously affect its nature and function. Some aspects of the relation of income to levels of living and types of things purchased and used have already been discussed. (See Table 13, page 250.) In periods of prosperity individuals and families are full of hope and ambition, want to get ahead financially and in social status, and in general live in a climate of euphoria. Whether prosperity

makes for more happiness and success in the modern family than does a period of economic depression is unknown. If we are to judge by the 1940's, prosperous times induce an increase in both the marriage rate and the birth rate. And the latter resulted not only from the high ratio of first-order births but also from the fact that many families with one, two, or more children had additional children during this period. These facts are graphically shown in Figure 58. However, as to the future, there will likely be a decline both in the marriage rate and in the number of first-order births. As long as prosperity continues there will probably not be any marked decrease in second-order or third-order births. Under conditions of economic depression, however, we may anticipate a noticeable general decline of both marriage and birth rates. Yet, in the light of long-time trends, it may well be said that "large families are definitely a thing of the past."³⁰

Since the modern family has been exposed to the crises of depression and war, we must examine briefly some of the effects of such conditions on family members.

Effects of economic depression. The effects on the family of prolonged unemployment or sharp loss of income were made evident in most countries in the

²⁹ From "Record number of new mothers," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1948, 29, no. 10: 2. New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. By permission.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

decades following World War I. As judged by American evidence on the matter, when the loss of family incomes continues for a considerable length of time, there usually follows a process of readjustment: (1) The initial period is often marked by considerable confusion in which the principal breadwinner tends to blame himself for his difficulties, and in which the wife and children may also take much this same view. Often desperate efforts are made to find other work and to adapt to new types of skills or occupational demands. (2) After a period of instability there begin to emerge new family patterns. In some instances the wife and some of the children may find work and thus set up a situation for altering the traditional role and status of the father and husband. In others the family may go on work relief, and this also entails some adaptation to role and status both within the family and in the community. (3) As to interspousal relations, much depends on the prior attitudes and values. A number of studies have shown that where the affectional bonds of husband and wife were already strong, the husband did not lose out either in love or in family authority. But where the family was poorly knit together, where the wife did not respect and love her spouse, the husband frequently lost what admiration there was as well as much of his former authority.³¹ (4) The effects of depression are also qualified by income, occupation, and class status. Families in the lower economic brackets may suffer sharply from want of proper and adequate food unless there is sufficient public relief at hand. All families reduce expenditures for clothes, travel, and recreation. And, in the light of the high value we place on money, an almost universal anxiety concerning debts develops.³²

³¹ See Robert C. Angell, *The family encounters the depression*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936.

³² See Laetitia M. Conrad, "Differential depression effects on families of laborers, farmers, and the business class," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1939, 44: 526-533. There is a large literature on the economic and other effects of the depression of the 1930's. See S. A. Stouffer and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Research memorandum on the family in the depression*. New York: Social Science Research Council, bulletin

The responses of individuals and groups to crises are always qualified by the prior conditioning. So it is with the adaptation of the family to a long and severe economic depression. Some come through these situations without much alteration; others are more definitely influenced. Yet the nature and degree of these changes will depend not only on the nature of the critical situation but also on the receptivity and the reactivity of the individuals and families. More subtle effects, of course, are difficult to measure. We should like to know, for example, if nearly a decade of public relief for millions of our population has had any repercussion on the attitudes of individualism, on sense of personal responsibility, and on initiative as against anticipated acceptance of care and direction from the agents of the state.

Effects of war on the family. In our American value system, war has usually been regarded as deleterious, and hence writers on the effects of war on the family are apt to stress the negative effects.³³ But as in the matter of economic distress, the influences must be regarded in the light of the larger social-cultural patterning and trends of the time. Certainly modern war, if at all prolonged, is characterized by tremendous alterations in institutions and in the routine of everyday life. Obviously these modifications reach firsthand into the home. For our purposes we shall list what seem to be the more common effects of wartime conditions on familial living.

(1) Under modern conditions of large-scale warfare, involving an entire "nation in arms," there is usually a rise in both marriage rate and birth rate. (2) On the other hand, there is no doubt that the general alteration of

no. 29, 1937. Also, Ruth S. Cavan and Katherine H. Ranck, *The family and the depression; a study of one hundred Chicago families*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938.

³³ Such is the case in the otherwise excellent brochure by Willard Waller, "War and the family," New York: The Dryden Press, 1940. This pamphlet contains some valuable data, but the discussion takes a rather pessimistic line. See also Sidonie M. Gruenberg, ed., *The family in a world at war*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942.

life conditions during wartime also facilitate extra-sexuality, both among the unmarried and among married men removed by training and combat conditions from customary family life. And with this goes greater exposure to venereal diseases. Yet, again judging by the situation in this country during and right after World War I, the effects are not entirely negative. Under the need for prevention of disease and prophylaxis for those exposed, a considerable change in the former hush-hush attitudes took place. Campaigns against venereal diseases became publicly accepted and supported.²⁴

(3) The dislocations within the family due to military and economic pressures from the outside are also apparent. Wage-earning sons are called to the colors, and as wars are prolonged many younger men must also join up. Such changes throw added economic and other burdens on those who remain behind. But daughters and mothers are not left with household duties only. The call for workers in business and industry becomes ever more insistent, first to take the place of men who shift from peacetime to wartime occupations, and then later to take on jobs in war industries themselves.

In the United States, moreover, not only did women — married and single — go into war work and into many other vocations, but family life was also affected by the high incidence of family mobility associated with boom cities which sprang up as new war industries were established. In this connection it is interesting to note that attempts were made to locate many of these new industrial centers with reference not only to already established manufacturing areas and to sources of raw materials but also with reference to available labor supply.²⁵ The tasks of housing, schooling, and the impact

of large numbers of new families produced both community and familial dislocations of great magnitude.

While both England and Germany witnessed marked shifts in industrial demands and hence in mobility of families as well as individuals, they also faced an added problem in the large-scale evacuation of younger children from cities liable to aerial bombardment. The full import of this novel cause of familial breakup is not clear. It is said that in the early days of the war, in 1939, no less than 1,400,000 persons were removed from the larger British cities to rural districts. Of this number over 800,000 were school children, the balance being chiefly mothers and youngsters below school age.

The effects of such dislocations were varied: The reception by the country folk made for one problem, the readaptation of city dwellers to rural life made another, the loneliness and desire to be with the father and other members of the family constituted still other strains. In fact, the British authorities found that they had to permit many mothers and their children to return to their urban homes. Many seemed to prefer the risks of bombing to the difficulties of adjusting to living in the country.

On the continent, too, the forced migration of families from occupied areas for work in war industries or on farms, or in order to remove families from combat zones, actual and potential, produced perhaps the gravest dislocation of normal life for thousands of families which the world has ever witnessed. The immense difficulties of postwar reconstruction provide an idea of the meaning of these changes for the population of Europe. In our own country the obligatory resettlement of enemy aliens, though involving no such numbers as the enforced migrations in Europe, made necessary many familial readjustments for these people.²⁶

²⁶ See Tolan Committee Report: "Preliminary report and recommendations on problems of evacuation of citizens and aliens from military areas," 77th Congress, 2nd Session, House Report no. 1911, March 19, 1942, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1942. See also Dorothy S. Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, *The spoils*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946.

²⁴ See, for example, H. J. Locke, *Social aspects of syphilis*, Indianapolis: Indiana State Board of Health, 1938, which describes some of the broader cultural changes growing out of the war campaign against syphilis.

²⁵ There is a mine of information on the problems connected with large-scale migration in the so-called Tolan Reports on National Defense Migration, 1940-1942, *et seq.*, entitled "Hearings before the select committee investigating national defense migration," pursuant to House Resolutions 63, 491, 629, 76th Congress, and House Resolution 113, 77th Congress. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1941-1942.

In closing this chapter, however, we must stress that evidence of change in family must not mislead us. The family is still the *primary* human association; and from the standpoint of relative time spent in the home rather than elsewhere, family life remains more important than we might imagine. It is estimated that homemaking women and preschool children spend from two thirds to nineteen twentieths of their time at home. School children spend from one half to three fourths, and workingmen from one third to two thirds. Among the

professional and business groups the relative time spent at home is somewhat less. Of course, it is not merely the matter of hours but also the meaning of family life which characterize the changes. There is no doubt that home life has been influenced by technological improvements and alterations in member-roles, and that along with these modifications the significance of the family and household has also changed. Yet future trends toward a more planned and regimented society may produce still other patterns in the family.

Interpretative Summary

1. The family always has been and remains the fundamental primary group although many of its former functions have been taken over by other groups.
2. The forms of family organization may vary, but the central features center around child-bearing, child rearing, and the induction of the child into the culture of a given society.
3. American family institutions are an outgrowth of Judeo-Christian ideas and practices, abetted by the further effects of romanticism and our own frontier experience.
4. Industrialization and urbanization are greatly modifying former patterns of family life.
5. These effects are evident in the political, economic, and social emancipation of women and are measured by the increasing number of women in the labor force, in politics, and in civic affairs.
6. Crises such as economic depressions and modern total war serve to accelerate changes in family patterns. In general, depressions are marked by declines in the marriage and birth rates. Periods of war are usually characterized by full employment and high incomes. But dislocations of families resulting from war and industrial service as well as from exposure of the civilian population to combat conditions sometimes put considerable strain on families. Yet, judging by recent wars, family solidarity is amazingly resilient and persistent. The family is still the fundamental matrix of group life and personal development and is likely to continue to be so for some time to come.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is meant by saying that parenthood and the family are basic to all social organization?
2. What does Malinowski mean by "the principle of legitimacy"?
3. Distinguish between patrilineal, matrilineal, and bilateral descent.
4. Define monogamy, polygyny, and polyandry. Show how the latter two are always limited in extent in any society except under special circumstances.
5. Does the companionate marriage constitute a family? Discuss.
6. Distinguish between exogamy and endogamy. What might well be the hereditary effects of each on family stocks?
7. Name and illustrate the types of prohibitions which limit and direct one's choice of a mate in our own society. Contrast with such prohibitions in primitive and in civilized societies other than our own.

8. Illustrate specifically some of the effects of the Industrial Revolution on family life.
9. How do you account for the fact that the Americans marry so young and have such a high proportion of their adult population in the married status?
10. How do you account for the fact that the number of families in the United States is increasing at a faster rate than the population? How long will this trend keep up? What will stop it?
11. How do you account for the rise in the proportion of married women gainfully employed and the decline in the amount of child labor? Relate these changes to cultural modifications with respect to the status of women and children.
12. Does prolonged unemployment of husband and father always tend to produce increased conflict in the family? What factors might make for strengthening the bonds of family members? What for loosening them?
13. Are the effects of war on the family always bad? Discuss, pro and con. List some of the more obvious influences of war on the family.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Conrad M. Arensberg and Solon T. Kimball, *Family and community in Ireland*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940.

Based on anthropological field work in Ireland, this is a contribution to the sociology of both the family and the small community.

E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro family in the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

A full and competent account of the subject by a leading sociologist. Contains both statistical and individual case-history materials.

Willystine Goodsell, *A history of marriage and the family*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

A convenient and standard account, based on sound coverage of more extensive treatments of the subject.

Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany: its women and family life*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1938.

An excellent account of family life under National Socialism. Shows clearly what does and may happen under an authoritarian government.

Horace Miner, *St. Denis, a French-Canadian parish*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

Based on an anthropological study of a community and its families, this study brings out the interplay of individuals and groups in terms of family and community relations.

Alva Myrdal, *Nation and family: the Swedish experiment in democratic family and population policy*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941.

A mine of invaluable facts, ably interpreted.

C. C. Zimmerman, *Family and civilization*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

A study of "the role of the family in civilization" under such conceptual rubrics as "Trustee," "Domestic," and "Atomistic" family systems. Very suggestive and provocative.

The Family: Interpersonal Relations

THIS CHAPTER will deal with the interpersonal relations of the individuals who collectively make up the family. The types of interaction within this basic primary group are those between husband and wife, those between parents and children, and those between or among the children. We shall begin by discussing courtship and certain other factors in mate selection. Then we shall examine the interpersonal contacts of the spouses and the factors making for success or failure in marriage. Next we shall deal with the children and parents in the family setting. The chapter will close with a section on what happens when the family is dissolved by divorce.

Courtship and Mate Selection

The form and content of interpersonal contacts which emerge with the family itself are always qualified by the psychological elements which each of the spouses brings to the new association. In Western society these new patterns have their inception in the processes connected with courtship.

Sources of the courtship patterns. Certain institutional features of mate selection in different societies were described in the previous chapter. Here we are concerned more particularly with the nature and function of courtship as a preliminary to marriage. E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke define courtship as "all forms of behavior in which a man seeks to win the consent of a woman for marriage."¹ Courtship, as we know it, is by no means a universal culture pattern. In fact, the very word reveals its origin in the courtly life of earlier times. (See below.) With us it is associated with

ideas of romantic love and consists, as a process, in a variety of interesting interactions.

Our present concepts of courtship and marriage are a curious mixture of two rather opposite views. One derives from Judeo-Christian dogmas about the wickedness of sexual passion. The other comes from the belief that romantic love is the true foundation of happy marriage. The moral-religious dogmas rest on the firm conviction of an eternal conflict between "the flesh" and "the spirit," or divine quality in man. For one to give way to the flesh is to follow Satan into sin. To get the greatest satisfaction in this life and the life to come one must be ruled by the divine spirit. This means a strong and constant check upon the flesh. Thus, the Christian ideal tolerates sex relations for procreation but not for pleasure. In contrast to this is romantic love, which does not deny one's impulses. The sentiment carries with it the idea that one can tell when one is in love by some mystic feeling, that such love is abiding, that it involves mutual sacrifices as well as satisfactions, that the prospective mate will fulfill an ideal, and above all else that it is the central motivation to courtship and matrimony.

The cultural root of Western ideas about romantic love are to be found in the later Middle Ages, in the so-called Age of Chivalry. It arose among the nobility and their literary protégés. Gallant knights and troubadours are supposed to have carried romantic love to great heights both in poetry and in actuality. However, the "amorous cravings," the romanticism, and the sentimentalism about women were expressed "outside the bonds of matrimony."²

¹ E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke, *The family: from institution to companionship*, p. 361. New York: American Book Company, 1945.

² For a good account of medieval romantic love, see Henry Osborn Taylor, *The mediæval mind*, 4th

Marriages were arranged by the fathers, who kept in mind matters of status and wealth. The rationale of medieval romanticism is thus described by Henry Osborn Taylor:

"Love, with the Troubadours and their ladies, was a source of joy. Its commands and exigencies made life's supreme law. Love was knighthood's service; it was loyalty and devotion; it was the noblest human giving. It was also the spring of excellence, the inspiration of high deeds. This love was courteous, delicately ceremonial, precise, and on the lady's part exacting and whimsical. . . ."³

While such high-flown and extreme expressions of romantic love disappeared with the decay of feudalism, the ideas and practices were carried down into modern times in the courts of kings and nobles. And finally, in the last three centuries, the rich bourgeois class everywhere has imitated the nobility; and since the 18th century the petty bourgeois, in turn, has taken over many romantic ideas from these other classes.

Unlike the earlier phase, among the bourgeois classes romantic love as a culture trait became associated with monogamous marriage and the stable family. The growing individualism which accompanied the rise of Protestantism, the emergence of the democratic political state, and especially the individual initiative fostered by modern capitalism affected love-making and marriage. From the romantic patterns the petty bourgeois and masses of laborers and farmers accepted the theory and practice of freedom of choice of the mate, the idea of constancy of love, and certain other features.

In colonial America, though the father continued to have chief control over the marriage of children, "young people seem to have been allowed some freedom in the choice of a mate." However, "the colonies safeguarded marriage by requiring that the consent of the parents to the union be clearly expressed and that the marriage be duly recorded."⁴

ed., vol. I, pp. 586-602. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925. Quotation from p. 586.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 588. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

⁴ From Willystine Goodsell, *Problems of the family*, pp. 78, 79. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1928.

On the frontier and in rural America during the 19th century there was considerable freedom in the choice of mates. "Keeping company" was in the folkways, but courtships tended to be "short and sweet." Romance in the rural community was usually but a prelude to a matter-of-fact marriage and family life in which a wife and children were useful as economic assets in addition to any affectional needs they might satisfy.

Courtship in the town life of the last century tended to be somewhat more prolonged in time. It was a period of testing and trying in which "spooning" was tolerated but prenuptial sex relations were tabooed.

Rapid urbanization since the opening of the present century brought in its wake further changes in courtship patterns. The high mobility of the population, the loss of primary-group controls, the increasing degree of specialization, the impersonal nature of so many contacts, and other aspects of modern mass society have profoundly influenced courtship practices. For example, the sexual element in love-making has become rather openly recognized both in communication and in overt conduct. Young people talk more freely about the biologic foundations of mating. Advertising carries material dealing with personal hygiene which would not have been tolerated a few decades ago.⁵

So, too, the automobile has fostered freedom of movement and thus has helped undermine the former rigid controls of love-making through community gossip. Young people are now able to escape the eyes and ears of parents and neighbors. The motion picture and other media of mass communication have also helped alter the older family controls as well as provide new romantic imagery.

Before reviewing some of the present-day aspects of courtship, on both the psychological and the situational side, let us examine the sentiment of love, which plays

⁵ See, for example, Theodore M. Newcomb, "Recent changes in attitudes toward sex and marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 1937, 2: 659-667.

so large a part in our whole courtship-marriage pattern.

The sentiment of love. As a sentiment, love is a set of desires, emotions, feelings, attitudes, images, and ideas organized around an object, material or personal. The particular nature of love has been the topic of almost endless discussion. For our purposes we may draw on the discussion of the topic by E. W. Burgess and H. J. Locke:⁶ (1) There is the desire for sexual intimacy resting on the biologic drive and related to physical attraction. (2) There is "associational intimacy" which individuals seek from each other. This is marked by strong mutual identification and emotional interdependence involving sympathy, understanding, encouragement, and reassurance. (3) "Sublimated intimacy" is characterized by idealization of the prospective mate. Also, various forms of warm companionship, in which the sexual elements are absent from consciousness, are phases of sublimated intimacy.

In addition to the above, the sentiment of love is often associated with the thrill of new adventure, seen in the excitement of courtship. It may also become associated with need for confiding friendly relations in other than matters directly related to overt love. Self-esteem and recognition by others is also an important element in the sentiment.

The particular combinations of elements in love will vary with the persons concerned and with the types of relationships involved. In outright lust the biologic element predominates. In romantic love the biologic element may be present but tends to be sublimated in terms of certain cultural expectancies. There is filial love of child for parents and its counterpart of love of parents for their children, and there may be fraternal love between siblings.⁷ In these instances the sexual components are usually quite thoroughly disguised and sublimated into

tender affection. Love between the spouses, or conjugal love, may represent a combination ranging from direct biologic interest to tender feelings and high mutual respect.

The courtship process. The beginnings of courtship in much of middle-class America are to be found in the practices of dating and rating. This procedure is largely a product of urban culture. In earlier times courtship began with "keeping company." This led, if the couple was congenial, to "going steady" and then to an engagement. Today it is much more common for the young people to spend some time in dating different individuals. This serves to extend the range of friends and potential mates and to multiply the occasions for seeing and getting acquainted with one another. It involves considerable social circulation and exposure to more potential opportunities.

During the period of dating, the individuals involved may also "rate" each other. This reflects their value system and concerns such qualifications as beauty, health, and prospects of future economic and social status. These matters are linked to more serious expectations about prospective mates. (See below on mate selection.)

During the dating and rating phases, there may be a good deal of coquetry and flirtation on the part of the girls, the use of what college students call "a line" — a pattern of talk devised to impress or otherwise influence a partner — and various forms of interpersonal bargaining and tolerated exploitation. Many college girls like the smartly dressed "good spender." The college men, if they come from upper-income families, want their "date" to be attractive, "sharp" in talk, and a pleasant companion.

The more serious intentions of courtship begin to appear when a couple begins "going steady." This is marked by a focusing of attention on each other to the exclusion of others. In this there may be a good deal of sublimated and associational intimacy.

No matter how much a couple manages the initial phases of courtship on their own, when the formal engagement is announced the families, neighbors, and community

⁶ See Burgess and Locke, *op. cit.*, pp. 372-376.

⁷ Colloquial English contains no word to designate the children of a family without regard to their sex. The term *siblings* does, and it is coming into more common use.

enter more directly into the courtship process. The length of an engagement will be determined by a number of factors — economic status, age, and influence of parents — but, in general, the engagement period is one for further testing and trying, with an eye to future matrimony. Studies have shown that in general "the longer the period of acquaintance, courtship, and engagement, the higher the probabilities of a successful marriage."⁸ Yet there are many individual variations in this matter. Sometimes a prolonged engagement means that one or the other (or both) of the persons involved is not certain that the marriage is desirable. All sorts of rationalizations may support the delay: the excuse of having to help support a needy parent, feeling of economic inadequacy, and plans for further education or professional experience.

In many societies engagements set up such solid expectations of marriage that they are never or very rarely broken. In our highly individualistic and mobile society engagements are not viewed so seriously. One study of broken engagements reports that such factors as "superficial attraction," long separation, parental influences, differences in cultural backgrounds, and personality divergences were the most important causes. The last two appeared to be the major reasons for breaking off.⁹

Factors in mate selection. The whole course from acquaintanceship through courtship to marriage involves both personality and situational factors. As to the former the attitudes toward, and expectations about, future mates are vital. These, in turn, rest on the person's earlier social-emotional and other conditioning. The situational factors include such items as physical proximity, as, for instance, living in the same neighborhood or community; the influence of parents and friends; class position; occupation; and religious affiliation.

One important psychological feature of romantic love is the *idealization* of the prospective

mate. Slang expressions, such as "dream boy" or "dream girl," reflect the popular concern with this matter. And a projected mental picture of the ideal mate gives some cue to the individual's values and attitudes.

In general, studies made of American college and university students show that the men emphasize sexual attraction, sexual purity, beauty, and health to the relative neglect of differences in class and education. Of particular interest is their failure, as a rule, to mention domestic habits and childbearing and child-rearing capacities. The girls tend to stress occupational ambition, ability to make money, and social status. They put less emphasis on good looks than do the men. Both sexes stress the importance of common race and religion and especially personality traits, but they are usually vague as to just what they mean by the latter.¹⁰ In connection with this last point, Anselm Strauss's study of 173 men and 200 women who were engaged or who had been married for less than a year is instructive. "The great majority of both men and women report, according to Strauss, that the ideal and real mates are 'identical,' 'very close,' or 'close' both in physical and in personality characteristics. The study uncovered the significant fact that when subjects compared the mate finally selected with the one they liked next best, there was practically no difference between them in approximation to the ideal on physical traits, but large differences in personality characteristics in favor of the preferred marriage partner. This difference seems to indicate that physical appearance is an initial selective factor within which, however, selective discrimination takes place on the basis of the desired personality traits."¹¹

Somewhat related to idealization is the widespread belief that men want to marry women like their mothers and that girls

⁸ For a convenient review of some of these studies, see M. F. Nimkoff, *Marriage and the family*, pp. 400-404, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947. See also Wayne C. Neely, "Family attitudes of denominational college and university students, 1920 and 1936," *American Sociological Review*, 1940, 5: 512-522. The latter brings out the changes in certain values and the retention of others, especially those of the men as to the importance of sexual purity on the part of their ideal wife.

¹¹ Burgess and Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 418. By permis-

⁸ Burgess and Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 360-363.

want to marry men like their fathers. There is an old American song which runs something like this:

"I want a girl just like the girl
That married dear old Dad;
She was a pearl, and the only girl
That Daddy ever had."

This common belief has had some support from the Freudian psychologists who contend that the child in early life builds up an attachment to the parent or parent-image of the opposite sex which affects his later choice of a mate. But the evidence on this topic is not clear-cut. Anselm Strauss,¹² for example, found little or no positive correlation between physique of parents and fiancé or mate. He did find some evidence that parent-images influence the choice of mates but not necessarily in terms of Freudian theory. That is, the resemblance was not necessarily between the girl's father and her fiancé or husband. It might be that the desired psychological traits of the latter were like her mother's. Similar variations were found in the case of the men. So, too, Robert F. Winch's study of courtship behavior of 435 college men "points to the greater importance of the mother-son relationship than of the father-son relationship." But, as he says, whether the psychoanalytic or some other interpretation is the sounder must await further statistical and case-study investigations.¹³

The whole topic of parent-image and mate selection is confused for want of adequate techniques for studying the possible relationships. There is much clinical evidence to support the Freudian hypothesis, but extensive testing of random samples of the general population has not been made. Moreover, the psychological factor is probably less one of direct identification than it is one of finding some kind of satisfactory mother substitute or father substitute as the

case may be. Then, too, there is always the problem of unconscious disguises, such as those which may emerge as a result of hostility to the parent of opposite sex.

Certainly mate selection is bound up with the conscious and unconscious personality needs of the individual. As the economic, recreational, and other features of former family life tend to occupy less attention, the emotional interdependence of mates tends to become more important. Again specific evidence on just what elements in personal make-up are considered important is scanty. Strauss's investigation, however, throws some light on the matter. In his sample of men and women he found that the former tended to emphasize the need for a mate to appreciate what the man wished to achieve and to stimulate his ambition. On the other hand, the women stressed the need for someone to love them, to confide in, and to show affection. They also emphasized the need for someone to help them make decisions, someone to look up to, and someone who would stand by them in difficulties. Both wished equally to have their personal ideals respected and to find relief from loneliness.¹⁴

Other important factors in the assortative mating of individuals in our society are homogamy and heterogamy. The former means the tendency of like to attract like; the latter is its opposite. There have been many investigations of this topic. The bulk of them show that homogamy was a definite factor in selection in terms of such matters as age, stature, health, intelligence, temperament, attitudes and values, and religion. Most of the earlier investigations dealt with couples already married, and it is not always possible to segregate the influences of living together as a cause of likeness from the place of homogamy in mate selection in the first instance. However, later studies of engaged couples tend to show that the case of heterogamy is no better than statistical chance, be it physical, psychological, or social traits. In the matters of race, age,

¹² Anselm Strauss, "The influence of parent-image upon marital choice," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 554-559.

¹³ See Robert F. Winch, "The relation between courtship behavior and attitudes towards parents among college men," *American Sociological Review*, 1943, 8: 164-174. Quotation from p. 164.

¹⁴ See Burgess and Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 420 for a summary of this part of Strauss's *A study of three psychological factors affecting choice of mate*. Ph.D. thesis. Chicago: University of Chicago Library, 1945.

and religion especially, the case for homogamy seems amply proved for American society. In such matters as education, social-economic class status, nationality, leisure-time interests, and habits of smoking and drinking, homogamy is also clearly evident but in less substantial ratios, though still above chance.¹⁵

Family and class factors still limit mate selection. In general, people marry in their same class, though some studies have shown that a noticeable fraction of male college students say that they are willing to marry beneath their social status. Girls seem less willing to take this view. Family interference in marriage, of course, was once quite common. Today it is less.

Yet Alan Bates's study of 136 young married couples and of a sample of unmarried college students reports that for this sample, at least, the father influenced the son in 49 per cent of the cases, the mother in 79 per cent. In contrast, the father influenced the daughter's choice in 69 per cent of the cases, and the mother in 97 per cent. The maternal influence was greater on both sons and daughters than that of the father. On the whole, however, the direct interference of the parents was of moderate sort. But one fifth of the cases reported the parental attitudes to be definitely rigid and authoritarian.¹⁶ On the matter of parents' own experiences as affecting their children's choices, Burgess and Locke remark: "Parents most prone to interfere in courtship are those whose marriages are broken or unhappy and those who have projected their own frustrated ambitions upon the child."¹⁷

Assortative mating is also affected by age, education, and religion. As to age, at 15 years a girl's chances of marrying sooner or later are nine out of ten. If a woman is still unmarried at 45 years of age, her chances are but one in ten. The girl's chances of marrying up to age 22 years are better than are those of a boy, but after 22 years of age a man's chances are better than hers, up to age 45 years, when their

chances are equal.¹⁸ Regarding education, it is worth noting that as of 1940, at least, the higher the education of a woman, the less likely was she to marry. Of every 10 college women graduates 45 years of age or over, only 6 were or had been married. Of every 10 women in the general population of like ages, 9 were or had been married.¹⁹ Then, too, religious affiliation is a definite factor in mate selection. But it is not so much a matter of nominal designation as Catholic, Protestant, or Jew but rather the degree to which the individuals still attach importance to their faith. One study showed that of every 10 children whose parents were Roman Catholics, 6 married a Catholic, 3 a non-Catholic, and one married without the approval of the church. But where only one parent was a Catholic, the proportion of mixed marriages in the children was 50 per cent higher.²⁰

The secondary contacts so common in urban life have tended to make it more difficult for young people to meet. Yet, despite high mobility, a great many marriages have their inception in contacts of more primary sort. Nearly one half of L. M. Terman's sample of married couples said they first met in the neighborhood, at a friend's home, at a church gathering, or at some other of the community social organizations.²¹ Paul Poponoe asked married students at Teachers College, Columbia University and in an evening high school in Berkeley, California where they had first met their spouses. Of the former group — mostly teachers of the middle class — 57.6 per cent reported such primary contacts as private homes, church, and "educational system." Of the latter group — mostly people in a lower social stratum than the former — 51.8 per cent reported such secondary contacts as commercial recreation, business, "travel and education."²² It is quite likely that city

¹⁵ From Nimkoff, *op. cit.*, p. 459. The data are from *Science News Letter*, 1942, 41: 376.

¹⁶ See Nimkoff, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 448. His data are from Gerald J. Schnepf, "Leakage from a Catholic parish," Ph.D. thesis, Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., 1943.

¹⁸ See L. M. Terman, et al., *Psychological factors in marital happiness*, p. 196. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938.

¹⁹ See Paul Poponoe, "Meetings that lead to marriage," *Eugenical News*, 1932, 17: 86.

¹⁵ See Burgess and Locke, *op. cit.*, pp. 421-422; also E. W. Burgess and Paul Wallin, "Homogamy in social characteristics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1943, 49: 109-124.

¹⁶ See Alan Bates, "Parental roles in courtship," *Social Forces*, 1942, 20: 483-486.

¹⁷ Burgess and Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 406.

life coupled with class status makes for some differential in the ratio of primary as against secondary contacts which may lead to marriage.

How mate selection is also affected by residential propinquity is shown by a number of studies. J. H. S. Bossard examined 5000 consecutive marriage licenses issued in Philadelphia. He reported that over 17 per cent of the couples gave residential addresses of within one block of each other, 23 per cent within two blocks, and over one third within five blocks. In fact, more than half of them (52 per cent) lived within 20 blocks of each other. Only 17 per cent resided in different cities. Moreover, there is some evidence that the tendency of people to marry those in the same vicinity has actually increased, at least in certain cities. Ray H. Abrams found this to be true for Philadelphia, as did Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy for New Haven.²³ Moreover, it is apparently not only the factor of distance but also the factor of density of population which influences the relative rates of selection of those near by. On the basis of his studies in New England, John S. Ellsworth concludes tentatively: "Other things being equal, the possibility of marriage between persons living in different population groupings decreases as the distance between them increases but tends to increase with the number of persons available at given distances."²⁴

It is not mere propinquity or density, however, which determines such assortative mating. Rather, it is that people of similar race, nationality, occupation, religion, and social class tend to live in the same neighborhoods. In short, the ecological factors of segregation have a place in this process.

²³ See J. H. S. Bossard, "Residential propinquity as a factor in marriage selection," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1932, 38 : 219-224; Ray H. Abrams, "Residential propinquity as a factor in marriage selection: fifty-year trends in Philadelphia," *American Sociological Review*, 1943, 8 : 288-294; Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, "Premarital residential propinquity and ethnic endogamy," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1943, 48 : 580-584.

²⁴ From John S. Ellsworth, "The relationship of population density to residential propinquity as a factor in marriage selection," *American Sociological Review*, 1948, 13 : 444-448. Quotation from p. 448. By permission. Ellsworth's findings may be tied in with S. A. Stouffer's theory of "intervening opportunities." See the latter's "Intervening opportunities: a theory relating mobility and distance," *American Sociological Review*, 1940, 5 : 845-867.

FIGURE 59

TITLE SECTION OF A BRITISH MATRIMONIAL NEWS-



Despite the advantages of propinquity, similarity of occupation, religion, and social status, urban society and culture are such that many marriageable individuals find difficulty in making acquaintanceships which might lead to matrimony. To meet this need various institutions have arisen to serve as "go-betweens." One of the oldest in our urban society is the newspaper or printed pamphlet which serves to advertise for spouses. Figure 59 gives the caption of one such British publication. In addition to providing a medium of communication among people seeking mates, such journals sometimes provide advisory services to help individuals "to choose the IDEAL one to fit in with their own life."²⁵ Other institutions to foster mate selection take the form of "lonely hearts" clubs of various sorts, commercial "introduction clubs" and matrimonial bureaus, and dating clubs, the latter often sponsored by private social-service agencies.

Individual reactions to such opportunities vary. The quality of impersonality in initiating such contacts and the payment of money for advertising or registering with an agency may seem a little cold-blooded to many lonely people who otherwise might use such services. Yet the continuing existence of such institutions shows that they fulfill certain demands for help in mate selection in urbanized societies.

²⁵ From *The matrimonial post*, Charing Cross Road, London, W. C. 2, England. By permission.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, July, 1944, p. 1.

It is clear that the selection of a mate is a complex affair, and seldom is any one factor the determining one, at least in a highly flexible democratic society. Let us now turn to examine the interpersonal relations of couples after they are married.

The Relations of Husband and Wife

The customary inferior position of women meant a denial of opportunity for full emotional and intellectual maturity. Added to this inferiority are certain aspects of the romantic marriage pattern in our society which has helped keep women in subjection to men. The theoretical picture of the dominant, chivalrous male who sweeps his beautiful woman off her feet, declares his eternal love and fidelity, and puts her upon a pedestal of affection is counteracted by the fact that he refuses to accept her as an everyday equal in the workaday world. Only in recent decades have women gained something approaching economic and political equality with men, and this chiefly in democratic countries.

Yet everywhere in education, business, and politics it is difficult for men and women alike to give up traditional patterns. Often women want to have independence and equality, and yet in critical situations they frequently retreat to former romantic expectations where the male is concerned. It is often difficult for them to live in these two worlds, and in this sense certain confusion arises. Likewise, men may talk of their acceptance of the idea of equality with women, but they, too, tend for the most part to operate along customary lines. Nevertheless there is a trend, at least in middle-class America, toward a more equalitarian and democratic family configuration.

The psychology of husband-wife relations. In democratic countries the chief social-psychological factors in the new relations of the spouses relate to companionship, mutual stimulation with respect to economic, political, and other external demands, and, finally, the deeper concerns of love life. Associated with these are the

person's need for security, for reassurance of his capacity, of his role and status, and the relation of his sex functioning to self-assurance, confidence, and emotional support from others.

Today, with fewer children and with the disappearance of economic and educational activities from the home, the mates are more and more dependent on mutual companionship and sexual attraction in order to keep them together. This comradeship must mean interstimulation for achievement in the outside world and a close integration of occupation and the deeper sentiments of the love life. Related with this must come also the respect and standing of the individual in the wider world outside, reflected back into the family life.

There is an especially important interaction centering in the sex life. At the purely biological level this relation in man is not much removed from that of the anthropoids. Actually, however, sex functioning is everywhere profoundly influenced by culture. While in some societies rather little emphasis may be put on the more subtle features of the love life, there has grown up among certain classes the notion of mutual admiration, respect, and the intimate desire of each mate to please the craving of the other, not merely at the physical level but in regard to all the finer, kindlier, and more sympathetic relations. As society removes from the family other functions, including the former heavy burdens of childbearing and child training, these more intimate relations may come to play a greater part.

Every person has an intense craving for dependency and security. These are built up in the child in the structure of the family. Adults carry over into later life the same needs. The pattern of security in the family finds one important expression in the role of the husband and father as provider, as professionally or occupationally successful in terms of what the culture sets down as an ideal. He also develops an image of himself as father of his children and as lover to his wife. When the relations with his wife, with his children, and with the wider world outside become unstable and insecure, these

relations are reflected back into his own self-image. That his own self-assurance may grow and remain, he needs the reassurance of others, especially those intimate with him in the family.

The man's personality may be much affected by his sexual love. He may find in these intimacies his greatest stimulation to activity in the wider world as well as comfort from strain outside — in fact, a set of stabilizing factors not to be secured either in parenthood alone or in economic success outside.

In like manner the wife must find her security in the strength and companionship of the husband. If she has a profession, she not only will need the prestige afforded by her professional or business colleagues but will require appreciation and understanding from her mate. If her work is cut off entirely from the rest of her life, it will remain a segment of her personality which she does not share with the man with whom she is otherwise most intimately connected.

So, too, the sexual life of the wife must, like that of her husband, symbolize the deeper sympathies with her mate. It must be a source of comfort, release from stress, and a means of reassurance.

Finally, the wife as mother and caretaker of her children develops a self-image which will grow or diminish both in relation to the attitudes of the husband and of the children as well. If the family is marked by conflict, instability, and unpredictability, her own inner self may fail to be a well-rounded structure.

It is easy to ask, What about the permanence of these relations? What have they to do with the changing size of family, with increase in the number of childless marriages, and with the problem of divorce?

So far as constancy goes, the older notion of marital contract enforced by outside coercion appears to be giving way to a realization that genuine constancy rests upon psychological factors. It is not to be denied that external pressure and social expectancy are important, but the fundamental demands for stability will develop out of these newer but more necessary intimate relations.

If one spouse makes greater professional progress than the other or develops too divergent habits and attitudes, inconstancy may appear. Where there are no children, this may lead to other arrangements or to easy divorce. Where children are involved, the situation may be differently considered.

It is clear that in democratic societies, at least, the marriage pair, in the strict sense, has become increasingly significant as the former family functions disappear. This change needs emphasis, since many writers on the family still think largely of family behavior that belongs to an age which is passing away. Not to see and understand the newer relations in marriage is to fail to prepare for changes already at hand.

Measures of success and failure in marriage. Discussion of interspousal relations has led to various attempts to determine and measure the specific elements in the person or situation which make marriage a success or failure. While there have been a number of these, two American studies are most suggestive. One by E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., secured data regarding 526 middle-class couples in Illinois who had been married from one to six years. The sample was mostly native-born urban stock with either high-school or college education.²⁷ The other was made by L. M. Terman and associates from a sample of 792 married couples of urban and semiurban middle-class status in California.²⁸

While both studies deal chiefly with middle-class urbanized families, and in spite of the fact that the samples may be biased toward the happiness end of the scales or categories, the results are nevertheless impressive. They throw light on the possibility of predicting marital satisfaction on the basis of premarital experiences and situations, since they indicate some of the more important factors making for success

²⁷ E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, Jr., *Predicting success or failure in marriage*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1939.

²⁸ L. M. Terman, et al., *op. cit.* Terman had access to the schedule used by Burgess and Cottrell and employed some of the items, with modification, in constructing his own methods of measurement.

or failure of wedded life. However, no single factor is very important, but clusters of certain ones are.

Regarding the general judgment as to whether marriage was happy or not, Burgess and Cottrell report that 63 per cent of their group gave a rating as "happy" or "very happy," and only 13.5 per cent as "unhappy" and 8 per cent as "very unhappy." Using a somewhat different rating scale, Terman's sample reported about two thirds as "extraordinarily happy" or "decidedly more happy than the average." On the other hand, less than 2 per cent fell into the categories "decidedly less happy than the average" or "extremely unhappy."²⁰

More important for us are the findings regarding cultural and psychological factors making for such subjective reactions. The major findings of the Burgess and Cottrell study are as follows:

(1) The cultural level of the husband's family is more important than the wife's. The man, but not the woman — as judged in this study — may marry below his economic and educational status. Also, divergence of church affiliation did not seem very important, at least in the first six years of married life.

(2) For this sample rural background is a better risk than urban.

(3) In contrast to husbands, wives have to make the greatest personal adjustments in wedded life. Theory to the contrary, a thoroughly accepted equalitarian pattern between the spouses did not appear in this sample.

(4) An only child is a poor risk compared to those who come from families with more than one child. Where both spouses are "only" children the probabilities for failure are increased.

²⁰ This sharp difference regarding the negative responses may be due in part to the fact that Terman excluded divorced couples from his sample. The Burgess and Cottrell sample contained slightly more than 13 per cent who were divorced. The rating of happiness or unhappiness is, of course, highly subjective. Katherine Bement Davis in her book *Factors in the sex life of twenty-two hundred women*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1929, gives 88 per cent of her married sample as reporting happiness in marriage, and slightly less than 12 per cent as saying they were unhappy. See Burgess and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, chapter 18, for reviews of other investigations into the matter of marital satisfaction. It is difficult to know just how valid such reports are since couples may fail to state their deeper feelings.

(5) The affectional contacts of the child in his own family definitely condition his later love life in marriage. Of special importance is the strong love of son for mother and of daughter for father. If these attachments to the parent of the opposite sex are satisfying, the individual will tend to fall in love with someone like the loved parent in temperamental and other qualities, and on the whole this will tend to make for a happy marriage.

(6) Likeness in socialization is important. The attendance of both at Sunday School beyond their 18th year, and of the husband at church two or more times a month, were found to be good prognostic signs. The possession of friends of both sexes by both spouses was another indicator of success. Also, there was a high positive correlation between higher education and marital satisfaction. Apparently long engagements and approval of the match by both parents are predictive of success. To be married by a minister is likewise associated with better chances of marital satisfaction. The most satisfactory age of marriage for the woman is about 22 years, for the man between 28 and 30.

(7) On the other hand, economic status was less important than the authors had anticipated. While moderate income is slightly correlated with marital success, it is not significantly so. As to occupation, women teachers had the highest predictive scores of the wives; and of the men, chemical engineers, professors, ministers, and athletic coaches were considered better marital risks than laborers, traveling salesmen, or mechanics.

(8) The sexual adjustment in matrimony is not a matter of sheer biological urge or adaptability but is qualified at every point by social-cultural conditioning.

Terman's results on the whole confirm those of Burgess and Cottrell. He, too, reported that a high degree of marital happiness in one's parents and absence of conflict with parents and strong attachments to mother or father were predictive of success in one's own marriage. Also, he found that firm but not violent discipline and sensible parental attitudes and instructions with regard to sexual matters were important. It must be stressed again that no one of these factors is particularly important in itself. But combinations of them may be highly significant. Of all the factors, probably

happy home life and likeness in socialization are the most important.

As to specific items in interpersonal relations which influence adjustment of couples, Terman lists the grievances which one spouse had about the other, first as to frequency of complaint and then as to intensity or degree of seriousness. The most frequently noted grievance of both spouses had to do with insufficient income. Otherwise the husbands ranked the following the most frequently: wife's feelings too easily hurt, her criticisms, matter of "in-laws," wife's nervousness, poor management, and disagreements as to amusements. Otherwise the wives rated the following complaints regarding their husbands the most frequently: "in-laws," husband's nervousness, his poor management of affairs, his criticisms, matters of disagreement on amusements, and husband's failure to discuss problems with the wife.

On the basis of various rating scales, Terman also reported some of the important personality traits of the happily and the unhappily married. He found that wives who fell in the "unhappy" category tended to be oversensitive, nervous, contentious, restless, and unfriendly and to feel inferior to others. Also, they were wasteful, unconventional and unsystematic in their work, and, on the whole, conservative. "Unhappy" husbands show many of the same characteristics as the "unhappy" wives. But they tend to find outlets for their frustration and anxiety in fantasy rather than in seeking sociable contacts. Also, they tend to be antagonistic to women in general, whereas "unhappy" wives often try to compensate for their rebelliousness by looking for romance outside the home. "Happy" husbands reveal an even disposition, co-operation, and interest in social life and are democratic toward others rather than aggressive and domineering. They tend to be methodical in habit and conservative in social views.

The Burgess-Cottrell and Terman studies were important landmarks not only in sociological and social-psychological research methodology but in attempting to put the findings into such form as to be practically

useful.³⁰ However, some limitations and cautions as to the present use of such measures of marriage success and adjustment may be noted: (1) Only combinations of, not single, items are predictive. (2) The scales are most effective in predictions for those who have either high or low scores. They are not very good for predicting for those who fall in the middle range. (3) The scales fail to get at the more subtle and dynamic personality factors and should be supplemented by careful individual case studies. (4) The time factor in marital adjustment is important.

Judson T. Landis' investigation bears on this last item. For a sample of 409 couples, all of whom reported happy marriage, he studied the length of time required after marriage to achieve adjustment in the following: sex, spending family income, social activities, relations to "in-laws," religion, and having mutual friends. He writes: "Husbands and wives, regardless of age at marriage, years married, or years of education, reported it had taken more time to work out adjustment in sex relations than in any other area."³¹ The next most difficult problem was money, and least troublesome were matters of religion and mutual friends.

Although these studies have dealt only with urban, middle-class families, nevertheless it is apparent that analysis and prediction of the elements determining success or failure of marital relations is possible (1) within a relatively stable cultural framework, as witnessed in these middle-class samples, and (2) in terms of underlying personality structure.

In closing this section we may note the following factors which seem to make for marital success in middle-class American families: (1) genuine companionship, including habits of playing together; (2) absence of self-pity and ability to talk over

³⁰ Scales for prediction and adjustment are available. See Burgess and Locke, *op. cit.*, appendix C, pp. 760-787; and Nimkoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 446-475, 522-530 for copies of "The marriage prediction schedule" and the "Marriage adjustment form" with instructions for taking, scoring, and interpreting.

³¹ Judson T. Landis, "Length of time required to achieve adjustment in marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 666-677. By permission.

difficulties and come to sound compromises; (3) satisfactory sexual adjustment; (4) respect for the other person's integrity; (5) interest in, and emotional support for, the expectations regarding the spouse's professional success; and (6) appreciation of wife's and husband's role and status in the home and outside.

The Family and Child Training

We have already discussed many of the functions of the family with regard to reproduction and socialization of the child and with respect to variations in the cultural patterns which are applied to the growing children in the family and the community. (See chapters 4, 7, and 9.) Moreover, as we noted in chapter 17, many of the former functions of the family have been altered under the impact of urban culture. Let us note some of these effects as they have to do with child training, child roles, and child needs.

Reproduction and infant care. Biologically the wife is always more intimately associated with procreation than the husband. His part is momentary; hers continues not only through the period of pregnancy but also through months of nursing and years of subsequent care of the child.

Present-day American family life reveals changes in the relations of husband and wife in regard to the children which grow out of present economic conditions. In urban communities, particularly, the absence of the father from the home for long hours leaves to the mother nearly *all* the duties of child training and discipline, a condition not true of the earlier American family nor even now so true in rural America, where the father and children — at least those old enough to work — are in daily interaction.

Economic and other activities of children in the home. While reproduction and care of offspring are the central purpose of family life, the child is often considered an economic asset. Among peasant peoples everywhere children are put to work at early

ages in the fields and in the household. Even in some preagricultural societies boys are often initiated early into fishing and hunting activities and girls into household duties. Today in the more advanced industrialized societies, child labor has pretty well disappeared.

Religious and moral training of children has always been bound up with the home; and though formal religious education has reached into the earliest years, the family still furnishes the matrix of religious ideas, attitudes, and practices. We noted in chapter 9 the importance of the early years in moral training. In the family the basic notions of God, of salvation, and of morality are laid before the child.

The home also provides the first recreational patterns for the child, although the play groups furnish important connections with the wider world outside. In earlier times the family as a unit frequently indulged in recreation together: games, picnics, family reunions. Today the individualized nature of recreation has tended to take this function almost entirely out of the home, although the radio, video, and automobile have done something to reunite the family for recreation.

As to education, the family provides the bases of all the child's later formal learning. The interaction of parents and children is the background upon which most of the intellectual and emotional conditioning of the child takes place. In earlier societies the home furnished much of what is now in the hands of formal education. Yet in spite of great changes the family still gives the child his basic training in social attitudes and habits. We must discuss a few of the fundamentals of these, since they are so important to adult participation in social life.

Psychology of parent-child relations. In chapter 9 we discussed the rise of the self, the importance of role and status, and the fact that the future adaptations to vocational, marital, religious, and political groups are largely determined by the social-cultural conditioning in the earliest groups. Since it is clear that the deeper motives of

behavior are emotionally toned and that these motives are definitely tied up with early social interaction, we must mention six important factors in childhood adaptation in the family. These are (1) the sense of security, (2) status, (3) companionship and growth of ideals, (4) power relations with reference to reality and authority, (5) freedom to grow intellectually, emotionally, and socially, leading to (6) the sense of responsibility and independence, that is, to the assumption of power itself.

(1) Born as he is, helpless and incapable of managing his own behavior, it is highly important that the child develop a *sense of security* out of his earliest social contacts in the family. The foundations of this sense of safety are laid first of all in showing the child love, care, and protection; and, second, in training him in regular habits of feeding, sleeping, bodily care, and play. There should be a healthy balance of discipline and affection. Consistency of training accompanied, however, by love is essential because it provides the very stability that is necessary for further learning. It is basic to making the child's world friendly, understandable, and predictable. That is, he must learn that his contacts with mother, with father, with brothers and sisters, and with others fall into more or less comprehensible and regular patterns, but patterns marked by a certain indulgence as well as authority. One of the most serious faults in child training is to play fast and loose with the child's emotions.

(2) The sense of security is related to *status*. The child's position in regard to his parents and brothers and sisters is fundamental to all his future relations in groups outside the home. Very often feelings of being rejected, of difference, and of inferiority arise in the family. These may carry over to later life. It is inevitable that the child form in his own mind an image or conception of his parents from their treatment of him and from their behavior generally. Thus, it is common for parents to talk about honesty, truthfulness, perseverance, and other virtues of our culture, but their overt conduct in these matters provides better "copies" than their verbalism. The

self- or ego-ideal of the child, so important in defining a goal toward which to strive, will be affected by his contact with his parents at every point.

(3) In order to provide adequate patterns, the child needs the *companionship* of his parents. If they are aloof, if they take on the stern patriarchal manner common in many cultures, the child will develop a self and ideal distinctly different from those which he gets if they try to meet him at the level of his own intelligence and emotional development.

(4) The *power relations* with reference to social-cultural reality and authority also develop out of parent-child contacts. Habits of bodily care, of social relations, and of managing the material world are fundamental. Mother and father symbolize to the child forms of personal power, just as the inevitability of material objects forces him to reckon with impersonal power. The child's own wishes must give way in the face of demands for obedience and conformity to these powers external to him. The manner in which he learns how to get on with his family around him will be carried over to his interactions with school authorities, religious leaders, the police, and other agents of the organized state and morality. The patriarchal, authoritarian patterns of family discipline in favor in totalitarian countries will most certainly induce attitudes and habits in these matters different from those we find in a more democratic family structure. (See chapter 4.)

(5) So, too, the manner in which the child learns to handle the material forces around him may bias his future interests and attitudes toward art, science, and religion. These first expressions of power arise from personal-social contacts, but very soon the cultural patterns of the wider community and its special groups come into play to modify these primary subcultural relations. The overdomination of the parents may lead the child to a sense of rebellion which, though repressed or held back in childhood, will later express itself in resentment and resistance to other sorts of authority.

(6) Again, the child may so completely accept the dominance of parental authority that he remains emotionally linked to the parents throughout life at an infantile level and thus will fail to develop an adequate sense of *independence* and *responsibility*. Normally, as the child grows up, he transfers his affections to other persons. He learns to manage situations outside the home and family; he extends his interests to other groups; and with all this his intelligence, his emotions, and his social habits grow until he weans himself from the original dependence on the mother and other family members.

Fortunately, the demands of the material world around him direct the growth of the child's intelligence along important lines, so that somewhat independently of the family his intellectual learning continues. Yet in more intimate person-to-person relations with mother, father, and other family members, there is sometimes a tendency to keep the child and even adolescent at an early level of emotional attachment. Some parents make their children so dependent on them in the early years that later the children cannot make adequate emotional-social adaptations to persons outside the family. In many cases, in spite of individualistic culture patterns, fundamental matters like choice of vocation, selection of love mate, adherence to religious body or political party are largely determined by direct parental influence. Such a child cannot develop into a normal, healthy, and responsible person. He remains infantile or childish in his emotional-social life as an adult, handicapping his participation in adult groups.²²

The opportunity to grow up intellectually, emotionally, and socially should be linked to the assumption of responsibility. Independence may give "rights," but these are always correlated with duties and responsibilities. If a parent remains too prominently in the thought and feeling of the children as they approach adulthood, the

latter may fail to assume full adult obligations.

Another matter of great importance is the attainment of mature love life. As boys and girls come into puberty they usually learn about the other sex through school contacts, healthy recreation, and mutual regard. When parents constantly fear that "something will go wrong" with their adolescent children, when they refuse to let them discover many things for themselves perhaps by heartaches, injuries to pride, and defeat as well as by happy relations and success, they are likely to find in the end that their protected children are not able to assume the responsibility of adult mating and the establishment of an emotionally well-balanced family life, because they have not had a chance to grow away from the overattachment of mother or father or from fears laid upon them in their childhood by parents. Often, too, parents unwisely try to foist their political and economic views on their children, feeling that the children may turn away from them and their love, to take up with new and perhaps radical ideas and practices directly opposed to their own. Yet the independent and responsible child grown to adulthood may well be left to decide for himself in matters such as these.

When all is said and done, none of us can escape fully the impress of the parental patterns upon us, whether it be as to mating, choice of vocation, or participation in the economic, political, and religious order. The wise parent will know this; he will understand that the most subtle way to influence his child toward what seem to him good patterns or ideals will be not only to instruct him but, better still, to act as sincerely as a parent in relation to these situations as he would have the child act. Example is always better than precept. The day-by-day relations between parent and child will leave their mark and will determine in basic ways the direction of the child's own life. It is only when the parental training itself has been emotionally infantile and false that unfortunate examples will be set before the child.

²² See Kimball Young, *Personality and problems of adjustment*, chapter 16. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940.

Dissolution of the Family by Divorce

The family as a social group is dissolved by the death of one or both of the parents, by desertion, by voluntary separation, or by divorce. In the present section we shall discuss only the last as it affects the family, and with particular reference to the United States.

Although in a few societies marriage is a contract terminated only by death, nearly everywhere there is provision for the dissolution of this contract under special conditions. Where marriage is a religious rite or sacrament, divorce is often forbidden or is extremely difficult to obtain. Where the family is an economic unit and offspring are economically valuable, a sterile wife may be returned to her family. If a bride-price or dowry has been paid, this may be and often must be repaid to the husband or to his father or family representative. Impotence in the husband is often a cause for marriage dissolution. Adultery is a widespread reason for divorce, although in societies dominated by patriarchal and masculine authority, adultery of the husband is often condoned. Other grounds for divorce in some societies are economic insufficiency, emotional incompatibility, and insanity.

The presence of children almost everywhere acts as a deterrent to divorce, even though the customary or legal code permits easy dissolution. The tribe or state generally takes the view that the care of children is a primary obligation of the family, a fact, of course, which we have emphasized as basic to the whole historical function of the family. The inheritance of property and the economic use of children, as well as the demands of family functions proper, have all played their part in keeping the family intact.

Pertinent facts about divorce. The public alarm voiced about the "rising tide of divorce" has some basis in fact. But there is also considerable misinformation and misconception about it. For example, in 1890

there were about 7 divorces per 100 marriages, or a ratio of 1 divorce to 14 marriages. In 1910 the ratio was 1 to 10; a decade later 1 to 6. By 1940 it was approximately 1 to 5. During the postwar years many people were quite upset to discover that in 1945 it was nearly 1 to 3; in 1947 it was 1 to 4.4. But alarmists misconstrue this. To quote a report by experts:

"This does *not* mean that 23 out of every 100 married couples got divorced in 1947, nor that 23 out of every 100 marriages are ending in divorce; it means merely that 23 couples got divorced in 1947 for every 100 couples who got married that year. To use an analogy, if a school has hundreds of pupils and in a certain year 23 pupils are expelled and 100 pupils are enrolled (some new pupils, and some of the previously expelled ones allowed to enroll again), we do not say that 23 out of every 100 pupils in that school are being expelled. Only if conditions remained constant for years would such a ratio apply."²³

This does not mean, of course, that the rising rate of divorce has no significance. To quote again:

"Marriages and divorces both increased at a greater rate than the population of the country over the 81-year span, 1867 to 1947, reaching record levels in 1946. The population was about 4 times as large in 1946 as in 1867. . . . At the same time, marriages were more than six times as numerous . . . and divorces were more than 60 times as numerous. . . ."²⁴

It must be recalled that the population became older in this time-period, that this meant a higher probability of marriage, and that due to high levels of prosperity and various attitudes and values the people of the United States have one of the highest marriage rates in the world. But, obviously, the differential increase in divorces means that the right to dissolve marriage by divorce has become recognized both in the mores and


²³ From "The American family: a factual background. I. Basic family and population statistics," pp. 23-24. Report of Inter-agency Committee on Background Materials. National Conference on Family Life, May, 1948.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

in the law. It is against this basic fact that divorce must be studied and interpreted. The changing shift of marriage and divorce rates in this period is shown in Figure 60.

FIGURE 60

ESTIMATED MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE RATES: UNITED STATES, 1867-1947³⁵



The above is the general picture. Let us now list some of the situational correlates of divorce in this country:³⁶

(1) *Community and regional differences:* Divorce is about twice as common in urban as in rural areas. Also, the rates are highest in the Pacific and Mountain states, and lowest in the Northeastern region.

(2) *Occupational differences:* It is much more common among the semiskilled than among any other occupational group, being about double that of the professional group.

(3) *Education:* There is some evidence that the higher the educational attainment, the higher the ratio of divorce.

(4) *Religion:* The chances of being divorced are higher for those married by a civil official than for those married by a clergyman. One study by H. Ashley Weeks in Spokane showed that divorce rates in families of school population were three times as frequent in non-Catholic as in Catholic families; four times as great

³⁵ From "Provisional marriage and divorce statistics: United States, 1947," *Vital Statistics, Special Reports, National Summaries*, September 9, 1948, 29: 56. Washington, D. C.: Federal Security Agency, Public Health Service, National Office of Vital Statistics.

³⁶ Some of the facts summarized here are drawn from Nimmo, *op. cit.*, pp. 630-639, who has reviewed certain of the pertinent literature on these topics.

in mixed Catholic-Protestant marriages as in Catholic; and for families of no religious affiliation the rate was six times the Catholic.³⁷

(5) *Duration of marriage:* The longer a couple is married, the less likely is it to be divorced. More than one in 10 divorces takes place within the first year of marriage; about two thirds occur within the first ten years of marriage.

(6) *Divorce and other disruption of family life:* Death of husband or wife is the most important cause of family dissolution. "In 1940 the number of families headed by widows or widowers was 2½ times the number of families headed by divorced persons and by one or other of two married persons living apart."³⁸

(7) *Childlessness:* For a long time about one half the divorces were granted to couples who had no children. During the peak years of divorce in the middle 1940's, three fifths of the divorced couples had no children.

(8) *Remarriage:* Most divorced persons remarry. For example, in 1940 there were about 1,500,000 divorced persons in the United States. And although about 5,500,000 married couples got divorces from 1940 through 1946, the number of divorced persons in the latter year was about 2,000,000, or an increase of only half a million.³⁹ It must be recalled that these were years of high marriage rates as well as of high divorce rates.

Age is a factor in remarriage. The older the divorced person, the less chance he has of marrying again. At age 30, a divorced man has 96 chances in 100 of remarriage; a divorced woman of like age has 94. In comparison, a widow of this age has 60 chances in 100 of remarriage, and a spinster only 48 of marrying at all.⁴⁰

³⁷ See H. Ashley Weeks, "Differential divorce rates by occupation," *Social Forces*, 1943, 21: 334-337.

³⁸ From "One child in nine in a broken family," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1944, 25, no. 3: 4. By permission of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

³⁹ See "Characteristics of single, married, widowed, and divorced persons in 1947," *Current population reports - population characteristics*, series P-20, no. 10, February 6, 1948, p. 1, Bureau of the Census. Another sample survey reported that in April, 1948, "one out of every eight married persons in the United States . . . had been married more than once." Moreover, of those who have married in recent years, the proportion of second marriages is much higher. See "Marital status, number of times married, and duration of present marital status: April, 1948," *ibid.*, series P-20, no. 23, March 4, 1949, p. 1.

⁴⁰ The chances of remarriage for the widowed and divorced," *Statistical Bulletin*, 1945, 26, no. 5: 1-3.

(9) *Legal vs. actual causes*: The legal grounds for divorce are usually not the "real" reasons. Various state laws provide for divorce on such grounds as adultery, sterility, impotence, desertion, cruelty, drunkenness, insanity, or non-support. The social-psychological reasons are often quite different: quarrels over money matters, incompatibility (sexual or otherwise), disputes over the training of children, and many subtle factors which the law does not and perhaps cannot take into account. It is increasingly evident in this country that divorce is really granted on the grounds of mutual consent of the parties involved.⁴¹

Psychology of divorce. The psychological effects of divorce on husband and wife may be negative or beneficial, depending on the circumstances. We must note that there are no well-accepted norms of adjustment of the divorced person.

Among important matters is, first, the loss of companionship. Even though conflict has been frequent, the mere fact of living alone again may be a strain on the man or the woman. Of course, if there are children, whoever gets the custody of the children — usually the wife — has their companionship. Sometimes removal to a new locality is imperative, and new friends must be made. Then there are those sensitive persons whose marital experience has so damaged their ego or self-image that they develop such a bitterness toward marriage and toward the opposite sex as to render future marriage and other satisfying emotional relations impossible. And there is the matter of normal sex life of divorced persons — a matter not always easy, and likely to lead to substitutions, such as heavy drinking, drugs, or to irregular and ordinarily unsatisfactory clandestine relations. There is little doubt that in many cases the need of sexual adjustment is a factor leading to early remarriage.

⁴¹ See N. P. Feinsinger and Kimball Young, "Re-crimination and related doctrines in the Wisconsin law of divorce as administered in Dane County," *Wisconsin Law Review*, 1931, 6: 195-216; and N. P. Feinsinger, "Observations on judicial administration of the divorce law in Wisconsin," *Wisconsin Law Review*, 1932, 8: 27-48. Also, E. R. Mowrer, *Family disorganization*, rev. ed., pp. 56-72. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939.

Remarriage itself is not a simple matter psychologically. It is not easy to clear oneself of the sense of guilt arising from separation from the former mate and children, if there are any, even though the "causal" conflicts were unbearable. Though a person may enjoy a new love in another marriage or liaison, he may feel that he has betrayed the old love. Then, too, in remarriage, no matter how emancipated from his first mating a person may feel himself to be, he may find himself in time making unfavorable comparisons between the new alliance and the former one. It is very easy to idealize the old marriage as time heals the wounds of past differences, especially if the new marriage proves somewhat trying.

No adequate studies have yet been made of a sufficient sample of successful or unsuccessful remarriages. However, a small sample of 146 divorced persons who had married again reported that 76.7 per cent of them were either "very happy" or "happy" in their subsequent marriages.⁴²

Divorce and children. Divorce is likely to be an intense crisis for the children. The breakup of the home and family means a critical readaptation. Although quarreling, conflict, and desertion may have contributed to the dissolution of the family, it has been throughout a group of intimately interacting persons. The sense of security, both financial and personal, may be lost even though the conflict itself has become intolerable. Where the divorced parents cannot provide for the children, the state must take care of them in foster homes or public institutions.

Parents sometimes use the children as weapons in their conflict with each other. This may go on within the family for years, with each parent using all the devices he has to get the child or children "to side with him." Often the children are at a complete loss to know where to turn. When the divorce is at hand, this emotional

⁴² See H. J. Locke, "Predicting marital adjustment by comparing a divorced and a happily married group," *American Sociological Review*, 1947, 12: 187-191.

pulling-back-and-forth of the child between the parents may become more acute, sometimes leaving emotional scars upon the child for years to come.

Social stigma often attaches to children of divorced parents. Ridicule and censure easily produce a sense of difference and of inferiority on the part of children who, as we know, take up from those around them the very attitudes applied to themselves. There is doubtless a distinctly healthy motive in most remarriages which will again give the children, even though but stepchildren, a status in the neighborhood and community.

Culture standards will have much to do with this matter of ridicule, censure, and social nonacceptability of the divorced mate and the children. If divorce should become more common than it is now and reach into all classes of the population, much of the attendant shame should disappear. This is already evident in some social classes.

There still remains the deeper problem of emotional attachment and security that is built up between parents and children. The loss of a father or a mother by divorce, like loss by death, may leave the child with a feeling of isolation that even the acceptance of divorce in the wider community may not make up to him. The whole emotional-social development of the infant and child in relation to his parents or other guardians may become more difficult if there is a divorce. It is often a question whether or not some sort of marital compromise which will keep the family intact, at least while the children are growing up, is not for them at least a healthier situation than divorce and

all that it entails. It is difficult to generalize on this question when in every family there are so many unique factors. The problem of emotional insecurity cannot be denied and must be reckoned with in any sane discussion of divorce.

Remarriage is often fraught with difficulties for the stepchildren, especially when children born of the second marriage arrive and begin to play their roles in the family drama. Favoritism, jealousy, and open conflict may result. Certainly not all remarriages involving stepchildren turn out badly, but the danger is there and must be taken into account as a further probability in the situation.

Divorce is not the cause of marital disturbance and change but, rather, the reflection of changing culture norms. Democratic societies are groping their way to new patterns of behavior in family life, and in doing so, social strain and much personal suffering are involved. While divorce has been rather common in all cultures, in our own it is a doubly difficult problem because it is related to a rapid shift in nearly all the basic institutions and culture patterns. So far we have not invented any social grouping other than the family which will better serve the fundamental function of rearing children. Perhaps if we get away from attitudes of blame and ridicule in regard to marital difficulties and come to handle the underlying psychological problem as one for treatment and re-education, many of the difficulties will disappear. Certainly it is very hard at this juncture to predict the future form of marriage and family life in our rapidly changing world.

Interpretative Summary

1. In American society marriage is assumed to grow out of romantic love.
2. The sentiment of love is a complex organization of desires, emotions, attitudes, images, and ideas directed toward some object.
3. Contemporary courtship has become largely individualized; parents and the community have only indirect effects on its processes.
4. Mate selection, however, is conditioned by family and class status, education, occupation, religion, and residential propinquity as well as by various personality traits of the individuals concerned.

5. The interpersonal relations of spouses are qualified by a wide variety of factors, of which sex adjustment is only one. Congeniality, mutual regard, and common interests, among others, are very important.
6. Reasonably adequate devices have been developed to predict marital success or failure and to measure the elements in marriage adjustments. We anticipate that better instruments of measurement will be developed as sociological research improves.
7. Among other important results of the child's socialization in the family which are important for future adjustment are sense of security, status, companionship, ideals, and realistic power relations with others, including a recognition of the place of both responsibility and independence.
8. The dissolution of the family by divorce produces differential effects on parents and children in terms of their prior conditioning. At present American culture does not provide any sanctioned ways of adjustment for divorced persons or their children. But as divorce becomes more common, accepted folkways and mores will emerge to bear on such persons.
9. Viewed broadly, the American family is passing from a somewhat authoritarian type to one more democratic, based on companionship. There is certainly no basis for certain popular beliefs that it is likely to disappear.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Trace the changes in the concepts and practices of romantic love from the Middle Ages to the present.
2. Name and discuss the steps in the courtship process and show how they are related to the culture of the time and place. Compare present practices with those of your grandparents' day.
3. What are some of the situational and subjective factors which enter into mate selection?
4. What are the principal demands of interaction between husband and wife today? How do they differ from those of parents 100 years ago?
5. Cite an instance, if you can, of conflict between older and younger generations in regard to child training which illustrates the older and the newer culture patterns of family life.
6. What are some of the most important items in sound childhood adjustment to parents and family?
7. Cite cases of child difficulties arising (a) out of loss of sense of security, and (b) from failure to develop sense of independence and responsibility.
8. How do you account for the increase in divorce in this country, especially since 1900?
9. Name and discuss the important situational correlates of divorce in the United States.
10. Are the "legal causes" of divorce usually the genuine or "real" ones? If not, why not?
11. What are the chief problems of readjustment of divorced parents? Of the children of such parents?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Ray E. Baber, *Marriage and the family*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939.

A standard, well-balanced textbook, good coverage, bibliography.

Howard Becker and Reuben Hill, eds., *Family, marriage, and parenthood*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1948.

A comprehensive symposium, with bibliographies, by competent scholars.

Jessie Bernard, *American family behavior*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942.

A stimulating textbook; good summaries of literature; no formal bibliography. Considerable stress on ethical considerations regarding the family.

Henry A. Bowman, *Marriage for moderns*, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948.

Practical rather than scientific orientation, designed for courses of advisory kind; good style.

Ruth Shonle Cavan, *The family*. New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1945.

A short but incisive treatment.

Evelyn R. Duvall and Reuben Hill, *When you marry*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1945.

Contains some sound practical advice.

Morris Fishbein and E. W. Burgess, eds., *Successful marriage: an authoritative guide to problems related to marriage from the beginning of sexual attraction to matrimony and the successful rearing of a family*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1947.

A practical book with wide coverage, but necessarily brief and at times inadequate.

Joseph K. Folsom, *The family and democratic society*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1943.

A very full and well-documented treatment.

Judson T. Landis and Mary G. Landis, *Building a successful marriage*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948.

Some sound advice backed up with much data. Book an outgrowth of a college course designed to help undergraduates prepare for married life.

Edgar Schmiedeler, *An introductory study of the family*, rev. ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947.

A good statement of the Catholic view on marriage and the family, well-written and suggestive.

Andrew G. Truxal and Frances E. Merrill, *The family in American culture*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1947.

A solid textbook, much historical material, and wide coverage.

Willard Waller, *The family; a dynamic interpretation*. New York: The Dryden Press, 1938.

An incisive and provocative treatment, largely philosophical and expository.

Education: Its Structure and Function

BROADLY CONCEIVED, education is one of the chief means by which a society transmits its culture from one generation to the next. We shall begin with a review of the cultural background of education, followed by a description of the institutional features of modern educational systems, with particular reference to the United States. Certain aspects of the interpersonal relations of teacher, pupil, and parent will then be examined. There is a section on mass communication as it supplements and/or competes with the school. The chapter will close with comments on some of the persistent conflicting views regarding present-day education.

The Place of Education in a Culture

Everywhere the society of a given time and place uses some means to help fit the members of the new generation to their place in the community, be it large or small. The transmission of culture which is necessary to this aim has both formal and informal, deliberate and nondeliberate features.

Formal and informal features. The principal items of cultural accumulation which are more or less deliberately transmitted in all societies include: (1) various skills, both mental and motor, which enable an individual to make a more rational adjustment to his world as well as provide him with the tools for other learning. Reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic illustrate mental skills; manual training, motor skills. (2) Knowledge, such as that provided in science, folklore, history, literature, and art. And (3) the value system of the society, including the indoctrination of symbols of in-group loyalty and solidarity. For example,

we have the flag, the national anthem, the map, and the legends of the nation-state; the crucifix, the music, the mythology of the church; and still others connected with home and economic life. In the teaching of values both rational and emotional elements enter.

In addition to such more or less conscious and formal transmission of culture, there is a great deal of nondeliberate and informal passing-on of knowledge, skills, and values. In American schools, for instance, we put heavy stress on both interpersonal competition and co-operation. The former is found in strong rivalry for rewards, such as grades for academic work or success in athletics. We train in co-operation through our stress on group spirit and teamwork. So, too, the school affords an opportunity for the emergence of leadership and many other assets which may be of great help in later life.

Education among nonliterate peoples. All nonliterate peoples have some form of transmission of culture, but the functions we think of as "educational" in the formal sense fall to the family, clan, vocational, or magico-religious guild. While there are many variations, the fundamental aims of primitive education are not unlike those of advanced societies: the folklore, mythology, and history, training in manual skills, teaching of manners, and instruction and practice in the mores.

The differences in education among non-literates rest, as they do with more advanced peoples, upon their views of the child. For example, some, like the Plains Indians, regard the child as an immature or miniature adult with much the same motives as an adult. These tribes put much time into deliberate instruction in legends, moral tales, and religion. The Kaffirs of South Africa view the child as

an irritating creature who is unaccountable in his conduct and subject, as are adult Kaffirs, to deception, threats, and intimidation. The Manus of Melanesia leave the early training in such things as swimming, throwing a spear, and handling a boat pretty much to informal contacts of younger with older children. The Arapesh view the child as one to be carefully guarded and gently instructed since his future function is to take over the care and protection of his elders.

Sometimes the work of teaching is done by the parents, with one or the other taking the main responsibility; sometimes it is in the hands of uncles or aunts or grandparents. There is also a mixture of direct rational with emotionalized training. Though formal schools as we know them are entirely lacking,¹ certain differentiation of specialists is present. Such are the craftsmen of certain guilds who teach the crafts, shamans or priests who instruct in magical or religious rituals, and war leaders who train men in military skills.

Formal institutions. Education as a special function of a particular group or agency of society did not arise till mankind had invented writing and arithmetic and advanced in agriculture, metallurgy, and commerce. All the ancient civilizations — Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Persia, India, China, Greece, and Rome — had systems of formal education. In all these it was confined to the privileged and leisure classes, and much of what has now become a part of formal schooling, such as vocational and civic training, was left to other groups: familial, religious, political, and economic. The upper classes tended to stress philosophy and ethics, art and music, rhetoric, mathematics, and gymnastics and military arts — the things considered proper interests of ruling classes.

Education in the Middle Ages was in the hands of the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. At first it was

pretty meager, directed to simple instruction of the illiterate masses in church regulations or to intellectual and moral initiation of individuals into the priesthood and orders of the church.

The serious beginnings of modern education, both elementary and higher, had to await the Renaissance, the Reformation, and important economic changes. Protestantism, with its emphasis on individualism in religion, the rise of trade and city life, and the Industrial Revolution, which freed the individual from serfdom and the feudal mores, began to break the class and theological hold on education. It became increasingly apparent that neither a sound representative government nor an efficient business or industry could be manned and managed without literate and technically trained individuals.

Today all advanced societies have extensive educational facilities: the school plant, a wide variety of curricula and methods of teaching, a specially trained personnel for management and instruction, and a rationale or philosophy of the aims, methods, and values of education. However, the aim, form, and content of education differ with the cultural system, and since the variations are related to the larger cultural systems within which they are embedded, let us examine some of the differences.

Authoritarian values and education. While the modern world has seen the emergence of a variety of educational systems, the two modal patterns are those which center around the values and practices of representative democracy and those which are oriented to totalitarian, authoritarian values and practices. The major contrasts of these cultural systems were listed in chapter 4, pages 49ff. At this point we shall discuss education and its relation to the basic philosophies.

In the broad and basic sense, of course, the aim of education, both formal and informal, in all modern national societies is to enculturate young and old alike with the fundamental values and practices of said countries. All of them rationalize their kind

¹ See Margaret Mead, "Education, primitive," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 5: 402, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931. See also Nathan Miller, *The child in primitive society*, New York: Coward-McCann, 1928; and W. D. Hambly, *Origins of education among primitive peoples*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.

of education as being good for the masses. The crux of the difference, of course, lies in what is considered *good*, that is, as defined by the culture.

Since the contrasts in values have bearing on action in relation to both intranational and international affairs, it is important to know just what these differences mean not only with respect to such issues as politics and economics but with regard to such a powerful agency of cultural training as education. Some of the important differences in the two cultural systems are reflected in the aims of education as related to the larger philosophy of the state, to the groups or classes which manage the social controls, and to the means by which the larger purposes of the state are carried out in the community through the school and through the media of mass communication. Let us first see how these operate under authoritarianism.

(1) The aim and content of education are bound up with the theory of the interrelation of the society, state, and individual. Under totalitarianism the state is considered to be coterminous and identical with the national society. In the words of Benito Mussolini: "Everything for the state; nothing outside the state; and nothing against the state."² Such a philosophy leaves no place for the rights and liberties of the individual as recognized under democracy.

The application of such a basic doctrine to education was set forth in Article 20 of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party of 1923 in these words: "The concept of the state must be inculcated at school from the very moment the intelligence of the child begins to awaken." In Soviet Russia this same idea is conveyed in these words: "National pride and national self-consciousness are characteristics of Soviet patriotism. These qualities must be cultivated in our children."³

² Quoted in I. L. Kandel, *Educational yearbook of the International Institute of Teachers College*, Columbia University, "The end of an era," p. 71. New York: Teachers College, Bureau of Publications, 1941. This volume contains some good material on German and other totalitarian educational programs.

³ From *I want to be like Stalin*, p. 55. New York: John Day Co., 1947. By permission. This little book, "from the Russian text of pedagogy by B. P. Yesipov and N. K. Goncharov, translated by George

(2) Authoritarian states have a ruling elite of some sort or other which determines the basic philosophy of the state, its more detailed goals, and the methods of attaining the latter. Such a ruling group believes it has a mission. And the leaders of this elite provide the symbols of identification which help tie the masses to their rulers, all in the name of the larger totality. This was amply shown in the Nazi philosophy of racialism. (See chapter 11.)

Though couched in socialistic rather than racist verbiage,⁴ the Communist Party in Russia continually tries to persuade and impress the Russian people that its mission is to bring about a democratic classless society everywhere. The Party links patriotism to the Russian nation-state with the wider aim of world communist revolution by preaching that "the interests of our people and the interests of the toiling masses of the entire world are indivisible."⁵

In actuality, the communist goal of a democratic classless society is remote. In Soviet Russia at present there is a heavy stress on the nationalist state with all the trappings of patriotism and the application of the doctrine of sovereignty.

In all authoritarian countries it is considered important to indoctrinate the young, through the schools and otherwise, with the proper deference and loyalty to the purposes of the ruling elite. Thus, the Nazis taught what they called the *Führer Prinzip*, or Leader Principle. In a sense this was the central theme of the entire class structure as projected by the Nazis. Beginning with Hitler at the top, there was a gradation of authority in every class and group down to the very bottom of the society. This principle was associated with mystic concepts of race, folk, and state and gave the basis for personal zeal and fanaticism in carrying out the Nazi Party program.

A similar function of leadership is found in the Soviet Union. In the early years it was Marx, then Marx and Lenin. Today it is Stalin, Lenin, and Marx, somewhat in that order of importance. Through the school, as well as outside, the Communist Party is building in the minds of young people a strong and, in the words of some outsiders, a "perfectly fantastic loyalty to Stalin and the Communist

S. Counts and Nucia P. Lodge," is a mine of information about the content and method of teaching present-day Russian children.

⁴ See chapter 11 on latent racialism in Russia.

⁵ From Yesipov and Goncharov, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Party."⁶ The picture of Stalin hangs in every schoolroom, and his name is "invoked at every gathering or assembly of children or youth. . . . He is lovingly characterized as 'leader of the people, author of the Constitution, beloved father and friend, Comrade Stalin.'"⁷

This illustrates the heart of such identification. It is a father-image as the carrier of authority and love — an idealization of two basic components in child training: discipline and indulgence. There is nothing unique in this. It is only that through classroom teaching and propaganda the national hero is, as it were, "tailor-made."

(3) The methods of accomplishing such conformity and control take the form of regimentation of practically every aspect of the lives of the people in such societies. In Germany under the Nazis the process by which conformity was brought about was called *Gleichschaltung*, or co-ordination. The stress on group solidarity was repeated in drama, song, literature, and in the state-controlled organizations for all ages.

In Soviet Russia the regimentation is designed to be equally as complete, although in such a vast country with its diverse cultures the attainment of conformity and unity may be a very tedious and time-consuming task. As is well-known, the entire political, economic, and educational systems are completely dominated by the Communist Party. While there is some accommodation on the part of the ruling Moscow coterie to the cultural demands of various regions and localities, all the essential programs and controls are centralized in the Party *Politburo*. It does no serious harm to this centralization of power to tolerate linguistic differences and local folklore and folkways so long as they are no threat to the rule of the Communist Party. In fact, a certain amount of harmless deviation may serve to keep the masses from growing too restless under the lash of severe regimentation and control. The provisions for recreation of students and workers probably serve to counteract some of the hardships imposed by the Russian rulers.

Under authoritarian principles, the control of the school touches every aspect of education. The teachers are carefully chosen and supervised, and deviations from the

"party line" are severely punished. The course of study is laid down by central authorities, and little or no modification is tolerated. The students of all ages must be given nothing but "the truth" as the ruling elite sees it. Another illustration from Soviet Russia is in point:

There has been a long and bitter controversy among Russian scientists over the Mendelian principles of heredity. Marxist philosophers look askance at genetics since it does not appear to give sufficient weight to the potential place of the environment in making and remaking the individual. Periodically the debates of Russian biologists came to the attention of the Communist Party leaders. Lest such controversies undermine faith in the official Party views, pressure is exerted to enforce conformity. Thus in September, 1948, *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party, published an open letter addressed to Stalin and signed by the head of the national Academy of Medical Sciences of the Soviet Union which said, in part: "We promise you, our dear leader, to remove the errors committed by us in the shortest time, and to reconstruct all our scientific work in the spirit shown us by the great party of Lenin and Stalin."⁸

The idea of a free science and a free literature is no more to be tolerated than are conceptions and practices of free speech and free elections. Of course, the controls are always rationalized in terms of the soundness of the views of rulers and of the decadence and deceit in bourgeois society.

Democratic values and education. In contrast to the patterns of authoritarianism as they set the stage for education under dictatorship are those traditionally associated with democracy. The ideal of a free man in a free society is so taken for granted by individuals brought up under representative government that it is often difficult for them to comprehend any other scheme of life. Certainly democracies have no such formalized and logical philosophies as serve to rationalize authoritarian ways of life.

⁶ See George S. Counts in Introduction, p. 25, *ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Quoted in the *New York Times*, September 23, 1948, section C, p. 8. By permission.

Representative democracy has had a long history, and the values and practices we now associate with it are the result of slow and gradual cumulation of ways of thinking and doing. It can hardly be called a system in any ordered sense. It is not always consistent. It makes mistakes. It learns "the hard way" as evidenced by the difficulties democratic countries have in shifting from peace to wartime operations.

Democracy is more than a set of political institutions and processes. Under its philosophy the national society is not considered to be coequal and coterminous with the state. The latter is but an agency of the former and constantly under its control. Moreover, the basic philosophy rests on beliefs in natural rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This implies, further, not only a jealous regard for one's own rights but a duty to provide and guard similar rights for others. In the words of The President's Commission on Higher Education (1946-1947):

"From this basic tenet have derived the specific ingredients in the American idea of democracy: the right of all men to equality of opportunity, the equal right of all citizens to vote and to hold office, the rights of religious liberty, freedom of speech and all forms of expression, freedom of association, freedom from want and from fear and ignorance; the obligation of the majority in power to respect and protect the rights of the minority."⁹

It would be a mistake, of course, to assume that there are no class and other group controls in representative democracy. There are. This has been particularly true in some European countries where the class structure is more rigid than it is in the United States. (See chapter 28.) For example, in Britain both the Anglican Church and the upper class have, in the past, largely determined policy and practice in education. While the Industrial Revolution brought in its wake an increasing extension of school op-

portunities for the middle and lower classes, the system itself changed very slowly toward a more democratic pattern as to aim, content, and procedure. The Education Act of 1944 marked an important forward step. It extends and strengthens elementary and secondary schooling and provides more opportunities for able young people to get a higher education. While some believe "The act pays rather too much deference to traditions,"¹⁰ and while the postwar years made it difficult to carry out many of the provisions of the act, on the whole it marked an important official advance in democratic mass education in Britain.

In the United States education was at first largely in the hands of the church and the local community. Moreover, it tended to be restricted to the financially abler classes. Free public education was not considered essential until it became clear to leaders and masses alike that universal literacy goes hand in hand with the belief in, and practice of, universal suffrage and member-participation in civic life. Moreover, in most democratic countries the abolition of property qualifications for voting and office-holding was correlated with the demand for compulsory elementary education at public expense. And in this matter the United States was far in advance of most other countries.

While the classroom subject matter has changed through the decades, American education has revolved around the concepts of sound knowledge, public welfare, training in basic skills, and indoctrination in fundamental values of democracy. An educated citizenry in a democracy means not only persons with sound knowledge and skill but individuals who can combine individual choice and freedom with sense of personal and public responsibility for their judgments and actions. There is nothing in this thesis to imply the so-called "dead level" theory of democracy. Rather, it indicates that every means possible should be

⁹ From *A Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education, Higher education for American democracy*, vol. I, "Establishing the goals," p. 11. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.

¹⁰ W. Kenneth Richmond, *Education in England*, p. 149. London and New York: Penguin Books, 1945. This book is a critical but stimulating review of English education.

used to provide equality of opportunity in education for all the children of all the people and that out of such a system will come intelligent citizens capable of managing their own affairs and at the same time willing participants in the larger concerns of the community and the nation. While we have not always been entirely clear as to the central theme of public education, for the most part we have been exceptionally successful in the diffusion of mass education.

In closing this section, we must remind ourselves that despite the many sharp and striking contrasts between education under representative democracy and under totalitarian systems, the aim of mass education is always to prepare the young for later participation in adult society. Hence the school will carry the values of the latter to its charges. The aims and values may seem dangerous or bizarre to outsiders, but so long as a given cultural system persists the school will be its servant. Moreover, the moral principles of loyalty, obedience, patriotism, and a whole host of codes of good manners and mutual participation in group life have much in common in both systems. For example, many of the "Rules for School Children" adopted in 1943 by the Soviet leaders could, with slight modification, fit the democratic schools. The stress on diligence, obedience, personal cleanliness, good posture, use of proper language, and like matters is pretty much in the same general tradition as our own.¹¹

Cultural variations usually represent differences in emphasis and direction with respect to the major cultural imperatives. They are seldom completely distinctive and unique. So it is with matters of education.

We turn now to examine some aspects of the nature and function of the American school system.

Education in the United States

The history of education in the United States may be divided into three periods. Before 1880 it was almost wholly under

local support and control. Between 1830 and 1880 the foundations of our modern school system were laid down, paralleling in development the nation's expanding industrial life. During these 50 years the states more and more assumed control over their respective educational systems.


From 1880 on there was a growing recognition of the central importance of schooling. Child labor was gradually abolished, girls and women were accorded more educational opportunities, provision began to be made for health and vocational education. Then, too, there was a great extension in the total amount of time given to school. The earlier stress on elementary education gave way in time to emphasis on high-school training; and on top of this there has come, in the last few decades, a great increase in enrollments in colleges and universities. More recently the belief has been spreading that education should be a continuous process from infancy on throughout life.

The growth of education. That the people of the United States put great stress on education is shown by a few figures. There are nearly 250,000 schools of various levels — elementary, secondary, and collegiate — with a capital value of nearly 11.5 billion and endowments of about 2.8 billion dollars. The enrollment in full-time day schools in 1947 was nearly 29 million individuals. There were probably another 3.6 millions in part-time and adult formal education. The full-time enrollees in 1947 were 42 per cent of all individuals in the age range 5–34 years. For those in age 6–15 years, more than 9 out of every 10 were in school. There were about 1.2 million teachers, full-time and part-time, for all school levels. An overall view of the changes is shown in the fact that in 1890 a little more than one half the population aged 5–19 years was in school; in 1910, two thirds; and in 1947, nearly eight tenths. In no other country in the world and at no other time in history has such a large proportion of a population been in school. It reflects both an amazing faith in education and a steadily rising standard of living.

¹¹ See Yezhov and Goncharov, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–150.

FIGURE 61

RESIDENT ENROLLMENT AND TOTAL FACULTY, INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
IN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, 1910-1960¹²



School opportunities have been constantly expanding for some decades. In 1880 there were 15 million individuals aged 5-17 years in our population, of whom less than two thirds were enrolled in school. In 1947 there were 29.4 million, 85 per cent of whom were in school. By 1900 compulsory elementary education had become firmly established. And while secondary enrollments had been going up slowly since 1880, after 1910 they increased rapidly. In 1890 there were about 400,000 high-school students; in 1910, about 900,000. In 1940 there were 6.6 million; and by 1950 there will be about 7.5 million. The growth of college and university opportunities has not been quite as striking, but nevertheless the changes are impressive. In 1900 there were about 350,000 students in this category. The next 40 years saw a million added to this number. In 1948 there were more than 2 million students in American colleges and universities. Some of these, of course, were veterans whose education had been postponed by reason of their participation in World War II. Figure 61 shows growth in numbers of students and teachers, average number of students per faculty member, and certain projected goals based on The Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education.

A rise in the level of educational attainment is another measure of change. For example, in 1917-1918 the typical (median) enlisted man in the army had completed 7 years of school-work. In 1944 the median was 10 years.

Population changes and future trends. Like other countries with a relatively stationary population, the educational trends of the future will reflect the general decline in the birth rate. During the 1930's the elementary-school enrollment for the entire country decreased.

However, the slow aging of our population and the increase in births in the 1940's will mean considerably larger enrollments in the next few decades. For example, in 1939 there were slightly more than 2 million six-year-olds ready for the first grade. In September, 1953 the number will be nearly twice this. Or take those who enter the junior high school or seventh grade, according to estimates "the gain from 1946 to 1958 will be nearly 1,100,000 or over 50 per cent!"¹³ So, too, while there was a decline in the ratio of population of high-school age during the 1940's — due to the low birth rate earlier — by 1950 this trend will be reversed, and by 1961 the number ready to enter the first year of senior high school will be 55 per cent higher than it was in 1948. And this estimate does not take into account any probable increase in the proportion of youngsters of high-school age who will go to school. So, too, by 1950 there may be a slight drop in college enrollments since by that time the backlog of veteran students will have largely disappeared. But, again, during the 1950's the numbers of those of college-entrance age

¹² From *Higher education for American democracy*, op. cit., vol. IV: "Staffing higher education," adapted from Chart 1, p. x.


¹³ P. K. Whelpton, *Forecasts of the population of the United States, 1945-1975*, p. 56. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.

will begin to go up, so that by 1964 there may well be an increase in this group of 57 per cent over that for 1950. This estimate, too, does not take into account any change in the proportion of students of college age who may go to school.¹⁴

Some continuing inequalities. So much for the overall view of American education. When we examine it more closely we find that there are variations in terms of income, occupation, sex, race, and regional and rural-urban residence. We have already noted that, in general, the lower the income, the higher the fertility rate. (See chapter 13.) This means a certain concentration of school-age children in low-income families. In 1945 more than one third of the children under 18 years old were in families with annual incomes of less than \$2000, and nearly half of America's children were in families with incomes of \$2500 or under. The relation of income to education is also revealed in the levels of educational attainment. See Figure 62.

FIGURE 62

SCHOOL ATTAINMENTS RELATED TO FAMILY ECONOMIC STATUS ¹⁵



Occupational status of parents is also correlated with the amount of education given the children. The lower the occupational level, the less the educational attainment.

¹⁴ P. K. Whelpton, *Forecasts of the population of the United States, 1945-1975*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁵ *Urban Higher Education for American Democracy*, op. cit., vol. II, p. 14, redaction.

Figure 63 is a graphic presentation of the findings for a large sample of young people, aged 16-24 years inclusive, in Maryland.

The ratios of the sexes in our schools is also revealing. At the elementary level, the proportion of boys and girls usually reflects the sex ratio of the child population in the community. Formerly girls outnumbered boys in the high schools, but men greatly outnumbered women in the higher institutions.

In 1900, two fifths of the pupils in the secondary schools were boys; today the sexes about equal each other. In the colleges in 1900, only slightly more than one third were women students; in 1940, two fifths. In 1947 they comprised only one third again, but this was due to temporary heavy influxes of veterans. The most striking sex inequalities are found at the graduate and professional levels. In 1939-1940, of the 12,157 master's degrees granted, less than one third went to women, and only 9 per cent of the doctorate or like professional degrees were granted women. In 1946-1947 only one in ten of all medical students enrolled was a woman.


The sharpest educational differences in this country are those between the whites and the Negroes. This is but another measure of the color-caste system. (See chapter 28.) To cite a few facts:

In 1940 Negroes 25 years old and over had completed, on the average, only 5.7 years in school. The corresponding average for native whites was 8.8 years; for foreign-born whites, 7.3 years. Only 7.3 per cent of the Negroes in this age bracket had finished high school, while nearly 29 per cent of the native-born whites had done so. In 1947, of all white persons 25 years old and over, approximately 35 per cent had completed four years of high school, whereas only 13 per cent of nonwhites in this age range had done so.¹⁶

At the college level the discrepancies are equally striking. Two and one half as many whites as nonwhites of 25 years or more had had some college education. In 1939-1940

¹⁶ Nonwhite includes Negroes, Orientals, American Indians, and persons of Mexican ancestry which is clearly Indian. For purposes of comparison, we may consider the nonwhites as equivalent to "Negro" in the earlier figures, since more than 90 per cent of the nonwhites are Negroes.

FIGURE 63

RELATION OF FATHER'S OCCUPATION TO THE AMOUNT OF SCHOOLING RECEIVED BY CHILDREN¹⁷

the ratio of white college students to whites in the total population was 1 in 81; for Negroes, the ratio was 1 in 225.¹⁸

"The median years of school completed [in 1947] for adult whites and nonwhites were 9.4 and 6.9, respectively."¹⁹

The discrepancies ramify every aspect of education where segregation exists:

The average annual school term is shorter, the ratio of pupils to teachers is greater, and the average outlay per Negro child is less than half that for the white child in those states which have segregation. For example, in these 17 states for 1939-1940 the average annual salaries of elementary and secondary teachers, white and Negro, were \$1046 and \$601, respectively.²⁰ However, some of these differences have been considerably lessened: "The gap between length of the school year

for whites and the shorter one for Negroes has been narrowed from 14.8 days in 1939-1940 to 9.5 days in 1943-1944."²¹ So, too, the number of pupils per Negro teacher in 1943-1944 was only six students more, on the average, than for the white teacher in the states which have segregation. In 1939-1940 it was 8.5 pupils more.

In the words of Benjamin Fine, "The low state of Negro education is a challenge to the American way of life. A well-educated, intelligent electorate, regardless of race, creed, or color, is the best assurance that America will continue as a democracy."²²

The regional differences in education are associated with level of living, rural-urban variables, and Negro-white ratios. The South spends the least per capita for education of any part of the United States. Table 16 gives the expenditure per pupil for education in 1944 for the 10 states with the highest expenditures and for the 10 with the lowest. All of the latter are in the South.

²¹ "To secure these rights. The report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights," *PM's Sunday Picture News*, magazine section, November 2, 1947, p. 10.

²² Fine, *op. cit.*, p. 162. By permission.

¹⁷ From H. M. Bell, *Youth tell their story*, p. 59. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1938. By permission.

¹⁸ See Benjamin Fine, *Our children are cheated: the crisis in American education*, p. 151. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1947.

¹⁹ "Educational attainment of the civilian population: April, 1947," *Current population reports—population characteristics*, series P-20, no. 15, May 4, 1948.

²⁰ For a review of the facts on such differences, see Fine, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153, 156.

TABLE 16

EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL FOR EDUCATION, 1944²³

STATES WITH HIGH EXPENDITURE		STATES WITH LOW EXPENDITURE	
State	Expenditure	State	Expenditure
New York	\$185.12	Mississippi	\$42.25
New Jersey	185.07	Arkansas	52.36
California	164.79	Alabama	54.17
Massachusetts	161.00	Georgia	55.70
Montana	159.11	South Carolina	58.22
Illinois	158.02	Tennessee	62.21
Connecticut	151.09	North Carolina	65.16
Wyoming	150.17	Kentucky	75.28
Nevada	149.30	Virginia	75.30
Rhode Island	148.87	Florida	82.76

Some of the divergences between rural and urban schooling have already been noted. (See Figure 38, page 251.) While the gap is gradually being reduced, the proportion of individuals enrolled in school for each age group is highest in urban and lowest in rural-farm areas. The educational situation in the rural-nonfarm areas falls between the other two.²⁴

From the standpoint of a healthy democracy there are two serious unsolved problems in these continuing inequalities. First, so long as they exist, the general educational level of the whole population will be lower than it might and should be. In the second place, it is evident that these divergences mean that the local and the national community are not using their intellectual potential. Certainly there is no clear proof that children from low-income families, from parents of lowly occupation, or from Negro or farm homes are necessarily lacking in native ability to benefit from more education. True, there are differences in intelligence, but their positive correlation with these cultural factors is, at best, very low and statistically rather insignificant.

Several studies show that educational opportunity is not equally available to all. Harland Updegraff's report from Pennsylvania on the socio-economic status and school history of

910 pupils with intelligence quotients of 110 or better is enlightening. Certainly individuals with such IQ's are considered fit for college. Yet of his sample, for the upper socio-economic fraction, 568 in number, 93 per cent graduated from high school and 57 per cent went on to college. Of those in the lower socio-economic bracket, 342 in number, only 72 per cent finished high school and 13 per cent attended college.²⁵

A University of Minnesota study in the 1940's showed that for every high-school graduate who ranked in the top 30 per cent of his class and entered college, two high-school graduates of equal standing did not go to college.²⁶ On the basis of its inventory of talent of the American people, the President's Commission on Higher Education states: "1. At least 49 per cent of our population has the mental ability to complete 14 years of schooling with a curriculum of general and vocational studies that should lead either to gainful employment or to further study at a more advanced level. 2. At least 32 per cent of our population has the mental ability to complete an advanced liberal or specialized professional education."²⁷

Certainly whether or not we attain the high standards set down by the President's Commission, every effort should be made to

²³ From *United States statistical abstracts, 1947*, p. 131. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1948.

²⁴ See *Higher education for American democracy*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 20.

²⁵ Cited in W. Lloyd Warner, Robert J. Havighurst, and Martin B. Loeb, *Who shall be educated? The challenge of unequal opportunities*, p. 50. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. See also their review of Helen B. Goetsch's study in Milwaukee, *ibid.*

²⁶ Cited in *Higher education for American democracy*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 14-15.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 41.

equalize educational opportunity so as to raise the level of general education as well as to make use of all the available high capacity and special talent of our people. The costs of such a program, however, would be very high.²⁸

The changing curriculum. The operation of any modern educational system involves the following: (1) the pupils or students for whom the school is organized; (2) the curriculum or course of study and the various methods by which the subject matter is conveyed to the student; (3) a more or less trained personnel — teachers, supervisors, administrators; (4) the school buildings and material equipment necessary to the work of instruction and administration; and (5) the financial resources derived either from public taxation or from religious or other nonpolitical sources. Some data on student and teacher population, on differential costs, and on various inequalities in facilities have been given. Problems concerning the fourth and fifth items are outside our purpose. Since the curricular content of education reflects the larger culture from which it springs, we must take note of certain changes in the former as a phase of the changes in the latter.

As the basic orientation, the main shifts in elementary and secondary education, at least, have been from curricula oriented to subject matter to those focused on the child as a growing personality. Under the former the stress was on the mechanics of learning and on developing capacity to reproduce what had been read or heard. Today the school is more and more child-centered, to use Harold Rugg's term, with stress on self and social development.²⁹

In the matter of method, the shift has been from the former rather severe authoritarian to a more democratic practice wherein the child has a larger degree of participation.

"Progressive education" has gradually influenced even the more conservative public and parochial schools, usually without the frills and fancies so often associated with "progressive" instruction. Matters of motivation, co-operative learning, and sound mental hygiene are given much attention.

The rapid rise in high-school population, especially after 1910, led to a proliferation of separate courses and various groupings of courses of study, such as liberal or college-preparatory, commercial, vocational, fine arts, and so on. In fact, the drift has been away from courses designed to prepare the pupil for higher education to those which are considered to have a more practical usefulness in jobs, or in the home, and give the prospective future citizen some orientation to his public and political rights and duties. The ancient languages, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and formal political history tend to give way to modern languages, simplified "unified" mathematics, and social studies with an emphasis on current problems.

Along with these trends has gone considerable reorganization of the institutional framework. The secondary school is being extended downward to include the last two years of the traditional elementary program, and upward to cover the first two years of college work. The former we know as the Junior High School; the latter, the Junior College. American junior colleges have grown rapidly. In 1927-1928 they had an enrollment of about 50,000. Two decades later their enrollment had increased tenfold. Under the growing pressure of young people, including veterans, for college education, many communities established a two-year college course in connection with their high schools. These "community colleges" are usually staffed by high-school teachers, and their facilities — laboratory, library, and other — are frequently quite inadequate when measured by the usual collegiate standards. Yet they represent a distinctive trend. It may well be that they and the junior colleges will become widespread and represent for a lot

²⁸ See J. F. Dewhurst, et al., *America's needs and resources*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1947, pp. 321-325 for estimates of future costs, based on much more modest and reasonable assumptions.

²⁹ See Harold Rugg, *Foundations for American education*. *Yonkers-on-Hudson*: World Book Company, 1947.

of young people the terminus of their formal education.

While there has been a considerable hit-or-miss development in high schools, and some confusion of purpose, the leaders of American education have come more and more to take the position that every normal-minded individual should have a high-school education, and an ever-growing fraction of our young people at least two years of college work. The trends in secondary education do not look merely to occupational preparation. It is recognized that intelligent citizens must have a general education as well. This not only includes knowledge of literature, history, and science but must, in turn, be tied up with social-emotional attitudes and values that make for a well-rounded personality. Moreover, both the wider public and the schoolmen have come to recognize the importance of training, at both elementary and secondary level, in moral-patriotic values that will induce a healthy loyalty to our fundamental values. (See below.)

The great rise in college population followed more or less inevitably from the prior sharp increase in high-school attendance. In 1948 there were more than 1750 colleges and universities in the United States. Of these about one third were under public control. Of the others not quite one fifth were supported by the Roman Catholic Church, something over two fifths by other denominations, and the balance by non-sectarian agencies. The concentration of colleges follows rather closely the density of population, that is, they are found chiefly in the Northeastern and Central states.

Like the secondary schools, colleges have witnessed considerable changes in the course of study. But, relatively speaking, these have been less drastic than in the high schools. While colleges and universities are notoriously conservative, there has been a shift from classical courses to those of more practical sort. There has been a considerable increase in preprofessional and professional courses in medicine, engineering, journalism, art, agriculture, social work, and teaching. As new specialized vocations

arise — for example, in personnel and other administrative work, in public relations in business and government, and in radio and television — the colleges and universities begin to provide training for these new occupations.

Nevertheless, as noted above, the higher education continues to be the particular privilege of the upper-income classes. The democratization of advanced education has gone on slowly, but since the need for trained leadership and experts is absolutely essential to the maintenance of our complex industrialized society, we may well expect that, in the future, more provision will be made to furnish training opportunities for those who show ability to assume the specialized roles essential to modern conditions.

Adult education. In 1947 a public opinion poll reported that "more than two out of every five adults in the voting population expressed the desire to engage in some kind of study." The survey also showed that more women than men wanted adult education; that the age-group 21-29 years expressed the greatest demand; and that the more schooling a person has, the more additional education he wants. As to subject matter, social science stood first, with professional fields in second place.³⁰

There are various reasons for this interest in adult education. Desire to improve one's knowledge and skill with respect to his job or profession is one. Wide public interest in domestic and foreign issues, coupled with the growing belief that only through an informed citizenry can the country solve its problems, is another. Then, too, people have much more leisure than formerly and want to take up reading, crafts, arts, or other activities to enrich their lives. And while the press, the radio, and the motion picture provide some of the needed information, this is not enough. More forthright school facilities are required.

Earlier we had the Lyceum and the Chautauqua. Then came public forums and more

³⁰ See *Higher education for American democracy*, op. cit., vol. II, p. 61.

formal adult education under both private and public sponsorship. Also, various universities set up extension and correspondence courses.

Every state now has some facilities for extension work. Of the extension courses offered in 1947, 40 per cent were at the junior-college level; 52 per cent, senior-college; one per cent, graduate; and the balance not of college grade. While many students work for credit in these courses, a high fraction enrolls merely for the satisfaction of getting additional knowledge.

So, too, college-sponsored correspondence courses give other opportunities. In the late 1940's nearly 100,000 students were enrolled in such courses. An additional 800,000 people took work in various privately owned commercial and vocational correspondence schools.

Organized labor has long been interested in adult education. In Britain various projects to bring lectures, forums, and classes to the workers have been under way. Though its enrollments have not been strikingly high, the Workers Education Association has served as a leader in this development. So far, in the United States, adult educational programs built up by the labor unions themselves have not been extensive. But with their growing participation in politics, as witnessed in various political action groups, we may expect American labor unions to give more attention to adult education in the future.

Other uses of adult education have centered in Americanization programs, in which the social settlements had a part, especially during the decades when this country was receiving thousands of European immigrants each year. More recently various schemes to lessen discrimination against minority groups and to foster good will and toleration have been attempted under such names as "Intercultural Education." Many cities have tried various programs to combat prejudice, the most widely publicized of which is the "Springfield Plan," tried out in Springfield, Massachusetts.²¹

²¹ For a convenient summary of developments in this field, see Mary-Jane Grunsfeld, "Intercultural and intercultural activities," *Social work year book*, 1947, pp. 240-248. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947.

We may expect a continuing expansion of adult education in the United States. To be effective this will mean more attention to the needs and interests of adults, better preparation of teachers for this type of teaching, the use of visual and other new instructional material, considerable research and experimentation as to subject matter and techniques of instruction, and finally some careful evaluation of the developing program.

In addition to the types of education just described, both federal and private enterprises have stimulated new efforts to extend training of youth and adults. During the 1930's we had the Civilian Conservation Corps. The Apprentice Training Service sponsored by the federal Department of Labor is a more recent venture carried out in co-operation with high schools, colleges, and other training centers. There is also a wide variety of technical institutes, both public and private, which represent a growing need for such training but have not as yet been integrated to the formal educational system. In addition, many industrial and business firms have programs of apprentice and in-service training, focused on specialized vocations.

Interpersonal Relations and Roles

The patterns of interaction in the school concern the pupil-teacher relations and the pupil-pupil contacts. Also, since the school is embedded in the community, the role of the teacher in the American community will bear examination.

Relations of teacher and pupil. Teaching is a matter of social contact of pupils and teachers. While the materials of books and skills must be mastered, these do not exist without reference to personalities. Unfortunately much of our earlier educational psychology failed to recognize that *all learning is essentially social*. If the social climate of learning is not conducive to efficient work, if the teacher sets up emotional resistances in the pupils or fails to present the material in such a way that they can

comprehend it, learning is retarded or made actually impossible.

The interactional pattern of teacher and pupil is borrowed first of all from the home. The teacher is largely a substitute parent-image, and the school situation fosters the fundamental values of obedience, discipline, docility, regularity of attendance, and preparation of lessons — the roots of which lie in the home. Likewise, the teacher is a kind of preacher, not only as regards facts but concerning moral and social matters as well. Centuries of religious dominance have left their mark on instructional practice. The lecture system in college is a clear case of the church manner of teaching. Even in the elementary and secondary schools the teacher often assumes the role of the exhorter, much in the preacher pattern. Even the physical set-up of the classroom, with its rows on rows of seats arranged before the teacher's desk, is borrowed from the church. The seats are but modified pews, and the desk the instructor's pulpit!

As to pupil reaction to the teacher, there is often a common tendency to idealize coupled with a strong identification. Also, pupils are quick to react unfavorably to what they consider unfair treatment and inconsistency on the part of their instructors.²²

Teachers differ among themselves in personality and hence in their appeal to their pupils. No adequate studies of these matters have been made, but there is some evidence that teachers still tend to be rather compulsive about matters of morals and classroom discipline, that a goodly percentage of them are at least mildly introverted, and a certain fraction definitely neurotic, and that in social type — as distinct from personality structure proper — they reflect a wide variety of roles in the person-to-person relations with their pupils.²³

²² See Russell V. Bollinger, "The social impact of the teacher on the pupil," *Journal of Experimental Education*, 1945, 13: 153-173; also Wilbur Brookover, "The social roles of teachers and pupil achievements," *American Sociological Review*, 1943, 8: 389-393; also his "Person-person interaction between teachers and pupils and teaching effectiveness," *Journal of Educational Research*, 1941, 34: 272-288.

²³ For a review of some of the literature on this topic and some otherwise unpublished material on social role, see Kimball Young, *Personality and problems of adjustment*, pp. 451-460. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940.

Classroom performance is also influenced by the persistence of a deep-seated cultural belief that instruction will wipe out individual differences in native ability. In spite of the laboratory, the workshop, and the project method, the printed page still holds the center of the educational stage. As a result it has been difficult to introduce novel methods of instruction into the classroom and to break the hold which the traditional teacher-pupil relations have on the learning process. Yet considerable advancement has been made in the recognition of individual differences in learning ability, both by provision of classes for fast, medium, and slow learners and by means of day-by-day realization of such differences on the part of the teacher in her dealings with her pupils.

One of the features of our American school system which reflects the individualism and the competitive spirit of the economic and political order is the emphasis upon rivalry and individual attainment. Daily classroom procedure is frequently built around personal competition for grades and rivalry between groups within the class, these groups often being artificially chosen by the teacher, such as one row set against another for grades or other rewards.

Pupil-to-pupil interactions. Pupils build up distinctive patterns of action in the schoolroom itself. They assist each other in the learning process, the superior boy or girl often helping the duller or lazier pupils. It is unfortunate that little use has been made of the natural social interaction of pupils in the teaching process itself. Formal provision might easily be made in many instances for the pupils to teach each other.

Just as the teachers themselves acquire from the pupils such social roles as the "easy mark," the "old grouch," or the "swell guy," so do the pupils. There is the "teacher's pet," the athletic "hero," the "sissy," the "grind," the "grade getter," and the "clown." These grow out of classroom practices. Teachers as well as pupils are responsible for the development of these pupil stereotypes.

The primary groups of pupils, exemplified in play activities, are not long left to carry on by themselves. The school provides formal control of these through athletics and clubs. In our increasingly complex society these more specialized secondary groups serve an invaluable function in helping to direct play activities into lines which prepare the boy or girl for later participation in other groups and in the community as a citizen. This seems to be a fairly typical and recent American practice in contrast to the patterns found in many European countries.

Teacher and parent relations. We have already noted that the teacher assumes the role of a substitute parent in dealing out discipline and in exercising authority. The parents expect the teacher to assume such a responsibility. They frequently offer objections if they imagine that the school is failing to carry over this authority pattern. Parents are often really more concerned with the moral and social effects of education than with formal instruction, in spite of the fact that they hold dearly to the fetish of book learning.

The school, in turn, affects the daily routine of the family in many ways: the hours when parents must arise to get the children off to school; the hours when breakfast and luncheon must be served; trips which the parents must make on special occasions, such as school entertainments; and shopping tours for new garments for a school party or school drama. The family culture itself is affected. Instruction in cleanliness, brushing of teeth, proper diet, and even book knowledge reach back into the home, perhaps challenging parental ideas and habits and sometimes creating conflict between the children and the parents, especially where the parents have a culture different from the American culture which the child gets from the school.

Teachers and the community. In spite of our faith in education, the teachers are seldom an integral part of the American community. Their function is largely limited to formal instruction of the children. The teachers are treated casually, are seldom

brought into close contact with the families of their pupils, and are often looked upon as "social" nonentities.

Certain phases of our American educational system make for this condition. Nearly all elementary and two thirds of our secondary teachers are women, and doubtless the lower social status of women generally reflects upon teachers. Mobility and early marriage also make for temporary relations between the members of the community and the teachers. School boards in most localities do not employ married women as teachers. Another factor is the insecure tenure of teachers. Lacking the advantages of group solidarity which would provide her with bargaining power, the teacher is always dealt with as an individual. When she gets into any difficulty, she has to fight her battle with the community and the school board single-handed.

These conditions combine to produce a sense of insecurity and inferiority on the part of the teachers themselves, doubtless keep more aggressive persons from continuing in or from entering the profession, and help to feed the community stereotypes that teachers do not "amount to much" and that the schools are filled with "unsalable men" and "unmarriageable women." Certainly elementary and secondary teachers are lower in social standing than other people of corresponding education.

Although the teacher usually has a low status and a restricted part in community affairs, the school boards frequently demand religious conformity from her. Protestant communities do not wish Catholic or Jewish personnel in the public schools; where the Catholics are in a majority, too many Protestants are undesirable. Membership in some Christian church is in the mores of most American communities, and teachers who do not conform are given little or no consideration — an illustration of the power of the mores in contrast to the legal code, which provides for "the free exercise" of religious faith.

In moral conduct the teacher must, for the most part, conform to the code of the most conservative groups in the community. Parents who themselves indulge in less traditional forms of action still demand that

the teachers of their children shall exemplify the old and homelier virtues.

In instructional materials conservative beliefs are also in the saddle. No textbook is likely to be selected which contains material that will offend the prejudices of any group in the community sufficiently well organized to protest. The American Legion, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Ku Klux Klan, chambers of commerce, political cliques, labor unions, religious organizations, and like groups may object to books or to teachers that they do not like. There is an orthodoxy in the schools not unlike that demanded by theology. It is not only in the lower schools that restrictions operate. Many colleges endowed by conservative churches restrict the teaching of science. Economic and political radicalism is also taboo in educational circles. There are few socialists or communists among teachers. In spite of their potential leadership, educational institutions tend to follow, not to direct, communities in new thought and action. (See final section.)

Teacher organizations. Teachers do have various organizations designed to represent their professional interests. Probably the oldest is the National Education Association, founded in 1857, which had about 440,000 members in 1948 — only 40 per cent of all public-school teachers. But many teachers feel this organization to be ineffective in helping to secure better salaries and working conditions. As a result recent decades have seen a growing movement to organize teachers into labor unions. The American Federation of Teachers, organized in 1916, reports 50,000 members.²⁴ A teachers' affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) has even less members. The tradition of individualism, the desire of teachers to identify themselves with the professions, and the belief that the teacher has a special community mission have doubtless retarded this entire movement.

Yet, in most American communities the rising costs of living in the mid-1940's were not compensated by anything like an adequate increase in teachers' salaries. Although for the most part the teachers did little more than grumble or look elsewhere for other jobs — between 1940 and 1947 more than 350,000 teachers left the profession — in several cities public-school teachers went on strike. Three highly publicized teachers' strikes occurred: in Buffalo in March, 1947; in Minneapolis-St. Paul about a year later; and in Providence, Rhode Island in May, 1948. These served to dramatize a nation-wide situation. And while the teachers' unions were usually the leaders in fostering the strikes, it is worth noting that the bulk of the support for such action came from nonunion teachers.

Despite some public resentment in the matter, the low morale of unpaid teachers was probably more detrimental than the temporary inconvenience to pupils and parents. Yet there is a fundamental issue as to the use of such overt pressure as a strike on the part of professional groups. Until the strikes just noted, the American Federation of Teachers had never called a strike. Many teachers avoided calling their action a strike. A Buffalo group termed it "abstention from work." Certainly there is a strong sentiment that both as members of a profession and as public servants school teachers do not have the right to resort to such tactics to gain their ends. This issue is likely to be the topic of public debate, regarding not only teachers but other civil servants, for some time to come.

Other Media of Education

We have seen how formal education has constantly expanded its radius to take over the transmission of culture formerly left in the hands of the family, the skilled trade, the church, or other association. Furthermore, many new features have been added to the school program. Yet formal education is supplemented by various media of mass impression. In fact, some of these devices compete with, as well as supplement, education as transmitters and carriers of culture.

²⁴ See *World Almanac*, 1949, p. 410. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1949.

The library. One of the most important community institutions which support the school is the public library. In a sense libraries themselves represent an extension of educational opportunities. There were about 7000 libraries in this country in 1945, and they contained over 100 million books. The number of registered borrowers was about 26 million. The circulation of books amounted to 400 million books. There are regional differences in these facilities. The Northeastern, Far Western, and Midwestern states are best provided, and the Southeastern and Southwestern least. About one third of the population of the United States lives in areas which have no library service. Another third of our people has quite inadequate library service. In 1948 we were spending about 52 cents per capita for public libraries, though experts say a minimum standard should be \$1.50 per capita.³⁵

The printing press and mass impression. Books are pouring from our American presses at the rate of about 10,000 titles a year. Nearly one third of these are of more or less technical character. These books furnish, of course, material for formal education. But, in addition, the reading habits set up in school carry over to provide people a means of further acquisition of all sorts of skill, knowledge, and entertainment.

Perhaps more important than books are the magazines and newspapers. Periodicals have been increasing in circulation in recent decades.

The largest single group, the monthly magazines, increased in number from 2328 in 1900 to a peak of 3804 in 1930; in 1947 there were 3357. The total of all periodicals in 1947 was 6429. Although there has been a decline in numbers of daily newspapers (from 2514 in 1917 to 1872 in 1947) and of the less common weekly and biweekly papers, the circulation of dailies has increased enormously. In 1947 the average total circulation of dailies per issue — not counting Sundays — was over 50.7 million.³⁶

³⁵ See *New York Times*, June 18, 1948 for the report on the 67th annual meeting of the American Library Association.

³⁶ See *Directory of newspapers and periodicals*. Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer & Sons, 1947.

Books, magazines, and newspapers flood our people with a daily, monthly, and seasonal stream of words that cannot fail to leave their impression. Their competition with formal education is apparent. One may well ask if it is morally worth while to train millions to read and then discover that their interest does not rise above the tabloids and sensation-mongering news sheets; the mystery, love, or adventure-story magazines; the comic books; or the "best seller" books. This material is constantly providing myths, legends, and stereotypes for these millions that cannot but be reflected sooner or later in their political, economic, religious, and moral attitudes and behavior. The reverence for the printed word as such is one of the reasons why propaganda and advertising are so effective in our world today.

Movie, radio, and video. In addition to the printing press the motion picture, radio, and video have become powerful media of mass communication. Statistics for 1948 report 18,765 motion-picture houses in the United States, with an aggregate seating capacity of more than 11 million. Calculations as to weekly attendance vary from 77 million to 100 million. Estimates for 1948 give a world total of over 86,000 movie houses with a total seating capacity of 38 million.³⁷ These figures do not include workers' halls in Russia, where free movies are shown.

The use of the radio has spread rapidly. In 1930 there were 12 million homes with radios, and a total of 13 million radio sets in use. In 1948 the corresponding figures were 40 million and 75 million. Video will probably have somewhat the same kind of phenomenal growth. At the end of 1948 there were about 900,000 television sets in use and more than 65 television sending stations. It is estimated that there will be between 300 and 400 such stations in the 140 metropolitan areas of the country by 1950.

³⁷ *World almanac*, 1949, p. 381. The United States has 22 per cent of the motion-picture houses and 30 per cent of the seating capacity. The corresponding percentages for Europe are 60 and 40 per cent.

These new visual and verbal stimuli constantly confronting our people, old and young, cannot but influence their attitudes and habits, although in different ways from those of the press. For example, research into the effects of the radio are showing that, for the most part, serious broadcasts reach chiefly the more educated groups, the very groups already under the impress of the printed page. For those less schooled and in the lower-income brackets the radio is used mostly to give entertainment, relatively superficial advice, and "spot" news.³⁸ In addition to their place for newscasting and entertainment, both radio and video may be expected to find greater use in the school for more formal education.³⁹

Never before has the world seen such an array of agencies for mass impression. Oratory, formal teaching, religious exhortation at revivals, and all other methods of arousing large numbers of people with the same stimuli at the same time pale into insignificance beside these mighty forces. Whoever controls these devices will determine in large measure the direction in which our masses will go. Where there is a conflict of aims and content between formal education and these other agencies, one cannot predict which will prove the more powerful. In capitalistic United States, while formal education is predominantly state-controlled, these other means of stimulation are, with few exceptions, in the hands of private enterprise. But, to an increasing extent, national states are taking over the control of these newer devices, combining them with the traditional educational system sometimes in order to bend them to the ends of their particular political and economic systems. This raises the profound question of the effect of propaganda as well as of education on the conscious and unconscious direction of thought and conduct.

³⁸ See P. F. Lazarsfeld and H. Field, *The people look at radio*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946; also, Lazarsfeld and P. L. Kendall, *Radio listening in America*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948.

³⁹ For a competent discussion of one phase of such use, see Roy Dwyer Wilkey and Helen Ann Young, *Radio in elementary education*, Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1948.

Conflicts in Education

Despite the great gains which education has made in the past decades, there remain many conflicting views on a number of important matters. These are both specific and general in character.

Some persistent problems. Among the numerous specific problems of education that continue to be topics of public discussion are the following:

(1) Although many changes have been made, the inertia of the traditional course of study is a good evidence of the power of the past over the present. Curricula at all levels carry an unnecessary load of tradition. Courses of study still continue to be largely "subject-centered," not "student-centered."

(2) This, in turn, suggests another long-standing discussion about specialization as against general, liberal education at the high-school and especially the college level. At what point should highly special subjects be introduced; and, when introduced, how much? Only a course of study focused on subject matter readily lends itself to specialization. As outside vocational demands have more and more influence on secondary and advanced education alike, it is easy to emphasize technical courses on the grounds that they fit individuals more adequately for their future vocations.

The bits-and-pieces character of much of our liberal-arts education is well-recognized, and various attempts to bring about some kind of "core of general education"⁴⁰ for both high school and college have been made. This core represents those parts of the total course of study which are considered basic for all students. Moreover, this core may well consist of materials organized without regard to traditional subject matter. Various general orientation and survey courses in the sciences and humanities illustrate this approach at the college level. So, too, the trend in some quarters to reduce the number of free electives and the number

⁴⁰ See *General education in a free society*, pp. 98-102, Report of the Harvard Committee. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.

of different courses in the college curriculum is a reaction to overspecialization and purely subject-matter orientation. We will not get the most effective education until we develop an intelligent balance between a general and integrated type of instruction centered around the individual as a person and the specialized training needed as a preparation for his vocation.

(3) As regards the place of the school in the community life, there is the perennial question of the treatment of public issues in the classroom. Related to this is the potential interplay of education and social action. The problem of academic freedom usually arises whenever special-interest groups in the community object to teachers' discussing topics which such groups consider none of the school's business.

In the matter of social action the taboo is even more severe. Direct participation in reform usually meets with strong opposition from those who control the schools at every level. High-school or college students seldom take part in conflicts between labor unions and employers or become active in political campaigns. This is not the case in some countries where the institutions of higher learning, especially, are often the seedbeds of progressive and even radical movements.

(4) Another pertinent problem has to do with the nature and kind of federal aid which state education may or should receive. In the past, the major support of education has come largely from local and state sources. While most states have tried to equalize educational opportunities within their own boundaries, marked differences between states and regions continue. (See below.) In view of this and general concern about further extension of schooling has come a growing pressure to get more federal funds for the schools.⁴¹

There has been much opposition to such proposals from business interests that object

to further federal taxation and from many educators who believe that, if such aid should be given, the federal government will of necessity play an ever-larger part in the direct control of the schools. There is some basis for a certain anxiety that further state control of the school is itself a threat to the traditional freedom of education.

(5) This last point, in fact, brings up another topic: What about the relation of private to public education in a democracy? The courts have more or less consistently contended that education is a function of the nonpolitical groups of our national society as well as of the government. Certainly privately endowed institutions of higher learning have played an important part in our national life. Yet mounting costs of schooling have led some to argue in favor of government aid to such institutions. Such suggestions are particularly apt to arise during periods of economic depression. But again the fear of direct control makes many people connected with such institutions hesitate to press for government help.

Since a good deal of the private schooling in this country is in the hands of religious denominations, there is the further problem of state support for church activities.⁴² We shall return to this topic in chapter 20.

(6) As the United States comes more and more to play a part in international relations, there is certain to be public discussion as to what changes may and should be brought about in the teaching of American history and training in loyalty and patriotism. Any marked recurrence of isolationism as a reaction to extensive spending of funds for foreign relief or to "meddling" in international affairs may lead to strong insistence on continuing the teaching of the traditional values associated with the nation-state.

⁴¹ For a critical analysis of traditional tax programs to support the schools and a defense of federal aid, see Seymour E. Harris, *How shall we pay for education?* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. For a strong plea for such help for higher education, see *Higher education for American democracy*, vol. V, *op. cit.*

⁴² Two members of the President's Commission on Higher Education took strong exception to the Commission's recommendations favoring federal aid for "publicly controlled institutions of higher education only" to the neglect of privately endowed schools. See *op. cit.*, pp. 65-68. Yet they also took a firm stand against direct federal control of higher education, should such support be granted private schools.

Conflicts in the philosophy of education. We have already contrasted some of the pertinent features of education under authoritarian and democratic systems which, in turn, reflect differences in philosophy. But within our own country various differences have arisen, some of which lie behind the specific problems noted above. A controversy of wider significance, especially as regards higher education, is that between the rationalist-absolutist and the relativist-liberal views. The former is defended by Robert Maynard Hutchins, Mortimer J. Adler, and their followers; the latter by John Dewey, William H. Kilpatrick, B. H. Bode, and Harold Rugg, among many others.

The so-called "rationalist-absolutist school" begins by assuming that there is a set of fixed truths or first constancy of human nature. Hutchins writes:

"Metaphysics, then, as the highest science, ordered the thought of the Greek world as theology ordered that of the Middle Ages. One or the other must be called upon to order the thought of modern times. . . ." ⁴⁵ It is from metaphysics that "educators determine what education they shall offer" and, moreover, "by way of metaphysics . . . students . . . may recover a rational view of the universe and of their role in it. If you deny this proposition you take the responsibility of asserting that a rational view of the universe and one's role in it is no better than an irrational one or none at all." ⁴⁶

The theory of a fixed human nature and of an absolute, universal truth as related to education is set forth thus:

"One purpose of education is to draw out the common elements of our human nature. These elements are the same in any time or place. The notion of educating a man to live in a particular time or place, to adjust him to any particular environment, is therefore foreign to a true conception of education.

"Education implies teaching. Teaching implies knowledge. Knowledge is truth. The

truth is everywhere the same. Hence education should be everywhere the same." ⁴⁵

While Hutchins does not dismiss science completely, he does not believe it to be of central importance in education. Rather, education should center around a consideration of the great truths found in the literature and philosophy of the past. In fact, his colleague Adler contends that "the defects of modern culture are the defects of its intellectual leaders . . . the disorder of modern culture is a disorder in their minds . . ." and sound culture can be attained only by a "synthesis of faith, reason, religion and philosophy, supernatural and natural knowledge." ⁴⁶

In contrast are the "experimentalists," or those who hold that education should build on science and democratic liberalism. They view modern science as the greatest aid to the understanding of man and the universe. They view culture from a relativistic standpoint and as a growing and changing web of institutions, ideas, and values. For them there are no absolutes, no eternal "first principles." Human nature is not some fixed entity but is subject to change and growth.

For this group the school not only is important in the transmission of culture but, in time, must take a lead in directing future change. Moreover, only the liberal conditions of democracy permit such use of education. The core of the argument is, in Dewey's words:

"Democracy has been a fighting faith. When its ideas are reinforced by those of scientific method and experimental intelligence, it cannot be that it is incapable of evoking discipline, order, and organization. . . . The task is to go on, and not backward, until the method of intelligence and experimental control is the rule in social relations and social direction. . . . Intelligence after millions of years of errancy has found itself a method, and . . . The business of liberalism is to bend every energy and exhibit every courage so that these

⁴⁵ Robert M. Hutchins, *The higher learning in America*, p. 99, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936. By permission.

⁴⁶ Robert M. Hutchins, *Education for freedom*, pp. 26-27. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943. By permission.

⁴⁵ Hutchins, *The higher learning in America*, *op. cit.*, p. 66. By permission.

⁴⁶ From Mortimer J. Adler, "God and the professors," *Vital Speeches*, 1940, 7: 98-103. By permission.

precious goods may not even be temporarily lost but be intensified and expanded here and now."⁴⁷

These two philosophies are obviously in sharp conflict. Yet that of Hutchins and Adler may not be waved aside as a mere retreat to medievalism. It has a wide appeal because it provides an island of certainty in the contemporary sea of confused aims and trends in mass society. It also has "the answers," and many people want the surety of such answers. While Dewey and his followers also have a faith, it is not focused on any absolute truth but rather on the central value and usefulness of a combination of science and liberalism which is by definition never fixed and final. This often fails to give the common man — be he student or not — the kind of assurance he craves. While the standpoint of the present book is in general agreement with the Dewey view, we must recognize the strong appeal of the other philosophy. In fact, it may spread widely in periods of insecurity. And it should be noted that the heart of the Hutchins-Adler school has much in common with authoritarianism. It is not in the democratic tradition though it claims to be.⁴⁸

Finally, against the background of modern mass society and its highly complex culture may be put the fundamental question as to the educability of the masses.

⁴⁷ From *Liberalism and social action*, pp. 91-93, by John Dewey. Copyright, 1935, by John Dewey. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons.

⁴⁸ See Adler, *op. cit.* The literature on this controversy is extensive. In addition to citations to

Are the masses capable of acquiring the knowledge, skill, and moral responsibility sufficient to enable them to take part not only in choosing freely their leaders from among the most able but also of having a place in the management of human affairs? Or are they so limited in learning ability, so prone to emotional-wishful thinking rather than rationality, that it is bootless to expect much from further extension, or a different kind, of education? Will there not always be a need for a special and distinctive elite of some kind to inform and especially to guide and direct the masses?

The democratic ideal rests on the affirmation of the first question. Authoritarianism affirms the second. Certainly the stress on the authority principle rather than on a more equalitarian one fosters the belief that somehow the masses need a strong father-image as a focus of their identification and co-operation. There is no positive proof, one way or another, on this topic. It is a matter of faith which grows out of a given value system. Yet any intention to continue and extend democracy must rest its case on the former view. Not until we have made further efforts to make democracy work should we abandon the philosophy of science and democratic liberalism.

Hutchins and Adler above, see Harry D. Gideonse, *The higher learning in a democracy*, New York: Rinehart & Co., 1935; Harold Rugg, *Foundations for American education*, Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Company, 1947; and *The authoritarian attempt to capture education*, Papers from the 2nd Conference on "The scientific spirit and democratic faith," New York: King's Crown Press, 1945.

Interpretative Summary

1. Education, through both formal and informal instruction, is one of the chief means by which a society transmits its culture from one generation to another.
2. In nonliterate societies education is handled through kinship or other primary groups.
3. Today education has become a powerful agent of the nation-state in indoctrinating the young with the values and attitudes which the state holds sacred.
4. Mass education in the United States far exceeds that in any other country. It is a phenomenal demonstration of our faith in education as well as of our great national wealth.
5. Despite the extent of, and stress on, education in the United States there remain many inequalities due chiefly to differentials in income and social status.
6. The press, the radio, the video, and the motion picture also provide much mass education and are often more potent than the formal school.

7. Among many other issues which confront education, both in theory and in practice, are these: (a) specialization *vs.* general liberal education, (b) the place of private schools, especially those under religious control, in relation to public education, (c) the nature and extent of state and federal aid and control over education, and (d) the larger conflict of basic educational philosophies.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What, in brief, are the chief purposes of education among nonliterate peoples?
2. Just how do the schools reflect the larger culture in which they are embedded? Illustrate from authoritarian and democratic societies.
3. Give the principal facts regarding the rapid growth of American schools — at all levels — in the past half-century. How do you account for this growth?
4. What evidence is there to show the persistence of educational inequalities? Are these deviations a challenge to democracy? If so, why?
5. How do you account for the fact that the colleges and universities are usually considered the most traditional of the educational institutions?
6. From your own experience illustrate the nature of pupil-teacher interaction (a) in the elementary school, (b) in the secondary school, and (c) in college.
7. How do you account for the status of the American teacher in most communities?
8. Illustrate how special-interest groups — business, religious, labor, reformist, etc. — influence the schools (a) as to course of study, (b) as to financial support, and (c) as to selection of teachers.
9. Just how important is the growth of the motion picture, the radio, and video as means of spreading knowledge and opinion? At what age levels, and with reference to what aspects of education, are these the most effective competitors of formal schooling?
10. Discuss, pro and con, the strengths and weaknesses of the Hutchins view of education as against that of John Dewey.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Harold Albery, *Reorganizing the high-school curriculum*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947.

A full review of the field with ample bibliographies.

Lloyd A. Cook, *Community backgrounds of education*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1938.

An account of programs designed to link the schools more closely to the community.

Francis J. Brown, *Educational sociology*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1947.

Discusses the school in its larger social-cultural setting.

Llewellyn White and Robert D. Leigh, *Peoples speaking to peoples*, A report on international mass communication from The Commission on Freedom of the Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.

Discusses both mechanical and social-psychological barriers to mass communication in relation to international affairs and suggests various remedies.

Religion

WE ARE all familiar with the Biblical expression "man shall not live by bread alone." This is but one way of saying that our daily lives are taken up with other than purely material matters. While the basic needs or imperatives are satisfied through familial, economic, and political groupings and institutions, the universality of religious experience gives clear proof that it, too, is deeply rooted in man's needs.

The Nature and Function of Religion

Religion may be defined as man's belief in supernatural forces outside himself, which forces, he is convinced, influence human events. As a concrete experience, moreover, religion is accompanied by emotions, especially of fear, awe, or reverence. Actually, religious culture is more than this bare outline.

In many societies there are a wide range of institutions and a body of special officials, with forms of worship, ceremonies, sacred objects, tithes, pilgrimages, and the like. In the higher cultures religion produces elaborate theories or theologies to explain man's place in the universe. In many instances it has close connections with moral control and sets up systems of ethics with elaborate rules of conduct. Furthermore, the great religions of the world — Brahmanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism — are really centers of elaborate culture systems that have dominated whole societies for centuries.

Although our principal interest here is in the religious beliefs and practices of higher societies, especially our own, some comment about primitive religion will serve as a background to our discussion.

Primitive religion. In the course of trying to satisfy his more immediate needs of sustenance, shelter, reproduction, and group and personal safety, prehistoric man found himself confronted with many forces in nature which he feared and did not understand. He speculated, and that was the beginning of philosophy. He put forth a finger to investigate, and that was the beginning of science. He experienced fear and awe, and these were the beginning of religion.

Primitive religion rests upon a belief in personal and impersonal powers which interfere in man's life. The belief in personal powers is called *animism*. It is illustrated by belief in spirits, ghosts, and demons which bring good or bad luck. Impersonal power, known by the name of *mana* (Melanesian), *orenda* (Iroquois), *manitou* (Algonquian), or by other names, manifests itself in natural objects, through men, or through spirits or ghosts.

To the nonliterate, the various phases of life are not sharply subdivided as they are with us. Work and art, play and religion, magic and tool-making — all are closely interwoven. Economic activities are often surrounded by noneconomic rituals. Recurrent events in the life of the group, such as birth, death, marriage, and seasonal changes, have special emotional significance. And ceremonies expressive of these emotions are developed and become part of the folkways.

Surrounded as he was by forces of nature and of other men, forces which he did not fully understand, early man did not distinguish in any logical way between natural and supernatural elements in events. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish primitive religion from the other phases of rudimentary culture. In particular, what we call

magic overlaps with religion on the one hand and with practical behavior on the other.

Magic is invented or discovered in the same way as other techniques are invented or discovered. A certain act is performed either accidentally or because imagination suggests that it might be successful. If it seems to work, it is adopted as a rule of action. If it is discovered that friction produces heat, this may suggest fire. The imagination furnishes a clue which proves valid in overt action. But again, imagination suggests that if I burn a wax effigy of my enemy, I will be doing harm to him. Or a barren woman among the Batak of Sumatra has a wooden image of a child placed in her lap so that she may bear a child. If the intended victim actually does fall ill or if the woman conceives, the invention is successful. We call fire-making naturalistic or realistic because its action is fully explained by present-day physical science. We call effigy-making magic because any success it may have is outside the cause-and-effect relations known to material science.

General religious patterns. The institutional practices and formal theories which have grown up around religion are many. The most important are the ceremonials, symbolism, sacred objects and buildings, creed, theology, and the church as an organization.

Ceremony or ritual is a standardized and accepted action directed toward some specific end. Rituals and ceremonies, of course, are not confined to religion. In religion, ritual is a settled manner of entreating or controlling the supernatural powers in regard to some particular situation. Ordination, the sacraments, various forms of sacrifice, and penance call for special rituals. In some churches, like the Greek or Roman Catholic, the ceremonials are elaborate. In other churches, like those of the Quakers or Calvinists, such forms play a slight part in religious life.

Throughout religion *symbolism* plays an important part. Symbols are substitutes or representations of some object or situation. They may be verbal or tangible. A commonly recognized religious symbol assists the person to

identify himself with his fellows. It promotes a sense of solidarity. Often it comes to stand not alone for the particular object or situation to which it was originally attached but for the whole group and its culture. The cross stands for Christianity, and the crescent for Mohammedanism. We must recall that the symbol in the mind of the user may serve either an intellectual or an emotional purpose. For the religious worshiper, the object and its symbol are combined into an indivisible emotional experience that asserts itself whenever the situation calls for contact with the supernatural powers. The eucharist, for example, symbolizes for the Christian the supreme sacrifice of Jesus, and in this ritual the worshiper identifies himself intellectually and emotionally with one of the main tenets of his theology.

Associated with rituals and symbolism are all sorts of *sacred objects* which give external evidence of internal power. The Hebrew ark of the covenant and the phylactery, the Christian censer, bells, robes, surplice, candles, altar, and especially the cross are important in many religious exercises.

For their religious exercises people often repair to special sacred localities: mountain tops, mineral springs, groves of trees, river banks, or seashores. Special *buildings* in which their exercises may be carried on are erected: the tabernacle of the ancient Hebrews; the temples of ancient Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome; the synagogues of the Jews; and the cathedrals and churches of Christianity.

Theology is the systematic explanation which religious leaders work out to show man's relation to his god and to the universe. Often this includes some account of the origin of the world and of man, like the stories of creation in our own Bible. It presents the *creed* or body of beliefs and doctrines of the church. The written words become the sacred scriptures.

In our society religious belief and expression have become organized in the form of systematized institutions which as a totality we call a church. In a broad sense a *church* is (1) a body of devotees, (2) organized for a religious purpose and developing as an agency for this, (3) rituals, (4) a hierarchy of officials and leaders, and (5) a body of doctrine and philosophy which ties the whole together into a more or less systematic unit. In common speech, too, the term *church* is sometimes used to mean a unity of common religious beliefs and practices, as when we speak of the Christian Church. At other times, the *church* refers

to a more limited body of devout believers within this larger grouping, such as the Presbyterian or the Methodist Church. These, properly speaking, are denominations. In a fourth sense, *church* is used to mean a given congregation or locally organized body of worshippers.

The *sect* is a body of believers which grows up within the larger church or denomination. Certain persons, often few in number at first, begin to differ with the main ceremonials and creed of the parent organization. At the outset they do not think of themselves as outside their denomination. Only as they come into controversy and conflict with the ecclesiastical order of the original body does the idea of separation arise. Often, only after they have been excommunicated do they formulate their own creed, their own official hierarchy, and take on a distinctive name or "denomination" of their own.

Special social roles in religion. In nearly all societies religious beliefs and practices give rise to distinctive social roles. Someone has to carry on. As an elderly Maori remarked to a white man, "Gods die if there are no priests to keep them alive."¹ While the social types in religion are not to be sharply distinguished from each other, they tend to fall into two general classes: the religious thinkers and mystics, and the executives or operators of the external functions of the church. The former include the mystics proper, the prophets, and the messiahs. The latter include the priests or pastors, formal teachers, many missionaries, and various administrators. As to personality type, the former would tend to be classified as introverted since they indulge in rich fantasy life and are chiefly interested in the essence of supernatural contacts and interpret these experiences as divine communications. The latter would be called extroverted, chiefly, since they tend to be expansive and outgoing in attitude and concerned with form rather than substance. Mystics are likely to be innovators and disturbers of the established order. Religious executives are generally, not always, con-

servative and prefer the old and tried to the new. There is, in fact, a sort of recurrent struggle in religious groups between these two kinds of persons. Some would confine religious expression within rather definite limits set by symbols, rites, traditions, and established theology. Others would not unduly hamper religious experience by such established patterns of thought and action but would leave much to the individual's unique experience. Let us describe briefly some of the more common types:

The *priest* or *pastor* is a generalized functionary carrying on the religious rituals and expounding theology. He is the special person who officiates at the church sacraments and cares for both spiritual and temporal affairs.

Religious *teachers* or *philosophers* have played a distinct part in the rise of our great world religions. Jesus, St. Paul, Mohammed, and Buddha are all familiar instances. The *missionary* is a special teacher whose business it is to carry the message of some established religion to nonbelievers.

Mention must also be made of the *religious executive*, who may be, as was St. Paul, both missionary and organizer. In many Protestant churches where a priestly hierarchy is not developed or is practically nonexistent, the affairs of the church organization are carried on by executives whose work combines that of priest or pastor with social-service work and management.

The *mystic* plays a special part in religious growth. He identifies himself, or comes into union, with the god, or with the world-spirit, or with the Absolute — however the culture phrases the concept. The mystic illustrates the place of the divergent person in a society who may initiate changes in culture. Mystics fully believe that, through their dreams, visions, and other unique mental experiences, they come into direct personal communication with divine powers.

The *prophet* is an important religious leader. While he may be a priest, often he is a mystic. He serves as a mouthpiece for some divine power, issuing warnings, giving commands, and laying out plans for future events. Obviously, the prophet's role is set by the culture. Where there is a strong priestly hierarchy, as among the Ekoi of West Africa or in the Roman Catholic Church, there is little opportunity for such persons. In contrast, the

¹ Quoted in W. I. Thomas, *Primitive behavior*, p. 329. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937.

religious transition set up by the Protestant Reformation stimulated a long line of mystics and prophets who have greatly influenced Protestant history.

The *messiah* is the divine leader or prophet who accepts supernatural attributes, who foretells some catastrophic end of the world and often assumes the role of final judge. The messiah is the creature of the people themselves, who in a time of crisis look to him to save their society from disaster. The culturalized expectancies concerning such a deliverer are well shown among the ancient Hebrews. The most outstanding of these anticipated deliverers was Jesus Christ. Yet he was but one of a long line of Jewish messiahs.²

The Place of Religion in the Larger Society and Culture

Religion has long had intimate connections with other features of culture. In simpler societies this relationship is obvious. Yet the modern church has also reached out to other groups and institutions within the community. Although in many cases the political state has officially supported religion, in democracies official state religions have disappeared. Nevertheless, church leaders still wield great influence in politics, education, economics, and moral controls. More recently the church has developed recreational and social-service features.

As a background to our discussion of these matters, let us review certain statistical facts regarding the place of religion in the modern world, and especially in our own society.

Population of religious bodies. The statistics of church membership are not a particularly good measure of the place of religion in a given population — racial, national, or local — for several reasons: (1) There is no adequate census of religious adherents for the world at large, nor for the United States.³ (2) There is no agree-

ment as to what constitutes membership. Age differences themselves would make for inaccurate figures. If one church counts as communicants infants and children while another counts only adolescents and adults, it is obviously hard to make any comparisons. (3) It is also difficult to get a measure of participation. Is the ardent member to be equated to the lukewarm or even indifferent ones?

Some estimates of the religious communicants of the world make them practically identical with the total world population, about 2.1 billion.⁴ About 29 per cent are Christians. Of these, 330 million are Roman Catholics; 128 million, "Orthodox" (including Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Coptic, and some others); and 138 million, Protestants. The Hindu and Brahmanist groups make up nearly another one fifth; the Confucianists and Taoists, about 16 per cent; and the Mohammedans, an additional one tenth. The others, nearly one fourth, include those who are counted as Protestants "but are not regular communicants."⁵ In addition, this fraction includes about 12 million Jews, the Shintoists, and a variety of others, among them the estimates for non-literate peoples.

While church membership in the United States is more reliably determined than are world religions, the figures at hand are still estimates. Moreover, for reasons noted above, such statistics are difficult to compare in matters of age, participation, and the like. Bearing this caution in mind, there are nonetheless some pertinent facts to be reviewed.

According to reasonably good estimates there were more than 77 million communicants in continental United States in 1948. These were divided into 256 separate religious bodies with nearly 254,000 separate operating units with their own meeting places of some kind or other. These religious bodies differed

protects churches from interference in their worship. As a result, many denominations view an objective census as none of the state's affair.

⁴ See *World almanac*, 1949, p. 289. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1949. Also, John Kieran, ed., *Information please almanac*, 1949. New York: Farrar, Straus & Co., 1949.

⁵ *World almanac*, *op. cit.*

² See W. D. Wallis, *Messiahs: Christian and pagan*. Boston: R. G. Badger, 1918.

³ In the United States there has often been serious opposition to a scientifically conducted religious census. Religion is in our mores as a form of personal and group activity which has little or no relationship to the government, except insofar as the state

greatly in numbers. For example, 50 reported having less than 1000 members; but many of these represent sectarian deviations from larger denominations from which they sprang. All together, the Protestants numbered somewhat more than 45 million or slightly less than 60 per cent of the total. The Roman Catholics reported about 25 million. The balance are scattered among non-Christian groups, of which the Jews make up nearly 5 million. Of the Protestants, 72 per cent were listed in the four denominations: Baptists, Methodists, Lutherans, and Presbyterians.⁶

The number of communicants per local church unit, or church in the sense of a given congregation, is fairly stable. In 1947 in this country there were 286 members per congregation. In 1936 there were 280 members per local church.⁷ However, there is a rather sharp differential between the size of rural and of urban congregations. For example, in 1936 the average size of congregations in the urban localities was four times that of the rural, about 541 to 133.⁸

The church and the community. In the primary community of medieval Europe the church was the focus of much of the life of the people. In Protestant countries it continued to serve important functions, although where rival denominations and sects arose the integrating benefits of religion and church organization were often lost in theological conflicts. In spite of the continuation of these divisive tendencies, the churches have served the community as the center not only of religious thought and action but also of moral standards. Today the primary-community church reflects the changes which have gone on in the wider world outside. Open-country churches in the United States, for example, are declining, while the village and town churches are becoming the center of both farm and village religious activity. The rural and village

church has added educational, recreational, and social-service activities to its roster of functions.

Formerly the church was the focus of much of the neighborhood life. The Catholic churches have continued to be particularly effective as neighborhood centers because the membership is divided geographically into parishes in the same manner as voting precincts or school districts are laid out. This gives the particular pastor a chance to serve the people who are themselves neighbors to each other and who already have attitudes of solidarity growing out of common life. The urban Protestant parishes, for the most part, are not now divided on geographic lines, with the result that members are drawn from widespread areas. So long as the population remained fairly stationary, this handicap was overcome by the fact that the church buildings were located in the residential sections in which most of the members lived. Today in our rapidly growing American cities the situation is quite different. Many church edifices are left stranded in the midst of retail or wholesale districts or in cheap rooming-house or emerging slum areas just beyond the retail business section.⁹ The members are often so remote from the home church that they drift away to other parishes nearer by or give up their church affiliation entirely.

In other ways the city church is caught in the changes of life, especially in the growing emphasis upon secondary-group organization. Sophisticated urban populations are skeptical of what organized religion has to offer. There is frequently a conflict within the church body itself as to whether it shall liberalize its dogma, take up social-service and educational and recreational programs, or stick by the old and the tried at the cost of younger membership and at the cost of slow decay and perhaps final disappearance. (See below.)

⁶ Data from *World almanac*, *op. cit.*, and "The state of the church," *Christian Herald*, 1948, 71: 24-26.

⁷ See *World almanac*, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

⁸ See *Summary and detailed tables, religious bodies, 1936*, vol. 1. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1941.

⁹ For an interesting example of ecological invasion and displacement as it has affected local churches, see *Brooklyn Protestantism, 1930-1945, a study of social change and church trends* (mimeographed). Brooklyn: Brooklyn Church and Mission Federation, 1946.

Religion, education, and recreation. Formal teaching has long been the prerogative of organized religion. In Christian history, the church has played a decisive part in education. The cathedral schools of the Middle Ages were used for religious and moral training, while Protestantism fostered elementary learning so that members might read the Bible.

The Sunday School was established in 1780 by an Englishman, Robert Raikes (1735-1811), with a view to more formal religious and moral education. The movement soon spread to America. In 1936 in the United States 162,000 congregations — about four fifths of the total — reported Sunday Schools, with more than 18 million pupils, including both adults and children.¹⁰

More important than the Sunday School has been the continued rise of parochial schools, organized to fulfill the legal demands for formal schooling but offering the children of various churches religious and moral instruction not possible in public schools. In 1948 there were 7724 Catholic elementary and 1637 high schools with a total of 2,519,739 pupils.¹¹ The whole standpoint underlying this form of education is set forth in the "Encyclical on education" (1930) by Pope Pius XI:

"It is necessary that all the teaching and whole organization of the school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch, be regulated by the Christian spirit, under the direction and maternal supervision of the Church; so that Religion may be in very truth the foundation and the crown of youth's entire training; and this in every grade of school, not only in the elementary but in the intermediate and the higher institutions of learning as well."¹²

There is a certain conflict between the church and the democratic state implied in this whole standpoint. We shall discuss some aspects of such conflict in a later section.

¹⁰ See *Summary and detailed tables, religious bodies*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

¹¹ See *World almanac*, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

¹² See "The Pope's encyclical on education," *Current History*, 1930, 31 : 1101.

Closely related to more formal religious education has been the development of such organizations as the Young Men's Christian Association, the Catholic Youth Organization, and the Young Men's Hebrew Association. There are, in addition, vacation schools, clubs, and forums; and other devices are sponsored by the churches, in which more formal education is supplemented with opportunities for recreation or discussion of current moral, religious, and economic problems.

The Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and Camp Fire Girls, although not strictly religious in standpoint, have much in common with these other agencies. Their general purpose is to supplement the work of various groups such as the family, the church, and the school, chiefly through leisure-time activities, such as first aid, woodcraft, and athletics.

It is significant that religious organizations are taking over some of the functions formerly located in the home, the neighborhood, and even in the school. Religious thought and activity are becoming again a focus for the integration of a host of separate activities.

Religion and the mores. As we saw in chapter 3, the mores consist of the codes of social conduct which grow up in any community or society. The mores are the generally accepted and expected forms of conduct which are assumed to be necessary for group welfare. Religion has frequently been a powerful factor in lending emotional support to the moral code. In all the great religions of civilized man there is a distinct intermingling of religion and morals. This is expressed in the religious support of taboos, in the effect on conduct of belief in a god, in the influence of a belief in future reward or punishment.

Taboo is a negative command, a restraint upon action. Taboos are the "thou shalt nots" of society. Religious notions of the clean and the unclean, of the sacred and the profane, ramify many cultures. If one is unlucky enough to handle a sacred or an unclean object, it may take elaborate rites of purification and penance to undo the consequences. So, too, religious taboos come into play with regard to childbirth, death, and status.

Without doubt the *belief in a god influences moral conduct*. Even among the Ekoi of West Africa, where magic is so powerful and where spirits are used for malevolent ends, men believe in benign spirits who counteract the evil ones and aid man in more humane ways. So, too, some non-literates of relatively simple culture, such as the Australian Bushmen and the Andaman Islanders, believe in spirits which are considered guardians of morality.

As the concept of an ethical god develops in many societies, this relation of god to morality becomes more important. By identifying himself with such a god an individual may modify his conduct. Among the Hebrews, Jehovah as a god of vengeance gradually emerges as a god of high moral qualities. In the religion of China, so marked by ethical tone, we find this comment in the Book of Rites:

"The object of all ceremonies is to bring down the spirits from above, even their ancestors; serving also to rectify the relations between ruler and minister, to maintain the generous feeling between father and son, and the harmony between elder and younger brother, to adjust the relations between high and low, and to give their proper places to husband and wife. The whole may be said to secure the blessings of Heaven."¹³

In Christian theology the struggle between the forces of God and the forces of Satan symbolizes the conflict within the individual between the moral and the immoral, between the spirit and the flesh, between righteousness and evil. Throughout Christian history the role of the gods and saints as standards for virtue is highly important. A personal deity becomes an ideal with which one may compare one's own conduct.

Any scheme of eternal reward or punishment for conduct here and now becomes a powerful aid to morality. Although the idea of continuity of life after death is rather widespread, not all groups have the notion of retribution or divine judgment. This

idea came rather late in cultural development.

In many of the higher religions the belief in a final judgment, with its terrible punishments for the evil and its glorious rewards for the virtuous, is pictured in bold and striking manner. Without doubt, the fear of hell fire and damnation has been a powerful factor in the control of conduct. Associated with this fear, systems of penance and absolution have been developed to remove or at least to lighten the burden of future punishment. As ideas of science permeate the masses, the notions of future existence change, and beyond doubt the fear of damnation ceases to be the factor in conduct it once was.

The virtues of truth-telling, honesty, fair-dealing with others, conformity to sexual codes, in short, all the accepted details of moral conduct of the community or society may become integrated with religious beliefs and practices. Today, with the disappearance of many of the ancient and primitive features of religion, the morality of fairer distribution of wealth, of sound and honest politics, of high community standards of health and conduct, and happiness become the religious ideals of the church.

Religion and the economic order. In primitive society nearly every feature of life is mixed with religion. This is clearly evident in economic life: food-gathering, hunting, fishing, herding, agriculture, trade, and barter. It is not always so apparent, however, that religion also plays a part in our more advanced capitalistic economics.

Max Weber (1864-1920), a German sociologist, R. H. Tawney, a British economist, and others have shown a certain parallelism, if not correlation, between the development of Protestant ideas and practices and the rise of modern capitalism in western Europe and America.¹⁴ The individualism of Protestantism goes hand in hand with the rise of nationalism and the change from the class

¹³ Quoted in J. E. Carpenter, *Comparative religion*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1913, pp. 150-151.

¹⁴ See Max Weber, *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*, trans. by T. Parson, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930; and R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the rise of capitalism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1926.

structure of the Middle Ages to the open-class system of our own time. (See chapter 28.) Second, the otherworldly asceticism of Catholicism, in which emphasis was put upon escape from this material world into contemplation of and preparation for the hereafter, gave way to what Weber aptly calls "worldly asceticism," in which, retaining the moral virtues of hard work, honesty, truthfulness, and steadfastness of purpose, the direction of activity is toward the affairs of this world as a preparation for the hereafter. Assuming a method of salvation, such as the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination or the Lutheran doctrine of grace, the individual must fulfill his role in this world of everyday affairs in order to demonstrate his membership in the Kingdom of God.

During the Middle Ages money-making was considered distinctly secondary to godly pursuits. By the 16th century material gain had assumed greater importance, and the profit system was well under way at the time of the Reformation. The dogmas of the Protestant religious movement not only were, in part, an outcome of a rising philosophy which was influencing business and statecraft but, in turn, gave further support to capitalistic endeavor. Hard work, sacrifice of present pleasures for future profits in a business, honesty in business dealings, and other homely virtues became the daily morality of the pious Protestants, especially the Calvinists, the Quakers, and the Separatists. The individual, having religious assurance of salvation, practiced these virtues as evidence of his godliness. While these new ideas and practices had to fight their way step by step against religious tradition, in time they won wide acceptance.¹⁵

Capitalism, Protestantism, and political democracy, bound together by certain accidents of history and certain similar ideologies, came to full bloom in America. Religious piety, individualism, the emphasis upon liberty and activity, the worship of material success coupled with unlimited natural resources, made America a living example of this combination of the repres-

sion of pleasure-seeking and the direction of energy into hard work, success, and religious satisfaction. There is no better demonstration of the connection of business, religion, and certain moral virtues than is expressed in the words of Roger W. Babson:

"Statistics lead me to believe that the faith, industry, thrift, and enterprise in people are very largely due to religion. . . . Where the people are irreligious, are found indifference, wastefulness, and extravagance. . . . Ninety-five per cent of the people who do not get along well materially owe their misfortune to lack of these religious qualities of faith, industry, courage, imagination, and thrift. This means that the real great work of the church today lies in reviving these great productive qualities in the souls of the masses."¹⁶

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all communicants and all church leaders agree with such views. Quite to the contrary, they believe that capitalism has been injurious to the true aim of religion. The inequalities of wealth and the exploitation of people — both as workers and as consumers — by business interests long ago led many church leaders as well as others to give thought to reforms in the economic order. Throughout the 19th century many preachers inveighed strongly against the abuses of the capitalist system. Some of the more radical even suggested various forms of what has come to be called "Christian Socialism."¹⁷ And in the 20th century there arose among certain American Protestant groups what was known as the "social gospel" movement. One of the leaders of this was Walter Rauschenbusch (1861–1918), who contended that "Capitalism has generated a spirit of its own which is antagonistic to the spirit of Christianity."¹⁸ Hu-

¹⁵ From Roger W. Babson, *Religion and business*, pp. 97–99. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. By permission. In Soviet Russia many of these same worldly ascetic virtues have been stressed without the religious overtone and without reference to private profit-seeking.

¹⁷ See D. O. Wagner, ed., *Social reformers*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932, chapters 12, 13, and 28 for source materials on some of these views.

¹⁸ Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the social order*, p. 315. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912.

¹⁶ See Tawney, *op. cit.*, chapter 4.

man rights should come before those of property; mutual service, not profit, should be the chief economic motive; and co-operation, not competition, should be the means of economic production and distribution.

So, too, many leaders of the Roman Catholic Church have periodically expressed strong condemnation of the abuses of capitalism. They have not contended that the systems of private property and profit-seeking are in themselves evil, but they feel that reforms are necessary.

The views of the leaders among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews on economic matters have much in common. Most of these leaders would subordinate the profit motive to that of human service, and some favor extending the control of government over business in order to bring about social justice. For example, Harry F. Ward believes that present trends of thought among religious leaders concerned with these problems point in the direction of some form of "democratic, ethical state socialism."¹⁹

Where the church gets its support from the dominant capitalist class, it can hardly go far in differing in its economic views from those who pay its bills. If the church, like the traditional school, continues but to reflect the dominant economic and political views of those in power, it will consume much of its time and energy concocting excuses or rationalizations for the present economic and political order. On the contrary, the church may stimulate broad economic and political reform and thus become a distinctive factor in social change. Which direction any denomination will take can be determined only in terms of the cultural setting in which it finds itself.

Conflict and Co-operation

While various of the major social processes enter into the religious life and culture of a people, two important ones — conflict

and co-operation — have been almost universal. Most of our examples, however, will be drawn from Christianity.

Conflict in religion. Religious bodies are no different from others in their jealous regard for power and control. Whenever any church group is threatened by other groups, it responds as do other groups by avoidance, escape, or some kind of aggressive counteraction. How violent religious conflict may become is witnessed in Western history in the Crusades of the Middle Ages against the infidel, by the Thirty Years' War between Catholic and Protestant nations in Europe, and by the cruelty of sectarian strife in the British Isles during the 17th century. More recently the bitter conflicts between Mohammedans and Hindus in India and between Arabs and Jews in the Near East show how religion, when linked with economic and political aims and institutions, may be a powerful element in open conflict.

Sometimes the interdenominational hostility is more bitter than the opposition toward "the world outside." Denominational and sectarian hostility is well-illustrated in our own country. The incipient conflict is reflected in the wide-ranging religious prejudices among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Emory S. Bogardus has listed the following divisive factors among these three groups:

(1) Differences in church organizations, doctrines, and forms of worship; (2) differences in church traditions, and historical clashes; (3) the fact that each group believes it is the most important expression of religion in the world; (4) the fact that the members of each group tend to generalize more on the unfavorable reports about the other groups than on the favorable reports; (5) the fact that racial prejudices tend to augment religious differences; (6) the fact that social, political, and occupational discriminations increase religious differences.²⁰

The last two factors noted above indicate again how racial, economic, and political

¹⁹ See Harry F. Ward, "Organized religion, the state, and the economic order," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1948, 256 : 72-83. This is a good review, especially of recent trends.

²⁰ From *Source book for the National Seminar on Jews, Catholics, and Protestants*, Washington, D. C., March 7-9, 1932, p. 37, held under the sponsorship of the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

factors interplay with religious prejudices themselves to enhance religious conflict. As E. A. Ross well states, "The fewer the social, political, commercial, or professional advantages church membership bestows and the greater the spiritual advantages, the better will be the feeling among the churches."²¹

Historically Christianity has been involved in another conflict, namely, that between church and state. The controversy over the relations of the Roman Catholic Church to temporal power, that is, political control, went on all through the Middle Ages. Protestantism arose, in part, out of this struggle. Today the separation of church and state is a basic tenet of all democratic countries. Yet difficulties involving religion arise from time to time regarding the place of the church in education. Many believe that all basic education in a democratic country should take the form of public schooling. But various churches have long contended that the church and the home are the essential and proper agencies of education. Efforts to close parochial schools by legislation have met with failure. For example, an Oregon law of 1922 provided that after 1926 all parents must send their children to public schools. Yet the Supreme Court held:

"As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."²²

²¹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of sociology*, 3rd ed., p. 306. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938. By permission.

²² See *Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary vs. Pierce*, Governor of Oregon, 296 Federal Reporter 929. Case affirmed in 268 U S Reporter 510.

It is clear that education continues to be regarded as a family and religious prerogative in this country in spite of the theory of public schooling for all. But the matter has not rested there. Since the Oregon case was settled a number of problems regarding religion and education have arisen.

One of these has to do with provision for religious instruction. The system of "released time," as it is called, is an arrangement under which time is allowed from the regular school hours for children to attend classes in religion taught by people from their respective denominations. In most states such instruction is not permitted in public-school buildings but elsewhere, in places determined by the respective churches concerned. However, the children are required to attend or else do their regular schoolwork in this period. In Illinois, however, such instruction was permitted in the school buildings. But in a test case, the Illinois law was declared unconstitutional by an 8 to 1 decision of the United States Supreme Court.²³ The decision held that the Illinois law contravened the First Amendment to the Constitution, which had "erected a wall between church and state," as Justice Hugo Black put it in the majority opinion.

Yet the courts have approved legislation which provides for free textbooks and free bus transportation for children who attend parochial schools. Moreover, there is growing pressure from some Catholic leaders for federal and other tax aid for parochial schools on the grounds that such schools are deserving of public aid since they provide education for a large number of persons.²⁴ To counteract this trend many Protestant groups take a very firm stand

²³ See *Illinois ex rel. McCollum vs. Board of Education, School District No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois et al.* Appeal from the Supreme Court of Illinois, No. 90, argued December 8, 1947; decided March 8, 1948. 333 U S Official Reporter No. 2, pp. 203-256. Preliminary printing of the official report.

²⁴ This is somewhat inconsistent with the opposition which others in this church have voiced against federal aid to education on the grounds that it would lead to federal control. See minority comment by Msgr. Frederick G. Hochwalt and Martin R. P. McGuire in A Report of the President's Commission on Higher Education, *Higher education for American democracy*, vol. V : 65-68. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947. See also Ward, *op. cit.*, for a review of some aspects of this whole topic.

against any plan to permit the use of public funds for parochial schools.

Aside from the legal aspects, there has also been considerable controversy as to the value of the "released time" scheme of religious instruction. While there is much support for it from some leaders of all three major faiths — Catholics, Protestants, and Jews — there is a growing criticism of it from many educators on the grounds that it does not promote religious toleration. The latter believe that such a program actually stimulates a sense of religious difference among children, and certainly this is one of the roots of prejudice.²⁵

This whole conflict reveals many of the basic difficulties in a highly diverse culture such as ours. The plea for cultural diversity must always face the counterargument that to survive, a cultural system must also have a large component of uniformity and agreement. To permit religious differences to enter the schoolroom may in time undermine the unity which lies behind the philosophy and practice of a democratic education.

Co-operation among religious bodies. While conflict has marked the relations of many religious bodies to each other, co-operation is by no means lacking. In American Protestantism there has been some trend indicating consolidation and co-operation. That there is considerable support for such steps is shown in a 1948 poll of Protestant churchgoers. More than 4 out of 10 of those asked favored a combination of all Protestants in the United States into one church.²⁶ Denominations do federate for various purposes and for short or long periods of time. For example, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, established in 1908, consists of 25 affiliated denominations with a combined membership of more than 28 million. The Council's objectives include the stimulation of fellowship and unity among the churches, encouragement of "devotional fellowship

and mutual counsel" on religious matters, and co-operation in matters of moral welfare from the point of view of "the law of Christ in every relationship of life."

Another instance of co-operation is the "community church" which emerges with the union of separate Protestant groups. Such action sometimes takes place when the separate denominations become too weak to keep going by themselves. Sometimes the action is born of a strong public view that a community-wide church will serve the religious needs of people more effectively than separate denominations. The community church often stimulates public forums, offers recreational facilities to boys and girls of the entire city, and undertakes preventive programs in the fields of health and delinquency. This is a far cry from the function of the church as the dispenser of dogma, or moral advice, and of unregulated charity.

Co-operation across the traditional barriers of Catholic and Protestant, or of Christian and Jew is more difficult. Yet recent decades have seen a tendency toward certain conjoint action among the churches. The organization of local ministerial associations is one example. The National Conference of Christians and Jews, founded in 1928, has tried to develop tolerance and co-operation. Yet all such efforts are limited by strong interfaith rivalry backed by prejudice.

The divisive relations of the major religions of the world to each other reflect the larger cultures of which they are a part. Yet, as some of the barriers of prejudice and isolation have disappeared, certain tendencies to co-operation have arisen. Such gatherings as world religious conferences, in which representatives of all the major religions have participated, are evidence of a growing awareness of common problems in religion in spite of differences of creed. But such efforts must of necessity long remain largely verbal in the face of continuing political conflict on the international front. (See chapter 24.)

²⁵ See V. T. Thayer, *Religion in public education*. New York: The Viking Press, 1947.

²⁶ See *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1948, 12: 574.

Religion and science. There is a widespread belief that religion and science are in

fundamental conflict. Many feel that as science is more and more applied to solving modern problems — both technological and social-psychological — the less need there is for religion. The matter is not so simple as this. First of all, we have to define our terms more closely. When people talk about religion and science being in conflict, they usually refer to the fact that church officials have at various times opposed the findings of men of science. The churchmen contend that these findings contravene the long-established creed or dogma of their respective organizations. In this sense history is full of conflicts of church and theology with scientific findings.²⁷ For example, when Galileo (1564-1642) was haled before the Court of Inquisition for his scientific work, the indictment set forth various charges:

"... for holding as true the false doctrine taught by many — namely, that the sun is immovable in the center of the world and that the earth moves and also with a diurnal motion; ... following the hypothesis of Copernicus, you include several propositions contrary to the true sense and authority of the Holy Scripture.

"The proposition that the sun is the center of the world and immovable from its place is absurd philosophically, false and formally heretical because it is expressly contrary to the Holy Scriptures. ..."

Galileo recanted and renounced his alleged heresy. But Bruno (1548-1600), who refused to renounce Copernican cosmology, was burned at the stake in Rome. As late as 1819 the books of Galileo, Copernicus (1473-1543), and Kepler (1571-1630) were on the *Index* of forbidden books. But it must be recalled that neither Martin Luther (1483-1546), whose break with Catholicism started the Protestant Reformation, nor the orthodox Jews of the time were any more sympathetic to the rise of science. When the Jewish Ecclesiastical Council excommunicated Spinoza (1632-1677) they said:

"With the judgment of the angels and the sentence of the saints, we anathematize, excommunicate, curse and cast out Baruch de Espinoza, the whole of the sacred community assenting. . . ."²⁸

Since science depends on complete freedom of thought, and since its findings run counter to many church dogmas, it was inevitable that conflict should arise. The Copernican system, which replaced the older view of the cosmos, reduced the earth to a mere speck in the total universe and robbed man of much of his former conceit. Later, in the 19th century, the Darwinian theory of evolution placed man definitely in the animal kingdom. And during the past 75 years psychology and the social sciences have shown that man's mental life and behavior can and must be studied and understood from the standpoint and method of science.

There is no doubt but that education and practical technology have served to alter many of man's views about God, sin, immortality, and other features of traditional theology. In 1948 a public opinion poll made in 10 countries reported the answers to the question of personal belief in God. "Yes" answers ranged from 96 per cent for Brazil and 94 per cent for the United States to 66 per cent for France.

That skepticism is related to level of education and various political and other views is apparent. For example, in France the Communist part of the sample reported nearly two thirds "No" answers; and the Socialists, 29 per cent as to personal belief in God.²⁹

It is somewhat difficult to evaluate such findings, since people may be loath to tell exactly what they believe on matters which many consider intimate. Nevertheless there are other evidences of loss of belief in respect to such matters. James H. Leuba's studies of the beliefs of scientists and students are in point. He showed: (1) Between 1914 and 1933 there was a decline in the percentage of scientists who admitted to a belief in God and in immortality. (2) Scientists who deal with the inorganic world report a higher percentage of believers than do biologists, psychologists,

²⁷ The classic study is Andrew D. White, *A history of the warfare of science with theology in Christendom*, 2 vols. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1896.

²⁸ Quoted in Oliver L. Reiser and Blodwen Davies, "Religion and science in conflict," *Annals*, etc., *op. cit.*, p. 136.

²⁹ See *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *op. cit.*, pp. 173-174.

and sociologists. (3) The higher the eminence in science, the lower the proportion who report such beliefs. (4) In a companion study of student opinions, it was found that the proportion of believers decreased sharply as one moved from the freshmen to the seniors.³⁰ While other studies have shown that students, for example, still feel the need for some kind of belief, it is also clear that their views on specific doctrines are hazy and often nonexistent.³¹

Among intellectuals what is called "religious humanism" has a certain vogue,³² but it is doubtful if such views would have very wide appeal to the masses. However, for the more literate sections of the population the following from G. Bromley Oxnam provides a workable basis for correlating religion and science:

"... Faith contributes the assurance that the universe is friendly, that moral law is written into the nature of things, that creation moves to a diviner order. Science discovers the law. Mankind masters nature by obeying her. Faith is essential to sanity. Men lose their minds when convinced that life has no meaning, or when frustrated in attempts to realize goals. Religion offers goals. Science discovers means of realizing them."³³

Certainly without faith man cannot carry on, and it is doubtful indeed if mankind will dispense with some form of religion. Let us turn to see what place religious experience has in the life of the individual.

Although culture always sets the general patterns of behavior in regard to man's needs, individual differences in biological make-up and in experience make for variations within these broad limits. This is nowhere more evident than in religious ideas and habits. We have also shown how the mystic, with his more nearly unique

religious experience, stands in contrast to the priest, with his regimentation of religious expression in terms of the old and the accepted.

What occurs with the exceptional mystic is common to large numbers of lay devotees whose religious experience extends beyond the boundaries of creed and theology. As William James said, "In one sense, at least, the personal religion will prove itself more fundamental than either theology or ecclesiasticism."³⁴ A strong hierarchy and a long-established creed, however, tend to limit individual variation in these matters. In more flexible religious organizations, based in part on the theory of individualism, unique religious experience is more common. Still, no matter how formalized the religious organization may be, with its minutest details worked out, it cannot make provision for every religious need of the individual devotee.

Psychology of religious experience. Religion surely rests upon both a fundamental psychological need and cultural expectancies derived therefrom. While the cultural features of religion may change, there is no reason to assume that religion will disappear. The problem, then, is what function religious experience has in the life of the individual.

Aside from stimulating individual participation in various group situations, religious experience, at least in our Western culture, acts as an important balancing factor in personality. Such experience gives the person faced with difficulties, crises, or conflicts, surcease from worry and considerable faith in himself. If one believes in retribution hereafter, his conviction not only aids him in living up to the morals of his society but may assist him in carrying on in the face of defeats at the hands of those who abuse him. So, too, mystical experiences with the divine, no matter how they may be interpreted from a strictly scientific angle, give the individual

³⁰ For a convenient summary of this work, see James H. Leuba, "Religious beliefs of American scientists," *Harper's Magazine*, 1934, 169: 291-300.

³¹ See Paul C. Glick and Kimball Young, "Justification for religious attitudes and habits," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 1943, 17: 45-68. Also Gordon W. Allport, James M. Gillespie, and Jacqueline Young, "The religion of the postwar college student," *Journal of Psychology*, 1948, 25: 3-33.

³² See Reiser and Davies, *Annals, etc.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-140.

³³ G. Bromley Oxnam, "Religion and science in accord," *Annals, etc.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146. By permission.

³⁴ See William James, *Varieties of religious experience*, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1902, for a classic analysis of the role of personal factors in religious experience. Quotation from page 30.

a sense of participation in the universe which daily concern with material things scarcely affords.

In short, the mystic identification with power outside oneself may offset or balance the disappointments, heartaches, and pain of daily living, in which half-measures, compromises, and self-denials are common. It is easy for the critic of religion to point out that this sort of thing is "an escape from reality," a mass neurosis, or a mere "illusion," as Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) argued.³⁵ But this will hardly do. Cultural reality is not something material nor made up out of biological reactions to food, drink, and sexual objects. It is at heart psychological. That is, it is a question of beliefs, attitudes, ideas, meanings. It exists in the minds of men. One cannot, therefore, with Freud blandly dismiss religious experience as an unfortunate illusion without at the same time raising the problem as to whether art, philosophy, and most of the fundamentals of social organization and family life are not likewise "illusions." Faithfulness to a mate, loyalty to a country, or belief in a bank note can be shown by this logic to be illusions too. Even the material assets of a culture disappear without the support of their subjective meaning.

In short, in the light of cultural approval of religious experience and in view of our broader definition of culture as essentially psychological, religious thought and conduct cannot be considered merely "an escape" from something superior or better or real so much as an expression of a particular motive. In contrast, therefore, to the common-sense material world, we find a world based on fantasy or wishful thinking, particularly in religion, esthetics, and play. This world helps to fulfill life, gives it a richer, more pleasing, and more personally satisfying meaning.

Crises and religious expression. Any striking and unusual circumstances, espe-

cially if prolonged, which set up frustration, anxiety, and other emotional distress may easily set men to thinking of possible magical and religious ways of solving their difficulties. The particular form which individuals take up will be settled for them largely by prior cultural patterns. In our own Christian history these outlets have sometimes taken the form of mass movements, as in the religious manias of the Middle Ages or in the intense revivalism known to 18th- and 19th-century Protestantism. At other times the solutions have come more or less to the individual who finds his emotional contacts with divine powers within the more stable framework of the church. Such are the mystics, past and present, great and small. But no matter what form the religious expression takes, the effects on the person will vary with his individual make-up, his class and economic status, and the nature of his particular problems.

Some may join up with revivalistic and highly emotional groups, such as the Pentacostals, Nazarenes, and the Holiness sects.³⁶ Others may go in for Buchmanism or some quasi-religion like Existentialism. Still others may seek more secular but nonetheless emotionalized means.

The mention of secular means raises a familiar problem as to whether we should not, in fact, view such movements as fascism and communism as essentially religious in character. While many popular writers have designated these two political-economic movements as "religious," in terms of the usual definition they should not be so termed. To do so is to stretch the meaning of the concept of religion beyond its useful limits. On the other hand, both fascism and communism have emotional appeals for the masses: promises of future good and glory, elaborate ritualism, hero worship, and an intense sense of togetherness produce some of the effects of religious revivalism.

³⁵ See Sigmund Freud, *The future of an illusion*, trans. by W. D. Robson-Scott, New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1928; and his *Civilization and its discontents*, trans. by J. Riviere, New York: Random House, 1930.

³⁶ See A. T. Boisen, "Economic distress and religious experience: a study of the Holy Rollers," *Psychiatry*, 1939, 2: 185-194; also his "Religion and hard times," in *Social Action*, published by the Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches, 1939.

Levels of religious experience. Surely for the individual, there are various ways of satisfying his religious needs. We may have standardized our economic and political behavior, but in art and religion, at least, we permit flexibility. Certainly no one is prepared to say *what* kind of religious experience or church affiliation is *best* for people outside one's own social clique. This is a matter of life-organization and of social role and status. For example, some may easily object to the emotionalism of revivalistic churches, such as the Holy Rollers or the Nazarenes. Such critics fail to understand the meaning of religious experience for the communicants of these sects. In turn, members of the latter might well disdain the more thoroughly rationalized, esthetic, and intellectualistic views of the educated Roman Catholic or Episcopalian. There is in our Western culture a scale of permissible religious experience running from the extreme of emotionalism, sentimentalism, and fantasy to the highly esthetic, intellectualistic, or theological expressions suitable for well-educated people. Just

where the person will find himself depends largely upon his own cultural background and upon his adult choice.

One may find his greatest satisfactions in contemplation of otherworldliness; another may find it in contact with the world in an effort to make it a more desirable place in which to live. Certain religious groups favor the ethical, mundane interests, departing considerably from the more elementary supernaturalism. They put little emphasis upon otherworldly interests and concentrate directly upon problems of social reform. Whether such a field of activity, just because it is sponsored by a certain denomination and becomes slightly emotionalized, is religious in a strict sense depends again upon one's definition. For the present it seems preferable to keep the definition of religion within the narrower limits of an emotional, worshipful, or reverent reaction to supernatural powers. So defined, it still embraces an enormously important concern of the vast majority of mankind and will apparently continue to do so for a long, long time.

Interpretative Summary

1. Religion has to do with beliefs in, and activities with regard to, the supernatural.
2. Religion is found among all peoples, nonliterate and civilized alike.
3. Sociologically religion is closely tied up with social control. It ramifies through family, community, and other institutions.
4. Psychologically this experience falls in the fields of fantasy-thinking and emotion. Along with play and esthetic experience, religion represents an aspect of personality that stands in contrast to the material and more logical features of life.
5. While the secularization which goes with urban life has influenced religious beliefs, it by no means follows that religion is likely to disappear from modern society.
6. Despite the stress on brotherly love and co-operation, most religions in advanced societies have been marked by conflicts over such matters as creed, ceremonials, and various claims to power.
7. Strong emotional adherence to such movements as socialism and communism sometimes serves as a substitute for religious experience.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define religion and give an illustration of religious experience.
2. What is the function of ritual in religion? Illustrate from our own culture.
3. Illustrate from contemporary religions some of the chief symbols and sacred objects. What are the functions of these for the individual?

BASIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

4. Distinguish between a sect and a denomination. How do sects arise?
5. What are the particular roles of the priest, the prophet, the mystic?
6. Why are the statistics of religious bodies in this country so inadequate when compared to those regarding populational characteristics, agriculture, business, and industry?
7. Why have the American courts and the American mores tended to permit parochial education in a democratic society?
8. Make an outline indicating the principal organizational features of your own church. Cover personnel, rituals, creed, symbolism, and general community functions.
9. Illustrate by concrete instances the role of religion (a) in moral control, and in reference to (b) business and industry, (c) art and recreation, and (d) education.
10. What function has religion in helping to integrate one's personal life?
11. Is religion merely "an escape" from reality? Discuss, pro and con.
12. Why do many people, in the face of prolonged distress, seek out religion?
13. On what grounds do some people contend that communism is a form of religion? Discuss this use of the concept of religion.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Ernest S. Bates, *American faith; its religious, political, and economic foundations*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1940.

An excellent study of the Protestant Reformation and its fulfillment in the United States.

S. J. Case, *Social origins of Christianity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923.

A good introduction to facts seldom known to the college student.

E. J. Chave, *A functional approach to religious education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.

A stimulating and suggestive book on new trends in religious education.

F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, magic, and morals: a study of Christian origins*. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1910.

A most incisive analysis of sources of Christianity.

Knight Dunlap, *Religion: its functions in human life*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1946.

A competent psychological analysis of religion.

W. W. Howells, *The beathens: primitive man and his religions*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1948.

An anthropologist looks at primitive religion.

Rockwell C. Smith, *The church in our town*. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945.

A sociological analysis of the relationship between the church and the rural community.

Henry N. Wieman, ed., *Religious liberals reply*. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1947.

A symposium in defense of religious and scientific humanism, including a critique of "Neo-Thomism" and "The new supernaturalism."

Play and Esthetic Experience

OTHER derived yet universal interests of mankind are found in play and esthetic creation and appreciation. Just as religion is intertwined with the basic aspects of culture, so also these two patterns are linked to economic, political, familial, educational, and religious life. This chapter will examine the nature and function of play and art as they relate both to the cultural and to certain personal aspects of social life.

General Features of Play

Play is universal in society, but what the child or the adult does in play varies according to the culture. In discussing play in relation to our society we use the terms *recreation*, *leisure*, and *amusement*. These terms have much in common, but some distinctions may be noted.

Definition of play and related activities. Primarily *play* means free or active movement or exercise, specifically the expressive movements of the body and its limbs. In our society, it is applied to any relatively untrammelled, pleasant form of muscular or mental activity which does not directly concern the securing of a living or the duties as parent, citizen, or member of the moral and religious order. Play may call for exertion and the expenditure of energy, but the aim is essentially to please oneself, to give rein to diverting or relaxing mental or motor responses. *Recreation* means the activity given over to re-creating or rebuilding the mental and muscular systems through some refreshing and stimulating form of activity. In a looser sense it refers to any pleasurable diversion and for our purposes may be considered synonymous with play life. *Leisure* refers primarily to

the time which is not occupied by useful and necessary work. *Amusement* literally means the act of gazing at, or seeing, something. Actually there are many amusements which involve active participation of every member of the group. Amusement involves joyous and pleasant activity, often associated with wit and humor. *Entertainment* is usually thought of as a somewhat more organized means of amusing and diverting individuals or groups. Terms in common use, such as games, sport, gambling, festivals, hobbies, dancing, and storytelling refer to the types of popular play.

In our society we have usually distinguished between play and work. The latter is associated with useful activities and is linked with obligations and duties, many of which are carefully restricted as to time and compensation. Distinctions are often drawn between active and passive play. Active participation is said to involve muscular or mental exertion of the individual in the play activity itself. Passive participation is assumed to consist largely in gazing at and/or hearing others who are performing for one's amusement or recreation. Yet this distinction is meaningless as applied to many forms of play which embody both features.

Play and culture. The biosocial roots of play lie within the interactional patterns of the human species. There are a number of rather particularistic theories as to the cause and nature of play.

The first of these theories was developed by the German poet Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) and later taken up by the English philosopher Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). They held that play was the *expression of excess energy* developed in the growing child. While this theory has some merit with respect to young

children, it does not take into account the fact that many forms of play do not consume much energy. A second theory maintained that play is *preparatory to the later serious activities of life* (Karl Groos). There is, again, some point to this in that rivalry, emulation, co-operation, and other social processes appear in the play of children. Yet play is no more preparatory for later life than the activities of any one day are preparatory for the next. A third theory connected play with the concept of *recapitulation*, that is, that the prenatal infant repeats or passes through various physical forms which resemble the biological stages reached by the mature lower animals. This repetition or recapitulation was assumed to go on after birth also. Play life was said to re-enact the cultural stages of the race. Today no serious student of child behavior believes this theory. There is little evidence of fixed, stepwise cultural growth. And certainly children's play does not parallel the history of cultural development in any case.

None of these theories is satisfactory since all fail to take into account the social and cultural determinants of play life. There is no doubt that spontaneous, pleasant, and somewhat aimless muscular activity in young children is a phase of the rhythms of physical activity common to all the higher animal forms. As the child grows up, contact with his fellows and the impress of culture give direction to this activity. Yet there are variations which seem to us odd. For example, the Manus children, according to Margaret Mead, are not provided with any cultural patterns of play. However, they indulge in random and aimless activity. In our own society from the earliest years children learn how and what games to play from their older playmates and from the adults around them.

The cultural factors in the play life are illustrated in military Rome and the European feudal society, which were marked with the spirit of conflict: gladiatorial games, chariot races, and the medieval tournaments. In a more pacific, industrialized, and commercial society the conflict phases are often sublimated into football and other games, and much more attention may be given to passive entertainment.

Moreover, in capitalistic societies the masses think nothing of paying for much of their recreation. In fact, the control of leisure time is largely in the hands of business interests who appeal to man's recreational needs in order to turn a pretty penny in profits. In pietistic, puritanical cultures, play life gets still another sort of interpretation.

The effect of culture upon the use and meaning of recreation and leisure is aptly illustrated in many countries when authoritarian and totalitarian governments take over. For instance, in Nazi Germany an effort was made to link the control of the play life of the masses with the larger plan to co-ordinate the entire German culture to a totalistic aim.

The Nazis set up a nation-wide play program known as *Kraft durch Freude* (strength through joy). The aim and effect were to provide a counteractant to the highly individual character of much of modern play — reflecting as it does our larger segmentalized and confused mass society. The following quotation from a prominent Nazi gives the clue to their standpoint: "By superintending all the work of leisure-time organization, *Kraft durch Freude* at the same time prevents the atomizing effect of individualistic use of leisure time, which is not leisure-time organization since it has no relation to the natural form of human social life, that is, to the community of the people."¹

The *Kraft durch Freude* organization planned vacation trips, hiking parties, travel in foreign lands, athletic contests, and various forms of artistic enjoyment for the toiling masses of Germany. In theory at least the leaders constantly stressed the need to provide a sense of belongingness, of imparting "that blessed feeling of not being shut out in any way, but of having a place in the scale of achievement under the protection of the whole people. . . ." ² This feeling of togetherness was tied up to their larger aim of national economy and world destiny.

¹ From Horst Dressler-Andress, Director of the National Socialist organization *Kraft durch Freude* in an address, "The cultural mission of leisure-time organization," *Report on the world conference for leisure and recreation*, p. 77. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1937.

² Claus Selzner, "The social problem," *ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

A similar but less-effective organization of recreation was set up in Italy during the regime of Benito Mussolini. So, too, in Soviet Russia the state has recognized the importance of controlling many aspects of recreation as a device which will contribute to its overall program of mass control.

The contrast of this rather regimented play life to that found in democratic countries indicates clearly that in this dimension of social life, as in all others, culture puts its distinctive stamp. The Americans, like the British, indulge in mass recreation and mass entertainment, but for the most part their play rests upon voluntary association and more or less individual choice.

Some Forms of Play Life

It is obvious that culture sets the direction and gives meaning to man's play impulses, and bearing this fact in mind any number of classifications might be made of the forms of play. But since we are concerned in this section with the group aspects of play, we shall attempt no particular logical order. We shall first review some aspects of play life under primary-group conditions and indicate how these have been influenced by technological changes and urbanization.

Primary group forms of play. In primitive societies play developed around family, clan, and tribal life. The festivals connected with economic and religious life often took on recreational and artistic features as well. In many primary communities, either in primitive or in modern groups, there is no sharp line dividing play life from useful activity. Much labor of a collective sort, like fishing, hunting, barn raising, planting, and harvesting, may take on festive features. A church or neighborhood sewing circle easily combines useful work with entertaining gossip. Even today marketing is not given over entirely to buying and selling. The mad rush to a bargain sale is a form of mass behavior of a playful sort quite as much as a quest for lower prices. Many recurrent or occasional events have recreational features: attendance at weddings,

christenings, and funerals. Without doubt large-scale collective activities, such as lynching bees, religious and speculative manias, and war, carry with them a great deal of emotion and pleasant satisfaction not unlike those secured from leisure-time games.

Aside from the connection of useful action with play, there is in all primary communities a range of activities designed especially to furnish recreation and amusement in leisure hours. Dancing, the drama, and much of art are of this character. Folk music, festivals, and holidays provide an outlet. In medieval Europe the large number of holy days when work was taboo offered the peasants and townspeople an opportunity for relaxation. It is estimated that in some periods of the Middle Ages there were as many as 115 holidays a year. Although people were obliged to participate in religious ceremonials, these occasions served both a religious and a recreational function. Holidays which were originally holy, that is, sacred days associated with magical and religious rites, have today become secularized on every hand. In place of religious holidays, patriotic holidays are the common thing.

The decline of the primary community as the focus of people's activities and the increasing importance of urban types of activity have tended to destroy many of these traditional forms of recreation. As a result, churches, national recreational organizations, the schools, and the businessmen's organizations have stimulated the growth of clubs designed to retain many of the intimate primary-group features of play for boys and girls and for young men and women. Such organizations are illustrated by the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, and the Camp Fire Girls. Many of these groups aim to link education, religion, and moral training with recreation.

Other clubs combine recreation with economic purposes. The growth of the businessmen's luncheon clubs is startling evidence of the felt need for some sort of friendliness and sense of mutuality in an

BASIC INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

economic order marked by keen individualistic competition. The Rotary International, Kiwanis, and Lions — three of the most prominent — reported in 1948 a total of 935,000 members.³ In the United States there are about 25 such national groups, most of them organized soon after World War I.

While the lodge is a combination of secret cult, financial organization, and club to stimulate sociability, there is no doubt that one of its strongest appeals is to the play interest of adult men and women. Fraternal orders are found in many Protestant communities. The ritualism which departed from religion in Protestantism returns to people in the secret society. The increased membership in fraternal orders in recent years is striking witness of the appeal of these leisure-time organizations. In 1900 there were nearly 10 million members in insurance and noninsurance lodges; today there are probably three times that number.

Voluntary organizations have not sufficed to provide all the necessary leisure-time facilities for our society, and as a result the government has definitely entered into this field of interest. All states grant legal rights to set up municipal recreational systems with boards of directors, paid executives, and trained staffs. In 1944, such organizations in 1245 communities spent nearly 39 million dollars to furnish recreational services.

Parks and playgrounds have replaced the former open-country play facilities for many children. Certainly supervised play provides the city boy and girl with better opportunities for recreation and leisure-time activities than they can find in gang life, which often develops when they are left to themselves. In addition there are parks and recreation facilities under county, state, and federal supervision.

To cite only a few facts for the United States: In 1944 there were 10,022 supervised playgrounds. By 1945 nearly 2300 cities had established municipal forests, totaling 3 million acres; and county forest preserves in 23

states totaled nearly 7 million more. State-owned forest lands equal almost 20 million, and these have recreational facilities. So, too, the National Park Service manages more than 22 million acres. In addition the National Forests, with provision for picnicking, camping, swimming, and various other sports, comprise 170 million acres. The vast numbers who use these facilities are illustrated by these figures: In 1941, a peak year, 22 million people visited various national parks, 16 million vacationers used the federal forests in that year, and it is estimated that 28 million people visit state forests annually.⁴

Community and recreation centers are also common. The community center is an effort to recapture something of the older neighborhood solidarity so shattered by urban conditions. It attempts to stimulate recreational and educational programs of people within relatively circumscribed localities, chiefly in our cities. These centers provide not only recreational activities, games, dramatics, and festivals but also educational training — from instruction in cooking and handicrafts to night classes for aliens wishing to become naturalized.

Athletics and sports. Public spectacles of trained athletes to entertain the masses are as old as classic history. These might be gladiatorial contests, wrestling, boxing, racing, or various games using team organization. The American interest in all sorts of sports is widespread. For example, for the two major baseball leagues, in 1940 the attendance was over 9 million; in 1948 it was just under 21 million. Other millions attend basketball and football games, or go in for prize fights, horse races, and other sports, both commercial and amateur.

The extracurricular activities of students from elementary school to the university have long run to play and recreation. The importance of athletics in our educational system, especially our colleges, is apparent to everyone. In the Greek and Roman schools, of course, physical games were a distinctive part of the curriculum, but the

³ See *World almanac*, 1949, pp. 409 ff. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1949. Most of these members were in the United States.

⁴ Data from Russel H. Kurtz, ed., *Social work yearbook*, 1947, p. 430. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1947.

medieval church, with its opposition to the expression of man's biological nature, suppressed this sort of interest for centuries. Modern education, following the influence of romanticism and democracy, brought play back into the school.

Other forms of amusement. While athletics offer a form of vicarious recreation for large numbers of people, the drama in its various expressions has also been of importance. This form of art furnishes both esthetic satisfaction and relaxation for the audience. While tastes may differ as to what is "best" in the theater, the importance of this form of entertainment is evident in many societies.

The rapid development of the motion picture is one of the most striking events in recent decades. It is a medium of education, propaganda, news, and for the spread of fashion as well as a form of amusement and recreation. (See chapter 19.)

The motion picture affords the masses a vital outlet of relaxation and vicarious satisfaction. While the leading movie stars come and go with the years, and while there is a certain fashion in popular fancy, the traditional appeals of love-making, adventure, and conflict remain among the favorite themes. The screen not only produces its own heroes and heroines and dramatic entertainment but contributes to our total body of social myth and legend. History and fiction are intermixed at point after point to provide some of the important foundations of our basic values and attitudes.

As a means of recreation, the radio has had a more phenomenal rise than the motion picture. In 1922 only about 60,000 American homes were equipped with radios, and the programs were local, or of limited appeal. A quarter of a century later there were more than 40 million homes with radios, and the total radio sets in the country were more than 75 million. In the late 1940's, television entered the field of mass entertainment and is growing rapidly. (See chapter 19.)

There are favorite games in radio and video as there are in motion pictures. There

are favorite programs: dramatic, musical, and otherwise. The appeals are again to love, adventure, family life, and conflict in the form of comedy or tragedy; and all of these programs contribute their bit to hero worship, the myth and legend, and the general value system of a people. For the most part, these media, like the motion picture, are geared to satisfy the lowest common denominator of taste in entertainment. Dependent as they are upon commercial advertisers, critics should not fail to recognize that their appeal must be chiefly to the mass of consumers, not to the intellectually and artistically superior ten per cent at the top of the social ladder. Like the motion picture, they furnish more than entertainment. As we noted in chapter 19, they are powerful weapons in propaganda and education.

Gambling as a form of play. *Gambling* may be defined as a game in which there is a deliberate wagering or staking of money or other valuables upon future events which — so far as the participants know — depend upon chance, luck, or certain skills. Games of chance are almost as old as culture itself and were often linked with magic. Instruments of gambling were frequently used in divination.

Gambling games such as are played with dice, cards, or roulette wheels, depending upon the turn of events rather than skill, are widespread. The line between playing pure chance and other forms of gaming is hard to draw. Betting and wagering on events not of a strictly chance character are common: horse racing, cockfighting, prize fighting, or any other sport may be the object of wagers.

The distinction between games of pure chance, wagering on various human or natural events, and speculations on the stock market is difficult to draw. While the capitalistic economic order is built on the theory and practice of rational calculations about production and consumption demands, the persistence of taking chances on future market prices has been widespread throughout the centuries of capitalist economy — evidence again of the limitations of the

rationality of business in the face of deeper-lying motives in man. The speculation manias which have been common in European-American society since the 17th century, until the stock-market boom of 1929, are really forms of mass gambling.

Around gambling, as around other recreational interests, whole sets of culture patterns develop which are important in directing its expression. Taboo or ostracism of players who load the dice, mark the cards, or "fix" the wheel of chance; insistence on payment of gambling debts, often in preference to commercial obligations; in some cases the legal sanction of gambling, as in public lotteries; in others where gambling is legally taboo, the development of a whole system of undercover organizations, as we see in our country with bookmakers and pools — these are but samples of the customs or laws developed to foster or to control this form of play. The recent agitation in the United States favoring government lotteries with a view to raising public funds represents a considerable shift in our mores regarding the meaning of gambling.

Commercial and noncommercial recreation. The close linkage of business enterprise and recreation in capitalist countries has been the subject of much debate. Some people view commercialized recreation not only as regrettable but as destructive of the most effective and satisfying community life. Actually, the dominance of capitalist ownership of so many of our leisure-time facilities is but another evidence of the wide ramification of the profit system in our culture. Commercialized recreation is both cause and effect in this matter. It developed as a phase of our urbanization to meet a certain demand of the masses, and it must be recalled that taxpayers were long opposed to spending public funds for community recreation. The view was that the church, the school (in an informal way without cost to the public treasury), and voluntary or commercial organizations should provide such advantages to the people.

On the other hand, once businessmen turned their attention to recreation as a

means of making money, a new cultural pattern arose, and pressures were exerted politically to protect such vested interests. Today the commerce in recreation occupies a leading place in our economic structure.

Noncommercial recreation represents, of course, a great deal of leisure-time activity in which there is little or no cost. But this aside, much of it is supported by taxation or private philanthropy. The growing intrusion of the state, into this entire field indicates a growing recognition of a public responsibility for this aspect of life, a standpoint which bespeaks our mass society in rather sharp contrast to our earlier primary-group organization of everyday life.

Interest in various forms of play, both commercial and noncommercial, in the United States has expanded steadily for a long time. This, of course, reflects our great wealth and high levels of living. To take only one measure of this, consumer purchases of recreational goods and services, but not counting vacation travel, increased fourfold between 1910 and 1940. However, our concern with specific aspects of play life has altered over the years. Measured in terms of relative expenditures, there has been a decline in money spent for drama and opera; radios and phonographs; fraternal, patriotic, and women's organizations; and for books. For example, for the years 1929-1941 the decreases, percentage-wise, were 66, 31, 24, and 16 respectively. On the other hand, there has been an enormous increase in money spent on gambling machines, horse and dog racing, and professional football. The percentage increases, 1929-1941, for these items were 985, 663, and 373.⁵


An overall view of the total expenditures for recreation and changes in relative proportions for various major items is shown in Figure 64.

Play, Mores, and Personality

Play is important in socialization; it bears upon moral training; and it is valuable in the balancing and integrating of the personality.

⁵ See J. Frederic Dewhurst, et al., *America's needs and resources*, pp. 279-284. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1947.

FIGURE 64

CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES FOR
RECREATION, 1909-1942⁶

Social processes in play. Play life provides experience in various of the more important social processes. The play of children and adolescents affords an important area of basic socialization. Through play they acquire knowledge, skills, and values. More especially, in our culture play gives training in competition, conflict, co-operation, and differentiation. Team games as well as interpersonal rivalry condition individuals to accepted patterns of struggle. But neither competition nor conflict in culturalized play in our society is uncontrolled. All recognized forms of interindividual or intergroup play are regulated by certain rules. This is important since it means that the culture lays down accepted and expected ways of personal conduct. If one does not follow the rules, punishment follows. If one does follow them, there is a reward. Such conditioning makes for an orderly, predictable personality and has its implication for morality.

So, too, group or team play trains in co-operation. This means that the individual not only must follow the rules of the game as a member but must co-operate with his

teammates to gain the goal of the group as a unit. This may mean the sacrifice of personal desire. Finally, the skills acquired in play doubtless help to develop special attitudes and habits which will have bearing on one's later occupational skills and roles.

Play life and morality. The use of leisure time is not free of moral and religious implications. In some societies, notably those affected by Christian and especially the puritanic theology, play and recreation have been looked upon as immoral. Just as the expression of the biological interests was taboo in all Christianity, both Calvinism and pietism, in particular, took the stand that play is an immoral waste of time and energy, that it has its roots in evil design, and that it leads man away from the religious and moral life demanded by the divine plan of salvation. Roman Catholicism has always been more tolerant of the play interests and the temporal foibles of man. While such worldly interests were not approved, they were considered venial, not mortal, sins. In the puritanical theory not only was the flesh a handicap to man but man was also required to suppress and control his more natural desires by useful work, sobriety, and thrift. All of these fitted into the developing capitalistic culture, which, in turn, gave added impetus to repressive measures not only to control but also to wipe out play-time activities.

In our society most reformers who look upon recreational activities as sinful turn to the political state as a means of control; and just as they attempt to wipe out prostitution, liquor traffic, and gambling by legal fiat, so do they attempt to regulate the motion pictures, the dance hall, and other forms of entertainment by legal repression.

In the last few decades this severe standpoint has given way to a more tolerant view, toward a conception that what we want is intelligent direction, not suppression, of play life. Many churches that formerly tabooed card playing, dancing, and musical entertainment do so no longer. In fact, some congregations use such recreational

⁶ From *Development, op. cit.*, p. 283. By permission.

means and even some forms of gambling, such as bingo, in their money-raising schemes. Reform bodies that propose moralized recreational programs enlist more followers and usually obtain more financial support than those which advocate complete suppression.

There is a return to the conception that play has a distinctive place in the normal life of man — something which the Greeks well understood. This idea has been a part of an important educational theory since the time of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Also, play is recognized as related to artistic creation. Moreover, properly directed play is considered to be one of the basic means of moral training. Almost all community recreation programs have the moral purpose more or less consciously before them. Wherever tax-supported public recreation is found, it is defended on the grounds that it fosters good citizenship, prevents delinquency and crime, and prepares boys and girls for their future familial, economic, and civic roles.

Obviously, much of modern amusement and recreation is passive and vicarious in character. Millions sitting every season through the baseball or the football games, millions attending the movies, millions reading the comic strips or the best sellers, millions looking at horse races, going to prize fights, and other millions listening to phonographs, player pianos, orchestra and band concerts, lectures, and more millions listening to radios or enjoying television — all of these forms of entertainment do not for the most part call for active muscular and much intellectual participation. On the other hand, there are other millions — or the same millions at other times — who dance, play golf, tennis, or baseball, swim, go hiking, or indulge in more active intellectual participation in card games or in solving crossword puzzles, or go in for the creative arts and handicrafts as hobbies.

As to the quality of play, it is very easy for the well-to-do classes to assume that all people should have the sort of recreation which their own class enjoys. One may regret the apparently cheap and tawdry lei-

sure habits of others, but from the standpoint of mental health and social balance one cannot be too certain that any particular class standards will fit others. The projection on to others of our own class standards and habits of play often fails because we do not realize that play, like religion and art, is a matter of tastes and needs, which may be quite different from our own. (See below on art standards.)

Play as a balancing factor in personality.

In the persons whose major life interests take on the characteristics of creative activity, work produces deep satisfactions not unlike those which arise from play and recreation. For most people, however, the need to work means drudgery and monotony, is looked upon as a mere means to money return, and does not integrate itself, as work, to their deeper motives and interests. While work for these people becomes in time a deep-seated habit which they could with difficulty lay aside permanently, most of them find a balance through leisure activity quite removed from their daily vocation.

One benefit is found in the release of muscular tensions. Much of our work today involves fine muscular co-ordinations rather than those of the larger muscles. Active games afford an opportunity to release physical energy through the larger muscles in activity that is pleasing and exciting. Yet some people prefer more intellectual forms for the release of tensions. Still others like theirs at an emotional level. Individual variations are great, and one dare not lay down general rules.

There are psychological features of play which must not be neglected. Games for the most part are built on the pattern of hunting and doubtless afford in a sublimative way a deep-seated interest in new adventure and in exciting pursuit of game or goal. Perhaps every man desires deeply to make "his kill," whether it be in love-making, in big game, in money at poker, or in a low score at golf. Another reason for stakes, wagers, and prizes in games and sports, or for the more honorific rewards of prestige,

lies in the fact that these are tangible evidences of a successful "kill."

Another value in play lies in the ancient Greek notion of catharsis. The drama was said to give the spectators release from their own pent-up emotions and to act as an emotional but vicarious purgative. Doubtless a good deal of play and recreation gives just such release.

Laughter, wit, and humor have distinctive places in much of our amusement and recreation. The intense and serious purpose of the poker player or the golfer may afford satisfaction in the final successful issue, but much of our play carries with it the more spontaneous features of laughter and wit. The popularity of the theater in this connection is evident. So too in the sophisticated wit of the drawing room as in the more Rabelaisian tone of the barroom there is a playful release of tensions.

Psychologically, play has its roots in fantasy thinking and acting. It is often a substitute for more useful behavior. It affords an opportunity to forget the demands of the job or business, to escape the duties of citizen or parent, and to find, as an adult, release and recreation in a world of socially acceptable wishful thinking. A good illustration of this was the marked increase in gambling in Great Britain during the late 1940's. While the British have been habituated to betting on sporting events, the frustrating regulations of the Labor Government, following on the rationing and restraints of the war period itself, gave impetus to further concern with sports and gambling as a means of balance and release.

The appeal of gambling is self-evident. Chance, in a sense, is the goddess of all fantasy. The desire to get something for nothing is deep in most of us. And while what pleases the ego may vary with the culture, one of the most common cultural traits is some scheme or other for playing "Lady Luck." While the trend of rational, objective thought and action in much of our modern life runs counter to the luck interest, man still finds a place for its expression in his leisure time, art, and religion.

The function of fantasy in lodge activities must be noted. One reason why the fraternal order is so popular lies in the fact that the daily round of life in an industrial society is humdrum and drab. The ordinary man more and more tends to be reduced to the level of a mere robot. On lodge night, however, the ordinary shoe clerk or the third vice president of a bank may become for the time the Exalted Potentate of the Realm of the Mystic Knights of Akbar. The ritual, the costumes, and the official status afford him an opportunity to let loose his suppressed wishes for power — something which he cannot accomplish in our highly routine, mechanized, workaday world. In highly regimented mass societies the emotional benefits may also come from organized marching and immense though carefully controlled political gatherings into which ritual and colorful appeal are skillfully interwoven.

Social-Cultural Aspects of Esthetic Experience

The esthetic experience of man relates to his interest in beauty. Artistic experience is denoted by pleasant emotions, attitudes, and ideas which are associated with the perception of line, form, mass, color, sound, or words. In a material way art serves no immediate purpose of survival. In a broader sense art, like play and religion, seems to be essential to society. It gives satisfactions which do not always arise while one is providing for the basic physiological wants.

In our discussion we shall refer principally to the fine arts. By the fine arts we mean first, those of line, form, color, etc., including architecture, painting, sculpture, and the so-called decorative arts; second, the art of sound or music; and third, the art of words and sounds, or poetry and prose. There are three factors in all these: material, form, and meaning. The first concerns the medium in which the artist works: stone, wood, paints, clay, gold, steel, precious stones, the combinations of sounds or words. The second has to do with the structure of the product, designed in such a way

as to give sensory pleasures in line, form, color, rhythms, or in the plot of a story. Meaning in esthetic experience grows out of its association with other activities. Culture definitely influences the production and enjoyment of art. We shall briefly point out the foundations of art, its interrelations to other phases of culture, and then discuss the social standards of artistic taste.

Foundations of esthetic experience. Artistic activity and interest are clearly connected with the play impulse, and if we could find the roots of play we possibly would discover those of art as well. Like play, art is related to wishful thinking and the run of imagination beyond the immediate needs of survival. If play is something of an overt expression of fantasy life, as it evidently is in much of its more "natural" forms, artistic expression itself may be thought of as but a further expression of this play put into more intellectualized and directed form. Certainly art lifts man above his cruder nature. It gives him a chance to seek perfection in some object outside himself, satisfies some craving or longing within the person for a sense of completeness or wholeness which is often not possible in the conflict and half measures of daily social intercourse.

Art is not a mere "interlude" between periods of useful action. Neither is art "passive" while other parts of life are "active." It is easy to overemphasize the passive, escape notion, especially when we are overawed and overimpressed by the hurry and ceaseless activity that our material world demands of us.

In short, for the personality art, like play, religion, philosophy, or creative science, may serve as a balance to an otherwise distraught and unintegrated life. It is not escape but an extension of the individual's reality and behavior into a world created by imagination and enjoyed not alone but by others as well. Art may have its origins in play and fantasy thinking, yet it gets social acceptance and becomes an integral part of the culture. As with play and religion, art is not a neurotic illusion, not a drug to

relieve the personality of its material obligations, but evidently a necessary part of our existence.⁷

Art and material culture. In the most rudimentary societies the struggle for survival was doubtless so intense that most of man's energy was used up in providing food, shelter, and clothing for himself and his family. Only as we get something in excess of these bare necessities have we time or disposition for play or esthetic production. Yet there are few societies that do not have some forms of art.⁸ No matter how art originated in the race, it certainly must have made its appearance fairly early, along with the more utilitarian functions. (See chapter 3.)

Art is always affected by the state of the material culture. In the days of handicrafts it had a distinctive place; artist and artisan worked together. In our time of machine manufacture, art must take on a different expression. Much nonsense has been written about the loss of art in the machine age, but the machine can destroy only an art not suited to its function in a culture. The machine cannot and has not done away with man's creative interests, nor with his inclination to put artistic flourishes on useful articles or to produce objects of beauty for the pleasure they afford in themselves.

The emergence of beauty of form in modern machinery comes only after the chief mechanical efficiencies are worked out. For example, the earlier designers of automobiles could not get away from the background of slowly moving wagons and railroad engines because of what the psycholo-

⁷ For an interesting psychoanalytic theory of esthetic creation and appreciation, see the following papers by Harry B. Lee: "Poetry production as a supplemental emergency defense against anxiety," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 1938, 7: 232-242; "A critique of the theory of sublimation," *Psychiatry*, 1939, 2: 239-270; "A theory concerning free invention in the creative arts," *ibid.*, 1940, 3: 229-293; and "On the esthetic states of the mind," *ibid.*, 1947, 10: 281-306.

⁸ See Franz Boas, *Primitive art*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927; also M. J. Herskovits, *Man and his works: the science of cultural anthropology*, chapters 23, 25, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947.

gist calls the apperceptive mass of previous experience. It took time and experience to change to more effective devices for motor power and speed. In these developments the engineer and the artist combined their talents. Art is not divorced from mechanical products, except where one lags behind the other and where the interest is first in efficiency, as it is likely to be in an age dominated by technology and concern with money-making.

What is evident as to modern vehicles is true of other products of the machine age from articles of daily use — office equipment, typewriters, calculating machines, household devices — to buildings in which stone, concrete, brick, steel, and glass are put together in reference to lighting, heating, and the general purpose of the building. Frank Lloyd Wright, with his insistence that the building should suit its location, climate, material, and purpose, stimulated the appreciation and practice of this newer art in architecture. Streamlined art is in the folkways of our time.

In short, machine products at first merely copied the products of the handicraftsman. Today the tendency is for the factory product to appear as if made by the machine, to bear, in other words, the hallmark of its age — a further evidence of the integration of practical industry and the arts.

Art and religion. The English writer Jane Harrison points out⁹ that art and religious ritual grew out of practical situations, such as those concerned with planting, harvesting, and the solving of group crises. Gradually from these activities, ritualistic dancing and dialogue arose. For example, in the evolution of the Greek drama, the chorus represents a vestige of the time when there was no audience on one side and actors on the other but when the whole performance was a common social experience of the group.

Among many nonliterate peoples decorative symbols have magical and religious meaning. In the art of the Pueblo Indians


three lines in a semicircle denote rain falling from clouds — a design which is used in their rain-making ceremonials. The sand drawings of the Navahos, the decorations of the Australian natives at their festivals, and the designs of many utilitarian objects possess a magical meaning to assist the hunter, the fisherman, or the horseman.

In the history of Christianity, art and religion are closely linked together. The beautiful images of the Christ, of the Virgin and Child, and of various saints represent some of the finest wood carving or work in stone that we have in church art anywhere, and the whole range of painting and church architecture of the Middle Ages shows how artistic feeling and religious worship were intertwined. The expression of religious feeling in beautiful form is found almost the world over, sometimes in dancing and music, sometimes in religious drama, and in Oriental and Occidental cultures very definitely in sculpture, painting, and architecture.

Art and moral control. Art has a definite place in the mores and hence in social control. From Plato to the present there have been protests about the disastrous effects of sensuous art upon conduct. Plato was skeptical of any art which aroused the passions of men. This notion, modified by his followers and combined with certain taboos of Hebrew origin, became the basis in Christianity for the whole conception that the flesh of man is sinful and weak and should be held in check by the spirit. Any forms of art which stimulate these sinful tendencies of mankind were taboo. Thus, while art played a part in medieval life, it was an art built around ideals of a "perfect" society, leaving the beauty of the human body out of consideration.

Renaissance and modern art returned to the classical conception of sensuous beauty, but the church and the moral reformers still resist and whenever possible censor those forms of art which appeal to the passions, on the assumption that such stimulation leads to overt conduct contrary to the moral codes of the society.

⁹ Jane Harrison, *Ancient art and ritual*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1913.



Collection of the Museum of Modern Art

PERSISTENCE OF MEMORY by Salvador Dali

Yet art largely reflects the society from which it springs. Music, drama, novels, pictures, sculpture, and architecture embody the values, ideals, and hopes of the people who produce them. They naturally serve to inculcate into the rising generation these same values. Until modern times this carry-over of ideals and values through art from one generation to another was largely indirect and unconscious. Today, however, with propaganda developed to a scientific technique, art, like education, play, and religion, can be used consciously and deliberately as a part of a whole national plan to indoctrinate young and old with ideals and values considered sacred or moral by those in control. In Soviet Russia art, like recreation and education, bears the stamp of communist ideas and is used to enculturate a whole people with selected and planned values. In a somewhat like manner Hitler and his followers banned what they termed decadent art from Germany and supported

esthetic products more in keeping with Nazi ideals.

Culture and art standards. The standards of art reflect in large measure the accepted values or meanings of the particular culture in which we find them. The correct and proper in art, therefore, as in morals, is a matter of consensus and culture. This is well illustrated in the history of art. El Greco (c. 1548-1625), a painter in Spain, had little recognition in his time because other standards prevailed. In English literature the status of William Shakespeare (1564-1616) has varied with literary values since his time. In the 18th century, when the classical couplet was in vogue and stereotyped drama and poetry the fashion, Shakespeare's style was viewed as incorrect. In the next century his work recovered its place. The importance of consensus is aptly illustrated in writing, painting, music, and sculpture today. To many the work of

*Collection of the Museum of Modern Art*

CHRISTINE'S WORLD by Andrew Wyeth

Joyce, Stein, Dali, and other "moderns" is just so much jargon or pictorial nonsense. To the "initiates" it is apparently highest art.¹⁰ In the same way, cubism or futurism is meaningless to most laymen and to many critics. Often only the painter or the sculptor retains the key to the intricate patterns of colliding lines, planes, and masses of color. In music we find much the same thing. Richard Wagner (1813-1883) was not widely understood or appreciated for years because his compositions ran counter to the musical traditions of his time. So, too, recent music has only gradually won popular acceptance.

Still, if the essential thing in art is esthetic enjoyment, not ideas and verbal communications, there is no reason why laymen may not, under adequate stimulation, come to accept any art as standard and proper. In

time we may even see the work of the "great masters" of the past put away as the product of an unsophisticated and somewhat childish age. Certainly the cultural standards of morality, religion, and art show many variations. While it is difficult and dangerous to characterize whole cultural epochs, it is clear that much primitive art is marked by various sorts of symbolism and, from our point of view, by certain absurdities of dimension;¹¹ that fifth-century Athenian art possessed a certain cold beauty in contrast to the more decorative and somewhat gaudy art of later Greece and Rome; that medieval art, with its emphasis on otherworldliness and theological conceptions, avoided the sensuous; that the Renaissance rediscovered the sensuous beauty of classic art and extended it, especially in painting; that modern art has been torn asunder in recent decades by controversies over light, color, and form, over the efforts to express so-called "pure ideas" or the essence of things in

¹⁰ For a discussion of this in reference to the psychology of thought and language, see Kimball Young, *Social attitudes*, chapter 5, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1931; also see Edward F. Rothchild, *The meaning of unintelligibility in modern art*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

¹¹ See Ralph Linton, "Primitive art," *American Magazine of Art*, 1933, 25 : 17-24.

color and form only. To essay to judge which of these periods is superior to others is to fall afoul of our own particular cultural prejudices. For examples of "modern" and "conventional" art, see the pictures by Dali and Wyeth.

While there is a certain central theme of art in every culture, there is also within this cultural framework a place for individual initiative. Even a casual examination of European art and artists will show this. Ruth L. Bunzel has admirably shown the place of individual divergence in primitive art in her study of art among the Southwestern Indians.¹² Individual variation in art within the limits of any culture in the end brings about just those extreme departures from the older art which lead in time to new "schools or sectarian movements in art." These latter, in turn, replace the old "schools" as the standards of art in the society.

Finally, we may ask: Who, within any given society, sets the standards of taste or determines the direction of the consensus of which we have been speaking? Much of fine art in the past has been the art of the dominant classes, themselves a minority of the total population. Even in "the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome," the slaves and lower classes had a different relation from that of their masters to the esthetic features of the culture of the time. In serf and peasant Europe, the aristocratic and later the rich bourgeois classes patronized and enjoyed the higher arts. But it must not be imagined that the lower classes themselves did not have their artistic enjoyments in handicraft creations, in folk songs and dances, and in the drama or religious exercise. They did.

Art cannot be separated from the life around it. It is not an escape from life but a part of it, and there is no such thing as pure esthetics except in the minds of sophisticated specialists. Such rarefied notions exist only in people who themselves are remote from most of the life around them

and who by means of money, political power, or intellectual rationalizations isolate themselves from others — an isolation which promotes snobbery.

If a great many Americans get their artistic enjoyment from the motion picture and radio, from billboard and other advertising, from the "cheaper" novels and other literature, or from swing music, we must realize that to them these values are as pleasant and as satisfying perhaps as Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* or the novels of Marcel Proust are to a limited minority. While one must not gainsay the possible advantage of introducing all children to the opportunity for esthetic creation on their own part, or to an understanding of the delights of "better" art, we must not forget that if art is to have a place in the individual life, it must touch that life at the vital point, that is, through the emotions and feelings. It can never do so in the purely intellectual sense, even for the critic and the highly cultivated person, unless the intellectual concern is coupled with emotions and feelings.

It is probably unwise to try to impose on the masses the higher and more logical foundations of esthetics. These things, if they are to come at all, must grow slowly out of daily contact with good art, from creative education, and from the other everyday actions of men and women in the world of economic, political, religious, recreational, and other social behavior. As Leo Stein well remarks:

"I have all my life been looking for some good reason why one *ought* to be interested in art, or should prefer good art to bad, but beyond such reasons as that art does less harm than alcohol or gambling, I have found no reason whatever within the limits of the usual discussions. What is commonly said, though often disguised in pseudo-profundities, is that the best people do so-and-so, and that every one should do the same. In short, the appeal is to authority."¹³

¹³ Leo Stein, "Art and the frame," *New Republic*, March 24, 1926, 46: 143. By permission. In this connection, see also Harry B. Lee, "The cultural lag in aesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1947, 6: 120-138, for a sound critique of the mysticism still prevalent in the interpretation of artistic creations.

¹² Ruth L. Bunzel, *The Pueblo potter: a study of creative imagination in primitive art*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1929.

The appeal to authority is but the appeal to snobbery and prestige and has little inherent in it to catch the imagination of the man in the street, who as soon as he has heard the lecture on esthetics, visited the art

gallery, or listened to the symphony is likely to sneak off to the first movie at hand, or to find himself a racy novel, or to enjoy an evening of modern ballroom dancing with his wife or sweetheart.

Interpretative Summary

1. Both play and esthetic experience are universal in man. While there are no instincts of play and artistic creativeness, as some believe, play and art provide expression or outlets for important human needs and motives.
2. Such universal social processes as opposition, co-operation, and differentiation are found in play.
3. To be meaningful to others esthetic creation and performance must communicate ideas, sentiments, and values. Neither play nor art has significance outside the social framework.
4. The nature and standards of play life and esthetic activity are determined by culture.
5. Much of the recreation in urban mass society tends to be of the passive, spectator type. So, too, much of the interest in artistic matters is of the passive, appreciative kind. There is, however, a good deal of mass participation in sports and other forms of recreation. While there is a growing interest among the masses in trying their hand at artistic creations of one kind or another, the essential creative capacity of the ordinary man in this matter has not been tapped.
6. The psychological components of play, esthetic experience, and religion have much in common. They combine fantasy, logic, and motor reactions in orderly and meaningful ways.
7. For the individual play and art both provide release of consciously and unconsciously derived anxieties and tensions. This release, in turn, helps to balance and integrate the personality.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define play. Distinguish it from work.
2. What is the function of play for the individual? For society?
3. How does culture determine the nature and meaning of leisure-time activities?
4. How do you account for the shift of interest from such things as opera and fraternal orders to horse racing and other commercial sports?
5. What are the differential effects on the personality of indulgences in "passive" as against "active" recreation and entertainment?
6. List the principal appeals, in terms of basic human motives, of (a) the motion picture, (b) the radio, and (c) television.
7. Why has gambling such a universal appeal? Why have the people in the United States, for the most part, opposed the introduction of state-run lotteries? How do you account for the fact that lotteries are common in Latin countries?
8. Discuss the relation of play to morality. Have the movies and the radio undermined our mores? If so, how? If not, why not?
9. What is the function of esthetic experience for the individual? For society?
10. Discuss, pro and con, the contention that machine production destroys art and esthetic taste.

11. What do you think of Leo Stein's point of view concerning art?
12. How do play and art aid in the integration of the personality? Illustrate.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

John Dewey, *Art as experience*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934.

Esthetic experience derives from the interaction of self and art object.

Havelock Ellis, *The dance of life*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923.

A readable and invaluable analysis of the place of esthetic experience in life.

Bernard C. Heyl, *New bearings in esthetics and art criticism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943.

Among other things, deals with the place of value judgments in esthetics and art criticism; contains a rich mine of documentation.

Francis D. Klingender, *Art and the Industrial Revolution*. London: Noel Carrington, 1947.

An interesting account of the impact of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain on its folk as well as fine art, beautifully illustrated.

Norman C. Meier, *Art in human affairs: An introduction to the psychology of art*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1942.

A good introduction to the psychology of esthetic creation, a critique of "experimental (modern) art," and a descriptive analysis of the place of art in everyday life, including its function in social control. Amply illustrated.

Austin F. Riggs, *Play: recreation in a balanced life*. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1935.

Advice on types of recreation, books, etc. which will aid a person to a more satisfactory adjustment.

George Santayana, *The sense of beauty*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896.

A philosophic classic on the place of esthetic experience in the personality.

Leo Tolstoy, *What is art?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1932.

The author's classic statement on the moral function of art.

Sociological Aspects of the Economic Order

WHILE the formal treatment of economics falls outside the scope of sociology, certain aspects of economic behavior interest sociologists. These include, among others, certain group and institutional aspects of an economy; the demography of the labor force; the relation of income to consumption and general welfare; and the place of competition, conflict, and differentiation, and related social processes.

The Basic Elements of Modern Economy and Enterprise

The chief culture patterns of economics have to do, first, with technology and the human skills necessary to production, distribution, and consumption. Second, they have to do with the use and controls of property, wealth, and economic enterprise. Technology and forms of wealth, in turn, rest on the possession and use of the resources of a particular society, be it large or small.

Basic resources. A *resource* is any part of man's physical environment and any human skill, attribute, or knowledge which is useful in creating an economic good or service as these are defined by a given culture. Economic theory has long treated land, labor, and capital as the basic resources.

Since land resources were discussed in chapter 10, we need but note that they are a source of food, shelter, and of goods derived from the processing of minerals and a source of industrial energy. However, since resources tend to be spatially immobile, effort or work must be used to make them available for man.

The concept *labor* refers to the individuals engaged in productive activities in a given society. In traditional capitalist theory, labor is viewed as a commodity to be bought and sold in the market for a price. Broadly it includes all persons who by their work contribute to the production and distribution of commodities or services. In this sense housewives or other persons who cook, sew, tend babies, and do other routine household duties without direct compensation in money should be counted as a labor resource. Unfortunately statistics report only those activities which bring in a money income or can be estimated in such terms. We shall discuss the labor force below.

Capital represents a surplus item, an intermediate good or form of wealth devoted to the production of other commodities or services. The accumulation of capital depends on some form of abstinence, some restraint of the impulse to consume or destroy the good at once. Long ago man learned to maintain a scarcity in reference to immediately pressing wants in the belief that in this way he would be able to secure more goods at a later time.

Capital is a matter of use or function rather than of specific object. Coal burned in a grate to heat a room is a consumption good; used in a blast furnace in making steel, it is considered a capital good. Capital or producers' goods are easily distinguishable in machines, plants, railroad equipment, and the like. On the contrary, a box of breakfast cereal or a dress is obviously a "consumption" good. But things like a refrigerator, furniture, or a house are usually called "durable consumers' goods."¹

¹ Clearly the term capital in this sense is not to be confused with the term *capitalism*, which is a system

Some basic institutions. The interplay of land, labor, and capital varies with the cultural system. Under capitalism, around which most of our discussion will revolve, there have arisen four fundamental economic institutions: (1) *private property*, or ownership of resources; (2) *contract*, the means of bringing persons, instruments, and materials together for operations associated with production, distribution, and consumption; (3) *profit taking*, the lure, "bait," or motive which leads persons and corporations to produce and sell goods; and (4) *freedom of trade*, or enterprise, expressed in our concept of the free market.

Under socialism some variations in these institutions take place. Private property gives way to state or other collective ownership. Contractual relations continue though they may be modified by the state. It is often naively assumed that the taking of profits disappears under socialism. This is not true. Judging by Soviet Russia, Britain, and other socialistic states, the aim of state management is still profits, though their distribution may be differently determined than under private ownership. And certainly various forms of socialistic control over both human and material resources greatly modify the operation of a free-market system.

Forms of ownership and control. The type of ownership of property varies with the culture. In some societies it may be divided among members in terms of individual needs or by some ranking system as to age, sex, and social position. In other societies, individuals considered responsible for creating a good may be recognized as entitled to own the same. The development of Western capitalism has gone through certain phases which reflect the whole shift from a primary-group organization of society to industrialized, impersonal mass society and culture.

of private property and private profit. Nor is it to be confused with money or with stocks and bonds, which represent certificates of, or claims to, ownership. These things are important in our exchange economy but are not to be identified with capital goods.

The first and still highly important form of ownership and control is individual *proprietorship*. As capitalist enterprises expanded, one man joined with another and systems of *partnership* arose. This enabled two or more individuals to pool their natural resources, capital, and/or labor with a view to making more profit. Sociologically a partnership represents a form of co-operation.

In time, however, a third kind of ownership, the economic *corporation*, emerged. As a form of secondary group it enables individuals to act under a common name in order to own, hold, and manage property or an enterprise. The benefits of such operation are distributed among the associated stockholders. It carries a charter from the state which defines its rights, duties, and obligations. The individual stockholder is not liable for the debts of the corporation, and the life of the corporation is independent of the lives of the individuals who own the stock.²

No aspect of our time, in fact, typifies mass society more adequately than the corporation. Although recognized in law as a legal personality with many of the rights and duties of an individual, it operates in complete anonymity and impersonality. While it may enter into a contract, the controls which may be exercised over it are not exactly those which society may use with respect to an individual. While a corporation may be fined or enjoined by the courts, it cannot be put in jail, nor can it suffer from a sense of guilt and conscience. Yet corporations are the property of multiple individuals. Particular men run corporations. They make decisions as to policy and practice and hence affect the lives of workers, consumers, and others. In fact, present-day corporate organization influences our productive capacity, our financial system, the employment of labor, and the buying habits of everybody. The corporation is not confined to capitalistic economics. It is found also under socialism. For example, the nationalization of banking and coal mining

² Corporate organization is very old. It is common in religion and charity. As an economic institution it goes back to Roman times at least. Its modern form emerged in the joint-stock companies of the 16th and 17th centuries.

in Britain modified only slightly the essential corporate forms of organization and control of these enterprises. Soviet Russia has developed most of her state-controlled and state-managed economy along corporate lines.

The dominance of great corporations.

The impact of corporate organization upon a given economy varies considerably. With regard to the United States, until the War Between the States the chief corporations had to do with banking, insurance, transportation, and public utilities. After 1865 the number of corporations — both small and large — grew rapidly. Today giant corporations have come to dominate five important areas of American economy: manufacturing, mining, transportation, public utilities, and finance. Yet certain contrasts must be noted. Only one third of the economic activities concerned with service, contract construction, and retail merchandising are owned by corporations. In agriculture less than 10 per cent of the total volume of commercial agriculture is produced by corporately owned farms.

A number of studies have been made showing the variations in this matter in the United States. For example, A. A. Berle and G. C. Means reported that as of January 1, 1930, the 200 largest corporations (each with assets of 90 million dollars or more), other than banks, controlled nearly one half the total corporate wealth, two fifths of total business wealth (other than banking), and somewhat more than one fifth of all the national wealth.³

Although this study reflects the period just prior to or during the economic depression of the 1930's, the essential ratios have shifted slightly since there is some evidence that smaller businesses grow faster in boom times than in depression years. Thus, between 1939 and 1946 the assets of the 200 largest corporations increased by 50 per cent, but the next 800 corporations — in terms of size — increased even more. In 1939 the former held 50 per cent of assets of all manufacturing; in

1946, only 45 per cent.⁴ Yet there is no doubt about the fact that a country's capacity to produce in peace or in war is bound up at every point with the growing importance of large corporations.

The market and its institutions. The exchange of goods and services makes for more effective satisfaction of man's material wants. Most societies, even the lowliest, have some kind of exchange system, though it be but simple barter. In more advanced societies all sorts of institutions act to facilitate exchange: the market, price systems, media of exchange, and others.

Production is the making of a useful good or service which has a value. By use or *utility* is meant a power or capacity of a good or service to satisfy a human want. By *value* is meant some measure of effort, sacrifice, or cost. But since wants tend to outrun available goods or services, scarcity results. Thus there arises a problem of balancing the supply of goods or services, on the one hand, with the demands or wants on the other. And in the exchange relation a bidding occurs of one against another for the commodity or service. This means competition or struggle to secure the best good or service at the lowest cost in effort.

What an individual will pay — that is, exchange for a good or service — is called *price*. Since price has to do with quantity or amount of a good or service, it represents a measure of some quality or attribute or aspect of an object or a service. In more complex operations from production to consumption, price is usually defined as the monetary value of a good or service.

From a recurrence of bargaining relations, in terms of supply and demand, arises some sort of orderly pattern of exchange which economists call *the market*. This is a useful abstraction or concept for a set of human relationships. A *market* is simply a particular arena within which a single set of forces of demand and supply interact with regard to a given good or service.

³ A. A. Berle, Jr., and G. C. Means, *The modern corporation and private property*, p. 32. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

⁴ See "Financial trends of large manufacturing corporations, 1936-46," *Survey of current business*, 1947, 27: 16-24. Washington, D. C.: Department of Commerce.

It is well to note that price is related to both demand and supply. A mere desire of a person for a good or service does not, in the language of economists, mean a demand. Economic demand arises only when such a desire is accompanied by an ability or willingness to pay a particular price, that is, to give some measure of use, effort, or cost for what one hopes to get. It is a social interaction.

As soon as exchange relations pass from those of simple barter in goods, some kind of medium or symbol of the transaction develops. This we call *money*, and it may be anything from stones, seashells, gold or silver coins to pieces of government paper.

In modern economics money is usually classified in terms of three uses: (1) It is a unit of *calculating value or standard of value*. Hence price is usually expressed in money terms. (2) Money is also a *medium of exchange*. This may be some form of coin, paper money, or checks, which are obligations against bank deposits of those who issue them. Credit is a value on deposit against checks or other instruments of exchange. (3) Money may also be a *claim to wealth* or a *store of value*. People keep coin or paper in safety deposit boxes or in savings or other bank accounts in anticipation of future needs.

Banking arose to aid the money-credit operations. A *bank* is an institution to extend loans — commercial or investment — and to handle credit relations among its customers. Its resources come from deposits of individuals or corporate savers or from its own profits in business enterprises. Since banks are viewed as quasi-public agencies, they often come under various governmental regulations.

The business cycle. Modern economy has long been marked by periodic fluctuation in production, employment, income, and general business activity. Such recurrences we call the *business cycle*. Years or seasons of prosperity are followed by periods of economic depression. Economists classify three types of cycles: accidental, seasonal, and secular.

The first is due to unexpected events, such as flood, fire, earthquake, famine, serious epidemics, and the like. The second arises from variations in business and employment in a given year. Christmas and Easter are associated with increases in retail trade. The planting season brings more business in seeds and farm equipment. The harvest season affects railroad carloadings.

Secular trends are those of longer time span and are, economically and sociologically speaking, the more serious. Apparently these cyclic fluctuations have taken place in all countries which operate under the capitalist system. Studies of our own American economy show that between 1790 and 1948 we passed through about 36 such major cycles or, on the average, about one cycle to a little over every four years.

The causes of the secular cycle are multiple, and no one has been able to tell which are most important. Such things as over-extension of credit, technological changes, competition between stress on consumers' as against capital goods, and a variety of social-psychological causes are those usually named. The last-named, of course, is the personal or subjective counterpart of the external causes.

For example, a rising consumer demand for semidurable goods, such as automobiles or farm machinery, may lead the makers of these things to overproduce for an anticipated market. Later they may find consumer demand or interest slackening, and the sale of cars or equipment falls below what had been expected. Their production is then cut down, which means layoffs for workers. In turn, the workers have less to spend, which fact influences other producers, and so on through the whole network of an economy. The speculative market is also an example. Here suggestion and expectation of future returns serve to push up the market. But loss in confidence may act, in turn, to drive the market down unexpectedly.

It is not our intention here to analyze the social psychology of the business cycle or of market operations generally. Yet the human and social effects of the business cycle are of interest to sociology, as these concern the labor force, income and consumption

differentials, and various interactional processes.

The Labor Force

The labor supply of any society consists of all its potential workers, male and female. At what age an individual is counted as a potential worker depends on the cultural definition. For example, since we now eschew child labor, adolescents under 14 or 16 years of age are not considered to be in the national labor force. Earlier, as is still true in some societies, younger children were so considered. Hence the *labor force* may be defined as that fraction of a population which is engaged in producing economic goods and services. In our society this includes wage earners and owner-entrepreneurs. Those temporarily unemployed are also counted in the labor force. As noted above, of course, the economy of a country also benefits from those who work without monetary compensation.

Composition of the labor force. The labor force of this country has grown steadily, in keeping with our rising population. In 1890 it consisted of 22.2 million persons, or about 23 per cent of the total population. In 1940 it was 53 million, or 40 per cent of the people. In 1949 it was about 62 million, and by 1960 will be about 64 million. The proportion of the total population represented in the labor force for the latter two dates will be slightly more than 40 per cent. This leveling-off of the fraction of the total population in the labor force is due to the disappearance of child labor and to the fact that we are approaching a stationary population with its consequent aging.

A second important feature of our labor force is the increasing number of women gainfully employed. Nearly seven times as many women were engaged in gainful work in 1940 as in 1870, whereas the increase for men workers in this period was only three and a half times. Even more striking has been the increase in the number of married and divorced women in the labor force. In

1890 only a negligible fraction of married women were in this category. In 1940, 15 per cent of married women living with their husbands were in the labor force, and in 1948 this percentage had risen to 22. In fact, in April, 1948 there were more married than single women in the labor force: in the ratio of 8.3 to 5.9 millions respectively. Of the former, more than 90 per cent were living with their husbands.⁵ The increase in the number of gainfully employed women, both single and married, reflects the changing status of women. (See chapters 17, 26.)


Trends in occupation. Since the beginning of our nation there have been tremendous changes in the relative importance of various occupations in our total economy. At the time our country was founded farming and allied occupations were the most important income-producing activities of our people. The changes in the proportionate place of our major occupations in our national economy since 1870 are shown in Figure 65.

These shifts have taken place largely as a result of technological change. Arduous heavy manual labor has given way to the machine and to pursuits in derivative industries. For example, between 1870 and 1940 the total population more than doubled and the labor force more than trebled. Yet the labor force in agriculture increased only about 50 per cent. In manufacturing and mechanical industries it grew about 300 per cent. In contrast, that fraction of the labor force in public service increased more than 2000 per cent; in clerical service, more than 1600 per cent. There were high percentage increases also in trade, transportation, and professional services.⁶

⁵ These figures are from John D. Durand, *The labor force in the United States*, pp. 17-19, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948; J. Frederic Dewhurst, et al., *America's needs and resources*, pp. 541-544, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1947; and "Marital and family characteristics of the labor force in the United States: April, 1948," *Current population reports: labor force*, December 23, 1948, series P-50, no. 11, p. 1.

⁶ See H. D. Anderson and P. E. Davidson, *Occupational trends in the United States*, p. 22. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1940.

FIGURE 65

SHIFTS IN OCCUPATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870-1940⁷

Unemployment. One important measure of the business cycle is the proportion of the labor force actually at work. Even in prosperous times there are always some people out of work. It is estimated that in the peak years of war production, 1944-1945, when 7 million emergency workers had been drawn into the labor force, there remained as many as 600,000 unemployed people in this country. During an economic depression, unemployment often reaches high proportions. In 1921 there were 4.3 million unemployed, or about 10 per cent of the labor force. One fourth of the labor force, or nearly 13 million persons, were unemployed in 1932-1933. And in 1940, even after the defense boom had begun, there were still 8 million out of work. During the boom years of the late 1940's, the number of unemployed ranged between 1.5 and 2 million.

The impact of unemployment on the individual and his family varies with its nature and extent. A prolonged period of general unemployment affects more or less the total population. One of the most evident differentials is in the age groups. Judging by the depression of the 1930's,

laborers in the age brackets 14-24 years are harder hit than older workers. So, too, workers from minority groups, such as Negroes, who also represent chiefly unskilled workers, are often first to be laid off.

The effects of prolonged unemployment on the individual's habits, attitudes, and values will, of course, vary with his culture. In our society, where the individual wage earner is assumed to be economically self-supporting and responsible for his own care and that of his family, a steady job affords status and self-respect. Continued unemployment or low income which reduces the family budget below the subsistence level is to him a major tragedy. As a rule it is only after every other resource—such as loans from friends, relatives, or "personal loan" corporations, charge accounts at stores, and sale of furniture and personal property—has been exhausted that the poverty-stricken family comes to the public or private agency, seeking relief. In a society in which the individual is held responsible for his acts, it is a great emotional strain to ask for charity. Long periods without wages, discouragement in seeking employment, certain conflicts of personalities at home, and acute need drive the wage earner finally to ask for help from organized charity.

If the period of unemployment is prolonged, if such crises recur with only short interludes of work, the whole attitude and ideas

⁷ From Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture.

of worker families may change. Ambition to work, sense of responsibility, and pride in family economic independence may give way to an actual anticipation of material support from outside.

It is in this way that the culture pattern of expectation of governmental aid during a depression comes to replace the older willingness to endure the hardships of unemployment. There is little doubt but that the prolonged depression of the 1930's left such an impress on the culture of the American as well as of other industrialized societies of the Western world. The enormous call upon public funds — federal, state, and local — is well-known.

Labor and industrial productivity. Mere brawn on the part of ample manpower is not a sufficient labor resource in a modern industrialized society. The operation of an effective, productive system of industry rests on three important types of knowledge and skill: (1) high-level scientific knowledge, engineering skill, and inventiveness; (2) high-level technical skill of workers; and (3) sound managerial techniques. The first gives direction and pitch to further industrial developments as well as sets some limits to it. The importance of the second is shown by the contrast of the skills of workmen in long-industrialized countries like Britain, Germany, and the United States to the situation in the first phases of the industrialization program of Soviet Russia. True, further mechanization and standardization which make for mass production on the assembly lines tend to lessen the importance of individual skills. Finally, managerial talent is necessary to the direction and co-ordination of various operating units in industry or business. All kinds of specialists are found in this group: plant managers, personnel officers, accountants, and public-relations staff as well as top policy-makers.

One striking feature of the economy of the United States has been the decline in working hours along with rise in productivity per man-hour and a continuing improvement in levels of living. This is graph-

ically set forth in Figure 66. "Over the 90-year period from 1850 to 1940, output per man-hour, as measured by national income in constant prices, has quadrupled."⁸ During this time the average work week dropped from an estimated 70.6 hours in 1850 to 43 hours in 1940. "With increased output per worker and per man-hour, we have been able as a nation to consume an ever larger volume of goods and services, while producing and distributing them with less and less effort."⁹ Automatic machinery and mass-production methods have played a large part in this.

These changes in the productivity of our labor force are also reflected in the increasing amount of education and leisure which are available to people generally. However, though the general level of living has risen, there remain variations in levels of income and consumption.

Income and Consumption Differentials


The material welfare of a nation depends, first, on the amount and nature of the goods and services provided; and, second, on the manner in which such goods and services are distributed among the population. The people concerned most directly with production are the members of the income-earning labor force. The economic rewards of these persons is reflected in the annual income. But, as already pointed out, there are other productive activities not defined in terms of cash received, such as goods and services produced for the workers' own consumption at home or on the farm. Hence, in the statistical materials to be presented, we must bear in mind that income figures represent only that fraction which is computed in terms of money. On the other hand, every living person — child or adult — is a consumer. Obviously the total number of individuals to be fed, clothed, housed, and otherwise provided for is larger than the total labor force.

⁸ From Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 569. By permission.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 551.

FIGURE 66

TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT, WORKING HOURS, AND NATIONAL INCOME, 1850-1949, WITH PROJECTIONS TO 1960¹⁰



The distribution of national income. The income of a country is a fair measure of its wealth and material well-being. The extent to which a country is able to satisfy the wants of its people depends on the degree of effective use and distribution of its resources and products.

The national wealth of the United States has increased throughout its history. Figure 66 gives the national income from 1850 to 1949, adjusted to the 1940 price index. But there are sharp fluctuations in national income in terms of prices and the business cycle. Thus, in 1929, the "current" dollar income was 92 billion. It fell to two thirds of this during the depression. By 1940 it had risen to 95 billion, and in 1948 the national income reached a peak of 234 billion in "current" dollars.

It is sounder economics to give income in "constant" dollars, or real income as it is adjusted to costs of living, than in terms of "current" dollars, that is, earnings at a given time without regard to their purchasing power. In periods of economic recession, incomes tend to outrun prices. In boom periods, especially those following long wars when there is a backlog of consumer demand for goods not available during the war, prices are likely to outrun incomes. Thus, in the middle 1930's, although the national income was depressed,

prices fell relatively still lower. In the late 1940's, in contrast, prices tended to rise somewhat faster than wages. Yet the steady improvement of productivity accompanied by betterment of income has meant a growing expansion of goods and services available for ever-larger numbers of individuals and families. That is, the level of living has risen. For example, between 1913 and 1948 real wages among American factory workers rose 100 per cent, from \$11.00 a week on the average to \$22.00 a week. In current dollars the rise was from \$11.00 to \$51.00.¹¹

In terms of money available for consumption, the most important analysis is that showing amounts to families. Certain broad differences in terms of rural-urban and regional residence have already been discussed. (See Figure 47, page 282.) Not only are such differentials in income proportions important but there are rather sharp differences in the relative share of national income obtained by the consumer units, that is, the spenders.

For example, in 1935-1936 the highest tenth of all consumer units (the smallest annual income of which group was \$2600) received 36.2 per cent of the total aggregate income of all consumer units. In 1947 the comparable highest tenth got 33 per cent, and the lowest annual income of this group was \$5700. In contrast, in 1935-1936 the lowest tenth (with incomes from \$0 to \$339) got but 1.7 per cent of the total income. Comparable figures for this tenth in 1947 (with incomes from \$0 to \$749) got 1 per cent of the total. Put more broadly, the upper 30 per cent of the consumer units in 1935-1936 received 62.2 per cent of the income. In 1947 the comparable percentage got 60 per cent. In 1935-1936 and also in 1947 the upper 50 per cent got 79 per cent of the total.

Levels of living and expenditures. Mention has already been made of the steadily rising level of living in the United States, as measured by income. It is also measured by consumption expenditures. Thus from 1909 to 1941, in current dollars, such costs

¹¹ Reported in the *New York Times*, February 29, 1948, from a news release of the Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.

¹⁰ From Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 25. By permission.

trebled. In constant dollars the increase was more than 75 per cent. Yet, how individuals dispose of their incomes varies with the amounts annually earned. This, in turn, differs with level of living, state of the business cycle, and changes in consumption habits. For example, in 1909 — a prosperous year — the American people made 73.4 per cent of their consumption expenditures for three groups of items: (1) food, liquor, and tobacco; (2) clothing, accessories, and personal care; and (3) housing and utilities. In 1932 — a depression year — they spent 65 per cent on these items. In 1941, at the beginning of very prosperous times, the percentage for the same things was 62.4.

Changes in consumption patterns are shown by the fact that since 1909 transportation and medical expenditures nearly doubled, and outlays for recreation increased by one third. For these three items, the American people in 1909 spent 12.4 per cent of their total consumption dollars; in 1941 they spent 21.8 per cent.¹² Important changes from 1929 to 1948 are shown in Figure 67.

Another useful measure of level of living is the proportion of income which goes into savings.¹³ An examination of Figure 67 will show that the ratio of savings to other expenditures fluctuates with the business cycle.


In 1929, of total income, 90 per cent went into consumption goods, 1.1 per cent into taxes, and 8.6 per cent into savings. In 1930-1934 only 6.9 per cent of disposable income went into savings. In contrast, during the war period of high wages, rationing, and campaigns for saving, the percentages rose to as high as 28.3 in 1944. But this was definitely a temporary wartime feature, and much of this saving was spent in the postwar years for both consumer and durable goods. In fact, by 1947 the fraction of disposable income going to

¹² These figures are from Dewhurst, *op. cit.*, p. 81. The authors maintain that comparisons which would include the years of World War II would not be quite as satisfactory because of high expenditures for war goods and consequent shortages in consumer items.

¹³ Savings include such expenditures as premiums on insurance, savings and other bank accounts, stocks and bonds, payments on mortgages, home improvements, retirement funds, and all other monetary contributions to capital goods.

FIGURE 67

PER-CAPITA FOOD COSTS, EXPENDITURE, AND CONSUMER INCOME, UNITED STATES, 1929-1948¹⁴



savings had dropped to 9 per cent. In that year 13.5 million families actually spent more than they took in, largely to get things not purchasable during the war. Almost three fifths of these dissavers bought automobiles, furniture, household appliances, and radios. Moreover, most of these families were in the low-income brackets, the under-\$2000-income group.

In fact, the poorer the individual or family, the smaller the fraction which was available for savings. Thus in 1947 only 64 per cent of America's 31 million families did any saving, although the total amount saved was 25 billion. In fact, four fifths of the net saving by consumers came from families in income brackets of more than \$5000.¹⁵

On the basis of such monetary statistics, one may well ask: What constitutes a satisfactory or reasonable, or at least a minimum, level of living? Our answer to this question will reflect not only our productive capacity

¹⁴ From Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C.

¹⁵ See "1948 survey of consumer finances. Part IV. Consumer saving and the allocation of disposable income," *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, 1948, 34: 914-932. Washington, D. C.: Federal Reserve Board.

and its potential use, the state of our national wealth and the amount of our national income, but also our basic value system itself. Our institutions of private property, profit-seeking enterprise, and machine technology are associated with competition, freedom of speech and assembly, personal choice of occupation and of residence, unhampered research, and with our forms of free civic life generally. These, in turn, are related to our ideas as to what constitutes a decent life for the citizen. There has been a growing belief that we want more than subsistence conditions for our working population, that in a potentially wealthy country such as the United States men and women are first of all entitled to proper diet, adequate clothes, and good housing; and, second, that there must be a surplus for the educational, recreational, and other non-material needs as well. Our steadily rising levels of living are evidence that the American people are carrying these views into practice.

Consumer habits and business enterprise. Modern technology and complex business enterprise have profoundly altered the market situation in which the ordinary consumer finds himself. Such changes are due to mass production, to the disappearance of the earlier competitive pattern because many monopolies have arisen, to the shift from an agricultural to an industrial nation, to our high degree of division of labor, and to our urban life. The consumer has become more and more dependent on the institutions of the market place. At an earlier date, say 1890, the ordinary buyer in a small town or rural trading center purchased goods which were usually of a quality not too difficult to determine. On the basis of what he could see, touch, or taste, he could decide whether to purchase or not. Today in modern retailing — rural or urban — the customer is in a different situation. This is reflected in a variety of ways:

(1) The quality, durability, and utility of goods are not well standardized in relation to price. (2) Advertising profoundly influences

consumer wants and habits of buying. Some advertising is useful in informing prospective buyers about available materials or services. Some of it is emotional and status-appealing. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is an old motive, hence all sorts of advertisements stimulate people to buy so that they, too, may have a product popular with the "best people." (3) The nature of retailing has greatly changed. The department store, the mail-order house, and the chain store all give witness to the growing complexity of the market, to alterations in the earlier competitive patterns, and to changes in the role of the ultimate consumer. The chain store is a good reflection of business enterprise in mass society. It eliminates the middleman, it handles standardized goods, but its merchandising tends to be impersonal though efficient. (4) Finally, alterations have been made in use of credit. Many consumers no longer pay cash or make use of an open charge account. Rather, they pay on some sort of fixed installment plan. Installment buying has become a culture pattern for large sections of our population. This means, again, that the charges for this service, for carrying the manufacturing and middleman costs, are sooner or later passed on to the consumer.

The difficulties for the consumer arising out of modern merchandising reflect the transition from an old to a new method of distributing consumption goods. While many critics bewail advertising, chain stores, and other aspects of contemporary selling, it must be realized that all these are intimately interwoven with the whole fabric of modern business enterprise. Yet, along with these changes, consumers are developing devices to protect themselves.

Consumer protection. The present-day consumer is just beginning to acquire knowledge to help him in his buying. The government, acting as an agency for the consuming public, has taken an increasing interest in this matter. There are laws providing for pure food and drugs, for standard methods of packaging and labeling, and for licensing and inspection — a type of control which emphasizes the conditions surrounding the production of a good or a service rather than the nature of the product

itself. Such regulations are found in public transportation systems, in restaurants, packing houses, and so on. So, too, governments attempt to set up standards regarding such matters as weight, freshness, chemical composition, and quality. Standardization, if carried to its ultimate limit, would tend to eliminate style or fashion, both of which are factors in selling. Here again we see a struggle between the logical and useful appeals and the irrational nature of many of man's wants and satisfactions.

In addition to governmental aids, various private consumer organizations have been set up to inform prospective buyers about quality and price. Fire-insurance companies maintain engineering corps to test building materials, and the American Medical Association has long carried on campaigns against quacks and nostrums.

Social Processes and the Economic Order

Both primary and derived social processes are at work in the economic order. Especially important are competition, conflict, co-operation, and differentiation. In addition, the derived processes of accommodation and stratification are clearly in evidence. These processes operate both in interindividual and in intergroup relations. As an approach to some of the more specific aspects of process, we open this section by considering the industrial plant as a grouping of diverse individuals resembling, in some ways, a community.

The industrial plant as a quasi-community. A factory, department or other retail store, a business office, or any other aggregate of individuals concerned with economic production or distribution develops many features of a community, though not all of them.¹⁶ Such grouping

we shall call an "industrial plant." This is characterized by a given locus or place of work and certain central and peripheral functions carried on by individuals with particular roles and statuses directed to a given economic end. Some of the relations of individuals and groups within the plant are formal and institutionalized; others, of an informal sort, develop from the very fact of people working together in close proximity.

While there are wide variations in details, as a rule a plant has the following formal features: (1) The personnel have certain traditional or contractual relations to each other. The most obvious division is that between management and worker. The former may be the owner but under corporate organization is usually an agent of the owners. (2) In terms of interactions, the relations of management to workers are those of graded authority and responsibility. The aim of management is the most effective production for the highest profits. The expectation from workers is highest performance in terms of their wages. No doubt, the pattern of giving orders and of expecting compliance therewith represents an extension into adult life of authority-obedience patterns built into the individual in his earliest years in the family and school. (3) Within this large framework there are graded series of relationships. In management they range from the chief executive downward through subordinate management personnel to the foreman. Among the workers there is a gradation in terms of skill, seniority, and other accepted criteria of differentiation of role. These gradations are measurable not only in wages, working conditions, and various work privileges but in widely accepted social status. For example, among railroaders the engineers and conductors are at the top of the prestige pyramid, the maintenance-of-way men and other "lowly" workers at the bottom. (4) Spatial arrangements are made in terms of management's decisions as to what makes for highest industrial efficiency. Thus a plant has a certain ecology related to the functions performed by the various workers.

¹⁶ Since the aim of the plant is narrower and more specialized than that of the true community, and since its population consists only of members of the labor force, it necessarily lacks the breadth and scope of the community as usually defined. Yet in many of its features the resemblance is close.

(5) To keep the plant in successful operation, all sorts of rules are laid down as to where to do one's job, skill expected, use of materials, avoidance of wastage and spoilage, compliance with safety measures, provisions of light, ventilation, rest periods, devices for handling grievances and suggestions for improvement, and many others.

On the informal side, again there are many differences in terms of the specific nature and function of the plant. But among other common features are these: (1) Workers tend to develop cliques or groupings among themselves in terms of spatial proximity, likeness of work done or level of skill, especially as related to the status factor, commonality of outside interests, and other situations or motivations which serve to bring about associations not recognized in the formal organization of the plant as an economic unit. (2) Such groupings may and often do result in certain informal status systems that in turn may influence the morale of the workers. For example, if white workers have cliques to which nonwhites are not admitted, friction may arise. Or failure of management to take such informal associations into account by breaking them up in the name of efficiency may result in loss, not gain, of workers' productivity. (3) Sometimes these informal groupings are powerful factors in influencing the level and amount of production. There are mores of plant performance defining how much work to do for a day's pay, avoidance of speed-up which may affect other workers' wages, protection of each other from foremen in matters involving wastage and spoilage of machines or materials, and many other features of work activity. Failure to conform to these mores usually leads to various forms of punishment: ridicule, ostracism, and at times even bodily injury.

While such patterns, formal and informal, arise and continue in most plants, they are further influenced when labor unions are organized and collective bargaining of one sort or another comes into operation. Union contracts frequently not only act to modify the formal features of the plant in

such matters as wage rates, hours, conditions of work, insurance benefits, amounts to be turned out per worker per day, and so on, but also may influence the informal features of plant life by affecting status relations in terms of craft-union membership as against the industrial unionism of the unskilled and semiskilled. And in plants not completely unionized, divisions of workers along lines of membership or nonmembership may make for conflict.

These are but some of the more general social features of the industrial plant, and many of the more specific processes can be understood only against the background of such a quasi-community.¹⁷ We turn now to take up competition, long considered a basic process in the economic order.

Competition. The interactional activity which occurs in bargaining is a case of economic competition. This may be defined as rivalry and struggle to get possession of those things which a given culture considers as wealth. It is but a phase of the larger universal struggle for goods, tangible and intangible. As economic theory states the matter, we have, on the one hand, a niggardly and limited nature or resource, and, on the other, a population with an ever-increasing number of wants. In the modern world this latter has taken the form either of an increasing number of mouths to feed or the extension of wants as these reflect higher-and-higher standards of living.

As to personal motivation, the traditional theory of economic competition assumes complete self-interest among buyers and sellers in regard to any article in the market.

¹⁷ There is a growing literature on what is often called Industrial Sociology. Among others, see W. E. Moore, *Industrial relations and the social order*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946 (has good bibliographies); W. F. Whyte, ed., *Industry and society*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1946; and S. D. Hoslett, ed., *Human factors in management*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946. See also F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and worker*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939; B. M. Selekman, *Labor relations and human relations*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1946; and Elton Mayo, *Social problems of an industrial civilization*, Cambridge: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1945.

It takes for granted a rational judgment of wants and of the means of satisfying them. It postulates the principle that each man acts for himself alone, by himself solely, in exchange, to get the most he can from others while giving as little as he must himself. F. A. Walker (1840-1897), an American economist, put the notion of so-called "pure" competition in these words:

"The idea of competition is opposed to combination. . . . Men in this state act as freely and as independently as the minute particles of some fine, dry powder absolutely destitute of cohesion. . . . Competition is also opposed to custom. . . . Competition is opposed to sentiment. Whenever any economic agent does or forbears any thing under the influence of any sentiment other than the *desire of giving the least and gaining the most* he can in exchange, be that sentiment, patriotism, or gratitude, or charity, or vanity, leading him to do any otherwise than as self-interest would prompt, in that case, also, the rule of competition is departed from."¹⁸

This view of competition clearly reflects the whole social-cultural period in which modern capitalism developed. It assumed a self-regulating interrelation of price, demand, and supply. This, in turn, rested on a simple psychology of rational motivation directed "to *economizing or utility-maximizing behavior*" believed to flow directly "from the fact that human wants are comparatively unlimited in relation to the resources available for the satisfaction of such wants."¹⁹ Modern psychology does not support this view of human behavior. Men have impulses and interests which do not completely correspond to their rational needs. Political and religious views, class status, and life philosophy may well influence economic behavior. Love, sympathy, hatred, anxiety, and indifference tied to irrational attitudes

and values may and do enter into man's economic choices.

Yet it was the contention of laissez-faire economists of the 18th and 19th centuries that the free flow of goods and services through rational and politically or otherwise unhampered competition would result in the most efficient production and distribution of goods, capital, and labor supply — all to the ultimate benefit of the consumers. They fully believed the competitive practice of their time, and they believed the institutions of private property, contract, profit making, and laissez-faire freedom of action to be a true and objective operation of universal forces in nature and society. They little realized the place of historical-cultural factors in the development of a particular type of economics which may by no means continue unaltered.

As our capitalist culture developed it became evident that men are not always equal in bargaining power, either in the labor or in the commodity market. The assumption of complete impersonality and rationality in exchange relations was not borne out by events. In fact, the free-market system itself broke down, as certain men or groups began to get advantages over others. As Horace Taylor puts it: "The primary objective of every business enterprise is to secure and maintain some strategic advantage in the market in which it operates."²⁰ As a result in every exchange system, in time, some will have a bargaining advantage over others. Thus, under capitalism various monopolies arose which controlled prices for goods and services. These run counter to the theory and practice of free competition.

Monopoly. The trend toward monopolies is correlated with the growth of big business and big labor unions. A *monopoly* is a form of enterprise — either economic or otherwise — which has more or less complete control of some social function or institution. Actually, this condition seldom exists

¹⁸ From F. A. Walker, *Political economy*, 2nd rev. ed., p. 92. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1887. By permission.

¹⁹ See J. J. Spengler, "Sociological presuppositions in economic theory," *Southern Economic Journal*, 1940, 7 : 131-157, quotation from p. 132, italics in the original. This is a thoughtful and suggestive paper on the limitations of classical theory.

²⁰ Horace Taylor, et al., *Main currents in modern economic life*, 7th ed., vol. I, p. 293. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1941. By permission.

in business. It usually means the power to restrain the would-be competitor or to determine a price. Some forms of monopoly have become legally accepted, as in the case of public utilities where competition is obviously wasteful. Other forms have not, though the pattern of the large corporation exerts great pressure in this direction.

To meet the pressure of entrepreneurs to keep down the price of labor, workers undertook combinations of their own in the form of labor unions. These organizations contended that this was the only way to equalize bargaining power in their competition with owners and managers for what they thought their share of the wealth. Moreover, as corporate business has grown, either along competitive or monopolistic lines, labor unions have extended their control over the labor supply. Today we have the interesting situation of the giant corporation and the giant labor union at odds over wages, hours, conditions of work, and even over matters of management and ownership.²¹ (See below on conflict.)

While the business world has been affected by trends toward monopoly, the process of competition goes on at many other points. Both interpersonal and intergroup competition are characteristic of human relations in the industrial plant. Men struggle for higher rates of pay, for promotion up the economic ladder, and for better status generally. This apparently is as true under various forms of socialism as it is in our own economic system. The Communist Party leaders in Soviet Russia soon discovered that incentives in industry must include differential incomes and status, and there has emerged a network of competitive relations in many ways quite similar to those under private capitalism.²² Competition does not disappear under socialism.

²¹ It is worth noting that labor unions of the kind we know are not tolerated in Soviet Russia since there the government does not accept the thesis of competitive bidding for labor in the economic system. It will be interesting to note what happens to labor unions in Britain if socialism continues there.

²² See Gregory Binstock, et al., *Management in Russian industry and agriculture*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Industrial conflict. The basic issue in all conflict concerns the distribution and use of power. Our discussion will deal only with the conflict between employee and employer under capitalist economy. The more revolutionary programs which aim at overthrow of the political and economic systems of a given society will be discussed in chapter 23.

The historical setting of industrial conflict is well-known. As to basic philosophy, each side rests its case on the doctrine of "rights." The capitalist ownership of the tools and machines of production, the insistence on the "right to hire and fire," on the right to determine wages and working conditions and various other matters of production stimulated a sense of injustice and abuse on the part of workers. They, in turn, organized to modify and restrict the owner-management practices in terms of asserted rights of labor to bargain collectively on the matters at issue.

In the early days of the Industrial Revolution in England there was strong opposition, both legally and in the industrial mores, to collective bargaining. But later there, as elsewhere, the system became more or less accepted. In the United States today the union organization of workers is pretty generally taken for granted, although a large fraction of the total labor force is still not unionized. In 1900 there were less than a million workers in labor unions. In 1947 the total union membership in this country was 15,400,000 or about one fourth of the national labor force.²³ Nevertheless the conflict pattern persists, with each side developing strong in-group values, attitudes, and practices with respect to the other.

On the side of owners the strategy and tactics take the forms of direct antiunion action, as in the refusal to hire known union workers, the use of labor spies, and strong-arm methods against union leaders and other members. There is also a good deal of anti-union propaganda. So, too, the company union has often been regarded as a means of preventing voluntary organization of the workers.

²³ *World almanac*, 1948, p. 912. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1948.

*Wide World Photo.*

OPEN VIOLENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND STRIKERS ON A PICKET LINE

The unions, too, have their power devices. They may restrict the number of apprentices. They may slow down their work in the plant. Also, they develop various forms of "feather-bedding" or provision for excess number of workers as measured by the efficiency standards of management. So, too, they boycott goods not made by union labor as a show of union solidarity. And with a view to long-time as well as short-range aims, there is much prounion propaganda of various sorts. Some of this takes the form of attacks on business and industry and on the leaders of the same. Some of it portrays the advantages of unionization to prospective members. Still other propaganda may be directed to the consumer public with a view to enlisting their verbal if not overt support.

When the workers fail to secure the remedies they seek by bargaining, they may resort to the strike. It is their most effective weapon. The strike is a collective refusal to work. It arises, however, from a long chain of prior conditions and actions. The development and course of a strike, in fact, illustrate a cycle more or less common in many conflict situations.

The process may be traced as follows: (1) a more or less extended period of unrest and emotional tensions between workers and employers — especially enhanced by the organization of the workers into unions; (2) failure of peaceful attempts to relieve strain by methods of collective bargaining or arbitration; (3) mobilization for direct action; (4) unless prevented by law, there may be dismissal by employers of workers suspected of

fostering the strike and the use of other devices to prevent the strike; (5) frequent belouding of the issues by the rise of personal hostilities toward leaders or officials on either side; and (6) the strike itself. The strike, in turn, leads to (7) attempts to settle by various devices: conferences, arbitration by state or other outside body; (8) appeals from both factions to the wider public; and (9) the end of the strike by some means of accommodation. (See below.)

The actual strike is conducted much in the manner of military strategy and tactics. The use of picket lines is common, as well as direct effort to prevent strike-breakers from entering the plant. Open violence may result between workers and between strikers and the police. The government becomes concerned with strikes when they lead to the destruction of property, personal violence, and disturbances of the public order.

There has been considerable shift in recent years in the views on bargaining and the use of the strike as a weapon in the struggle between unions and management. This is evident in the various laws which aim to equalize the bargaining power of organized labor vis-à-vis the employers. It is clear in the disposition of the police in many communities not to interfere in certain activities of strikers, such as parading, speechmaking, and the like, so long as there is no open violence. Also, the widespread readiness of large sections of the public not to cross a picket line is another.

The larger effects of strikes in economic and other terms are difficult to assess. Historically they have been associated with the fluctuations in the business cycle. In the period after the War Between the States, when industrialization spread rapidly, strikes for higher wages often increased in number as prices declined. Since the opening of the 19th century, however, strikes have tended to increase in periods of rising prices.²⁴ More recently they have often concerned union

recognition and various union rules rather than the wage structure itself.

The direct economic cost of strikes is measured by the number of laborers involved in work stoppages and in the percentage of the total working time lost thereby. This fluctuates greatly, in general with the rise and fall of prices. Thus, in 1927 over 26 million man-days were lost by reason of strikes. This was 0.37 per cent of the total working time of the nation's workers. In 1930 the corresponding figures were 3.3 million, or 0.05 per cent. In 1946 — a period of realignment of labor-management relations after the war — 116 million man-days were lost, or 1.43 per cent of the total working time. In 1947 the figure had dropped again, to 34.5 million man-days lost, or 0.41 per cent of the total working time. In 1948 the loss was slightly less than in 1947.

Yet the economic losses are not the only ones. The continuation of the conflict pattern may in the long run lessen industrial productivity and widen the differences in the class structure. In fact, Karl Marx argued that this sharpening of conflict was an inevitable step in the historical process which would end in the liquidation of capitalism as a system. Actually what Marx predicted for the highly industrialized countries has not taken place. Rather, unions and management have tended to give up the pattern of conflict in favor of various forms of co-operation and accommodation.

Accommodation. The settlement of strikes represents a form of accommodation, the features of which will vary with the relative strength of the opposing sides. In the early days of collective bargaining the loss of a strike sometimes meant the dissolution of the union. And in these cases the accommodation often took the form of increased domination on the part of employers over their workers. Today, with big unions fighting big business, the relative strength is often fairly equal.²⁵ Today strikes usually end in some kind of compromise or arrange-

²⁴ For a study of the interplay of the business cycle and strikes, see J. I. Griffin, *Strikes: a study in quantitative economics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

²⁵ On the growing power of labor unions, see Sumner Slichter, "Are we becoming a 'Laboristic' state?" *New York Times Magazine*, May 16, 1948.

ment in which the opposing aims of the two contestants are modified in the resulting contracts.

Other forms of accommodation have a place in the disputes of workers with employers. Arbitration and mediation are common forms. Sometimes there is a voluntary arrangement to settle difficulties by a board made up of representatives of labor and management with third parties chosen by mutual agreement. Sometimes the state may establish some system of compulsory arbitration in connection with its efforts to outlaw strikes.

Then, too, conciliation systems such as works councils or committees within plants are set up to bring about more peaceful settlement of difficulties between workers and management. Such programs may or may not have any relation to union-employer contracts. But certainly these patterns reflect a mood of co-operation rather than conflict, and their growth in number and responsibility to settle difficulties bespeaks a shift from the conflictive to a more tolerant and co-operative interactional pattern in the relations of labor and management.

Some other social processes. Co-operation as well as competition and conflict is a feature of the economic order. In fact, when interindividual and intergroup opposition establishes some kind of working equilibrium it represents in a very broad sense a kind of overall co-operation and/or accommodation. But, more specifically, co-operation among the members is an absolute essential to the solidarity and effectiveness of the groups which make up the larger economic order.

Then, too, co-operation is found in various associations of consumers and producers, described in chapter 14. We need not repeat the discussion here but should point out that consumers' co-operatives are far less common in our urban factory-worker populations than they are among our farmers. In many European countries consumer co-operatives are widely used by city dwellers.

Another important process in modern economy is that of differentiation of role, or division of labor, as it is termed in economic theory. Certain aspects of differentiation in the economic order will be discussed in chapter 27.

Conflicting economic orders. On the wider front of variable cultural systems are found conflicting ideas and practices respecting the economic orders. Some reference to this was made in chapter 4 in contrasting and comparing democratic with totalitarian-authoritarian systems. It is apparent that the differences between the two culture systems, so far as the economic features are concerned, lie less in the strictly technological than in other aspects of their total culture. For one thing, the patterns of ownership and larger controls often differ. Under communism as practiced in Soviet Russia the political order has come to dominate and control the economic. To a lesser degree political dominance is seen in the socialistic pattern set up in Great Britain and elsewhere.

Yet even in countries traditionally capitalistic there has been a steady intrusion of state controls into the economic order. Some people have come to call the emerging patterns a "mixed economy." This means a combination of private enterprise, co-operative industries, and government-owned industries as well as a variety of governmental controls over natural resources and over various economic practices of private capitalism.

Thus, viewed realistically, some of the differences in the economies of socialist as contrasted with capitalist societies are less sharp than might at first appear. However, there is no doubt considerable incipient, if not open, conflict as to basic values in socialism as against capitalism with respect to the forms and distribution of power in the national society and within the various groups and classes therein. For example, the place of partial as against overall national planning is one. Precisely at what points and to what extent the political order should or should not intrude itself into the

economic is another. Then, too, there is the crucial question of how to retain the long-accepted and expected civil rights of the individual and groups in the face of extended planning and control by the state. This is a particularly difficult challenge

where there is general consensus that the national society and the national state are not coterminous. We shall return to examine some aspects of this conflict when we discuss planning and control in the final chapter.

Interpretative Summary

1. The basic elements in modern economy are land or resources, labor, and capital. Yet the manner in which these are used and controlled varies in relation to systems of ownership and economic enterprise.
2. The large corporation has become increasingly a dominant feature of modern capitalism and socialism alike. It symbolizes certain basic features of mass society.
3. In modern economy the labor force must be measured not merely in terms of sheer numbers but in relation to levels of skill and productivity.
4. The morale and the productivity of the labor force, in turn, are affected, in capitalist countries at least, by fluctuations in the business cycle. No one has yet found a means of preventing such periodic modifications in the operation of an economy.
5. The economic well-being of a society rests not only on the levels of production but upon the manner and kind of distribution of a society's wealth. The differentials in income reflect variations in skill and in economic and political power.
6. The history of the United States, like that of other advanced industrial societies, has been marked by a steady rise in the levels of living of the masses. Yet there are many unsolved problems relating to differentials in the welfare of the bulk of consumers.
7. Present-day industrialized economy operates through the basic social processes of competition, conflict, co-operation, and differentiation. In addition, such derived processes as accommodation and stratification find a place.
8. Industrial conflict, typified by the strike as a weapon of organized labor, continues to be an important cultural pattern in capitalist countries. Under the rigid controls of authoritarian states the strike is no longer tolerated as a right of the workers.
9. Various forms of co-operation and conciliation are gradually replacing the conflict patterns which have long marked the relations of labor and owner-management.
10. The economic orders of divergent cultural systems symbolize certain more serious conflicts in ideas as well as practices. How these conflicts may be resolved it is impossible to say at this juncture.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What do economists mean by saying that land, labor, and capital are the three essentials of an economy?
2. Define: proprietorship, partnership, corporation, money, credit.
3. What makes the giant corporation so important in modern economy?
4. What is meant by *the* market? Is the New York Stock Exchange *the* market or *a* market?
5. What is meant by the business cycle? Why do many economists consider this one of the crucial problems of modern economy?
6. What are the more objective measures of income?

7. What problems does the consumer face in buying goods today that he did not face 50 or 60 years ago? What protection has he in the face of advertising and other methods of "high-pressure" salesmanship?
8. What forces are at work in the modern world modifying the earlier patterns of laissez-faire competition?
9. What are the chief conditions which stimulate strikes? How have the demands of labor altered in recent years? What is the reason for this change? Trace the major steps in a strike.
10. What elements in capitalist as against socialist economies make for potential conflict between nations? What elements make for pacific agreements among them?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

T. W. Arnold, *The folklore of capitalism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937.

An insightful description of the place of custom in the operation of capitalism.

A. A. Berle, Jr., and G. C. Means, "Corporation," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 4 : 414-423. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

The history and function of the corporation in Western culture.

Herbert Heaton, "Industrial revolution," *ibid.*, 1932, 8 : 3-13.

An excellent analysis of the industrial development of modern times, not a mere rehearsal of chronology.

M. J. Herskovits, *The economic life of primitive peoples*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940.

Important as showing the meaning of economic orders in nonliterate peoples.

Sumner Slichter, *The American economy: its problems and prospects*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

An excellent analysis of our capitalist economy, its trends and problems.

Werner Sombart, "Capitalism," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, *op. cit.*, 1930, 3 : 195-208.

A full review of the development of capitalism and its chief features, largely from the author's own professional standpoint; but very suggestive.

Sociological Aspects of the Political Order

It is the proper function of political science to deal with the institutions and processes of government. Yet many political activities have considerable bearing on topics of interest to sociology. Among others these include the relation of the national society to the state, the way in which the mores and public opinion influence political action, the place of political revolution in social-cultural change, the meaning of the rapid expansion of government, and the growth of the welfare state as related to the economic order. The sociology of international relations as related to peace and war will be dealt with in chapter 24.

The present chapter will first discuss the nature of the political order. Second, it will consider the institutions and processes of government. This will be followed by an examination of the nature of gradual or evolutionary and of violent or revolutionary change.

The Nature of the Political Order

All societies, except those of simplest extended kinship groupings, have some sort of larger, overall regulations dealing with the general welfare of the tribe or the community. These patterns rest on the idea or belief that certain acts come within public control. Usually there are certain groups or persons who set up the rules and who act to see that they are enforced. In its broadest sense this wider regulatory force may be called the government. In the more rudimentary societies such controls are largely informal. In more complex ones they are both informal and formal. In general, the more complex the community, the more formalized the

controls tend to be. Such more definite organization is reflected in special personnel — legislative, administrative, and judicial — whose function it is to operate the various control agencies. In the strict sense, the concept political order or government refers to these special regulations and the operating personnel.

The meaning of the political order will be clearer if we examine its roots. *Political* comes from the Greek *politikos*, pertaining to the citizens of the state. In ancient Greece a citizen was a full member of the city-state with a certain role and status in public life. These stood in contrast to his culturally deep-rooted relations with his family, kin, and occupational or other associations. However, students of the time, like Plato (B.C. 427?–347) and Aristotle (B.C. 384–322), drew no sharp distinctions between the community or national society and the state. To them the small, rather compact city-state was the “national” community as we know it. Persons who were not citizens, such as slaves and foreigners, had no rights or duties with respect to the city-state.

The community obligation of the citizen is more clearly shown in the Roman *res publica* from *res*, meaning thing, affair; and *publicus*, meaning public, belonging to the public. *Res publica* had to do with regulating the relations of citizens in the community. The distinction between public and private matters is historically important because it indicates the shift from kinship to territorial basis of control, from private vengeance to public punishment, from small primary-group obligations to larger ones based on secondary contacts.

The nature and function of the state. In modern times the political order is centered

in the sovereign state. It is the core of contemporary nationalism, as a social myth and as a set of practices. The sovereign state has become the principal instrument of public order and reflects, in fact, the continuing need for some overall dominant agency of control in industrialized mass society. (See chapter 24.)

At this point we may consider the *state* as an organized and integrated power or force used in the management and control of the public interests of a national community. These usually include such things as external and internal security, justice, welfare, and varying provisions for freedom, depending on the nature of the state and the national society. Also, the state has sole power to levy taxes to pay for these services.

Some background factors. The state is, of course, a historical product. Among others, the following are important factors in its development: (1) As populations grew in numbers, further differentiation of function probably led to a breakdown of former controls and the need for an extension of regulations to new areas of conduct. (2) This meant a shift from family or kinship basis of social control to one founded on the larger community with a certain territorial basis. (3) Particular individuals or groups or classes served to set down the rules and put them into effect. (4) More integrated forms of government tended to arise as groups or societies were threatened by, or fell into, conflict with other societies. This last-named was most important in the rise of more complex states. Warfare among groups makes for stronger in-group solidarity. At just what historical point the state as a separate organization of power arose is hard to determine. Certainly many non-literate peoples had quite elaborate governments: laws, rulers, and various agencies of control. Since our interest is in the modern state, we need not discuss the origin of the state further.¹

Institutions and Processes of Government

It is a far cry from the simple tribal or village council of older men to the elaborate operations of modern government, and yet the social processes involved have much in common. They all revolve around the nature and use of power. First, someone or some group makes the rules and laws or at least standardizes those at hand without which there could be no order. This is the legislative function. Second, somebody or some group enforces the regulations. This is the executive or administrative function. Third, as a phase of enforcement there grows up some method of settling controversies where the meaning and application of the laws or codes are in question. This is the judicial field.

Fourth, there is some means of relating the functions of these three state agencies to the cultural acceptances and expectations of the larger society and its various associations. Under representative democracy this is usually treated in terms of the interplay of the community and/or public, the party system, and the government.

Legislative institutions and functions. The central purpose of legislative bodies is to make the laws which become the government controls of the society. Other chief functions are those of taxation and investigation of administrative personnel to see if it carries out the mandates of the legislature. In some systems they may, on occasion, act as a judicial body, as in the impeachment of public officials. The legislative institution — parliament, assembly, congress — set up to make the laws, usually does so on the basis of some written or unwritten constitution. Law-making, however, may not be confined to the legislative body. In our system law is also made by judges in rendering court decisions, by administrative action, and by initiative and referendal schemes which permit direct legislation by the voters.

In democratic countries legislators are elected by various systems of voting,

¹ See R. H. Lowie, *The origin of the state*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1927; and W. C. MacLeod, *The origin and history of politics*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1931.

sometimes by direct and sometimes by indirect methods, as when one legislative body chooses the members of another. Representation is usually on a territorial basis, such as the precinct, county, or other geographic district. And in this country, at least, prospective legislators must live in the local residential area where they stand for office. It is deep in our culture that persons who live in one's own neighborhood, city, or region will serve the public's interests best. The British have no such view but nominate and elect men to the House of Commons regardless of where their home address is. There is little doubt that the older theory of geographic locus breaks down under modern conditions. It reflects the primary-group culture from which it sprang. Today, individuals and groups believe they should be represented in terms of secondary-group interests of their professions, businesses, labor unions, and the like. What is sometimes called "group representation," operated through the lobby and the pressure group, shows that the modern legislature must deal in problems other than those which can be defined in terms of primary groups living in limited localities.²

The Soviet system of representation in terms of being a worker in a plant, or in a railroad system, or a member of a labor union, or a farmer means a conscious recognition of the need to shift from a strictly territorial to a more functional basis of representation. In fact, our pressure group or lobby is a kind of unofficial soviet.

Judicial institutions and functions. A stable state rests on law, and law is but a form of social control through the systematic application of the power of a political agency in society. Law implies three features: (1) a determinable relationship of causes and effects or events in society; (2) a predictability of conduct based on this relationship, and (3) a condition of general expectation and acceptance with respect to legal operations.

² See Pendleton Herring, *Group representation in Congress*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929.

While the law — constitutional, statute, or judge-made — fixes the rules of human conduct, conflicts of interest constantly require some adjudication. Hence courts are set up for this purpose, usually at two levels: those of original jurisdiction and those for appeal, the latter being crowned by the nation's highest court of justice.

Most court cases fall into two legal categories: the criminal and the civil law. *Criminal law* deals with offenses against the public peace, morality, and order and is illustrated by misdemeanors and by more serious offenses, such as murder, treason, housebreaking and entering, and arson. *Civil cases* are suits at law between persons or between duly constituted associations, such as corporations. These relate to such matters as enforcement of contract, titles to property, collection of debts, torts (which have to do with injuries of person to person which may lead to recovery of damages), guardianship of children, marriage and divorce, or many other controversies not related strictly to the public peace.

The definition of what constitutes a criminal or a civil case depends on the culture. In many primary-group communities homicide or feuding was treated as a private, not a public, matter. Today these are crimes. The relation of the larger cultural setting to the definition of offenses, especially criminal ones, is important. For example, in revolutionary periods many acts become crimes which previously have not been so considered. Rights to public assemblage, to free speech, jury trials, and habeas corpus (the right to know by what law one is placed under duress) are instances of legal provisions which often disappear in revolutions.

The selection and qualifications of individuals to operate the courts vary with the culture. In Anglo-American practice, judicial functions have been divided between those of jury and those of judge. The jury system goes back to the primary-group theory of democracy, that an individual accused of crime has the right to be tried by his fellows of equal status. Although our jury system has been much criticized, and while there has been a constant trend to abandon trial by jury except in more serious

criminal cases, it still represents an important link between the citizenry and their government.³

Executive institutions and functions. A third basic function of government is to put into effect the "will" or laws of the state. Where government is at all complex there are usually several levels of administrative power and function. First, there is the *head of state*. He may be elected by popular vote or derive his role and status from the dictatorial patterns of a small clique or party. He is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the power of the state. In extreme cases the dictator-head may be both law-maker and law-enforcer, though this is less often the actual case than popular fantasy would have it.

The head of the state usually has some kind of council or cabinet to advise him. In some cases the council itself is the head of the state in the sense that its decisions are binding, as in Britain. In others it is only advisory, as in the United States. In Soviet Russia the real head of the country is the *Politburo* of the Communist Party. It has no place in the published constitution. This is a case of single-party dominance of the executive and legislative functions. The various congresses and presidia are largely window-dressing for the real controls exercised by the Communist Party.

The second-level administrators are the heads of major governmental departments or bureaus. They are charged with carrying out the executive policies determined by the head of the state and his advisers. Below this are several other layers of administrators: division and bureau chiefs, and a mass of specialists of various qualifications, duties, and responsibilities.

In democracies it was once common to draw practically all administrative personnel from membership of the political party in office. The spoils system is as old as the rule of *demos*, and it is not unknown under

authoritarian and dictatorial forms of government. But as the duties of administrators became more complex and demanded special skills in an increasing number of cases, and as abuses of nepotism and the sinecure mushroomed, devices such as civil service were set up to check the spoils system. The aim and function of the civil service is to take public administration out of the hands of politicians and set up professional standards in the selection and promotion of government personnel.

Yet mere administrative machinery, even if fed by specialists from civil-service rosters, does not necessarily give the highest efficiency. Nor is the spoils system always incompatible with sound performance. Naive people too easily put their faith in external forms and ignore the substance of public service. Moreover, there is even some danger that as the relative number of public servants increases they may become politically minded and develop a new kind of spoils system. The whole issue is so pertinent that we must discuss it further.

Administration and bureaucracy. Undoubtedly the extension of government services (see below) has meant an increase in the relative importance and role of the administrative in comparison to legislative and judicial branches. This shift has brought with it increased public concern with the nature of the administrative institutions and processes.

Ideally an administrative system involves (1) a set of rules and regulations respecting specified activities; (2) a given personnel, organized into some (3) hierarchy of authority, who (4) carry out the regulations (5) for the benefit of the public. With the growth of administrative functions in government, these related patterns tend to take on certain characteristics of their own which are associated with the word bureaucracy.

Originally the term bureaucracy referred to the administration of government by means of bureaus, that is, special functioning units to care for such matters as taxation, police protection, communications, foreign relations and military defense, and a wide

³ See Roscoe Pound, "Jury: England and the United States," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 8: 492-498. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

variety of welfare duties assumed by the state. Today the term has come to mean certain unintended but nonetheless important features of political and other forms of administration. The most striking of these is the development of a set of self-perpetuating culture patterns in which the means of public service often become ends in themselves and in which the power interests of the administrative personnel are directed to their own self-protection rather than to satisfactory functioning of the governmental agency as a public service.

Some of the important features of bureaucratic structure are: (1) The structure of administrative functions, or the "table of organization" as military parlance has it, becomes so sacred that no deviation from it is permitted. (2) The fixed rules designed to facilitate decisions tend to predominate at the expense of variable situations. As bureaucratic members of the military are so fond of saying, "You can't go wrong if you stick to the book," that is, to the rules and procedures laid down by those in the higher echelons of authority. (3) Such emphasis means a tendency to view various activities as fitting neatly into predetermined and stereotyped categories. Everything has to be labeled, acted on, and reported in formalist fashion with no deviations. The flow of decisions may become so intricate, so trussed up in red tape, that the purpose or intent of the action may become completely secondary to the proper fulfillment of the procedural rules. (4) This means high degree of impersonality in handling cases requiring administrative decision. The bureaucrat is a symbolic representation of his organization. He has no power of making personal decisions. (5) Such stress on "the book" and on cautious following of the rules results in what Veblen aptly called "trained incapacity," that is, loss of flexibility to meet new situations. (6) As to personnel, they are chosen by examinations to prove their ability and training for the job; but once on the job they are protected by various regulations about permanent tenure, recurrent promotion, seniority, and retirement schemes financed by pension arrangements.

The whole structure represents a fixed and safe world of action, marked by rigid rules, methodical and impersonal execution of the

same, and hence a predictable outcome. Once such a scheme gets into operation it becomes extremely hard to modify it.

The regimen set down in institutions has its counterpart in the human beings who operate the system. There is no neater illustration of the interplay of culture and personality than in the field of bureaucratic administration. Let us note a few of these relationships.⁴

The competence needed for the job will vary with what is expected, and the incumbent in a given office must come up to certain standards. But once on the job there is pressure to be prudent, methodical, and precise in carrying on one's work. One needs little or no initiative or imagination to perform, and responsibility is avoided by passing difficult questions on to those above one in authority or by hiding behind the rules.⁵ In fact, to demonstrate such qualities will likely lead to punishment of some kind, not a reward. Innovations are not welcome in a bureaucratic world. Rather, this world encourages and rewards timidity, conformity, and deference to higher authority and regulations. Living in a safe world, bureaucrats often show arrogance or indifference to their clientele.

Thus the otherwise timid and routinized office-holder can show his power over others. This is a feature of bureaucracy which individuals conditioned to a culture of individualism, personal appeal, and flexible deci-

⁴ On the sociology and psychology of bureaucracy, see Harold Laski, "Bureaucracy," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 3 : 70-74, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930; R. K. Merton, "Bureaucratic structure and personality," *Social Forces*, 1940, 18 : 560-568 (reprinted in part in Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., *Personality in nature, society, and culture*, pp. 282-291, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); also, R. K. Merton, "Role of the intellectual in public bureaucracy," *Social Forces*, 1945, 23 : 405-415; Philip Selznick, "An approach to a theory of bureaucracy," *American Sociological Review*, 1943, 8 : 47-54; and Reinhard Bendix, "Bureaucracy: the problem and its setting," *ibid.*, 1947, 12 : 493-507.

For a vigorous attack on bureaucracy as a system, see Ludwig von Mises, *Bureaucracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944; for a defense, see Paul H. Appleby, *Big democracy*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945; see also J. M. Juran, *Bureaucracy: a challenge to better management*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.

⁵ See H. D. Lasswell, *Power and personality*, pp. 89-91. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1948.

sions find so frustrating in military service and in dealing with governmental bureaus generally. While bureaucratic features may arise in the economic order, at least under free enterprise individuals "can take their business elsewhere." With regard to most governmental services there is no place else to go. This is one of the most striking features of life in a highly planned socialistic society. (See chapter 32.)

The qualities of timidity and conformity are also tied up with the deep wish for economic security. This, in turn, is satisfied by reason of seniority rights in pay and promotion and in pension rights.

Finally, bureaucratic personnel often develops its own strong in-group solidarity. Despite the aim of professional civil service, all sorts of subtle and real power elements may come into play to build up one's bureaucratic following. The evidence of favoritism in so-called merit-rating, on which promotion so often rests, is a case in point. A person in a higher position may do much for his favorites below him, or he may block many actions of any subordinates whom he does not like. In time the bureaucratic system comes to exist for itself, and its members may become practically a hereditary caste which manipulates the government to its own ends. This is not likely to happen under democracy. Nevertheless, our administrative personnel might become politically oriented and by means of its voting strength and organization as a pressure group seek to dominate the larger political order to its own ends.

While this trend has not been too evident in the United States, it is not absent. Certainly the bureaucracy in Germany had a part in the swing to Nazism. It is a powerful element in French politics. And while all the facts are not at hand, there is much evidence that a bureaucratic class is developing under the close supervision of the Communist Party in Russia. The Party leaders realize that control of the government administration — which there concerns both the political and the economic life of the nation — is important if their dictatorship is to continue.

Such tendencies reflect the growing importance of managerial personnel in government. Some believe there is a drift toward managerial revolution in politics as there is in private enterprise. This drift may be even stronger in totalitarian societies than under representative democracy because public service is a means of rewarding party members for their political adherence. This represents a spoils system on a vast scale. As a matter of fact, the experience of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Russia shows the close linkage of party participation and public-service personnel.

In short, once the administration of government — or of business, for that matter — becomes encrusted with bureaucracy, the system tends to perpetuate itself, unless some devices are set up to prevent it. Cautious and safe men pick men like themselves for the jobs. There is a kind of empire-building of the timid to protect themselves from the strong. They fear any inroads upon their role and status by bold and ingenious people. Officialism, like extreme ecclesiasticism in the church, means that the form of the law remains but the "spirit," the dynamic function, disappears.

Suggested preventives to extreme bureaucracy include such items as (1) a more careful selection of personnel through merit; (2) a system of permitting publicity regarding administration and contact with public associations aside from direct administrative functions; (3) the careful choice of political heads of departments and allowance for considerable flexibility as to policy-making; (4) decentralization of operations which will keep the administrative workers in close contact with its constituency; (5) professionalization of the service and opportunities for invention of new methods and choice of means by the staff which will serve to stimulate interest in the creative possibilities of administration and away from rigid, bureaucratic formalism. A too-highly fixed system not only favors the safe and timid man but also provides a background for the ultimate manipulation of such personnel by those who would use the bureaucracy for direct political ends. Therefore, (6) promotion should be made on merit, not merely by seniority; and (7) an organic and

close relation between legislative and administrative personnel should be maintained in order to prevent the isolation of one from the other.

Whether such measures or others will serve to prevent the rise of a vast bureaucracy as a feature of government in mass society remains to be seen. Certainly so far as representative democracy goes — as the author remarked to a group of federal administrators — “the basic question . . . is how to delegate power and yet retain control, that is, how to combine power and responsibility in our public servants. . . . We must never forget that the final arbiters of political policy and practice are the citizens themselves.”⁶

This leads at once into the fourth phase of the political order noted above, namely, the relation of the society to the state.

The party system and the political process. There are two simple but basic aims in the field of political power. The first is to get into office — legislative, administrative, or judicial. The other is to stay in office. In democratic societies these purposes are institutionalized in the multiple-party system. In authoritarian cases either a ruling class or a single party, which soon takes on the features of a stabilized ruling class, retains this power by various devices, such as physical force and propaganda.

Under the former system parties seek election at the hands of a majority of the citizens under certain rules laid down in the law and the mores. As a means of securing the general support or popular “will,” political parties become organized in a hierarchical fashion and develop codes, leadership, tactics, and strategy for capturing elections, including membership drives, propaganda, and “getting out the vote.” As Walter Lippmann says, voting is a form of

“paper mobilization” of the latent power of the masses which may be expressed in public law and action by means of a legally determined majority, that is, through the potential force of large numbers. Moreover, the elected and appointed officials of the state take over the job of dealing more or less systematically and continually with problems “which come to public opinion spasmodically and on appeal.”⁷

While parties struggle in the larger public arena in an effort to get rid of their opponents through elections, there are also often competition and factional conflict within the party organization itself, aiming at domination of policy. Since at best party organization is loose and intermittent in effectiveness, inner cliques or “rings” develop, which furnish continuity between one campaign and the next. These political factions are usually more thoroughly organized than the party itself. A familiar historical case is Tammany Hall in the City of New York.

The most successful parliamentary governments have operated through the two-party system. In countries of many political parties, the conflicts for power are often hard to resolve in compromise and other accommodations. This is particularly true in periods of grave crisis, such as prolonged economic depressions or war. This fact is amply demonstrated by events in Europe between the two world wars.

Under ordinary conditions of stable society, when a party is elected to manage the government, it does not mean that the party defeated at the polls has no influence. It represents an important minority for the period — “His Majesty’s loyal opposition,” as the British phrase has it. It influences public opinion in favor of its countersuggestions to proposed legislation. It acts as a balance and an alert critic of the party in power. Under democratic culture defeated parties, then, do not take up arms to start a revolution, nor does the majority suppress the minority of the time by violence. Both operate under mutually accepted rules of the political game. In time the parties have

⁶ From Kimball Young, “The relation of the administrator to the farmer and the expert,” in *Standards of values for program planning and building*, Proceedings of School for Washington Staff of Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Oct. 17–20, 1939. Mimeographed by Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1939.

⁷ Walter Lippmann, *The phantom public*, p. 72. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927.

to face the national community again to see which will be elected for a new term of office.

The relation of the national community or public to the party system and government — at least under democracy as we know it — is featured by a number of important theories and practices. The core of these is stated in what we call "The Bill of Rights," including such items as the right of free speech, of free assembly, of petition, of trial by jury, of the writ of habeas corpus, and a number of others. The ideas and the practices which grow up around these indicate that in representative democracy the state is not identical or coterminous with the national society in which it is embedded. Under this theory, and in the words of the usual 4th-of-July oration, "the state is the servant, not the master, of the people." These rights are a historical product though often regarded as divinely fixed or inherent in man. But however they may be interpreted, they mean that ultimate power in a democratic society rests with the citizens, not with the state.⁸ When we use the concept representative democracy as applied to government, we mean just that. Individuals "represent" the members of the national society and in the last analysis are responsible to them. The party system is but a convenient device to implement this basic relationship.

This thesis, of course, is not uniformly and universally accepted. The philosophy, and especially the practice, of Nazism denied it. And in practice, if not in terms of Marxian theory, Communist Party dictatorship in Russia does not follow this principle.

This is not to say that the single-party form of dictatorship, which is usually a small minority of the total society it rules, neglects the matter of support from the wider national society. Certainly modern dictators attempt to win popular support or conformity by education and propaganda as well as by coercion. They tend to follow Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), who ad-

vised dictators, in addition to providing themselves with ample military protection, to make a serious effort to win mass support. In doing so, emotional appeals, extensive promises as to future benefits — tempered always with some lesser but more immediate advantages — and all the devices known to propaganda have been effectively used. Stable society and governmental order rest on human acceptances and expectations; and capable masters of men realize that to get this in revolutionary times, changes in attitudes, values, and habits in the masses must occur. Although concentration camps, machine guns, and the secret police are effective in external controls, nothing but the minimum participation in life activities involving government can be expected unless there are favorable inner convictions.⁹

When a political party arises which aims at a complete overthrow of the present cultural order, we may have the beginning of an organized revolutionary movement. If successful, such parties usually destroy the rival parties, change the form of government, and institute a new social-economic-political order.

We shall examine revolution below but only after discussing the slower, more gradual changes in the political order.

Gradual Change and the Political Order

In highly dynamic periods, such as the present, the political patterns do not remain static. They are influenced by technological inventions, the breakdown of primary-group forms of living, and the related extension of secondary and mass-society patterns of action. In particular these changes have been associated with an extension of governmental enterprise and controls.

While there is no absolute standard with which to measure the nature, extent, or rate of any social-cultural changes, most students distinguish between the slower and

⁸ See Kimball Young, "Society and the state: some neglected areas of research and theory," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 137-146.

⁹ On this and related points, see R. M. MacIver, *The web of government*, especially chapter 8. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947.

less disrupting modifications and those more sudden, violent, and disorganizing kinds. The former are often called evolutionary; the latter, revolutionary changes. This section will take up some aspects of the former as they touch the political order, especially in the United States.

The extension of government. One of the most striking changes in modern life is the growing intrusion of the government into areas of action long considered outside the direct scope of the state. This is particularly true with reference to economic institutions, but it is also evident in almost all important phases of our society. The manner in which the state tends to become the all-embracing controlling agent depends on the cultural values and practices of time and place. In most democratic countries it has moved chiefly in the direction of administrative regulations of capitalistic enterprises and of furnishing certain public services. In Britain, however, nationalization has begun. But, on the whole, such trends have not disturbed very greatly, as yet, the familial, religious, and economic foundations of democratic societies. In authoritarian countries the state has taken over property and economic enterprise entirely, with more and more regimentation and planning with respect to nearly every aspect of public and private life. Perhaps the forms of control, however, are in the long run secondary to the meaning which these have for individuals and groups within the larger society. It is quite conceivable that under our representative system the idea may emerge that government is in essence administrative.¹⁰ If this became accepted in practice, the United States could move very easily into a totalitarian pattern. On the other hand, if the essential division of

governmental functions into legislative, executive, and judicial remains, such a complete identification of government with administration may be prevented. These are basic matters of value, attitude, and action and must be taken into account in any sociological analysis of the state and the distribution of power.

There are various ways of measuring the expansion of functions in the political order. The most obvious are increases in costs of government and in numbers of public personnel. Others are the growth in services and regulations.

Regarding the first a few striking figures will reveal the magnitude of changes in our own country. From 1800 to 1940 the population of the United States increased 8 times, the federal expenditures 880 times. Or note another measure: In 1800 the per-capita expenditure of the federal government was about \$1.45; in 1915 it had risen to \$7.56; by 1940 it was \$71.49; and in 1948, \$268.23.¹¹ These do not include costs of local and state governments, which have also risen enormously. An overall picture is revealed in the fact that in 1946 of the 194 billion dollars spent in this country, 65 per cent went for consumers' goods and services, 17 per cent for private gross-capital formation, and 18 per cent into governmental expenditures for goods and services.¹²

Modern states do not depend on taxes alone to meet their costs but on borrowing as well. Another measure of rising expenditures in this country is seen in Figure 68, which shows the increase in the national debt from 1929 to 1949. Surely depression and war are two conditions which foster increases in governmental costs.

The increase in public employees at all levels of government is another indicator of the extension of the political order. From 1880 to 1940, for example, the number of

¹⁰ This view, once expressed by G. C. Means, is shared by many American economists and political scientists. It is obvious that this standpoint has much in common with the defense of the fascist state as being essentially administrative, not legislative. For a summary statement of Means' views, see "The distribution of control and responsibility in a modern economy," in B. E. Lippincott, ed., *Government control of the economic order*, University of Minnesota Press, 1935.

¹¹ These estimates are in current dollars. During periods of war, of course, the costs always rise sharply. Thus, in 1945 the federal government spent \$719.07 per capita. See *World almanac, 1949*, p. 267. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1949.

¹² *United States statistical abstracts, 1947*, p. 273. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1948.

persons on the federal payroll increased nearly three times as fast as did the total population. During the war (1945) the total number of federal employees rose to 3,649,769. In 1948 it was still over 2,110,000.¹³

The general social-cultural setting for the expansion of governmental operations, as measured by costs, are: the extension of territory, the growth of population, and especially the increased sense of public responsibility for the welfare and security of individuals — conditions themselves arising out of our complex technological culture.


From the very outset, the government provided such minima of services to the citizens as protection, through courts and police powers, of person and property, a standard monetary unit, a system of fixed weights and measures, postal services, and certain aids to build highways and improve waterways. Later a wide variety of inspectional services were set up for food, water, housing, and other necessities. Since one of our basic expectations was an enlightened citizenry, it was soon realized that education should be taken out of the hands of private corporations and the church and put into governmental hands. (See chapter 19.) More recently a whole host of welfare services has been established. (See below.)

Our Constitution provides that the federal government shall not only protect private property, establish a stable currency, and enforce contracts but regulate, if necessary, interstate as well as foreign commerce. In addition, vague but nonetheless potent police powers give the state the right to legislate with regard to safety and general welfare.

Tariffs were long used not only to raise revenue but to protect American industry. So, too, entrepreneurs constantly sought advantages over their rivals — through superior techniques of production, better access to raw materials, shrewder methods of marketing goods, or what not. As a result, in many fields monopoly began to replace competition as described by the theorists. In addition to growing monopolies cut-

FIGURE 68

GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL DEBT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1929-1949¹⁴



throat competition, the watering of stocks, and excessive charges for economic service led to a good deal of public clamor to have the government step in to regulate certain aspects of private enterprise.

The demands for regulation were usually phrased in terms of "public interest" as against "private interest," but actually the struggle was largely that of certain segments of the population against others. For example, during the last quarter of the 19th century, American farmers felt that grave injustice was done them by the railroads with their system of high charges and rebates. In similar vein small enterprises, pushed to the wall by growing trusts, demanded relief in the form of regulations making possible free competition — in line with the theory of *laissez faire*, on which all had been nurtured. From this came the Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887. Then followed in 1890 the Sherman Act, designed to prevent monopoly and restore competition.


In time two trends emerged in reference to governmental attempts at regulation. It became apparent that the economic forces were making for large-scale ownership and operation. The former was seen in the development of the giant corporation and in the emergence of mass-production and mass-selling methods. The second factor was the recognition of what is politely termed "natural" monopoly. It became evident to all that certain kinds of services,

¹⁴ Data from *World almanac*, 1949, p. 268, from reports of the United States Treasury.

¹³ *New York Times*, November 12, 1948.

FIGURE 69

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND FEDERAL WORK PROGRAMS: PAYMENTS TO RECIPIENTS AND EARNINGS OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, JANUARY, 1933–December, 1943¹⁵



such as the provision for water, light, power, and local transportation, did not conform to the competitive thesis, that rival enterprises striving to furnish such goods and services to the public led to wastefulness through duplication of effort.

As a result, former legal rigidities began to give way. Under the broad concept of the "rule of reason," allowances were made for certain types of monopoly, and the legal restraints were interpreted as bearing only on "unreasonable" monopoly. With reference to natural monopolies, the trend in legislation thereafter was toward regulation of rates and conditions of operation rather than legal insistence on free competition.

The nature and extent of further governmental regulations since 1890 have fluctuated somewhat with the state of the business cycle, the relative strength of various pressure groups (especially those representing farm, big-business, and labor-union interests), and the drift of public opinion regarding the place of government in general-welfare programs.

The first decade of the present century saw the serious beginnings of programs to

conserve such natural resources as timber and water. So, too, the Clayton Act and others strengthened the earlier antitrust laws. But it was the depression of the 1930's which stimulated the most striking growth of governmental services and regulations. These concerned agriculture, business, and labor as well as larger community interests as to social security and health. Let us note some of the more important of these:

The decline in farm prices and other problems in agriculture stimulated a number of federal measures. Among others were the Agricultural Adjustment Administration Act (AAA), set up in 1933 to subsidize certain commercial farm groups, and the Federal Security Administration of 1937, aimed at rehabilitation programs for certain depressed farmers. The Rural Electrification Administration provides funds to help install electrical equipment in rural areas. So, too, various credit and crop insurance agencies were established.

Aid to business was first tried in 1933 in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA),

¹⁵ Prepared from *Social Security Bulletin*, 1944, 7, no. 2:26. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office.

later declared unconstitutional. This was our first serious move towards a state-regulated but privately owned economy. While it had support from certain business interests, it was too drastic a change for most people. In fact, the scheme had many features of corporate regulation then in vogue in fascist countries. Less severe changes, but nonetheless somewhat opposed by business, were measures to insure bank deposits and to regulate more closely the operations of the investment and stock market. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, designed to help refinance business enterprises, was welcome, especially to certain big-business groups.

With regard to labor, various efforts were made to offset the effects of prolonged unemployment. These included the Civil Works Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Public Works Administration, and the Works Projects Administration. The public costs of these are shown in Figure 69.

Not only was an attack made on problems of unemployment and financing, but through the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 the federal government undertook to render direct assistance to the demands of the laboring classes. The former, under the National Labor Relations Board, was designed to assist workmen in organizing for collective bargaining with employers. Under the Commerce clause of the Constitution, the latter was passed to provide for certain minima of wages, hours, and working conditions in any enterprise producing goods for interstate commerce.

In 1947 the former law was considerably amended by the Labor Management Act (Taft-Hartley Act). It provided among other things for publication of financial records of unions and restricted certain union practices permitted or not forbidden in the Wagner Act. But the powerful labor unions developed strong opposition to the Taft-Hartley law. In fact, the conflict over legislation dealing with labor-management relations is an excellent illustration of the shifting balance of political power as related to unions and business. Also, it probably presages still further drift in the United States not only toward further regulations but toward more and more distinctly state-sponsored socialistic programs.

With respect to the larger community, various federal and state agencies to aid housing

have been established. (See chapter 15.) But more far-reaching are the programs set up under the Social Security Administration. This agency has charge, among others, of the following: old-age and survivors' insurance, unemployment insurance, public assistance, maternal and child health and welfare, and aid for crippled and other handicapped children.

The state as owner-operator. It is only a short step from providing funds for works programs, relief from mortgage burdens, housing, and the like to outright state ownership and operation of various enterprises. Americans early realized that the central government had a major interest in such matters as the manufacture of military supplies and the maintenance of harbors and waterways. Local units have long since assumed provision for water and sewage disposal. In fact, Adam Smith (1723-1790), the Scottish philosopher-father of *laissez faire*, recognized that such enterprises were not susceptible to the mechanics of free competition. But from public water supply it is but a step to provision for gas and electricity and for local transportation. In many cities in this country public ownership of such enterprises has long been accepted. Yet the trend toward public ownership by the federal government began only in recent years. The integration of electric-power facilities into larger regional units — under giant corporations — gave rise to agitation for federal regulations and in some quarters for federal ownership. The most conspicuous example of this trend is the Tennessee Valley Authority, set up in 1933. Of course, the purpose of the TVA is not only to produce electric power but to conserve natural resources.

A more clear-cut case of state ownership and operation — aside from examples of wartime necessity — is the production of atomic energy. The Atomic Energy Commission, established in 1946, has complete control of the sources of fissionable materials, their production, and utilization. Some plants are under its direct management, others under its close supervision. Large-scale research in all phases of nuclear physics is also under its direction or subsidy.

When we dispassionately consider these examples of our own expanding governmental action, we must realize that great changes have taken place though in a peaceful evolutionary fashion. When we look abroad we find either outright ownership and management or a complete regimentation and control in similar fields. In Britain the Labor Government, during the early years of its regime, nationalized banking, coal mining, and transportation. Its policy has been a gradualist one, the full implications of which are not yet clear. Soviet Russia allows only a modicum of private enterprise and personal ownership of property. Nazi Germany co-ordinated her economy around a militarized society with an aim at total controls inside and an expanding, exploitive conquest of the world outside. The representative democracies have not yet moved as far toward planning, regimentation, and overall state control as the dictator countries, but the trends toward increased and co-ordinated controls by the state are nevertheless in evidence. (See chapters 31, 32.)

While some of these shifts have been of a slow and evolutionary kind, others have come about through more violent methods. Let us turn to examine the nature of the latter.

Revolutionary Conflict and Changes in Government

While the term revolution has been used in a wide variety of senses, its more restricted meaning relates to a basic shift in the locus of political power brought about by violent overthrow of an existing government. New forms of political organization appear, new laws replace old ones, new classes come into positions of dominance, and often new economic or other patterns appear. The essence is the sharp change in the forms and distribution of political power. In general, it is largely a matter of the speeding-up of cultural changes already under way in a particular society. In revolution such changes are set in motion by open conflict.

Such conflicts, like others, take place within a cultural framework. In our own Western history, at least, four background factors played a part in political revolutions.

Background factors. There is a desire for improved economic conditions, which improvement it is believed can only be brought about by violent overthrow of those in power. In agricultural societies land hunger and the wish to escape heavy tolls, taxes, dues, and rents to landlords are often prominent stimuli to revolt. In urbanized, industrialized societies workers may organize to seize the means of production and to control the state which they regard as not contributing to their interests. However, revolutions are not born of abject poverty and misery but by a rise in the level of hope and aspiration of the masses, which itself comes from relatively better conditions than existed before. The peasants and city dwellers in prerevolutionary France were better off than like classes elsewhere in Europe. In the case of both prerevolutionary France and prerevolutionary Russia, the peasants already owned one third of the land. The American colonies in 1776 were better governed than they had been in 1700. In spite of economic and industrial dislocation in Russia during World War I, the lot of the city factory workers and peasants was doubtless improved over the conditions 12 years before, when the abortive revolution of 1905 took place. To be completely beaten down will not lead to revolt but to resignation to the fates. In short, revolutions are not made by downtrodden masses who cannot and will not stand any more repression. As Lyford P. Edwards says, "The emotion which furnishes the driving power of revolution is hope, not despair."¹⁶

Associated with the wish for land and wealth and improved levels of living go desires for more political rights, higher social status, and in some instances religious freedom. The particular goals sought will, of course, depend on the cultural setting.

¹⁶ Lyford P. Edwards, *The natural history of revolution*, p.35. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.

In this connection, also, the very ideas of revolutionary change grow out of prior intellectual advances. The Renaissance, the Reformation, and the scientific progress of the early modern period, along with colonial and economic expansion, laid the intellectual groundwork for the various revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. The concepts of natural law and of natural rights, the critical attitude toward religious institutions, the growing belief in individualism and democracy, and the undermining of the idea of the divine right of kings were among important new ideas which contributed to revolutionary movements.

Yet revolutions are not set in motion automatically by depressed economic conditions nor by demands for rights and statuses. The demands have to be made vocal and specific by leaders and organizations prepared to take action. In the inception of revolutionary movements leadership is likely to be of an intellectualistic nature and by the organizations of liberal and reformist type. Later, if the movement advances, leadership passes to agitators and men of action and to organizations operating along military lines ready to seize power by violence. The general strike has often been a preliminary step to the actual outbreak, and such an event can be developed and manipulated only by a solid phalanx of revolutionists.

Accompanying these other factors is the emergence of a new social myth to replace the one which lent support to the older and would-be-discarded institutions. In fact, the intellectuals and liberal organizations just noted often unwittingly serve the purpose of criticizing and undermining the old myths and thus prepare the masses for the indoctrination of new ones made along revolutionary lines. The old order is described as "bad," "evil," "corrupt," and "decadent." The new myth promises "land for the landless," a "job for everybody," "1000 years of peace"; in short, "a new heaven and a new earth."

Those who would retain the *status quo* may attempt to offset the new mythology by reforms, by developing new slogans of a

better day, accomplished by peaceful, legal means. But frequently these very methods are associated with half-hearted suppression of freedom of discussion and organization, which but serves to stimulate further the revolutionary activities.

Stages in the revolution itself. It is against such background changes that the revolution proper takes place. Among other features are these:

(1) There are a growing attention to a few basic issues and a consolidation of various groups or interests into those for or against a revolutionary change. What has been called the "oppression psychosis" of the masses becomes more acute, and the minority organization guiding the revolutionary operations prepares for the time when it can seize the reins of government.

(2) The outbreak of violence itself is often accompanied by strikes, prolonged unemployment, food shortages, and widespread disorder — difficulties which the tottering government is unable to meet and solve. Frequently the first shift in legal and political power consists in the removal of the reactionary and conservative government by liberal or moderate revolutionary groups. At least this was a preliminary step in the French, Russian, and German revolutions of modern times. But, as a rule, these temporizing and half measures do not solve the problems as now defined by the more extreme revolutionaries and their supporters. As a result, the latter in time seize the state and drive out the liberals, as the latter did the old and time-worn government. In order to accomplish this more radical step autocratic force is necessary. This means control by a dictator and a small determined elite at the top. By propaganda and careful organization the revolutionary minority secures the support of the masses for more vigorous measures. And, if well-handled, the masses in turn identify themselves with this new-found strength and lend it their support.

(3) The seizure of the government, of the productive system, of the means of communication and transport, and of every

other essential feature of a society may be found necessary if the extremist group is to succeed. But successful revolutions are not made by a rabble that storms the Bastille or fights in the streets. Mob violence in revolutions is far less significant and far less bloody than most people imagine. Rather, co-ordinated military action is undertaken either by such political-party armies as the Italian Black Shirts or the Nazi Storm Troopers, or by the converted soldiers and sailors of the Russian military forces under Bolshevik leadership.

In the consolidation of power it is often necessary to resort to terrorist methods. However, the reign of terror is not uncontrolled mob action but just what it says: a *reign* or *rule* of terrorism with a view, first, to destroying divisive elements; second, to integrate power; and, third, to convince everyone, inside and outside the country, that the revolution is a *fait accompli*.

The reign of terror is generally concluded by the same forces that set it in motion. When the counterrevolutionary armies are defeated, when something approaching unification of power within the country is established, when malcontents are silenced, converted, or driven out, there is little need to continue the terror. Of course, as an event it lingers on in the myths and legends of the masses, and the threat of reinstating it is often effective for years in quelling organized opposition — witness Nazi Germany and Russia.

The new order. The final feature of the revolution, of course, is the *consolidation of political power*. The legal and governmental machinery is put into new hands. Interestingly enough, all revolutions produce their own particular rationalizations or explanations for this redistribution of power. The change is excused in terms of public welfare, on the grounds that the power of the owners and exploiters was being abused and that hardships and violence were necessary. In this way the confiscation of property is made lawful and proper by conscious and unconscious revision of the mores and the legal codes.

There follows still further settling-down. The changes initiated in violence are gradually modified so as to tie up with those of the prerevolutionary culture. The activities of the revolutionary agitator and organizer of undercover conspiracy give way to needed legislative action, executive policy-making, and run-of-the-mill administrative work. In time there rises to the top of the social structure a whole new crop of individuals who knew nothing of the older periods of prerevolution and the strife which took place in the overthrow of the former government. They become concerned with making the new system work — and it is seldom as new as the revolutionists themselves imagined it would be. In short, the national society tends to settle down; the old culture tends to absorb the new to form slightly, not greatly altered, patterns; and life moves along.

Of course, if the new government undertakes widespread peacetime changes, more or less under enforced planning, as was the case in Soviet Russia, the subsequent impact of the revolution may be very great. There is no doubt that the rapid industrialization of that country and the striking shift from the old farming to collective agriculture meant more changes in a shorter time than occurred, let us say, in the industrialization of Britain, western Europe, and the United States. It is equally important to note that some of the difficulties in Russia as well as the gains may be laid to the door of such rapid industrialization quite as much as to the particular political theory of the Communist Party. It is extremely difficult to disentangle theoretical Marxian economics and Communist Party programs from the whole rapid change involving industrialization, urbanization, and other features of mass society and its culture. These aspects of the Russian case are rather a particular historical component in the total process. They do not alter the general pattern of political revolutions just described.

The drift toward statism. Conflict associated with revolution brings sharply into focus the relationship of this process to

social-cultural change. While the gains usually fall far short of the anticipations of the radical theorists and agitators, there is no doubt that such extreme upheavals have played an important part in giving new direction to culture and in altering the forms and distribution of power. In some ways modern, totalistic, international warfare produces even greater, though perhaps somewhat different, kinds of changes. (See chapter 24.)

Yet, taking the long view of history into account, one may raise the question as to whether the continuation of the pattern of violent conflict, either within a given national society — as between labor and management — or between sovereign nation-states, produces the results which might be achieved by competition and co-operation operating under certain agreed-upon rules. This is not to imply that mankind is likely soon to give up all forms of conflict. It is a matter, rather, of limiting these to more sublimated forms, in the meantime trying to develop various accommodative arrangements which will restore needed balance or equilibrium when the struggle of various groups has unsettled a given national society.

The difficulty with revolution as with other intense and violent conflict is that the end-results may make for worse conditions than existed previously. It is here that democracy seems to offer something superior to authoritarianism. As we have indicated earlier in this chapter and in chapter 4, the clear recognition in theory and practice that the national community is not identical with the state may help to forestall resort to violence. Also, it should

make for realization that the welfare of the whole national society or community shall take precedence over the interests of special and smaller groups, be they those of owner-management, labor unions, racial or political minorities, or other.

Among others there are two things which encourage demands from the general public for further extension of governmental control: the cyclic and severe breakdowns of the economic order and the trend toward monopolies, of both management and organized labor, which result in wasteful struggles.¹⁷

So long as democracies continue to hold to the basic principle that the national community is dominant over the state we are not likely to experience such complete and minute controls. Yet the drift toward statism is strong. One of the test cases of our own time is that of Great Britain with her mild and gradualist socialism. Will she be able to extend nationalization of industry and business without sooner or later undermining the rights which have so long been associated with that free and democratic national community? With us some kind of mixed economy, that is, a balance of state controls and even state ownership with the free-market system, seems to be emerging. As Spengler neatly puts it, whether the state will "once again take over economics" may well depend "upon whether men can establish enough little socialisms to allay the clamor for one big socialism."¹⁸

¹⁷ For an excellent analysis of the drift toward statism as related to the economic order, see J. J. Spengler, "The role of the state," etc., *The Journal of Economic History*, supplement VII, 1947: *The tasks of economic history*, pp. 123-143.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

Interpretative Summary

1. The state is the core of the political order.
2. The state is not identical and coterminous with the national community or national society. Under democratic political organization this separation is most clearly recognized.
3. In authoritarian systems there is today pressure to bring about an identity of community and state. This very fact is partial demonstration that the power of the state does ultimately rest on the national society.

4. The functions and powers of government are pretty much the same in every type of state and concern legislation, administration, and adjudication. Under authoritarianism these functions are frequently combined in the hands of the small ruling elite. Under democratic systems they tend to be dispersed among a wide variety of groups.
5. Social-cultural change in government, like other changes, takes place at differing rates. Slower changes are called "evolutionary"; more rapid, "revolutionary."
6. Political revolution means violent overthrow of existing government and rather widespread changes in the political, economic, and social order generally.
7. Revolutions appear to go through certain cycles or stages, at least if we judge by examples from Western history.
8. There is considerable evidence that the actual changes brought about by revolution were much less extensive and complete than the revolutionary theorists, agitators, and manipulators said they would be. Cultural inertia and cultural lag are more potent than many imagine.
9. Whether induced by slow and evolutionary change or by violent and revolutionary change, there seems to be a cultural drift toward statism.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is meant by the political order? Compare it with the economic order.
2. Define state, government, sovereignty, nationalism.
3. Discuss the state as a cultural pattern. How do you account for the absence of the state in rudimentary societies?
4. What are the traditional three functional agencies of government? Which of these is gaining ground as to importance in modern society? How do you account for this?
5. By what means do the members of the national community keep control of their government? What branch of government is most important in this?
6. What is the function of the political-party system in a democracy?
7. What is the basic problem associated with a growing bureaucracy? Why do many writers consider a growing bureaucracy a serious threat to free and sound government?
8. What situations stimulated the growth of state regulations and activities in the United States between the two world wars?
9. Name and comment on the most important background factors in revolution.
10. Trace the principal steps in a revolutionary movement.
11. How may one tell when a revolution is over? Illustrate from American, French, and Russian revolutions.
12. Write a short critique on the growth of statism in the modern world.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

T. W. Arnold, *Symbols of government*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935.

A companion piece to his *Folklore of capitalism*, in which the author describes and analyzes the meaning of political symbols.

D. W. Brogan, *The free state: some considerations on its practical value*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945.

An essay on the nature and meaning of democracy. Though written under wartime stimulation, it contains some telling interpretations.

Sebastian de Grazia, *The political community: a study of anomie*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.

A study of the psychology of political belief and behavior in mass society, with special reference to anonymity, impersonality, and loss of earlier nonlogical values. A most stimulating discussion with implications which reach beyond the traditional scope of politics.

Peter Drucker, *The end of economic man*. New York: John Day Co., 1939.

Traces and analyzes the shift from period of relatively free enterprise to statism.

Frank H. Knight, *Freedom and reform, essays in economics and social philosophy*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

A collection of incisive papers on science, democracy, ethics, religion, planning, and social action as related to the economic and political orders.

H. D. Lasswell, *Politics: who gets what, when, how*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936.

A realistic study of political processes and manifestations of power.

Charles E. Merriam, *Systematic politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945.

A review of the nature and functions of government by one of America's leading political scientists, full of insight, telling example, and sound interpretations.

Alfred Meusel, "Revolution and counter-revolution," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 13 : 367-376. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

A good review with a slight touch of Marxianism.

G. H. Sabine, "State," *ibid.*, 14 : 328-332.

A sound and critical review.

W. J. Shepard, "Government," *ibid.*, 1932, 7 : 8-15.

A full review marked by incisive interpretations.

R. C. Snyder and H. H. Wilson, *Roots of political behavior. Introduction to government and politics*. New York: American Book Company, 1949.

An excellent collection of selections dealing with the nature and function of the state, government, and political parties. Attention is also given to the relation of these to the class structure, population problems, and economics. The authors provide a sound interpretation to each chapter.

War, Peace, and International Relations

RECURRENT struggle between sovereign nation-states has marked most of recorded history. Nor is there much sound reason to assume that the world has seen the last of war. The large and powerful nation-states of today have not yet developed any very satisfactory accommodations to keep the peace. And yet man has now devised the most lethal weapons of all time: various uses of nuclear fission as in the atomic bomb and the dispersion of radioactive substances, bacterial and chemical weapons, and others. The threat to the very existence of the species itself from a world-wide application of such devices is no longer a mere fantasy.

Over against these dangers must be placed the fact of growing cultural, especially economic, interdependence of nations and regions on each other. Moreover, humanitarianism and belief in the possibility of a world order continue strong. Leaders and masses everywhere seem to want peace. But differences arise when plans to achieve such order are presented or tried.

The first part of the present chapter will discuss such topics as sovereignty and nationalism, the cycles of war and peace, and various cultural and personal aspects of war. Then we will take up the social-cultural and other elements making for peace and world order.

Sovereignty and Nationalism

The present problem of peace or war is bound up with the contradiction between the growing cultural interdependence of nations and peoples and the persistence of strong beliefs and practices revolving around sovereignty and nationalism. Let us see

what is meant by these two patterns of thought and action.

Doctrine and practice of sovereignty. The essential feature of sovereignty relates to a particular locus and organization of power. As a dogma and a practice sovereignty has had an important place in modern history. The breakup of European feudalism and the transition to modern culture patterns were marked, in part, by the rise of the nation-state. This was brought about by the subjection of the feudal lords to a central monarch who unified and extended his control over increasingly large territories. The *sovereign* — from which the word sovereignty comes — was the locus of final power. The doctrine of the divine right of kings was but a rationalization of this fact, just as its dissipation later was evidence of a shift in the source of ultimate authority which came with the rise of representative democracies.

Sovereignty as an attribute of the state, as representing the concentration of necessary authority to establish and maintain a political order, was crucial in the rise of the modern state. Difficulties arise, however, in actual practice over the question as to whether sovereignty is unlimited or, on the contrary, itself subject to law or other control. Even so-called absolute dictators are not completely unrestrained. The very nature of their social-cultural conditioning induces some form of control. Of course, a madman who is also a dictator — as we know from history — may approach such power expressions. But such a person sooner or later is liquidated. No community or state could long endure if ruled by the in-

sane whims of an individual. Where the national community has been recognized as superior in ultimate power to the state, the limitations of its sovereignty are said to rest in the constitution and finally in the customs, mores, and opinions of the members of the national community. It is in this context that the concept of popular sovereignty arose.

Where the state has come to be viewed as identical with if not superior to the national community, sovereignty may come to be regarded as above and outside the law. And while such a conception may be useful in enabling a monarch or the ruling elite to bring about internal reorganization of the government and society,¹ as happened in Germany in the 19th century, it has its disadvantages when applied to the external relations of states and national societies.

In the relations of state to state the only limits to complete freedom of action lie in the various accommodations or arrangements which they make among themselves. But since there is no overall and superior power to enforce such agreements, each sovereign state is free to break them at will. It was upon this foundation that the Germans defended their invasion of Belgium in 1914 when they said that a treaty was but "a scrap of paper."

This concept of sovereignty implies, of course, a kind of political self-sufficiency. By the same token it easily leads to economic autarchy. Yet in actuality no state is completely sovereign in this sense. To be so would require complete isolation from the rest of the world. In practice, states have developed a host of agreements with each other which we call international law. These definitely limit the sovereignties of the respective states which are parties to the arrangement. If, of course, a nation-state decides to break such agreements, it may do so; and, in fact, this is what happens

¹ As a matter of fact, some 19th-century British utilitarians took the view that state sovereignty was unlimited as a rationalization for their demands that Parliament enact a variety of legislation which was patently contrary to common law. See F. W. Coker, "Sovereignty," *Encyclopædia of the social sciences*, 14: 265-269. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

when war breaks out. Yet in war there remain certain rules of the game and certain devices for dealing with enemies through neutral governments which reveal that even in such conditions absolute sovereignty is an illusion.

Nationalism. Another important feature of the modern state is nationalism.² The concept is closely bound up with that of nationality. The latter refers technically to membership in a given nation-state in which there are reciprocal relations between such member and the state. Nationalism consists of a set of beliefs, convictions, and values, in short, a social myth about the nation-state and membership therein. The effectiveness of nationalism derives, in part, from the identification and sense of solidarity of individuals with respect to the national society as well as with regard to the place of the state as the central power agency in such a national community. (See chapter 23.) In other words, the significance of nationalism in modern times does not depend on people's relation to the political order but to the whole common culture, including their familial, economic, religious, recreational, and esthetic interests and activities. The clever political leader, in either democracy or dictatorship, stimulates the nationalistic spirit by appeals to values which relate to the community as well as to the state as such. This is clear from an examination of the chief features of nationalism.

(1) Nationalism is a form of in-group response related to the nation-state. In its more violent expression it is the modern counterpart of extreme tribalism, usually though often mistakenly associated with nonliterate peoples. (2) This adherence to the in-group is symbolized in the love of homeland, which in turn (3) is associated with geographical territory controlled by the state or considered as

² There is an extensive literature on nationalism. Among others, see Max H. Boehm, "Nationalism: theoretical aspects," *Encyclopædia of the social sciences*, 1933, 11: 231-240; Carlton J. H. Hayes, "Nationalism: historical development," *ibid.*, pp. 240-249. Also Hayes' *Essays on nationalism*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926; and Hans Kohn, *The idea of nationalism*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944.

the area of the national community.³ (4) The spatially oriented national in-group is symbolized by the map and the frontier which must be defended at all costs. The power of the country and the integrity of its territory are symbolized in the national songs: "Rule, Britannia!", "There'll Always Be an England," "Deutschland über Alles," and "The Battle Hymn of the Republic."

The nationalist spirit is also kept alive (5) by the legends and myths of the homeland. These consist of stories of great accomplishments in war, of heroes who brought glory to their country. Washington, Jackson, and Grant in the United States; Cromwell, Lord Nelson, and Wellington in Britain; Frederick the Great and Hindenburg in Germany; and Joan of Arc and Napoleon in France are names to conjure with. And of morale-stimulating slogans in wartime, there is no end. They are born of the situation: "Save the Union," "Make the World Safe for Democracy," "Can the Kaiser," and "Remember Pearl Harbor."

The effectiveness of early enculturation in hero worship and the belief in national greatness and destiny is such that contrary ideas and emotions brought to bear later upon the individual seldom have any effect in times of crisis. For example, at the outbreak of World War I in France and Germany thousands of socialists who had for years contended, in public and in private, that they would not fight in any future nationalistic wars were among the first to support *that* war as a matter of saving their native land. In Britain before World War II a policy of appeasement and pacifism led to neglect of national defense; but once the war was considered to be serious, there was amazing unity aimed at defeating the enemy. So, too, the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor galvanized Americans into patriotic support of a war. The majority of isolationists and pacifists were as readily moved to resentment and aggression as were more bellicose persons who had long favored intervention.

³ Strong nationalism has, on occasion, developed among a people who, though politically controlled by an unwelcome state or states, agitated and worked for a nation-state of their own. Polish nationalism of the 19th century was such a case.

When the life of one's nation — the largest and most important we-group in one's experience — is threatened, one seldom has any sympathy for those who do not follow the mass. Many pacifists support war, once it has broken out, because their deepest conditioning has been such that threats to destroy their country inhibit any ideas about international good will.

The symbols of complete sovereignty and of nationalism are powerful elements in the solidarity of the nation-state. They have their place in war-making, and they must be reckoned with in any program to foster a more satisfactory international order.

The Cycle of War and Peace

The relation of war and peace to each other may be viewed as phases of long- or short-time cycles of group behavior. The dynamics of war in our time follow a processual course not unlike that which is found in other conflicts. Let us examine some phases of the war-peace cycle.

The rise of an issue. The concept of the sovereign state, of more or less complete self-determination of nations, implies that certain working relations, agreements, or accommodations must be made between nations with respect to those spheres where their interests may conflict — be they political, economic, religious, or other. The cycle of warfare begins when such prior agreements or arrangements are disturbed. Usually some preliminary efforts are made to settle such differences amicably. If these fail, diplomats and executives representing the opposing states begin to consider the accepted alternative of war as a means to compose the differences. At this stage issues are sharpened, and demands and counter-demands tend to be defined in terms of potential hostilities.

The preliminary maneuvers. In response to particular political, economic, or other demands, there usually develops a "war fever," an expectancy that the only way to settle an issue lies along the road to war.

During such a period there may be more and more threats and occasional overt incidents, such as shooting of border patrols or sinking of ships. While attempts at pacific settlement may be continued, as the wider public becomes involved — as it does in our society — agitation for war backed by the traditional conflict-arousing symbols of national honor and glory mounts in volume and intensity. Old myths regarding the potential enemy are re-aroused along with the demands for an aggressive defense of long-accepted "principles" or "truths." As the public shifts its interests from domestic to foreign policies it comes to feel, as do its leaders, that war is the only solution of the issue.

In all this the usual in-group *vs.* out-group pattern develops: growing solidarity at home and increasing hostility toward the other country. And as the preliminary battle lines are drawn, prior differences among groups within a nation begin to disappear largely because their antagonism may now be displaced on a threatening enemy.

The stages of war itself. During the preliminary phase there usually takes place a considerable mobilization of military and economic forces; and in modern wars, a psychological preparation as well. Once the war begins, this mobilization is speeded up and military action begins in earnest. For the individuals there is often a good deal of emotional release. It is felt that now action can and does take the place of words. On the institutional side various changes take place: (1) The state becomes master of the economic as well as the military activities. Labor is shifted to new types of work necessary to the war aim. These changes, in turn, mean a decline in ordinary capital and consumption goods. (2) Military and international policies overshadow domestic policies. Legislative bodies become secondary to executive and administrative operations. (3) There is usually a growing restraint of free speech and free assemblage, and the courts may be invoked to compel allegiance and participation in war effort.

Then, too, the shift to military life has its repercussions on the family, on education, and on nearly every aspect of life. On the psychological side, morale becomes an important aspect of united effort. (See below.)

If the war is prolonged, however, the grim enterprise begins to be taken more and more for granted, and sometimes the flag-waving and emotional intensity become less significant. Yet success at arms will re-arouse it, while defeat or failure may depress both vocal patriotism and overt effort. In fact, in long wars the public tends to develop war-weariness. With continued evidence of death, disablement, sickness, and economic hardship comes widespread personal and social disorganization.

Then, too, on the larger front of military and economic effort, sooner or later there is some sort of stalemate, defeat of the other side, or other decision leading to a truce. A truce represents a willingness and an expectancy that organized violence will give way to a discussion of ways and means of arranging for peace. When this stage is reached, the cycle of war is at an end, and the foundations for a return to peace are laid.

Postwar accommodations. If one side is thoroughly defeated by the other, the peace terms are likely to be severe, taking the form of huge money indemnities, loss of territory, destruction of the remaining military forces, and the like. If the war ends in a stalemate, the arrangements may be more in the nature of a compromise and a somewhat equalitarian balancing of post-war power. Both these procedures typify the process of accommodation.

At this point we need but note that post-war reactions are usually marked by grave economic dislocations. Industry and business have difficulties in returning to peacetime production and exchange. On the political side, old patterns, such as democratic participation, may not reappear, and in their place there may be a new set of values and habits. Likewise in education, in family life, in religion, in recreation, and in art we may find that the war has wrought

great alterations and that new culture patterns which arose during the war may persist.

War as a Social-Cultural Enterprise

Although warfare among primitive peoples is by no means universal, among many tribes organized military combat has been a long-established culture pattern.⁴ But warfare as we know it is clearly associated with the more advanced cultures and especially with those which have developed some form of centralized political government. The ancient civilizations of Asia and the Near East, of Greece and Rome, and of Central America and Peru all experienced military operations of rather large proportions. In fact, the essentials of present-day military organization, strategy, and tactics were developed in ancient times. Modern warfare is simply a vaster enterprise carried on by men who have the benefit of our technology. In order to indicate, at least in elementary form, the nature of this complicated culture pattern, we shall discuss certain institutional and functional aspects of modern military organization.⁵

The army as a disciplined mass. A first consideration in the making of an effective military organization is the source of manpower. Once manpower is available, the next problem concerns its organization. In this the art of war comes into play. The cultural patterns of military training and action have a long history. Obviously, military objectives are not gained by mere unorganized and untrained hordes. The pattern of leadership and followership common in other group enterprises is highly developed in an army. The basic division of function or role is threefold: commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers,

and privates. Each of these has particular duties and obligations for which it must be trained. The officer corps tends, moreover, to become a separate professional class, and in modern times, at least, it offers a long-time continuity to the art of war, its preparation, and execution.

The application of modern science and technology to the military has enormously increased the complications of preparing for and conducting a war. Those units having to do with engineering, communications, and supply have become increasingly important. Finally, the management of such a large enterprise has also taken on new features. Like a vast corporation, a modern military enterprise demands not only increasing amounts of special knowledge and skill but training and planning for its co-ordination in actual strategy and tactics.

Planning and executing warfare. The planning and the execution of fighting are matters of co-ordinating individuals and groups into an interacting unity. Into this goes knowledge — some of it based on science — judgment, foresight, and shrewd guessing. As in so many other areas of group behavior, there are too many intangibles and unexpected variables for one to speak accurately of a science of warfare.

The translation of military information and skill into actual operation depends upon strategy and tactics. *Strategy* (from the Greek meaning "to lead an army") is the technique of using armed strength in order to secure the ultimate aim of war, that is, victory. More specifically it refers to the art of military command, and the aim of grand strategy is not only to defeat the enemy but to oblige him to fight the battles as much as possible on one's own terms and not on his. In total war, military strategy merges directly into the wider programs of the political states involved in struggle.

Strategy is qualified by a large number of factors, particularly by such matters as manpower and its training and morale, supplies of arms, munitions, food, shelter, transport, and other essential services to the combat troops, and by climate and topography of the potential seat of war. Plans are also dependent on

⁴ See M. R. Davie, *The evolution of war*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929.

⁵ Our major attention will be given to army organization and operation. It would carry us too far afield to attempt to discuss in brief space naval institutions and operations. Those who wish a brief account of naval matters may consult H. W. Baldwin, *What the citizens should know about the navy*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1941.

knowledge of previous wars, and especially by the state of science and material technology.

Tactics (from the Greek meaning "put in order, or arranged") is the method of disposing or maneuvering troops in action against the enemy in such a way as to insure the attainment of a particular goal during a battle or the final aim of a given battle. While the distinction between these terms is not always clear, we may say that strategy means the larger, overall plan for an entire war or field campaign, while tactics refers to the planned operations of particular aspects of a given battle.

Modern total warfare, of course, involves not only carefully planned and executed strategy and tactics, but the use of every available human and material resource as well. In such colossal struggles the power potentials — manpower, metals, oil, coal, food supply — become the basis upon which the actual military operations are projected. (See chapter 10 on comparative resources.) Yet, obviously, the success or failure at arms will depend on the organized and effective use of such reserves of force and equipment. The amazing success of Germany in the early phases of both World War I and World War II demonstrates what well-planned use of limited resources can do.

Effects of War on Population and Culture

Modern warfare tends to speed up the rate of cultural change; and if it lasts any length of time and if there is much loss of human life, certain effects begin to appear in the population structure itself. There are two factors to consider, the biologic and the social-cultural.

The biologic effects of war. Does war damage the biologic stock of a nation? In wartime do the "best" — physically and mentally — "go first," as many distinguished commentators have contended? Or is war biologically selective? Or, again, are the physical factors so intermixed with social-cultural effects that one set of influ-

ences cannot be understood independently of the others?

It is difficult to get at these questions in any adequate way for at least two reasons: first, because of our traditional attitudes and values; and, second, because we do not have the essential information regarding the biological problem involved. People long trained to abhor war are likely to believe it dysgenic for the population which experiences it. Those who take war for granted, and especially those who glorify it, easily rationalize it as beneficial to the race. This was a common view in Germany.⁶

While the loss of life is not pleasant to contemplate and while the losses in terms of leadership and participation in society are evident, from a strictly hereditary view such a depletion of the pool of available reproductive genes may not be as serious as some imagine. If a war lasts for years and there is a continued drain on manpower, these genetic losses will become increasingly more dysgenic. Moreover, if total war should come to involve an increasing number of civilians killed by highly lethal weapons, or if outright mass slaughter of captives or civilians in conquered countries should become a common practice, under a fanatical assumption of a divine mission, then the destruction of potential reproductive power would become very grave.

Then, too, it must be remembered that the females of the species contribute one half of the genes to the next generation, and the mothers and sisters of men killed in combat remain at home and do or may continue to breed. From the standpoint of the assumption that there are graded differences in gene quality in our total gene reservoir, the continuity of superior genes will not be too greatly impaired, at least so long as a reasonable fraction of the males of like superior genes have access to females of the

⁶ For example, one German general put it in these words: "The law of nature is the survival of the fittest. This means that strength and efficiency must prevail, and whatever is too weak for life must succumb and be destroyed. Man, too, is subject to this unchangeable law, both as an individual and collectively in the family, clan, tribe, or nation." From A. H. von Taysen, "Krieg," *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, 1936, I: 171-175.

higher gene grade. This holds, however, largely for past wars.

Today one dare not press the argument for superiority of certain gene sources very far since radioactive effects of atomic warfare may seriously damage the *genetic* elements. This contingency would alter many of the previous views.

On the other hand, the arguments for the eugenic effects of war are even more difficult to demonstrate. Some writers contend that warfare makes for sounder stock, but this, of course, may imply the inheritance of acquired characters, a view which is not acceptable to modern geneticists.

The whole eugenic theory implies the extreme Darwinian thesis that only the stronger survive and reproduce. But the matter is far too complex to be put into such simple form, and the arguments reviewed above respecting the possible dysgenic effects can be reversed to indicate that there are few, if any, eugenic ones either.

Some social-cultural effects of war. It would take us too far afield even to enumerate the large number of social-cultural effects which flow from modern war. But we may summarize the more evident changes as follows:

(1) The shift from peace to wartime industry not only dislocates the nature of ordinary business enterprise and the operations of the market but affects individuals and groups in a wide variety of ways. All sorts of daily habits of work and play are altered. For example, a husband on a night shift may find his whole routine of daily life modified as to hours of sleep, recreation, meals, and the like. (2) War tends to take many men out of the home, into military service or to distant industries, thus influencing the family income and altering the pattern of interaction of family members. (3) Women, both married and single, increasingly tend to go into industry or public service, which, in turn, changes their role and status. (4) Also, there may be an increased interest in religion, especially as personal hardship and death and illness of near of kin become common. (5) So, too, educational devices are likely to be affected as well as school enrollment. Many aspects of the

course of study in American colleges during World War I were closely geared to military needs, and even more striking changes were set in motion in World War II. (6) The incidence and nature of delinquency and crime are altered. Crimes against persons often decline, but depredations against property increase, especially if times become hard.

There is a variety of other effects, but these will give some idea of the wide scope of changes. Not only does war tend to permeate every phase of life, especially as it becomes all-embracing and lengthens into years, but it is probable that war-weariness is not unrelated to the ennui and fatigue which come with the long persistence of the military form of life.

When peace returns some of these effects remain. The most apparent are those which influence one's external life: technological and institutional changes. As an illustration of institutional alterations, we may cite the widespread introduction of military training into our colleges during and after the First World War. Perhaps more vital is the general expansion of governmental powers which arise in wartime and continue thereafter. The famous political slogan of the early 1920's, "Back to normalcy," was a businessman's desire to escape the controls and devices which World War I had brought to him. Similar public pressures were common after World War II.

Effects of war on invention and diffusion. The view that war is always wasteful and "bad" ignores, among other matters, the significant fact that throughout modern times, at least, wars have fostered new inventions and/or technological applications. Efforts of military leaders to subdue an enemy or to fend off attacks stimulate the development of all sorts of new devices.

The relation of scientists, inventors, and engineers to military strategy and tactics has long been close. Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) and Galileo (1564-1642) were both important as military advisers and engineers. A. L. Lavoisier (1743-1794), the founder of modern chemistry, was head of the *Régie des poudres* in a French arsenal. In fact, in 18th-century

WAR, PEACE, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

France, the only systematic instruction in science was in the artillery schools.

In the 19th and the present century the association of the laboratory and the military has been intimate. During World War I Fritz Haber, an industrial chemist in Germany, first produced synthetic nitrates by using the nitrogen of the air. In more recent years immense strides have been made in modern physics with wide ramifications into radio, radar, and, of course, nuclear fission. All of these have important peacetime uses.

The interplay of science, invention, and military action makes an intriguing story, only a few details of which we give here. The good example in modern history has to do with gunpowder. This explosive was long known in the ancient East, but when it was applied to warfare in Europe it greatly aided in the breakdown of medievalism. The making of gunpowder stimulated the studies of combustion and gases, which researches became the foundations of 17th- and 18th-century chemistry. Once gunpowder came into use, the development of cannon and later of muskets, in turn, influenced metallurgy. Originally cannon were made of bronze, but by 1410 iron began to be used. The demand for iron cannon led to the improvement of blast furnaces and casting. Also, the technology necessary in making cannon laid the foundation for perfecting the cylinder so essential to a successful steam engine.

The principle of interchangeable parts, developed in the 18th century in connection with making pulley blocks for naval use, was applied to gunmaking by a Frenchman, Leblanc (1785), but really put into effective use by Eli Whitney in 1798. This important American inventor not only stimulated the machine-tool industry necessary to such a program but gave an impetus to mass-production methods.

We have, also, not only invention but much cultural borrowing between actual or potential belligerents. Armies or navies are likely to adopt from their opponents any instruments of defense or offense which have been used against them. The tank and the dive bomber (first developed in this country) were highly perfected by the Germans preparatory to the Second World War.

In short, whether one approves of war or not, there is no doubt that warfare has greatly influenced modern science and technology. Moreover, in totalitarian and dic-

tatorial governments, science has come under the direct dominance of the state. In the process of combating these powers, representative democracies themselves have had to borrow similar patterns. In total war a nation tends more and more to integrate and control every aspect of its culture and social life, and research and invention can no longer remain aloof from government demands for their aid.

War and the Individual

The meaning of war for the individual will depend essentially upon the nature and extent of his participation in the military effort. Warfare involving more or less everyone in a tribe or a nation means something quite different for the ordinary adult member from what it means in dynastic or other struggles which employ professionals or mercenaries, but which do not affect directly the ordinary man or woman. Until recently even the use of large mass armies meant little direct experience with actual combat for the bulk of the population.

Total war has changed the entire pattern of interaction. Everybody, even children, is likely sooner or later to be directly or indirectly engaged in, or experience the effects of, war effort. Civilians may face as severe an exposure to military action as any one else. In total war there is no front line; everything and everyone contributing to the war effort is liable to direct attack. The former sharp distinctions between the military and the civilian patterns of life tend to disappear. Individual adjustment everywhere calls not only for knowledge and skill but for those social and emotional reactions which provide the core of morale. Then, too, on the larger stage of modern culture systems, we must examine the meaning of conflict, especially in war, with reference to the integration of the personality.

The nature and source of morale. The term *morale* has long been in use to characterize the thought, attitude, emotion:

and action of individuals and groups engaged in forms of struggle or co-operation. Morale has both external and internal aspects. The former refer to objective and observable evidences of effort and are measurable in a rise or fall of industrial production, of sick-leave or malingering, or in success or failure in battle. The internal concern attitudes, values, and meanings described by such words as zest for, or a strong faith in, a cause, determination, courage in the face of danger, stamina, readiness to sacrifice, and the like. The importance of the subjective element is witnessed in the very word itself, which comes from the same root as the terms *moral* and *mores*, which imply thought, emotion, and action concerned with group solidarity and survival.

One source of morale is the individual's belief in nationalist myths and legends. Another lies in the habits of obedience and discipline which have been built up in our industrialized society, where specialization of skills and co-ordination of individuals are imperative. Thus, in the division of labor the discipline of the machine is self-evident. That is, the individual's acts are controlled by the operation of the machine, by the logic of a mechanized situation. This imposes on him a certain mental discipline and acceptance of control by an external instrument or agent. Yet the continuity of our complex industrial-political order also depends on co-ordination and a sense of interdependence with others. In short, the specialization and co-ordination of the separate units of effort into a totality produce a certain discipline, regimentation, obedience, and restraint of personal impulse. Otherwise the whole order would collapse. The individual cannot act alone, yet neither can the co-ordinated group operate without the unit individual. This is one of the most challenging paradoxes in our modern world.

In total war these patterns of specialization, co-ordination, discipline, and obedience of the population are transferred (a) to accomplishing the military task of defeating the enemy, and (b) to fostering high morale since the whole productive effort is

considered to be a part of a program of national as well as of individual survival. Concretely this means the selection and training of individuals for specialized jobs or roles, either military or civilian. During the war morale in military or industrial situations alike tended to be higher when the personnel felt that they were doing the tasks for which they were vocationally suited. So, too, leadership plays an important part in morale. This is well recognized in military operations.⁷ The military commander, at any level, is a father-image of varying degrees of acceptance or rejection on the part of the enlisted men.⁸ Successful leadership consists in a subtle mixture of authority, justice, intelligence, and sympathetic understanding towards the men under him. And the latter must be able to identify themselves with the leader as he plays the various and sometimes contradictory roles with regard to these qualities which changing situations demand.

In similar manner civilian morale is much influenced by the nature and type of leadership. The successful wartime leader at home must symbolize for the masses the solidarity and sense of power essential to national effort. Winston Churchill will long be remembered for the effectiveness of his "sweat, blood, toil, and tears" speech in arousing public support for the war. So too, Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini symbolized power and hope for their respective countrymen.

In short, high morale, linked with military and economic strength, is vital to the

⁷ On leadership, see L. A. Pennington, R. B. Hough, and H. W. Case, *The psychology of military leadership*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943. The nature and function of military morale are amply shown in the reports of The Research Branch, Morale Services Division, Army Service Forces, in their publication: *What the soldier thinks*, 1942-1945. See S. A. Stouffer, C. I. Hovland, et al., *Studies in social psychology in World War II*, 4 volumes, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

On important phases of morale on the home front, see Goodwin Watson, ed., *Civilian morale*, Second Yearbook of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1942.

⁸ This is the thesis of Sigmund Freud's *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*. London: International Psycho-analytical Press, 1922.

survival of a nation; and contrariwise, low morale, even if there are economic and military resources, tends to cast the die toward failure and defeat. It must be borne in mind that morale is not some magic quality or thing. Rather, it is a set of attitudes, values, and habits with regard to specific situations or general principles and practices which together constitute an important element in the strategy and day-by-day tactics of international conflicts in our modern world.

Integration of personality in conflict. As we noted in chapter 9, the organization of one's ambivalent ideas, attitudes, and habits with respect to in-group or out-group relations provides a balance or integration for the personality. (See Figure 7, page 130.) That is, we may find outlet for contradictory patterns of love and co-operation on the one hand and of hate and conflict on the other. Moreover, the displacement of aggression is often toward objects or substitute situations which have no direct causal relation to the original frustration and aggression-arousing situation in the family or some other early-experienced primary group. Beginning in personal insecurity, fear, and anger arising from unfulfilled drives, these fears, rages, and antagonisms, however, become directed toward symbols and actual persons of some racial, religious, political, or national group. And, though integration may and does occur in religious and other conflict situations, in our time war has given the individual the most meaningful opportunity for just such co-ordination and balance of contrary tendencies.

If people are patriotic to their nation at war, interpersonal animosities of a more intimate sort, be they toward members of one's family, neighborhood, business rivals, or others, tend to disappear. At such times, all unite in a common cause. People are filled with patriotism, sacrifices, love of country, and good will toward other citizens. The man in the street identifies himself with the aims of his leaders. Slogans, myths, and legends sweep over him, and he approves alike the acts of brutality and the heroism of his fellows. He feels responsi-

ble, with his fellow citizens, for success of the venture.

Assuming high morale and solidarity, what are the attitudes and habits developed toward the out-group, which serve as a balance to this thrill of patriotic love and co-operation with members of the national in-group? There is a strong desire to defeat and even destroy the enemy forces. They contain only evil. Their leaders are satanic. Their national plans are thoroughly diabolic. And it is firmly believed that the only way to save the world is to destroy these forces.

Thus, balance or co-ordination of opposite emotions is struck, which is so well typified in all in-group *vs.* out-group relations. There is no check on the unlimited hatred of a national enemy as there is ordinarily in the hostile relations of individuals and groups. Rather, one's fellows, all hating in the same manner, give open approval to extreme violence. The common sentiments of all strong in-groups in every war are like those expressed in the German "Hymn of hate" of World War I:⁹

"We love as one, we hate as one;
We have one foe and one alone."

Furthermore, as noted above, in our daily life we develop irritations and antagonistic attitudes toward other people in our own society. We dare not express our hostility too openly or too fully to our personal rivals or even to those out-groups which exist within the larger national community. But when a war comes along we have an amazing opportunity to drain off our most vicious and unsocialized attitudes upon other national groups as objects of aggression.

Such as integration of love and hatred is possible only in conflict, where the opposing emotions are directed upon two objects simultaneously. Ordinarily at any given time we are supposed, because of cultural conditioning, to inhibit either our love or our anger. We express either one or the other, not both at once. In wartime, especially, we may experience both.

⁹ While such sentiments typify wartime propaganda, it is worth noting that the "Hymn of hate" was not revived by the Nazis in World War II, apparently because it was well-known that Ernst Lissauer, the author, was of German-Jewish descent.

This balance of hatred and love constitutes one of the important psychological advantages of all conflict. In the light of this profound effect upon the individual, the student of human struggle must reckon with this fact in any attempts he may make to ameliorate or abolish conflict, including war.

Certainly if history teaches us anything, good will, appeasement, and Christian faith and love represent but one side of man's social behavior. We must also reckon with the fundamental hostilities which remain in individuals as a result of childhood and adolescent training: rivalry, envy, and jealousy and, later, competition and conflict for role and status which extend these patterns from the early face-to-face groups to those of our industrialized mass society. In fact, our nationalistic spirit is bound up with this psychological pattern of affection, dependency, co-operation, and self-sacrifice, and of aggression toward those outside — either latent or overt — depending upon the degree to which these others are believed to threaten our own fundamental nationalistic values. Thus, while we may discount the notion of an instinct for war which operates for its own sake, we do find a basis for the larger conflict and antagonism in the individual's early experience. Second, our culture later directs this aggression upon races, religions, and nations. Hence to deal with the problem effectively, we must ask again: Can we eliminate the development of aggression in individuals? And can we redirect or change the cultural objects of antagonism, that is, can we eliminate or reduce group struggles by altering institutions and groups? Our wish is that mankind might improve at both these levels. Surely we should be able to reduce the intensity of aggression in the individual during his early and formative years, but that we can eliminate it entirely seems very doubtful. So far as institutional changes may be made, any alteration must bear in mind that the fundamental antagonisms will inevitably find outlets in adult life. In other words, there seems no basis for assuming that we can abolish conflict as a social

process. The areas of conflict may change, but as a process it is as fundamental as co-operation and competition.

Let us now see what efforts man has made to prevent or reduce wars and to establish a peaceful international order.

National Communities, States, and International Relations

To be effective, any satisfactory global political system must rest not only on agreements among the states but actually upon the deeper facts of a world community.¹⁰ Just as the state, as we know it today, derives its power from the underlying national community, so any world-wide political order must rest on the firm foundation of a world community. And while many people talk glibly about a world community, it is, as we shall see, far from being a reality. Let us now look at some of the situations — economic, political, and other — which either facilitate or retard a trend toward more pacific relations among peoples and nations.

Economic factors. That modern nations can scarcely live an economically self-sufficient existence is apparent to most of us. Such interdependence was greatly enhanced by the rise and spread of industry which requires raw materials from widely scattered sources. In fact, in the century prior to World War I a certain economic world order had arisen, despite the persistence in some states of tariffs and other limitations on free trade. The restrictive nature of much of the world's trade today, however, is related to shifts in the balance of political power which have been under way for some time. Nonetheless economic interdependence is clear. We purchase and use articles of food, clothes, implements, tools, machines, and recreational objects that are made of raw materials from the wide world. The coffee, tea, or cocoa of the breakfast

¹⁰ Various aspects of the topic of world community in relation to war and peace are discussed in Quincy Wright, ed., *The world community*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.

table comes from afar, as do the tin and bauxite which go into utensils used in preparing the same. People ride to work in motor vehicles that could not be made without importing tin, bauxite, chromium, and rubber.

A few simple facts may help to reorient us on these matters: The automobile uses materials from 18 different countries; beauty shops need products from 17; clothing manufacturers from 21. The electrical goods industry imports from 17 countries, and the jewelers from 21. Radio is dependent on 18 items from abroad, the stationary-supplies industry on 24, and the telephone on 15 different outside sources.¹¹

In turn, the United States exports large amounts of coal, copper, gypsum, lead, petroleum, phosphate rock, silver, and zinc among the minerals. Meats, dairy products, apples, tobacco, wheat, and lumber are shipped abroad in large amounts. Of manufactured articles the most important exports are automobiles, electrical machinery, engines, hardware, farm equipment, sewing machines, firearms, cotton goods, motion pictures, and rubber products.

In order to move the needed goods and services from region to region and from country to country, the world has been blanketed with a network of land, sea, and air transport and communication lines. From the turn of the present century to the outbreak of World War II the marine tonnage in the world increased 136 per cent. As aids to facilitate transportation common navigation rules have been worked out by international agreements. Likewise, uniform freight rates on shipping lines operating in the same region or between the same ports were generally agreed upon. Long before the coming of the railroad, many of the larger rivers of the world were "internationalized" for traffic, and all sorts of provision for use of port facilities were made. So, too, in Europe, in particular, a variety of international arrangements were developed to make easier railway transport over the thousands of miles of political boundaries. Uniform bills of lading, reciprocal use of rolling stock, fixing responsibility for damages, coordinated timetables, and many other com-

mon practices were set up. Also, agreements were made among European nations to aid in motor transport services.

The story of air transport is even more striking. In the two decades separating the two world wars, airplane lines had reached into every nook and cranny of the globe. The most remote regions became, overnight, within relatively easy flying distance. Taking only statistics of the United States, in 1937 there were seven international lines in operation with 104 planes in service which flew 8,628,730 miles and carried about 150,000 passengers. In 1947 there were 12 lines with 154 planes in service, and they flew nearly 86.1 million miles and carried more than 1.3 million passengers. So, too, an aviation treaty established in 1947 the International Civil Aviation Organization with 26 nations co-operating. This institution set up a basic set of standards for global air traffic.¹²

The international postal service, known as the Universal Postal Union, was set up in 1874, and, except as interrupted by wars, practically the entire habitable globe is embraced in a single world-wide postal area. But postal service is slow in comparison to that of the telegraph, cable, telephone, and the radio, which permit the almost instantaneous transmission of language.

The development of radio communication follows a somewhat similar course. After early monopolistic trends, international agreements were made regarding commercial radio and use of radio in shipping. Since World War I radio broadcasting has become not only commercially but politically one of the most important media of communication to the masses.

The telephone and later radiotelephony have made possible world-wide conversation. The Americas have taken the lead in the international use of the telephone. By 1938, through a combination of radio, cables, and land transmission lines, the United States could reach every continent and the major islands of the sea by means of 74 different telephone circuits.

It is evident from all this that, in terms of movement of raw materials and manufactured goods and in communication, the world has moved toward an international

¹¹ Data from bulletins of the National Council for the Prevention of War, Washington, D. C., 1932, and elsewhere.

¹² Data from *World almanac*, 1948, pp. 724-725; and *ibid.*, 1949, p. 912. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1948, 1949.

order. In fact, we find a rather paradoxical situation in which we have international traffic and communication rules but in which national ownership and national control determine the final decisions. There is an obvious disparity in this that only time and intelligence can solve. The isolationism which has become linked to sovereign nationalism stands in sharp contrast to the economic, industrial, and intellectual interdependence which seems necessary if man is to carry forward his present-day culture.

The most serious economic counteractant to these trends are efforts at national economic self-sufficiency. These are supported in some nations by high tariffs and by political controls of all international trading. Until such barriers are eliminated, we can hardly hope for serious advancement toward a workable international political order. Another condition which tends to hold back the development of the world community is exploitation of colonial peoples and resources. The emergence of political arrangements will be treated below.

Religious, intellectual, and other contacts. Still other forces encourage the growth of a world community. Early Christian zeal carried the new faith over India, Indo-China, China, and Japan. Mohammedanism reached eastward to India and China and westward into Africa and southern Europe. These religious movements thus took on something of an international character and were a definite factor in breaking down some of the ancient isolation of the world.

The extent to which Christianity has been diffused is roughly measured by figures of membership in what are usually called non-Christian countries. One source reports something more than 9 million Roman Catholics and nearly 4.5 million Protestants in Asia, nearly 7 million Roman Catholics and about 2.8 million Protestants in Africa, and 1.5 million Catholics and over 6 million Protestants in Oceania. The spread of Mohammedanism in Africa is witnessed by the report that there are 55.5 million adherents of that faith there. Of the 138 million Mohammedans in Asia,

nearly one half are found in India, where their influence has long been felt.¹³

Christianity has spread more than its plan of salvation. Linked with it are other culture traits of education, politics, and economics that have affected non-Christians everywhere. Notions of economic individualism, of respect for women and children, and a stimulation of democratic and even socialistic ideas have followed in the wake of its formal and informal religious teaching. The Christian missionary schools have brought to Asia and Africa Western ideas of education for the masses, have taught children and adults the rudiments of learning that they would otherwise never have acquired. This ferment, planted in the midst of alien cultures, has been a potent factor in undermining the older culture patterns. Christian standards of dress, consumption, and superiority foster trade in cotton cloth, footwear, foodstuffs, and even sporting goods. Politically the ideas of democracy, of the importance of the common man, of the doctrines of equality and opportunity have helped unsettle ever-larger sections of the populations of India, China, and more recently Africa.

The dominant Western powers had no intention originally of letting loose such ideas and attitudes of freedom and equality in Asia and in Africa. They preferred to exploit these countries economically and religiously but did not dream of later repercussions upon world affairs. But nations, like individuals, cannot long eat their cake and have it too. Sooner or later economic, political, and even religious reverberations were bound to disturb the old balance of power and to raise new questions of international relations when these reactions, as they do, derive from more fundamental pressures of population on resources. (See chapter 12.)

Certain social contacts of peoples followed almost from their first trading relations. Men cannot buy and sell without

¹³ From *World almanac*, 1948, p. 472. Oceania includes Australia and New Zealand. The statistics are at best rough estimates.

some form of communication, and more complicated business relations are dependent on a considerable body of common knowledge. The rise of various *linguae francae*, or dialects composed of varied language elements, is evidence of the need for a common means of communication.

Modern science is both amoral and apolitical. It could not be otherwise and still be science. As trade, missionary schools, and colonial entrepreneurs spread over the rest of the world from Europe and the United States, they dispersed not only the applications of science but the content and method of science itself. This was most apparent in Japan, India, and China, where there already was a high level of intellectual culture although modern science, as we know it, had not developed in those areas. The diffusion of the scientific standpoint and findings provides a common ground of communication and has been an aid in fostering international understanding. The technologies which follow from the applications of science are even more important since they concern an ever-increasing number of people as these regions adopt Western machines, transport facilities, and other appurtenances of an industrial age. To operate a steel lathe or repair an automobile or airplane demands the same kind of skill in Mukden, Surabaya, or Bombay as it does in Pittsburgh or Moscow. And behind that skill lies not only a common body of knowledge but a means of its communication.

Internationalism has also reached drama, athletics, and many interests other than the strictly intellectual. Moreover, during peaceful times tourist traffic among the world's countries is very heavy.

In connection with these varied international contacts there has arisen a wide variety of more or less formal organizations representing many common interests of world-wide concern with politics, humanism, religion, law, science, the press, labor problems, public health, sports, finance and business, agriculture, and others. Many organizations familiar to us have international connections. Such are the Red Cross,

Boy Scouts, Y.M.C.A., Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club, and many others. And in spite of its declining political influence in the 1930's, the League of Nations in its work with regard to labor problems, public health, and other matters definitely fostered patterns of international co-operation. The United Nations carried forward many of these programs after World War II.

Again, these contacts have not always paid dividends on the credit side of the international ledger. For example, differences in religious views and practices also tend to separate large sections of the world population from each other. In spite of the doctrines of universal brotherhood found in some of the great religions of the world, church organizations have in actuality been tied to nationalistic interests. So, too, variations in the mores and laws touching many human relations, such as those in the family, the community, and in relation to classes, serve to keep up segregation. Even deviations in esthetic productions and standards may help keep nations apart, for the art of a people is one of its most distinctive symbols, and underlying all these others is the basic difference in language and forms of thought. While technology and modern business, politics, sports, and so on may have made for a kind of universal *lingua franca* in these matters, the deeper psychological underpinning of language, the deeper emotional meanings of culture, which are imbedded in speech and writing, serve as a basis for variability and separateness which cannot be gainsaid. Certainly any plan for an international order must reckon with the linguistic factor if it is to face reality.

In short, the awareness that there are tremendous odds against a workable international order is the first step, perhaps, in dealing more intelligently with the problem. As we noted elsewhere, the fact that technological advances and economic patterns have diffused over the world does not mean that any deeper sense of unity and human brotherhood has arisen. The mechanical nature of the former and the highly impersonal character of the latter represent largely

a purely rational accommodation of men and nations to each other. Social solidarity rests on traits, feelings, and values far deeper and unconsciously embedded in the associated life of people of different regions and nations. Moreover, the diffusion of technology and business methods may even serve, when these are linked to the older culture base of the particular recipients, to develop variability. As Richard T. LaPiere has well said: "Culture is not contagious," and it does not follow that contact on the side of material culture leads inevitably to some sort of general synthesis or assimilation of culture into a new unity derived from the old forms. If the principle of differential rate of cultural diffusion be sound — as it seems to be — it may take a long, long time to get sufficient unity in our diverse world to make for a stable international order. Let us look at some of the efforts directed to such an end.

Efforts to Establish International Peace

In the Atomic Age the human race is faced with one of the most difficult tasks in its long history. The evident need to facilitate the already growing interdependence of nations and regions is blocked by the continuance of strong sentiments and practices revolving around nationalism and sovereignty. Man and his culture have arrived at a point of such contradiction and inconsistency¹⁴ that leader and led alike are looking for some solution. In this section we shall see both what has been done and what has been suggested for the future.

¹⁴ William Graham Sumner maintained that there is some kind of continuous "strain of consistency" among the folkways, mores, and institutions which make up a cultural totality. See his *Folkways*, pp. 5-6, Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906. The present author does not believe that there is anything inevitable and logically necessitous in society and culture which makes for "consistency." Rather, man and his culture are highly flexible and varied, as Sumner himself so well demonstrated. The trend or "strain" toward consistency probably arises largely where the incompatible features of a culture are such that unless some accommodation or compromise among them takes place, the society and its culture will fall apart. There is a very good chance that mankind is at present confronted with just that choice.

The trends toward international organization have been of both formal and informal sort. The former is exemplified in international law, including treaties to taboo war, and in various leagues and tribunals of states. The latter is evident in the unofficial associations of men which foster peace and international co-operation.

Formal accommodations. With the rise of modern nation-states arrangements began to be made which we call international law. They affect certain economic matters such as trading, fishing, international use of inland waterways, and many others. Sometimes these have had a coercive character of a strong state on a weak one, sometimes they are mutual agreements of relative equals. We need not enter into the long debate as to whether international law is true law or is based on convention and breakable accommodations. It is a matter of a jural system which restrains unlimited exercise of force and which essays to put some moral responsibility into the use of power. Whatever one may say about treaties being but scraps of paper, nation-states have moved definitely in the direction of a general consensus to support and carry out agreements so made. Moreover, states have long since not only agreed on specific matters at issue but many have agreed to arbitrate their differences in the future.

In the hope of more effectively curbing international warfare, if not to prevent it, efforts have been made in the last few decades to develop more permanent institutions to settle disputes between sovereign states. The first widespread application of such a program began in 1899 with the First Hague Conference, from which was set up a Permanent Court of Arbitration through agreement among most of the world's nations. Though some minor disputes were settled by this agency, the various governments, especially the more powerful ones, were reluctant to submit what they considered major issues to this body, nor were they willing to limit their national sovereignty in any serious way. The Court never had any powers to enforce

its decisions. War remained in the culture pattern as the final arbiter of diplomacy and dispute.

At the close of World War I there was widespread discussion regarding some kind of international organization which would preserve the peace. Out of this came the League of Nations. Contrary to some popular mythology on the matter, the League was neither a superstate nor a federation. It had no territorial basis or jurisdiction and no coercive power over its members. It was a loose association of nations with certain legislative, judicial, and administrative features. Its aim was to promote international co-operation, the maintenance of world peace, and the establishment of some workable form of international law and justice. To the Council and the Assembly and the executive offices was added The Permanent Court of International Justice.

The story of the decline of the League of Nations is well-known. From the outset the United States failed to participate because strong isolationist forces would not follow President Woodrow Wilson's (1856-1924) leadership, and the Senate refused to ratify our entrance into the League. Although, in all, 63 states were at one time or another members, its linkage to the Versailles Treaty and its lack of any actual power led to criticism and open refusals to comply with its aims and program. In the upsurge of dictatorships and revolutionary nationalism Japan (1935), Germany (1935), and Italy (1939) left the League, and in 1939 Soviet Russia was expelled as a penalty for her attack upon Finland. At the outbreak of World War II, in fact, it was certainly a moribund institution. The founding of the United Nations organization gave public notice of its final demise.

In spite of its sad end, the League of Nations was the first large-scale attempt at some form of world-wide political organization. And while its failure is clearly due to the persistence of strong nationalism, the League did serve as a base from which to project the United Nations.

The United Nations organization was born of World War II. It had its inception in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington, D.C., August 21-October 7, 1944, followed by the United Nations Con-


ference on International Organization in San Francisco, April 24-June 26, 1945. At this conference delegates of 50 states were present, and a formal charter was drafted. After the agreed-upon number of nations, 29 in number, ratified the Charter, the organization went into operation. Later the other original participating states signed up, and by the end of 1948 it had a membership of 58 states. As stated in Chapter 1, Article 1 of the Charter its aims are (1) "to maintain international peace and security," (2) "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," (3) "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems," including economic, social, and others, and (4) "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." It precludes interference in the internal affairs of any nation.

The institutional organization is rather complex. There are three main agencies—the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the International Court of Justice—and a host of subsidiary commissions, committees, and specialized agencies. The General Assembly is composed of all members, the Security Council of eleven. Of the latter, five are permanent: from the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Russia, France, and China. The balance are elected by the Assembly. Each member of the Security Council has one vote, but only the five permanent members have the right to veto any proposal. In fact, the Security Council is the core of the organization, and the right of veto means that no action may be taken without complete unanimity.

The International Court of Justice is considered the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice. It consists of fifteen judges elected jointly by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Its function is to settle disputes regarding interstate treaties, international law, and violations of other international obligations.


The management of the organization is in the hands of a permanent Secretariat and his staff. Two important subsidiary agencies are the Trusteeship Council, which deals with supervision of various areas under United

FIGURE 70



Nations trusteeships, and the Economic and Social Council, which is charged with the promotion of "higher standards of living, full employment . . . universal respect for, and observation of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Under its guidance are a variety of specialized commissions and committees to deal, among others, with problems of population, human rights, status of women, labor, education, science, and food resources. In addition, an Atomic Energy Commission was set up to try to work out a plan for the international control of the use of atomic energy. Figure 70 shows the interrelations of its principal agencies,

In its early years the United Nations was beset with almost endless difficulties and misunderstandings. The dogma of complete and autonomous sovereignty was enthroned in practice, if not in theory. There was no central, coercive, and responsible authority backed by law and coercive force to carry out its decisions. The demand for unanimity, expressed in the sanction of the veto of the five large world powers, was such that little was accomplished. (This was clear in the handling of the recommendations of the Atomic Energy Commission and in dealing with disorders in the Balkans, Palestine, and Indonesia — to mention only a few.

UNITED NATIONS AND ITS VARIOUS AGENCIES¹⁵

Yet the meetings provided a platform for discussion of issues and probably had some educational effects. However, the sessions were also a sounding board for propaganda and counterpropaganda among the nations, and some thoughtful people felt that this dramatic war of words often did more to undermine the values of international good will than otherwise.

And while the subsidiary agencies have no part except to discuss and inform, they probably serve as points of contact among individuals from widely divergent societies and cultures. The gains from such interaction are hard to measure, but the general

hope is that they do serve to facilitate international understanding.

Informal efforts for peace. The unofficial efforts to prevent war have come chiefly from two sources — the pacifists and the "internationalists," to use Norman Angell's term.¹⁶ Pacifism is a philosophy opposed to war, and ardent pacifists refuse to approve or support war for any purpose. The

¹⁵ Adapted from poster of the Dept. of Public Information, United Nations, July, 1947. By permission.

¹⁶ See Norman Angell, "Pacifism," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 1933, 11 : 527-528, and his "Peace movements," *ibid.*, 1934, 12 : 41-48.

views and actions of the "internationalists" support various plans and projects for world organization as a means of securing peace.

As a doctrine pacifism, as a vision of an "unarmed world," reaches back to the social prophets in Hebrew history (c. B.C. 700) and to Confucius (B.C. 551-478) and Gautama (B.C. 563-483) in the Orient. It was the central doctrine of Christ and his early followers. And despite the bloody history of Christianity, pacifism has been a strong feature of many groups of Christians.

As to definite suggestions to foster universal peace, Dante (1265-1321) proposed a World Empire and Henry IV of France (1553-1610) put forth his *Grand Design* in 1603. In the 17th and 18th centuries various writers took up the cause, including William Penn (1644-1718) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).

Organized peace movements, however, first got under way in the 19th century, following the Napoleonic wars. Some took the form of pacifist societies, others worked toward international organization. The first international peace congress was held in London in 1843, and during the next decade there was a great deal of mass support for various peace programs. The Crimean War and our War Between the States tended to check the growth of these activities. But later some serious efforts were made to establish arbitration schemes among the nations as one device to avoid war. The strong nationalism of the day is reflected in the reservation put into one proposed bill on this matter before the American Senate in 1887. It stated that "any difference which, in the judgment of either Power [Britain or the United States] materially affects its honor or integrity of its territory, shall not be referred to arbitration under this treaty except by special agreement."¹⁷

In 1897 Alfred B. Nobel (1833-1906), the inventor of dynamite, established the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1919 Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) founded the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which was only one of many peace organizations.

During and after World War II all sorts of suggestions were put forward. Some were based on analyses of past attempts, such as the League of Nations; others were largely sentimental wishes for a better world. Some favored a federalist pattern of international or-

ganization; some were for a world state. Into the discussion the old familiar problems of nationalism and sovereignty continually intruded themselves. So, too, some recognized the importance of slowly building a world community while in the meantime trying to work out some accommodation through diplomacy and compromise among the powerful nation-states which would keep the peace, even though it be an uneasy one.¹⁸

The pacifists have also been very active in their campaigns to arouse the American public to the threat of another war. Among other of their tactics, they oppose military preparation and any gesture suggesting the use of armed force to back up international negotiations. Some pacifists strongly support the program for a world government but usually without any very practical blueprints as to how to go about establishing the same.

Some basic considerations. It would carry us too far afield to undertake a detailed analysis of the wide variety of factors which must be taken into account if we are to face realistically the problem of developing a world pattern of law and order. Some of the cultural factors which facilitate or block such an order have already been noted. Certainly it is important to recognize the basic components in human personality, society, and culture. Only naive or foolish people hold that mankind is incurably committed to war. By the same token, only naive or foolish people hold that mankind

¹⁸ The amount of printed material on proposed roads to peace is overwhelming. Among others, the following will provide a fair coverage of the varied approaches: The views of Wendell L. Willkie, Henry A. Wallace, Herbert Hoover, and Sumner Welles, as put forth by these men while World War II was still going on, are conveniently brought together in a symposium made up of books or parts of book published elsewhere, entitled *Prefaces to peace*, New York: co-operatively published by Simon & Schuster, Doubleday & Company, Reynal & Hitchcock, and Columbia University Press, 1943. See also Crane Brinton, *From many one: the process of political integration; the problem of world government*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948; and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948; E. H. Carr, *Conditions of peace*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944; and Emery Reves, *The anatomy of peace*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945.

The belief that the first step to world order would come from a federal union of English-speaking nations is found in Clarence Streit, *Union now*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939.

¹⁷ Quoted by Angell, *op. cit.*, 12 : 45.

would be instinctively given over to peace if once certain time-binding and space-binding institutions were changed or eliminated. A realistic approach must start from where we are, not from where we hope to be. It is a matter of science against fantasy. And some of the hard-core, objective facts with which we must reckon are these:

(1) Despite modern communication, the spread of technology, and the exchange of goods and ideas from country to country and region to region, the world is marked by a high degree of cultural diversity. Take but the matter of language, which is really the center and carrier of cultural diversity. Including all the local and regional variations, there are several hundred languages. But consider only the chief ones: There are 210 million English-speaking peoples, 150 million who speak Russian, 350 million Chinese, and more than 300 million who speak Hindustani. These make up about one half the world's population. Moreover, the first three of these languages are the core of rather distinctive culture systems; and two thirds of the last, another. In the balance of the world are other nations not too removed from the culture systems, say, of the English- or the Russian-speaking peoples. Yet there are still other linguistic groups with rather sharp culture differences.

Intellectual discussion of the problems of war and peace all too frequently neglect the facts of deep-seated differences among peoples. And while these are obviously not biologically or racially but culturally determined, they have an enormous tenacity of their own, especially in matters of values. It will take a long time to bring the varied culture systems into any sensible unity. Surely it is very doubtful if the short span of but a generation of peace would do much to alter the sharp divergence now existing among the world's peoples, though some seem to think it might.¹⁹ Much depends, of course, on whether a period of peace is

productive of movements toward genuine world order or but an interim in which to prepare for the next war.

(2) The problem of cultural diversity becomes even more striking when we consider the interplay of irrational and rational elements in the conduct of mankind. We may seek a world order based on law or rule of reason. But countering this, as always, is the play of nationalist myths and legends which may serve to block logical movements to establish a global jural system with one central sanction of enforcement. So, too, religious and other elements in conduct and culture which are also based on fantasy may act to hold back movements of mutual toleration. Even systems of production, especially those outside the areas of modern technology, are heavily loaded with irrational sentiment and practice.

(3) Then, too, there is the basic bio-social problem of the world's population and the world's resources, which we examined in chapter 12. Despite the warnings of experts about the difficulties involved in this question, there continue to be downright misunderstanding and much wishful thinking on the topic. The general assumption of the sentimentalists is that if we just managed our global economy correctly there would be ample food and shelter for all.²⁰

It is very doubtful if the masses of men in the countries of high levels of living will rationally and voluntarily submit to plans which would take from them the substances they now hold, except by force. The solution of the world's ills will not go forward until people generally can be convinced to deal intelligently with the problem of population and resources. Glib statements that there are ample resources for all will not help us in doing so.

(4) The place of irrational elements in human behavior raises the question of the

¹⁹ See Karl M. Deutsch, "The crisis of peace and power in the atom age," in Lyman Bryson, et al., eds., *Conflicts of power in modern culture*, chapter 60, pp. 654-666. See this entire symposium for some excellent papers on present-day conflicts. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

²⁰ Even so astute a scholar as Charles E. Merriam, *op. cit.*, p. 286, rather blandly writes: "There are food, shelter, clothing, health, education, and cultural and recreational advantages for every human being if we but reach out and take them." See the citation to J. J. Spengler in chapter 12, page 187, regarding this whole topic.

relation of personality to the mores, institutions, conventions, and values of time and place, that is, to its culture. Psychologists and psychiatrists alike have raised a number of problems regarding the psychological foundations of peace and war.²¹ Thus, in 1944 a group of American psychologists prepared "The Psychologists' Manifesto," in which they maintained, among other things, that war is not instinctive but a learned, that is, enculturated, set of habits; that "racial, national, and group hatreds can, to a considerable degree, be controlled"; that through education the rising generation can do much to alleviate, if not eliminate, hostility leading to war; that "the root-desires of the common people of all lands are the safest guide to framing a peace," and that there is a definite "trend of human relationships . . . toward ever wider units of collective security" and that commitments toward a genuine peace will prevent the rise, later, of public apathy about the importance of a sound international system of peace. In much the same vein others have pointed out the place of personal frustration, anxiety, and hostility in furnishing the psychological sources of adherence to nationalist ideas and values and in believing that future security is found in military preparedness.²²

Almost all these writers, while giving a good descriptive analysis of motivation and learning neglect the place of such fundamental conditioning factors as population pressure on resources, adherence to high standards of living and personal expectancy

as to future rewards, and other elements in our own culture. Nor do they describe, analyze, or understand the inertia of culture in those areas of the world which have not been industrialized and secularized as has the Western world.

Despite these limitations, both psychologists and psychiatrists have done us a real service in pointing out the relation of frustration to anxiety and to aggressiveness. Thus realistic fear may and does have a place in motivating man to make sane choices at times. Also, the demands for national security so closely linked to doctrines of nationalism, sovereignty, and levels of living probably reflect deep and unconscious anxieties in the masses regarding their future.²³ No doubt a good deal of personal anxiety motivates the hostility toward the enemy nation in wartime, although such aggression also provides a certain balance of emotions at the time. (See above.) Nevertheless, there is work for psychologists, economists, sociologists, and others to do in stimulating every sincere effort to enlighten the common man as well as the leaders regarding the fundamental factors which must and will enter into any serious steps toward world organization for peace.

Sovereignty, while an important element in a stable political and societal order, must be altered or limited by the rule of law. In democracies it is well-recognized that the national community is basic to the state and not subordinate to it. The same principle must operate in the evolution of a world order. Moreover, law is meaningless unless it can be enforced. Hence any plan for world organization, federal or otherwise, must provide for some kind of central agency charged with responsible power. Only such central power could punish infractions, or control the weapons of aggression such as the use of atomic energy and bacterial or chemical warfare. To develop some sanctioned contractual arrangements among nations does not of itself mean that national or local powers are com-

²¹ For a psychoanalytical view, see Edward Glover, *War, sadism, and pacifism*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933; for more behavioristic views, see E. C. Tolman, *Drives toward war*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1942; and M. A. May, *A social psychology of peace and war*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943; on the relation of individual motives and mechanisms, see E. F. M. Durbin and J. Bowlby, *Personal aggressiveness and war*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1938; and Gardner Murphy, ed., *Human nature and enduring peace*, Third Yearbook of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945.

²² See, among others, Ranyard West, *Psychology and world order*, New York: Penguin Books, 1945; David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, *Theory and problems of social psychology*, chapter 15, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948.

²³ See, for instance, the pertinent comments of Ralph K. White's "A note on insecurity" in Murphy, *op. cit.*, pp. 450-453.

pletely given up, though they must perforce be restricted. For example, under such a system a state would not be permitted to manufacture atom bombs or other weapons of war.

The problem of power here as elsewhere is that of its *amount*, its *distribution* among individuals and groups, and the *degree* and *nature* of the *responsibility* of individuals and groups in its use. In this regard we must re-emphasize that to be successful world political organization must wait upon the development of a basic world community. Without the latter, the former must of necessity be limited in what it can accomplish. And the facilitation of such a world com-

munity rests on the continued contact of peoples and nations. In fact, the steps toward workable peace will probably follow the reopening of trade, diffusion of technologies, renewed intellectual contacts, and other evidences of communication and exchange among the major as well as among the minor political powers of the present day. Every forward step in these matters will aid in the emergence of a world political organization. It is in this connection that some people put more faith in the subsidiary than in the main features of the United Nations as it was first established. As the former advance, the latter may be obliged to alter its *modus operandi*.

Interpretative Summary

1. Sovereignty and nationalism played a most important part in the rise of the modern nation-state. But in the light of contemporary problems of war and peace, both will have to be modified if we are to get a peaceful world order.
2. The relations of modern nation-states have long been characterized by two-phase cycles: peace and war; then peace, then war again; and so on.
3. War is an institutionalized form of conflict centered in nationalism and the doctrine and practices of state sovereignty.
4. War has been an extremely important factor in cultural change in the past.
5. Modern wars have become so destructive and so out of keeping with present-day cultural trends that many people express great anxiety about the future survival of the human race.
6. The shift toward some form of international organization is relatively very recent. Not much may be expected under present world conditions. Yet some steps are being taken, and may be taken, toward a peaceful world order. But classes and leaders everywhere are not sure as to which steps should come first, and which later. In short, men agree on the *aim of peace*, but differ violently as to how to attain it.

Classroom Aids and Suggestions for Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What is meant by sovereignty, nationalism, and national community or society?
2. What are the major steps in the process from a state of peace through war to peace again? Are these necessarily universal, or are they solely the result of history and situation? Illustrate the steps in reference to World Wars I and II.
3. Review the various arguments regarding the biological effects of modern warfare. What other serious biological effects come from modern war that have nothing to do with the genes but which constitute a form of personal and social disorganization?
4. Write a short paper or class exercise illustrating the effect of war on family life gleaned from your own experience or that of someone you know well. Among other matters, give attention to (a) changes in work and leisure habits, (b) changes in level of living,

- (c) effects of rationing on food and other consumption habits, (d) influences on interpersonal relations within the family, e.g., more or less conflict, increased or decreased affection and mutual aid, bereavement, worry, and others.
5. Illustrate some of the effects of war on invention and diffusion of culture.
 6. Define morale. Name some of the important factors making for high wartime morale. Name some that destroy morale. Illustrate from World War II.
 7. What are the roots of hostility in an individual's early training? How are the conflict attitudes displaced or transferred to situations outside the primary group? What place has culture in this?
 8. Discuss the place of aggression and conflict in the integration of a person's thought and action. How do conflict and co-operation work together in this process?
 9. Discuss, pro and con, the contention that opposition is as inevitable and essential a phase of human interaction as is co-operation. If the processes of opposition are accepted as being universal, as a phase of interaction, then make suggestions on how to sublimate and control them without recourse to war and other forms of violence.
 10. Discuss critically both formal and informal proposals and actions to build a workable international order which would check or eliminate war. What factors must be taken into account in any program looking toward world peace?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

J. D. Clarkson and T. C. Cochran, eds., *War as a social institution*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941.

A valuable collection of papers on the psychology, anthropology, and history of warfare.

Henry Dale, ed., *Atomic energy: its international implications*. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948.

A collection of highly suggestive papers on the international control of atomic energy, the peacetime uses of atomic energy, and related topics.

Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Power, the natural history of its growth*. Trans. by J. F. Huntington. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948.

A Frenchman's sobering analysis of the dangers to mankind of the growing concentration of power in the hands of the state.

William James, "The moral equivalent of war," in *Memories and studies*. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1911.

A classic statement on the problem of peace and war by one of America's most distinguished psychologists and philosophers.

W. F. Ogburn, ed., *Technology and international relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.

A symposium dealing with the place of modern inventions and discoveries, including, among others, aviation, nuclear fission, and mass communications, in war and peace.

❧ Part Four ❧

Social Relations Based on
Role and Status

Role and Status as Related to Age

AMONG the most important differences among individuals and groups are those having to do with role and status. While reference to these has already been made, especially to role in chapter 9 on the rise of the social self, in this and the following three chapters we shall examine in more detail variations in role and status as these are related to age, sex, specialization, leadership, and class and caste.

The Nature of Role and Status

As an orientation to our discussion of these specific areas of differentiation and stratification we must examine the main features of role and status. This we do in the present section.

Definition of role and status. These two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Yet, though closely related, they should be carefully distinguished. *Role* is the individual's function, performance, or "doing" directed to some aim, be it work, play, or other activity. *Status* is the position or standing which a person or group holds in relation or reference to the position of another person or group. Both role and status fall within the acceptable and expected limits of a given culture. The child develops his sense of self-ness — pride, confidence, sense of difference and likeness — in part from taking over the roles of mother, father, siblings, and others. He also acquires his knowledge and skill very much within this same framework of identification with others. Adult roles are the outgrowth and continuation of such childhood and adolescent beginnings. Along with his role-taking the child gets rewarded or punished as what he does is evaluated with regard to what others do. The family,

play group, or other in-group places him in a position of approval or disapproval vis-à-vis others. Such responses give the first training in the status relations of individuals as these are tied up with particular or general roles.

Role and status are at all times closely interwoven. What an individual or group does, at least more or less recurrently or habitually, is certain to be given a standing or position in a scale or hierarchy of values by others. And this is the root of status.

Forms of role and status. There are two types of role and status: ascribed and achieved. *Ascribed* roles and statuses are those usually set down in advance by the cultural norms or expectancies without reference to innate differences in ability or strength and without reference to personal choice. *Achieved* roles and statuses are acquired by the individual because of choice, talent, special capacity, struggle, or given performance.¹

Ascribed status usually implies some kind of distinctive mark or feature. Such are age, sex, and race. These rest essentially on physical traits, as culturally defined, of course. Common age statuses are infancy, youth, maturity, and senility. The sex distinctions are obvious. Interracial status is most commonly marked by color distinctions.

Achieved status is illustrated in our society by free choice of mates, in a man's becoming rich through operations in the competitive market or attaining high position

¹ See E. T. Hiller, *Social relations and structures*, pp. 335-337, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947. He gives a threefold classification: ascribed, assumed, and achieved. The distinctions he draws between the latter two hardly seem to warrant making a special category for each. We follow the more usual practice in our twofold classification.

in his profession because of special knowledge and skill. However, one's culture may and usually does designate the steps or processes by which assumed or achieved status may be secured. In other words, it provides certain permissiveness and sets certain limits. Thus, a man who made his money by vice, corruption, or other illegal and immoral devices would probably not be accorded the status that is given to one who follows the rules of the capitalist market. At least this is the more or less ideal pattern.

In some societies statuses have been largely of the ascribed sort. Such was true of the ancient Incan Empire, where the newborn infant was classified as "babe in arms," later the child as one "able to stand," and still later as "under six." Then from six to eight years he was termed a "bread receiver," and so on, until at twenty years he became "almost a man," at twenty-five "able-bodied," at fifty "half an old man," and after sixty years "an old man asleep."² While no modern society draws such sharp distinctions as these, highly authoritarian cultures, both contemporary and ancient, often fix statuses rather rigidly. This was true in feudal Japan, for example, where individual and family status was regulated by sets of minute rules. In contrast, one of the distinguishing features of democratic societies is the permission of individual choice and freedom. While ascription of certain statuses remains, in a wide range of activities status is acquired, not fixed in advance.

In this connection, mention should be made that in highly fixed societies the individual may not experience the fear and worry over his roles and statuses as much as one may and does in a society where the cultural expectancies demand continual struggle for role and status. In the latter, anxiety and heavy sense of inferiority and guilt follow if one fails to make good.

This is a price men pay for the privilege of competition for role and status. There is nothing instinctive in this situation, however. In fact, viewed historically, permis-

sive attainment of role and status is relatively a late cultural development. It is tied up with individualism, liberalism, and acceptance of interpersonal competition.

Reciprocal relations in role and status.

In one sense roles and statuses are but a series of rights and duties. That is, they represent certain reciprocal relations among individuals. To understand this interplay we must define right and duty. A *right* is a privilege or opportunity to act (verbally or overtly) which is reciprocal to another's *duty* to allow or permit the same. The rights of one are always qualified and limited by the obligations of another. While in Western culture the doctrine of natural rights has long been considered one of man's basic values, actually there is no biological foundation for such. This does not mean it is not a potent cultural norm or expectancy. It is. In actual operation all rights are bound up with reciprocal duties of others to respect them. These are, in short, but organized forms of interaction which control individuals and groups. Thus the marital rights of a husband to his wife's sexual favors mean a corresponding duty of the wife to permit the expression of such rights. In a representative democracy a citizen's right to vote in an election implies his obligation to abide by the outcome of said election even though his party be defeated at the polls.

All societies reveal a wide range of such reciprocal relations. To note only a few of the more important ones: The economic order is an order because the contacts of men in the market are made up of more or less widely accepted rights and duties. A legal contract to work or to deliver a given product at such and such a time and place is a pattern of reciprocal rights and duties supported by the law of contracts. In family life the interplay of sympathetic identification of parent and child is counterpoised by obligations to provide on the part of the former and by duties of obedience on the part of the latter. Power relations in the operations of government reveal the same pattern. The king and his sub-

² A. M. Tozzer, *Social origins and social continuities*, p. 208. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925.

jects, the judge and the accused, the police and the citizen whose property he protects, the elected official and his constituency, all have mutual rights and duties.

Of the many patterns of such reciprocities, some operate quite independently of others. Some come into conflict with each other. Many rights and duties associated with family life or religion have little or nothing to do with those outside the home or the church. In contrast, a man's ethical code about killing another may cause inner conflict regarding his rights and duties as citizen-soldier when he is called upon to engage in war. Or the widely accepted relations of competitive business may, in time, come into conflict with one's humanitarianism. As related to the organization of the self, such conflicting roles and statuses made up as they are of habits, attitudes, ideas, and values, may produce a rift in the personality. There may result lack of that balance and integrity which make for more reasonable and enjoyable life.

Yet in many societies we find that one role and its accompanying status may become the integrating center around which the personal life organization of the individual is built up. Other roles and statuses, of which there are many, tend to be secondary to this one key position. For the most part, the woman's chief rights and duties have centered around those of wife-mother-homemaker. In contrast, in our society the man has been considered chiefly in terms of husband-father-breadwinner. In other societies the medicine man, or warrior, or scholar has constituted the major role of the man of highest status. As we shall see in discussing the class structure, rating of occupation is one of the most important criteria in determining class status in our present-day world, though not the only one. The economic and related advantages one may command in terms of food, housing, clothes, and leisure are related to various privileges accorded by others.

Such a key station is determined by the external social valuation of that role and status in the community or in any other group able to give such rewards. This valu-

ation, of course, must be associated with the participation of the individual in said community or group in terms of the expected rights and duties associated therewith.

Processual basis of role and status. Differentiation is the interactional process of developing separate and distinctive roles and statuses for individuals and groups. The roots of differentiation are competition and co-operation. The chief sources of differentiation in the individual are variations in terms of age, sex, intelligence, and emotionality, as these are qualified and given direction and meaning by a given society and its culture.

Modern psychology has taught us much about the importance of individual differences as they relate to age, sex, and mentality. These differences, which provide in part the foundation upon which social distinctions of role and status rest, are first made evident at birth as a result of heredity and the effects of prenatal growth. All the basic capacities for learning one's way in the social-cultural mazes of the world are established in the organic constitution of the individual at that time. Second, these individual variations are affected by maturation of the body as one moves from infancy to maturity. In the third place, the most important element is learning at the hands of parents, siblings, teachers, preachers, and others as we grow up. Unfortunately much of the material from contemporary psychology still ignores the effect upon individual development and function of deviations in institutions and ways of life among various societies and their cultures. Finally, in terms of age, sex, and mental differences, the individual moves into roles and statuses having to do with his specialized functions, with his being a leader or a follower, and with his position in the class structure.

Age Differences, Society, and Culture

All societies recognize differences in role and status as related to age. Adults have more physical strength and more experience

than have adolescents. Youth has distinct advantages over childhood, even though neither youth nor childhood has the capacity shown by maturity. In old age both mental and physical powers decline, and dependence on others once more limits the range of thought and action. Yet variations in age are defined in terms of custom rather than in terms of physiology. As Ralph Linton puts it, "In the case of age, as in that of sex, biological factors involved appear to be secondary to the cultural ones in determining the content of status."³

In most societies there are usually four major categories of age differences as related to role and status: infancy and childhood, youth, maturity or adulthood, and old age. Let us note some of the important features associated with each stage.

Infancy and childhood. It is obvious that the role and status of infant and child are related to dependency on, and guardianship by, the parents or other persons of an older generation. There is nothing that the infant or child can do to alter this fact. Yet how societies regard babies varies among both primitive and civilized peoples, and also may change with time and circumstance.⁴ In ancient Sparta, where there was a heavy stress on the need for a strong body as well as a normal mind, sickly or deformed infants were done away with. Among some tribes the bearing of twins was thought to be a bad omen, and they were disposed of lest some evil descend upon the family and the tribe. In other instances, as in our own, babies are idolized and made much of by older children and adults.

With respect to the child, in contrast to the infant, there is a like variability. Among some peoples the child is regarded as a miniature adult. He is expected to conduct himself as "a little man" or "a little lady," as the case may be. Among others there is firm demand for silent conformity, as where

children are expected "to be seen but not heard" when in the presence of their "elders and betters." In still other societies a child may be given a very high status. This is so among the Marquesans, where the eldest son is considered the head of the family, regardless of his age. Ralph Linton reports seeing a nine-year-old Marquesan boy, son of a chieftain, drive all the adults out of the family house because he had become angry over what seemed a trivial matter.⁵ Sometimes there is little or no formal direction or discipline of the children until they are ready to pass into adult status, say, during adolescence. At that point, however, the training may be extremely severe from our standpoint. In recent decades democratic cultures have shown a tendency toward not only the child-centered school but the child-centered home. In such families the child may be permitted, in effect, to dominate many domestic situations which in other cultures would not be tolerated.

With reference to Western society, it is clear that the culturally defined period of dependency and immaturity has been markedly lengthened. As culture has become more complex, the new generations of individuals seem to need more time to learn the skills, knowledge, and values considered necessary for full adult role and status. In fact, the prolongation of the period of childhood and of the training of youth may be used as one measure of the complexity and enrichment of a given culture.

Likewise, the recent trend, especially in Western society, has been toward a kindlier and more humanitarian view of children. To foster the interests of the child has become increasingly a basic value in democratic countries. In contrast, under authoritarian and dictatorial regimes the care and training of the child may be directed to his future service to the state rather than toward independent and free participation as an adult.

In the development of personality there are certain reciprocal relations between

³ Ralph Linton, *The study of man*, p. 119. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936. By permission.

⁴ For a discussion of wide variability, see Nathan Miller, *The child in primitive society*. New York: Brentano's, 1928.

⁵ Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

parent and child. The major rights and duties in this relationship tend to be set down in certain norms of acceptance and expectancy. Obviously the duties of the parent to the child cannot be enforced by the latter. Failure to provide for the child's care and training in terms of the group norms may be punished by agencies set up to do so. (See below.) But for the most part the parents fulfill their duty and provide physical care and social-cultural training or socialization. The latter includes instruction in facts, skills, and values such as those of obedience and personal responsibility.

Of special importance is training in the fundamentals of later adult roles. In Western society we stress individual initiative, learning to "stand on one's own feet," and striving for success in competition with others. These emphases prepare the child and youth for his later struggles in the world of industry and business. In other societies such values are not known or are frowned upon. Among the Arapesh, for example, while the child is somewhat hurried toward adult role and status, so that the parents may retire from active life, he is given strong familial support as he grows up. There is little or no pressure to compete with others in advancing from childhood to maturity. Among our Pueblo Indians, such as the Zuni and Hopi, the culture is noted for its co-operative rather than competitive spirit. This means that the children develop in the direction of more quiescent and docile participation in conjoint action with others. For example, white teachers of these children report difficulty in getting them to speed up their work in competition with other children.

So, too, in all societies the young child is inducted by his family and neighbors into the basic religious ideas and practices, into the forms of play and art, and into the in-group loyalties to tribe or nation. These instructions are reinforced in extent and intensity as the child passes into adolescence.

On his part the child must learn certain duties. As a counterbalance for adult care and training, the child must be truthful

honest, obedient, loyal, co-operative, and must show other evidences of conforming to adult expectancies or norms of conduct. These habits are built up by means of identification with the codes laid down by adults in words and conduct. He is rewarded for conforming and punished for not conforming. In our society ceremonials associated with Mother's Day, Father's Day, Christmas, birthdays, and other special occasions provide a pattern in which some of these reciprocal relations may be expressed.

Such relations, of course, are qualified by the factor of physical and mental ascendancy of the parents over the child. They are stronger than he. They know more than he knows. And they wield authority, that is, possess the means and capacity to punish infractions of the accepted and expected behavior. In societies featured by strong patriarchal organization the father-child relations may be rigid and severe. In our somewhat child-centered culture, one sometimes wonders if the children, not the parents, run the home. With respect to economics, in rural societies certain work demands on the child emerge fairly early. In city life there is little need or requirement for the child to be an economic asset. In earlier phases of the industrial development of modern societies, of course, this was not the case. The exploitation of child labor, in fact, was so serious as to lead in time to laws to prevent it. And such legal methods meant that the adults of said society took a more humanitarian view of the role and status of the children than had been the case at other times.

As noted above, the failure of parents to live up to the norms of child care laid down by a given culture usually results in some other group taking over this obligation. In a primary community a serious neglect of children by their parents might lead to gossip as a device to stimulate the parents to do their duty, or neighbors might lend a hand in aiding the children. Often the church took over such functions. In urbanized society today we have a large number of agencies, both privately and publicly

supported, which give attention to matters of child welfare. In a society which places a high value on children, failure on the part of the parents to fulfill their duties leads to their punishment by the law and the mores and to the rise of substitute means in the form of welfare organizations to replace parental care. Some of these agencies have a long history. For example, in New England there was the Society for the Aid of Little Wanderers, which dealt with orphans. In our day we have the Child Welfare League, the Children's Aid Society, and others which have professionally trained personnel to carry on their work. The point is that in societies with a humanitarian ethos, the training of children will be provided even though the parents fail in this obligation. In fact, since society everywhere tends to assure itself continuity, the care and instruction of the rising generation is everywhere considered a basic obligation.

The role and status of youth. The break between various age periods is determined in part by culture as well as by birthdays. While some societies definitely recognize changes during puberty from childhood to sexual maturity by special ceremonials and changes in social status and role, other societies make no such sharp division. Popular anthropology to the contrary, puberty ceremonies, even for the male adolescents, are by no means universal.⁶ One writer goes so far as to state: "All available evidence seems to indicate that primitive society gives little or no recognition to the period [of youth] as entitled to a social position distinct from that of maturity."⁷ Yet we recognize a certain age-gradation in our division of schooling into primary, secondary, and collegiate. Confirmation ceremonies and high-school graduation symbolize a certain passage of the growing boy or girl into a new role and status. Certainly

the long period of permissive and accepted preparation for adulthood is restricted, for the most part, to the higher cultures largely as a result of their complexity, specialization, and high standards of living. The common practice in our society is to consider youth as an age period from about 16 years to 24 or 25 years. Nothing could more truly reveal our standards. A few generations ago a person of 20 or 21 assumed full adult responsibility.

In our society training in education, religion, vocations, and in ideas of citizenship and morality are carried over to the adolescent by both formal and informal devices of education. We have adopted the theory that such a period better prepares the individual for his full adult responsibilities. (See chapter 19.)

Some important features of this transition from childhood to maturity are associated with the coming of full sexual capacity and the appearance of those secondary sex characteristics which further distinguish the male from the female. There are also changes in height and weight and other bodily modifications which mark the shift toward adulthood. While there are variations in the age at which the individual passes through puberty, the culture usually provides a certain latitude to him for fulfillment of his expected roles and statuses related to this phase.⁸ With regard to sexual maturation, it is important that the young boy and girl in our society become freed from the close ties to the parents, especially the mother. Only through such emancipation from the home will they be able to attain those heterosexual interests necessary to normal courtship and mating. (See chapter 18.)

Second, youth must continue to learn the essential skills which will prepare him for his adult occupational role and status. So, too, he must learn to co-operate as well as to

⁶ The most widely cited book dealing with the shifting of role and status among age groups is that of A. van Gennep, *Les rites de passage*. Paris: E. Nourry, 1909.

⁷ See C. C. North, *Social differentiation*, p. 71. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1927.

⁸ See Margaret Mead, *Coming of age in Samoa*, 1928; and her *Growing up in New Guinea*, 1930, (both) New York: William Morrow & Co. For a summary of data on primitive childhood and adolescence, see Margaret Mead, "The primitive child," chapter 24 in Carl Murchison, ed., *Handbook of child psychology*, 2nd ed., Worcester: Clark University Press, 1933.

compete with others. Here team games have a large part in teaching the patterns of conduct in later life. Then, too, he must acquire sense of independence, self-reliance, and individuality. These lay the foundation for adult responsibilities or duties which are the counterparts to one's rights.

Yet, in contrast to earlier practices, we in Western societies tend to prolong the period of preparation. We do not push our young people toward full maturity as some societies do. This is neatly illustrated in the law. Among other significant changes we have (1) raised the age limits for marriage, (2) increased the age limit on full accountability for crimes (witness the place of the juvenile court), and (3) raised the upper age limit of compulsory schooling.

In our society we have a curious divergence in regard to youth. On the one hand we have thrown about them added protection by increasing the years of compulsory education, by preventing child labor, and by restricting early marriage. So, too, the continued emotional and financial dependence of children on parents is evident in a large number of families. Nowhere else in the world is youth given such leisure and opportunity for education. In other societies individuals in these age brackets would be taking up adult responsibilities. Yet our youth have greater freedom from parental control than formerly. Our adolescent boys and girls are more sophisticated and mature in many ways than their parents were in their youth. Opportunities for escaping from family, neighborhood, and community controls afford our young people forms of experience which their fathers and mothers often do not approve of or understand.

The divergence between adult theory and practice and that of youth themselves exposes one aspect of our modern conflict of ages. (See below.) In our contemporary society the role and status of youth, their rights and duties, and the responsibility of their elders for their future welfare, especially, are not clearly defined. As a result many problems have arisen for which we are now trying to find a solution. In fact,

this very confusion represents changing patterns of differentiation. The process remains, but its direction and form are being modified, again demonstrating how culture influences social processes.

Youth and youth problems. In many countries young people have experienced a number of crises, such as prolonged unemployment, revolution, and war. Let us examine first the situation in our own country before taking up the broader social movements built around the needs of young people.

The 1930's were a severe test for American youth. The traditional high aspirations, acquired from their parents and teachers, were not attainable in the face of the unexpected economic and technological changes which they faced as they approached adulthood. Told that there would be a job waiting for them at the close of their schooling, confident that a man or a woman could get ahead by personal effort, and expecting a long period of peace and plenty, they found themselves, with their elders, plunged into one of the worst economic depressions in the history of the country. Not only was it increasingly difficult to get jobs, due to shutdowns and/or technological displacement of workers, but they unwittingly found themselves living in a country where the birth rate was falling rapidly but in which the available working population was steadily rising.

For example, between 1933 and 1940 the United States acquired a backlog of unused resource of nearly 4 million young people, ages 15-24 years, who were out of regular school and out of work. Nearly 60 per cent of them were in our cities, 30 per cent were on farms, and the balance came from rural-nonfarm families.

The crisis for those who emerged from school to seek jobs was even more serious than for those somewhat older. The unemployment census made during the last week in March, 1940 reported, in spite of improved conditions, that there were 3 million persons in the age range 14-24 years either out of work or engaged in government emergency work projects.

While the economic depression of the 1930's contributed heavily to this condition, technological changes also played a part. The productive capacity per worker has been greatly enhanced. In comparing the efficiency in basic industries in 1910 with those in 1930, W. V. Bingham points out that "scientific and technological improvements have made it possible for the increased quantity of food and goods needed by a 33 per cent greater population to be grown, made, and transported by but a 6 per cent increase in workers."⁹

In short, the particular difficulties in this country arose from the fact of an aging population, from an extended period of depressed business, and from restriction of economic outlet due to technological advances. Youth, like their elders, found that they could not get jobs even with the resources of good will, intelligence, and education. While there was doubtless considerable selection of workers who were absorbed into the working group in terms of special skills, there is much evidence from studies made on employed and unemployed that no sharp and statistically significant differences were found in mental ability, personality traits, or education between young folks who got jobs and those who did not.¹⁰

Various attacks were made on this serious situation, first, by older institutions and new federal agencies and, second, by emerging youth organizations themselves. Under the pressure of circumstance and in keeping with traditional American views, efforts were made through the schools to help solve these problems of youth. Various federal agencies, such as the National Youth Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps, were set up. Particular stress was placed on devising more effective school programs to meet the requirements of our economic-industrial order.

⁹ From W. V. Bingham, "Abilities and opportunities," *Occupations*, 1934, 12 : 13.

¹⁰ One of the best of these surveys is reported by W. F. Dearborn and J. W. M. Rothney, *Scholastic, economic, and social backgrounds of unemployed youth*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. The sample for this came from those who had served through a period of years as subjects in the study of physical and mental growth undertaken at Harvard University. The data on these cases are particularly complete.

The most effective programs were developed around three aims: (1) More adequate provision to be made for vocational guidance so that youth could be directed efficiently in terms of their abilities and the type of available job toward a satisfactory occupation. (2) Adequate vocational training and preparation to be given so that the young people would possess proper knowledge and skill to enable them to take their places in the industrial order at the close of their schooling. And (3) some placement system to be developed to get the youth to the job, either through the school or through public employment agencies.

In addition to the formal school programs, the resources of many of our existing organizations for youth, such as the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., Y.M.H.A., and the CYO, were brought to bear on the matter. These organizations developed training programs and provided added leisure-time facilities for older unemployed youth. The Works Progress Administration and the National Youth Administration also provided both training programs and community services looking to something beyond mere vocational guidance and preparation. In the rural areas the 4-H Clubs, the Future Farmers of America, and the Agricultural Extension Services were brought into action to aid and further the more formal educational programs. The problems of rural youth were in many ways as acute as those in our cities. Due to the high birth rate and to the impact of technology on farming, it is estimated that there were, in the late 1930's, almost 2 million youth living on American farms who were not needed for agricultural production. In the 1940's the expansion of production and military service in World War II absorbed a great many young people. So, too, as long as industrial production remains at a high level, the youth problems of the depression will not be likely to recur.

Both the educational and the traditional youth organizations are, of course, adult-dominated as to policy, management, and financial control. And for the most part the youth of our country, along with their elders, tried to solve their problems within

the framework of tradition and custom. Just as the broad psychological and cultural base of the capitalistic system was for the most part taken for granted during the depression, so, too, our youth did not greatly depart in idea and desire from the traditional views and values.

Howard M. Bell's 1937 study in Maryland revealed rather typical opinions about the depression crisis. Opinions from a sample of 13,500 young people of both sexes, ages 16-24 years, revealed that although the bulk of them had experienced personal problems regarding employment or fear of economic insecurity, most of them looked forward to jobs, marriage, and civic life with about the same hope as has usually characterized American youth. While there are no comparable data from earlier generations, the most striking change from the past was the widespread acceptance of the view that the government had a major responsibility with reference to the personal problems of the citizens and young people. For example, with regard to relief from the effects of prolonged unemployment, 90 per cent of these young people believed this a "valid responsibility of government"; but of these, 95 per cent favored a public works program rather than a dole.

When asked if they believed there was "such a thing as a 'youth problem,'" only one quarter of the young people thought there was none. In reply to the query if they had any pressing personal problems, one third said they did not. There is a remarkable agreement in the replies of those who believed there was a general youth problem with the statements as to what was considered to be the most serious personal problem. Fifty-eight per cent who agreed that there was a general problem also believed it to be essentially economic, and 67 per cent of those who had personal problems considered the most serious one to be that of economic security. There was general agreement, moreover, as to the importance of the latter regardless of age, sex, color, or relief status.

While the Bell study concerned only one state, it may be considered rather typical. Studies made elsewhere in general confirm the Maryland findings.¹¹ For example, a

survey made in Indiana regarding the personal and community problems as viewed by young people showed that their most serious personal problems were those of making money and getting a job. The most serious community problems, they believed, were recreation and job opportunities.¹²

In general, various studies reveal that both youth and their elders believed in the essential features of their culture and that remedies could be made within its political-economic-educational framework. The most generally accepted means proposed concerned (1) equalization of educational opportunity, (2) vocational guidance and training, (3) job placement in industry after schooling was over, (4) improvement in levels of living, including attention to health, recreation, and citizenship, as well as to income, and (5) the development of planned community and national programs for youth.¹³

Although, for the most part the youth of our country reflected our traditional value-system, the mounting distress and anxiety resulted in a gradually growing chorus of protest from certain youth groups which agitated for a more thorough-going overhauling of our political and economic system. The most vigorous of these protests came from the American Youth Congress, a nation-wide organization recruited from groups of young people mostly with liberal, pacifistic, or religious-reformist views. To these were added minority organizations of youth with more radical political programs, especially one affiliated with the Communist Party. This last-named group, though decidedly a small fraction of the total, was well-equipped with techniques of manipulation and control and was able, at times, to swing the formal program of the Congress toward a leftist position. This, in turn, brought much public protest and

¹¹ See H. F. Ainsworth, et al., *Rural youth, La Porte County, Indiana*. Purdue University and U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1941.

¹² See H. P. Rainey, "Foreword," to Bell, *op. cit.*; H. P. Rainey, et al., *How fare American youth?*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1937; and H. M. Bell, *Matching youth and jobs, a study of occupational adjustment*, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1940.

¹³ See H. M. Bell, *Youth tell their story*, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1938.

considerable disaffection from the milder co-operating organizations, many of which withdrew or became inactive. Partly as a reaction to the more radical trends and in keeping with contrary public sentiment about the Congress, the National Foundation for American Youth was established in 1940. This organization had a mild program falling more or less within the conventional patterns of American society. Later the American Youth Congress was disbanded, only to be replaced by the American Youth for Democracy. This last organization has had a stormy career, since many people believe it to be dominated by left-wing influences.

On the whole, it can hardly be said that the United States has had a youth movement in the sense in which this term applies elsewhere. Apparently there was too strong a fundamental faith in the traditional American system. What a more prolonged economic and political crisis might have produced we do not know. Yet, judging from European experience, we cannot expect anything very revolutionary from youth until the middle-class background of our political and economic order is more thoroughly disrupted than it was in the ten years of depression just prior to World War II. Since the future may see an upsurge of young people in our own country, let us note some aspects of youth movements elsewhere as indicative of basic factors and trends.

Youth movements. The term youth movement has been used loosely to refer to any rise of youth organizations with a view to improving the status of young people in a society. But, more strictly speaking, it usually has had some political and economic as well as moral aims. As Hans Kohn remarks, "Basic to all youth movements are a deep dissatisfaction with the existing intellectual, moral, social or political order, a desire to change this order, and a confidence in the power of youth to accomplish this change."¹⁴

¹⁴ From Hans Kohn, "Youth movements," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 15 : 517. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

Such movements have varied with time and place. In some countries just being influenced by democratic ideas, such as China, the youth movement was confined largely to students who stimulated the breakdown of the older order but hoped to build a democratic order of their own outside the influence of Western imperialism. In Russia young peoples' organizations had long had a part in the revolutionary movement; and once the Communist Party came into control, the youth of the land were cajoled or forced into organizations designed to foster the Soviet revolution. In like manner, Mussolini and the Fascist Party made good use of the youth groups in Italy to further the ends of the new order. The story in Germany is much the same; and since it reveals how a youth movement emerges, we may review some pertinent facts about it.

The German youth movement of the late 19th century had its roots in certain romantic notions derived from Rousseau and others and from various critics of the bourgeois and Christian order which, it was assumed, stood in the way of attaining more lasting justice and happiness for the masses of mankind. In the earlier phases the movement put little stress on the economic life. In fact, many of the members of the youth organizations and most of the leadership were recruited from the relatively well-to-do classes. Rather, the emphasis was on congeniality, romantic interest in folk dances and folk songs, on life outdoors, and freedom from the restraints of urban-industrial society. There was much mystical talk of mutual sharing, of fellowship, and of the need for a real leader to replace the dominance of a bureaucratic political-economic order.

After the defeat of 1918 and during the severe postwar years the youth movement in Germany, at least in some quarters, took on a more revolutionary character. The fellowship groups (*Bündische Jugend*), though at first not large in numbers, took a more vigorous ideological turn against what they considered a decadent bourgeois order. There was a drift toward programs of more complete reformation of society, military patterns were more and more introduced, and the former romanticism gave way to hard-headed plans

for participating in the violent overthrow of the political and economic systems. The Communists and the National Socialists, in particular, stimulated this trend, and youth groups were linked up with their specific revolutionary aims. Yet, in terms of numbers, the bulk of the German youth was not brought into either of these larger movements. The older outdoor groups and youth welfare organizations were still numerically superior. But when Hitler came to power, the Nazis proceeded apace to liquidate all youth groups not directly related to the Party, either by incorporating them into the Hitler Youth organization itself or by forbidding their existence.¹⁵

During the first years following World War II conditions in Europe were too unsettled and chaotic to provide the rise of new youth movements. Yet the seeds for such were being sown by this very fact. Moreover, the swings toward socialism or communism in central and western Europe have been definitely supported by younger people.

The appearance of youth movements, especially those of revolutionary character, not only represent a phase of overt or incipient conflict of age groups (see below) but also, more importantly, symbolize the fact that the former cultural order of a society is in the process of rapid transition, that the older ideas and practices no longer satisfy the felt needs and aspirations of large numbers.

Such concern with the cultural system finds its expression in young people since it represents not only their flexibility — in contrast to the psychological fixity of their elders — but more especially the fact that through education and the stimulation of hopes for jobs and a better social order they have become conscious of their potential strength and potential contribution to modern culture.

Yet to return to such a basic matter as population distribution, the probable place of young people in countries with an aging

population must be viewed with reference to the distribution of power within a society, especially as to the possible recruitment of force from a base characterized by a low birth rate. That is to say, while we are now adding to our labor supply at a striking rate, this trend must sooner or later cease, unless the birth rate rises over a long time period or we take in large numbers of young people through immigration. And finally, whether the young will rise in force to take from the old the basic controls depends, of course, on how the adults conduct themselves, first, with reference to the larger matter of social power and, second, with regard to solving the problems of youth in particular.

Adult roles. Adulthood is marked by the assumption of full social responsibilities resting upon physical and mental vigor. Here also the cultural norms determine how we define maturity. In every society the adult takes over functions not expected of children, youth, or old age. In a hunting society these adult functions differ from those in a pastoral or agricultural society. The age at which the individual comes to maturity will be settled by factors intrinsic in the particular culture.

Every tribe or state makes provision for the adult to take some place in the control of his community. The age at which the person acquires full-fledged membership in the community varies in the different societies. Thus, among the American Plains Indians acceptance as a member of a war party marked arrival at adulthood. In our own society political majority is assumed when the person acquires voting privileges. In time of war the capacity to bear arms becomes the standard of political responsibility. On the other hand, the capacity to hold office is assumed to go with age. In the United States, while most local and state offices are open to any qualified voter 21 years or over, the holding of federal offices is restricted to narrower age limits. A person under 25 years of age cannot hold office as a Representative in the national Congress. One must be 30 years old to be eligible for the United States Senate, and 35 years or

¹⁵ For a full and careful account of German youth under the Nazis, see Howard Becker, *German youth: bond or free*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

over to be eligible for the Presidency of the United States.

Voting privileges, capacity to hold office, jury service, and obligation to bear arms are basic marks of adult political responsibility in a democratic country. With these, of course, go all the obligations of the good citizen, which are stipulated, at least on the negative side, by the legal codes and mores regarding conduct, both private and public. Under dictatorship the ordinary adult may be accorded no voting or discussional privileges, but he may well find specific public roles as party member, worker, taxpayer, soldier, or other participant, to which a certain status may be attached.

In our society marital responsibility is assumed when one is married. If the individual marries before his political majority is reached, he nevertheless is not excused from his economic and other obligations to his family.

There are many other social roles which go with adulthood. In the church a person may remain layman or, if the organization permits, he may become lay preacher, vestryman, deacon, Sunday-school teacher, elder, priest, or pastor. Also, there are financial obligations set up to support one's church. There are also various roles in clubs, business and recreational; in fraternal orders; and in various special-interest groups. There is a whole battery of character-building and philanthropic community activities in which the alert and well-socialized citizen will play a part, not merely in giving financial aid but in lending his own services.

As the individual advances toward later maturity his contribution to society and culture ordinarily reaches its peak, although there are individual differences related to physique, intelligence, disposition, and particular social-economic role. In summarizing the relationship of bodily and mental capacity and such roles, W. R. Miles states:

"We have found that the vast armament of physical and mental skills practiced by men and women in most cases can be kept in good working order to a period far past middle age. Some of the physical skills which depend so

much on speed and strength for effectiveness in competition suffer early decrement, while in the realm of the more strictly mental skills organization proceeds with the maturation of experience so that master workmanship and the highest professional competence tend to appear late and endure long."¹⁶

Old age. A decline in physical and mental vigor leads to a gradual relinquishment of full social responsibilities. The external evidences of this decline are again difficult to determine, and individual variations are apparent. One man at 50 may be far more vigorous than another, and some men at 60 have better health and more intellectual alertness than others ten years younger. There are few adequate studies of physical changes in old age. Old age is not only determined by physiological condition of muscles, glands, and brain; it is also a psychological and cultural matter. Again to cite our Plains Indians, loss of war prowess meant that the man was reduced in status. Where the old men of a tribe continue to wield great influence far into the years of physiological senility, old age in the cultural sense is delayed, no matter how feeble mentally or physically the individual may have become.

In some primitive societies old age carries with it a real distinction in rank or status. In many tribes the elders are the most powerful and revered members of the group. Alexander Goldenweiser remarks: "While these [old men and in some cases old women] take a less active part in the everyday activities, their leadership in ceremonial and political matters is pronounced and they do everywhere constitute the great depositories of tradition, figuring as the mouthpiece, as it were, of the conservative *status quo*. They know the past, in fact, they know all there is to be known, and they see to it that this knowledge is passed on without much loss as well as without much addition. They are the great stabilizing fly-wheel of the civilizational mechanism."¹⁷

¹⁶ W. R. Miles, "Age and human society," chapter 15 in Murchison, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 676. By permission.

¹⁷ Alexander Goldenweiser, *Early civilization*, p. 257. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922. By per-

In a country like China, where ancestor worship has dominated family and community life for centuries, the power of old age over the social order is everywhere apparent. Deference to old age, to the patriarch of the family, and the desire for sons to carry on ancestor worship have retarded the rise of new ideas and new ways of life.

Throughout the history of our own European culture old age has retained enormous power. Where the patriarchal family order holds, as in ancient Rome, the oldest male in the family retains control over all the others. It is true even today in the peasant areas of Europe. Where urbanization has taken place, where industry has developed, this reverence for old age has been modified. Nevertheless, positions of prestige still go to older men. Judicial, military, political, and economic leadership tends to remain in the hands of older men.

However, with the increase in the number of people in the middle and older age groups we are likely to see a heightened conflict between older men and men in their prime. The revolutions of Russia, Italy, and Germany were all managed by relatively young men. Hence generalizations about the influence of older men must be qualified by circumstances. And, while many younger men rose to important positions during World War II, it is worth noting that during the years of reconstruction following 1945 in many countries there was a definite swing back to leaders recruited from the older age brackets.

The cases of leadership and headship among older men, however, touch but a small fraction of the population in these later ages. A large percentage of our old people become dependent on others for economic support. In our individualistic society in the past, the provisions for old age have rested upon efforts of the person himself and on his family. Only gradually as a new co-operative spirit grows up are we coming to realize a certain responsibility of the community and state to provide care for old age through pensions and insurance. Some of the important economic, political, and health aspects of our aging population were discussed in chapter 13.

In addition to provision for economic security, we are now beginning to recognize the need for adequate social-psychological support for the aged who have retired from active employment. Among other factors the following are important: (1) provision to keep them in good health, (2) pleasant social-emotional relations with friends and family, (3) adequate recreation or possession of interesting hobbies, (4) continuance, where they wish, of independence of residence and freedom of mobility, and (5) some form of "useful work-like activity" — not recreational in nature — which will contribute to their self-esteem. Obviously, how old folks react to their change in role and status reflects their own culture, and these points reflect the views of persons living in our individualistic society.¹⁸

The status of the dead. It may seem strange to individuals living under urbanized and sophisticated conditions that among many peoples death does not end an individual's place in the group. But in many cases, "when a man dies, he does not leave his society; he merely surrenders one set of rights and duties and assumes another."¹⁹ In some primitive tribes there are quite elaborate patterns of belief and action which serve to link the living with

¹⁸ There is a growing literature on the medical, psychological, and social aspects of old age. This fact itself reflects our awareness of the implications of an aging population. One of the first important books was G. Stanley Hall, *Senescence*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1922. Then came Lillian J. Martin and Clare De Gruchy, *Salvaging old age*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930. (Both Hall and Martin were prominent psychologists who lived to "ripe old age.")

Among more recent books, see the following: E. V. Cowdry, ed., *Problems of ageing*, rev. ed., Baltimore: William & Wilkins, 1942; Oscar J. Kaplan, ed., *Mental disorders in later life*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1945; George Lawton, *Aging successfully*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1946; Edward J. Stieglitz, *The second forty years*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1946; and *Birthdays don't count*, the 1948 Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging, Albany, 1948.

For a review of research, projection of new research, and a full bibliography, see Otto Pollak, *Social adjustment in old age*, Social Science Research Council, bulletin no. 59, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948.

¹⁹ Linton, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

the dead. Among the Tanala of Madagascar, for example, the clan is divided into two sections: the living and the dead. The latter must be kept informed of all important events of the living and invited to all clan ceremonies. In turn, it is the duty of the deceased members to do things beneficial to their living descendants. So, too, the burying of personal property with the departed is another form of recognizing that life goes on after death.

To realize that this idea is not entirely strange to us, one has but to recall the Christian doctrine of personal immortality. While most Christians do not have any very extensive beliefs or practices to connect them directly with their dead relatives, nevertheless there is at least a tenuous relation. This is evident in prayers to aid the deceased in his progress out of Purgatory, to note but one example. Belief in communication with the dead, found in spiritualism, is another. Also, the practice of marking graves, of providing for their care, and the ritual of placing flowers on the graves of our loved ones are all further evidences that, despite our secular ways, we still have a place for the dead in our thoughts and feelings. Occasionally the family of the deceased may carry out quite an extensive plan to symbolize the continuity of the living and the dead. The author recalls seeing in a certain American graveyard a square tomb, built above the ground, about the size of an ordinary living room. There were a heavy door and several windows. In one corner of the tomb was the sealed coffin. The rest of the space was taken up with household furnishings which had been the favorites of the deceased: chairs, tables, rugs, pictures, and the like. The place was given excellent care at considerable cost. Another illustration is found in the cemeteries of Italy, which are filled with elaborate sculptures telling some story of the deceased person and his family or friends.

Conflicts of age. Passing reference has already been made to situations which tend to induce age conflicts. The traditional power of the older people may on occasion

be challenged by individuals in the younger age groups. This is particularly likely to happen where changes in the culture are going on at a rapid rate. Thus, Kingsley Davis has pointed out that our present-day parent-youth conflict derives in part from the fact that the parent generation was brought up on a set of social norms which have already become altered; hence the training they give their adolescent children seems to the latter outmoded and nonapplicable. Illustrations of this are found in attitude toward dating, premarital sexuality, and class restrictions. From this come some interpersonal difficulties between parents and children. In fact, contemporary American culture does not provide explicit patterns with regard to parental authority. Then, too, while the small-family system sets the stage for more intense feeling among family members, the whole trend today is toward dispersion of activities once centered in the home.²⁰

Conflict of age, however, is not confined to struggles between parents and their children. In highly stable societies the old men of the tribe or nation are likely to retain the dominant control, and a man must wait many years before he falls heir to social power. In more complex societies, especially in times of sharp changes, younger men often have a chance to assume leadership. This fact is brought out by E. B. Gowin.²¹

The Puritan Revolution in England (c. 1640-1660) was led by men whose average age was 42 years, while in calmer times English history has been guided by men well in the sixties or above. The dozen chief leaders of the French Revolution averaged 38 years of age, while the average age of French political officials and leaders in quieter times was about 59 years. The French revolutionary generals of 1793 were all young men, in contrast to the tradition-bound generals of the counterrevolutionary armies of England, Prussia, Spain, Italy, and Austria. Likewise, our own American Revolution was managed

²⁰ See Kingsley Davis, "The sociology of parent-youth conflict," *American Sociological Review*, 1940, 5: 523-535.

²¹ E. B. Gowin, *The executive and his control of men*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

by men whose average age was under 40 years.

Marx was 29 years old and Engels 27 when they wrote the *Manifesto*. Many postwar revolutionary movements in Europe demonstrate the role of younger men in the agitation for change. Mussolini was 39 years old when his Black Shirts "marched" on Rome; Hitler was 44 when he became dictator of Germany; Goering was 40; Goebbels, 36; and Himmler only 33 years old. In the British Labor Government which went into office in 1945 there were among the leaders many younger men. Herbert Morrison was 57 years old; Sir Stafford Cripps, 56; Aneurin Bevan, 48; and John Strachey only 44. Churchill was 71 years old at this time.

Not only in the arena of politics but also in economic life young men are constantly pressing on older men for control. In the history of great fortunes in this country, the rapid rise of relatively young men to positions of financial power is well-known. In an expanding economic society like 19th-century America there was room for both youth and old age.

Nevertheless, the increase of people in the middle and upper years due to changes in birth and death rates may foster age conflict. Middle age and old age are likely to "sit tight" in their positions of power, and young men coming up the economic and political ladder may have to cool their heels for years before they secure these desirable places, unless in open conflict the elders are dislodged. Many scholars take the view that the inflexibility of

old age in positions of economic and political control is an important factor in retarding our solution of the pressing economic, political, and other social problems of the present.

Yet, with the very changes which have increased the ratio of men in the middle years of life are associated cultural changes which require that a man must spend longer years than formerly in professional schooling before he is considered ready to assume leadership in medicine, law, teaching, engineering, or business. Then, too, age is not so absolutely correlated with conservatism as some writers imply. Flexibility of viewpoint is the result of training rather than of years.

In any case age conflict, like sex conflict, is not likely to be so intense as are other forms which involve strong we-group *vs.* others-group antagonisms. Age conflict would hardly prevent capitalist owners and leaders, no matter what their age differences, from sticking together against the revolutionary aims of communist or socialist labor. The struggle of age for power will tend to be confined within the particular we-group, be it racial, economic, political, or religious. The demands for the larger group solidarity against opposing groups will serve to limit the extent and intensity of age conflict itself. The struggle of age resembles the factional fights within a trade union, a sect, or a political clique rather than the conflict between two strongly entrenched in-groups.

Interpretative Summary

1. Role and status, though related, are not identical. The former refers to the activity or function of the individual; the latter to his place or position in a culturally defined scale of prestige and power.
2. Status may be either ascribed or achieved. The extent to which status derives from one or the other in a given society depends on the cultural norms and expectancies.
3. Role and status differentials enter into interactions as they are associated with age, sex, specialization, leadership, and the class structure.
4. Differences in age provide one of the important bases for functional divisions and groupings in society as they relate to role and status.
5. Yet culture, not biology, determines the meaning which people put upon age and age differentials.
6. The older generation, by virtue of its knowledge, skill, and power, usually predetermines the socialization and enculturation of the young.

7. The problems of youth and youth movements are derivatives of economic and related difficulties in a given society. They represent an incipient, if not overt, conflict with the older generation.
8. The conflicts of youth and age, though present in many societies, especially those undergoing rapid change, are not as a rule as deep or as significant as conflicts involving property and class status.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define and distinguish between role and status.
2. What are the basic differences between ascribed and achieved status? Illustrate each.
3. Indicate the chief reciprocal relations of role and status.
4. Illustrate how infancy, childhood, youth, maturity, and old age are variously defined in different societies.
5. How do you account for the extension of the period of youth in our society, in contrast to many primitive or peasant societies, in which the late adolescent is introduced into marriage and full economic responsibilities? Have we overdone the matter?
6. What is meant by a youth movement? What relation has such a movement to the society and culture of the time and place? Why has the United States so far not experienced such a movement? Under what circumstances may it develop one?
7. Why has old age tended to hold the reins of social control? Is this control likely to continue? What influence has the aging of population on this?
8. What forms do age conflicts in our society tend to take? Illustrate.
9. How may changes in the age composition of a society stimulate age conflict? What means may be taken to allay this?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

James H. S. Bossard, *The sociology of child development*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.

A standard textbook on the subject; good coverage of literature, and many fine insights into the social mechanisms involved in child development.

Charles S. Johnson, *Growing up in the Black Belt*. Washington, D. C.: American Youth Commission, 1941.

The problems of adjustment of the Negro child and youth in the South.

George Lawton and Maxwell S. Stewart, "When you grow older," *Public affairs pamphlet no. 131*. New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1947.

An excellent but brief account of the chief social and psychological problems of people in the upper age ranges.

Margaretha A. Ribble, *The rights of infants: early psychological needs and their satisfaction*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.

Presents a strong case for sympathetic and indulgent care and training of infants, largely from a psychoanalytic standpoint. Reflects our humanitarian democratic cultural view.

Sex Differences in Role and Status

THE INDIVIDUAL's role and status will also be affected by the factors of sex difference. Although there is considerable variability in the matter, all societies reveal a dual set of functions associated with the two sexes. First is that connected with reproduction and the rearing of children. Second, sex plays a part in the division of labor. Sex differences also come into play in relation to intellectual achievement, mechanical invention, esthetic, religious, and other phases of social interaction. It must not be assumed, however, that all these divergent social functions grow directly and instinctively out of such differences. In this area of differentiation, as in others, culture plays an important part. A large part of the traditional belief about divergences between men and women is really rationalization that has grown up in the course of cultural history.

The chief areas of sex differentiation are those bearing on parenthood and child care, on economic and political activity, and on morality. Before examining these we must review some of the facts about biological and psychological differences between males and females.

Biopsychological Differences

No matter how much social-cultural conditioning influences individuals generally, there are certain biologically determined factors which must not be overlooked in considering role and status as associated with sex differences. We must examine the most important of these because of certain common misconceptions. First, there are variations as related to health and mortality. Second, there are important differences in sexuality. And then there is the still uncertain matter as to whether there are definite differences in male and female char-

ities, traits, and conduct which depend on, or are causally correlated with, sex differences.

Some physical differences. The age-long myth that women are innately the weaker sex is not supported by science. While the factors of individual differences play a part, and while such things as diet, exercise, medical care, and social-cultural conditioning greatly influence the nature and extent of the differences found between the sexes, there is a mass of evidence that the female withstands the hazards of life better than does the male.

One obvious fact is the difference in life expectancy. In 1947 for the United States this was nearly 70 years for white women, and about four years less than this for men. (See chapter 13.) This difference is reflected in the higher proportion of females in the upper age ranges. For example, in 1940 for ages 60-64 about 11 per cent of men were widowers; in contrast, 31 per cent of women were widows. For ages 75-79, while "only one third of the men are widowers, more than two thirds of the women [had] lost their spouses through death."¹ In 1947, counting widows, divorced, separated, and single women, two thirds of all American women over 65 years of age were without husbands.²

This superiority of the female over the male is obviously due to differentials in the death rate. It is apparent from the outset of life. Thus for deaths in the prenatal period, where sex is determinable, the mortality for males is much higher than for females.³

¹ Otto Pollak, *Social adjustment in old age*, p. 59. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948.

² From George Lawton, "Proof that she is the stronger sex," *New York Times Magazine*, December 12, 1948.

³ See Amran Scheinfeld, *Women and men*, p. 32. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1944. For a sample of states and cities in this country, the ratio

Similar differences show up at and after birth. For example, in the United States in 1940 deaths from premature birth were 25 per cent higher for boy than for girl babies. Then, as to mortality under one year of age, death from intestinal obstruction and hernia was twice as high among male as among female infants; from convulsions, 53 per cent higher; from circulatory diseases, 35 per cent higher; and from influenza and pneumonia, 22 per cent higher. The death rate for tuberculosis was practically the same for both sexes; and in that year 7 per cent more girl than boy babies died of whooping cough.⁴

That these differentials are not merely matters of care and circumstance is shown by the fact that although since 1900 infant mortality has decreased in this country about 65 per cent, the ratio of male to female deaths among infants has actually risen. Moreover, while infant mortality for Negroes is much higher than that for whites, similar sex differences are found. In truth, where levels of living are at their lowest and infant mortality the highest, the excess of male over female deaths is the lowest. Where the levels of living are highest and the infant death rate lowest, the differentials of male-female mortality are the greatest.⁵

Similar differentials in viability continue more or less through life. For instance, one report on sex differences in mortality rates for a number of principal causes of death, excluding those involving "primary and secondary sex organs," states that for circulatory and blood disorders, 50 per cent more males die than females; for respiratory and nervous diseases the like excess is about one third; and for disorders of the alimentary tract, about one fourth. Only with regard to disturbances of the endocrines was the ratio for women higher than that for men — about 13 per cent excess for females.⁶ As Antonio Giocco well says:

"... The differences between the males and females relative to mortality may be summarized to say that the former exhibit a higher mortality from diseases among which the so-called chronic degenerative pathological processes predominate and from diseases which might be attributed to the social function of the sex, while the females compared to the males show a higher mortality in relation to conditions related to the function of reproduction and in addition manifest striking susceptibility to causes directly or indirectly deriving from a breakdown of the endocrine system."⁷

Some of the sharp differences between the mortality of men and of women, as related to particular diseases, may be due to the greater stress which the former may have to face in our society. In recent decades, the interplay of bodily constitution — the product of hereditary and maturational forces chiefly — and behavior has been increasingly understood. From the point of view of diagnosis and therapy, much work has been done in this regard through what is called psychosomatic medicine. *Psychosomatics* is the study of bodily disorders whose full nature can only be understood when emotional and related psychological causes are also taken into account.⁸ Among other things, these studies have been enlightening with regard to sex variations. Long-accepted assumptions about many disorders associated with maleness or femaleness have been modified. To cite a few examples from a British writer: During the 19th century, the incidence of peptic ulcers in Britain was much higher in females than in males. During the 20th century the reverse has been true. Diabetes was once largely a masculine disorder, the ratio of men to women being about 2 to 1. Today there is a complete reversal in the sex ratio. On the other hand, exophthalmic goiter, long considered chiefly

deriving from sexual organs were omitted since obviously disorders of female organs cannot be compared with those of the male.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73. By permission.

⁸ See H. Flanders Dunbar, *Emotions and bodily changes: a survey of literature on psychosomatic interrelationships, 1910-1945*, 3rd ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1946. See also her *Psychosomatic diagnosis*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1943.

⁴ Percentages from Scheinfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 64. He drew his data from the federal Bureau of Vital Statistics.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-71.

⁶ See Antonio Giocco, "Sex differences in morbidity and mortality," *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 1940, 15: 59-73, 192-210. Data from p. 69. Disorders

a feminine complaint, has shown a steady increase in occurrence among males.⁹ What is true of Britain is also true of the United States and other highly industrialized societies. In fact, many of our psychosomatic disorders are apparently a concomitant of urbanization and industrialization, which, however, affect the sexes differentially in terms of their roles and statuses.¹⁰

Differences in sexuality and morphology. While the basic determinant of sexuality depends on the presence or absence of the so-called X chromosome, the full development of maleness or femaleness is the result of the interplay of a vast number of genetic, maturational, and environmental forces. (See chapter 7.) The development of sexuality is closely linked up with the endocrines. There is little doubt that not only is the body build definitely related to sexuality and endocrine influence but that emotional and perhaps intellectual functions are affected by the physiological differences in sexual functions.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the sexes are, in anatomy or in physiology, completely separate. There is ample evidence that this is not so. There are not two distinct sets of physical traits, one male, the other female. Rather, there are two clusters of basic features: one masculine, the other feminine.

Although both primary and secondary sex characters are thus fixed at birth or shortly thereafter, there are always individual variations and much overlapping. While the particular bodily contours of the female distinguish her from the male, there are many men who tend to fullness of bust,

wide hips, and the typical female coating of subcutaneous fat. Contrariwise, there are many women who tend to resemble the typical male in height, weight, and bony framework. Such overlapping in physical traits is apparently due primarily to genetic and to endocrine influences, especially the pituitary and sexual hormones. But beyond these primary constitutional differences all sorts of social and cultural influences come to bear upon the sexes. Certainly there are women who seem "naturally" to take on masculine roles, and men who develop both physical and social traits traditionally attributed to women. We all know docile, retiring men who marry aggressive, dominant women; and medical studies have reported that in the more intimate marital relations themselves the customary roles of pursuit and submission are not always followed. Yet how much some of this sort of overlapping of pattern or even reversal of role is due to early conditioning and how much to fundamental organic factors we do not know.

With reference to the central aspect of reproductive functions, however, the differences are clear, and society and culture must and do take cognizance of the same. The basic matter is found in the primary sex characteristics, marked in both sexes by distinctive external genitalia and internally by rather sharp differences between the female and male functioning. The important reproductive capacities follow upon pubertal changes which take place in girls in our society at about 13 years or shortly thereafter, and in boys about a year later. With the former the change is marked by the appearance of the menstrual cycle, in the latter by capacity for impregnation.

In childbearing itself, the obvious function of the female sex sets her off at once from the male. Conception is for the male relatively incidental and temporary. It does not interfere with his physical activity in other matters. Not so with the woman. Conception to her means a marked change in physiological reactions. The period of gestation makes demands upon her strength. Her other activities are affected. And

⁹ Data from James L. Halliday, *Psychosocial medicine: a study of the sick society*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1948. There are also some class differentials in these matters: peptic ulcers are greater among laboring classes than the well-to-do and professional groups, diabetes and hypertensive cardiovascular troubles attack males in the well-to-do classes most frequently and females in the poorest classes. Exophthalmic goiter has a high incidence among married men in the well-to-do group.

¹⁰ See C. P. Donnison, *Civilization and disease*, Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1937, on the low incidence of psychosomatic difficulties among non-literate and preindustrial peoples.

childbirth itself is a severe crisis. While the meaning of childbearing is determined largely by the culture of the time and place, the more personal, intimate phases of the experience which underlie the cultural interpretation make for psychological differences between the male and the female that perhaps can never be entirely bridged.

Psychological differences. It is still a common notion that women lack the mental ability of men. The view is so deep in our culture that it is very difficult to eradicate it. Women are said to be more intuitive, more suggestible than men. Men are assumed to be more logical, more deliberate and rational. Woman is supposed to be highly emotional, more fickle in her interests, more personal in her vanities, and given to petty behavior, while man is thought to be more stable emotionally, more impersonal, and concerned with objective, material matters. These differences are often assumed to rest on inherited qualities.

What does modern psychology have to say about mental inequalities in relation to sex? At best we can only note the broad findings from our own society.

Sex differences in motor and in sensory perceptual capacities are not striking, and the various published results are by no means consistent. No important differences have been found in hearing, smell, or taste. Men have shorter and more consistent reaction time and better precision of movement than women. Women, on the other hand, seem to excel in tasks involving rapid shifts in attention and in quick adaptation to new visual-motor patterns, such as are found in mirror-drawing and cancellation tests. Published results still show small but consistent superiority of boys and men over girls and women in numerical, mechanical, and spatial ability as illustrated in number and maze tests and those requiring knowledge and skill of machines and tools. In contrast, women do better than men in matters demanding verbal and memory aptitudes. This difference appears in the earliest years from childhood to maturity.

With reference to so-called general intelligence, the results on the Binet-Simon tests

show that for the most part girls are slightly superior to boys up to about the age of 14 years. The same thing applies to findings based on most of the group intelligence tests. The Binet-Simon and many of the group tests are heavily weighted in favor of verbal and memory items, and this may account for some of this difference in favor of girls, though the fact of more rapid mental and physical pre-pubertal development of the latter is usually considered the important causal factor.¹¹

Among high-school pupils, boys on the whole do better on intelligence tests than girls. Studies of college students show wide variations. On the whole, sex differences in total scores, if present, are not large. And there is far greater deviation within each sex group and on scores on particular items in the test scales than there is between the sexes as separate groups. On the whole, college men are superior in mechanical, scientific, and problem-solving tests, and women in language and memory items. Some studies have shown, however, that women when exposed to practice or learning make greater improvement in the mechanical and problem-solving items than do men. This may indicate that the initial superiority of men over women depended on their prior experience rather than on any particular ability associated with sex differences as such. In fact, there is increasing recognition of the importance of social-cultural training in all these differences. It may well be that cultural, not biological, factors determine the variations which these studies have reported.

Cultural determinants of mental functions that have long been recognized by some anthropologists and social psychologists are now being experimentally demonstrated by psychologists. It is clear that not only reasoning, judgment, memory, and mechanical performances are much affected by cultural conditioning, but even the basic functions such as hearing and seeing — to say nothing of the other senses — are

¹¹ Some doubt on this particular interpretation may be raised in view of the fact that tests made with the Dearborn group scale, which is less dependent on verbal capacities than most of the like scales, gives no consistent differences between the sexes in the age span 7-17 years. On this point see Anne Anastasi, *Differential psychology*, pp. 426-428, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937. She cites many original investigations.

greatly influenced by social-cultural training.¹²

Applied to the matter of sex differences, this means that many of the capacities and performances once attributed to differential biological inheritance are actually the result of variations in the kind of tuition which the sexes receive from their fellows. For example, mechanical playthings are provided boys while their sisters get dolls and household toys, and such experiences will affect their performances on mechanical tests. The slight verbal superiority of girls in our schools may be due not only to the fact that they mature somewhat in advance of boys but to the emphasis we put on verbal learning as a somewhat less vigorous type of activity, and on the fact that growing girls find that in literary matters they have some chance to compete with their brothers on a more equitable basis than on the masculine-dominated playground or in the workshop.

One of the first psychologists to realize the high probability that social-cultural factors influence the performances of men and women throughout the whole range of mental abilities was Helen Thompson Woolley, whose research on this topic at the turn of the present century helped initiate the long line of subsequent investigations. Bearing in mind the time it was written (1903), Mrs. Woolley's concluding statement is still pertinent:

"The point to be emphasized . . . is that, according to our present light, the psychological differences of sex seem to be largely due not to difference of average capacity, nor to difference in type of mental activity, but to differences in the social influences brought to bear on the developing individual from early infancy to adult years. The question of the future development of the intellectual life of women is one of social necessities and ideals, rather

than of the inborn psychological characteristics of sex."¹³

When we turn to inquire about possible sex differences in social and emotional or dispositional traits, we find that psychology so far has not contributed very much satisfactory data. Tests of so-called character traits, of introversion and extroversion, of emotional instability, of aggressiveness or docility, of sociability and the like are far from satisfactory as to reliability and validity. For instance, an analysis of certain results from the Bernreuter Personality Inventory indicated statistically reliable differences on the following items: women were emotionally more unstable and more introverted than men, whereas the latter were more self-sufficient and more dominant.¹⁴ But this test is by no means regarded as a sound measure of such traits, and we must be most cautious in accepting such findings as scientifically demonstrated.¹⁵ Of course, even if it is shown that women are more neurotic, more introverted, and less dominant than men, such characteristics may well reveal cultural conditioning rather than any innate variability due to sex. On the other hand, there may be reason for contending that biologically determined patterns linked to sexuality would tend to be expressed more fully in temperamental matters than elsewhere. Again this whole topic is beclouded by theory and counter-theory and especially by lack of clear-cut data on the interrelations of emotional patterns, sexuality, and overt conduct and verbal opinion. Until we have more adequate proof one way or another on this question, we must withhold final judgment.

Some attempt has been made to develop a masculine-feminine index of interests and personality traits on the theory that some characteristic male and female patterns of response may be present and that such an index might

¹² See, among others, Heinz Werner, *Comparative psychology of mental development*, trans. by E. B. Gaiside, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940; M. Sherif, *The psychology of social norms*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936; F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932; and Otto Klineberg, *Social psychology*, chapters 8, 10, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1940.

¹³ Helen Thompson (Woolley), *The mental traits of sex*, p. 182. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903. By permission. Italics not in the original.

¹⁴ See Anastasi, *op. cit.*, pp. 440-442.

¹⁵ For a review of various criticisms of such tests, see Kimball Young, *Personality and problems of adjustment*, chapter 11. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940.

be helpful in predicting occupational, marital, and civic and other roles for individuals in our society. The work of L. M. Terman and his associates in this field has been suggestive. The men in their sample showed, on the whole, distinctive interest in new adventure, in outdoor and strenuous vocations, in mechanical matters, in science, and in inventions. They were also more aggressive, self-assertive, rougher in language and manners, and "express more hardihood and fearlessness." In contrast, the women of the sample were more interested in domestic affairs, in artistic matters, in indoor and more sedentary occupations, and in vocations concerned with "the young, the distressed, and the helpless." Also, the women expressed themselves as more sympathetic, timid, fastidious, and sensitive to esthetic matters, as more emotional and more inclined to render severe moral judgments on others.¹⁶

As the authors readily admit, nurture rather than nature, especially home background, education, and occupation, must account for most of these differences. Yet, as noted above, it may be that in some fields of human reaction, biologically determined forces, for instance childbearing and child rearing, tend to throw the balance in favor of some patterns rather than others. In spite of the impress of culture, functions closely associated with sexual differences *per se* cannot be completely disregarded. This will be evident if we now turn to look at the role of women in relation to familial, moral, economic, and political roles and institutions.

Sex Differences, Society, and Culture

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, sex differences are more or less self-evident with regard to such family roles as childbearing and child rearing. So, too, women have long had a rather definite place in the economy of most societies. With reference to roles and statuses in government and in the community, there has been much varia-

tion and recently much change.¹⁷ We shall examine some aspects of these matters in this section.

Differentiation in familial role. The divergent roles of men and women in the family have already been discussed in chapter 18. At this point we need only emphasize the principal features as projected against the larger background of the conventions, mores, and law of a particular society. (1) The reproductive function of the female, of course, cannot be gainsaid. Moreover, in most situations there is a host of domestic duties which have grown up around the family: child care, cooking, and the like. (2) As to familial authority, this will vary in terms of whether the society operates under matriarchal, matrilineal, and matrilocal systems, or those associated with the patriarchy. If the former, the wife's brother may have a leading role in family discipline rather than the husband. If the latter, the father carries this responsibility. In our own Christian culture the patriarchal pattern has long dominated the family. And linked to it has been the concept of women's inferiority and a general belief that sex was *sui generis* sinful. (See chapter 17.) (3) The major economic responsibility has tended to be the husband's, but the wife in many societies has had heavy economic obligations as well, though these have tended to be located in or near the household. And (4) the familial training of the children has usually been divided between the sexes in terms of the larger community pattern; that is, the system under a patriarchy would differ from one where the husband was supreme. Nevertheless, in matters concerning everyday habits and household duties children can hardly escape those situations in which they must first learn their ways in the world from their mothers.

Yet culture sets the general framework within which even sex and familial differen-

¹⁶ L. M. Terman and C. C. Miles, *Sex and personality: studies in masculinity and femininity*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936. See summary of the findings, pp. 447-448.

¹⁷ For data and analysis on what has happened to middle-class women, see Elizabeth K. Nottingham, "Toward an analysis of the effects of two world wars on the role and status of middle-class women in the English-speaking world," *American Sociological Review*, 1947, 12: 666-675.

tiation takes place. This is well brought out in Margaret Mead's comparison of three tribes in New Guinea: the Arapesh, the Mundugumor, and the Tchambuli.

Although these peoples live relatively near each other and have many cultural features in common, each tribe has a rather distinctive form of sex differentiation. The Arapesh have more or less standardized the personality (role and status) of both men and women into the sort we would describe, against the background of our own culture, as "maternal, womanly, unmasculine." (See chapter 4.) In sharp contrast, the Mundugumor have patterned the role and status of women as "actively masculine, virile," and lacking "any of the softening and mellowing characteristics" which people in our society traditionally label as "instinctively feminine." The Tchambuli have still another set of patterns. Their women have a definite position of family and community dominance. As persons they are happy, well-balanced emotionally, highly efficient; and, moreover, they largely determine sexual choice. The men are at odds with the opposite sex; they feel inferior, unwanted, and timid in love-making. They are so petty and unhappy as to give the outsider the appearance of emotional instability.¹⁸

As striking as these contrasts are, as much as they demonstrate that so-called masculinity and femininity depend greatly on cultural conditions, these data should not blind us to the fact that the core of sex differentiation remains. First, the reproductive functions cannot be altered; and, second, so far as we know, there is in each of these societies, as in all others, a considerable range of variation. The picture just given is rather of the type, or average pattern, but around this cultural norm there are doubtless many deviations in the life organization of individuals. Even among the Mundugumor there must be some women who are rather "more feminine" than others, just as there surely are men who are "more masculine" than the norm would appear to expect. But these cautions aside, such comparisons have value in obliging us to revamp some

of our traditional concepts about female and male roles which we have long rationalized as due to biological and inherited rather than cultural causes.

Variations in the sexual mores. The traditional morality applied to women in our society has been different from that applied to men. First of all, women are not expected to be as efficient as men and are often excused on all sorts of counts from participating in struggles and work which men find not only possible but stimulating. The male, having built up the pattern of fighting and pursuit, expends his energy freely. The female, with her pattern of more sedentary and more docile life, is hardly expected to cope with the same sort of situation as the male.

Certainly our moral code is tempered to the woman. We forgive her or at least lighten the punishment of crimes committed by her against property. The woman shoplifter or forger is likely to get more lenient treatment by the courts than the man caught in a similar offense. We are not so lenient in the matter of sexual infractions. According to W. I. Thomas, the morality of the male is peculiarly related to business dealings, toward "society at large," especially toward other men. Women's morality is more personal in character, is to a greater degree a "morality of bodily habits," and childbearing becomes an important factor in matters of sexual morality.¹⁹

The sex differential is manifested not only in the volume but in the type of crime in practically every country. To cite only some statistics of our own country: For 1946, according to federal reports, among adults arrested the ratio for all offenses for males as compared to females was 8.3 to 1; yet for automobile theft it was 47 to 1, for robbery 20 to 1, for criminal homicide, 8 to 1. On the other hand, for prostitution it was 1 to 1.6.²⁰

In some societies there is considerable sexual freedom for both men and women,

¹⁸ See W. I. Thomas, *Sex and society*, chapter 5. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1907.

²⁰ From *World almanac*, 1948, p. 450. New York: New York World-Telegram, 1948. Data from federal statistics.

¹⁸ See Margaret Mead, *Sex and temperament in three primitive societies*. New York: William Morrow & Co., 1935.

but in our own we have tended, under Christian taboos, to place a high positive value on chastity. And even today in the face of considerable loosening of the older mores, the persistence of our taboos is clearly seen in the fact that, proportionately, women tend more often to be arrested and convicted for sexual than for property crimes.

Sex and economic roles. As we all know, the household has been the locus not only of childbearing and child rearing but of important economic functions as well. Only in modern times have the latter functions tended to disappear from the home. (See chapter 17.) From what we know of the natural separation of reproductive function and from observations of primitive tribes, it is clear that, for the most part, certain basic division of labor had its source in sex differences. An elaborate cross-comparison of occupations and sex among primitive hunting peoples made by G. P. Murdock shows that males are concerned either "exclusively" or "predominantly" with such matters as pursuit of sea mammals, hunting, trapping, and fishing. In contrast, females are "predominantly" or "exclusively" taken up with occupations such as gathering fruit and nuts, preserving meat and fish, gathering herbs, roots, and seeds, and with cooking.²¹

While there are some variations, warfare and the chase seem the more natural and obvious habits of the male, while sedentary occupations more easily become the female, who must remain near the primitive hearth in order to give personal attention to the young children. As W. I. Thomas puts it: "The primitive division of labor among the sexes was not in any sense an arrangement dictated by the men, but a habit into which both men and women fell, to begin with, through their difference of organization — a socially useful habit whose rightness no one questioned and whose origin no one

thought of looking into."²² Moreover, so accepted was this view that a man who did woman's work was looked upon with scorn and contempt, not alone by men but by women too. Modern peasant and farm households, until the introduction of industrial devices, were not greatly different from those of more primitive societies. It was not until the commercial and industrial changes of the modern world took women out of the home that their economic functions changed. The emancipation of women — both mothers and grown daughters — from the household economics illustrates again how culture patterns give the direction to social processes themselves.

Women in increasing numbers have gone into vocations outside the home, giving them money wages of their own, freedom of residence, and stimulating changes in their personalities which influence other relations of the sexes as well. The effect of these changes on the composition of the labor force was noted in chapter 22. The relation of economic emancipation to present-day family life was discussed in chapter 17. Yet, in spite of great changes, there remain many inequalities between the sexes as to rates of pay, hours of labor, control of working conditions, and types of work. Various surveys of wages for comparable work show that women usually earn less than men.

The commoner defense of lower pay for women is that they are not as efficient as men, which is perhaps true in many cases, not from less innate ability so much as from lack of adequate training. Then, too, they can often live on less than men, since most of them do not carry family responsibilities. Generalizations on these matters are likely to be false because of varying capacities and situations. In the whole public reaction to the newer economic role of women there is a curious paradox. On the one hand, much so-called "social legislation" aimed at control of hours, wages, working conditions, and kinds of work for women rests upon the ancient premise of women as members

²¹ See G. P. Murdock, "Comparative data on division of labor by sex," *Social Forces*, 1937, 15: 551-553. Most of these peoples, but not all, were hunting folk.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 140. By permission.

of the "weaker sex." On the other hand, many advocates of women's complete equality with men, especially in economics and politics, demand that they be given the freedom allowed men to enter any vocation, to receive the same wages, and that they attain complete equality before the law. Doubtless the tendency to treat women at work like minors needing special legal protection is but a transition stage toward a different conception of the role of workers regardless of sex.

Conflict of sexes. The shift of women from a position of inferiority to one approaching equality of men has not been accomplished without struggle. In fact, conflict of the sexes may break out whenever the customary roles and statuses are threatened. However, sex conflict is not likely to be as intense and as widespread as many other forms of conflict. First of all, the formation of strong we-groups in terms of sex can occur only within limited range. Women may organize a political party, a club, or possibly some occupational association. None of these reaches as deeply into basic interests as do the broader and more general industrial, racial, nationalistic, or class groupings involving both sexes. As E. A. Ross says, "Sex conflict is never grim and engulfing like conflicts between races or classes."²³ Men and women have too much in common in their respective functions in the family, in the church, in the community to allow the struggle to become all-engrossing at the expense of these other attachments.

Yet, in these dynamic times certain controversies have emerged. Note has already been made of some aspects of the matter with regard to occupation. In the remainder of the chapter some aspects of intersex conflict as related to politics and certain other aspects of our culture will be discussed.

The place of women in politics. Although in primitive society or in peasant

and rural-farm life women have had a distinctive part in household economics, in the wider community and political control they have had, until recently, little or no part at all. Even in matriarchal societies, though their community status was important, they nowhere had full control or even equality with men so far as many relations are concerned. The scattered examples of women in history who took part in political control — Cleopatra (69–30 B.C.), Lucrezia Borgia (1480–1519), Catherine de' Medici (1519–1589), Queen Elizabeth (1533–1603), or Catherine the Great (1729–1796) — are special cases which, like some other exceptions, rather prove the rule.

It is curious that the 18th-century romantics themselves had little place for women in their scheme, although such women as Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797), who was profoundly affected by revolutionary romanticism, agitated for equality of the sexes politically and economically. No less a person than Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), who so greatly affected modern liberal thought, wrote as follows on the education of women:

"The education of women should always be relative to the men. To please, to be useful to us, to make us love and esteem them, to educate us when young, to take care of us when grown up, to advise, to console us, to render our lives easy and agreeable: these are the duties of women at all times and what they should be taught in their infancy."²⁴

Certainly few of the founders of our own republic had any notions of women's political equality with men. That women at the time were not unaware of their changing importance is neatly illustrated in the letter of Abigail Adams (1744–1818) of March 31, 1776, to her husband, John Adams (1735–1826), who was then attending the Continental Congress. Among other things, she wrote:

"I long to hear you have declared an independency. And, by the way, in the new code of laws which I suppose it will be necessary

²³ E. A. Ross, *Principles of sociology*, 2nd ed., p. 196. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1930.

²⁴ Quoted by H. Baker-Crothers and R. A. Hudson, *Problems of citizenship*, p. 168. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1924.

for you to make, I desire you would remember the ladies and be more generous and favorable to them than your ancestors. Do not put such unlimited power into the hands of the husbands. Remember all men would be tyrants if they could. If particular care and attention is not paid to the ladies, we are determined to foment a rebellion and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or representation."²⁵

As we know, little came of this entreaty and threat, but it is interesting to note that on July 2, 1776 New Jersey granted its women the right to vote, a provision which was rescinded in 1807.

This is not the place to retrace the story of women's struggle for a new role and status in the political arena of this and other Western countries. During the middle decades of the 19th century, Frances Wright (1795-1852) lectured on women's rights, while the Grimké sisters of South Carolina (Angelina Emily, 1805-1879, and Sarah Moore, 1792-1873) and Abigail Kelley (1810-1887) not only spoke and wrote against slavery but urged recognition of the right of women to discuss public questions.

It is a curious comment on masculine attitudes of the time to learn that the agitators against Negro slavery were split over the issue of permitting women to participate in their campaign of abolition. This discrimination led Lucretia Mott (1793-1880) and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815-1902) — both prominent leaders of women — to call the first women's rights convention at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. Other conventions followed, demanding political equality with men. The description of one of these conventions in the New York *Herald* for September 7, 1853 reveals the attitudes and beliefs of the man-made world of that day: "The assemblage of rampant women which convened at the Tabernacle yesterday was an interesting phase in the comic history of the Nineteenth Century . . . a gathering of unsexed women, unsexed in mind, all of them publicly propounding the doctrine that they should be allowed to step

out of their appropriate sphere to the neglect of those duties which both human and divine law have assigned to them. Is the world to be depopulated?"²⁶

The national crisis of the War Between the States temporarily threw the agitation for women's rights into eclipse. Curiously the Fifteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, which provided the right to vote without reference to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude," did not include the word "sex." When American women naturally asked why they could not vote when the Negro man had been granted this privilege, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of *Minor vs. Happersett* in October, 1874 handed down a decision that citizenship did not confer the right to vote.

Nevertheless, the right to vote was gradually granted women, first in school elections, later in other local elections, and finally in various states in all elections. From about 1896 to 1910 the movement was deflected into agitation for temperance and prohibition of the liquor trade, but during the second decade of this century the woman suffrage movement was revived with vigor, and a large number of other states, especially in the West and Middle West, granted women the full ballot. In August, 1920 the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, providing women full rights to vote, was declared in effect.

Just as in business and industry the traditional role of woman as woman still plays a part, so in the political arena women are not yet integrated, as citizens, with their men folks. The continued existence of women's political organizations — leagues of women voters and the like — gives evidence that women, denied the equality which is legally theirs, must attempt by forming a bloc or pressure group to influence voting and legislation. Until these practices disappear, it is idle to deny that sex differences still play a part in politics.

Women and culture change. In related matters of education and marriage women have slowly gained equality with men. In 1836 Mt. Holyoke Seminary for Women was founded, in 1865 Vassar College was

²⁵ *Familiar letters of John Adams and his wife Abigail Adams, during the Revolution*, pp. 149-150. Hurd and Houghton, 1875. By permission of Houghton Mifflin Company.

²⁶ Quoted in Baker-Crothers and Hudnut, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

established, and Radcliffe in 1879. Oberlin College in Ohio was the first college in America to adopt co-education, throwing open its doors to both sexes in 1835. Many professional colleges have been loath to permit women to enroll. Women are not encouraged to enter law, medicine, or engineering; and some professional schools in these fields still bar women students.

Many of the modifications in the marital and domestic relations of women we have discussed in chapters 17 and 18, especially concerning functions in the home, in regard to divorce, and as to freedom in relation to persons outside the family.

In the face of these changes, men have been forced to alter their own habits and attitudes toward women. The male in our society has been reluctant to relinquish his superiority and domination. On the other hand, in their anxiety to accomplish independence and equality, women have often gone to extremes. One of the common fallacies of the more extreme feminists has been their inclination to ape men in clothes, habits, and ideas. It is doubtful whether sex equality requires that differences in clothes, speech, interests, and habits should disappear. Women may well be given opportunities with men for professional work and participation in government, not because they are women but because they have ability. The sexual factor must be disentangled from the long-standing attitudes and habits of both men and women. There is no reason why women cannot develop independence in fields of their own choosing everywhere. What we need is not uniformity but added variability and stimulation for social inventions which will prove more adequate to our needs. This we will not get if women merely imitate men in a narrow manner and do not really grow up emotionally and intellectually.

The fundamental explanation, therefore, of any differences between men and women, aside from the purely sexual, rests not upon the capacity of the brain or body but upon the direction of attention and training laid down in the society. The real variable is the individual, independent of sex or race. The

traditional position of women results from lack of opportunity, failure of men to permit them to take part whole-heartedly in the culture, that is, from the isolation which prohibits them from developing their normal capacities. In this regard women are in a position analogous to that of children, nonliterate peoples, and those in the lower economic strata of society. They are not what we call intellectual because they have not been taught how to handle the materials of knowledge. Until women are accorded equal opportunities with men on every hand, we cannot talk accurately about inherent mental or motor differences in the sexes.

There may be some men who do not wish to see women inducted fully into the man's world. Those who oppose the advancement of women toward the full participation in the world of men often hide behind outworn notions of innate biochemical or psychological differences. This only befuddles the issue by being essentially dishonest to both sexes. This, of course, is precisely what the Nazi theory and practice attempted to do by reducing women to an inferior class fit only to bear children to the glory of a would-be superior state.²⁷

In any case, it will be some time before women are permitted full participation in the culture around them, and until then we shall see discriminations against them and hear the prophets of doom pronounce in serious tones about what will happen to the home and to children when women do get their equal chances with men.

It must be indicated, furthermore, that if women themselves wish this full participation in the culture around them, they (and men, too, for that matter) must give up many present-day attitudes and practices. If women wish to be treated as equals with men in business, school, or politics, they cannot expect in these situations the special deference, the polite chivalry, the protective treatment from men which traditionally are associated with their sexual role. It is too

²⁷ See Clifford Kirkpatrick, *Nazi Germany: its women and family life*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1938.

often true that some of those women who talk glibly of equal rights and privileges themselves want the old-fashioned atten-

tions of men — not only in love-making but in many other relations quite removed from such.

Interpretative Summary

1. Sex differences provide an important basis for differentiation of role and status.
2. The biological differences in the sexes are always interpreted in terms of a given society and culture.
3. The most obvious differentiation concerns the function of childbearing and child rearing.
4. Yet most societies also reveal in their economy division of labor along sex lines.
5. There are some important biological differences between the sexes, the most apparent of which are those connected with childbearing.
6. In terms of survival competence, the female is not the weaker sex. This is revealed in her capacity to resist the hazards of life better than the male, especially in the early years.
7. Women have been making steady gains toward economic, political, and other equality with men. Some of these gains have been obtained only after a period of conflict. The trend toward sexual equality, moreover, has been most marked in democratic, industrialized societies with a relatively stationary population.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What evidence is there from vital statistics that the female is not the weaker sex?
2. What data from psychosomatic medicine show the impact of social-cultural forces on sex differentials in certain disorders?
3. Are traditional and present differences in the roles of the sexes due to inherent or to acquired factors? In what roles do organic factors play the most significant parts? In what roles the least significant?
4. What changes have taken place with respect to the economic and political roles of women in democratic societies?
5. Outline the major steps in the emancipation of woman from dependence and social minority to her present relative equality with man in our society.
6. Outline the changes in male habits and attitudes that must necessarily accompany the maturation of women socially.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Mary Beard, *On understanding women*. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1931.

A distinguished American historian gives her views on the problems of women in modern society.

J. Langdon-Davies, *A short history of women*. New York: The Viking Press, 1927.

A well-written and incisive essay on the role and status of women in various societies.

Elsie Glück, "Women in industry," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 15 : 451-459. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

A historical review of the place of women under modern industry and the difficulties as well as gains which women have experienced in striving for more occupational equality

Margaret Mead and Bernhard J. Stern, "Woman, position in society," *ibid.*, pp. 439-451

Miss Mead's section deals with women in primitive society; Mr. Stern's with the history of the topic from ancient times to the present. Both excellent discussions.

S. D. Schmalhausen and V. F. Calverton, eds., *Woman's coming of age*. New York: Live-right Publishing Corp., 1931.

A symposium giving a wide coverage to changes in the roles and statuses of women in modern times.

Women's Bureau Conference: The American woman, her changing role — worker, homemaker, citizen. Washington, D. C.: Department of Labor, 1948.

A collection of papers on women in gainful employment and with respect to changing family and other social roles, given at a conference sponsored by the Women's Bureau, February 17-19, 1948.

Specialization and Leadership

AGE AND SEX are not the only foundation of social differentiation. Individual variability in mentality and action must also be taken into account. The dull find the competition for status or occupation severe. Able persons run ahead of their fellows in the race for prestige. The great majority of folks pursue a mediocre course because their mentality and social status decree it so. In this chapter we shall examine differentiation as it relates to specialization and to leadership.

The Nature and Function of Specialization

The division of labor as used by economists refers to the specialization of occupation. However, they seldom use the term in this narrow sense. Rather, they include under the concept all aspects of specialization entering into the total productive process. But specialization of role or function is not confined to economics. It is exemplified in practically every social grouping, and it is obviously related to the rise and continuity of social classes, as we shall see in the next chapter. Differentiation of role is clearly evident within such occupational groupings as entrepreneurs, business executives and managers, skilled and unskilled laborers. It is seen in professional men, in statesmen, public administrators, military officers, teachers, prophets, and priests. In fact, not only does specialization of role arise in every association of men, but where these are linked to basic needs and goals such differentiation takes on the permanence and persistence of institutions themselves.

There is some specialization of function even in rudimentary societies. We have already noted that age and sex differences

set the stage for certain differentiation, but within these broad areas more individualized roles will arise with regard to fishing, hunting, horticulture, warfare, handicrafts, and religious-magical interests. So, too, in recreational and artistic matters specific roles may arise. These varied roles among people arise chiefly from differences in original capacities and from differential exposure to, and reception of, social-cultural training. Furthermore, such deviation in role makes not only for more effective adaptation but also fosters interdependence. As Henry Clay, an economist, puts it, "From the point of view of the individual, division of labor means *specialization*; from the point of view of society, it means *co-operation*."¹

While special roles are to be found in tribal societies, highly integrated specialization accompanies the rise of higher cultures characterized by extensive agriculture, handicrafts, exchange, writing, the political state, and other advanced aspects of culture. The ancient world, even before the rise of Greece and Rome, was aware of specialization in economic, political, military, religious, and other areas of human association. Professions and techniques arose with their own skills, knowledge, language, and social status. This illustrates, in fact, the growth of that variation in group participation which Ralph Linton has called "specialties."²

Economic division of labor. A society without economic specialization would be one in which each man worked to satisfy his own wants, and nobody for another's. Division of labor did not go very far in any

¹ Henry Clay, *Economics for the general reader*, p. 21. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918.

² See Ralph Linton, *The study of man*, pp. 272-273. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936.

society until men began to produce goods or services in such surplus that they could be exchanged for the goods or services of others. In fact, specialization of economic role not only depended on the state of technology and on the needs of the tribe or society but also arose in response to the exchange or market process, both within and without the in-group. Men gradually discovered that division of labor was beneficial to one's self and at the same time to others.

While the first great extension of economic division of labor came in the ancient civilizations, the modern world has seen the greatest amount of specialization. Prior to the coming of the factory and the power-driven machine, vocational specialties had taken the form of skilled work on a total product, or at least with reference to a large and important segment of the whole productive procedure. For instance, the "putting-out" system stimulated the breakdown of what had formerly been a larger, more unified productive process of making cloth from its carding and weaving stages to its completion for the market. Nevertheless, it was the machine which began the replacement of hand-eye skill and gradually undermined that form of division of labor which rested on personal skills.

The modern machine makes it possible to produce small interdependent parts that can be combined into a total product. This, of course, involves standardization and further simplification in the making of a particular part. In turn, such breakdown of the industrial processes makes for efficient production and fosters mergers and the building-up of large-scale corporate forms of ownership and control. The transference of specialization from man to machine had a part in stimulating large economic enterprises. Finance capitalism and machine-controlled division of labor grew up together. (See chapter 22.)

The effects of economic division of labor in our society are many and varied. Let us note, first, some of the more obvious advantages and, second, some of the limitations or disadvantages, at least as viewed by some commentators:

(1) Specialization permits the selection of persons in terms of *capacity* to perform particular work. Both intelligence and temperament may be important. (2) It facilitates the *acquisition of high skill* in some one craft or phase of an operation. The "jack-of-all-trades" gives way to one who can learn the requisite skill with accuracy and speed. (3) It *increases efficiency* because it makes for concentration of attention and skill upon single items, and this in turn is related to (4) *standardization of product*, which makes mass production possible. (5) It often — though not always — makes for a *better product*. (6) It *saves time and energy*, especially as effort is thrown on the machine and not on the man. (7) It permits *classification of skills and products*, making in turn for effective management and distribution.³ And (8), as mentioned already, specialization promotes the factory system and the organization of *large-scale units of production*. This means the assembly of many workers and many machines under one management, makes supervision simpler, allows concentration of raw materials at convenient points, and permits advantageous marketing.

Some of the alleged limitations of the division of labor, especially in the machine age, have been put down as follows: (1) Factory work and machine production make for hazards to life and limb, may produce ill health if not carefully controlled, and under speed-up conditions shorten the span of effective working years. (2) Overspecialization may so concentrate attention and skill upon simple muscular activities as to make for such monotony and routine of work as to destroy incentive and creative interest in one's job. Critics of the modern factory system often say that such work is fatiguing, unpleasant, and disheartening, and that it lowers workers' morale. They say that the artisan who made a total product — chair, house, pair of boots, piece of cloth, etc. — understood every step in the process, enjoyed himself in putting the material together, and had a genuine pleasure in seeing the finished product. They contend that the

³ The extent of specialization is evident in the listing of about 29,000 titles of particular jobs in the *Dictionary of occupational titles*, 4 Parts, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1939-1945. Of this number, "approximately 7000 are coded titles," that is, they fall into a number of more- or less-established job classifications. The others are uncoded but usually are related to some more recognized job category.

machine dominates personality. They tend to agree with Karl Marx, who argued that the machine — an objective, impersonal thing — controls the spirit, initiative, and freedom of the operator. The individual, instead of being the end of the economic process, becomes merely the means to production, becomes but an appendage to a "monstrous" system of machines that reduce him to a nonentity. The impersonality of the modern world is not entirely due to the market place and the wage system. It also has roots in the factory system itself. (3) The modern machine tends to destroy the skilled trades and to substitute semi-automatic and automatic machines to do the work, leaving the operator to do but simple movements. This segmentalization of operations, moreover, encourages mental dissociation, fantasy, and loss of interest in the object of labor effort. (4) Such high specialization in a capitalist society tends to make the workman increasingly dependent upon the owner-employer and the type of machine to which he is accustomed. This exposes him to controls by the employer, the risks of technological unemployment, and under conditions of the business cycle to seasonal and long-term periods of unemployment.

It is clear that these factors in our modern life are just those which have come to characterize mass society. As efficient and advantageous as the factory system is for our economic welfare, it has not contributed to society and culture without some cost to human beings. Yet man's adaptability is enormous; and when the basic demands of material security, good health, and steady employment are provided, when home and family life give deep satisfactions, and when there is a whole-hearted participation in the civic, religious, and recreational life of the community, many of the effects of overspecialization tend to disappear. Certainly, though a high division of labor may have destroyed many skills of the past, in most Western countries it has been accompanied by improved public health, shorter hours of work, higher pay, extension of public education, and a better level of living for the masses.

Social implications of specialization. The most outstanding feature of the division

of labor is not the separation of functions but the fact that it renders these functions interdependent in a society. Men in society find it advantageous to specialize in their work, only to find that this very specialization binds them to each other with powerful bonds of absolutely essential interaction. It is one of the curious turns of historical fate that the laissez-faire policy, which encouraged individualism, should in the end produce a social structure so interdependent that the dislocation of any considerable part of it, say a key industry like coal mining, power transmission, or transportation, threatens the whole society. In other words, specialization promotes not only separateness but also the integration of group life. It enhances competition within the circle of the trade or function but is mutually beneficial for the total society.

Co-operation follows from specialization. The woodworker is dependent on the tool-maker for his axes, chisels, and hammers. The weaver is dependent on the shepherd for his wool, and both may require the services of the commercial trader or merchant to market their goods. The entrepreneur is dependent on the banker for capital, and so on. In fact, the economic order is made up of a vast network of competition, co-operation, and differentiation.

For the most part, however, the economist has concerned himself with the mere mechanics of this interdependence and this specialization. He has tended to neglect the social-psychological features. As we saw in chapter 9, interaction has a subjective phase as well as an overt one of stimulus and response. The presence of others to whom we respond means that we have an internal image of them which is associated with their overt behavior. We reflect or mirror these others in ourselves. In other words, specialization, with its resulting interdependence or co-operation, sets up identification with others. This results in a kind of like-mindedness in spite of divergences of external activity.

Occupations and differences in intelligence. Research on individual differences

TABLE 17

RELATION BETWEEN AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENTS OF CHILDREN AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION BY PARENTAL OCCUPATION ⁴

PLACE OF STUDY	PROFES- SIONAL	SEMI-PRO- FESSIONAL, BUSINESS, MANAGERIAL	CLERICAL AND/OR SKILLED	SEMI-SKILLED	UNSKILLED
Northumberland, England Elementary and High-school Pupils (medians)	112	109-110	101-103	98 †	96
Isle of Wight, England Elementary Pupils (medians) . . .	107	103-109	99-101	97-98 †	96
New York Small-town and Rural Elementary Pupils (medians)	116	107	98	95 ††	89
New York Town and Rural High-school Pupils (medians)	121	112	108	108 ††	111 ††
Minneapolis Preschool Pupils (means)	125	120	113	108	96

† All classes of agricultural workers, omitted here, were put together in both British studies and show average IQ of 97-98.

†† In the New York study, the category "farmer," omitted here, had an average IQ in the elementary-school sample of 91; in the high-school sample it was 106. The high median for the unskilled may reflect the fact that the high-school children of unskilled parents come from the most able and ambitious of this group.

in intellectual capacity which began with problems of learning in school led, in time, to efforts to discover the correlation between vocational role and status and intelligence as measured by the various tests. For the most part it has not been possible to secure these data directly from adult workers. Rather, schoolmen used the method of classifying the performance of school children on intelligence tests in terms of the occupation of the children's parents. This entire procedure is open to considerable question, first, because the tests are none too valid and, second, because we have really no sound classification of vocations. But

bearing these limitations in mind, the data do reveal differences in the intelligence of children, on the average, when classified with regard to their parents' position in an occupational scale. Table 17 is compiled from a number of the better-known studies, and while there are considerable differences in average IQ in each of the categories, the general gradation from professional to unskilled groups is clear.⁵

Yet averages are likely to be misleading. In every instance there is a great deal of overlapping among groups as classified by parental occupation. This fact is illustrated in a mental-test study of over 100,000 high-school seniors in Wisconsin made between 1929 and 1933. Figure 71 gives the median


⁴ Compiled from: J. F. Duff and G. H. Thomson, "The social and geographic distribution of intelligence in Northumberland," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1923, 14: 192-198; H. MacDonald, "The social distribution of intelligence in the Isle of Wight," *ibid.*, 1925, 16: 123-129; M. E. Haggerty and H. B. Nash, "Mental capacity of children and parental occupation," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1924, 15: 559-572; F. L. Goodenough, "The relation of intelligence of preschool children to the occupation of their fathers," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1928, 40: 284-294.

⁵ The two British studies used occupational categories quite different from the American, but the present author made as good an approximation as he could to fit them into the American schema. Also, the fact that the Minneapolis results are consistently higher throughout than the others may be due to the fact that the children tested were very young (18 to 54 months) and to the nature of the Kuhlman-Binet tests employed.

scores and the range of the middle 50 per cent of the scores for these pupils classified in terms of their parents' occupations. Certainly there is but a slight positive correlation between the average intelligence-test score of children and the occupational gradation of the parents. Some writers have attempted to account for this gradation in terms of hereditary differences. The assumption is that biological inheritance acts as a selective factor with reference to occupation. However, to date there is no clear-cut proof that such is the case. (See below

FIGURE 71

MEDIANS AND RANGE OF MIDDLE FIFTY PER CENT OF INTELLIGENCE-TEST SCORES OF 100,000 HIGH-SCHOOL PUPILS IN WISCONSIN, CLASSIFIED BY PARENTAL OCCUPATION ⁶



on leadership.) No one doubts that intelligence plays a part in determining occupational role and success, especially in a democratic society, where personal achievement of role and status is expected. But we need not assume any close positive correlation between such facts and genetic factors beyond those broad general ones which enable us to classify people roughly into low-grade feeble-minded, morons, normals, and superiors. In terms of averages, the whole range from professional to unskilled, indicated in Table 17 and in Figure 71, falls within the category of "normal intelligence." Couple this with overlapping vari-

ability, and there is little reason to assume any high correlation of occupational status and intelligence as measured by the ordinary tests.

There have been some attempts to measure the intelligence of adults and to relate their performance to their occupational specialties. The distribution of occupations of draftees, classified on a scale of intelligence developed during World War I, showed a gradual rise in the median score from laborers (unskilled) to officers in the engineer corps, who got the highest scores. The overlapping in scores of occupational groups was enormous. There were some unskilled laborers, for instance, whose scores overlapped with those of the dullest mechanical engineers. But the tests tended, on the whole, to favor those trained in verbal manipulations rather than those who possessed high manual skills.

In spite of such limitations, the mental tests used in the army during both World War I and World War II served the very useful purpose of aiding in the selection of men for training in special skills and for determining potential noncommissioned and commissioned officers. Such general predictive value is sufficient reason for using intelligence tests. But once rough classifications are made, special tests should be given before special training for the various occupations begins.

Social-emotional traits and occupation. It is especially difficult to analyze the relation of social and emotional traits to occupational choice. Yet recent investigations have thrown some light on the problem, and we may in time discover some really important things about the types of work people like or take up in terms of their dispositional differences. In a society like ours, where most people are provided a wide range of choices of vocation, such a discovery would have important bearings on social differentiation. These differences apparently appear in occupational selection.

While doubtless most people fall into the so-called ambivert or mixed class, certain studies of occupation suggest that choice of

⁶ Adapted from Ruth Byrns and V. A. C. Henmon, "Parental occupation and mental ability," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1936, 27: 284-291. By permission.

vocation is related to different temperamental and emotional characteristics which are called introversion and extroversion.

Max Freyd's study of "mechanically" minded and "socially" minded persons showed that the introvert is more inclined to mechanical interests, while the extrovert tends to be interested in dealing with people and social situations. He found that the socially inclined exceeded the mechanically minded in excitability, self-confidence, open-heartedness, talkativeness, neatness in dress, and in readiness to make friends. The mechanically minded were more self-conscious, conceited, careful of details in their work, and capable of finer motor co-ordination.⁷

Some years ago, G. W. T. H. Fleming made a study of the records of the mental hospital in the county of Dorset, England, covering a period of 40 years. While his classification was rough, especially because of difficulties in earlier diagnoses, his reports tend to confirm the view that there are modal or typical differences in temperament in relation to occupation. Among the various mental cases engineers, students, bookkeepers, surgeons, dentists, chemists, soldiers, carpenters, stonemasons, bricklayers, and lawyers tended to fall into the introverted class. On the other hand, farmers, blacksmiths, shopkeepers, policemen, railwaymen, shepherds, merchants, managers, and business directors tended to fall into the extroverted group. There was considerable overlapping, but the differences appeared to be statistically significant in many of the occupational groupings.⁸

While such studies as these are tentative and inconclusive, they suggest that the occupation is often associated with emotional and temperamental interests quite as much as with intellectual ability. Of course, culture will play an important part. Where the dominant trends in a society favor particular types of activity, the culture itself sets the stage both for the development of temperamental qualities and for choice of occupation. In America today, characterized as

it is by business interests and materialism, there is much indirect and direct pressure put upon our young people to go into business and money-making. The result may well be that we have developed what might be called an "extroverted" set of culture patterns, in which the chief rewards go to those who look to externalities, to handling social situations for making money or acquiring prestige. Such a society neglects the introspective arts of contemplation, of subjective literature, and other features of life which may have characterized other societies — the Oriental, for example.⁹ This but illustrates again the interplay of psychological motivation and the culture of the time and place.

Differentiation and Leadership

Some form of dominance-submission relations is manifested in practically all social groupings, large or small. Some person will take the lead, "set the pace," persuade, direct, or coerce another or others to a certain line of action, or get the other or others to desist from some conduct. Broadly this form of control we call *leadership*, which for our purpose we define as the dominance or direction of the behavior of others by a person who by reason of voluntary acceptance or by some form of coercion, actual or potential, is in a position to exercise such power. The roots of social dominance lie in primary-group training, and the human prototype of leadership may be seen in the animal world, especially in such advanced species as the monkeys and apes. (See chapter 2.)

That some individuals are endowed by nature with special leadership qualities is, in the light of our present knowledge, highly dubious. Yet it is pretty clear that the traits and behavior patterns which we attribute to adult leadership begin to appear in childhood. Age differences among children will elicit some form of dominance, as will sex differences in other situations. So,

⁷ See Max Freyd, "Introverts and extroverts," *Psychological Review*, 1924, 31 : 74-87.

⁸ See G. W. T. H. Fleming, "Introverted and extroverted tendencies in schizoid and systonic states as manifested by vocation," *Journal of Mental Science*, 1927, 73 : 233-239.

⁹ See Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934, for an account of how personality and culture interact.

too, specialization of function is particularly important in the rise of leadership. A person who can perform a certain act more effectively, quickly, and with more widespread influence than another sets the stage for others to attribute to him qualities of control, even if he does not begin, himself, to assume some. As a matter of fact, social-cultural factors must constantly be reckoned with in considering dominance.

There are various facets to leadership: (1) The leader's drives and emotional needs, his capacities, and his energies must be understood. (2) The interaction with the followers usually involves some form of identification of the latter with the former. (3) There is a willingness or obligation to comply with the forms of activity set down by the dominating individual. (4) The latter must also have an ability to identify himself with the group members in some degree, and yet, as his power becomes apparent, some sense of distance and separateness from them develops, even if not present at the outset.

The sources of leadership. Studies of children in the home, on the playground, and at school provide us some idea as to the manner in which dominance patterns grow up. On the basis of such primary-group experiences adult leadership emerges.

Muscular strength will have its place in a play situation, making it possible for one child to coerce another about a toy. But perhaps more important is individual difference in intelligence. For the most part, sheer physical mass has less place in our society than foresight, shrewdness, power to solve problems for one's self and others, and capacity to secure sympathetic support from followers. Likewise, strong impulse or drive in a group situation toward a given goal will set up interactions in which dominance may arise.

The beginnings of such distinctions in role are usually made in the home. Aggressiveness in parents may serve as a stimulus for like behavior in the child. Parents encourage children to display themselves before others. They talk before them of their

intelligence, of their qualities of leadership. Not only the strictly personal-social conditioning of children by parents and relatives but also traditions of leadership in a family — the picture of long generations of successful men and women — affect the children. In our society social status afforded by wealth or professional prestige also plays a considerable part.

Dominance may also arise from frustrating situations. The parents or others may inhibit or repress the child in some situation only to find that he makes renewed effort to get what he wants; or, failing that, to seek some substitute. The most important situational sources of such reactions involving the parent and child are denial of affection or felt withdrawal of love (rejection), discipline of basic drives such as are involved in teaching bodily habits, and basic training in motor and intellectual skills. In situations involving others, the sibling rivalry may become a factor, especially where a child feels himself in disfavor, avoided, or where he cannot compete with his fellows on what to him seem equal terms.

Such experience in conflict situations provides excellent training for leadership. If, in the face of repression or frustration, the child retires to fantasy, he may imagine himself a powerful person who has his own way. Or he may, in some other group, overcompensate for his felt inferiority at home and become a dominant child on the playground. As a matter of fact, various observers of children have distinguished between the bully and overaggressive leader and the diplomatic, more sympathetic and persuasive type. Although the former — in our school situation — tends to be in less favor, he may secure his outlet in still some other association.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all leadership derives from frustration. Yet leadership in many instances has its roots in the oppositional situation in the home and on the playground. In this sense, dominance is closely linked up with the processes of conflict and competition.

From the beginnings in the home, on the playground, and in the school the child

leader may go on to take over dominance functions in his adolescent associations. He may be scout leader, or "boss" of a boys' gang; and which he will be is settled in large part by his social-economic status. But in any case he will get further training. Of course, some young children who appear to have the potentiality of leadership do not develop it in their later years.

Also, our culture provides for certain division of the dominance role. Certainly the child who indulges in fantasy and avoids too much active contact with his playmates will not ordinarily develop into executive, persuasive leadership. But under school or other stimuli he may begin mechanical inventions, or to write highly acceptable literary fantasies, or go in for composition in music and art. From such beginnings he may, in time, acquire the high status of intellectual leadership.

In any case, the major cultural patterns and associations will provide the outlets for the primary conditioning to leadership. In a military society soldiering will have high status, and young men will compete for leadership positions in the armed forces. In a society dominated by the business ethos, the stress will be toward money-making and power in the financial market. Moreover, a society controlled by religious and mystical values does not ordinarily stimulate the rise of scientific genius; nor does an "intellectualistic" order, such as was found in ancient China, foster risk-taking in business or mechanical inventions. In other words, the differentiation of dominance operates almost entirely within the framework of the larger society and culture. Let us see what some of these are.

Community and family factors in leadership. Leadership is a combination of ability and opportunity. While variation in ability doubtless has some of its roots in biological differences, culture and crises will almost always set the direction of its expression. Where class organization is strong, dominance tends to go with status as a member of a particular caste or class, and submission and docility to go with member-

ship in the lower ranks. In a democratic society, where class lines are not sharply drawn, leaders may arise from any group provided they follow the accepted patterns of the culture.

Without doubt, crisis plays a part in the development of leadership. Confronted with a novel situation for which old devices — material or nonmaterial — do not serve, there is set up an emotional and intellectual tension among members of the group. The leader, whether a mechanical inventor or a statesman, largely focuses these feelings and desires of his group upon a solution. Yet it seems rather clear that no matter how unusual a given leader may seem to his contemporaries, the stream of events is the more powerful. This is not to belittle the leader but to free us from the bias that he can control events without reference to the cultural factors.

Among the social situations affecting the leadership are occupational and locality backgrounds of leaders. Any number of studies have shown that leaders come from the better-educated classes and from urban rather than rural sections. Stephen S. Visser examined the occupation and birthplace of persons included in the 1922-1923 edition of *Who's Who in America* in an effort to study this problem. Table 18 summarizes the pertinent data on the 18,400 persons included therein.

Using the 1870 census as a basis (a fair estimate of the population for the period when most of these persons were born), Visser shows that in proportion to population the cities contributed 6 times as many persons as did the farm, villages 9 times as many, and the suburbs 11 times as many. Clergymen fathered 2400 times as many notables as did the unskilled laborers in proportion to numbers. Today doubtless the business classes, doctors, lawyers, and teachers contribute more than they did at that time, and the fact remains that the professional and business classes together still furnish many times their ratio of prominent men, when prominence is measured on the basis of those who get into *Who's Who in America*. Wealth alone is not the determining factor, since clergymen and teachers are not known for high incomes. Doubtless cultural opportunity is the most important factor.

TABLE 18

BIRTHPLACES OF PERSONS IN *Who's Who in America* FOR 1922-1923 AND THE
OCCUPATIONS OF THEIR FATHERS¹⁰

BIRTHPLACE	PER CENT OF TOTAL	OCCUPATION OF FATHER	PER CENT OF TOTAL
Farms	25.9	Farmers	23.4
Villages and Towns	24.5	Unskilled Laborers	0.4
Small Cities	24.8	Semiskilled and Skilled Laborers	6.3
Large Cities	20.6	Businessmen	35.3
Suburban Areas	4.1	Clergymen	11.1
		Other Professional Men	23.2
		Men of Leisure	0.3

In another study F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn secured data from 7371 business leaders in this country. The parenthood status of these men ranged from laborer to business and professional classes, but the respective contribution of each of these groups varied enormously. For example, the business group produced 110 times as many business-leader sons as did the combined groups of unskilled and semiskilled workers. Eighteen times as many business leaders came from business ancestry as from farmers, 4 times as many from business families as from clerical and salesman groups, and not quite twice as many from the business group as from the professionals. Although businessmen and professional men comprise only 10 per cent of the gainfully employed, they produced 70 per cent of the business leaders. There is certainly a high correlation between the occupation of father and son in this category.¹¹

In interpreting their findings the authors lean heavily to the theory that innate intelligence or endowment is far more important a causal factor than is the presence or absence of education and other opportunity. While it is true that in an open-class society individuals do have a greater chance to alter their roles and to rise in status than they would have in a fixed society, nevertheless, until the advantages of father's occupation, of education and family tradition, and of locality are carefully controlled, it is impossible to accept fully the

rather sweeping generalizations of these authors. Intelligence and business shrewdness are not fixed quantities inherited in the genes and unaffected by training. In our time of growing inflexibility of occupational classes, it may well be that the business class would tend, on the whole, to recruit its members from a like class of parents. Unfortunately we cannot compare these data from our own period with like facts regarding the sources of American businessmen 100 or 150 years ago.

Kinds of leaders. Attempts to classify leaders follow, in general, two lines of approach: one, to fit them into some scheme of personality type; the other, to assign them to some general role or type of social participation. However, the matter of classifying people in terms of types of personality or life organization is extremely difficult and far from scientifically satisfactory. Nevertheless, for practical purposes and as a first approximation at generalization, such categories as extroversion and introversion have been used with some success.¹² For example, O. L. Schwarz's dual classification of leaders as "men of action" or as "men of thought" has been equated to extroverted and introverted types respectively.¹³

While, in general, men dealing with practical affairs, with other men, and with concrete social situations — be it in business,

¹⁰ From S. S. Visher, "A study of the type of the place of birth and of the occupation of fathers of subjects of sketches in *Who's Who in America*," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1925, 30: 551-557.

¹¹ F. W. Taussig and C. S. Joslyn, *American business leaders*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

¹² See Kimball Young, *Personality and problems of adjustment*, chapter 13. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940.

¹³ See O. L. Schwarz, *General types of superior men*. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1916.

politics, war, or religion — do fall into the patterns of thought and action which are called extrovertive, there is little doubt but that many successful executives, salesmen, and administrators are ambiverts or even introverts who have been able to assume the necessary roles for such leadership. In the same vein, while leadership in the fields of philosophy, theology, art, science, invention, and ideas generally may tend to fall into the introvertive patterns, the individual variations are very great. There are many laboratory men or writers who would be called extrovertive and who, on occasion, make excellent executives and "men of action." Many more of those who deal in ideas are doubtless of the mixed or ambivert type.

When we turn to classify leaders in terms of broad social roles, we seem to be on somewhat surer ground. Many of the classifications which have been used make little or no attempt to link them to particular personality structure but, rather, follow only the type function or form of social participation, usually in the person's chief occupation.

There has been no end of classifications of leaders. The present writer has used a convenient distinction between headship and voluntary leadership. The former is dominance due to power or authority resting on ascribed role and status through some system of promotion or appointment by other dominant individuals. The latter depends on more or less voluntary approval of followers who accept the dominant person as one to handle problems or to furnish ideas on matters of special or general concern.¹⁴

Another, and more detailed, classification is that of Charles Bird, who has drawn on a number of earlier writers. He sets down four "convenient points of reference": executive or institutional, dominant, persuasive, and expert. The first is concerned with maintenance and control of particular institutions and of the policy and personnel

associated with the functions belonging thereto. The dominant leader whom Bird designates as "extremely aggressive, assertive, and extraverted" produces programs, organizes their fulfillment, and secures submission and co-operation of his followers by the appeal of direct action and, if necessary, by certain forms of discipline. The persuasive leader keeps in closest touch with his followers. He controls them by the use of suggestive words and symbols of emotional appeal rather than by argument and rationality. The expert is the highly proficient specialist whose work or contribution is so essential to the operation of social life that he is accorded great deference and given a large measure of control.¹⁵

David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, while they do not attempt any systematic classification in terms of social roles, list various "functions" of leaders as executive or co-ordinator of the activities of the group, planner, policy maker, expert, arbitrator and mediator, and ideologist. In addition to these they discuss leader role as "external" representative or spokesman for the group, as "controller" or "gate keeper" of interpersonal relationships of group members themselves, as "purveyor of rewards and punishments," as "surrogate for individual responsibility," as ideal or model, as "father figure," and even at times as scapegoat.¹⁶ The last role, of course, would signify the loss of leadership. In another connection they describe authoritarian and democratic types of leaders. But these obviously refer rather to the psychological characteristics and methods of operation than to social roles as the concept is being used here.

Still another set of categories is that of A. B. Wolfe with his concepts of conservative, radical, and scientist. While they represent different roles, Wolfe shows that often the conservative and the radical are alike in personality make-up and reveal emotional and highly biased views in regard to the things they value most. Only the scientist, who has much the same role as the

¹⁴ See Charles Bird, *Social psychology*, chapter 11. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940.

¹⁴ See Kimball Young, *Social psychology*, 2nd ed., chapter 10. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1944.

¹⁶ David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, *Theory and problems of social psychology*, pp. 417-422. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1948.

expert, retains his impartiality and impersonality.¹⁷

Writers on politics have given more attention to the problem of leadership than perhaps any others. One of the most enterprising attempts to study various general political roles and the corresponding personality structure has been made by H. D. Lasswell. Among others he has classified political (social) roles as: the bureaucrat or administrator, the boss, the diplomat, the agitator, and the theorist.

The *administrator* is essentially the executive who operates an institution or agency along precise, orderly, and fixed lines. Lasswell contends that psychologically the type bureaucrat has a basic desire for emotional security and stability which can best be provided by a compulsive orderliness, precision, and rigidity of habits. The *boss* is a hard-headed opportunist concerned with the manipulation of political power through suave manner, calmness, patience, and clever and often insincere use of conversation and social graces. He is essentially a bargainer for political ends and combines some of the qualities of the undercover man, the entrepreneur, and the military strategist. Psychologically he represents a basic dependence on persuasive words, on the manipulation of inside knowledge and of situations often divorced from personalities as such.

The *agitator* is given to reform and revolutionary plans. He has programs, catchwords, and suggestive slogans, first, to characterize the *status quo* as bad, evil, and decadent; and, second, to furnish verbal pictures of a new heaven and a new earth to come. He is often marked by intense self-love, strong belief in verbal stimuli, great faith in magical or fantastic devices for reforming the world, and frequently a strong sense of being persecuted by others — itself a powerful motive for "fixing" things in the world so as to suit one's own conception of right and wrong. The *theorist* applies his energies toward making a systematic analysis of the environment, attempting thereby to formulate a consistent, logical picture of his world. Often he is interested in reform; but, again, he may desire to preserve the *status quo*. His essential interest, however,

is in abstractions, in ideas, and in constructions of a rich but controlled imagination. His security and satisfaction come from dependence on general principles, on verbal abstractions. For the most part he is introverted and finds his power in organized and logical fantasies. Unlike the administrator, he is not bothered with concrete routines of every day; nor is he, unlike the agitator, necessarily concerned with conveying his theory and message to the masses. He is often a recluse and would make neither a good rabble-rouser nor a diplomat since he is too direct, logical, and intellectually honest to fit either of these roles.¹⁸

Again these types seldom occur in pure form but are often found in combination. Lasswell cites Herbert Hoover as essentially an administrator, the Old Testament prophets as agitators, and Karl Marx as a theorist. William Lloyd Garrison (1805-1879) was an agitator and administrator of ability. On the other hand, Nikolai Lenin (1870-1924) and Thomas G. Masaryk (1850-1937) of Czechoslovakia represent a composite of administrator, agitator, and theorist. Under Lasswell's rubrics Adolf Hitler might be classified as a combination of agitator and boss.

None of these schemes for classification of leadership is completely satisfactory. First, we know far too little about the causal sequences in the life histories of leaders; second, we have no adequate standards for determining types; and, third, the varied historical situations in which leaders operate are extremely difficult to classify. It is clear that the various categories reflect the culture as well as the more personal experience and bias of the proponents for this or that schema. We shall return to some aspects of this matter in discussing leadership in mass society at the close of the chapter.

Certainly as to whether there are general traits or aspects of leadership remains a most difficult question. Of course, there is some evidence of clusters of personality traits in the rough-and-ready division of dominance into action persons and thinking persons noted above. But the situations play such an important part that they must always be

¹⁷ See A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, radicalism, and the scientific method*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. The present author has pointed out that scientists are only impartial and objective in reference to their specialties. See Kimball Young, "The need of integration of attitudes among scientists," *Scientific Monthly*, 1924, 18: 291-305.

¹⁸ See H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930; and his *World politics and personal insecurity*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1935.

taken into account, and any sound study which attempts to classify personality might also try to classify types of situations in which such traits come to operate. This is extremely hard to do, as anyone can discover for himself by trying it out.

Certainly there is one aspect of generality which cannot be overlooked. Group members or followers often tend to *ascribe* to those who are in positions of dominance over them personality characteristics and powers which the latter may not possess. This is a familiar occurrence, as when a great natural scientist or engineer is expected by the masses also to be an expert on international politics, labor-management relations, or the effect of comic books on children's conduct.

Yet it is clear that once powers are attributed to others, the latter may capitalize on these "gifts" from their followers and assume knowledge, skill, and dominance in fields where they have no real competence. Sometimes, too, people who are the victims or beneficiaries of this projection of potency on them by others get busy and attain at least some capability in the areas in which wisdom has been ascribed them. These are subtle social-psychological phases of leadership of considerable importance, but unfortunately they have, to date, not been adequately investigated.

Leadership and group effectiveness. The interaction of leader or head and members of a given group will be qualified by the aim of the group, its form of organization, the patterns of control, and a variety of other factors. Common-sense observation as well as more careful research has shown how the attitudes, values, and output of a group are influenced by the nature of the relations of the members to the leader and to each other.

One of the best-known and most widely cited studies of leadership and group performance was made at the University of Iowa under the direction of Kurt Lewin (1890-1947), a psychologist.¹⁹ The purpose was to

observe and analyze the relation of the leader to a group and the nature of interpersonal contacts of the members to each other. Two groups of five boys each were formed under adult leaders. The general purpose of each group was to make masks for a forthcoming play. One group operated under what Lewin and his associates called an "authoritarian" pattern, the other under a "democratic" one. In the former the leader took complete charge, determined the policy, dictated the techniques of work, put individuals to particular tasks, and gave information or made criticisms in a direct, "personal" way. Otherwise he tended to remain aloof from active group participation. In the latter the policies, techniques, and particular tasks were determined through free and full discussion of all members. The leader was friendly, entered into the group actively, and his praise and criticism alike were "fact-minded."

The results reveal some striking differences. Among others, we will note the following: The authoritarian in contrast to the democratic group was characterized by a great many direct orders and commands from the leader to the members. The social climate of the groups differed sharply. The members of the former were either more hostile to each other and to an outside group than were the democratic members or more submissive and apathetic. While the authoritarian group turned out a lot of work when under the direct instruction and eye of the leader, when he temporarily absented himself, their productivity dropped off sharply. There appeared to be more *we-feeling* in the democratic than the other group. Under induced frustration in the work situation, the democratic group responded by greater and more organized effort to overcome the difficulty. In contrast, under like frustration the other group tended to give up, to blame each other, and to show other evidences of group disruption. In the authoritarian group the boys were more deferential to the leader, yet they made more attention-getting approaches to him. Also, there were much more spontaneous conversation and

Journal of Social Psychology, 1939, 10: 271-301; Ronald Lippitt, "An experimental study of the effect of democratic and authoritarian group atmospheres," *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, 1940, 16, no. 3, 43-198; and Ronald Lippitt and R. K. White, "The 'social climate' of children's groups," chapter 28 in R. G. Barker, et al., eds., *Child behavior and development*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1943.

¹⁹ See, among others, Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and R. K. White, "Patterns of aggressive behavior in experimentally created social climates,"

sense of ease in the democratic group than in the other.²⁰

While we must be most cautious in drawing any wide conclusions from this and similar studies, the results are suggestive.²¹ Moreover, common-sense observations as well as other studies of the relationships of the head or leader to members of a given group tend to confirm, in a broad way, the findings of the Iowa study.

In real-life situations, the control or dominance which an individual exercises will vary greatly in terms of the cultural expectancies, that is, in terms of habits and attitudes. Many institutionalized groups have a hierarchical and rather fixed ordering of authority from the top down. This is most evident in the military and in churches with a formalized priesthood. Similar patterning is found in most governmental and educational systems. It is a common feature of our industrial order.

The dominant individual or individuals in such groupings are in control largely by virtue of ascribed status. They represent what we have called headship. Such persons expect deference and identification on the part of those who make up the group. It should not be imagined that because dominant individuals are not voluntarily elected to their positions their followers are less inclined to follow them. It all depends on their social-cultural conditioning. However, in addition to the formal organization of any military, political, economic, or other group, some kind of informal associations may arise. These are often spontaneous and voluntary associations of individuals. In these groups dominance may and often does emerge in terms of more "natural" conditions of voluntary recogni-

tion and choice of leadership abilities. (See pp. 413-414 on the factory as a community.)

Whether the group be formal or informal in organization, the effectiveness of its operation and its morale are influenced by the nature of the contacts of the members with those in authority, be they military officers, political personnel, plant managers, foremen, or others. It must never be forgotten that the dominance of one means submission of others. Furthermore, in our culture at least, the pattern of dominance-submission derives in the first instance from the interactions of parent and child in the latter's formative years. As the individual grows up and becomes a member of various groups, the patterns of dependence and/or dominance which he learned in the family will, in all likelihood, be extended. Of course there will be changes, but it is doubtful if anyone ever escapes the effects of the conditioning of the early years. Among other things important to making group action effective are these: The individual wants to feel secure; he wants approval; he wants to know what to do and what is expected of him; he wants a sense of participation; he wants consistent discipline; and he wants to be treated fairly and justly. Studies of morale and leadership in the American army made during World War II show that good morale among the troops was correlated with their having as officers men who were interested in them, understood their needs, recognized their abilities, were fair in discipline, promotional policy, and job assignment, and kept them informed, as far as security reasons permitted, as to the nature and meaning of their tasks as an outfit.

Much the same thing has been found true in industry and business. Thus, a survey of the interrelation of productivity, supervision, and employee morale in a large office force showed that the supervisors in high-production work groups differed from those in low-production groups in a number of ways: (1) they were under less close supervision from their own superiors; (2) they placed less direct emphasis on production as a goal; (3) they encouraged the workers to take part in making decisions; (4) they were "more

²⁰ In another study Lewin and his group set up three groups: authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire. In the last-named the leader had practically no place at all, except to advise when requested. Otherwise the group "ran itself." As might be expected, this group remained the most unstructured and ineffective of the three.

²¹ It is unfortunate that the publicity given these studies led many psychologists, educators, and others to generalize about democracy in contrast to authoritarianism far beyond what the facts warrant or what Lewin and his associates intended.

employee-centered"; (5) they spent more time in supervision and less in "straight production work"; (6) they were more self-confident about their roles as supervisors; and (7) they felt that they knew where they stood with the company.

In interpreting these findings the report says: "People are more effectively motivated when they are given some degree of freedom in the way in which they do their work than when every action is prescribed in advance. They do better when some degree of decision-making about their jobs is possible than when all decisions are made for them. They respond more adequately when they are treated as personalities than as cogs in a machine. In short, if the ego motivations of self-determination, of self-expression, of a sense of personal worth can be tapped, the individual can be more effectively energized. The use of external sanctions, of pressuring for production may work to some degree, but not to the extent that the more internalized motives do. When the individual comes to identify himself with his job and with the work of his group, human resources are much more fully utilized in the production process."²²

While the authors of this particular survey were careful not to offer any broad generalizations from their findings, the essential points of their interpretation surely have wide application. The importance of such interplay of dominant individual and the members of groups, whether in industry or elsewhere, is further shown by various programs to re-train supervisors and others who hold positions of authority. One of the most suggestive of these is the sociodrama. This is a group device in which individuals play out various assumed roles in the form of an unrehearsed drama. By this experience managers, foremen, recreation directors, and any number of other persons in positions of control have learned how to handle their

supervisory jobs more effectively. Under the guidance of an expert small groups of such supervisory personnel re-enact life situations and then discuss what they have done, make constructive suggestions for improvement, and otherwise come to see themselves as others see them. So, too, conflicts between supervisors and workers have been resolved by getting the individuals involved to go through the sociodrama as a means of exposing the underlying difficulties and of finding a way to resolve the difficulties. These role-taking performances are an excellent demonstration of George H. Mead's theory of the rise and function of the social self, discussed in chapter 9.²³

The form and nature of dominance is, in short, always related to the nature of the situation in which both head or leader and the members are in interaction. The foremen must possess qualities which make for effective solving of the task or problem of a given group. The members more or less identify themselves with the leader or head as a part of the group situation. Moreover, the members provide something to the leader in the form of satisfying outlets for his intellectual or other capacities and his needs for recognition and power.

Leadership in mass society. Without assuming any finality to the tentative classification of political leaders above, it is clear that three of the most significant leaders in present-day society are the administrator, the expert, and the agitator. The tremendous expansion of large-scale business and

²² From "Productivity, supervision, and employee morale," *Human Relations*, series 1, report 1, p. 4. A report from the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1948. By permission.

On other aspects of plant morale and leadership, see Douglas McGregor, "Conditions of effective leadership in the industrial organization," *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 1944, 8 : 55-63, reprinted in T. M. Newcomb and E. L. Hartley, eds., *Readings in social psychology*, pp. 427-435, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1947.

²³ There is a growing literature on the sociodrama and its elder kin, the psychodrama. See J. L. Moreno, "Inter-personal therapy and psychopathology of inter-personal relations," *Sociometry*, 1937, 1 : 9-76; his "Psychodrama and mental catharsis," *ibid.*, 1940, 3 : 209-244; and his "The concept of the sociodrama: a new approach to the problem of inter-cultural relations," *ibid.*, 1943, 6 : 434-449. On the use of psychodrama for training, see Ronald Lippitt, "The psychodrama in leadership training," *ibid.*, 1943, 6 : 286-292.

On the application of sociodrama to industry, see L. P. Bradford and Ronald Lippitt, "Role-playing in supervisory training," *Personnel*, 1946, 22 : 358-369; and J. R. P. French, Jr., "Role-playing as a method of training foremen" in S. D. Hoslett, ed., *Human factors in management*, pp. 99-116, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946.

industrial enterprise has placed the managerial personnel in a strategic position with reference to their success or failure.²⁴ In like manner, the extension of political controls over ever-new areas of social life has brought with it a growing staff of functionaries which tends to take on the latent powers of an established bureaucracy. (See chapter 23.) Then, too, our complex industrial, political, and military systems cannot operate without the expert. It was modern science applied through the Industrial Revolution which made the expert so important, and today he represents the use of the scientific method in our everyday material and social world. The application of his specialty demands that he be completely objective, dispassionate, and unconcerned with moral meanings. He occupies a position of dominance absolutely vital to the ongoing of our complex culture, yet as an expert he is set apart from much of our social and cultural world. He symbolizes, in fact, the highest degree of impersonality and segmentalized life in our mass society. And as a result of his skill and knowledge he has on occasion acquired power and prestige without adequate moral responsibility. Yet moral values cannot be gainsaid, and any sane program for using the expert must take this fact in mind.

Then, too, the agitator is particularly likely to assume a significant role in mass society in periods of grave economic insecurity and general uncertainty about the future political order. By use of our modern means of mass communication the agitator can all the more easily take on the role of the demagogue and, with appealing slogans and fine promises, capture the support of the masses in his drive for power. If the agitator combines his talents with those of an organized revolutionary minority, he may become the spearhead for producing vast changes, the full import of which the masses may not understand. The amazing

success of dictators in our own time should make clear the fact that the people who at first support the demagogue probably have no conception of what is in store for them once he is in the saddle.

Since the potential dominance of society and culture by any one of these types of leaders presents serious problems, we must seek some balance among them and relate them to the larger matter of general and mass participation in policy-making and ultimate controls. One method of stabilizing mass society under the pattern of a demagogic dictator, backed by a closely organized elite, is seen in the Russian practice. Under Soviet Russia's system the administrator and the expert become the servants of the ruling class and aid the latter in manipulating the masses into acquiescence of the system.

Another method may be found through more democratic organization, in which the specialist-expert and the administrator have their particular functions but in which their work is linked to the legislative and popular responsibilities of policy-making. The administrator must not be permitted to extend his authority beyond the boundaries set by the general will, nor may the expert operate as expert without moral responsibility to the larger public good. Moreover, if such a system finds some means of widespread responsibility, if and when the agitator appears, his proposals will have to face not only the analysis of the expert but the moral demands of democratic participation.

Leaders and followers. This discussion of power distribution among leaders and the bearing of this upon the masses suggests the whole problem of the relationship of the leaders to their followers. In societies in which there is a general participation of the masses in politics, economic matters, or religion, the role of what Bird calls the persuasive leader or what we may consider as either the agitator or the "responsible leader" (to use one of Lasswell's types) is particularly interesting. Such a leader crystallizes the vague feelings and attitudes of the masses who are confronted with a situation they

²⁴ See Chester I. Barnard, *The functions of the executive*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938; and his "Education for executives," *Journal of Business*, 1945, 18: 175-182, for an insightful analysis of some of the major problems facing contemporary business leadership.

cannot handle. They want something which they cannot define and hence cannot act on intelligently, because until we define situations our actions tend to be impulsive.

A leader offers his followers such a definition. The rise of Napoleon after the French Revolution, of Lenin in Russia, of Mussolini in Italy, of Hitler in Germany, or of F. D. Roosevelt in the United States well illustrates how the formation of definite programs accompanied by persuasive symbols of strength and security attracts the masses long weary of disaster, hardship, and especially uncertainty. They find in the leader and his platform an image that they can follow. So, too, in setting his role and in giving him status, they project upon him many qualities which they imagine a leader should have. Then by identification they again get these very qualities back into themselves with added dividends to their own personalities. This projection naturally reacts on the leader, who to be successful must assume these roles and accept this status. In this sense all leaders are, in the words of Emerson, "representative men"; that is, for their devotees they are symbols of great thought and power. Surely, such a leader as *symbol* affords a focus for feeling

and acting together. Around him and his ideas they build up a pattern of response directed to an end and usually satisfying because it appears to bear fruits in action.

Yet no matter what form or type of dominance we observe or experience, the leader is not separated from his fellows except in degree. He has much in common with them in biological background and in his participation in society and culture. Still, he represents distinction, uniqueness, and variability in thought and action which the followers like and admire. His particular deviation serves as a focus for the identification of the followers and hence makes for effective group activity. Such individual variation has its roots in constitutional differences in ability, in early training, especially as influenced by personal-social conditioning, and in such cultural factors as family tradition, class status, differential skills and knowledge, and in basic ethos or values of the society. Finally, leadership depends upon the power and prestige which the masses or particular groups of people attribute to the dominant person, and which, in turn, he comes to assume as a part of his own life organization. In any case, there is always an interplay of leaders and followers.

Interpretative Summary

1. Some kind of specialization of function is found in every society although in the most rudimentary groups this is not so evident except as it is related to age and sex.
2. The more complex the society, the more evident is a high division of labor.
3. Such high specialization makes for segmentalization of personality. This aspect of the individual life organization is one of the characteristics of man in mass society.
4. There is no clear-cut positive correlation between present measures of general intelligence and occupational classification by status. While there are some group differences in average measures, there are marked individual variations in each occupational category and a great deal of overlapping from one category to another.
5. Likewise, efforts to correlate personality traits or types with occupational choice have not as yet been very satisfactory.
6. Leadership represents a particular case of specialization of function. It, too, is found in every society.
7. The nature and qualities of leadership vary with the social and cultural situation. It is extremely difficult to define specific and universal traits of leadership.
8. Classifications of leaders by personality traits or types have to date not proved very meaningful. Classifications in terms of roles and situations have been somewhat more satisfactory. Much research is yet to be done in order to get at the relation of personality characteristics and leadership role and status.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define specialization. What are its roots in opposition and co-operation?
2. What does Henry Clay, the economist, mean by stating that from the individual's point of view division of labor means "specialization," but from the point of view of society it means "co-operation"?
3. What influence did the Industrial Revolution have upon the division of labor? What are some of the advantages of such specialization; what are some of the limitations?
4. What relation is there, if any, between occupational status and intelligence rating? Interpret the findings of contemporary psychology on this topic. What is meant by saying that "averages are likely to be misleading" when interpreting such findings?
5. How important are social-emotional and temperamental traits with reference to occupational specialization? Cite instances in which such traits made for failure in a given job; cite cases in which the emotional-temperamental traits made for success.
6. Define leadership, headship. Explain why dominance always implies submission.
7. Name and discuss the chief factors making for group morale as related to the role of the group leader. Illustrate from business, industry, the military, or elsewhere.
8. Are leadership traits universal or the product of a given situation?
9. What particular threats, if any, does the (a) administrator, (b) the expert, and (c) the agitator offer to a democratically organized society?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

George E. G. Catlin, "Expert," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 6 : 10-12. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

A review of the role of the expert in society, especially in government service.

Helen M. Jennings, *Leadership and isolation*, 2nd ed. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1947.

An excellent discussion of leadership from the standpoint of sociometric studies.

H. D. Lasswell, *Power and personality*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1948.

A discussion of the motives, skills, and power manifestations of political leaders.

Arthur Salz, "Specialization," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, *op. cit.*, 1934, 14 : 278-285.

An excellent review of the meaning of division of labor, particularly in industry.

Richard Schmidt, "Leadership," *ibid.*, 9 : 282-287.

A suggestive discussion with particular reference to various kinds of leaders, and the situational as well as psychological factors which must be considered.

"The OSS Assessment Staff," *Assessment of men: selection of personnel for the Office of Strategic Services*. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1948.

A report on attempts to assess the merits of personnel recruited for the difficult tasks of OSS during World War II. Similar techniques were used by the British War Office Selection Boards in determining fitness of men for officer training.

Stratification and Class Structure

THE PREVIOUS three chapters have dealt largely with the *roles* which individuals play in society in terms of differences in age, sex, mentality, specialization, and dominance. Yet we noted that such roles are related also to statuses: ascribed or achieved. This chapter will treat the relations of whole groups of people as these are affected by the position of such groups on a more or less accepted scale of status. That is, we shall see how society is organized in terms of the "social ladder," a graded ordering of power and prestige. The class structure of a given society is often described in terms of the distribution of the members in the form of a pyramid, with a relatively large number at the base and relatively few in the upper sections. But, as we shall see, this conception of the class system as a social pyramid does not necessarily hold in all cases.

As noted in chapter 4, such a gradation of people we call *stratification*. The term, moreover, is used to refer both to the process by which people become related on a scale of status and also to the institutional aspects of such grading. While we shall examine certain universal features of both the process and the institutions, our chief attention will be given to what goes on in our contemporary class systems.

Although the study of class structure centers mostly around its group features, we by no means neglect the individual aspects. The class structure represents certain fundamental institutions to which the person must adjust as he advances to his place as an adult in the community. For example, the early life of a person is greatly influenced by the class status of his family. Later his own position in a given class is important. Many of our basic habits, attitudes, and values reflect this particular phase of the social organization of a given society.

The formation of social strata is a process closely related to differentiation and accommodation. Some writers consider stratification as a special form of accommodation growing out of conflict only. Yet accommodation following conflict does not always lead to the formation of classes or castes, although this may have been the case in certain historical situations. The compromise — a phase of accommodation — which emerges out of an industrial strike means new arrangements of group interrelations but does not necessarily imply the sudden appearance of entirely new classes. The growth of economic, political, and religious class privileges is often the result of a gradual deposition of rights and duties that come from continuing relations of groups within a larger society. In this latter respect, in fact, stratification is as much a phase of differentiation as it is of accommodation.

The Nature of Stratification as a Process

Clearly, the development of role and status is not identical with stratification. This latter involves a more limited aspect of the total role-status organization of social life. For example, status as related to age, sex, mentality, and division of labor is not necessarily identical with ordering by class-gradations. Let us look at some of the specific features of the process of stratification.

Status and class formation. Class structure arises only when ascribed statuses become linked to groups within a larger society in terms of some ordering of status as higher or lower. That is, some graded inequalities of prestige and power come to be taken for granted. This is the essence of

stratification, which may be defined as a differential gradation of groups, including the individuals therein, on a scale of superordination and subordination. Classes begin to emerge in a community or larger society when some special-group function or power is accepted not only as right and proper but as dominant or subordinate to another, and when such status is handed down or tends to be handed down to the next generation of that particular segment of the larger society. That is, although the higher-lower relations develop out of struggle and differentiation, they become stratified only when the "biological principle" of heredity, as Charles H. Cooley put it, is applied.¹ By this Cooley did not mean that class status got into the germ plasm and was transmitted by biological means. Rather, membership in a class or caste is determined not by competitive efficiency or merit arising from competition or demonstrated personal ability but by virtue of being born into a family with said class status. From this situation you acquire, by enculturation, the class position of the parents. That is, class or caste role and status depend on a gradation of inequalities linked culturally to hereditary descent.

Some features of class structure. The emergence of a class structure does not mean that differentiation of role and status by age, sex, and mentality disappears. Rather, the class principle supplements these, and where the class system is widespread and effective it often takes on the features of a little society within a larger one. In truth, one of the threats of sharp class or caste divisions is that they may serve to disintegrate the larger overall society and culture.

The activities around which a class structure develops may involve almost any of the major associations and institutions of a society, such as the economic, political, military, religious, intellectual or esthetic, or any combination of these. C. C. North gives five areas around which class may develop: personal and civil, economic, political, reli-

gious, and honorific.² Talcott Parsons, viewing the matter from the angle of the individual rather than the group, suggests six "bases of differential valuations" in analyzing class structure: membership in a kinship unit, personal qualities, achievements, possessions, institutionalized authority, and power "not institutionally sanctioned."³

In terms of intergroup contacts, a class structure is a special case of in-group *vs.* out-group relations which lie along the scale or ladder of superior to inferior standing. For the members within a given class or caste category there is a strong sense of intimacy, solidarity, and co-operation. This rests upon the psychological mechanisms of identification among the members, which is shown by their common habits, attitudes, ideas, values, and symbols. These, in turn, permit the members to act in harmony where matters of class status are concerned. To belong to a class or caste is to know how to think and act in certain prescribed ways. Unity as well as sense of difference from others is further supported by all sorts of external marks of privilege and prestige, such as special dress, badges, and distinctive rights and duties.

The other class strata are out-groups with regard to which there is a hierarchy of power and deference. There will be a sense of superiority to those on the lower rungs of the class ladder and inferiority toward those on the level or levels above. If such a patterning of superordination-subordination between classes is sanctioned by the mores and law and if the intraclass relation of members is one of close identification, the social-cultural hierarchy is not likely to be disturbed. This gives a fixity to conduct which makes it possible to know in advance how others as well as you will act. That is, it makes for a smooth running of the social order. If and

² See C. C. North, *Social differentiation*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1926.

³ See Talcott Parsons, "An analytical approach to the theory of social stratification," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1940, 45: 841-862. For other pertinent material on the general theory of stratification, see Herbert Goldhamer and Edward A. Shils, "Types of power and status," *ibid.*, 1939, 45: 171-182; Kingsley Davis, "A conceptual analysis of stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 1942, 7: 309-321; and Lucio Mendieta y Nuñez, "The social classes," *ibid.*, 1946, 11: 166-176.

¹ See Charles H. Cooley, *Social organization*, p. 210. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

when the sanctions which support the class structure begin to be questioned and to dissolve, the class system is in the process of change and reorganization.

The duality of habits, attitudes, and values — one directed upward, the other downward — would seem to have some limits. We may ask, Does the top class or elite feel subordinate to any still higher order, and do those at the bottom of the social ladder feel themselves superordinate to any other order? The latter may find some outlet by regarding groups outside the class system or animals, plants, or objects in nature as beneath them. The class or caste at the apex of the pyramid may, for their part, project their feelings of subordination into the heavens and develop a sense of submission toward some abstract or divine principle. The dominant elite often consider themselves the vicereagents of God on earth.

The distinctions between classes or castes have been stated in terms of social distance and of moral evaluations. A variety of tests or measures of social distance have been developed with which to measure an individual's sense of nearness or remoteness from a member of another class or caste or with regard to the latter considered as a total group. These may be stated in terms of judgments in an order-of-merit ranking as to like or dislike, approval or disapproval, feeling of friendliness or its opposite, or any other way of stating or acting with regard to the scale of superiority-inferiority or deference. With regard to the Negro, for example, the respondent may be asked about his willingness to grant or deny the Negro the right to vote, or complete choice as to where he may reside, as to what job he may take, or as to free choice of mating without regard to color differences.⁴

⁴ There is an extensive literature on the measurement of social distance, a device first widely applied by E. S. Bogardus. See his *The new social research*, Los Angeles, J. R. Miller, 1926, and his "Scales in social research," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1939, 24 : 69-75. Various other and somewhat more elaborate methods of measuring social distance have been developed. For a review of some of these methods, see G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. M. Newcomb, *Experimental social psychology*, rev. ed., chapter 13, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1937; and G. A. Lundberg, *Social research*, 2nd ed., chapter 8, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1942.

More refined devices for getting at social distance have been developed in the sociometric scales which seek to find out the degrees of intimacy or remoteness or avoidance individuals feel toward other individuals or to groups as a whole.⁵

The criteria of class. On the basis of the discussion above, let us define class system and class. A *class system* consists of those more or less permanent groups within a community, large or small, which are related to each other in a series of gradations of superordination and subordination on a vertical social-distance continuum. A class system is supported by various institutions stabilizing acceptance and expectation of conduct related to this hierarchical ordering of status. A *class* is a group within such a system whose members are aware of common attributes, have strong common interests, and a sense of in-group solidarity. The members have intimate access to each other as related to their sharing of marital, economic, and other opportunities equally with others of said class. Moreover, these opportunities and privileges derive by "social heredity" from the status of the individual's family.

The criteria of class are clearly fixed by both psychological and external factors. As to the first, consciousness of kind and mutual social recognition are basic. In regard to the latter, the chief items have been occupation, income, education, persistence of genealogical status, place of residence, and such physical marks of difference as skin color. The importance of both external and subjective factors in class and class relations will be made evident in subsequent sections. Next to community a class is one of the most all-inclusive groups to which a person can belong. Many social-cultural situations permit a wide variety of simultaneous group membership. A person may be a physician, Episcopalian, Republican, member of Rotary Club, and Mason at the same time. But a person cannot belong to more than one

⁵ On sociometric scales, see F. S. Chapin, *Experimental designs in sociological research*, chapter 6, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947; and Lundberg, *op. cit.*, chapter 10.

TABLE 19

SOME WAYS OF RANKING PEOPLE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY⁶

COME	OCCUPATION	EDUCATION	FAMILY DESCENT	RACIAL DESCENT	ETHNIC DESCENT
1. Wealthy	1. Big-business executives	1. Graduate and professional school	1. Leading old families	1. Whites	1. English, Scottish
2. Comfortable income	2. Professional people; independent businessmen	2. College graduate	2. Others — often in terms of residence in community	2. Orientals	2. Germanic peoples and
3. Modest income	3. White-collar employees; small shop-keepers	3. Attendance at but not completion of college		3. Negroes	3. Other nationalities from northern and western Europe
4. Low income	4. Skilled workers	4. High-school graduate			4. Nationalities from southern and eastern Europe
5. Dependent on public support	5. Semiskilled workers 6. Unskilled workers	5. Attendance at high school 6. Elementary school only			5. Orientals

class. To repeat: *class* is a large and wide grouping of all members of a community organized in terms of accepted gradation or status.⁷

Rating or ranking and the class structure. Some writers confuse position in a ranking system of occupation or income with class position. But the latter usually involves much more than the rating of an individual in terms of income or job. Rather, status in a class system rests on a combination of roles and related statuses, including at times family or racial descent,

⁶ Modified slightly from R. C. Angell, L. J. Carr, et al., *Readings in sociology* 51, Part I, p. 96. Ann Arbor: The Overbeck Co., 1946. By permission.

⁷ For a critique of the class concepts in research, see Llewellyn Gross, "The use of class concepts in sociological research," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1949, 54: 409-421. He insists on a sharp distinction between substantive definitions of class in terms of the presence or absence of attributes and classificatory definitions which consider class as made up of variables measurable along a continuum. He contends that both theorists and research workers continue to confuse these distinctions. Gross, in turn, seems to confuse certain aspects of intraclass mobility with interclass movement.

education, length of residence, and others. Table 19 gives a cross-section view of some of the rating and ranking systems in present-day United States.

Now the degree of social recognition, mutuality of interest, and sense of solidarity vary with the ratings given or the ranks occupied by the same person. For example, a minister might have a high professional rating on an occupational scale but have a modest income and not be from one of the old leading families of the town. Yet he would be accorded a place in the top class of a New England town. In contrast, a newcomer to such a town might be a retired army colonel with considerable wealth, excellent education, high status in the social circles of the army, and yet he would not be accorded top-class status. His family is "unknown," he has "not been there very long," and so on.⁸

⁸ See Kenneth MacLeish and Kimball Young, *The culture of a contemporary rural community: Landaff, New Hampshire*, Rural Life Studies, no. 3. Washington, D. C.: Department of Agriculture, 1947.

For the most part, social class represents a combination of ranks as they influence social recognition of individuals and members of their families rather than position on a single ranking scale. Yet, on occasion, a position in a given rating scheme may determine class position. In fact, the color-caste system of the United States rests on the two-place ranking with respect to racial descent. However, a rank which is a class or caste in one society is not necessarily one somewhere else. For example, in Latin America gradations of color, from black to white, sometimes form an important criterion of the class system, but there is no absolute color line as there is in the United States.

The criteria upon which class or caste is determined varies from time to time and place to place. In pre-Nazi Germany, for example, the combination of old aristocratic family line and high rank in the army put one in the top elite. In Soviet Russia, membership and high position in the Communist Party are the chief criteria in contrast to czarist days, when nobility with a military career represented the highest class position. In the United States, family descent probably counts more in New England and in the Old South than it does in the Middle or Far West. For the country as a whole the combination of high-level business or political executive, wealth, education, and old-family descent represents the most satisfactory combination to insure one's place in the top class.

Certainly most serious students of history and society do not hold the strict Marxian view that class derives only from economic struggle. (See below.) Noneconomic factors enter in, and seldom is ranking on a single continuum the sole determinant of a class system. Viewed historically, military and religious factors have probably been as important in class determination as has the economic.

Primary and derived class status. Sometimes a distinction is made between primary and derived class status. The former is that in which membership and participation are based on a person's own position in the

various rank-order systems which are basic to the determination of class membership in the first instance and which have come down to one through family position. The members of the top grade in New England society who are of old-family descent are a case in point. Derived class status is dependent on the status of another family member. For example, in a military-minded country like 19th-century Germany, a son of a military man would be considered in his father's class while a child and youth. If he chose a military career he would, of course, follow in his father's class status. But, if he should decide not to do so but to go into business instead, he would lose his former high status. As R. C. Angell remarks, "The class status of members of a family tends to be derived from the class status of its dominant member."⁹

It is clear, however, that such derivation of class status implies a somewhat flexible class structure. In a rigid caste system such mobility would not be tolerated. One may lose caste, but one may not shift from one to another.

Some Institutional Aspects of Class and Caste

If we view stratification from the institutional rather than the processual angle, we find that class systems vary from highly rigid caste organization of society to the flexible and loosely ordered open-class system such as that which emerged in 19th-century America. A *caste* may be defined as an endogamous and hereditary group or section of a society which occupies a relatively fixed place on a scale of superordination to subordination. The limits of each caste and the relations to others are fixed by the mores and law. Marriage between castes is strictly taboo. Moreover, there is no approved way for members of one level to move up into another above or down to one below. A class is a group on a scale of status inequalities in which there are no such rigid limits. While familial inheritance is of central importance, there is some permissive mobility

⁹ From Angell, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 98.

up and down the hierarchy of ranks. Then, if individual initiative, interpersonal competition, and merit come to determine class status, if there is, in short, great potential mobility up and down the scale, we get an "open-class" system, to use Charles H. Cooley's term.¹⁰ Here the kinship affiliation, though not without importance, is far less significant than in more fixed-class systems. In fact, our open-class system is one which permits achieved status to qualify or modify the accepted or ascribed status.

Class systems among nonliterate. While more rudimentary societies have no class structure, some kind of class system is rather widespread among nonliterate peoples who possess complexity of culture. In North America the Kwakiutl had a rather rigid scheme. (See chapter 4.) The warring Plains Indians developed one also, while the Pueblo groups had a rather flexible class structure. There were caste systems in Peru and Mexico. In large parts of Africa, Asia, and Oceania class organization is common. For example, in many parts of western Africa the king and his nobles make up a rigid inheritable class rationalized as of divine sanction. Below them are various governmental ranks, specialized craftsmen, commoners, and slaves. There are other forms of class structure, as among the cattle-raising Wahuma of eastern Africa, who are the top class ruling the horticultural Bantu, whom they conquered.

In Polynesia we find a rich flowering of caste. The Maori nobility of New Zealand trace their descent through primogeniture back to the highest gods. Every man of distinction has to memorize his lineage so that upon occasion he can recite his pedigree. There are five groups of freemen: chiefs, priests, landed gentry, large landholders, and commoners. But the gradations of rank within these castes are numerous. Complex forms of address and carefully detailed rituals are worked out to control the relations of the various castes and ranks to each other. Somewhat similar castes have been found elsewhere in the South Pacific.

¹⁰ Cooley, *op. cit.*, chapters 21, 22.

Caste in India. The Hindu caste system has long been of great interest to Western peoples, and around it has grown up a host of myths and legends. In actuality it is more flexible, more dynamic, more complex, and less vicious than most of us imagine.

The word caste comes from the Portuguese *casta*, meaning lineage; and its application to the system in India shows that the first Westerners to reach the region understood the central place which kinship has in the maintenance of the gradations. The Hindu word for caste is *varna*, meaning color; and there is little doubt that in India, as elsewhere, color and racial differences have had some part in setting up caste lines.

Hindu tradition relates that the major divisions were established about 600 B.C. The ancient Laws of Manu gave the four chief castes as follows: (1) the *Bráhmans*, or priests, to whom were "assigned the duties of reading the Vedas (the sacred books), of teaching, of sacrificing, of assisting others to sacrifice, of giving alms if they be rich, and if indigent of receiving gifts"; (2) the military chieftains, or overlords, called the *Kshatriya*, whose duties were "to defend the people, to give alms, to sacrifice, to read the Vedas, to shun the allurements of sensual gratification"; (3) the agriculturists, herdsmen, and traders, called the *Vaisya*; (4) the servile class of menials and industrial workers, or *Sudra*, whose duty it was "to serve the before-mentioned classes without depreciating their worth."¹¹

This is clearly an idealized picture since the Laws of Manu mention 50 castes besides these major *varnas*. Outside these four orders, and outside the pale of Hinduism, is a varied mass of outcasts, the lowest of whom are the *Chandalas*. These miserable folk have no status at all and are regarded as the scum of the earth, about on a par with such "unclean" animals as dogs and donkeys.¹²

The four divisions, however, are but the skeleton of a highly complex system of castes and subcastes. The 1901 census of

¹¹ Quoted in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., 5: 466-467. See F. Max Müller, *The sacred books of the East*, vol. 25, *The laws of Manu*, chapter 10. London: Oxford University Press, 1886.

¹² See L. S. S. O'Malley, *Indian caste customs*, p. 13. London: Cambridge University Press, 1932.

India lists over 800 castes and subcastes.¹⁸ When the local differences in subcastes are taken into account, the number in fact reaches nearly 5000. Castes and subcastes are constantly forming and re-forming by division or unification. When we come to study the system closely, we find not the static, stereotyped picture of fiction or popular legend but a living, changing social organization. Although the Indian system of castes represents the most highly integrated system of social stratification that has arisen anywhere, its very dynamic character shows that while the regulations are severe and of long standing, the actuality of social practice cannot be defined within simple, narrow limits.

Caste or subcaste, moreover, is not determined by any one standard. Castes are formed in terms of occupations, sectarian groups, races, tribes, and other associations of people with distinctive culture traits or social functions.

To people of Western culture, some of the regulations of caste seem extreme indeed. For example, a man may not sit down to eat with another who is not of the same caste. All meals must be prepared by one of his own caste or by a Brahman. No man of inferior caste may touch the cooked rations of one of higher caste or, for that matter, enter into the latter's culinary quarters. No water or other liquid, once contaminated by the touch of one of inferior caste, may be used. Tanks, rivers, and other larger bodies of water, however, are not considered capable of defilement. Articles of dry food—for instance, rice, wheat, or millet—are not made impure by passing through the hands of a man of lower caste, but they cannot be used if they become moistened or greased. Among the peoples of southern India, where the unclean castes are peculiarly offensive to the higher ranks, pollution may occur even without touching. For example, a Kaniyan causes pollution to a Brahman if he comes within 32 feet of him, and a Nair pollutes him at a distance of 24 feet.

The severity of social pressure on the man who has been put out of his caste is striking. When a Hindu is expelled from his caste his

friends, relatives, and fellow townspeople refuse to accept his hospitality; he is not invited to their houses; he cannot secure brides or bridegrooms for his children; his own married daughters scarcely dare visit him lest they also lose caste. His priest, barber, and washerman will not serve him, although this ruling is becoming more difficult to enforce. Fellow members of his caste even decline to assist at a funeral of one of his household. With so strong a hold of the group codes upon the individual, it is no wonder that such a system persists even in the face of many forces which tend to disintegrate it.

While the caste system remains dominant, many changes have undermined its hold on the population, such as: (1) The urbanization of population affords the person who has lost caste a chance to change his identity in a great city, to take up another occupation, and perhaps to marry outside. (2) Travel and mobility throw the castes together in situations that were not likely to arise before the coming of the railroad and the crowded conditions of large cities. (3) Schooling has helped to alter attitudes and ideas regarding caste, especially among those who have had a higher education. (4) Christianity and other foreign religions doubtless have gradually had some effect upon attitudes and ideas regarding caste. (5) The spread of nationalistic and democratic ideas has been a powerful ferment in India and has assisted in breaking down some features of the caste system. In fact, in the very first years of Indian independence measures were introduced in the national legislature to abolish many features of the caste system. As democratic notions of equality become more widely accepted, the inconsistencies of their caste system with the new ideas should become apparent.

Yet the inertia of custom and habit is powerful. The village, the heart of Hindu social structure, is the seat of caste at its best. Family life, religion, and occupation still provide powerful support for the system.

Class and caste in Mediterranean culture. The class structures of Babylonia,

¹⁸ After the census of 1901, the tabulation of every tribe and minor caste was abandoned as not worth the time and effort. See O'Malley, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome were often rigid but not as elaborate as that which developed in India. In Egypt there were two upper classes — warriors and priests. Besides these there were various lesser classes of professionals and artisans, all relatively fixed. Babylonia, as early as the time of Hammurabi (c. B.C. 2250 or 1950), had a pyramidal feudal order in which class lines were strictly drawn.

Mesopotamia was apparently fairly free of anything suggesting caste, while ancient Iran and Persia, from which the Aryan conquerors of India are thought to have come, had, according to legend, four castes — priests, warriors, agriculturists, and artificers. In Greece we find a considerable variation. Sparta long retained what was in effect a caste system, with its division of the population into citizens, two intermediate castes, and helots. On the contrary, as Athens developed into a cosmopolitan state, the ancient class structure there was greatly modified.

In Rome the story is an interesting one of relatively fixed classes constantly being broken by changes in economic and political power and then re-established, until we get to the Empire, with its final crystallization of Roman society. With the gradual disappearance of the middle classes, the patricians formed a closed class, and the masses were rather thoroughly subjugated under a severe economic and political regime from which the individual could not escape.

Feudal society. With the breakup of the Roman Empire following the barbarian invasions, society in western Europe was re-fashioned along somewhat different lines. The feudal order which emerged was a more or less legally fixed system of classes, sometimes called "estates."¹⁴ There were the various gradations of the overlords, lesser lords, knights, burghers, guild members, freemen,

and serfs. A shift from one level to another was difficult. Gradually economic and political changes began to operate, and the seeds were sown for a disintegration of the old order and the rise of more flexible classes.

Classes in modern Europe. The Commercial and Industrial revolutions disrupted the feudal order and set in motion cultural and social changes which not only produced a shift from primary to secondary organization of society but influenced Western class structure. While the landed aristocracy, the military class, and the ecclesiastical hierarchy remained in the upper brackets, new classes emerged: first, from the large industrial entrepreneurs, bankers, and merchants; second, from the petty business groups; and, third, from the rapidly growing urban industrial masses. The latter became increasingly more numerous and socially more powerful than the peasant and gradually declining serf classes. The shift in the strength of the lowest class was slow. Serfdom did not disappear in France till shortly before the French Revolution, till Napoleon's time in Germany, and in Russia not until the period of our own War Between the States.

The most important elements in the modern world which tended to alter the class system were (1) capitalistic business enterprise and its close associate, the factory system; (2) the political order which stressed nationalism and, later, democracy; (3) the coming of religious tolerance and freedom following the Protestant Reformation; and (4) the expanding spirit and practice of free inquiry, which led to modern science and technology and had marked effect on political democracy, business, and even on religion. As we have already noted, these same forces, in time, produced many of the characteristic features of our mass society.

Among various indicators of changes in the class structure of western Europe are those associated with occupational mobility. While such mobility has not been as great or as extensive in Europe as in this country, nevertheless it has had its place in

¹⁴ See John W. Bennett and Melvin W. Tumin, *Social life: structure and function*, pp. 461-462, 466-470, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. In view of current terminology, little seems to be gained by introducing the term *estate* into current sociology. These authors use the concept *class* as we do *open class*.

the reconstruction of the classes. In England the nobility is constantly being recruited from the business and professional classes; and in Germany, France, and other continental countries it is not impossible for sons of lower classes to rise to the higher.

The vocational movement up or down the class scale does not occur by sudden leaping from low to high status but more or less stepwise from one rung to another. Moreover, mobility varies with the different occupational strata. P. A. Sorokin summarizes various studies on this matter made in this country as well as in Europe.

"Other conditions being equal, first, within the same occupation the more qualified and better paid strata shift less intensively than the less qualified and more poorly paid groups; second, members of occupations which disappear shift more intensively than members of occupations which develop and prosper; third, unskilled labor is more mobile than skilled labor; business and professional groups (their higher strata) are likely to be still more stable even than the group of skilled labor. In a country where agriculture does not rapidly disappear, the occupational mobility of those engaged in agriculture is likely to be low; in a country where agriculture dies out, the shifting of agriculturists to other occupations is likely to be high."¹⁵

Not only is there occupational ascent but a descent as well. The disappearance of the skilled trades as a result of replacement by machines is a common source of a downward trend among laborers. So, too, the rapid diffusion of chain-store merchandising may cause many small retailers to close their shops, and some of them will sink lower in the social-economic scale. A prolonged depression may have such an effect on all levels of productive workers. The rather sharp effects of a political crisis are illustrated in what happened in Germany after World War I.

The defeat in the war and the inflation which followed served to alter the German class structure. Many members of the Junker

class, especially those who were officers in the former military, were reduced in both income and status. In fact, many of them later joined Hitler in hopes of restoring their lost prestige. The bourgeois suffered heavily in wealth, and there was a distinct tendency for many of them to drop to the level of paid employees. So, too, the rather wide range of professionals and technical employees and civil servants tended to be merged into the trade-union laboring group below them or else left exposed as individuals with no class protection at all.

The liquidation of former social classes following a great political-economic revolution is well-known from history. The pyramid of power in Soviet Russia follows the pattern of a dominant-party elite: a vast range of administrative officials at the top with the masses below, within which there are perhaps some recognized gradations.¹⁶

Wars, like revolutions, often bring about considerable shift in the class organization; and while World War I induced many alterations in Europe, the effects of World War II resulted in even more drastic and more extensive changes.

Alterations in the class structure of Western society are not due entirely to economic forces. Since the breakdown of the Middle Ages — say from the 15th century to the present — there has been a gradual loosening of class rule in the political field. The emergence of nationalism led within two centuries to the beginnings of democratic control. The circulation of persons up and down the political ladder — like the movement in occupations or wealth — is accelerated in periods of rapid social change or revolution. During the last century political changes in Great Britain and western Europe brought political power into the hands of the middle classes. During the present century there have been still further shifts toward parliamentary democracy, as in the Weimar Republic and Czechoslovakia, and/or a shift toward fascist revolution, as under Hitler and Mussolini. In all these cases the class system was modified.

¹⁵ From P. A. Sorokin, *Social mobility*, pp. 426-427. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1927. By permis-

¹⁶ For diagrams showing the shift in class structure in Russia, see David Dallin, *The real Soviet Russia*, p. 97. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.

In the field of religious activity, much the same thing has taken place. Although during the history of the Roman Catholic Church certain families sometimes dominated the highest position, it is nevertheless true that the church has always provided ample opportunity for people of ability from the lower social classes. The Protestant Reformation made possible a greater chance for persons of lower status to rise in importance. Moreover, the individualism stimulated by Protestantism had its effects on political, economic, and intellectual life. The relation of the modern economic, political, religious, and ideational forces to class structure has shown some interesting developments in our American society. Achieved rather than ascribed status alone became an important factor in the class structure.

Class Structure in the United States

For well over a hundred years this country was the prime example of an open-class system in which the birth and lineage factor in the determination of class status had come to assume far less part than was true in European class organizations. While there were (and are) regional variations in the degree to which ascribed position was overshadowed by status derived from individual initiative and aggressive competition, nevertheless the open-class system became increasingly identified with the common man and the democratic process. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that a sense of class difference ever completely disappeared, except in rare instances. Moreover, in recent decades there have been some indications that the earlier, more fluid lines between classes are becoming somewhat solidified.

An equally interesting aspect of our American life is the fact that along with this open-class system there existed, at least in one large section of our land, human slavery which later, under military-political pressure, gave way to a caste system based on color. The persistence of the white-Negro caste relationship not only is an intriguing cul-

tural paradox but continues to present the United States with one of its most serious and pressing local and national dilemmas.¹⁷ It is the purpose of this section to discuss some aspects of the class system among the white population. The next section will take up the color-caste problem.

Some aspects of the open-class system.

The shift in the relative importance of ascribed as against attained status so characteristic of the open-class system came about largely because this country afforded, first of all, tremendous economic opportunities for the ordinary man — free land for settlement, other natural resources for easy exploitation, and a rapidly expanding business world. Second, political freedom was an essential tenet almost from the beginning and became increasingly significant as our population expanded under favorable material conditions. The theme "log cabin to White House" became almost as strong as did the "bank messenger to bank president" or the "bicycle shop to the Ford Motor Company" as the life ideal for enterprising young men. Third, religious tolerance and freedom furnished not only an outlet for individual choice but gave our democracy a strong supporting noneconomic, nonpolitical ideology and practice. And, fourth, freedom of research and invention, of personal mobility, and other associated features of individualism and liberalism became deeply embedded in our culture.

On the material side the individual was concerned with securing as much of the world's goods as he could, but money as such was viewed largely as an instrument of power. The aim to secure a high standard of life was composed of a mixture of equalitarian desire and a wish to rise in the status scale. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is a slogan for just this ambition. If a person cannot own a new-model high-powered automobile, at least he can get a car that will get him about to work or pleasure.

¹⁷ For a full and incisive analysis of this problem, see Gunnar Myrdal, et al., *An American Dilemma: the Negro problem and modern democracy*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.

Everyone wants videos or radios, to go to the movies, to possess a home, to wear clothes that are in fashion, even though of poor materials. If one cannot get a ring-side seat, at least he seats himself among the rafters to see a championship match. If he cannot belong to a private club, he seeks out municipal golf courses.

Critics may say that this puts a premium on shabby quality and on cheapness, but since man has some of the traits of a peacock and, moreover, is not altogether a rational judge of materials, appearances often count more than substance. When the industrial-commercial order has performed such miracles as to produce these things in great quantities at a low cost, it is little wonder that material possessions hold such power over us and encourage the upward striving which marks an open-class system.

This whole matter is related to the prestige which conspicuous consumption gives. To show one's wealth by spending has set the pace for the whole development of what may be called the "consumer psychology" of America. This itch for more material goods reflects itself upon the demand for a higher level of living on the part of those in the lower income brackets.

Our money-making pattern influences the whole system of beliefs of the multitude. Not only are professional men and women caught up in this, but all down the line, to have a good job and to get a good income seem more important than most other values. Moreover, the belief in individual attainment and in the potentiality of rising in the social-economic scale is witnessed in our ambition-complex. Every child is indoctrinated from home, school, and playground with the idea that if only he works hard and has initiative and drive he can get ahead. Myths and legends by the hundreds abound about men and women who have made good by such means. Newspapers, magazines, movies, radio, and other media of communication, as well as more formal education, carry this message. And by the same token, the individual is stimulated to struggle hard for advancement in politics or any other endeavor which he undertakes.

Finally, one of the most powerful factors fostering the continuation of the open-class pattern is the circumstance that the individual aim in every case is not to raise his own class but to pull himself up out of this class into the one higher. This means that any tendency for class solidarity to develop is always faced with the opposite desire of the most prominent and promising individuals to rise out of the class into the one above. Open classes, unlike castes and more rigid classes, do not develop the sense of solidarity to the point where the whole group is taken for granted and where the interests of one are identified with those of the other members. Because of this, strong we-group attitudes can hardly develop among the flexible classes. There are no fixed rules in the sense in which there are customary or legal regulations in the more rigid systems. Of course, there are codes which the individual must follow in order to make good in the upward climb to higher rank. There is not that intimate loyalty to other members of the class, there is not that personal sense of obligation to those above, nor quite the general attitude of class superiority with reference to those below.

Within the open-class scheme nothing is fixed; there are more variation and much more person-to-person play. The limitations on personal growth are broken down, and there is more interplay for divergent social behavior. In short, flexibility is one of the chief characteristics of the open-class system. Let us examine further into some of the particular elements which enter into it.

Occupations and stratification. While factors other than occupation and money-making enter into the class structure of the United States, there is no doubt that these are among its basic components. As C. C. North and Paul K. Hatt have pointed out, three features of a person's vocation have bearing on his place in the larger class system: its duties, prerequisites, and rewards. The first of these is reflected in the kinds of knowledge and skills which an individual must have to be successful in a given job. Various classifications of work

in terms of duties have been made, but one of the most widely used is the sixfold grouping into: (1) professional, (2) proprietary and managerial, (3) clerical and kindred work, (4) skilled workers, including foremen, (5) the semiskilled, and (6) the unskilled. These are often thought of as a rank-order not only to show an occupational grading scheme but also as graded correlates of income differentials. But from the standpoint of a full description of the class structure this leaves much to be desired. The second, the prerequisites, have to do with levels of intelligence, educational attainment, and degrees of training. Certainly these have some bearing on the larger judgment as to what is a social class. As to the rewards, they concern chiefly the "psychic income" or honorific elements, the nature of working conditions, and the financial returns. These three rewards may be combined into a very broad overall *occupational prestige*. Such a prestige value surely plays an important part in people's views regarding differential status in class relationships.

Such differentials were revealed in a national survey of opinion of a representative sample of Americans in 1947. The respondents gave the highest prestige ratings to occupations characterized by "highly specialized training and a considerable degree of responsibility for the public welfare" and the lowest to "unskilled, low-paid, and 'dirty' jobs, involving little public responsibility." The two top ranks were high government officials and professional and managerial personnel. In the middle range were clerical workers, skilled craftsmen and foremen, and farmers and farm-managers. At the bottom were various operatives, service workers, and ordinary laborers.

Regarding the important criteria for an "excellent job" most respondents mentioned first high income, then necessity and service to humanity, and third, social prestige and educational and other sacrificial effort to attain jobs and status. The standards by which people judged the desirability of an occupation were found to reflect their own experiences, ambitions, and needs. Those in the low income brackets stressed the money-making aspects; those with higher incomes emphasized less material values.

In another paper Hatt has pointed out that various occupations cluster together and that within each cluster there may be shifts from one particular job to another, or what is called horizontal mobility. Sample clusters are "political," "professional," "business," "manual work," "military," and "service." Shifts in jobs within a given cluster may be accompanied by changes in prestige and esteem just as is upward mobility from one occupational cluster to another. However, we know very little about the more subtle aspects of horizontal mobility and what it means as to membership in a given class. As already noted, in a flexible open-class system there are likely much interpersonal competition and less intense mutual identification and sense of solidarity than might be found in a more formalized and less mobile class system.¹⁸ Let us now look at some of the evidence regarding vertical mobility in occupation.

Trends in American occupations. Certain shifts in the occupation ratios in the United States were discussed in chapter 22. Among other things we noted the decline in agriculture and the relative growth in trade and transportation. Note was also made of the increase in the proportion of women, both unmarried and married, in the labor force. These changes have stimulated competition in some vocations and have tended to affect the function of occupation in determining social status. At this point we must examine the nature of occupational mobility since it is a factor in our open-class system.

Although limited to one community and to a sample of only 1200 cases, a study of occupational mobility by P. E. Davidson

¹⁸ Some of the material above is drawn from a preliminary report by C. C. North and Paul K. Hatt of their analysis of the national survey. This is reprinted as "Jobs and occupations: a popular evaluation," in Logan Wilson and William L. Kolb, *Sociological analysis: an introductory text and case book*, pp. 464-473. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949. Other data are from Hatt's paper, "Occupational classification in the study of social stratification," read before the Eastern Sociological Society, New York, N. Y., April 23, 1949.

and H. D. Anderson brings out some interesting facts. They secured data on three generations, thus giving some idea of trends. Using a six-class occupational scale similar to the one noted above, these authors found, among other things:

(1) Sixty per cent of the professionals went directly into their chosen work from similar parental occupations. Among the proprietary group, the majority came from either parental farm ownership or from business proprietors. The clerical class represent the principal "climbers" among these groups. The skilled group showed the least mobility. Two thirds of the unskilled came either from unskilled parents or from farmer fathers, including farm tenants. In general, North and Hatt's study tends to confirm these findings.

(2) There were shifts both up and down the vocational scale, but they were limited. Between two thirds and three fourths of the workers of this sample came from the level of the father or from the adjacent category. On the average the shift involved only "one step on the occupational scale." "In terms of number of moves, 35 per cent indicated upward movement, 23 per cent downward."

(3) There was a good deal of variation in the ages at which the workers found their final occupation. Of the unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled, over 69 per cent were settled in these jobs before they were 18 years old, whereas only one third of the professionals had made their final choice by that age.

(4) The older the worker, the more difficult it is for him to find new work when he loses his job.

(5) The educational background of workers varied considerably. The "typical professional" had an average of three years in college; the "typical proprietor" had gone as far as the second year in high school; the "typical clerk" went halfway through the secondary school; the "typical" skilled and unskilled persons had at least entered high school; but the "typical unskilled laborer" reached about the sixth grade only.

(6) Finally, these data show that for the most part the desire to make more money is the chief motive in shifting from one occupation to another.¹⁹

¹⁹ Summarized and quoted from P. E. Davidson and H. D. Anderson, *Occupational mobility in an American community*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1937.

The fact that there is some occupational descent as well as ascent needs emphasis, since the popular myth of universal upward movement, like most stereotypes, is not borne out by the facts. There are many other evidences of occupational mobility, some of which were cited in chapter 27 in connection with the discussion of specialization and leadership. While it is difficult to know fully about the present trends, there is general agreement that we are approaching a period of diminishing occupational mobility. If this proves to be the case, it may mark the beginning of a shift from an open-class to a more fixed-class system in the United States.

Open classes and anxiety. Yet the fact that not every American rises in the social scale and that many fall by the wayside must be examined against the background of our cultural expectancy that individuals will ascend the social ladder.

The more serious causes of the retardation of this dynamic pattern on the economic side have been the closing of the frontier, the lessening of available resources, the disappearance of competition and the coming of monopoly, and the technological and financial changes which brought us the giant corporations. The ordinary man found himself more and more hemmed in; his outlets into better jobs and more income began to be restricted. During the past two decades, especially, large sections of our population, rural as well as urban, have found the doors of opportunity increasingly narrower if not in many cases shut and bolted. On the other hand, our former ambition-complex has continued to be fostered by the schools and by the informal media of communication. The resulting strain between aspiration and achievement has not been easy to resolve. The upshot of this is that while there remain great opportunities compared to what one would find in other countries, the future possibilities of individual advancement do not seem so bright as they once were.

The basic demand to get ahead and the growing reduction of opportunities for upward class mobility together make for

personal anxiety and insecurity not found in more stable class systems. Karen Horney has pointed this out in her discussion of the conditions which make for a high incidence of neuroticism in our society.²⁰ With reference to occupations, there is not only considerable variation in degree and kind of upward mobility, as we noted, but some evidence that "occupational insecurity is associated with semiskilled, unskilled, and domestic and personal service workers."²¹ As we well know, economic insecurity is closely linked to emotional uncertainty and feelings of inadequacy.

Additional, though somewhat inferential, support for the contention that there are considerable anxiety and ambiguity associated with our present-day class system is found in C. Wright Mills' study of "the stratification and political position of small-business and white-collar" groups in selected medium-sized American cities. For the samples he investigated he found that small-businessmen had little political power and that, on the whole, their hostilities toward the government and toward organized labor revealed a good deal of underlying sense of insecurity. For the most part they derive what psychological strength they have from their identification with big-business interests.

The white-collar groups have even less sense of being an in-group. Their political power is diffused, unorganized, and leaderless. Their views on economic, political, and other public problems are largely vague reflections of their employers' views and those of the middle-class and upper-class people with whom they come into contact in the course of their work. They do not believe in unionizing, they tend to be conservative in politics, and "lack even a rudimentary awareness of their economic and political interests."²²

²⁰ See Karen Horney, *The neurotic personality of our time*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1937. In this connection, also, see H. H. Hyman, "The psychology of status," *Archives of Psychology*, 1942, 38, no. 269.

²¹ William H. Form and Delbert C. Miller, "Occupational career pattern as a sociological instrument," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1949, 54: 317-329.

²² See C. Wright Mills, "The middle classes in middle-sized cities," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 520-529.

That slow and subtle changes are under way in the American class system is pretty generally accepted, but it is difficult to describe and analyze these changes objectively. Certainly there is a growing awareness of an underlying trend toward the stabilization of our class system, which we shall now discuss in its institutional aspects.

Class structure. A widespread stereotype or popular assumption in the United States is that our class structure consists of three loosely organized groupings: Upper, Middle, and Lower. Moreover, earlier public opinion polls showed that between 70 and 80 per cent of cross-section representative samples of Americans thought of themselves, often vaguely, as members of the middle class.²³

If these percentages represent the objective facts, then the American class structure can hardly be represented by a pyramid but rather by a diamond-shaped figure with very small fractions of the total population at the top and the bottom. (See Figure 72.)

Obviously the various forms of distribution will be affected, in part, by the class units adopted to describe the class system. A twofold scheme of workers and property owners, as with Marx, would make for a different picture from that of a sixfold division, as with W. Lloyd Warner and others. It would carry us too far afield to go into all the pros and cons regarding what is the most satisfactory way in which to describe the class system of the United States. More important for us is to review and interpret the actualities.


There are both regional and rural-urban differences in the class structure of the United States. Moreover, various elements enter into the determination of class status, as we shall see. Let us look first at some studies of rural communities.

In a study of Landaff, New Hampshire, Kenneth MacLeish and the present writer found that the inhabitants divide themselves into two broad groupings: those with high status and those without it. Within these large limits there are some gradations.

²³ See "The people of the United States — a self-portrait," *Fortune*, February, 1940, 21: 14, 28.

The top of the social ladder is made up of old families of good economic substance. Below them are newcomers who have considerable property but have not been quite accepted by the "best" families. The lower class consists of the transient farm tenants, farm laborers, and a few poor farm families of longer residence, toward whom there is a certain toleration by the older and well-to-do families.²⁴

FIGURE 72

THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF PLAINVILLE²⁵

A much more detailed analysis of the class system of a rural community was made by James West in Arkansas. The conception of the class system of Plainville "as it

²⁴ See MacLeish and Young, *op. cit.*

²⁵ From James West, *Plainville, U. S. A.*, p. 117. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. By permission.

See also Harold F. Kaufman, "Prestige classes in a New York rural community," *Cornell University, Agricultural Experiment Bulletin, Memoir no. 260*, March, 1944. He had ratings made on a sixfold prestige scale. He found that over two thirds of those rated fell into the middle range.

appears to the average 'better class adult who bothers to think about it' " is shown in Figure 72.

Studies of the class system of urban communities also show considerable variation, and again the description and analysis are qualified, in part, by the manner in which research workers handle their data. One of the most exhaustive investigations was that of W. Lloyd Warner and associates in "Yankee City." The population there is made up of families with a long New England ancestry and of families of more recent American and other nationality origin. The authors used the traditional threefold class divisions, but each category in turn was divided into an upper and lower sub-bracket.²⁶ Each of the latter had some distinguishing characteristics, thus:

- Upper Upper: Oldest and usually, though not always, wealthy families, comprising 1.44 per cent of the population.
- Lower Upper: Families of more recently acquired wealth and of more recent residence; high professionals, making up 1.56 per cent of total.
- Upper Middle: Families now acquiring wealth; recent newcomers with wealth; most professionals. These constitute 10.22 per cent.
- II. Lower Middle: Merchants and higher white-collar workers, who represented 28.12 per cent.
- Upper Lower: Lower white-collar employees and skilled labor, comprising 32.6 per cent.
- III. Lower Lower: Unskilled workers; families on relief; transients, making up 25.22 per cent.

²⁶ See W. Lloyd Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The social life of a modern community*, chapter 5 especially, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941; and their *The status system of a modern community* (same publisher), 1942; also, W. Lloyd Warner, M. Meeker, and K. Bells, *Social class in America. A manual of procedure for the measurement of social status*. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1949.

Many critics have contended that Warner and his collaborators have over-refined their data. This is a matter of scientific aim and analysis of data. But the authors do make this rather significant admission: "It must not be thought that all the people in Yankee City are aware of all the minute distinctions made in this book." *Social life*, etc., p. 91.

An investigation of class structure in Burlington, Vermont, brought out a pattern in which nationality and religion also play important parts. In this community the top class comprises families of old Yankee stock, although they make up a definite minority of the total population. The other broad category is made up of "foreigners" and "newcomers." The former are not necessarily individuals or families born outside the country but rather those designated as not of the Yankee tradition. The latter represent families of perhaps acceptable New England background who have not yet been thoroughly assimilated into the local community. But within this wide division there is "a maze of classes and cliques," resting, for the most part, on three sources of distinction: (1) economic, divided between professionals and proprietary and laboring groups; (2) religious, with segregation chiefly between Catholics and Protestants; and (3) "ethnic" (or nationality) differences "which serve to enhance the divisions based on religion or economic status and also to create division within the religious worlds or the economic levels."²⁷

The study of the Lynds on Muncie, Indiana, divided the inhabitants into a two-class system, of working people and professional-proprietary.²⁸ All these investigations and many others not here noted tend on the whole to show: (1) a considerable flexibility in standards, which include income, occupation, nativity, education, religion, and length of residence; (2) a patterning, at least in regions of older settlement, which gives the residents of long standing — provided they have some wealth and education — the highest ranking; (3) only a gradual acceptance into the top class of people of recently acquired wealth; (4) that religious differences, especially when closely correlated with lower economic rank and brevity of residence, are often quite important criteria of demarcation; and (5) that moral values and moral conduct are fre-

quently considered important standards of judgment although these, in turn, are often linked to religious and even economic distinctions.

Within these categories all sorts of variations occur. A common remark reported by field workers in several investigations is, "The A family have plenty of money, all right, but they don't quite rate because they don't act right." Or, "Dr. B is as good a physician as Dr. C, if not better, but after all he's only been here a little while and folks aren't quite sure of him."²⁹ These qualifying comments are good proof that, judged by subjective standards, mere wealth or professional proficiency is not enough to warrant full acceptance in a given class. Other qualifying remarks often have to do with matters of religion, nationality background, length of residence in the country, and the like.

The psychological bases of our contemporary class structure have not been adequately examined. But Arthur W. Kornhauser has attempted to get at these, in a tentative way, through the examination of census data on occupations and incomes and the results of various intelligence, opinion, and other surveys. He found no sharp division into the "haves" and "have-nots" as the Marxians would like to believe, but he did find further confirmation for certain broad class distinctions in our country. Some of his conclusions may be summarized as follows:

(1) The upper and lower strata tend to become selectively differentiated through occupational mobility which, in turn, is partly determined by deviations in ability, education, and various so-called personality traits such as aggression, tact, perseverance, initiative, and the like. Kornhauser suggests that some of these components may have a hereditary basis.

(2) The distinctions of class are further enhanced by the fact of relatively greater freedom of opportunity in the higher than in the lower levels.

²⁷ See E. L. Anderson, *We Americans: a study of cleavage in an American city*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937. Quotation from p. 125.

²⁸ See R. S. Lynd and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1929.

²⁹ Warner and Lunt, *op. cit.*, report a good deal of this sort of qualifying comment regarding individuals; so, too, does Anderson, *op. cit.* This type of remark was also common in Landaff; see MacLeish and Young, *op. cit.*

(3) Some of our outstanding public problems are reflected in the varying attitudes and values of the classes, and in general it appears that personal maladjustment, sense of frustration, and unrest become more widespread as we descend the social-economic scale.

(4) Significant data with regard to trends in class feelings and with respect to the chief public issues have been accumulating through the public opinion surveys. Among other facts are these: (a) On the whole, the lower economic groups tend to favor liberal or radical public measures such as emerged during the days of the New Deal. Yet all classes adhere to the American conception of individual advancement; they expect to get ahead themselves or at least to see their children do so. (b) There are also some differences, qualified by economic status, with respect to sense of security and belief that their children will improve their status. (c) Apparently age, sex, education, nationality, religion, and race operate singly or in varied combinations to modify the attitudes on basic issues. Yet (d) there "are no clear and natural dividing lines as judged by measured attitude differences." The broadest separation is between the wealthy businessmen and the manual workers. But between these extremes are all varieties of subgroups. Of these latter those in small business or with the higher incomes and professionally nearest to the large-income group tend, on the whole, to agree with the wealthiest class. In contrast, lower-income clericals and professionals with a "social" view tend to agree, as a rule, with the manual workers. But again the variations are extensive. Moreover, further complications would be introduced were these data considered with respect to regions and to urban-rural populations. Kornhauser did not analyze the material from this standpoint.⁸⁰

The analysis of psychological factors associated with certain objective factors in class structure was carried forward by Richard Centers. He studied the responses of a cross-section sample of 1100 adult white males who were interviewed as to their sub-

jective class identification, their views on important social-economic-political issues, their adherence to certain traditional American values, and as to their occupation, religious affiliations, nationality background, and other matters. Among other important findings are the following:

(1) As to which class the respondents belonged to, "the middle class, lower class, working class, or upper class," the percentages for each of these categories respectively were: 43, 1, 51, and 3.⁸¹ Each respondent was also asked to name — from a range of typical vocations — which occupation he considered as associated with his own class. The replies showed a certain clustering, although there was much overlapping. The middle class was thought of as consisting of businessmen, professionals, managers, and white-collar wage earners. The working class, in contrast, was thought of as made up of manual laborers: skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled. (See above.)

(2) This clustering is confirmed by examining the way in which respondents of various occupations identified themselves as to class status. Three fourths of the respondents who said they were in one of these groups: business-owners, managerial, professionals, or white-collar also said that they considered themselves in the middle class. Nearly four fifths of those in the manual-laboring categories identified themselves definitely with the working class. And, while there were some differences, on the whole this held for both rural and urban sections of the total sample.

(3) With regard to the criteria on which judgments as to class membership were made, the survey showed that nearly one half (47.4

⁸⁰ See Arthur W. Kornhauser, "Analysis of 'class' structure of contemporary American society — psychological bases of class division," chapter 11 in G. W. Hartmann and T. M. Newcomb, eds., *Industrial conflict: a psychological interpretation*. New York: The Dryden Press, 1940. This summary is chiefly from pp. 258-264.

⁸¹ One per cent gave "Don't know"; and one per cent, "Don't believe in classes." Centers' question was obviously somewhat loaded but, as he points out, previous attempts to get a good view of subjective class-consciousness have been unsatisfactory. When presented with the usual academic concepts of upper, middle, and lower classes, the bulk of Americans say they are "middle class." Centers' use of "working class" is more in line with common ways of looking at class and is justified on this ground. But his inclusion of "lower class" showed, as do other surveys, that this concept has little or no place in the thinking of most Americans in this context. It is rather a derogatory term often applied to people outside a class-conscious category. To say another is "low class" may mean that he is crude and rude in manner, or is immoral, rather than refer to his position in the class structure.

per cent) said that how a person feels and believes "about certain things" was one criterion. "Education" was mentioned by nearly 30 per cent as another. One fifth of them noted "family." "How much money" a person has was mentioned by only 17.1 per cent. Varied scattered items accounted for another 5.6 per cent of the replies.³² As judged by this sample at least, neither wealth nor family standing count as much as some might imagine among the factors by which people judge class membership.

(4) The importance of beliefs, attitudes, and values was brought out by answers to various questions as to the opportunities for personal success, the place of government in providing security, as to labor-management issues, and others. These provided a scale of opinions on a conservative-radical continuum. Again the business-owner group, managerial and professional people, and the white-collar workers — *i.e.*, the middle class by their own definition — tended to express conservative views. The manual laborers, or working class, on the other hand, tended to be more heavily represented on the radical end of the scale. Again there was considerable overlapping, but the general differences of opinion and belief were clear.

(5) On the whole, people tended to correlate their own occupations with their ideas as to their class membership. And while occupation itself is a fair indicator of class status, and hence predictive of values and attitudes regarding public issues, when combined with identification as to class it is much more predictive of such values and attitudes.³³

From his study the author considers classes as groups in the total population who have certain common social-economic-political views and interests and whose social-economic positions are "objectively similar." He also found that levels of living and certain domination-submission relations in the economic field play a part in determining class consciousness.³⁴

³² Since respondents often gave more than one answer, the percentages total more than 100 per cent. Also, 9.1 per cent said "Don't know."

³³ From Richard Centers, *The psychology of social classes, a study of class consciousness*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

³⁴ On the matter of overlapping of attitudes toward property and related political practices as these reflect occupational ranking, see Alfred W. Jones, *Life, liberty, and property: a study of conflict and a*

Minority groups and the class structure. Before discussing the color-caste system, we must comment on the place of white minority groups in relation to the total American class structure.³⁵ Note has already been made that nationality origin may be one criterion in the determination of social rank and hence often becomes a factor in fixing class status. This is particularly likely to be so if (1) the nationality group has distinctive cultural characteristics or is thought to have; (2) if its members are also in the lower occupational and income brackets; and (3) if they constitute sufficient numbers to be considered a threat to the *status quo* in matters of jobs, places of residence, and political and economic power.

These are clearly also important elements which make for class distinctions in our society. And, in truth, a persistent inferior position on the part of a given minority group tends to set up some features of a class pattern between them and the majority. This was the situation with the Jews during the Middle Ages, when they had no civil rights. It was the kind of system which the Nazis established during the period of their military ascendancy in Europe.

Yet where the open-class system is the accepted pattern, such rigidities are not likely to be found. However, the great influx of European nationals into this country after the War Between the States led to a good deal of ecological and social segregation of various minorities. And the relations of individuals from the latter with members of the majority groups often led to misunderstanding if not to conflict. Very often, too, individuals in the lower social strata of the native-white population found in the immigrant someone whom they could regard as of still lower status. But as individ-


measurement of conflicting rights, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1941. While this study of Akron, Ohio, was not designed as an investigation of the city's class structure, it contains a wealth of detail on stratification.

³⁵ For a sound overall analysis of minorities, see Donald Young, *American minority peoples*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1932. For a vigorous treatment of minority problems, see Arnold and Caroline Rose, *America divided: minority group relations in the United States*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

uals from these nationality minorities made money, as they became educated or sent their children to the "best" schools, and in other ways became enculturated in American ways, they began to infiltrate into the classes of the dominant white majority. Such mobility served to dissipate the former segregative patterns. However, there remains a good deal of social segregation, even if spatial separation no longer plays as important a part.

FIGURE 73

BASES OF JOB DISCRIMINATION AS REPORTED
TO FEPC IN ONE YEAR ³⁶



Such classlike discriminations are seen in reference to employment and admission of prospective students to various kinds of private schools, at either secondary or collegiate level. And, of course, there do remain many restrictions on housing which affect not only our Negro but often other parts of our population. The various alleged reasons for job discrimination, as reported by the federal Fair Employment Practices Commission for one of the war years, is shown in Figure 73.

The Color-Caste System

Within the larger class system of the United States is a subsystem which has grown out of the accommodative relations of the Negro minority to the white majority. These relations have their roots in history. However, they are not fixed and final but are themselves undergoing change.

³⁶ Chained from Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, 1947.

Hence it is not always easy to describe and interpret them fully. Moreover, the emotions aroused among both whites and colored people over the "American dilemma" often obscures the facts and makes objective description and analysis difficult. The studies of Negroes and Negro-white relations have been especially marked by the errors of ethnocentrism and particularism. (See chapter 1.) There has even been considerable objection to the use of the concept *caste* or *color-caste* in dealing with Negro-white relations in this country.³⁷

Negro-white caste relations. The American color-caste is obviously based chiefly on differences in color and certain supplementary variations in physical features. These together give the Negro a high social visibility of culturally accepted and expected difference. The segregation by color of one tenth of our population — and concentrated in less than one quarter of the country — has tended to foster the growth of a smaller society within our larger national one. That is, the color-caste group is comprised of a wide range of groups at least loosely integrated into a total cultural unity. While many features of this color-caste culture overlap or are identical with the larger white American culture — which overlapping or identification cushions potential conflicts — nevertheless there is a world of

³⁷ This is not the place to enter into a discussion of this controversy. Earlier writers tended to use the concept *race* in treating the class structure as it related to Negro and white contacts. More recently the concept *color-caste* has come into use, and there can be no objection to this when used by careful investigators. In support of the concept *caste*, see, among others, the following: W. Lloyd Warner, "American caste and class," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1936, 42: 234-237; John Dollard, *Caste and class in a southern town*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937; and Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, *Deep South*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. In sharp disagreement with the Warner group, see Oliver C. Cox, "The modern caste school of race relations," *Social Forces*, 1943, 21: 218-226; his "Race and caste: a distinction," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1945, 50: 360-369; and his *Caste, class, and race: a study in social dynamics*, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1948. For a criticism of Cox, see Norman D. Humphrey, "American race relations and the caste system," *Psychiatry*, 1945, 8: 379-381.

color into which the white man does not enter.³⁸

The degree of segregation by caste varies somewhat by reason of region, occupation, education, and respective numbers of each race in the population of the community. In the deep South, still much under the influence of pre-Civil War culture, the biracial caste lines are more strictly drawn than in many border, northern, or midwestern states. In the two latter sections, if a community has only a few Negro families, they may become fairly well-adjusted to a relatively low social status but without much overt pressure on them as a racial group. In such places there is no discrimination as to education, transportation, entertainment, and often little, if any, with respect to residence, except as this is correlated — as it is with whites — with income.

But the bulk of Negroes in the North and Midwest live in large cities, and there serious problems have arisen. While some of the southern caste attitudes and practices carry over, many do not; and in the process of adaptation biracial conflicts of severe sort have occurred. (See below.)

The Negro-white caste relations have their cultural roots in slavery, with its concomitant beliefs and practices about white superiority and Negro inferiority. The three most obvious criteria of the present caste control are lineage or birth, the moral and legal restraint on interracial marriage, and the taboo on individual mobility in and out of the respective castes. The specific restrictions which have grown up are many and of varying intensity. We shall summarize the more important ones as follows:

(1) The taboo on intermarriage reaches deep into the culture of both races. During slavery and since, white men have often acted on the privilege of free access to Negro women while violently denying Negro men any contact of like nature with white women. This situation has interesting social-psychological

aspects into which we cannot go.³⁹ But it must be noted that it represents a departure from the type caste-pattern in one of its vital arrangements, blood relationship. And, considered against the background of American democratic theory, it has served to set up added resentment on the part of the Negroes.⁴⁰ In other words, in one important area of human relations where caste lines might well be severely drawn, the dominant class does not, as it were, "live up to the rules." This, in turn, sets the stage for hidden aggressions and recurrent conflict.

(2) In the political field, also, there is a sharp distinction between democratic theory and overt practice. Although the federal Constitutional amendments introduced after the War Between the States granted the Negro his franchise as a citizen, both the law and the mores were invoked in the southern states especially to keep the Negro "in his place," as the favorite rationalization has it. The "grandfather" clauses in many state laws prevented descendants of slaves from voting; poll taxes were imposed to put an economic barrier on free access to the ballot; and the general white community mores otherwise prevented the colored citizens from participating in political and civic life. Only very gradually are these restrictions being broken down in the South.⁴¹ In the northern and midwestern states, on the whole, the Negro has not been thus disfranchised. Rather, he has been exploited — as minority groups often are — by the politicians for their own ends. Although this has had repercussions in community life, it has served nevertheless to help dissipate the caste controls.

(3) The discrimination against the Negro in the economic field is well-known. On the whole the Negro gets less wages and is restricted to the more menial occupations. This applies to conditions both in the city and on the farm. As a slave the Negro was almost entirely confined to cotton and tobacco farming, and after the War Between the States he usually fell into the status of a share-cropper. While

³⁹ See Dollard, *op. cit.*

⁴⁰ This is not to hold that intercaste sexual relations may not take place in other caste systems, at least on a surreptitious level. The point is that these relations are looked upon as a right on the part of the dominant whites in a society that otherwise has stressed individual choice in such matters.

⁴¹ See Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, "To secure these rights," *PM's Picture News*, Magazine Section, November 2, 1947.

³⁸ The whole matter was once forcibly symbolized by an occurrence in the author's classroom. He had quoted R. E. Park's statement that "No Negro ever lived in the white man's world," to which a Negro woman student promptly replied, "And no white man ever lived in the Negro's, either!"


this biracial arrangement was essentially a system of peonage, it was fairly stable for some decades. But as cotton raising began to decline, especially in the Old South proper, economic distress came upon both white owner and Negro tenant. The former was faced with depleted soil resources and lessened profits; the latter with smaller and smaller rewards for his hard work. Moreover, in the last quarter of the 19th century white sharecroppers had come into the agricultural system of the South to offer competition to the Negro tenant. And, as a matter of fact, a good deal of the interracial tension in the South has grown up between the lower-class whites and the Negroes rather than between the upper levels of the whites and their colored tenants and employees.

In the North and in the growing industrialized cities of the South, the Negro came into competition with the whites as semiskilled and unskilled laborer. While he did develop some occupational differentiation in his own community, and in some instances rose to the level of skilled worker and white-collar clerk, for the most part he has remained in the lower brackets as domestic, semiskilled, or unskilled laborer. Figure 74 shows the proportion of Negro male workers in various economic groupings in two "border" cities: Louisville, Kentucky, and Washington, D. C. Averaging the figures for the two cities gives us 82 per cent of all male workers in the three lowest grades of labor—a sharp discrepancy from the situation among whites gainfully employed, where about 45 to 50 per cent fall into these categories.

(4) Biracial education in the southern states is continuing proof of the caste system. (See chapter 19.) Some of the striking differences are clearly shown in the contrast in financial support of white and colored education: in school plant, standards of teaching, salaries, and length of schooling. While conditions are steadily improving, segregated schools are likely to remain for a long time. In the North the situation is better as to support of education, but since Negroes tend to live in separate neighborhoods, many features of a segregated school system remain. Next to the home, the public school is our most important socializing agent, and it is in the classroom and from his books that the colored pupil gets his first full picture of democratic ideals. In a biracial world the actual discrepancy between the ideals and practice becomes increasingly clear

FIGURE 74

PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO MALES IN SEVEN SOCIAL-ECONOMIC GROUPS IN TWO URBAN COMMUNITIES, 1930⁴²



to him. Yet the school has served as an ideological source for the increasing demands from both Negro and white leaders and liberal associations that the caste system be abandoned and that the Negro be given a fuller place in our democratic society. During World War II many discriminations against the Negro were relaxed in both military and civilian occupations formerly denied him. But we are still far from an ideal arrangement regarding Negro-white relations, and in the meantime our culture stimulates personal sense of insecurity and conflict of ideals and habits on the part of the colored minority—a condition that fosters group conflict and community disintegration.

Class structure among Negroes. The whole color-caste problem is qualified by the fact that the Negroes themselves have developed their own graded class system. In general, this duplicates the white divisions into upper, middle, and lower levels. Within these broad groupings there are various minor ones and considerable variation in terms of income, occupation, and skin color. With regard to the last, it has long been known that Negroes tend to discriminate among themselves as to status in terms of degree of blackness. This is more apparent in the middle and upper Negro classes than in the lower, where the struggle for survival is so intense that distinctions of color lose any meaning they might have

⁴² Redrawn from E. Franklin Frazier, *Negro Youth at the crossways*, p. 22. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1940. By permission.

among Negroes of better economic standing.⁴³ Among the higher Negro classes a light skin does have status-giving value, and where the proportion of Negro blood is very slight indeed it becomes possible for the individual "to pass" into the white community unnoticed.

The place of the threefold class organization among Negroes varies with region and locality. However, in general, the lower class is characterized by a high proportion of dark-skinned persons, by low incomes, and unskilled work. In the rural areas there is a high percentage of illiteracy; and in the cities this class also reveals considerable family disorganization, shiftlessness, and social instability. The middle class rate lighter-colored Negroes high and emphasize strong family solidarity, social respectability, and church participation. As to income and occupation they come chiefly from the clerical, skilled, and semiskilled categories. They tend to be race-conscious and to support all movements to improve their racial minority. The upper class stresses light color, high income, and high occupational ranking. They put less stress on religion, except as a prestige device; and many of them indulge in conspicuous consumption as status-demonstrating behavior. Most of them are highly race-conscious although, at the same time, intolerant of the lower-class Negro.

In the rural South the bulk of colored folk tends to fall into the lower group, although even there some are found in the middle and upper levels. Moreover, the white controls tend to be more rigid and severe. In the border states there are considerably more flexibility and less violent controls, except under grave crises; and in the northern states, again, the class organization of the Negroes is qualified by the more tolerant reactions of the whites.⁴⁴

⁴³ See W. Lloyd Warner, B. H. Junker, and W. A. Adams, *Color and human nature: Negro personality development in a northern city*. Washington, D. C.: Council on Education, 1941.

⁴⁴ See C. S. Johnson, *Growing up in the Black Belt*. American Council on Education, *op. cit.*, 1941; and E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States*, chapter 12. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949.

Caste adjustment and Negro classes. The biracial adjustment is determined in large part by four sources of influence: the family, the neighborhood, the school, and the occupation. The white discriminations against the colored derive chiefly from these; and, vice versa, the attitudes and values of the Negro with respect to the dominant race also come from like group influences.⁴⁵ The white child is conditioned to consider himself superior to the colored; his playmates reinforce this learning; and while the school may produce in him some appreciation of a more genuine democracy in race relations, rationalizations are so easy to take on that often the impact of democratic ideology does not seriously influence his deeper prejudices against the Negroes. As an adult the white finds institutional protective barriers on every hand to keep him from having to compete with the Negro. The employer frequently operates along discriminatory lines; the trade unions, for the most part, do so; and all sorts of community patterns, such as segregated residential areas for Negroes, likewise keep him from contact with the colored group.

The Negro, in turn, is also conditioned toward the white. While there are variations in the manner and content of such teaching, the differences in home training in the various Negro classes as described by E. Franklin Frazier are enlightening. His data were drawn from the border states. To summarize his findings:

In lower-class families, comprising about two thirds of the Negro population, children are taught by parents and neighbors to accept the belief that the Negro is inferior to the white "and that his subordination to the white man is inevitable." While the middle-class Negro children show externally about the same deference to the whites as the lower classes do, there are some differences in their attitudes.

⁴⁵ For an interesting study of attitudes in an all-Negro community, see Mozell C. Hill, "Basic racial attitudes toward whites in the Oklahoma all-Negro community," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1944, 49: 519-523. For a full and informative account of Negro culture in Chicago, see St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black metropolis: a study of Negro life in a northern city*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1945.

Middle-class Negro families show more sophistication about their status. While they know that they must accommodate themselves to the white man's world, they do not accept the idea that the whites are inherently their superiors. They are also motivated by strong desire to make money and to rise in status partly as devices to make competition with the whites more probable.

The upper-class Negro children are even more sophisticated than the middle group. Not only do they not accept the idea of white superiority, but there is no "attempt to inculcate attitudes of subordination to whites." While these children are taught to avoid conflict with whites as unbecoming, on the whole the upper-class Negroes identify themselves with upper-class whites. As a mark of this they look down on Negro classes below them, just as they also despise the "poor whites." The fact that many upper-class Negroes are of mixed blood helps them to identify themselves racially with the whites. In many of these families there is a long tradition of education and accomplishment which serves as an effective stimulus to their children. On the other hand, sometimes in their efforts "to shield their children from racial discrimination" the parents induce mental conflicts in their young people when the latter do become aware of the intensity of racial prejudice.

The school, the playground, the street, and other areas of biracial contact tend to amplify the training at home. We have already indicated the implicit conflict-forming stimulus of democratic education. Later, in seeking employment, the Negro youth often experiences shock-producing discriminations. But how he will react depends on his prior training. In general, the more education he has and the higher his class background, the more difficulty will he have in taking an inferior role in a world dominated by a caste pattern.⁴⁶

"Learning how to be black in a white world," to use R. L. Sutherland's expression, is marked by a variety of interpersonal patterns.⁴⁷ The high social visibility of

color is, of course, one of the crucial factors, and as this disappears through racial mixture some persons of colored stock "pass" over to the white groups. Such transition is often accompanied by considerable emotional strain, since all former connections with one's family and the Negro community must be absolutely cut off. But the number who are thus amalgamated and assimilated in any year into the white population is indeed small.

Of more interest to us are various means by which the colored people adapt themselves to the white man's dominance:

(1) Some upper-class Negroes retreat behind the barriers of isolation and complacency. They build around them a little world marked by education, sophistication, and economic security. They have little to do with whites or with Negro groups below them beyond that demanded by their vocations.

(2) Far more common among Negroes in the upper level is the strong defensive reaction of black racialism. There is stress on a potential future for the Negro race as such, and aggressive racial leadership is emphasized as against that type of leadership which would seek conciliation or compromise with the white world. Sometimes the organizations which foster such patterns become associated with revolutionary movements ostensibly seeking human and democratic justice for all.

(3) Closely related to this defensive pattern, but finding its expression in interpersonal relations, are overt and vicarious forms of aggression. Fights between whites and blacks are not unknown, especially in the border states and in the North, where the severity of the older caste controls is relaxed. Yet this sort of conduct, North or South, is likely to lead to police or mob punishment. Perhaps more common is the transference of aggression toward the whites back upon members of the Negro's own race. There is a good deal of evidence that the high rates of violent crimes against persons among the colored is

⁴⁶ See Brazier, *Negro youth at the crossways*, op. cit., especially "Summary and conclusion," pp. 261-268.

⁴⁷ See his summary of American Youth Commission reports on Negro youth: *Color, class, and personal-*

ity, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1942. For some pertinent data and comments regarding similarities and differences in child training, in both white and Negro families, as this is in turn related to class status, see Allison Davis and Robert J. Havighurst, "Social class and color differences in child-rearing," *American Sociological Review*, 1946, 11: 698-710.

correlated with just this situation.⁴⁸ Minor emotional displacements consist in fighting, quarreling, and even self-derogatory joking among the Negroes. Vicarious aggressiveness toward the whites is seen in the identification of colored individuals with the boxing exploits of men like Jack Johnson and Joe Louis. The fact that these men defeated a large number of white prizefighters gives the Negro a lot of satisfaction.

(4) Closely related to more sublimated forms of aggressive reaction to the white person's discrimination is the development of a variety of patterns among the Negroes which serve as compensatory outlets. For example, whites often fail to understand that Negroes often do not tell them the truth or all they know, because they consider this one way of "getting back" at the whites. Just as petty thievery has certain symbolic value of power — often far beyond the mere monetary rewards — so, too, dissimulation before the whites is a high virtue. The Negroes among themselves may indulge in jokes, myths, and legends about the whites as compensatory means of relief. In the privacy of the Negro home, for example, a colored schoolteacher is known to have thrown her friends into convulsive laughter by mimicking the tone, manner, and words of the white superintendent of the schools.⁴⁹

(5) In sharp contrast to aggressiveness is servility, which has long been a common technique and one which the traditional white standard expects. Those Negroes who are conditioned to accept their inferiority often unconsciously adopt docile reactions while those from the middle and upper Negro classes who have been conditioned to quite the contrary view may continue to adjust overtly by taking a markedly deferential attitude simply because this seems the simplest and easiest way to get along with the whites.

Such patterns among Negroes have corresponding ones among the whites wherever the Negro methods in any way involve contact with the controlling caste. These range

all the way from counteraggressions seen in mob violence and lynching to conciliatory and accommodative efforts to bring about more peaceful and democratic relations between the races.

Conflict of Classes

Struggles between classes for power arise when the rigidity of superordination and subordination begins to break down. Opposition of members within a given class takes the form chiefly of interpersonal rivalry for positions within an accepted framework. The status striving of individuals in an open-class system to rise from one class to another is a phase of competition, the features of which have already been noted.

Interclass struggle. A conflict of classes implies a breakdown of a particular equilibrium which has grown up among the classes. Where one class — military, political, ecclesiastical, or economic — has come to dominate a society, the whole societal structure may be ordered in reference to this. But a crisis, like the Industrial Revolution, a new religion, or a war, may bring about tensions and unrest leading to an attempt by other classes to overthrow the dominance of the elite at the top. In our modern world, the most striking class conflict has been the economic and political struggle of the rising proletariat against the bourgeois capitalist class.

The intensity of class conflict, like any other, depends upon the range and depth of interests involved. One reason racial and international struggles are so significant is that they involve basic culture patterns around which intense emotional values have grown up. So it is in class struggles. If a wide range of interests — economic, political, religious, familial, and moral — can be linked up with class struggle, it will become the all-absorbing form of opposition in any society.

This is precisely what the dogmas of Karl Marx and his communist followers do. Marx's theory of history holds for a uni-

⁴⁸ See Hortense Powdermaker, *After freedom*, New York: The Viking Press, 1939, for some excellent illustrations.

⁴⁹ See Hortense Powdermaker, "Channeling of Negro aggression by the cultural process," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1943, 48: 750-758, reprinted in Clyde Kluckhohn and H. A. Murray, eds., *Personality in nature, society, and culture*, chapter 34, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

versal and continuous struggle of the workers against exploitation by the owners of capital goods, every other important feature of culture being predetermined by the economic relations of workers and owners. He interpreted history by the ideology of the class struggle, which became the peg on which he hung all forms of conflict. Marx and his collaborator, Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), say in their *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848) that "The history of all past society has consisted in the development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs." This was expressed in history not only in economics but also in religion and politics. The modern period is marked by the attempt of the proletariat "to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeois, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class."

Yet the aim of the class struggle, in the end, is a classless society, in which political power—that is, the state—will wither away as a true democracy of unselfish individualism comes into being. They say:

"When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.

"In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ From Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, trans. by Engels, p. 42.

Like all other movements, the communists have produced their own myths and legends. Like all such ideologies they aim to explain the past and the present as a means of directing the future. The communists work to enlist the workers of the world in one vast class struggle to end all exploitation and class organizations.

Color-caste and conflict. In a rigid caste system there is little or no overt conflict so long as the basic sanctions of the system continue to be enforced. In a fluid society such as ours the color-caste pattern is by no means so fixed. As a result periodic conflict, followed by new accommodations, has marked the relations of whites and Negroes for decades. In the South, however, the controls over the latter have been largely within the accepted color-caste scheme. The individual Negro who departed from the codes of the dominant whites was punished either in law or through direct use of violence. Lynching, however, has become less and less frequent. For example, in the mid-1890's there were more than 160 lynchings in one year. In the past decade the average annual rate was well under 10.

In the North, on the other hand, there are no well-established color-caste patterns of control. As a result and from various causes, there have been occasional but serious outbreaks of mob violence against the Negro. The chief "reasons" for such outbreaks appear to be expansion of Negro numbers and competition for jobs, especially in times of rapid industrial change. For instance, the Chicago race riots of 1919 followed the sharp economic depression at the close of World War I. The milder but nevertheless symptomatic riot in Detroit in 1942 over the matter of housing Negro defense workers in what were considered white neighborhoods represents a growing white-colored conflict in times of expanding employment accompanied by shortage of white workers. Individual malefactors on either side were soon submerged in the larger open struggle of groups.

Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1917. By permission.

Race conflict, then, is really a cultural conflict, centering around a racial group fighting for prestige and a higher status than that to which it has formerly been accustomed. In this sense, too, the ambition or struggle of races for recognition is not unlike that of serfs seeking to become peasants, of peasants seeking to improve their economic and political condition, or of immigrants desirous of citizenship and full participation in the life of their adopted country. But, unlike the serf, peasant, or immigrant, the colored person usually cannot leap the barrier of race. Conflict and accommodation are therefore inevitable in this field until biological mixture is permitted in the law and the mores.

Accommodation and the color-caste. Such periodic outbreaks are followed by further and usually varied accommodations between Negroes and whites. The extension of legal measures to insure fair employment practices, the increasingly more favorable attitudes of organized labor toward Negro workers, the gradual disappearance of restrictions on voting, and a number of other changes in culture patterns all indicate a trend toward more workable relations between the two races. The improvements are slow but steady, and many would press for more rapid changes.⁵¹ A word of caution must be introduced in considering this matter. The counsel of perfection may call for a much more radical program than any so far proposed by responsible public leaders in this country on the grounds that democracy calls for something more satisfac-

⁵¹ For a picture of the continuation of many forms of segregation and of differences in economic conditions of Negroes and whites, see A Report of the National Committee on Segregation in the Nation's Capital, "Segregation in Washington," published by the Committee, Chicago, 1948. This is a vigorous indictment of conditions in Washington, D. C., and takes on, in tone and text, the nature of a propaganda document. What is needed for a more objective understanding of betterment of conditions as well as continuation of unnecessary cultural differentials is a long-range view of what has happened in this city as well as others, say from 1870 to date, and for both Negroes and whites. There is no doubt the Negro has made great gains, but how does he compare in these gains with the improvements in levels of living and social-cultural participation with the whites? This is the crucial question.

tory than biracial accommodation through tolerant participation and certain castelike patterns. But a more empirical and realistic standpoint must reckon with the vast cultural as well as biological difficulties involved were we to attempt large-scale intermarriage with the colored and otherwise lay the basic groundwork for complete assimilation. No serious student of interracial problems in this country, either white or colored, has proposed such a scheme. To do so would fly in the face of some of the most solid facts and principles of social and cultural process. Cultural and social changes in these deeply entrenched matters are not to be effected in any such mechanical and rapid fashion. Cultural inertias and variabilities on both sides are too great to be overcome by any reformist magic. Much more sensible is a steady advance to a more pacific biracial patterning in which everless stress is given to color and race difference and a maximum emphasis is put on personal merit and demonstrated ability. These are the keys to a more satisfactory participation of the Negro or any other minority in the larger American society.⁵²

Stratification and Mass Society

In a period of rapid social-cultural change and with large-scale planning programs becoming more and more the accepted pattern, it is well to give some thought to the place of class structure in modern industrialized society. With respect to a planned society, some features of stratification will be treated in chapter 32. Here we offer a comment on some basic features which must be taken into account in considering future trends.

Class structure and complex society. It should be clear from what has gone before that some kind of class structure emerges in every society of any size and specialization

⁵² Somewhat hysterical public and official reaction to possible interracial conflict during World War II led to the use of coercive accommodation in the case of the Japanese, both native-born and aliens, who lived on the Pacific Coast. See Dorothy Thomas and R. S. Nishimoto, *Spillage*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947.

beyond the most elementary phases. As division of roles and attendant statuses becomes accepted and expected, and especially as these get tied up with family or other kinship group, with associations of artisans or workers, with military men or priesthoods, the process of class formation is at hand. When, in time, the principle of transmitting such roles and statuses is by virtue of membership in a family or one of these other groups, then the class structure becomes full-fledged.

If, in modern society, individual merit and free competition for special functions are kept alive and the kinship aspect is reduced to a minimum, the nature of the class organization will be very different from what it is when special privilege and opportunity are confined to the top groups while those below are held within the narrow confines of a fixed and restricted scheme. In other words, while we may grant that stratification of some kind is more or less inevitable, its particular form may vary greatly.

Two matters in connection with this must be noted. The thesis of Vilfredo Pareto, Italian economist (1848-1923), that every society has some sort of elite or dominating

class seems well taken. Furthermore, he points out that there is in historical time always a circulation of this elite class, even though the changes may be very gradual indeed.⁵³

The other matter concerns the moral judgment as to what kind of stratification we prefer, since cultural changes in our modern world are by no means entirely outside our choice and control. There is much to be said for a flexible open-class scheme, since it provides for circulation of individuals up and down the scale in terms of ability and interest. If we take the view that the growth of the individuality — that is, uniqueness and freedom of initiative — is a dominant value so long as it does not destroy the societal order, then we may contend that the open-class system affords a wide range of choice, a greater spread of stimuli, than any other so far developed. Such a continued individuality should enrich not only one's own life but also the lives of others.

⁵³ See Vilfredo Pareto, *The mind and society*, 4 vols., trans. by A. Livingston and A. Bongiorno, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1935. For Pareto's sociological theory, see T. Parsons, *The structure of social action*, especially chapters 5, 6, 7, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1937.

Interpretative Summary

1. Stratification occurs everywhere when the processes of differentiation and accommodation give rise to group relations on a scale of superordination and subordination, or high to low status.
2. Class implies both objective and subjective features. The former may be occupation, wealth, military rank, family descent, religion, or others. The latter consist of a cluster of values, attitudes, and habits associated with these objective factors which make for sense of intimacy, solidarity, and other features of an in-group.
3. In fixed-class structures the respective statuses are largely those of ascription and are transmitted through the family culturally. In a flexible, open-class system class status may be attained by individual achievement of the hallmarks of a given class. In the United States these usually represent a combination of certain social-economic-political views, occupation, and income. Family descent and nationality background also play a part. In other societies such things as achieved military prowess and ability, or intellectual attainment, may be the open sesame to a given class.
4. A caste is simply a more rigid and inflexible class.
5. In the United States, South Africa, and elsewhere the barriers between the white and the colored race or subraces take on the nature of a color-caste system. Moreover, the subordinate color group usually has its own class system, not unlike that of the white group. As the subordinate group gains in relative equality of rights, the severity of the color-caste relations tends to be dissipated.

6. Minority groups, aside from those associated with color, often develop status relations of inferiority to the dominant majority group resembling those found in a class structure.
7. Conflict of classes arises when the established elite or top class is threatened by the demands of the classes below for a redistribution of function and power.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define stratification, as *process*, as *institution*. What relation has stratification to social differentiation? What are the basic features in the process of class formation?
2. Describe the process by which achieved status may become ascribed status, and then become associated with class or caste.
3. What are the chief objective evidences of class distinction? How important are the subjective feelings and awareness in determining class differences?
4. Define social distance. May measures of social distance be used to determine class lines?
5. Distinguish between caste, class, and open-class systems.
6. What are the chief features of the Hindu caste system? What modern conditions are likely to bring about changes in this system?
7. What were the chief factors bringing about changes in the class organization of Europe since the Middle Ages?
8. What conditions produced the open-class system? What conditions may destroy it?
9. What are the chief features of the class structure in America today?
10. What are the principal elements in the color-caste system in our country? What conditions tend to perpetuate it? What conditions tend to alleviate or remove it?
11. What conditions set up conflict of classes? Discuss Marx's view on this matter.
12. What form is the class structure of industrialized mass societies likely to take in the future? How may it be qualified by the nature of the political and economic power?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

A. M. Lee, "Race riots aren't necessary," Public Affairs Pamphlet, no. 107. New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1945.

Some practical pointers on the problems of race conflict and how to deal with it.

James G. Leyburn, "World minority problems," Public Affairs Pamphlet, *op. cit.*, no. 132.

A good review of some of the major issues of minority groups the world over.

Paul Mombert, "Class," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 3: 531-536.

A critical analysis of the concept of class against the background of Western culture.

Arnold Rose, *The Negro in America*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948.

An abridgment of Gunnar Myrdal's *The American dilemma*, 1944 (same publisher).

R. A. Schermerhorn, *These our people: minorities in American culture*. Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1949.

A good coverage of the major minority groups and their problems.

✧ Part Five ✧

Control and Change

Social Control

WHEREVER men live in any sort of permanent association — reflecting their basic and acquired needs — they unconsciously or consciously develop rules of social interaction. In primitive society there may be regulations giving in detail the manner of dividing up the kill or rules setting strict barriers on the contacts of persons in terms of age and sex. In our own society we have laws protecting private property, setting tariff rates, regulating sanitation. We have customs which control sex expression or set down the rules of etiquette or furnish a code of ethics for medicine or law. While rules, conventions, laws, and moral codes are part and parcel of our more persistent and continuous group life, controls also come into play in more transitory associations, such as we find in mobs and in those somewhat vaguely delimited collectivities which we call publics. In mass society, in fact, some of the most important aspects of control have to do with this expanding fringe of less permanent and less institutionalized forms of social life.

The rules of society are usually discussed under the general term *social control*. We shall be concerned, however, not merely with the regulations but with such topics as *why* we have them, *who* puts them into effect, and *how* this is done.

Some Basic Features of Control

In a broad sense, social control refers to any verbal or bodily action by which one person determines the response of another. But most responses are determined not alone by the present stimulus but by the cumulative effects of past stimuli and responses — in the form of habits, attitudes, and ideas. This conception of control is sound enough, since it is an essential phase of interaction. In discussing expectancy of

behavior in chapter 8 we saw that by setting up anticipatory reactions in another, one may control that other person. Parents manage their children in this way when they furnish ideals for them to follow. Lovers exercise control when they identify themselves with each other; and one purpose of patriotic training is to build up attitudes and ideas which will control the behavior of citizens in time of war. Such expectancy patterns involve a positive stimulus which sets the stage for the particular acts to follow. We have already shown in earlier chapters the importance of expectation as a regulatory phase of interaction. There are also the negative or restrictive stimuli which people use. They deny or inhibit the actions of others. The "Thou shalt nots" of every society are illustrations.

Definition of social control. For our purpose we limit the term social control to a somewhat narrower and more conventional field. We shall not include those more intimate person-to-person influences which grow up in the sympathetic or antagonistic interactions of husband and wife, children and parents, members of a congeniality group, or among friends. We define *social control* as the use of physical force or symbolic means to enforce or bring about the operation of prescribed or expected rules or actions. The former include coercion and restraint; the latter, suggestion, flattery, or other verbal devices. Such control may involve the dominance of the larger overall society or community over groups within it, or of one group over another, or of a group over its members, or of individuals over other individuals.¹ Today the most

¹ For rather full accounts of social control in its various aspects, see, among others, L. L. Bernard, *Social control*, New York: The Macmillan Company,

extensive and potent controls are those of the state; but as important as these are, they do not cover all forms of control.

Social control arises when an individual or group is forced or persuaded to act to the benefit of his own or other group. This may be seen in the domination by a special-interest association, in the accommodative arrangements of two competing or conflicting organizations, or in the regulations by a professional society of its own members. It is also witnessed in much more informal manner in interpersonal relations and in the day-by-day operation of institutionalized groups. Exploitative manipulation of one group by another or of one group of the wider community is common in mass society. It includes such devices as advertising, monopolistic price-fixing by would-be competitors, and in outright racketeering.

Group organization, power, and control. Our previous discussions of primary groups and communities have shown that therein controls are simpler, more direct, and more informal than those which we find today in secondary-group organization and mass society, where many sanctions are highly formalized. In homogeneous societies comprised of a relatively limited number of extended families, regulations through gossip, a few moral rules, and occasional use of overt force may be sufficient.

As culture and peoples become heterogeneous and as secondary groups arise, the whole problem of social control changes in character. Not only are there increased differentiation and increased complexity of interaction, but everywhere there are cross-currents of warring factions. Employers get at odds with labor unions over hours of work, rates of pay, and conditions of labor. Racial groups conflict with each other for jobs and social status. Sectarian groups have long flung themselves at each other's throats in their frenzy over theological differences. Professional classes are in competition and conflict: physicians and surgeons

against quacks, well-trained attorneys against the shysters, and the scientists against the fakirs and magicians. Out of this sort of situation arises a need to regulate and delimit the expression of these narrower interests. There is always a danger that strong special-interest groups in conflict may disrupt the larger community and hence threaten the existence of all its groups.

The application of regulatory or manipulative devices of any sort implies the use of power, although its form and intensity may vary greatly. Psychologically power has its roots in the dominance-submission patterns which are universals. The simplest meaning of power is one's ability to make another do one's bidding. More abstractly, power means the possession of some influence or force which may be used to oblige another to conform to some expectation. In any social interaction it is the capacity to command the goods or services or compliance of others. Such controls may be informal or formal and use either physical or psychological devices as sanctions. And as the basis of social control, at least four aspects of power must be taken into account: (1) its amount or quantity; (2) its distribution among individuals or groups; (3) the purposes for which it is used; and (4) the means by which it is applied. At this point we shall comment only on the broad features of these. Some of the detailed aspects will be treated later on.

Amount of power. In simpler interpersonal relations the *amount* of power depends, in last analysis, on physical strength. But even in such situations a wide variety of reduced or sublimated expressions of power may be used. There is an old folk saying that one can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar. This means that power is always qualified by the responses of those to whom it is applied, since it can be manifested only in a social act or interaction. The extreme and limiting case of applying force by killing the other is not as socially productive as applying power so as to get his strength for your ends. The most elemental form of this is found in slavery or in

1939; Paul H. Landis, *Social control*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939; and Joseph S. Rouček and associates, *Social control*, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1947.

what has been called enforced co-operation. By gentler persuasion and suggestion you may often secure still more power from him to you. This implies a range of control which we shall discuss with reference to the means.

What is said of interpersonal controls applies in principle to groups. Power depends for its effectiveness on getting others to operate or not operate in a given social situation; and it may range from brute force to the application of verbal and other symbolic devices.

Yet effective relations do not rest entirely on strong muscle or a smooth tongue. To take the case of interpersonal contact again: If two men, A and B, are of the same weight and physical strength, neither may dominate or control the other. But if A has a stone or a club or a machine gun or an atom bomb and B has none, the potential and actual control of A over B is apparent at once. To apply this to the group situation, it is clear that the group which has added mechanical power has tremendous advantages over one which has not. The mastery of the white man over the native tribes or of a highly armed and efficient nation over others less well-equipped are contemporary examples.

However, added power need not always take mechanical form. This represents only an increase in potentials at the points on our continuum where overt force is applied. Men have long used verbal magic, flattery, promises, indoctrination, and all other forms of persuasion and suggestion in order to increase their management of others. In modern times propaganda, slogans, and stereotypes are a kind of magic, and they add to the amount of power which may be applied. To add ideology and word magic to machines makes a mass society almost invincible. Again the roots of such control lie in the early conditioning of individuals to words and symbols as well as in training in response to violent means in the family and other primary sources of socialization.

Distribution of power. The determination of who is to control is basically a matter

of the power and ability to satisfy wants in relation to the availability of the means of such satisfaction. But the physical and psychological wants of men seem constantly to expand faster than the means of fulfilling them. To advance from want to reward constantly involves efforts to manipulate and control other persons. In the most elemental instances of distribution, to go back to our hypothetical situation of A and B, the one who possesses the most force would also be in a position to effect its distribution among persons or groups. The distribution of power is correlated variously with such matters as age, sex, individual differences in skill, knowledge, class or caste, and with economic, religious, magical, political, esthetic, and other institutionalized features of community life. Many aspects of such sources of control have been dealt with in earlier chapters.

Today, the basic distribution of power derives from the political state, and many examples of this phase of social control were discussed in chapters 23 and 24. Here we shall examine state regulations within the larger context of the entire range of social control. In the final two chapters the whole question of political as against other forms of power will be taken up with relation to planning and with relation to power distribution through democratic or dictatorial forms. At this point all we need to stress is that since power in some amount will always be present — in view of the very nature of man in society — a crucial problem will always be *who* has it, that is, how it is distributed. This is the constant challenge everywhere but one which is particularly pertinent in our modern machine-made world.

Aims of social control. The basic purposes of control are to bring about conformity, solidarity, and continuity of a particular group, community, or larger society. This may involve balancing of powers among contending or social units. It may have to do with means of alleviating or preventing individual and group disorganization. It concerns the control of deviant individuals

who threaten solidarity and continuity. And it always deals with the potential or actual threat of the exploitation of the larger body by some subgroup which develops out of conflict, competition, and differentiation.


To control behavior means to bring about regular and recurrent actions or responses. Such regulation makes possible the prediction of behavior. We can anticipate what an individual will do or what will be the punishment if he fails to do so. For example, a contract enables the parties thereto to know in advance what to expect and what each will do. There is no changing of intention from day to day, and the obligation is binding for the time set. Personal whims may be permitted in intimate relations, but they have no place in an established order. Furthermore, control, especially by some overall power, makes for equilibrium between warring factions or groups by obliging them to accommodate themselves to each other and to the needs and values of the larger society. Control also fosters solidarity and integration. So, too, the mechanisms of control make possible continuity. They form a part of the culture which is passed along from generation to generation. Thus each generation gets a pattern of control which keeps the social order running smoothly. If each generation had to develop its own code, there would be waste of effort in friction.

Yet, in a rapidly changing society like our own, this continuity is disturbed, with the result that new codes have to be developed. New codes often come into conflict with old ones. This makes for difficulty in formulating regulations in a rapidly changing culture. New conditions demand new definitions, and often behavior far outruns the forms of control. The growing sense of insecurity, anonymity, impersonality, and dissociation in the individual in mass society is definitely related to the breakdown of the codes and rules of the more traditional social order.

Means of social control. By means of control we refer to the particular devices which are brought into play by those who

have the power and who aim at some particular objective.² As we have noted, power may take the form of either overt force or manipulation of symbols. In view of this fact, we may think of control extending along a continuum from the most extreme use of force — imposition of death — to such verbal controls as flattery. Also, the means of control may be thought of as negative or positive. Those which inflict pain or threaten to do so are negative; those which elicit and facilitate response by rewards of some sort are positive. Moreover, both formal and informal controls may employ a wide variety of means. Figure 75 provides a graphic arrangement of the chief means of control ranging from linguistic and gestural to those which use overt force.

FIGURE 75
A CLASSIFICATION OF THE CHIEF MEANS OF
SOCIAL CONTROL



Taking up the symbolic means of control first, it is well to recall that the great bulk of all social interaction goes on in terms of words and gestures rather than at the bodily level of contact. At best, one can push and shove another or withdraw from him; or strike, bite, pinch, or kick him; or fondle,

² A classic in this field is E. A. Ross, *Social control: a summary of the foundations of order*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901. See also F. E. Lumsley, *Means of social control*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1925.

caress, and make love. But the range of interaction possible through talk and writing is enormous. The child soon learns that words are a substitute for overt control. In the field of social control, as we have limited it, children and adults also learn that verbal communication will turn the trick of group regulation without recourse to more direct coercive measures. Since words are conditioned to actions, in most cases it is easy enough to bring about the desired result in behavior by the verbal approach. Overt bodily action we reserve for extreme cases.

So far as results go, the verbal method may be either negative and inhibitory, or positive and evocative. That is, some language appeals may be directed toward stopping oncoming or anticipated behavior. Other language stimuli may facilitate action in the desired direction. From the standpoint of the recipient, pleasant and positive verbal methods are chiefly praise, flattery, suggestion and persuasion, some forms of education, slogans, and propaganda. Negative means are gossip, satire, name-calling, threats, and commands. Let us examine the nature of these devices:

Praise is a sort of reward in words, especially from upper to lower strata, and induces social amenability and conformity. *Flattery* is undue, exaggerated, and somewhat false praise, usually set up for more ulterior purposes in dealing with others, especially those in an upper or superior social position. It appeals directly to the ego and is a particularly effective weapon in a culture dominated by individualism and desire for material goods. Yet flattery is effective in any society where there are differences in status and where prestige plays a part in control. *Indoctrination*, *advertising*, and *propaganda*, though often different in motive, all condition persons to act along lines which they like or imagine they like. Individuals come to want to do the acts suggested for them. *Persuasion* as a form of suggestion plays a part in all three of the above as well as in other situations. *Slogans* help to define situations and limit behavior along desirable lines. Slogans are the verbal signposts which guide a group to success.

Closely associated with praise and flattery is the giving of badges, rewards, or other tan-

gible objects drawn from a limited supply. *Rewards* often represent getting something for nothing, as when an honest person does not expect a reward for returning a purse he has found. And rewards usually pass from those of superior status to those of inferior. *Badges* are external symbols conferred on officials or on members of a group to designate status and authority. They exercise a great influence upon the recipients and upon others with whom these recipients come in contact. *Medals* granted for meritorious action not only confer prestige but have a valuable control effect on the recipient and vicariously on others. Other material symbols are *uniforms* and *insignia*.

While some *gossip* may be innocuous, that which concerns social control is largely critical in tone. Gossip helps to make myths and legends and is effective in formulating public opinion.

Satire, a combination of humor and critical logic put in a sarcastic way, is a highly intellectual and hence distinctly limited means of control. It is a method of exposing the foibles and weaknesses of persons and making them squirm under the verbal lash. It is unpleasant, although the more genial satire may not sting deeply. *Laughing at others* has doubtless been one of the oldest methods of control. It bespeaks superiority and is highly effective since it tends to mark off and isolate the individual from his fellows, a very effective means of control. If a person loses his sense of belonging to a group, of participating in common enterprises, even though he is not bodily removed he feels lonesome, unattached, and insecure. Although usually only temporary, ridicule and laughter may have powerful effects. This sort of control if continued may induce a lasting sense of inferiority in the person subjected to it.

Calling names or hurling epithets, especially at others whom one dislikes, is an old device of control. It is closely bound up with the still-prevalent notion that words have some peculiar magical power of their own to do damage to those upon whom they are cast.³ To call names is an aid in giving the recipient a lower social status. Name-calling has the effect of declassifying a person. A "wop" or a "red" is beneath us socially. A "moron" is

³ See Kimball Young, *Social psychology*, 2nd ed., chapter 16, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1944, for a review of the power of words over behavior.

stupid, and a "Bohemian" is wild in his conduct. Calling names is a common device in propaganda against an opponent.

Commands are a direct verbal form of ordering and forbidding — the oldest means of negative control through words. The command may be a positive order to do something or an inhibitory statement forbidding an action. Commands represent direct power. They have much more the sense of exterior authority than do satire, laughter at others, or calling names. In our society the most effective commands in secondary groups are those issued by the church and the state.

Threats are the most severe forms of verbal control. Yet to be fully effective they must be backed by physical force or the appearance of power to deny action. If the threat does not inhibit, then the person threatened must be made to suffer injury, pain, or punishment. Threats are distinctive carriers of emotion and accordingly have great potential power. Since the threat puts but two alternatives before the person threatened, there are only two ways out of the dilemma, and he must choose between them. Moreover, the threat loads the dice for the choice in the direction desired by the threatener.

Closely related to commands and threats is *censorship*. Censorship is complementary to propaganda. It is a restraint on the expression of opinion, whereas propaganda suggests opinion and action along predetermined lines. It is usually a command of someone in authority, often a representative of the state or the church, to stop the expression of fact or opinion. It is often physical in method, as in burning tabooed books, and in this sense it becomes an overt method of control. In fact, it may be considered as the borderline case between the use of external force and the symbolic controls. For the individual whose work is forbidden, censorship has all the effects of restraint of bodily motion. It usually sets up unpleasant and antagonistic attitudes.

The method of *overt action* is the final expression of control when no other way remains open. This means of control has historically been largely negative and restrictive. It signifies that if the individual does not do as he is told, pain, suffering, and even death may be brought upon him. Such action is just what it says, forced and not voluntary. The general term for this nega-

tive overt control is *punishment*. This includes fines, imprisonment, whipping, mutilation, torture, banishment, and death.⁴

Control by gross overt action appears in both primary and secondary communities, although the state more and more reserves the right to inflict severe punishment upon the individual. Punishment is easy because it relieves the punishers of responsibility for a system which makes such control necessary.

The fact that punishment is so easy is no reason to believe it is socially entirely effective. There is a traditional belief that punishment reforms the criminal or recalcitrant person and deters others who know of it from wrongdoing. Such an idea is so deeply embedded in our culture that it will take a long time to change it. There is considerable evidence, however, that the most effective method of reform is not punishment but, rather, the treatment of the recalcitrant as a socially ill person who needs reconditioning along positive and pleasant lines. The whole development of education, propaganda, advertising, and other social methods of control runs counter to the "Thou-shalt-not" devices of punitive justice. The former are positive. They build up habits and attitudes along desirable lines. They make unnecessary the fear of wrongdoing, since one is reconditioned to actions which are required and which by their nature prevent the expression of contrary or negative responses.

Internalization of controls. What we have just said about the importance of positive as contrasted to negative forms of control leads to a consideration of the relation of the person to the various means of social control with respect to which he is expected to conform. To be effective at all, control systems must have their counterpart in the individual's moral ideas, attitudes, and values. In fact, in discussing socialization we pointed out how these latter

⁴ Lumley, *op. cit.*, adds war, but this complicates the whole problem by drawing upon a rather wide range of other factors; so we shall omit it although, true enough, warfare may be a method of punishing another nation. See chapter 24.

develop and become internalized in the personality. (See chapter 9, pages 124-126, 130-132.) Let us explore further certain aspects of this moral training. In keeping with current social psychology we may posit two fundamental internal patterns which have to do with social control. These are sense of guilt and sense of shame. Both of these, of course, must be understood within the cultural framework in which they operate.

Guilt feelings consist in an internalized habit of punishing one's self for infraction of a code, moral and/or legal. In popular speech we call this one's conscience, and there is nothing mysterious about its operation. It is a set of attitudes and values which may be applied to check one's self before committing an overt act which is against the code, or serve to punish one after such an act has been committed.

The development of the conscience is also clear. Through the mechanism of identification, associated with learning the codes of conduct and of being actually punished at the hands of a parent, teacher, or other person, the child comes to play the role of the other with reference to various impulses and acts of his own which he has been taught to regard as immoral or illegal. That is, as in other phases of building a self, he learns to talk and to respond to himself as other persons have talked and responded to him. In fact where there is complete internalization, a show of external authority is hardly necessary. The parent, preacher, and policeman are replaced by their surrogates of moral and legal principles and actions. When thoroughly inculcated, the latter serve to keep the individual in line or to punish him when he departs from the code.

Internally the commission of an act contrary to the code leads to regret, sense of wrong-doing accompanied by anxiety, and often to a resolve not to do such a thing again. With respect to the object of our immoral or illegal act, be it person or group, one tries to make amends by apology, gift, service, or other penitential act. But the basic function of a strong conscience, of


course, is to so anticipate the consequences to others and to ourselves of an act against the code that we inhibit ourselves from ever doing it. In short, the capacity to inhibit is the core of conscience.

In contrast to guilt, shame consists in an internalized pattern the aim of which is to preserve one's status. A child learns from parents and others by identification and from their actions toward him to avoid doing things which will cause him to lose face or social position. Shame operates, then, in those situations where failure to live up to an expected role and status brings deprivation of such role and status at the hands of others. In societies where there is a strong family or other group solidarity, not only one's own role and status but those of the group members may be affected by one's shameful action. Under our more individualistic system shame tends to be more ego-directed although family and other group expectancy also plays a part, as when we say "we let others down" in doing something shameful. But the chief focus with us is the individual's personal standing in a hierarchy of status.

In general, people in Christian societies are conditioned to moral codes which make use of both guilt and shame, but especially the former. In contrast, the Japanese moral control centers chiefly around shame. There guilt feelings, if at all present, play a minor part in conduct. But shame looms large as a public control device. Its power is shown in the fact that a Japanese soldier who is made a prisoner of war is traditionally considered by his family to be dead. The picture on page 548 demonstrates somewhat literally the place of face-saving in Japan. Here the man in question feels that he has lost status as a result of falling into the hands of the law.

Forms and Agencies in the Distribution of Controls

In the last analysis the community or society, large or small, has the coercive force which is basic to all social control. But the distribution of such power varies with the

*Wide World Photo.*

A JAPANESE UNDER ARREST HIDING HIS FACE IN SHAME

instruments and values which a given culture provides. In this section we shall examine the broad division of forms and agencies through which control flows, in our own society particularly.

Informal and formal controls. We have already noted that social control may be either informal or formal. The first is illustrated by conventions, the mores, and public opinion. The formal controls are those worked out by the state through law and administrative devices or those consciously de-

veloped within organizations themselves, or between or among organizations to regulate their relations.

Many of society's informal patterns of control are undoubtedly hit upon more or less by trial-and-error to meet particular situations. Moreover, they are often formulated unconsciously and are not always consistent with each other. Mankind has been rather slow and late in trying to make its social order logical. Yet it would be a mistake to imagine that all folkways are the product of unconscious adaptation. Pre-

quently the informal controls are the product of deliberate or conscious decision, though perhaps in contradistinction to others already in vogue. The most important informal controls in a community are the moral codes and ideals, the religious convictions, public sentiment or opinion, artistic standards, and the general state of enlightenment.

The patterns of social control, like other items in the folkways, are slow to change. But as society became more complex through division of groupings and due to cultural growth, the informal agencies of control no longer sufficed. In fact, long before the modern age man developed more formal agencies of control.

When standardized codes of conduct are set down to be managed by special groups and passed on from generation to generation by special agencies, we have the beginning of *formal control*. In the rise of the political state, formal law-making and the invention of writing, which made possible the keeping of records and the preservation of codes, were especially important. In a modern, complex, social-economic society we could not get along without the formalized controls, because the personal, intimate relations have largely been replaced by more impersonal and indirect contacts. For example, in the primary community barter and direct dealing in produce were possible. Today, in an intricate economic organization such relations are possible only in a limited way, and all sorts of controls have been evolved to meet the needs of buyers and sellers, of producers and consumers, of merchants, bankers, shippers, manufacturers, farmers, and others who have a part in the complex web of economic life.

It must be borne in mind that formal and informal aspects of control are intertwined. In respect to the more loosely organized features of community life and in relation to the amorphous publics of our day, the informal tends to outweigh the formal. But in the more highly institutionalized groups, although the informal is not unimportant, the major controls flow through formal channels. Many aspects of these have been

discussed elsewhere. Here we shall review only some of the important regulations of the state, the economic system, the professions. We shall close with a discussion of the place of public opinion in the modern world.

State control. The political state is the dominant overall organization today. Through its exercise of sovereignty it is supreme in its coercive power. The *law* is laid down in order to maintain or establish the rights, duties, and liberties of the members of the state. Rights imply a two-sided relationship in which one person owes the other a duty and the other person benefits thereby. (See chapter 25.) A person has rights only insofar as others have duties toward him. One's rights set the limits upon other people's liberties. Freedom and responsibility always go together.

Yet liberty implies more than mere absence of duty. If other people are free to interfere, a person's liberty may be useless. Liberty, to be of benefit, must be protected by rights to noninterference from others. The common man usually does not distinguish between "rights" and "liberties." In fact, the protected liberties are what he means by rights — often called "natural rights." Liberties or rights, then, have a counterpart in duties or responsibilities. To talk of "personal liberties" and of "inalienable rights" as if they existed in a vacuum is to talk nonsense. Without some sort of social protection, that is, potential power, such "sacred" liberties and rights are worthless. There are no "natural laws" of economic behavior which protect private property or make free competition or individual initiative operate outside cultural norms. Man has inherited no political rights through the genes. These are cultural products. So far as democratic societies go, there is a general consensus — that means willingness to exert power to protect — providing for freedom of speech, inquiry, and assemblage, for occupational or residential mobility, free public education, the right to vote, to a writ of habeas corpus and trial by jury, to protection of life and property, for the

maintenance of health, and for a reasonable equality of opportunity in the struggle for existence. But these matters represent cultural gains, not divine favor, and they may be lost or extended depending on the course of human events. Hence it should be clear, as J. M. Clark says, that "inalienable rights" are actually "a very complex structure of regulations, and that they are matters of degree, with shifting boundary lines between what can be alienated and what cannot."⁵

Against the background of these reciprocal relations the law tells people what they *must do* and what they *must not do*. This sets the limits of what they *may do*. It fixes the direction of behavior along stable and predictable lines, thus serving an essential purpose of social control.

In theory the law is general in its application. It is not supposed to play favorites. It is not a special act for the benefit or injury of one person or special group. Its functions are as follows: (1) to make known the will of the sovereign power no matter how distributed; (2) to enforce this will upon the citizens in the name of the whole state; (3) to punish infringements without regard to special interests of persons; and (4) to supplement with the aid of compulsion the informal controls of the community when needed.

In this country the political state expresses itself in legal form through four channels: the constitutional or basic law, the statute law made by legislative bodies, through court-made or case law growing out of judicial decisions, and by quasi-legal administrative regulations. For the most part, the control functions of the state have to do with providing police and military protection for its citizens, regulating various aspects of its economic life, and providing for the general welfare. Various aspects of these functions were discussed in chapter 23. There we also indicated the gradual shift from the negative punitive function of the state to a positive, preventive place in our society. In this change the law has, of

course, followed alterations in the larger culture and especially in the mores and public sentiments of the masses and classes within the nation-state.

It is interesting to note that two very vague legal concepts, "due process" and "police power," have been invoked as convenient rationalizations for some of our most important new regulations. In our American jurisprudence all powers not delegated specifically to the federal government are reserved to the separate states and to the people. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," and the Fourteenth Amendment extends this to: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Since property and liberty are but bundles of rights and privileges, any regulation is a form of deprivation of the same. The matter of regulation, therefore, comes down to the definition of "due process," and this, in turn, rests upon the rather vague general concept of police power.

No one has given a satisfactory definition of "police power," but it covers an undefined residue of legislative power of a restrictive sort so far as it is permitted in the Bill of Rights. In actual practice it means whatever the courts decide to permit the states to do in limiting individual action and property rights. It is a flexible concept which permits changes in public opinion and the mores to encroach upon the slower-moving law through legislation and through juridical precedent. These devices for correlating the wider public concern for "social legislation" with the older legal framework are basic to the interference of the state in private business and industry and for all sorts of legislation dealing with an equally vague and loosely defined area called *general welfare*.

To see these matters in the larger perspective of social control, let us note briefly some of the legal measures which have been applied to property and profits, to labor and employment problems, to natural resources, and to community well-being.

⁵ J. M. Clark, *Social control of business*, p. 107. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926.

(1) In matters regarding property and profits, aside from the age-long protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, the state has attempted to control competition, made rules for corporations, especially public utilities, insurance companies, and giant organizations; it has regulated or abolished monopolies and has concerned itself with monetary matters, notably in times of periodic business depression. Through its taxing power the state not only pays for its services but acts to redistribute wealth generally. One of the crucial problems of the United States is the struggle between the giant corporation and monopoly and the small-business enterprise. Just what part the state will play in the future in regulating or managing the economic system depends on a variety of conditions. Certainly the state will have a larger part than it has had in the past, if present trends continue. As we know from other countries, under socialism the state extends regulatory and management controls over wider and wider areas of a nation's economy, as in Britain, or becomes itself the only owning and operating agency, as in Soviet Russia.⁶

(2) Where labor unions have attempted on their own initiative to force better bargains from the employers and, failing this, have resorted to strikes and violence, the state has come in to protect property and to maintain peace and order in the community. The legal right to strike may not be recognized, but the state has gone far in some instances in permitting peaceful picketing and demonstrations of force on the part of labor. Likewise, the state at times has set up arbitration boards to settle labor-employer disputes. But it was the New Deal era which gave American labor its greatest political — that is, governmental — support. Some aspects of recent labor legislation were discussed in chapter 23. So, too, we noted the extension of benefits through the social-security measures. We also pointed out the high costs of these both in money and in bureaucratic controls.

(3) The state has also concerned itself with conservation of natural resources of timber, coal, oil, and water power as they have become public problems. The earlier theory of unlimited freedom of private exploitation of these resources has broken down in the face of

a growing public recognition of general community rights to the benefits of these resources of nature, which men did not create with their own labor.

(4) So, too, in the broad area of general welfare the government has constantly assumed additional powers. At an early date the post-office service, certain regulations of commerce, and of public health through water supply and sewage and waste disposals were accepted as right and proper state functions. Urbanization and other effects of the Industrial Revolution have made necessary continuous extension of governmental controls and services. Not only has government taken cognizance of matters of public health but the very definition of public health has been steadily expanding until many former distinctions between the care of the ill at private expense and the responsibility of public agencies in this matter have disappeared. The whole definition of public responsibility is changing.

The exploitation of the ultimate consumer, so easy in urban society and in an era of mass production and national advertising, led in time to public demands that regulations be made to protect the retail buyers from practices injurious to health and from exorbitant costs. There had long been regulations as to weights and measures to insure honest dealing. But when the consumer had no way of judging what goes into a product, need of other regulations arose. Some of these controls we noted in chapter 22. So, too, there are many laws regarding the production and processing of foods.

Other regulations to protect the consumer have also been developed under the general police power through agencies such as the Bureau of Standards, the United States Public Health Service, the Bureau of Chemistry, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (control of narcotics), the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Steamboat Inspection Service, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and others. The separate states, of course, have laws and various boards and commissions regulating the production and distribution of milk, meat, and many other consumer goods as well as public health, public utilities, and correctional and educational institutions.

In addition to all these, the various controls over competition and monopoly with reference

⁶ For an encyclopedic review of government control of business, see H. D. Koontz, *Government control of business*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941.

to public utility rates were aimed, in part, at benefiting the consumer. In periods of crisis, like a war or a severe depression, the state has not hesitated to fix prices and to promote programs of co-operative production and purchase. There is really little limit to what the state may do to and for the economic system once such a method of control gets embedded in the culture.

So, too, the state long since took over control of education in large part, and from the formal school it has spread its work to general public-information services of immense scope and volume. It is obvious that the control of education is easily extended to take in every aspect of enlightenment, propaganda, and indoctrination.

Closely related to this is the growing control of various media of mass communication, not only as to means of transmission but regarding the content. Operating under general police powers, the government has long exercised censorship rights over the mails. This gives it the power to suppress the publication of printed material which the courts consider immoral or subversive. Just what is defined as "immoral" or "subversive," of course, depends not only on the law but on public sentiment of a given time and place. With the coming of the motion picture, the radio, and television there has been a further extension of state control in one form or another. The motion-picture regulations are of state and municipal origin. Certain aspects of the radio and television are in federal hands, and the control to date has been chiefly through the power of licensing.⁷

Where authoritarianism is in the saddle, governmental censorship may practically eliminate what we consider basic civil rights. The official taboo on whatever art, drama, fiction, or science those in power do not want provides a firm control on communication. This is particularly evident in Soviet Russia.

Finally, a word may be said about governmental control in the coming Atomic Age. Certainly, in time of war, controls will be more complete and perhaps more rigid than anything people in democracies have dreamed of.

This will apply to industry, labor, and every aspect of daily life. But even in peacetime, the Atomic Age may see great changes in the nature and extent of formal, governmental regulations on conduct. Such controls not only bear on matters of military security with respect to atomic and other highly lethal weapons but may well have to do with all kinds of regulations respecting safe and beneficial use of atomic power.

Controls within economic groups. The laws of the state by no means exhaust all phases of control having to do with our productive system. All sorts of formal and informal regulations grow up among businessmen as to wages, prices, hours of opening and closing, as to standards of merchandise, and as to other practices. The trade association is but one institutional expression of these developments. There are literally hundreds of these in the country.

A trade association has been defined as "a co-operative organization of businessmen engaged in a particular trade or industry for the purpose of protecting and promoting their mutual interests, and for the purpose of increasing the profits of its members, and of improving their service to the public."⁸ These associations are not to be confused with broader, more general organizations of individuals and corporations, such as the National Association of Manufacturers, National Metal Trades Association, American Foreign Export Association, or chambers of commerce, boards of trade, or merchants' exchanges. Trade associations are concerned with the production and sale of particular trade or industrial products.

Such organizations, although selfish in purpose, have learned that the consumer cannot be ignored. This is why the final, third phrase "of improving their service to the public" is in the above definition. In the old days of indifference to the rights of the public, such rationalization would scarcely have been added.

The trade organizations aim to control the quality of the goods — a function which

⁷ On the whole problem of regulating mass communication, see the report of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, *A free and responsible press*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947; also, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Government and mass communications*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947.

⁸ From J. H. Foth, *Trade associations: their services to industry*, p. 3. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1930. By permission.

requires a certain amount of education, propaganda, and even discipline applied to member organizations. The means of doing this are many, such as agreements on grading of products and on standards of production, and insistence on honest labels and trade marks. So, too, commercial voluntary arbitration among firms has become rather widespread, and many of the agreements so entered into are binding in law.

These methods simply represent efforts on the part of business itself to eliminate friction among competitors, to build up a sense of solidarity in the special-interest group, and to try to convince the consumer that they are dealing fairly with him. Another type of informal but effective control of business has arisen in some American cities through a linking of powerful racketeers, corrupt politicians, and certain business interests. Organized criminal gangs have exploited the idea of the trade association. For example, for a fat fee these gangs use the tactics of threats and violence to protect dealers from outside competition. Organized criminal gangs have also at times controlled labor unions in the same manner.

Aside from the more specific organizations designed to handle problems of control, a number of organizations of businessmen help to stimulate public good will toward business and hope to improve the conduct of business and professional men among themselves. The various associations of commerce do this. Moreover, the International Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, Optimists, Exchange, and like organizations, although primarily recreational in nature, also assist in fostering the business ethos.

As we have already noted, all control rests upon the consensus of and acceptance by the masses of the rules of the game. The latent power of the masses to resist controls which they do not approve is a well-known story in history. Ordinarily in a more or less static, slowly changing society the mores and law are reasonably well integrated to the situations demanding control. In a society in transition, like our own, the old mores and the old laws do not fit the new

cases, and critical public opinion and discussion come to be more and more important. New techniques of control are suggested and tried. Often chaos develops for a time because of the divergence of advice and practice.

Special-interest groups resent the wider community discussion of their economic behavior. Yet these very groups are in the end dependent upon the wider community to buy their goods. During the last quarter of the 19th century some public-utility companies, especially the railroads, expressed the "public-be-damned" attitude, but in the end they have had to accept public control. Today many utilities are using every device of advertising, education, and propaganda to undo the antagonism set up in the public by the earlier exploitative, individualistic practices.

So, too, the proprietary interests encourage the social myth of upward mobility of the successful businessman. They like the stories of the great heroes of modern finance and resent any efforts to "debunk" them. So, too, in the face of spreading socialism, they make renewed efforts "to sell" the public at home and abroad on the virtues of the "free-enterprise" system. They refer to the extension of state controls over the country's economy as "creeping socialism." It is apparent that the changing relations of the political and economic orders will involve considerable shift in the distribution of power.

As another evidence of the awareness of business interests to the larger public, mention must be made of the self-imposed censorship which motion-picture producers, radio broadcasting stations, and publishers practice.⁹ There have been a number of cases of loss of contract by entertainers who said things over the radio which either their sponsors or the broadcasting-company officials did not approve. In the early days of television there were occasional flurries of public concern over telecasting scantily

⁹ See, for instance, Ruth Inglis, *Freedom of the movies*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947. This report, prepared for the Commission of Freedom of the Press, contains an excellent summary of self-regulation in the motion-picture industry.

clad night-club entertainers or other "indecencies" not approved by the "best" circles. We shall very likely see both governmental and industry-determined regulation of the video as this form of mass communication is more widely diffused.

Controls within labor groups. The most effective control of labor over itself is found in labor unions, which have developed codes of behavior providing for agreements with employers covering wage scales, standard hours, and conditions of labor. Various regulations as to membership, dues, "scabbing," breaking strikes, and the like are developed. In addition to these all workers, union and nonunion, tend to build up certain labor folkways, such as not working too hard on the job, soldiering, condemnation of the pace-setter, and many little "rights" and "privileges" which have clustered around certain occupations. When time-study experts, who would further mechanize industry, try to alter these folkways, they often encounter unexpected resistance on the part of the workers.¹⁰

In more primary economic groups where the individual had rather direct control over his product, the right to work was never questioned. Today, where the cycles of bad times and good times interfere with employment, where others own the machines and market the product, an individual worker's "right" to a job is rather difficult to defend. For the most part, it cannot be protected except by a strike or other coercion, showing that it is not yet universally accepted or protected by legal means.

All this means that labor would modify the thesis of free competition and the doctrine of commodity supply and demand as to wages. The worker is coming to look upon a good living wage as a moral right or privilege, which the community itself must help him to secure. While the legal sanction to this view has come but slowly, the force of public sentiment is in many places gradually being mobilized in favor of some

arrangement which will prevent the social and individual losses which come from seasonal and other cyclical periods of unemployment.

The mores and public opinion of the wider community also effectively control the activities of labor in other ways. While laboring people may develop a great deal of sympathy for particular labor groups, there are many lines of cleavage among laborers themselves. Unskilled, unorganized laborers are the object of scorn on the part of union men. The higher-wage groups generally look down upon those in the lower brackets of income. In this situation labor develops little class consciousness in the Marxian sense. (See chapter 28.) As a result, there is not always the outside support by other workers of the strike, sabotage, or threat of coercion on the part of particular workers against their employers. Often other laborers turn against their fellows, sometimes going so far as to attempt to break the strike. It is against these practices, in part, that industrial unionism organizes.

The great middle class in this country — the small shopkeepers, the salaried workers, and the farmers — while divided into cross-currents of opinion on various public questions, play an effective part through public opinion in determining the outcome of conflicts between industrial laborers and employers. This illustrates an important point in the relation of the wider secondary community to conflict between special-interest groups. It is highly important that information and interpretation from both sides reach this wider public. For this reason adequate community control needs a further control, that of seeing that the media of communication are free from domination by certain special interests at the expense of others.

Social control of the professions. By professions we mean those highly trained experts who render services for fees or salaries rather than depend on profits with the risks which must go with business enterprise. The professions, in other words, represent

¹⁰ On this topic, see F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the worker*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939.

high degrees of specialized roles which give a common training, discipline, standpoint, and value system to a group. As an organized body such specialists as doctors, lawyers, and engineers become a differentiated guild with many of the characteristics of a distinct class. In our complex society the mass dependence on the expert is such that he is in a particularly strong position of power. Yet the professions are subject to state regulations, to many sets of rules laid down by themselves, and to the pressures of public opinion and the community mores.

The legal controls take the form of requiring minima of training, licenses to perform, and certain special regulations regarding their technical roles. Of more interest to us is the variety of regulations which such groups impose on themselves.

The medical profession is one of the oldest and has developed its rules more thoroughly than any other in our society. Ordinarily these codes deal with: (1) things or acts one *must* do; (2) things or acts one *must not* do; and (3) things or acts which carry some positive merit but which are not required. Some of these have to do with relations to fellow members, some with relations to other groups or to the community. Thus, the present code of the American Medical Association is divided into three headings: duties of physicians to their patients, duties to other physicians and to the profession at large, and duties to the public.

Since about 1930 there has arisen a sharp conflict between the American Medical Association and the advocates of plans to "socialize" medicine by such devices as regulating fees, providing for low-cost health insurance, and establishing clinics and other medical services for people of low income. The Association has begun to modify its age-long opposition to this sort of governmental control of its functions, and in time we may witness new forms of legal regulation of this profession, so long dominated by an individualistic point of view.

Lawyers have no such strong sense of solidarity as have medical men. Relative to their numbers, far fewer of them belong to

the bar associations, local or national. But they have attempted to set up codes covering such items as conduct of cases, currying favor with juries, suppressing facts, concealing witnesses favorable to a defendant whom an opposing lawyer is prosecuting, and indulging in intimidation, fraud, or chicanery. The lawyer is not to refuse to help clients even though fees are not forthcoming.

Both in medicine and in law the problem, so far as fellow members go, is to steer such a course between undue rivalry and competition and undue solidarity as will not destroy individual initiative and ambition.

The slight professionalization of teachers and the weakness of their we-group solidarity have already been discussed. (See chapter 19.) They, like other white-collar workers, thoroughly identify themselves with their middle- and upper-class employers. Only gradually through teachers' unions are teachers identifying themselves with the skilled and unskilled workers.

One phase of professional ethics linked closely with advanced teaching must be mentioned. This pertains to the ethics of scientific research. The scientific search for facts and for truth is bound up so thoroughly with logical method that anything but the highest form of honesty is intolerable. A grave ethical question arises, however, when we come to the matter of the application of scientific findings. Men in applying science have occasionally perverted the facts and the truth for gain or to suit the purposes of the state. For this reason there is a strong sentiment among research workers that the highest form of research must be carried on without any notion of application at the moment lest economic or political motives and the desire for personal prestige influence the facts, their interpretation, and their application. There is a growing threat to science, in fact, in any drift toward dictatorship, be it economic or political.

It is in this connection that another problem of ethical conduct on the part of engineers, accountants, architects, and other technically trained persons may be raised. Since these men who are trained in science sell their services directly to businessmen

for a fee, the whole matter of their integrity is at stake. Their honesty as to fact finding may not be questioned, although their employers may suppress or pervert their findings as they will. But they do face the temptation to misinterpret facts for a consideration, or to be secretly employed by competitors, or to accept commissions from dealers in materials. Also, where governmental agencies come into play there may arise temptation to follow a "Party" line rather than one dictated by objective facts.

However, most engineers are so closely tied to private industry that they fail to see their larger civic relation to the whole social structure. They have allied themselves very directly with the spirit of competition and capitalism.¹¹ Yet the trend toward socialism and state planning has begun to influence engineers, and we may expect to see considerable shift in their attitudes as government controls enter more and more into our productive system.

The general mores and public opinion influence the professions just as they affect business and labor groups. The doctrines of professional service are pretty thoroughly grounded in the mores, and when evidence accumulates that the doctor, the lawyer, the teacher, or the scientist goes in for money profits ahead of professional contributions, negative criticism may well have a deterrent effect on others in the profession, if not on the person criticized.

Some other agencies of control. Of the various institutional controls none is older or more respected in some quarters than religion. Through its ceremonials it regulates the conduct of its members; but, more than that, it usually provides a moral foundation for much of their conduct in the world outside. In more primitive societies, in fact, the religious life was intermixed with very other aspect of the culture: economic, utilitarian, recreational, and communal. Today it occupies a much more segregated

place, and yet it tends to reflect the dominant values of the time and place.

Religion gives a sanction to various social practices and opposes others. In our capitalistic society it has tended for the most part to support private business and the economic competitive system. On the other hand, some more divergent Christian sects have opposed exploitation and have stood out against the special interests of economic groups. (See chapter 20.)

Social control is not uninfluenced by the artistic standards and practices of a people. Art not only expresses the deep values and unconscious as well as conscious wishes of a society, but it also serves a control purpose as well. It provides ideals; it gives young and old pictures, music, fiction, drama, poems, sculpture, architecture that serve as symbols around which they can identify their own feelings, thoughts, and values. The importance of posters, fiction, music, and other arts in inducing personal and national morale in wartime is but a heightened instance of its continuing function in helping to regulate men's lives.

Closely allied to art is the control value of the general state of public enlightenment. Just how important widespread knowledge may be in fostering control has been the subject of serious debate. In democratic societies, however, it is given basic recognition as a fundamental to everyday living.

In mass society the role of the expert often segregates him from the larger everyday life around him. What the critics ask is rather, How important is general enlightenment? Logic and the laboratory are not yet within the ken of the bulk of mankind; but in our society we have operated on the thesis that general education makes for sounder citizen participation and pays dividends in our controls. Certainly the literacy of the masses has made them more susceptible to demagogic propaganda, which would seem to some to be evidence that the mass of mankind is incapable of straight thinking. Such a criticism is a challenge to democratic education which has never been fully met. Schooling may foster group prejudices, may throw its weight on the side of

¹¹ See Thorstein Veblen, *The engineers and the price system*, New York: The Viking Press, 1921; also, F. Taussig, *Professional and business ethics*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1926.

special-interest groups, producing rationalizations for exploitation, or it may free the individual from too great attachment to any given special group, so that he can see the relation of the economic or other narrow organization to the wider good of the entire community. If we indoctrinate the individual with narrow class interests, we may lay the foundation for a sort of control very different from one based on educating him to see the whole society in an ethical framework.

Yet if enlightenment merely means analytical ability and a carping criticism of everything and everybody, it will not foster democratic participation in control making which its proponents have often expected. Along with analytical ability and information there must go some basic emotionalized values and ideals. Without these, little is gained by mere knowledge. Enlightenment does not mean complete absence of faith in deep and abiding values. Without the latter, society and culture would break apart.

The form of social control is affected by various groups and institutions within the larger social framework. It is especially susceptible to education, formal and informal; to religious ideology; and to the growing use of press, radio, and motion picture by the dominant business interests or by the political state, which, as in communist countries, may foster the view of the dominant party in power. In the light of this latent power over public opinion one may raise some doubts as to how effective the control of the wider community may be unless the latter sees to it — by legal or informal means — that the media of public opinion is untrammelled by special-interest groups, be they economic, political, or religious in character.

These extralegal devices, like the informal ones, simply mean that the state alone cannot handle all the problems of social control. This factor is often forgotten by well-meaning people who wish to force upon the political state the necessity and duty of attempting all forms of social control. This leads us naturally into

the whole problem of the interrelations of morality, public opinion, the law, and the extralegal codes of control.

Public opinion and social control. The enforcement of the mores, at least in primary communities, is largely personal and direct. The law, in contrast, is assumed to be carried out only under fixed rules by stipulated authorities of the organized state. And extralegal codes and agreements are but an extension of the idea of formal control working its way out among the various groups without interference by the state.

In the light of these facts we may ask, Just what place has public opinion in control? In order to answer this we must look briefly at the nature and function of public opinion.

Opinion refers to the verbalized convictions which people express in reference to some social situation, person, program, or issue. Opinion is related to the fundamental attitudes, myths, legends, and ideas of a group or community. But opinion is not entirely identical with habits and attitudes. It merely gives them a certain interactional setting in terms of language; some opinions more closely reflect attitudes than others.

Public opinion refers to the discussion or talk about common social objects by members of a community, leading to some general conviction or consensus. In other words, it is opinion that is "published" or expressed in the market place, the forum, or wherever community members interact. Where opinion in a community wholeheartedly supports some particular value or object, we may, following E. A. Ross, speak of *preponderant* opinion or accepted sentiment. For example, in European and American society monogamy not only is established in the law but rests firmly upon preponderant opinion.

Public-opinion formation in our society has to do with the discussion among members of a community concerning issues upon which there is difference as well as agreement. It comes into play where the mores and the law do not cover a critical social situation. So long as no crisis arises around

some practice or belief, preponderant opinion will support it. It is in a time of rapidly shifting habits and attitudes like the present that differences arise. Public opinion therefore refers to *the verbalization of these differences in anticipation of changes in attitudes and habits*. But it does not develop unless there is an accepted pattern in the culture which permits it. As we know it in Western society, public opinion is linked with other culture traits, such as suffrage, representative government, the Bill of Rights, and the whole culture of democracy.

Public opinion really goes through a number of stages: (1) the rise of an issue; (2) the initial discussion of this issue with particular reference to formulating various proposed solutions; (3) the further discussion, pro and con, of these proposals; and (4) the swing to one side or the other as evidenced by consensus and voting or other methods of registering decisions such as straw ballots, petitions, and the like. The next stage would be that of overt action to carry out the project; but this, strictly speaking, goes beyond opinion formation. In fact, active public opinion often ceases when the fourth stage is completed. From then on the beliefs and convictions of people about an issue may easily become less aggressive. There remains a kind of passive, spectator reaction until an issue arises again.

It is evident that whoever dominates the formation of beliefs and convictions may profoundly affect the changes in the law and the mores. Censorship and propaganda thus become the most powerful weapons in social control in mass society, characterized as it is by specialization of work, impersonal relations, rapid transportation, and indirect communication over long distances. At their best, censorship and propaganda operate together. During World War I the

various governments censored certain news and deliberately manufactured other news in its place in order to keep up the morale at home and, if possible, to break it down among the enemy nations. World War II was also marked by extensive propaganda and censorship as control devices.¹²

Although in democratic, capitalistic societies the moneyed groups often attempt to control the news and press interpretations, they seldom do so completely. But employers and employees alike have not hesitated to inflict upon the wider community propaganda directed to their own selfish aims. So, too, even governmental agencies have begun to employ propaganda for their own ends. The present-day means of mass impression, in fact, are not entirely conducive to sound opinions. It is too easy for those in control to modify and qualify the statement of events or interpretations thereof. As a result, the ordinary citizen is at considerable loss to know *what* to think. This raises further serious questions for democracy.

Under authoritarian systems generally, censorship and propaganda are a part of the whole educational and promotional program of the national state. These devices are highly important in securing public support. Wherever such complete control comes into operation, we cannot speak of public opinion in the sense of widespread and approved discussion and changing consensus. In such a system all opinion once formed is, at least officially, preponderant opinion; there is no freedom of speech or of the press.

¹² On the nature and function of wartime propaganda, see Kimball Young, *Social psychology*, 2nd ed., chapter 21, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1944. More specifically on World War II, see Paul M. A. Linebarger, *Psychological warfare*, Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.

Interpretative Summary

1. Every society develops some forms of social control.
2. These range from very simple and direct moral codes and restraints (the mores) to very elaborate and complex kinds of control found in modern law.
3. The matter of control may be stated in terms of personal and social power: amounts, distribution in the population, aim as to its use, and the means for making it effective.

4. The means of control range from the use of physical force to a variety of symbolic devices.
5. The political state today represents the chief concentration of control and power. In earlier and other societies religious bodies have exercised the chief controls.
6. Yet there are other areas where control comes into play: classes, professions, occupations, and others.
7. In mass society public sentiment and public opinion are important aspects of power. Hence, whoever controls and manipulates public opinion may acquire great power. However, the sanction of force will remain the ultimate one.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Define social control. What is its relation to social power?
2. What are the four important aspects of control as a form of power?
3. Name and illustrate the chief means of social control. Which are positive; which negative? In what situations do the former work best? In which, the latter?
4. Distinguish between formal and informal means of control. Illustrate each.
5. What are the main differences in the rise and scope of public opinion in a primary and in a secondary community?
6. Why has propaganda become so important in modern society?
7. Cite some recent forms of legal control of business which run counter to the older notions of laissez-faire economics and rugged individualism.
8. Upon what situations do private businesses build up their own codes?
9. What situations led to the rapid expansion of governmental controls after 1933?
10. Why have lawyers not developed such a closely knit professional code as medical men?
11. What are some impending changes in the public control of medicine?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

J. M. Clark, "Government regulation of industry," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 7 : 122-129. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

An analysis of the main features of state regulations of the economic order.

Robert E. Cushman, "Keep our press free!", Public Affairs Pamphlet, no. 123. New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1946.

A useful and handy compendium of the story of a free press and an able interpretation of the importance of such freedom today.

Helen Everett, "Control, social," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, *op. cit.*, 1931, 4 : 344-349.

A broad general treatment of the topic from the standpoint of institutional economics.

Roscoe Pound, *Social control through law*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942.

One of America's leading students of jurisprudence sets forth his theory of the place of law in modern society.

Social-Cultural Change

EVERY society is characterized by an interplay of forces making for cultural stability and those making for change. Culture is never really static. Yet, for purposes of indicating broad differences, we say a culture is stable where a condition of equilibrium of patterns and processes is its most basic feature. In contrast, a culture marked by rather extensive alteration of its patterns and resulting disequilibrium is said to be a dynamic one. Many nonliterate peoples, especially those under conditions of isolation, probably remained relatively unchanged for long periods of time. Such were the Australian aborigines. Even under conditions of civilization, certain relatively complex cultures continued for long periods of time without experiencing any striking changes. Such was the situation in Egypt during some periods of its ancient history. On the other hand, our times are noted for their rapid change, especially in technologies and other features of our material culture. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the culture of any society, large or small, is ever really completely stable and static.

The bulk of this chapter will treat the nature of invention and diffusion as the chief processes making for cultural change. As to content, we center our attention chiefly on contemporary culture.¹ The closing section will discuss some of the implications of

the widespread innovations of modern times. The relation of cultural change to progress and planning will be taken up in the next chapter.

Factors Making for Invention and Discovery

Culture is changed by two means: by invention or discovery of new cultural elements within a given group or society and by the borrowing of traits and patterns from another group or society. Obviously neither mere invention nor borrowing induce important cultural modification. Rather, it is the application of such elements that produces change. For the most part, the effect of new items in cultural innovation is much the same whether these are the product of inventors and discoverers of a given society or are the result of diffusion from outside. Yet there are some interesting features of each process — invention and diffusion — which we must examine. This section deals with the former, the next with the latter.

In the face of man's biosocial and psychological foundation, the important factors in the building of culture are the historical antecedents of the particular society, the present state of readiness to accept or reject cultural change, and the functional adaptability of the new traits in the light of the other two factors. Once a device for meeting a given need has been acquired, it is likely to persist and become the groundwork for subsequent changes.

Invention of culture. It is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between discovery and invention. The former represents an accidental or sought-for perception of relations between elements in a given situation not previously recognized or understood. In-

¹ It is beyond the aim and scope of this book to examine the theories and empirical data on the processes of cultural innovation as studied by anthropology. However, we shall have occasion to draw upon some of its ideas and findings. An excellent and rather complete discussion of innovation and cultural change among nonliterate, with some illustrations, too, from civilized societies is found in A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology: race, language, culture, psychology, prehistory*, new rev. ed., especially chapters 9-14 inc., New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948. See also M. J. Herskovits, *Man and his works: the science of cultural anthropology*, chapters 29, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.

vention is a combination of known elements or devices into some new form. In a sense, discovery is fundamental to invention since man must have certain knowledge and skill regarding things, people, and situations before he can put his knowledge and skill to work to produce something novel.² Yet the discovery of new facts or relations may depend upon the invention of new methods of thinking or acting. For our purpose the term invention will do both for the discovery of some fact or principle and for the creation of some new device or pattern.

Since technology, due to material invention, has made such a striking impression on the daily living of men in our time, uncritical people imagine that invention applies only to mechanical devices. But inventions cover both material and nonmaterial phases of culture. The automobile and the telephone seem highly significant. But so, too, are the Australian ballot, intelligence testing, and chain-store merchandising.

Invention may be classified into two sorts: empirical and planned. Until the rise of modern science the bulk of inventions were of the former sort. Empirical invention grows largely out of trial-and-error attempts at improvement of some device already at hand or upon accidental discovery of some technique. Science has now provided us with the means of planning or directing and even predicting many of our inventions.

We may well ask, What stimulates inventiveness in the individual? The old proverb that "necessity is the mother of invention" requires qualification. Recurrent need may or may not induce inventiveness. Primitive man needed means to relieve pain and to counteract disease. And his magic was such a device, but only modern anesthetics and medicines have met these requirements successfully. The long-continued use of old and ineffective ways of doing things is

ample evidence that sheer necessity is not always the mother of efficient invention.³

It is rather the cultural and social situation that makes invention possible. The existence of sufficient leisure for calm and deliberate examination of devices is important. An element of curiosity must be present. Without doubt, "just monkeying around" with mechanical devices or ideas has brought about valuable new combinations. In trial-and-error invention, as in all hit-or-miss learning, accidental combinations are often significant. The false combinations may even suggest correct solutions later. Musing or daydreaming is also important. Getting "hunches" or making guesses is as necessary, especially in the early phases, as actual manipulation of physical objects or of social situations.

Yet, neither pressing necessity nor mental reverie alone, or the two together, will fully account for invention. Such advances depend on the combination of particular elements arising from two major factors: culture and the individual. These are closely interrelated, but for purposes of discussion we shall deal with (1) the general cultural base, (2) the values, attitudes toward invention, and interest or run of attention, and (3) the place of special and high intellectual abilities.

The cultural base. With reference to the effects upon culture and society, inventions and discoveries may be classed as primary or basic, and as secondary, derived, or "improving," as Ralph Linton calls them.⁴ The former are illustrated by such obvious items as the discovery of the use of fire, the invention of the phonetic alphabet, of the wheel, of the means of smelting iron ore, of the zero, negative numbers, calculus, and the

³ The truth is that very often, in the words of Thorstein Veblen, "Invention is the mother of necessity." That is to say, once an invention has become accepted as a new element in a culture, it may set up wants or motives not previously present in said society. The whole expansion of human needs under conditions of modern industry and merchandising is evidence enough of this. See Harrison, *op. cit.*; also, Herskovits, *op. cit.*, pp. 496-498.

⁴ Ralph Linton, *The study of man*, pp. 316-317. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936.

² See H. S. Harrison, "Evolution in material culture," *Report of the 88th meeting, British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1930, pp. 137-159. Also, R. B. Dixon, *The building of cultures*, pp. 34-37, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.

discovery of ultra-violet rays. Secondary inventions are those which have to do with improving or modifying others.

In order to survive, an invention must have some definite connection to the pre-existing culture. There is, in fact, a certain selective process going on at all times in reference to inventions in any society. If there are strong mental resistances against change, an invention may be dropped before being tried out. If, on the other hand, a society is receptive to inventions, they may effect profound changes. So, too, the use of an invention in the total culture is important. The Greeks invented the steam engine but limited its use to religious rituals. Their culture was not ready for its application to modes of transportation or machine production.

Both basic and improving inventions depend on the state of knowledge and skill in a given society. The cumulative effects of culture are apparent—no matter whether the prior development has been due to invention on the spot or to diffusion into society from elsewhere. The lack of scientific knowledge and techniques with reference to invention is beautifully illustrated in the case of Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519). He was certainly intellectually capable of inventing a successful flying machine. In fact, he constructed some interesting models of airplanes. But they were not workable because he lacked the necessary tools of modern mathematics and mechanics. Yet as a painter Leonardo was one of the greatest masters of all time. So, too, his contributions to the study of human anatomy and to military techniques were important. For these attainments there were adequate cultural bases. Not only do inventors sometimes lack the mechanical principles or methods, but the essential materials may not be at hand. This latter lack usually reflects cultural retardation in some related area of skill and knowledge. Hard steel could not be produced till certain alloys were developed, and hence the use of powerful explosives in artillery fire was held back.

Present-day extensions of discovery and invention depend upon the ever-larger cultural base from which they emerge, upon its cultural acceptance of inventions, and

upon the stimulation of capitalistic enterprise, which seeks to apply inventions and discoveries in order to make greater profits.⁵ We cannot ignore the place of capitalism as a stimulant to both science and technology, though in recent decades such socialistic states as Russia have encouraged inventions in the name of the state and public welfare.

Planned invention and science. Until the rise of modern science most inventions were of a hit-or-miss character. Science now provides us with a means of directing and even predicting many new inventions. Yet this is not a simple matter of addition; one discovery or invention often has to wait on another. The photoelectric cell, long known to physics, was not perfected for practical use until the invention of a vacuum-tube amplifier.

The planning of invention for larger needs of society has only begun. It was done in World War I in the designing and testing of the Liberty motor. Under governmental directive a number of engineers and other experts co-operated to develop a more satisfactory airplane engine. The development of the submarine detector during the same war was another case of necessity followed by planned and co-operative research. During World War II there was much more of this sort of thing. The most noticeable case was the so-called Manhattan Project, out of which came the atomic bomb.

Yet such planned invention is not merely the product of wartime needs. In agriculture there are any number of such illustrations, one of the most striking of recent times being the development of hybrid corn, which has made possible an increased yield of nearly 30 per cent. This new corn was developed by controlling the process of pollination so as to secure vigor, uniformity, and other characteristics. So far most of our planned inventions have had to do with mechanical and biological problems. But we are also witnessing attempts at institutional invention as a phase of social-cultural planning. (See chapters 31, 32.)

⁵ See F. W. Taussig, *Inventors and money makers*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.

Attitudes, values, and run of attention. Aside from the necessary cultural base in knowledge and skill, the social attitudes and values respecting invention are important. The factors of demand and deference illustrate this. From our standpoint preliterate man had a real need for public health measures to prevent disease, reduce death rate, and improve his physical well-being. But he did not get these, partly because he lacked the information and techniques and partly because his ideas and values regarding birth, death, and disease were vastly different from our own. What a culture demands and on what it puts a high deference will help direct its inventors. For example, among the Crow Indians there was considerable stress on individual visionary experience which would lead to the innovation of a new religious cult. But this society put no stress on new mechanical devices. In Samoa there is some allowance for innovation in ritual and decorative arts. Yet, "in the decorative arts, the freedom given to the individual is rendered nugatory by the absence of cultural recognition of the innovator and by the strong prejudice against active imitation; so the gifted individual receives but passing praise for his work."⁶

The Samoan attitude grows out of the general cultural patterning, which stresses individual conformity to tradition and cooperative relations. In contrast, we put much stress upon person-to-person competition for attainment, especially with reference to mechanical invention and business enterprise. On the other hand, we do not reward in either money or high status those who would suggest sharply different institutional norms.

It is evident, then, that what W. I. Thomas calls "the run of attention" in a society has much to do with the particular direction which inventions will take. Our entire matrix of technology and money-making sets the framework within which potential innovators growing up in our society will oper-

ate. Were we to fixate our present material culture at about its present level and turn our inventive attention elsewhere, we might experience a period in which deference and demand would relate to changes in the field of institutional, artistic, or recreational activities.⁷

Intellectual ability and inventiveness.

To recognize that the particular line of attention will be determined by culture does not gainsay the importance of persons of superior mental endowment in producing new inventions. We may well ask, What place has special ability or so-called inventive genius in invention? It is very easy to assume that inventions are the result of innate ability of a few chosen persons. There is no doubt that, given the proper cultural stimulus, the superior individuals will furnish the inventors. Yet what the superior person will do with his capacity depends on the society and its culture. It is hardly conceivable that the Negro genius of the jungle will become a great physicist. But he might well become a military leader or the inventor of a new religious ritual. Also, the size of a given population as well as the existence of high potential capacity is important. If, for the sake of argument, we accept that the upper one per cent of a given population will be — with proper training — superior, then obviously a society of 1000 will have at best but ten potential innovators. A population of a million may produce 10,000, and so on.

Clearly, the cultural base and individual training must be considered with reference to the knowledge, skill, and directionality of inventive activity. But the absolute and relative number of first-rate minds will always be a factor in scientific advancement.

⁷ In this connection it is well to correct a faulty impression created by writers who use the term "social invention" in referring to those new devices which do not have a physical, chemical, or biological core. From the angle of psychology all inventions are social-cultural, and such phrasing introduces a false sense of difference. What W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), call "social inventions" refer chiefly to institutional and nontechnological aspects of culture.

⁶ Margaret Mead, "The role of the individual in Samoan culture," *Journal Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1928, 58: 481-495.

Suppose all the Class A nuclear physicists, men of superior native ability, should be wiped out at one stroke with no replacements possible. The Class B men would still be capable of continuing important research and invention, for with the present techniques worthy discoveries and valuable applications would still be made. But few doubt that advancement in physics would ultimately be slowed down so as to affect all scientific progress related to it if the lost class A could not be replaced.

Moreover, we often fail to realize the difference between utility, minor improvements in science, and the big basic discoveries and inventions. One may be able to apply a discovery and yet not be able to make such in the first place. So, too, there is little correlation between the first-rate ability needed for invention and application and the capacity to make use of an invention. A high-grade moron may learn to run a truck or even to make minor repairs on it if it breaks down. But he lacks the ability to understand the scientific laws on which the internal combustion engine is predicated. The capacity to use and derive benefit from any given invention or idea is a vastly different thing from the initiation of the idea or the consummation of an invention.

The inception and the direction of invention depend, therefore, upon culture as well as upon superior ability. This relation of culture to individual ability raises the familiar "great-man theory of history." What is, does history make great men or do great men make history? Confining ourselves only to the matter of invention, the particular direction of inventions and their culture are determined by culture. The great names in science and invention often lead us into forgetting the slow accumulation of basic knowledge by less well-known men who made possible the more striking work of which the ordinary man hears. To the man in the street the story of Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and the falling apple may suffice to describe the discovery of the law of gravitation; but to anyone else, his great contribution was the culmination of the work of others who had

laid the foundation for his own important researches. The inventions of Thomas A. Edison (1847-1931) in electricity would have been impossible without dozens of researches in the century before him.

The close relationship between cultural base, values, and attitudes and high abilities is well demonstrated by the fact of a large number of duplicate inventions and discoveries during the period of modern science. Some years ago W. F. Ogburn compiled a list of 148 rather major inventions and discoveries made independently by two or more persons. Some of the more striking examples follow:

1. Discovery of the planet Neptune by Adams (1845) and Leverrier (1845).
2. Discovery of sun spots by Galileo (1611), Fabricius (1611), Scheiner (1611), and Harriott (1611).
3. Decimal fractions by Stevinus (1585), Bürgi (1592), and possibly by Beyer (1603) and Rüdolff (1530).
4. Logarithms by Bürgi (1620) and Napier-Briggs (1614).
5. Law of gases by Boyle (1662) and Mariotte (1676).
6. Isolation of nitrogen by Rutherford (1772) and Scheele (1773).
7. Photography by Daguerre (1839), Niepce (1839), and Talbot (1839).
8. Telegraph by Henry (1831), Morse (1837), Cooke-Wheatstone (1837), and Steinheil (1837).
9. Phonograph by Edison (1877), Cros (1877), and possibly by Scott (1857).
10. Relation of microorganisms to fermentation and putrefaction by Latour (1837) and Schwann (1837).
11. Theory of natural selection and variations by Darwin (1858) and Wallace (1858).
12. Sewing machine by Thimmonier (1830), Howe (1846), and Hunt (1840).
13. Stereoscope by Wheatstone (1839) and Elliott (1840).
14. Reaper by Hussey (1833) and McCormick (1834).
15. Centrifugal pumps by Appold (1850), Gwynne (1850), and Bessemer (1850).⁸

⁸ See W. F. Ogburn, *Social change with respect to culture and original nature*, pp. 99-102, New York: The Viking Press, 1922, for the entire list.

Clearly inventions and discoveries do not depend alone upon one particular exceptional person but also upon the nature of the culture out of which the new elements in the invention arise. If there were no superior persons available to make inventions, the rate of invention would be retarded. But since advances in invention depend so much upon minor accretions to the total body of knowledge, it is indeed doubtful whether any one particular inventor is essential at a given time. Yet society cannot afford to neglect those things which make the production of superior persons possible: sound biological stock and ample educational and other social opportunities. Both are essential. Great men alone do not make inventions, but neither can culture as a body of knowledge induce them.

Particular societies, of course, need not produce their own inventors and scientists; the advancement in one country or region may pass over to another. The larger effects of invention and technology can be discussed only when we have examined the features of diffusion or borrowing.

The Diffusion of Culture

As noted above, culture not only grows by invention or discovery but by diffusion. *Diffusion* refers to the borrowing and accepting of cultural traits or patterns from other social units or individuals. Ordinarily diffusion is thought of as a circulation of traits through *space*. In this sense it is not to be confused with transmission, which has to do with passing traits and patterns through *time* from generation to generation. Thus, formal education is not identified with diffusion but is an important part of transmission.

The spread of culture. The elements of culture may spread between nations and regions, from class to class, from community to community, and between any other association of men, or merely from man to man. For example, Christianity and later industrialism spread from Europe and the United States to Japan and China. Much

of our American system of education was borrowed from 19th-century Germany. As a rule, fashion spreads from the upper to the lower classes. Urban ways are diffused to rural localities.

The methods of diffusion are direct and indirect. The former refers to direct contact of persons or groups. By indirect we refer to spread of traits without personal or group contact. The first is illustrated by migration and colonization, by contact through war and trade, and by religious missionaries. The second is witnessed in the spread of printed materials, by the radio, and by the infiltration of ideas and goods by commerce carried on without direct personal contact. Indirect diffusion accompanies the development of secondary-group organization.

Culture does not necessarily spread only from advanced to less-advanced groups. It is often reciprocal. While Western man has diffused his culture, especially the material phases, over most of the earth, primitive peoples have contributed heavily to civilized societies. The most obvious to Americans, of course, is the large number of cultural items which we got from the native Indian. These include, among many others, maize or Indian corn and many methods of its cultivation, the potato, beans, tomatoes, and tobacco. He gave us the game *la crosse*. And he taught the colonists new methods of stalking game and the enemy in dense woods.

In turn, the white man brought the Indian the horse and saddle and firearms. And these traits produced great changes in the culture of the tribes on the Great Plains, giving them mobility, adding to their efficiency in game hunting, and stimulating their interest in warfare. On the other hand, these very alterations probably retarded any incipient tendencies toward more settled community life and horticulture. Also, Christianity was brought to the American Indian but, as elsewhere, it tended in many instances to be fused with the native religion, which indicates again that the items which are diffused sooner or later merge with the indigenous culture patterns.

Although many pacifists would dislike to admit it, war and conquest have been

important factors in diffusion. The Roman legions spread Latin culture around the Mediterranean and beyond. Not only political systems but also economic organization and religion have followed in the wake of war. Although formal as well as informal intercourse of nations is cut off by war, although isolation of each side from the other is the intention, diffusion still takes place.

It is generally accepted that diffusion is more important than invention in the total building of cultures. Of all the items in any given culture, perhaps more are borrowed from other peoples than are invented at home. Very often culture traits which are thought to arise from the stimulation of geographical conditions or from crises really come from other culture groups. Some cultural anthropologists go so far as to lay down a kind of rule that other things being equal, it is easier to borrow than to invent. Because of the inertia of habit and the lack of originality in man in the face of a crisis it seems the more common practice to look around and find some method already in use than to think up some entirely new device to handle the situation.

Rates of diffusion. Culture traits and patterns diffuse at different rates. It is generally accepted in cultural anthropology that, as a rule, material traits spread much more quickly than those which have to do with forms of the family, political organization, art, religion, or recreation. Native peoples, for example, adopt firearms, manufactured weapons, tools, and cloth, at the same time retaining their language, kinship organization, native religion, and art.

Diffusion nearly always involves modification, large or small. Rarely is any trait, unless it is of material character, accepted by another people without some modification at their hands. Diffusion may go on in an informal and almost unconscious way, or it may be the result of a conscious attempt to foist an alien culture on another society. Spreading by trade and migration is often of the first sort; that fostered by organized religion or by a conquering state usually takes on a more deliberate character.

There are also certain hindrances to diffusion, such as partial isolation and lack of means of transportation and communication, complete isolation of various sorts, taboos on change, and resistances to foreign ideas and techniques. So, too, displacement of one pattern by another prevents the further spread of the pattern displaced. The practice of coffee drinking is not likely to spread in a country like China, long addicted to tea.

The factors in the rate of diffusion may be summarized as follows: (1) availability of transportation and communication, including distance and barriers to travel, such as mountains or sea; (2) resistance to culture changes, such as taboo, sense of superiority, and general cultural inertia; (3) prestige of the diffused culture and its people; (4) conquest of one people by another; (5) migration, especially when *en masse*, as in the Teutonic invasions of the Roman Empire, in modern immigration, or in enforced moving of large populations from one section to another; (6) the need for some new element to meet a critical situation; and (7) adaptability of the recipients of the new culture, as in the ready adoption of Western industrialism by Japan.

As a matter of fact, the cultural and psychological elements operating in diffusion are not unlike those which more or less determine invention. That is, the broad cultural base of prior skill and knowledge must be taken into account. So, too, the basic values and attitudes of potential recipients are important. Individual capacity is of some significance because persons of high ability, scholars, political and industrial leaders, war chiefs, and religious functionaries will usually be in the vanguard of reception. Also, since nearly all borrowed traits are subject to some modification in their new setting, special ability will play a part in readapting the item to the new situation.

Factors Influencing Innovations

The acceptance of innovations is qualified by the nature and extent of the changes, by

the rate at which they are introduced, and by the degree of readiness of groups with respect to a given modification or addition to their culture. This last, in turn, will be affected by the pre-existing ideas, attitudes, and habits of individuals.

We have already indicated that societies differ as to acceptability of change. In a society oriented to modern technology, new cultural elements which contribute to further technology are, on the whole, more acceptable than radical innovations in institutions which support the moral system of the society. So, too, changes of wide scope will tend to induce more reaction than minor ones. One factor contributing to present-day problems is the fact that people cannot readjust themselves fast enough to all the implications of the large number of innovations to which they are exposed. In psychological terms this means that individuals cannot "unlearn" a lot of things necessary to acquire new habits and attitudes without becoming confused and distressed in the process.

Evolution and revolution. In terms of rate it has been customary to classify change as gradual or evolutionary (without implying universal unilinear stages) and abrupt or revolutionary. These terms are relative; there is no sharp line dividing evolution from revolution. The rates of change may be considered as lying along a continuous scale, ranging from very rapid alteration through a graded series of rates to a very slow modification. As a rule we think of revolution as involving not merely the sudden introduction of a single trait but, rather, a rapid intrusion of a number of basic patterns. Therefore the *time factor* and the extent or *number of items* changed are the key considerations in determining what is evolutionary and what is revolutionary. So far we have no general agreement on the point at which in rate or in number of traits revolution may be said to begin and evolution to cease, or vice versa. Certainly the dramatic and striking nature of political revolutions often leads to misinterpretation when the meaning of the slower and larger

processes of change which lie behind it are neglected.

It is especially important to underscore the point that no change survives if it cannot be linked to an already existing pattern. It may be necessary in revolutionary periods to induce this "existing" pattern by propaganda, indoctrination, coercion, or otherwise. But the fact remains that as the initial excitement of the revolution disappears, the rate of alteration declines, and later cultural change in a given society may take place very slowly indeed.

Nevertheless, in the breakup of the old order, old attitudes and habits are destroyed and some new ones established. When the overt activities of the revolution are over, we find a great deal of merging of the old and the new. Culturally considered, revolution is but an acceleration of change already under way.

Cultural lag. Whether induced by political revolution or by slower methods, changes in one field often induce dislocations in another area of behavior. Where a series of innovations appears, such a dislocation may take on serious proportions. For example, the last 175 years have seen a tremendous burst of material inventions in western Europe and America which have altered the nature of technological culture the world over. In sharp contrast, corresponding modifications in the nonmaterial culture have been slow, halting, and ineffective. The new needs of people in the face of these rather sudden material changes have not been adequately satisfied. In other words, the previous integration of the major parts of a total culture has been lost.

This differential in the rate of change W. F. Ogburn has called "cultural lag," which he defines in these words:

"The thesis is that the various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate, some parts are changing much more rapidly than others; and that since there is a correlation and interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture. . . . Where one

part of culture changes first, through some discovery or invention, and occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it, there frequently is a delay in the changes occasioned in the dependent part of the culture. The extent of this lag will vary according to the nature of the cultural material, but may exist for a considerable number of years, during which time there may be said to be a maladjustment."⁹

It is now generally accepted that many of our contemporary problems of society result from this lag in one part of our culture in the face of changes in another. There is a wide range of new habits, attitudes, and ideas fostered by these material alterations which society did not anticipate and for which there has been no preparation. This dislocation is largely a result of differentials in rates of change. In fact, *social disorganization* refers to the breakdown of the societal order to such an extent that the former controls are dissipated, the former close correlation of personality and culture is destroyed, and a certain chaos or disorder arises in which the old ways of doing have been lost and adequate new ways have not yet been developed.

Probably no one doubts the advantages which have accrued to technological culture: cutting down the severity of work and hours of labor, the increase in leisure for all classes, widespread education, mobility and travel, increased "animation" of life, extension of contacts, and a higher standard of living for millions. On the other hand, many dislocations have arisen from the failure of the nonmaterial culture, especially that connected with societal organization, to keep pace with these new material culture patterns. Mobility has broken down the neighborhood and primary community, loosened moral controls, and fostered certain types of crime. Changes in industrial production have caused technological unemployment, destroyed the skilled trades, and put millions into the semiskilled and unskilled classes who were never there before. High production and prosperity seem

to fluctuate more violently than ever with business depressions, unemployment, and consequent hardship. The political order is marked with many dislocations: the continuance of outworn political units of voting, the restriction of residence for office holders, and the persistence of other governmental forms that belonged to the horse-and-wagon era, including the lack of adequately trained political personnel for technical work in a complex political society. The lag in laws and administration of justice and in the correction and care of dependents, defectives, delinquents, and criminals is self-evident. Coupled with these is the wide range of new forms of exploitation which need governmental regulations in order to protect the public. The hurry and rush of living today are thought to be responsible for the increase in insanity and in other forms of atypical behavior.

When new patterns are believed to threaten old values and long-accepted ways of doing things, resistances are bound to arise. The slow acceptance of many new cultural items which ultimately bettered mankind is not always realized in these days of swift change. The receptivity of the individual to modifications in habits and attitudes is qualified by habits and attitudes already in existence. In our own history these prior habits and attitudes are related to the nature of the economic system, views of workers, political inertia, attitudes of experts, and class and community opposition.

Private enterprise and changes in technology. There are hundreds of instances of opposition to technological improvements in the history of modern capitalism and industry. The major aim of profits often blinds entrepreneurs to new opportunities to make money and to serve the public more efficiently at the same time. The major consideration was often not "Will it work?" but "Will it pay?" Various factors enter into this inertia. Among others may be mentioned: the large capital investments in going concerns already providing goods and

⁹ See W. F. Ogburn, *Social change with respect to culture and original nature*, pp. 200-201. By permission.

services, the cost of putting new plants into operation and of selling the product or service, the desire to maintain dominant position over actual or potential competitors, the somewhat unwieldy nature of large corporate enterprise which makes for disinclination to modify ways and means, and the difficulty of smaller businesses to secure capital in order to start new enterprises. Although there are almost endless illustrations of such resistances, we shall select some instances from the history of transportation.

The introduction of the railroad into the United States met with great antagonism. In 1812 John Stevens' proposal to introduce railway lines into New York state was flatly refused by such leaders as DeWitt Clinton, Governor Morris, and Robert R. Livingston. When later in 1815 in New Jersey and in 1823 in Pennsylvania Stevens obtained charters, he had difficulty getting capitalists to invest in his enterprises. The owners of canal barges and of stagecoach lines were particularly bitter in their attitudes against the railroads. The rationalizations of potential investors who objected to the railway were many and ingenious. Fear of speed, of setting fire to towns, of disrupting the local life as well as loss of prior investments was common.

Once the railroads had become fairly well established, however, a process of crystallization set in. All down the lines owners and investors opposed further advancements. Commodore Vanderbilt, one of the early railroad magnates, dismissed George Westinghouse (1846-1914) and his air-brake invention with the remark that he had no time to waste on fools. Eli H. Janney (1831-1912), the inventor of the car-coupler, waited ten years before he could get a foundry to manufacture them. Until very recently the design of the Pullman sleeper was pretty much the same as it was in 1859. Electric locomotives, streamlined trains, and other improvements were only slowly adopted. When the auto-bus came into use, railway executives and employee unions alike opposed the extension of bus lines since it was felt that this competition would ruin the railroads.

The automobile presents another story of long, slow development. As early as 1769 Nicholas Joseph Cugnot (1725-1804) invented a three-wheeled vehicle powered by

two steam cylinders. But he got no popular support for his device. Other steam-propelled carriages were tried out but had at best only limited success. When the internal-combustion engine in combination with other inventions made the automobile practicable, years went by before the new vehicle was accepted. The automobile was looked upon as "A rich man's toy" which would never have any practical use. The first American automobile manufacturers met hostile attitudes when they approached Wall Street bankers. John Pierpont Morgan (1837-1913) and his partners in 1908 refused to buy a block of securities for \$5,000,000 in a concern that was later consolidated into General Motors and became one of America's leading corporations.

As in the case of the railroads, improvements in the automobile were also opposed by corporate owners, though the lag in accepting what folks called "refinements" was less than had been the case in many other mechanical devices. Yet the self-starter, six- and eight-cylinder engines, four-wheel brakes, balloon tires, and the "fluid" drive were slow to be adopted. To this day the placing of the motor in the rear of the automobile has been limited to buses and a few types of stock-model cars.

The story of the airplane duplicates these others. This radical departure in the means of transportation and communication seemed even to a generation already attuned to rapid technological changes too fantastic to be accepted, and all the early airplane manufacturers met with difficulty in financing their inventions.

The prejudices of workers. Laborers, like investors, have often been slow to accept new technologies. The coming of the factory system in England and elsewhere met with much opposition from the workers. The most impressive opposition to modifications in industrial processes has come from trade unions. In the 1870's the introduction of labor-saving devices in the boot-and-shoe industry was bitterly opposed by the trade unions. Silk workers went on strike against the three- or four-loom system. The building and construction trades have fought a steady battle against the introduction of machine processing into their work. Union

agreements with painters dictated the width of the brushes to be used, so that workers would not be able to cover more surface than the unions considered fair. Union painters have long opposed the introduction of spray guns. The history of trade unionism is filled with such cases.

Political resistance. Political factors have also had a part in retarding industrial advancement. Not only did legislators listen to the public's opposition to the railroad as dangerous and disrupting of custom and tradition, but the vested interests of business have again and again put pressure on the government to prevent technological advancement. For example, the state of New York had gone into heavy public debt to construct the Erie Canal, and early railroad charters and franchises restricted the potential competition with the barges. Tonnage taxes, forbidding the carrying of freight, and other restraints were imposed. When the railroad unions became strong, they began agitating in Congress to limit the length of trains and determine the size of train crews — at the very time when improved roadbeds, more powerful locomotives, and safety devices made possible longer trains and smaller crews.

In the case of the automobile all sorts of local and state restrictions have been put upon car operators. Speed limits of ridiculous figures still remain in force in many places. Often towns and cities opposed plans for through highways because improved roads would by-pass their communities and thus lose them some business.

Even when it is in the interest of the state there may be much opposition to improvements. The United States naval officials were highly skeptical of John Ericsson's (1803–1889) screw propeller, and at first they flatly rejected his plans for the famous *Monitor*. The submarine was considered an insane invention; and though the first successful undersea craft was built for the United States in 1898, it was not until World War I that submarines came into general use. During the interim between the two world wars the French General Staff consistently refused to take seriously the air-

plane and the armored tank and other mechanical means of military offense and defense. And this in the face of the fact that the Germans not only were making great strides in these mechanized instruments of warfare but were in many instances explaining them publicly.

Then, too, through patent laws the state provides a legal protection to patentees. A patent is regarded as private property by the law, and in terms of application there is nothing to force a person or corporation holding a patent to make use of it. Hence, abetted by the state, corporations have been able to prevent technological advances in the interests of their prior investments. They often contend that the novel product is not worth what it would cost to make.

In nonmechanical fields, political opposition has been even more striking. Statutes in dairy states often forbid the sale of oleomargarine, and chain stores are often highly taxed on the theory that this will keep the independent grocers going. The dissemination of knowledge of birth-control methods is still a crime in many places.

Inertia among the experts. A most interesting phase of this entire subject is the frequent resistance of experts themselves. In the current slang of the radio, new inventions often "stump the experts." Scientific training is highly specialized; and men who for years have done work in one particular line, especially if they have obtained high prestige, often oppose changes if these run counter to their professional or other beliefs.

In 1826 an engineer declared regarding the railroad that "a rate of speed of more than six miles an hour would exceed the bounds of providence . . ." and the suggestion of John Stevens that trains might travel at the speed of 20 miles an hour was met with derision and the expression of grave danger to passengers and spectators alike. A striking instance of scientific authority invoked against a new invention was the astronomer Simon Newcomb's (1835–1909) criticism of the airplane. In 1906 he publicly declared that neither the laws of physics nor the state of the industrial arts made it practicable for man to "fly long distances through the air."

The history of modern medicine is replete with illustrations of hostility to innovations. We are all familiar with the endless opposition which greeted the pioneer work of Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) in the field of bacteriology and immunology. In the study of mental diseases, an interesting instance is the ridicule which greeted Dr. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) when before a distinguished group of neurologists in Vienna he reported a case of male hysteria. He was informed in no uncertain terms by the most distinguished neurologists of the day that this was impossible since hysteria was definitely linked to female physical functions and hence could not appear in the male. Freud lived long enough to see complete verification of his contention.

Class and community opposition. Not only do vested economic interests, trade unions, political bodies, and even experts often resist cultural change, but the general population frequently does so. In fact, the consumer public itself often takes its justification for opposition from these other groups. To tell the full story of the general negativism to innovations would be to describe some of the basic phases of acculturation, as these touch on technology and institutions. We shall note only a few instances.

Class factors enter very thoroughly into opposition. An amusing but withal revealing class attitude was expressed in the English Parliament by one Craven Fitzhardinge Berkeley in these words: "Nothing is more distasteful to me than to hear the echo of our hills reverberating with the hissing of railroad engines running through the heart of our hunting country, and destroying that noble sport [fox hunting] to which I have been accustomed from my childhood."¹⁰ The royalty of Europe long opposed the use of automobiles for state occasions, and Emperor Francis Joseph I (1830-1916) of Austria-Hungary never set foot in an automobile.

Class resistance to institutional modifications is well-known. Attempts to modify the system of private enterprise have met with re-

current criticism from the propertied classes, and agitation to abolish the capitalistic system has led to violent legal and extralegal means to silence such ideas.

The opposition of the general public is often no less vigorous than that of the privileged classes. When the railroads first came into rather general use preachers, merchants, and the man in the street often denounced them as instruments likely to destroy their way of life. There are numerous examples in the history of education of negative reactions to new pedagogical practices. In one community known to the author the system of staggering the time for recess so as to allow more play space for the children had to be abandoned because parents who saw some children on the playground more or less all through the day spread the word that this "new-fangled" plan was devised to stimulate all play and no work. The introduction of a course of study which would reduce such subjects as Latin and put in vocational subjects, art, music, and the like had to overcome opposition in community after community before being accepted.

Of course, the student should not imagine that every innovation is met by strong resistance. Many changes are facilitated by the pressure of grave economic-political crises. But on the whole, the more striking the change, the more intense the emotional opposition is likely to be. In spite of our own American belief in progress, and the stress it gets in both formal and informal education, alterations which touch our more basic values, attitudes, and habits arouse fear, anger, and negative feelings. The most acceptable changes are those which are in line with the alteration already taken for granted. Science still remains far in advance of application.

There are some critics of technology and science who agitate for a moratorium of mechanical inventions on the theory that mankind has suffered more than it has benefited from technological changes. So far most of this has been confined to the sphere of talk and writing. Yet it is within the bounds of possibility that following continued disasters of war, famine, disease, and other ills some leader or group of leaders might actually set about to put a legal and moral taboo

¹⁰ Quoted by B. J. Stern in "Resistances to the adoption of technological innovations," Part I, sec. 4, *Technological trends and national policy*, p. 40. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1937.

on science, invention, and technology on the theory that these cultural elements do more harm than good.

Wider Effects: Technology and Institutions

Obviously new devices, technological or otherwise, whether originating in a given society or borrowed from outside, set up a network of effects. In closing this chapter we shall discuss some of the ways in which innovations influence each other and constantly extend their effects on culture.

Technology and culture. The influences of innovations are both direct and secondary. Direct or primary influences are evident in such an invention as the cotton gin, which more or less completely replaces former production techniques. So, too, if a state changes from a representative democracy to a totalitarian, one-party system, many former institutions will be liquidated and replaced by others, although some old devices may continue to exist alongside the new.

The secondary or derivative influences are even more striking. These have to do with the extension of effects to other technologies and institutions or associations. For example, the cotton gin stimulated cotton raising and the large plantation system; it influenced the history of slavery and had, in turn, great effects upon political and everyday life of the South and the North as well.

In recent decades we have witnessed profound modifications in life due to the introduction of motor vehicles. The automobile, at first considered a luxury, soon became a routine necessity. To mention but some of its more obvious effects: In terms of transportation it led to the building of hard-surfaced, all-weather roads which, in time, permitted higher speeds of travel. More miles per hour led to further improvement of highways: the elimination of sharp curves, the construction of through highways, and so on. Likewise, the position of the driver was changed from the right to the left side of the car to permit better management of the car when in motion.

The causes and effects of new elements in a culture are often reciprocal. The automobile

may reduce the revenue of the railroads and hence influence the consumption of coal. On the other hand, the automobile "causes" an extension of pipelines for oil and increases the consumption of gasoline. The introduction of two items serving the same end, such as gas and electricity for household use, sets up a struggle for dominance. Such a competition itself serves a selective function.

The motor vehicle influenced other activities, such as the use of horses. For example, the displacement of draft animals on the farm and in our cities altered the importance of forage crops and pasturage in rural economy. But the automobile has had many other effects, including the increased mobility of people, daily, seasonally, and yearly. It has affected the growth of suburbs, encouraged decentralization of population as well as enhanced traffic congestion in urban centers. It has influenced the home life, made union school districts possible, and otherwise had many extensive effects.




Or to take an example from radio: As early as 1933 W. F. Ogburn and S. C. Gilfillan indicated at least 150 definite effects of the radio in such categories as on uniformity of stimulation — especially those originating from urban centers — on recreation and entertainment, on transportation, on education, on the spread of information, on religion, on industry and business, on occupations, on government and politics, on other inventions, and a variety of miscellaneous effects.¹¹ The radio, and more recently video, have also brought in their wake new words: broadcast, newscaster, short-wave, frequency modulation, televise, telecast, simulcast — to name only a few.

With regard to advances in communication and transportation, modern man has not yet understood the full import of just what increased speed through space may mean for future economic and political organization or for human personality itself. Certainly the contraction of space in terms of time was made painfully evident in World War II. Figure 76 illustrates technical progress with respect to travel time.

¹¹ W. F. Ogburn and S. C. Gilfillan, "The influence of invention and discovery," in *Recent social trends in the United States*, chapter 3, pp. 153-157. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933.

FIGURE 76

IMPROVEMENT IN TRAVEL TIME, SUPPOSING THE BEST TRAVEL TECHNOLOGY IN EACH EPOCH WERE APPLIED OVER THE WHOLE SURFACE OF THE EARTH ¹²



¹² Redrawn from T. J. Kreps, "Testimony on technology and the concentration of economic power," before the Temporary National Economic Committee, April 8, 1940, Part 30, p. 16259, 76th Congress, 3rd Session.

Advances in the biological sciences have also been striking. Medical research, coupled with public health programs, has eliminated contagious and infectious diseases to a degree undreamed of a century ago. The improvements, in turn, influence the age distribution of our population and hence affect our social structure.

Nonmaterial changes must not be neglected, since institutional inventions have widespread effects. Not only did the juvenile court system, set up in this country about 1899, influence the care and correction of young delinquents, but the public attitudes toward the delinquent boy or girl have led the schools to recognize misconduct among their pupils with a view to prevention of delinquency and have doubtless affected parental control of children. The juvenile court has also broadened the field of social work and perhaps instilled new ideas regarding the causation of crime into the minds of judges and attorneys.

Such educational changes as the kindergarten and the nursery school have not only affected children in school but also their conduct at home. Parole systems apparently are effective, beyond chance, in restoring many criminals to normal life. But such schemes, in turn, increase our bureaucracy and the costs in taxes.

Material and nonmaterial changes influence each other. The wide use of apartment houses affects the birth rate, but such dwellings are perhaps the result of a lowered birth rate in certain classes in the first instance. The nonmaterial effects of mechanical inventions are of varying degrees and kinds. The use of the typewriter first changed the habits of clerks, who had formerly used pen and ink. Later it gave rise to a class of special operatives, mostly unmarried women. And the employment of daughters as typists influenced the habits of the home: housework, control of the income of children, and matters of freedom of mobility and outside contacts of the daughters.

Lag in application. These examples are striking, but we must not assume that invention necessarily means use. New devices

often fail to become part of our technology or institutions. So, too, as noted above, resistances may long delay otherwise useful changes. Yet with regard to technology, at least, there are other factors to be taken into account. A new instrument or machine must be durable, simple, safe, and economical to install, operate, and repair. Then, too, there must be the needed materials for its manufacture, and in our time it must be capable of mass-production. This was the case with the automobile, the radio, and video.

On the other hand, there are no simple criteria for innovations in the more complex institutions. Those who are concerned with social-cultural planning, of course, have necessarily to give some thought to this matter. Yet, as we shall see in the next two chapters, for the most part planners, like others, are better at hindsight than foresight.

This topic suggests, finally, the matter of prediction of inventions. Some rather striking examples of short-range predictions have been published.¹⁸ In general, the forecasters have simply drawn on their knowledge of present trends in scientific research and then projected the applications of these into the future. Surely we may expect remarkable advances in the applications of nuclear physics. So, too, man's concern with medical problems will doubtless lead to further studies, for example, of the causes of cancer. In similar vein one may foresee a growing control of economy by the state, but just what particular form this will take is not so easy to predict.

In other words, beyond predicting the general drift of invention and discovery and the applications of new knowledge and skill, it seems bootless to try to foretell future changes. Certainly, however, we are all enmeshed in a culture which puts great stress on cultural change; and, backed by a continuing belief in progress, we may well expect further profound modifications in our ways of life.

¹⁸ See A. C. Lescarboura, et al., "The future as suggested by the developments of the past 75 years," *Scientific American*, Oct. 2, 1920, 123: 7, 320-321.

Interpretative Summary

1. Cultural change is constantly going on. Yet the nature, rate, and extent of such change vary with a given society.
2. The two major processes in cultural change in any given situation are invention and/or diffusion of new elements from another society. As far as the application of these novel features goes, invention and diffusion may be considered together.
3. Invention rests on a cultural base involving habits, attitudes, and values regarding the place of invention and special abilities and talents of particular individuals or leaders.
4. In Western societies, at least, the common cultural base and common line of interest have made for a great number of interesting cases of duplication of invention and discovery.
5. Diffusion or cultural borrowing is probably a more common factor in inducing cultural change than invention. But acceptability on the part of the receiving society will influence what is borrowed.
6. The nature and rate of impact of new cultural elements may vary greatly in a given society. When some innovations markedly influence a given culture while concomitant changes do not occur at parallel rates, or at all, we speak of cultural lag. The most obvious examples are to be found in the interplay of technological and moral patterns.
7. Resistance as well as acceptability may play a part in affecting the nature and rate of innovations. Resistance may arise from special-interest groups or certain classes, from the inertia of experts as well as of the masses, and from other factors of a given time and place.
8. Modern technology has profoundly altered contemporary society, not only in urban, industrial areas but in rural districts as well. Moreover, modern industrial patterns are being rapidly diffused to regions of the world heretofore relatively untouched by the Machine Age.
9. This diffusion of modern technology is bound up with problems of differential population growth, provision of food and other resources, and with problems of international war or peace.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. Distinguish between invention and diffusion.
2. Explain what is meant by the cultural base of invention.
3. What place have attitudes, values, and run of attention in invention?
4. How important is superior intellectual ability in invention?
5. How do you account for the stress on technological changes in the present day?
6. How may we account for the frequent duplication of inventions? Cite recent instances. Is the duplication of invention and discovery likely to be more or less frequent in the future?
7. What factors foster the diffusion of culture? What factors inhibit it?
8. Name and illustrate the chief forces which have resisted cultural change in this country since its founding.
9. What is meant by cultural lag? Cite some recent examples.
10. Illustrate from the motor car, the motion picture, the radio, or television the direct and indirect effects of an innovation on other aspects of life, technological or institutional.

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

J. D. Bernal, *The social function of science*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939.

A British scientist expresses strong views regarding the importance of socializing science in such a way as to make it more widely available for public use.

Carl Brinkmann, "Invention," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 8 : 247-251. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932.

A good review of the topic with special reference to western European history.

J. M. Montmasson, *Invention and the unconscious*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1932.

An excellent study of the place of creative ability in discovery and invention. The function of fantasy thinking as well as of more logical processes is also indicated.

W. F. Ogburn, "Change, Social," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, *op. cit.*, 1930, 3 : 330-334.

An excellent review of the major factors in cultural change.

W. F. Ogburn, *The social effects of aviation*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1946.

A valuable review and interpretation of the effects of air transportation on our culture.

S. McKee Rosen and L. F. Rosen, *Technology and society*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941.

A popularly written but sound discussion and analysis of the recent technological changes in the United States.

Gloria Waldron and J. Frederic Dewhurst, "Power, machines, and plenty," Public Affairs Pamphlet, no. 142. New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1948.

A well-written account of the interplay between modern technology (resting on prior invention), high production rates, and the continuing improvement of American levels of living. Comparisons with other countries are also set forth.

Progress and Planning

LARGE-SCALE social-cultural planning is in the folkways of our time. There is much talk about it; also, a good deal of actual effort is made to put particular plans into effect. To plan means deliberately to order events in advance insofar as one may, and individuals and groups have long used such means to anticipate the future. Our purpose, however, is to treat only those kinds of planning which are set up and controlled by the political system for the alleged purpose of better local, state, regional, or national conditions, as the case may be. The present interest in such methods derives, first, from the examples of state planning in Soviet Russia, Britain, and Germany; and, second, from the less ambitious planning schemes proposed or in operation in the United States and elsewhere.

While some serious economic and political problems, especially of the 1930's, may have been the more pressing stimuli to our American interest in planning, there are deeper and more fundamental reasons for examining the possibilities of overall organized planning in advance of overt events. The whole drift toward large-scale state planning is clearly in the folkways of our time.

Culture, Change, and Progress

The chief sources of present trends toward planning lie in the ideas about the form of change in nature and society, especially that of evolutionary growth, and in the doctrine of progress, as this was affected by the impact of applied science on expanding capitalism.

Nonliterate peoples probably had no notion of cultural growth or progress in our modern sense. Any gradual modifications made in their culture were not connected in

their thinking with any general scheme of change. It was only after culture had become highly advanced and recorded history had begun that man began thinking objectively about problems of cause and effect as possibly related to developmental or other principle of change.

Theories of social-cultural change. Three different theories came out of the Classical World on this matter. One very old idea was that of degeneration as in Hesiod's (c. B.C. 776) theory that mankind had passed downward from a wonderful pristine time, the Golden Age, to a Silver Age, a Bronze Age, and finally to an Iron Age. Another view held that the universe was in a constant state of flux or change but not necessarily in any given direction and certainly without any notion of upward progress or downward decay. This idea of flux is probably the source of the concepts regarding cyclic change. For example, Plato (B.C. 427?-347) believed that forms of government fluctuate through time and produce such variations as are found in royalty or tyranny, oligarchy or aristocracy, and restrained or uncontrolled democracy. His pupil Aristotle (B.C. 384-322) expressed similar ideas in his discussion of the changes in the political order.

Much later the idea of gradual growth or evolution from simple to complex emerged. The first important conception of such genetic development came from the Roman poet Lucretius (B.C. 96?-55), who in the fifth book of his *De rerum natura* discusses the rise of man from a primordial state of savagery to higher culture. But our modern concepts of evolution derive more particularly from the 17th and 18th centuries, when the idea of natural growth became associated with that of progress.

While the ancient world did not have the idea of universal and inevitable progress, its theory of degeneration became tied in with the Christian thesis of the Fall of Man and his ultimate redemption by the gift of a Messiah. The theory of flux or recurrent change has persisted in various forms. It is found in Oswald Spengler's explanation of the decline of Occidental culture, in P. A. Sorokin's theory that culture fluctuates from a sensate, materialistic type to one more idealistic and "spiritual" in quality, and in Arnold J. Toynbee's interpretation of various civilizational changes as expressing an interplay of *challenges*, e.g., of physical environment, war, invention, and the like, and *responses* to such challenges.¹

The concept of development from simple to complex, or of gradual evolution, remained largely a literary idea until modern times. The most important development of evolutionary theory — divorced from that of moral progress — came from 19th-century biology and is most frequently associated with the work of Charles Darwin. The theory of the origin of species is bound up with a concept of gradual, stepwise development of organisms from rudimentary and simple to complex and diverse forms. While evolution was considered a phase of cosmic change and notably in the organic world, its application to society and culture followed on the development of science, the expansion of business and industry, and the rapid growth of population which came after the Reformation. And one phase of this idea of social-cultural evolution took the form of a belief in universal advancement in a uniform and ever-upward fashion. But before examining this theory of unilinear cultural evolution, let us note the rise of the doctrine of progress in its larger setting.

Doctrine of progress. One of the most significant ideas in the Western world is that

of social-cultural progress. While the treatment of change does not imply any particular directionality, the belief in progress does. Man is thought not only to advance in complexity of culture but, in doing so, to improve in morality. The initial roots of the doctrine of progress lie in the Christian dogma of redemption, that man can move by God's plan from a life of sin to one of perfection in the hereafter if he fulfills certain obligations. Yet the full doctrine of progress emerged only when the concept of improvement and directionality was added to the older one. After all, the Christian theory of redemption is one of a cycle from the Fall of Man to his restoration as a member of God's eternal kingdom. The doctrine of progress assumes the advancement from a lowly state to a higher one, not a return to a previous state of perfection. There are really two aspects of this: one which was prominent in the 18th century, the other in the 19th.

The rationalist philosophy of the 18th century, associated as it was with the rapid development of science and its application leading to marked changes in man's material culture, stimulated the belief on the part of many that continued advancement was inevitable. The most striking advocate of this view was the French mathematician and idealistic philosopher the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794), who wrote:

"The result of my work will be to show, by reasoning and by facts, that there is no limit set to the perfecting of the powers of man; that human perfectibility is in reality indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us."²

This curious mixture of rationalism and romanticism was found in much of the writing of that day. Some contended with Rousseau that man should abolish the institutions of property and return to a primeval

¹ See Oswald Spengler, *Decline of the West*, 2 vols., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926-1928; P. A. Sorokin, *Social and cultural dynamics*, 4 vols., New York: American Book Company, 1937-1941; D. C. Somervell, *A study of history* (abridgment of Toynbee), New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

² From Condorcet, *Progrès de l'esprit humain*, *Époque I*, quoted by J. H. Randall, Jr., *The making of the modern mind*, rev. ed., p. 383, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940. By permission.

state of natural goodness. Others, while arguing that present economic and political institutions are "bad," believed that by altering them man could lend a hand to his progress. Thus, William Godwin (1756-1836) held that "human inventions, and the modes of social existence, are susceptible to perpetual improvement."³

During the first half of the 19th century there was an epidemic of utopian schemes which provided various blueprints of planned and perfect societies. Most of them still rested their case on the natural goodness of man and "the efficacy of conscious reason to create an earthly utopia."⁴ Hence they felt that some kind of overall planning would help progress along.

During the 19th century the ideas of social-cultural evolution were added to the doctrine of progress. While the contribution of Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) on biological evolution provided much support, the whole intellectual climate of the 19th century was favorable to the notion of forward development of mankind and his culture. The somewhat mechanical ideas of the previous century gave way to those of inevitable growth. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who had already begun writing on the upward development of institutions, was much impressed by Darwin's work and theory and reworked it to fit human society and culture. Alexander Goldenweiser has summarized Spencer's basic tenets in these words:

"In its bearing on social phenomena, the theory of evolution was to comprise the three following principles of development: that evolution is uniform, gradual and progressive,

meaning by this that social forms and institutions pass everywhere and always through the same stages of development; that the transformations which they undergo are gradual, not sudden or cataclysmic; and that the changes implied in these transformations point in the direction of improvement from less perfect to more perfect adjustments, from lower to higher forms."⁵

This concept was taken up by others, and it was long accepted that cultures pass through more or less fixed stages from simple to complex. This scheme of upward progress came to be known as the unilinear theory of cultural evolution. Beginning in crude form, institutions and forms of group life were assumed to move ever upward by steady gains toward complexity and perfection. One strong supporter of this theory, Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881), an American engineer turned anthropologist, divided cultural advancement into three stages: savagery, barbarism, and civilization, each with distinctive characteristics and uniform throughout every society.⁶ Economists assumed a steady and straight-line development from rudimentary hunting and fishing through pastoralism and agriculture to modern industrialism.⁷

As soon as social scientists began to go to living peoples rather than to books and theories, the simple stepwise scheme of evolution broke down. Yet as a stimulant to the doctrine of progress it long had an important place. Men in the West, in particular, were highly impressed by the vast changes associated with the Industrial Revolution; and while one particular theory or another might not prove adequate, the total effect of industrial changes was to stimulate still further a faith in the inevitability of man's upward development. There were efforts to decide what were the proper criteria to measure progress. Then, in more

³ From *An enquiry concerning political justice*, 4th ed., 1842, from a selection in Donald O. Wagner, ed., *Social reformers*, p. 294, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

⁴ See Carl Becker, "Progress," *Encyclopædia of the social sciences*, 12: 495-499, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934. This is a classic critique of the entire topic. For a more extended analysis, see J. B. Bury, *The idea of progress*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932. For a good review of the chief utopian socialists, see Harry W. Laidler, *Social-economic movements*, chapters 1-12, New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1944. Wagner, *op. cit.*, contains some good selections, from original sources, of certain writers on utopian socialism.

⁵ Alexander Goldenweiser, *Early civilization*, p. 21. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1922. Reprinted by permission.

⁶ Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient society*. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1877.

⁷ This idea still persists among some economists. See N. S. B. Gras, *An introduction to economic history*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1922.

recent times, there has been a growing concern with deliberate and long-range planning as an earnest of man's role in fostering progress. Before discussing planning, let us see how certain writers have viewed the doctrine of progress as it relates to change, whether deliberately fostered or not.

Definition and criteria. *Progress* implies improvement or betterment in a certain direction, as measured by some standard. Change can be demonstrated, especially in technology, but whether this marks moral advancement depends on the nature of one's values and concepts. In large part the doctrine of progress is a matter of faith or belief rather than a symbol of some objective, tangible thing. Writers of somewhat romantic turn of mind often go on the assumption that there is some mystical and moral power or principle which governs the universe. Individuals of more critical view take a skeptical attitude toward the entire matter and see in the idea of progress but a particular culture pattern of the Western world born of vast and striking industrial changes.

There are, however, some writers who see in history evidences of improvement and who have tried to put down what seemed to them reasonable standards by which to measure the same. Yet, in general, the criteria are either vague and general or so specific as to lose their meaning in a few decades. To some writers, "efficiency" seems the major factor, and many of these make a convincing case for progress in terms of saving time and resources and increasing mechanical power. Others have proclaimed personal "comfort and convenience" to be the main criteria, and to them advancement is measured in shorter working hours, better homes, and other evidences of high material standards of living. The moral criteria, however, are the most difficult to settle. Thus, people brought up in an Oriental religious culture might regard our Western stress on technology and mere physical well-being as quite beside the point. For them the development of the more "spiritual" values might be considered the

best measure of progress, assuming they would accept the doctrine in the first place.⁸

On the whole, then, the particular criteria of progress reflect the occupational and philosophic standpoint of those who are willing to publish them. Let us note a few sample listings:

Walter F. Willcox has laid out what he calls "a statistician's idea of progress" in the following six items: (1) increase in population; (2) increase in length of life; (3) uniformity of population; (4) racial homogeneity; (5) literacy; and (6) decrease of the divorce rate.⁹ In contrast, Alfredo Niceforo, an Italian criminologist, lists several indices of progress, as follows: (1) increase in wealth and in the consumption of goods; (2) decline in the mortality rate; (3) increase in intellectual superiority, as measured by the diffusion of culture and by the increased accomplishment of our men of genius; (4) moral advancement, measured by decrease in crime; (5) changes in the societal order, measured by the increase in individual liberty.¹⁰

The criteria of Willcox and Niceforo, like those of other writers, lend themselves for the most part to numerical measurement. Other writers have combined both statistical and qualitative criteria. For example, Clarence M. Case lists the following three standards: (1) utilization of the physical environment, under which are included various techniques for managing this environment: mental and physical health, scientific knowledge, and industrial organization; (2) distribution, not narrowly economic but broadly societal, including equalization of opportunities, freedom from class strain, and the whole matter of democratic participation of individuals in social life and its benefits; and (3) appreciation, that is, the estimation of things or events from "the standpoint of excellence, preciousness, and relative significance."¹¹

⁸ See F. S. C. Northrop, *The meeting of East and West: an inquiry concerning world understanding*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

⁹ Walter F. Willcox, "A statistician's idea of progress," *International Journal of Ethics*, 1913, 18: 275-298.

¹⁰ For a review of Niceforo's thesis, see R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the science of sociology*, p. 1003. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921.

¹¹ See Clarence M. Case, "What is social progress?" *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 1925, 10: 109-119; also his *Social process and human progress*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1930.

A more recent classification is that of Newell L. Sims, who indicates four categories of progress: (1) growth in order and harmony, (2) happiness, (3) development of individuality, and (4) such objective measures as increase in wealth and energy, which he terms "social surplus."¹² J. O. Hertzler, in his survey and analysis of various theories, noted 190 specific and different criteria, which he has put together under 11 major headings which seem to him capable of fairly objective determination: (1) moral, (2) economic, (3) political, (4) biological, (5) educational, (6) religious, (7) domestic, (8) esthetic, (9) intellectual, (10) recreational, and (11) racial.¹³

Although strictly scientific "tests" of progress may be hard to find, except by the method of consensus of experts in any given time and place, there is no good reason for ignoring two important facts: first, that belief in progress itself may act as an incentive to the changing of conditions; and, second, that the criteria, reflecting as they do a society and culture of a time and place, may well furnish a blueprint for the planning and controlling of social change for that particular society.

The belief in progress is a form of social myth but, as we have seen throughout our volume, social myths are highly important parts of culture. Men act largely on the basis of such beliefs, and without faith there can be no works of importance. If made less utopian and mystical and more practical, the doctrine of progress might become a fighting faith, a slogan or even a *principle* and a *tool* to be used in tackling problems of a given time and place.

If, therefore, we could establish tentative criteria, if we could make a careful analysis of the past cultural cumulations, interpreted in terms of a moral direction which general consensus agrees is desirable, then we might be in a position to use such criteria as a basis for objective checks on any planning

for the future. The essence of science is prediction and control. And while most predictions have been confined chiefly to the laboratory and to practical engineering with reference to specific problems, men have begun to believe that on the basis of such knowledge and skill as science and technology provide they may plan for cultural change on a much wider scale and for a longer period than has been true of the past.

Planning has been in use in almost all the major fields of human interest and endeavor. The whole economic-industrial order is witness to this. It is true in government; and the obvious place of planning in residential zoning, in community recreation, and education is taken for granted. Certainly in our individualistic society personal ambitions become effective through long-range planning of a career. No one doubts that some form of ordering the lives of individuals and groups is a common practice. The problem is rather one of its aim, extent, the time factor, and a vast number of matters concerning who will plan and who will execute. (See chapter 32.)

In fact, this whole topic of cultural change raises a further question: whether such modifications and growths in culture are entirely nondeliberative or automatic, or whether they may not also be increasingly purposive or directed. Before the theory of planning can be fully accepted or considered valid, it must be demonstrated that rational control is possible. Scholars differ considerably over the matter of the place of rationality in change; and before citing some attempts at planning, we must examine briefly certain divergent views on this matter.

Nondeliberative and rationally directed change. The view that culture develops more or less automatically and unconsciously through group experience is illustrated in the works of William Graham Sumner (1840-1910) and his pupil, A. G. Keller. According to Sumner, man's basic activities are directed to satisfying his needs, and various nondeliberative reactions long preceded rational reactions. Out of both unconscious and conscious selection among

¹² See Newell L. Sims, *The problem of social change*, pp. 345-351. New York: The Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1939.

¹³ See J. O. Hertzler, *Social progress: a theoretical survey and analysis*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1928. Also, Arthur J. Todd, *Theories of social progress*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918, has a good review of the vast literature on this topic.

needs and the means of satisfactions, habits arise which become, in turn, the basis of custom. "The folkways," writes Sumner, "are not creations of human purpose and wit." New methods of meeting needs, either mechanical or institutional inventions, are assumed to go through a process of selective adaptation, a kind of struggle for survival. While the folkways "are made unconsciously," there is, according to Sumner, a certain "strain toward improvement and consistency" among them. The former has to do with efforts to make a better adjustment of means to ends, the latter with attempts to reduce stress or conflict among various customs so that they "co-operate and support each other."¹⁴

While the basic process is considered largely nondeliberative, Sumner recognized that man, especially through modern science and rationality, has developed a means to correct and amend the folkways. The "critical faculty," as he calls it, is the outcome of education and training and may be used as a "guarantee" against irrationality, delusion, and misunderstanding of our world.¹⁵ Moreover, his pupil A. G. Keller admits that in details of material culture, such as the use of resources and production systems, some conscious controls may be used since tests may be applied to both means and ends in such matters.¹⁶ In matters of social organization and nonmaterial culture, however, Sumner and Keller, like many others, express grave skepticism as to the feasibility or possibility of conscious planning. Certainly Sumner, who was an ardent defender of *laissez faire*, would have strongly resisted state planning.

The relationship between technology and material culture and the institutional and social-psychological aspects has already been discussed in the previous chapter. Whether changes in the former always precede the latter, whether there is always a strain or "cultural lag" in the presence of such differing rates of change, and whether alterations

in the latter may not also come ahead of those in the technological realm are questions not yet fully answered.¹⁷ Certainly the proponents of gradual, nondeliberative growth have a tremendous weight of cultural history behind them. Yet the advances of science and its applications to human affairs challenge us to consider the probability of conscious and large-scale ordering of behavior in advance.

Without doubt one of the most vigorous proponents of this view was Lester F. Ward (1841-1913), a natural scientist who turned his attention to sociology. He believed man to be thoroughly capable of substituting conscious "telic" progress for the blind, ruthless, and wasteful operation of forces found in the animal world or in the earlier stages of man's own society and culture. Social teleosis means the intelligent, rational direction of natural and social forces to a desired end. Ward believed that since individuals had continuously demonstrated their capacity and effectiveness in conscious controls, it was also possible for a group or society to organize itself for rational control looking to improvement.¹⁸ Of particular importance in bringing about telic advancement were the further development of science, of education, and mass enlightenment. In taking this view Ward laid the foundation for the standpoint of John Dewey, the educational philosopher, who has long stressed the potential use of the school not only for the transmission of culture but for purposes of pre-testing consciously made suggestions for future cultural changes.¹⁹

There are many proponents of both these views, each with his own particular interpretation of cultural change and social processes. But the major difference is typified by the contrast in view of Sumner and Ward.

¹⁷ See W. F. Ogburn, *Social change with respect to culture and original nature*. New York: The Viking Press, 1922.

¹⁸ See Lester F. Ward, *The psychic factors of civilization*, Boston: Ginn & Company, 1st ed., 1893; 2nd ed., 1906; and his *Applied sociology: a treatise on the conscious improvement of society by society* (same press), 1906.

¹⁹ See John Dewey, *Freedom and culture*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939.

¹⁴ See William Graham Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 4-8. Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906.

¹⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 632-633.

¹⁶ See A. G. Keller, *Societal evolution*, rev. ed., chapter 6. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

Those who express doubt as to conscious ordering of social events do not usually deny that man has long made use of his intellectual powers in the process of adapting himself to his physical and social-cultural environment. Their main negative criticisms about deliberate overall state or social planning derive from their convictions that the whole course of cultural change is so vast and complex that large-scale, long-range programs to control the nature and direction of future events are not feasible. They believe that the unknown, or at least uncontrollable, factors so outweigh those which science and intelligence permit us to manage that it is foolish to try to project elaborate plans for future society and culture. On the other hand, the defenders of social teleis range from those who believe that controls are possible in matters of material culture only to those who go the whole way and believe that planning for every item in social life and culture is not only possible but even desirable.²⁰

Bearing these divergent views in mind, let us review briefly some type cases of attempts at social-cultural planning in our modern world. The wider theoretical implications of planning will be discussed in the final chapter.

Some Examples of Planning

Interest in, and programs for, extensive state planning in our own time stem chiefly from the dislocations in the modern world associated with the breakdown of traditional economic systems and from revolutions deriving from a disruption of former political patterns. Closely linked to these were the effects of World War I and its aftermath of economic depression in particular. The most striking case of planning

is that of Soviet Russia. Later, under National Socialism, Germany attempted a coordinated national effort. Britain has had long experience with government planning at local levels. In our own country the conditions deriving from economic distress are chiefly responsible for the emergence of much talk about planning and some milder programs of concrete sort. Examples might also be drawn from modern Italy and Mexico, as well as from other countries which have at least got to the blueprint stage. In every case social planning as here used refers to state ordering and control. In fact, the concept of social planning has become almost entirely associated with some form of state control.

Planning in Soviet Russia. The theories of Karl Marx and Nikolai Lenin, which furnished the battle cries when the Bolsheviks seized and held power in Russia in 1918, called for a program for changing to a classless society by means of a transitional dictatorship of the proletariat. The carrying-out of this intermediary stage became the main function and avowed purpose of the Bolsheviks, now known as the Communist Party.²¹

The Party abolished private property and drove out the owners of banks, industries, and businesses as the first steps in building a socialist economic and political order. During the early years, while it was resisting counterrevolutionists and stabilizing the huge country, concessions were made to the peasant owners and to certain bourgeois interests. It looked for a time as if the Russian Revolution might end up as some sort of modified capitalism. Yet almost from its inception certain groups in the Party had begun giving attention to large-scale social-economic planning. As early as 1920 Lenin appointed the Goelro, or State Commission for Electrification, to develop a program for

²⁰ For orientation to this entire field, the student may consult the works of Todd, Hertzler, and Sims, *op. cit.* See also J. H. Randall, Jr., *The making of the modern mind*, rev. ed., chapters 18, 19, and 21, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940; U. G. Weatherly, *Social progress, studies in the dynamics of change*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1926; W. D. Wallis, *Culture and progress*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930; C. M. Case, *Social process and human progress*, *op. cit.*

²¹ The Bolsheviks were the larger and more radical left-wing branch of the Social Democratic Party; the Mensheviks were the right-wing and more moderate group. Since 1918 the Bolsheviks have taken the name of the Communist Party. Its former rivals were liquidated in the first phases of the Revolution.

countrywide electrification to take from 10 to 15 years. The next year this committee was reorganized into the Gosplan, or State Planning Commission of the Council of Labor and Defense. At first this was an advisory body made up of 40 economists, engineers, statisticians, and others, most of whom were not Party members. For some years this group, from time to time enlarged and altered in organization, studied the problems of planning and outlined tentative programs. After Joseph Stalin became firmly seated in control and as the Party leaders decided to turn aside from Trotsky's program of continuing to foster a world revolution in favor of giving attention to Russian problems first, overall state planning moved rapidly ahead.

On October 1, 1928 the First Five-Year Plan was announced. Since then similar plans have been initiated and carried through except the third, which was interrupted by the war. After hostilities had ceased, the Fourth Five-Year Plan was announced to cover the years 1946-1950. The latter was designed to rebuild devastated areas as well as to expand general production still further.

The entire planning and program is under the Council of the People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Under the Commissars, and at the staff planning and top-control level, are such boards and committees as the Gosplan, or State Planning Commission, the Council of Defense, the State Bank, the Board of Man Power, and various boards or committees having control of weights and measures, of standards of production, of the co-operatives, of technical personnel, and of the arts and education.

The actual operation of the economy goes on at two levels: through the "All-Union Narkomats" or central government departments, and the "Union-Republican Narkomats" or similar departments of the constituent republics. The former have to do with the heavy industries, construction, munitions, and related activities. Thus the control of extraction and/or processing of coal, oil, chemicals, rubber, and paper and the production of hydroelectric or other power are under the central government. The separate re-

publics have charge of the production of consumption goods and certain extractive industries such as timber and construction materials.

Under the Narkomats are the separate Glavks or boards which control the trusts and plants of a given industrial sector of the total economy. At the plant level, at least, management has changed from the earlier form of committee control to one-man control. The entire system is tied together in a vast network of economic and political controlling bodies, often not too well co-ordinated.²²

The broad but vague aim of the Communist Party in Russia has followed the Marx-Lenin theory of working toward a stateless and classless society in which the workers will finally be in democratic control. The more immediate and practical aims have been to industrialize Russia as rapidly as possible. But it is well to remember that state planning in Russia, as was true in Nazi Germany, is concerned not merely with the economy of production, distribution, and consumption but with the control of every aspect of Russian society and its culture. The state constantly extends its controls into family and community life, into matters of education, recreation, art, and religion. In fact, if the essence of socialism is a planned economy, one may well ask, Just where does planning and hence state control end? This is a problem which every society moving in the direction of overall planning must face. We shall discuss the wider implications of this matter in the next chapter.

As for Russia, it is well to note that some of her economic difficulties have doubtless resulted from her efforts at rapid industrialization rather than from her system of overall political planning and management. At least, it is not always easy to disentangle the factors which arise from very rapid shift from a rural to an industrial culture and those which derive from a slowly emerging

²² For a survey of Russian economy, especially with respect to management problems, see Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow, *Management in Russian industry and agriculture*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. This is an excellent book because it presents the facts from the Russian reports but with a minimum of interpretation and comment by the authors.

system of complete political control of the kind undertaken by the Communist Party in Russia.

It is not possible nor necessary here to attempt anything like a complete summary of the nature and results of Russia's planned system. But we may indicate some of the more striking advances as well as difficulties insofar as we can tell. Since it is difficult to get adequate and valid data from Russia, we must necessarily view some of the published data with caution.²³

(1) Since industrialization was a major aim, the facts about changes in production are pertinent:

(a) From 1913 to 1940 industrial output went up eight-and-one-half-fold; but most of this great increase took place after 1928. In fact, between 1928 and 1940 production multiplied seven-and-one-half times. The Russians naturally point with pride to this accomplishment, but it must be recalled that their country was, relative to western Europe, only slightly industrialized in 1913. Moreover, Russia could and did draw upon the science and technical skill of already highly industrialized Britain, Germany, and the United States. Certainly England had no such help from others in the earlier phases of her own Industrial Revolution.

(b) Along with such changes has gone a shift in the labor force. In 1930 only 3.4 per cent of those gainfully employed were in the large-scale industries; by 1940 nearly one third were. This shift was accompanied by drawing upon the rural areas for workers, intensive training programs in the factories, and in a government program of drafting annually from 800,000 to a million youths, ages 14 to 17 years, for vocational training looking to subsequent employment in specified industries.

²³ Apparently during the earlier periods of planning Russian officials were less loath to give out reports of their economy than has been the case since the outset of World War II and after. On this matter, see Harry Schwartz, "On the use of Soviet statistics," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1947, 42: 401-406. See also comments by Bienstock, et al., *op. cit.* The data summarized here are drawn chiefly from Bienstock, et al., *op. cit.*; from Earl H. Sikes, *Contemporary economic systems*, chapters 12-18, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1940; and from Harry W. Laidler, *op. cit.*, chapter 26.

(c) As to the kind of goods produced, the chief stress throughout has been on capital or producers' goods. The planners viewed this as a necessary price to pay for rapid industrialization. Harry W. Laidler says that in 1913 one third of the total industrial output of Russia was in producers' goods. In 1940 three fifths (61 per cent) were in this category. And while there has been a great increase in both between 1928 and 1940, the capital-goods production went up 14-fold while that of consumers' goods multiplied only 4.3-fold.²⁴

(2) In many ways the application of machine technology to farming is the most striking and bold feature of Soviet Russia and its planned economy. At the time the First Five-Year Plan was put into effect there were about 26 million separate farms. In less than 10 years practically all of these were replaced by about 250,000 peasant collectives or *Kolkhozy* and a few thousand large state farms or *Sovkhozy*. The former produce more than 90 per cent of all farm crops; the latter serve more or less as models of completely centralized, mechanized agriculture. But, on the whole, the latter have not proved themselves very efficient despite the fact that they represent, in a sense, the rural planners' dream.

While large-scale agriculture made possible some increase in total farm production, one of the main purposes of collectivization was to enable the Soviet authorities to control the production and distribution of grain and other products. During the early years of Soviet regime the peasants frequently failed to plant the requested acreage or, once harvested, they hoarded it or disposed of it in ways which the central government considered either uneconomical or unpatriotic. As with other aspects of Soviet economy, it is quite likely that at the outset the program to collectivize and mechanize agriculture was an opportunist device to get food for urban workers and to produce a surplus of cereals to sell in the world market. There is certainly some evidence that, on the whole, the program of the Communist Party has tended to favor the city worker at the expense of the peasant.

Then, too, as the country became more highly industrialized, the relative importance of agriculture in its total economy has changed. In 1913 only two fifths of the national wealth was derived from industry, the balance from agriculture. In 1940 about 70 per cent came

²⁴ Laidler, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

from industry, the rest from agriculture. It is a fair estimate that the relative importance of the latter will decline still more with further industrialization. For contrast, in this country less than 20 per cent of the annual national income is derived from agriculture.

(3) On the educational side there was a great extension of elementary, technical, and advanced education. At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution the illiteracy figures stood at about 90 per cent. Today about 8 out of 10 of school age or above are literate. A large program of vocational training was introduced as a phase of the various plans so as to improve the skill of the labor force. So, too, there was a campaign of mass education and propaganda through books, periodicals, and placards, and through the motion picture and the radio to enlist support for the new order of things—economic and political. It is difficult to measure these things, but they were all a part of the larger state plan.

While no one doubts the great changes which have taken place since the Revolution, and especially since 1928 under deliberate planning, the effects have by no means been entirely satisfactory by Western standards. For example, as to level of living there has probably been some improvement over czarist days but not very much. At the outbreak of World War II the Soviet worker and his family had a less and poorer diet than the French or German or even Bulgarian laborer.²⁵ Moreover, the rapid growth of cities produced an acute housing shortage. The high rate of labor turnover as well as the lack of adequate skills made for industrial inefficiency. The lack of managerial proficiency in plants and on the collective farm alike meant wastage and retardation of operations. In fact, the whole effort has been somewhat handicapped by the attempt to develop an economic system different from that under capitalism, where the price mechanism acting through the market has worked reasonably well.

Yet, despite some interesting developments of their own, many features of Soviet economy are much like those under capital-

ism. Certainly so far as the technology of modern industry is concerned, there can be little difference since technology rests on the findings of universal science. But even in terms of organization, financing, and the human factors in production there is much similarity. In terms of common-sense economics it is clear that provision must be made for accounting systems. There must be provision for reckoning with what we call profit or loss. Capital investments are necessary to the program of building more plants, railroads, or other producers' goods; hence some method of securing and controlling such assets is necessary. So, too, the relationship of incentives and skill must be taken into account. Soon after the Communist Party came into full control of the country, it became apparent that a uniform scale of pay would not do. Any reasonable person can see that a highly complex industrial system must almost of necessity require some kind of differential system of payment for labor. Idealists and sentimentalists aside, a mechanical or chemical engineer or a well-trained plant manager is more important than a ditch-digger in terms of his contribution to a modern economy.

The political leaders and the economic planners soon learned this lesson. Today in Russia there is probably a greater spread of wages between the bottom and the top of the occupational ladder than anywhere else in the world. Various indexes to measure wage rates have been set up. One such scheme had 8 categories of such a character as to permit the workers in the 8th class to get 2.8 times as much pay as those in the first. In some plants the managers get 20 times as much as do the unskilled workers.²⁶

Yet even sharp wage differentials do not prevent inefficiencies. There are evidently much wastage, some graft, and many of the same difficulties found elsewhere from a combination of poor management, burden of bureaucratic regulations, and lack of good morale. Various schemes such as the shock brigades of Stakhanovites were organized in the 1930's to stimulate laggard

²⁵ See Aaron Yugow, *Russia's economic front for war and peace*, p. 212. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942.

²⁶ See Sikes, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-355.

workers to higher production.²⁷ Periodically during the early five-year plans and certainly since World War II the state officials and Party leaders have harped on industrial inefficiency and the need to increase production. At times one wonders whether or not the whole scheme of planning in Russia is not largely propaganda window-dressing for the not too well co-ordinated efforts at industrial change.²⁸

Certainly the whole planning system has been supported by a continuous barrage of propaganda, dressed up in terms of promises of such benefits as better wages and regular employment. On the larger propaganda front, planning was rationalized as the basic step toward the heaven of a completely democratic, classless society.

Finally, it must be noted that in addition to differential wage rates, vocational training, persuasive propaganda, and some improvement in living standards, the whole economic structure of Russia, like its political system, is honeycombed with a vast spy system. While the industrial workers are permitted to offer advice or suggestions about details of plant operation and while intellectuals may debate among themselves as to particular means to attain the ends set down by the Party, there are no voluntary labor unions or public discussion as we know it. There can be no collective bargaining as to wages, hours, and working conditions where the political state is owner and boss. There is no free speech, free press, or free assembly in the manner of representative democracies. In fact, one of the most significant features of the Russian economy is the use of the tactics of the police state in its operation and control. One of the crucial questions regarding planning in an industrial society is whether a complex indus-

trial system can operate effectively under the shadow of fear of the informer, the inquisitor, and the hangman. It is hard to imagine that a penal labor camp would win a prize for high efficiency and high morale by any standards. We shall have more to say on this topic when we discuss in the next chapter the implications of the contention that a state can "plan for freedom."

Planning in Germany. Certain kinds of planning under governmental agencies have long been a feature of German culture, especially at the local level. These included zoning, parks, roads, and community reconstruction programs. The long tradition of state interference in the national economy was evident not only in ownership and control of railways and telegraph lines but in the stimulation as well as regulation of various large industries. The German state had long taken firm measures to aid its foreign trade. So, too, there was much social legislation: retirement and health insurance, public housing, and other aids to workers. These and other features of German culture made it easy for the Nazis to set up a long-range plan for Germany after they came to power in 1933. The persistent though not always consistent program of *Gleichschaltung*, or co-ordination, of every group and institution into the scheme of National Socialism became a slogan for the planners.

With regard to economics, however, the Nazis never had any systematic theory as did the Marxian socialists. Actually, the name of the movement, *National Socialism*, was a clever portmanteau word combining the appeals of nationalism with those of socialism. However, it was not difficult to win support for various programs which promised at once a rebirth of national glory and a form of socialism which would satisfy the masses. The Nazi leaders set up many additional controls over both industry and labor, all rationalized as for the good of the larger national society. Hitler once remarked, "I build up my entire community on the concept of work."²⁹ In fulfilling this

²⁷ Stakhanov was a miner who under the stimulation of public appeals had cut several tons more coal than were required in his mine. This instance, along with others, was used by the Communist leaders as a symbol of patriotic duty of all workers to step up production. Clubs of Stakhanovites were organized as a part of this propaganda campaign.

²⁸ See Michael T. Florinsky, *Toward an understanding of the U.S.S.R.*, p. 164, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939. This view is shared by many other students of contemporary Russia.

²⁹ In his address to the arms workers at the Tegel-Borsig plant, December 10, 1940.

aim, both employer and worker had their respective roles. They were supposed to co-operate to form a "shop community." No strikes, lockouts, or other labor conflicts were permitted.

As an aid to co-ordinating the national economy two functional bodies or "estates" were set up — one for agriculture, the other for trade and industry. In addition, the Labor Front organization operated in conjunction with the estates in matters bearing on the laborers themselves.

While private capitalism was not officially abolished in Germany, the whole economic order became subordinate to the political. The Nazis proliferated the already extensive bureaucracy; and by rationing of raw materials, regulating prices and wages, and controlling the market organized what was in many ways a form of state capitalism.⁸⁰

When the Nazis came to power in 1933 they loudly announced a Four-Year Plan to eliminate the vast unemployment in Germany. At that time more than 6 million workers were totally out of work, and several millions more were only partially employed. To achieve their aim the government began large public works, such as highway construction. By reducing taxes, they also encouraged private enterprise to hire more workers. They reduced the labor supply also by driving the Jews out of business and labor and by forcing women out of industry. But the most effective means was the beginning of a large program of rearmament. By 1936 the number of registered unemployed had dropped to about 1½ million and, by the outbreak of the second world conflict, Germany was actually faced with a labor shortage in various fields, especially in the metal industries and in agriculture.

A Second Four-Year Plan was announced even before the first one had been completed. The aim was frankly to make Germany economically self-sufficient and to carry forward her military preparations at a faster tempo. The slogan became *Wehrwirtschaft*, that is, a wartime economy, at least three years before the invasion of Poland.

⁸⁰ The complications of the Nazi economics are indicated briefly in Sikes, *op. cit.*, chapters 23-26; and in F. L. Neumann, *Behemoth: the structure and practice of national socialism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1942.

Whatever the rationalizations may have been, planning in Nazi Germany was hardly such in any philosophic sense. It was at first pretty largely a recovery program, although it carried with it a pattern of extensive regimentation of agriculture, business, and industry. In its second phase it was frankly a national program for war; and, when hostilities commenced, Germany was already mobilized for a total but a quick try at world conquest.

In detail, however, Germany's program had many of the usual accoutrements of large-scale planning; and when seen against the background of the whole effort to enforce the Nazi rule and ideology on the masses, we may consider it a kind of plan. Again one must realize that what the Germans said and what they did in this period do not entirely coincide. But the same is true of Russia. In many ways the pattern of dictatorial planning and execution in these two countries was not dissimilar. Planning, like other human ideals, tends to become something different in its practical operation.

Nevertheless, the Nazi program was amazingly successful as measured by objective criteria. Unemployment disappeared, order was restored in the country, national ambitions rose again, and a large part of the population undoubtedly fell in line with the regimented life which the Nazi program intended. The human costs, as we know, were high and horrible. But the Nazis, like the Communists, never hesitated to invoke an old rationalization for violence that "the end justifies the means." Hitler said he was aiming at 1000 years of peace, in which Germany would rule the world. Stalin promised his followers not only an ever fuller dinner pail but a classless society of love and congeniality. These ideals seem as good as any others to people who have been conditioned to believe in them. It would be foolish indeed to assume that the masses in these countries did not, for the most part, fall into the pattern set them by their overlords.

Planning in Britain. There is no better example of the drift toward large-scale

governmental planning than Britain. The more immediate background for this lies in a series of economic crises associated with two world wars and with the decline of British economic power in the world. Yet the basic concepts in support of national planning were laid earlier in the research and writing of the Fabian socialists.³¹ They took a gradualist position regarding the coming of socialism in contrast to the more violent and revolutionary view of Marx and Engels. Moreover, they insisted on basing their ideas of directed change on facts established by sound investigations of contemporary economic, social, and political conditions.³² On the action front the Fabians co-operated with organized labor and with various reformist groups to bring about socialist measures at the level of county and local government.

Local planning in Britain has been extensive and includes public utilities, transportation, housing, and public health measures. Of course, many of the dreams and blueprints of the planners have never had a chance, as yet, to be put into action. But there is no doubt that the success of socialism and of planning at the level of local government in Britain served to lay the foundation for the larger socialism and national planning which began to be put into effect by the Labor Party following its election in 1945.³³

³¹ For a review of their work, see Harry W. Laidler, *op. cit.*, chapters 17-18; also, G. D. H. Cole, "Fabianism," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 6: 46-49, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931.

³² Not only did the Fabians, especially the Sidney Webbs, make their own studies of conditions but their whole position, they felt, was bolstered by various surveys of local communities, such as Charles Booth, *Life and labour in London*, 7 vols., London: The Macmillan Company, 1902; and *New survey of London life and labour*, 7 vols., London: P. S. King & Son, 1930-1932; and B. S. Rowntree, *Poverty: a study of York*, rev. ed., New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1922. Then, too, there have been a number of important official investigations under various Royal Commissions dealing with problems of production, health, and the like.

³³ There is an extensive literature on local planning in Britain. See H. Myles Wright, ed., *The planner's notebook*, London: The Architectural Press, 1948. See also E. D. Simon, *Rebuilding Britain: a twenty-year plan*, London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1945; and Flora Stephenson and Phoebe Pool, *A plan for town and country*, No. II of a series; "Target for To-

Prior to World War II and during the war, there was much public discussion of national planning in Britain, and the Labor Party had definitely set its course toward nationalization of key industries and certain long-range planning projects. Indicative of widespread concern for the future and of interest in planned programs as one means of solving national problems are the Barlow, Scott, and Beveridge reports. The first was made by a "Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population" in 1940. It examined into the causes and meanings of shifts in industry and population and suggested certain remedies to be "taken in the national interest." The second was the "Report of the Committee on Land Utilization in Rural Areas" in 1942 and dealt with problems of agriculture and country life in highly industrialized Britain. The third is the well-known report of "An Inter-departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services"—the so-called "cradle-to-the-grave" plan with which the name of Sir William Beveridge, an economist, is so closely linked.³⁴

During its first years the Labor Government was concerned with large problems of economic and social reconversion, following the war. Many of its programs were more or less improvisations to meet current difficulties. Such were the controls over exports and the retention of rationing at home. In fact, it is doubtful if the Party had any sheaf of blueprints for planning ready at the time it came into office. As was the case in Russia in the 1920's and of Germany in the 1930's, the political group in power turned to national planning partly as a hope as well as a device to meet more or less immediate crises. But in line with its socialist philosophy, the Labor Party carried through programs to nationalize certain important elements of British economy. In 1946 the state took over the Bank

morrow," London: The Pilot Press, 1944. This whole series has a wide coverage dealing with industry, education, social security, and other topics.

³⁴ For a convenient and graphic summary of these three reports, consult *Maps for the national plan*, prepared by the Association for Planning and Regional Reconstruction, London: Lund Humphries, 1945.

of England and the overseas airlines; the next year, the coal-mining industry; and in 1948, inland transportation. But nationalization is not identical with what is more technically meant by planning. The former may mean only a transfer of ownership; the latter implies a co-ordinated program of operation and control directed to some predetermined goal or goals. It is very unlikely that the Labor Government had much to offer in the way of plans for any of these enterprises aside from the general conviction, backed by public sentiment, that they should be owned and controlled by the central government.

The National Health Service, put into effect in mid-1948, represented a kind of plan, tied into some phases of the Beveridge program. But again the working-out of this has necessarily been on a somewhat empirical basis. Yet there is no doubt that Britain, like much of Europe, is definitely moving in the direction of some form of socialism which brings with it national planning of one kind or another.³⁵

Since Britain, long a citadel of democracy and individualism, has moved in the direction of socialist planning, it symbolizes the contemporary discussion about this topic. In fact, the programs there, both actual and proposed, have given rise to a vigorous debate on the merits of planning. We shall examine some phases of this discussion in the next chapter.

Postwar recovery plans. Before discussing domestic planning in the United States, some comment may be made about various programs for postwar recovery in Europe in which this country has played a part. The close of World War II left much of Europe economically devastated or, at least, seriously depleted. So, too, the political order was highly unstable in many countries. After the first flush of enthusiasm for the United Nations had disappeared, it became apparent in the United States that something

should be done to aid the democratic countries of western Europe to get back on their feet. This led to the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), which, under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, became effective as the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA).

A four-year co-ordinated program was set in motion within a few months. The magnitude of the undertaking is evident in the report of the conference of the 16 participating countries, in September, 1948, which stated that nearly 22 billion dollars in credits and loans would be necessary to carry the program through 1951. Such funds would be used to help these nations to rebuild their economy not just singly but in a co-operative way. The serious condition in some of these countries was brought out in the report of this conference, which pointed out that "industrial production in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands was reduced to 30 to 40 per cent of prewar and in Italy to only 20 per cent; production of bread grains fell to only two thirds of prewar. . . ." There was also widespread destruction of housing, railways and rail equipment, and other transportation and power facilities. Moreover, there had been a considerable dislocation of population through voluntary or forced migrations.

Under conjoint planning and with the advice and financial aid of the United States steady progress was made within a very short time after the plan got under way. But there were also difficulties. First, the 16 separate nation-states found it hard to co-operate on some points, such as finances, tariffs, quotas of supplies, and the like. The dogmas of nationalism and sovereignty continued to harass the project. Also, how to deal with postwar Germany was a serious point of difference. Second, Soviet Russia and her satellites in eastern Europe had declined to join in the program and, in time, the Marshall Plan became a symbol of a growing split between the democratic countries of western Europe and those more or less dominated by the authoritarian system of Moscow. This division of Europe into two camps handicapped recovery.

Yet despite the difficulties both among the participating countries and between

³⁵ For a convenient review of these trends, see Herbert Heaton and Alvin Johnson, "Socialism in western Europe," *Headline Series*, no. 71, September, 1948 (pamphlet), New York: Foreign Association.

them and their east-European neighbors, it was one of the world's first large-scale programs for practical international planning. From the lessons learned from this venture, perhaps other and more extensive plans may be drawn up looking to a more sane and pacific international order.

Planning in the United States. In comparison with Europe, the United States has so far had little experience with overall state planning. Nevertheless, as we have moved toward monopolies in business and industry, as the political order has constantly intruded itself into areas formerly not its concern, as the masses have come more and more to look to the government for general welfare measures, we have moved in the direction of state planning.

Yet planning as a means to anticipate and hence control cultural change is not new, nor is it confined to governments, either local or national. Just as in all highly industrialized countries, private enterprises in the United States have long since set up certain patterns for planning for the future. The rising tide of effort to improve and extend the mechanization of production, the coming of the Taylor system of piecework and speed-up, and the growing attention to coordinated business methods all mean that owners and managers have given more attention to preliminary blueprints and predictions and plans than had been the case in the heyday of small enterprise and freer competition. The research laboratory has contributed greatly to the use of prediction in reference to production, and statistics have given us devices for estimating trends in output, prices, and market conditions. Today plan and prediction reach into every aspect of a complex productive system. Since the public is often interested in community and areal aspects of planning, it is worth while noting that for years telephone companies and real-estate organizations have planned their own future developments in terms of statistical and other studies of population trends in various communities. The former, in particular, have been reasonably successful in anticipating urban

growth in different ecological areas and thereby preparing their operations with this in view.

These are but particular illustrations of the impress of science and technology upon our daily lives. One cannot operate a complex industrial system without research and engineering, and to use scientists and engineers means to plan in advance.

The first steps in governmental planning in the United States were made in our growing cities, which had to look forward to water and sewage systems for their expanding neighborhoods or which began to be concerned with regulating growth by establishing zones for business, light industry, heavy industry, residences, and for building parks and street systems. The impetus to such public undertakings frequently came in the first instance from nonpolitical community agencies interested in poor relief, delinquency, dependency, housing, and other care for the underprivileged masses. The specific stimulus, moreover, came from the community surveys which emerged in the early years of the present century.³⁶ And as a background to these surveys there had been considerable public agitation because of reports about the frightful conditions in our urban slums.³⁷

In time, not only were municipal ordinances passed to remedy some of these conditions, but officials began to think in broader terms of projecting city growth in a more orderly fashion. Down to the present, however, most of these programs have been concerned with matters of streets, water and sewage systems, parks, zoning, building codes, and other externals. Not only do cities lack the governmental power to go extensively into planning but private interests are constantly balking many of the more thoroughgoing proposals. Moreover,

³⁶ One of the first extensive community studies is the so-called *Pittsburgh survey*, a series of monographs edited by P. U. Kellogg, sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation, 1914.

³⁷ Of historical importance are such works as Jacob Riis, *How the other half lives*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892; and Lincoln Steffens, *The shame of our cities*, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1904.

local programs must be correlated with those of state, region, and the nation.³⁸

Another area in which partial planning was attempted has to do with the conservation of natural resources, a topic which began to get serious national attention during the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919). But beyond legislation to protect our forests and certain related soil resources, the program has only recently become a part of a larger national plan.

The realization of the need to consider local, state, regional, and national problems in a more or less unified fashion developed after World War I. On the economic-industrial side large surveys were made analogous in importance to the earlier community studies. Then, in the early 1930's, came President Herbert Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, which produced voluminous reports on national economic, political, and sociological matters.³⁹

While these investigations are chiefly cumulations of facts, they served to sharpen the public consciousness of the need for a broad consideration of our entire culture. From these beginnings, and under further stimulation of the economic depression of the 1930's, a National Planning Board was set up in 1933 under the Public Works Administration. In June, 1934, this was superseded by Presidential order by the National Resources Board, which still later became the National Resources Committee. Again, in 1941, the name was changed to National Resources Planning Board. With the help of federal funds to employ a large staff of experts, and in co-operation with various local and state planning organizations, this committee has issued a large number of reports dealing with natural resources, in-

dustry, urbanization, regionalism, and other topics. Almost without exception the various reports have urged the carrying forward of a concrete program of extensive local, state, regional, and national planning. Just how this is to be done in the face of our present loosely organized and dual state-federal organization is not always made clear, but we have certainly moved toward the fact-finding and recommendation stage of large-scale government planning.

During World War II much of our economy fell under governmental planning and control. This involved not only military strategy more particularly but the entire logistic operation, including rationing of raw materials, location of plants, control of the labor force, rent control, food rationing, and many other matters. In fact, modern total war is one of the most important stimulants to large-scale state planning and hence control. What the next step in peacetime planning may be remains to be seen.

On the concrete side, however, and rather independently of the work of the National Resources Planning Committee, several federally sponsored projects have been undertaken in this country which have the character of a plan, though one program is seldom integrated to another. Some of these have already been discussed in connection with rural, urban, and regional problems. (See chapters 14, 15, and 16.) In addition to soil-conservation projects, there was the Resettlement Administration, designed to assist depressed farming groups, especially those marginal to commercial agriculture. So, too, there were certain federal housing and community projects, such as Greenbelt near Washington, D. C. But there was never a well-rounded national or regional scheme such as is the pattern in Soviet Russia, or to a lesser degree was the case in Nazi Germany, or may be the situation in Britain.

To date, however, the largest and most discussed national project is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Since it is viewed by some as a kind of model of what may be developed elsewhere, a few facts and comments as to its accomplishment are in order.

³⁸ For a discussion of some of these matters, with various recommendations, see National Resources Committee, *Our cities: their role in the national economy*, especially pp. 78-79. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1937.

³⁹ See *Recent economic changes*, 2 vols., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1921; E. G. Nourse, et al., *America's capacity to produce*; and M. Leven, et al., *America's capacity to consume*, (both) Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1934. Also, *Recent social trends*, 2 vols., McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1933, and the series of special monographs listed therein. More recent is J. Frederic Dewhurst, et al., *America's needs and resources*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1947.

The TVA was set up by Congress in 1933 with the general purpose to develop the Tennessee River drainage basin in the interests of navigation, flood control, and national defense. It was also empowered to generate and sell surplus electricity as a means of avoiding waste of water power. The river and its tributaries encompass an area of 41,000 square miles, of which 54 per cent is in forests and almost all of the rest in pasture or tilled farms. There are more than 3 million residents in this area, and another 4 million people live in the immediately adjacent region. In 1948 TVA had the services of more than 15,000 full-time employees to run this project. Some critics cite this last fact as evidence that bureaucracy always increases with planning.

To control the water of this river system calls for two lines of action. One has to do with building publicly owned dams on the river and its chief tributaries. These serve to prevent or reduce destructive floods, improve the navigation facilities, and provide hydro-electric power. The other function of TVA reaches beyond the publicly owned streams to privately owned lands which are the source of the run-off of water in the first instance. This requires a co-operative arrangement with individual landowners which calls for efficient farming practices, reforestation, and other devices to the maximum retention of the rainfall in the soil. Every gain at this point, of course, reduces the problems of flood control along the larger streams.

The accomplishments are striking. The TVA has built 16 large dams and has acquired control of 5 others constructed by private industry. Several large generating plants have been built, and during World War II the valley became an important source of power for purposes of war production. For example, between 1940 and 1948 the TVA increased its electricity-producing facilities by 250 per cent. Aside from the requirements of power for national defense, electric power is provided to states and local communities under a preferential system, which system has also had much criticism from privately owned utilities.

To foster soil conservation and development of sound agricultural practice, the TVA has a staff of competent experts who advise the farmers. Also, there are various co-operative arrangements with state and local agencies looking to conservation and improvement of agriculture.

In the first fifteen years of its existence, the federal government appropriated about 780 million dollars to TVA. Yet more than 260 millions in revenue were received during these years. Nearly 90 per cent of these revenues was obtained in the latter half of the period.

As noted above, this project is a kind of trial at federal development in a given region. Proposals such as the Missouri Valley Authority may, in time, be established along similar lines. Certainly we may expect other large-scale regional planning programs. Yet, looking at the developments in this country as a whole, in comparison with the programs in Soviet Russia or elsewhere in Europe, we must repeat that the United States has had no overall federal planning. What we have had has been partial and piecemeal. To call many of the developments during the 1930's "national planning" is really to confuse the concept with various recovery programs in which the state has stepped in to regulate and direct certain aspects of the country's economy, especially with reference to prices, wages, and employment through public works, as was the case during the prolonged depression of the 1930's.

Nevertheless, the idea of planning is becoming increasingly accepted in our culture. Certainly the governmental controls during war with their inevitable plethora of rules, procedures, and a vast administrative personnel may stimulate new points of view about government and industry, foster further dependence on the state by the masses for controls and benefits, and bring in their wake ever-expanding regimentation even in times of peace. Concern for national defense and the idea of international organization also stimulate belief in planning. Hence, representative democracy can scarcely avoid giving more attention to regulation of business and to national and large-scale planning. Many doubt that either political democracy or economic free enterprise will survive the present trend toward regimentation and large-scale planning. We shall examine some aspects of these questions in the final chapter.

Interpretative Summary

1. Ideas about social-cultural change arose only with the coming of civilization. Non-literate peoples do not seem to have such concepts.
2. The Classical societies produced theories of cultural degeneration, of cyclic change, and suggested vaguely those of organic and social evolution. But it remained for men in modern times to develop the doctrine of progress as we know it. It is distinctly a cultural product of the Western world.
3. The doctrine of progress has its roots, first, in the Christian theory of the Fall and Redemption of man. But, more important than this idea was that of inevitable advancement from lower to higher condition. The doctrine took on the concepts of both directionality and moral betterment. The 18th-century writers on progress stressed the theses of natural goodness, natural rights, and rationality. Those of the 19th century tended to emphasize the idea of growth toward a more perfect condition. The idea of progress got support from modern theories of biological evolution and from the vast changes which accompanied the Industrial Revolution.
4. Some writers have expressed considerable doubt about the whole concept of social-cultural progress, contending that it is largely a reflection of the industrial changes associated with the rapid exploitation of hitherto untouched natural resources.
5. Certainly those who have tried to set up criteria of progress have always done so in terms of the values of their particular society and its culture. They could hardly do otherwise. Moreover, it is much easier to establish criteria for measuring technological advances than it is to lay down standards regarding moral advancement.
6. Deliberate and large-scale social-cultural planning of today is partly a function of our present conceptions of progress. It is a recent addition to modern culture.
7. The modern state, as one phase of its increasing power, has become more and more engrossed in planning, either in a limited way or on an all-out, totalistic scale.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What were some of the Classical theories of social-cultural change? Illustrate.
2. Write a short statement explaining the doctrine of progress, its sources, and some of the changes the doctrine has undergone in the past two centuries. (See Carl Becker's article on culture, *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 12 : 495-499, cited above.)
3. Discuss critically the different criteria of progress which have been put forth by various writers. Show how they reflect their own times and interest.
4. Does the fact that the doctrine of progress is a social myth make it any less important as a rallying point around which a planned society may be built? Discuss, pro and con.
5. What is meant by planning? Illustrate from personal life; from public life.
6. What devices have been used in Soviet Russia since 1928 to make the state planning program go? What were some of the major difficulties which emerged: economic, political, and personal?
7. How did the Four-Year Plans in Germany fit into the Nazi policy of complete national co-ordination (*Gleichschaltung*)?
8. What are some of the chief historical antecedents to contemporary interest in national, regional, and local planning in Britain? In the United States?
9. What changes during World War II facilitated the trend toward state planning? What changes, if any, retard the movement?

10. What critical conditions may lead the American masses to submit to overall planning? What appeals may be made to them to accept such a program and to assist in its operation?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

John Jewkes, *Ordeal by planning*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948.

A severe but shrewd critique of the policies and programs of the British Labor Party in the 1940's.

David E. Lilienthal, *TVA: Democracy on the march*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944.

A popular account of the accomplishment of the TVA with the author's comments and interpretations as to what such a project means for democracy.

Lewis L. Lorwin, *Time for planning: a social-economic theory and program for the twentieth century*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945.

An optimistic interpretation of planning, the history of the idea, and suggestions as to planning for the United States.

R. W. G. Mackay, *Britain in wonderland*. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1948.

Written by a member of the Labor Party, this is a strong plea for a federated United States of Europe under socialism.

Karl Mannheim, *Diagnosis of our time*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944.

A trenchant analysis of the ills of contemporary society with an ardent defense of the idea that planning and democracy may be developed together.

Philip Selznick, *TVA and the grass roots*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949.

An insightful and critical analysis of the administrative policies which were attempted in the first phases of the TVA and their implications for planning.

Francis Williams, *Socialist Britain: its background, its present, and an estimate of its future*. New York: The Viking Press, 1949.

A very capable apologia for the British Labor Party and its program. May be read as a counteractant to Jewkes, *op. cit.*

Theory and Practice in Planning

PLANNING in one form or another has become a subject of much public concern. W. F. Ogburn has said, "Planning is inevitable in an age of change," and Karl Mannheim goes so far as to say that "there is no longer any choice between planning and *laissez-faire*, but only between good planning and bad."¹ Certainly an ever-wider acceptance of planning is becoming deeply implanted in our culture. As pointed out in the previous chapter, planning by individuals and by groups is as old as culture itself. What disturbs many people today is the growing prospect of extensive state planning. At least in countries where free discussion is permitted there is much division of opinion on the matter. Sometimes the proponents for or against state planning generate more heat than light regarding the topic. In the postwar world, interest in the matter has been sharpened because of the drift toward socialism of one sort or another. Many view this drift as a threat to personal liberty and other basic values. One leading British industrialist remarked with feeling: "Nowadays politicians and others without industrial knowledge or training, much less managerial experience, endeavor to dictate in detail how industry should be run. . . ." ² He went on to say that all industry desired was to be let alone so it could get on with restoring British economy. In contrast, the defenders of planning under socialism in Britain say they intend to carry on their "economic planning in a manner which preserves the maximum

possible freedom of choice to the individual citizen.' " ³ They view their program of nationalization and large-scale planning as devices which will not undermine or retard individual liberties but rather preserve and enlarge them.

It is very easy for people interested in this whole matter to define it in terms of simple "good" or "bad," "white" or "black." Moreover, those who take this naive view are also likely to give particularistic explanations for the present trends toward state planning. Some attribute it to the designs of evil men bent on power, or to a decay in personal stamina in individuals who turn to the government as an island of safety, or to loss of religion, or other single causes.

In terms of practice as well as theory, it is evident that state planning ranges from the dictatorial and totalistic kind in Soviet Russia through the milder, less extensive and gradualist types of western Europe and Britain to the rather piecemeal and distinctly limited kind tried out in the United States in recent decades. Yet even Russian life and economy are not completely dominated by the state. While the major lines of activity are under governmental scrutiny and control, there is some private ownership of property, there is some barter, and there are even some market operations outside the controlled exchange organizations of the state. So, too, there are certain rather rigid controls in this country, though for the most part through voluntary agreement rather than compulsion. Also, there are many features of the welfare state. Yet, on the whole, the United States continues essentially to be a country of free enterprise

¹ See W. F. Ogburn, "Social trends," in L. Wirth, ed., *Eleven twenty-six*, pp. 64-77, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940; and Karl Mannheim, *Man and society in an age of reconstruction*, p. 6, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1941.

² In *The Chicago Tribune*, December 15, 1947, in a dispatch from London quoting Sydney S. Guy, chairman of the Guy Motor Company.

³ From the "Economic Survey" presented by the Labor Government to Parliament in 1947, quoted by Francis Williams, *Socialist Britain: its background, its present, and an estimate of its future*, p. 248, New York: The Viking Press, 1949.

and free market. Britain represents a system between the modal patterns of Soviet Russia and those of the United States. And because of the strong tradition of individualism and democratic liberalism in Britain, what develops there in reference to planning will be watched with interest by laymen, politicians, and scholars alike. In the discussion to follow, reference will be made to views and practices from all three of these cultural foci of the modern world.

Before going on to examine some of the pertinent problems of theory and practice as related to planning, it is well to recall that planning is a program aimed at social-cultural change in a particular direction with a given aim or goal in mind. Moreover, as noted in the previous chapter, state planning and socialism, in some form or another, are very closely associated. Yet even people who eschew socialism as a political-economic philosophy believe that to solve certain of our present-day problems some degree of state planning is necessary. It is hardly a matter of plan or no plan but of the kind and amount of such planning.

Some of the most important conditions which have led people to look to planning as a way out of contemporary difficulties have already been discussed in various sections of this book. These include, among others: (1) the persistence of the business cycle with its features of periodic "boom and bust," of high prosperity followed by mass unemployment and low returns on investment; (2) the growing power of monopoly and giant business organization, which tend to destroy sound competition, so long considered "the life of trade"; and (3) the very rapid and somewhat hit-or-miss introduction of new technologies and other new cultural items which make for confusion of values and conduct. And, (4) on the political side, the continuance of doctrines and practices of strong nationalism and independent sovereignty are constant stimulants to economic self-sufficiency which reduce the trend to freedom of international trade, population mobility, and free communication, and serve to foster war as a means of settling interstate diffi-

culties. Behind all these lie the larger problems of population pressures on resources, of the rivalries between the wealthier and the less wealthy nations and classes, between the "haves" and the "have-nots." (See chapter 12.)

In short, large numbers of people have lost their confidence in the operation of the "invisible hand" of competition in the market as the key to prosperity and in the essential "goodness" or "rightness" of things political. As a result the cry has gone up in many quarters calling for some kind of master plan which will enable mankind to rearrange the social-cultural world in such a way as to alleviate if not prevent such major disturbances in the future, and thus by implication contribute to human freedom and that vague but important value called happiness.

Since planning means the use of power, the problem arises at once as to how this power shall be used and distributed among groups and individuals. From the contemporary examples of overall and partial planning, it is clear that the state has been the chief, if not the logical, source of such power and its allocation. As we approach the details of state planning, three other matters appear on the social-cultural horizon: what form shall the power take, who shall possess it, and how shall it be used to execute the plan? Under the dictatorships, whether admitted in theory or not, the state with a master plan in operation tends to spread its power and function till the state itself embraces the whole national society. This is clearly demonstrated in both communist and fascist countries. We saw that in Russia, in order to bring about the completion of the program, there was a general social compulsion throughout the entire country. Resources, goods, and services were rigidly rationed, and the free market thus abolished. Workers were closely controlled in all important matters of the national economy. And the system of private property and free enterprise was largely liquidated. The Communist Party leadership rationalized all this in the name of a transition to a classless society, yet meanwhile

Soviet Russia was not only becoming industrialized and urbanized, but she was wiping out the former class system and putting in its place a new one, with the Party as the elite. Moreover, in spite of the theory, she took on nationalistic patterns and moved toward a dominant place in world power politics.

Russian ideals of international revolution became in time dissipated and altered to a major concern with self-sufficiency and a home-grown revolution. Russia but illustrates again a well-recognized fact that the elaborate and all-embracing idealism of revolutions ends up by changing far less than was anticipated and in a certain petering-out of the original intensity of the movement. But if the revolutionary drive was dispersed, the state plan served as a useful device by which the Party was consolidated in power. Much the same process was found in Italy and Germany under fascist dictatorship.

To date planning in this country, as noted above, has in contrast been partial and of a mild variety in the economic sphere. In the noneconomic it has been of ameliorative sort, as in public housing, public health, recreation, and in the extension of mass education. Recent trends in Britain indicate more drastic planning though still with the hope of retaining the basic values and practices. Yet the repetition or persistence of economic distress and the recurrence of war may lead all the countries of the world in the direction of large-scale planning.

We shall examine, first, the basic factors or elements that must be considered with reference to any state planning program; second, some of the principal institutions to which planning has been applied or for which plans have been suggested; third, the meaning of planning for groups and individuals that fall within its orbit.

Aims, Distribution, and Execution of Power in Planning

While no one doubts the importance of science in providing the tools for planning, in some ways the human aspects are far more

crucial. Significant matters which any scheme of projecting plans into the future must bear in mind are, among others: (1) the aim, goal, or objective, (2) the time perspective, (3) the persons or authorities who are to do the planning, (4) the personnel who are to carry it out, and (5) the effects of planning with reference to institutions, groups, and individuals. We shall deal with the first four of these in the next section. The fifth factor will be dealt with in the sections following.

The aims or ends of planning. The objective of planning may be broad or narrow in scope. If the former, it may involve the reshaping of an entire society and culture both in its technological and in its institutional and social-psychological aspects. If only the latter purpose is intended, then decisions must be made as to what special areas are to come within the purview and control of the planners. In either case, the most obvious matters calling for attention are such things as conservation of and pre-arranged use of natural resources, improvement in the production-distribution system, and the betterment of the physical items in the level of living, food, clothing, and housing. However, the contemporary dislocation and lack of co-ordination among our varied groups and institutions have suggested to some the need of a master plan in order to overhaul all the major patterns of life: familial, educational, recreational, esthetic, political, and religious. Even the intellectual life, including scholarship, research, and invention, has been considered the proper area for planning.⁴

In almost every planning program put in operation in recent decades the material culture has received the most attention. This has been true in Russia, Germany, Italy, Britain, and elsewhere in Europe and is certainly the case in Mexico and this country. But under dictatorship master plans have reached out to cover more and

⁴ On this latter, see J. D. Bernal and Michael Polanyi, "Ought science to be planned? Two opposing views. The case for collective research [Polanyi]; the case for individualism [Polanyi]," *Annals of the Atomic Scientists*, 1949, 5: 17-20.

more areas of everyday living. The state has interfered in familial, recreational, religious, and esthetic values and practices in a way which would shock Americans and Britishers.

Yet those among the latter who are uncritically favorable to planning may well pause to ask, If once state planning is begun, just where shall it stop? (See below.) The concentration of power and the revolutionary drive of the authoritarian states facilitate the setting-up of master plans whereas the ethos of individualism and free enterprise, the practice of compromise, the belief in voluntarism, and the suspicion in many quarters of growing governmental interference make for hesitancy and doubt about moving quickly into planning on a wide scale. Moreover, no matter what the extent of such programs in the first instance, they almost inevitably tend to expand into areas not formerly considered their province.

The time factor. Once the objective is established, the matter of the time perspective becomes important. Shall the plan be for a long period or a short one? Sometimes planners remain vague on the topic of time; but if the program is rationally conceived and executed, the temporal factor must be considered. Otherwise the whole predictive and control technique may be handicapped. Again planning, like other institutions, grows by what it feeds on. Just as aims are likely to be extended to cover new fields of behavior, so, too, once a project is under way for a stated period, it becomes easy for those in charge to begin to think in terms of still longer time. If a five-year plan is good, why not a ten-year plan? And if a ten is good, why not a twenty-five-year plan?

This is another matter to be borne in mind by proponents or opponents of planning in a democracy. Dictators easily use such projects as devices to keep in power, and the continual extension of the time perspective is simply a part of the manipulation of their controls. But democracies should always consider not only the aim of large-scale planning but how long it will last and

the implications of the whole program for the total society.

The planners and power. As important as the aim and the time are, the most challenging question of all is, Who shall do the planning? Here we come face to face with the ever-recurrent problem of the nature and distribution of power. This involves the authority to determine the broad policy, the particular objectives, the time factor, and the working out of the day-to-day execution. Nearly all proponents of planning contend that some sort of centralized overall authority is essential. If this is granted, then the further question arises as to how the leaders shall be selected and how much power shall be granted or delegated them. Under authoritarianism such designation of power and function may be quite differently conceived than under a representative democracy. The serious implications of this phase of planning are often ignored or neglected by the enthusiastic advocates of such procedures.

Under dictatorship the top elite provide the source of authority. If the masses are taken into account, it is chiefly to see that they are kept sufficiently satisfied so as not to disrupt the program, and on the more positive side to indoctrinate them by promises and emotional appeals so as to enlist their wholehearted support. In a loosely knit democratic society such concentration of power will be viewed with misgivings, for when such authority is granted it tends to be consolidated into institutional forms and organized personnel, difficult later to dissolve. In a democracy men may well ask, How much power is to be delegated, to whom, and what checks shall be imposed so as to require periodic reconsideration of policies and plans and a review of the detailed operations? This is an old familiar problem growing out of the relation of administrative to legislative powers and functions, and it must be taken into account in contemplating state planning, large or small in scope. It is easy for zealous proponents to brush this problem aside as of no consequence. They all too glibly dismiss it by

rationalizations about a trained body of administrators fired with high sense of public duty and responsibility.

Before dismissing the topic of who shall determine policy and make the major blueprints in planning, we must note that emotional conviction is not enough to insure a sound plan. In the early years of the socialist changes in Britain there were many appeals and rationalizations along emotional lines. Those in power talked and wrote a good deal about the change of heart and motivation which must come if their plans were to be a success. Emotional conviction is doubtless necessary to any social movement, but there is evidence that failures to make a plan work have been excused on the ground that workers and public alike were not converted to socialist planning.⁵

In any case, intellectual ability, training, and honesty are needed if planning is to work at all. The most sensible scheme so far suggested seems to be that the broad policy and the major blueprint should be determined by leaders chosen from a wide range of experience and interest. The scientist and the expert will have a place in this, just as will the administrator. But experts and administrators often illustrate what Thorstein Veblen once called "trained incapacity." That is, their very specialization often unfits them for taking a larger and broader view of public questions. If we are to have democratic planning, then leaders in business and industry, in labor, in politics, in education, in the arts, and the community of consumers must be represented. In fact, under the delegation of power to plan there must be a realization that the whole matter is not one of merely preparing blueprints, collecting data, and carrying out a program. The first obligation is legislative, not an administrative, one;

⁵ See John Jewkes, *Ordeal by planning*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. This is a severe critique of socialism in Britain by an economist who follows much along the lines of Frederick A. Hayek, *Ad to serfdom*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

The high-minded and moral viewpoint on socialism is represented in Sir Stafford Cripps, *Towards socialist democracy*, Toronto: G. J. McLeod, 1945; and in Francis Williams, *op. cit.*

that is, aims involve consideration of policy, and this in turn must rest upon deeper and social-emotional values as to what kind of world we want, what nonmaterial elements in our culture must be reckoned with, and what balances or compromises must be made in order not to undermine the system of representative democracy and its associated patterns of free enterprise, freedom of speech, criticism, and individual initiative and the other values in a democratic world. In a society committed to a scheme of magic leadership, fixed classes, and complete regimentation of the masses such considerations may have little place. Yet these are basic to a democracy and must not be swept aside by zealots who too often seem to believe that we can have detailed and elaborate state planning and at the same time preserve the values that emerged in a much more individualistic society. (See final section.)

The execution of the plan. When a plan has been made, whether broad or narrow, or for a long or a short time, means must be devised to carry it out. Clearly the practical execution must fall largely upon certain experts and technicians and a great body of administrators. In this connection the managerial function becomes central, and almost every attempt to put a program into operation has witnessed an increase in the number of bureaus with an army of supervisors, inspectors, bookkeepers, and minor officials charged with seeing that the scheme is carried into effect. Since in our time almost all large-scale plans of the sort we have been discussing are developed under the aegis of the state, a planned society must be prepared for a tremendous increase in its administrative personnel with the attendant effects of a vast bureaucracy.

While much of what took place in Britain after the Labor Government came to power in 1945 was a continuation or an extension of state controls rather than changes derived from any well-planned program, there was a marked increase in bureaucratic red tape.⁶

⁶ For some telling examples of everyday frustration and confusion arising from such an increase in rules, see Jewkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-221. This was a familiar story in Nazi Germany.

Again, all too often the planners explain this as due to poorly trained administrative staffs or to lack of good will on the part of the producing and consuming public. And again there is a good deal of wishful thinking that somehow or other improvements may be made in the quality of administrative personnel.⁷

Plans must of necessity operate along pre-determined lines. Even though some variability is acknowledged in theory, the daily execution of a program tends to take on an authoritarian aspect. There must be some regimentation; and the wider the scope and the more fundamental the aim, the more detailed such regulations are likely to become. And it is just at these points, of course, that groups and individuals begin to feel the impact of a pre-ordered system. In spite of contentions that choices of means may be made, in the routine there is little place for originality or difference. Certainly where clashes of interest appear the planners usually have their way, at least in the matters of external conformity.

Since administrators far outnumber others in controlling a planned or pre-ordered program, there is always the likelihood that their fixity and narrowness of view may actually stultify a plan which was originally conceived as flexible. In a society which fosters rigid class organization, in which bureaucracy easily becomes linked to the dominant revolutionary party, the retention of political and economic power for itself may come in time to overshadow the praiseworthy and humane intentions of the original planners. Such a trend toward the consolidation of power by managerial and administrative staffs has been a feature of both the modern economy and the modern state. There is every reason to believe that managerial and bureaucratic functions will be extended as co-ordinated and pre-ordered schemes are put into effect.⁸ Every proposal

for any extensive governmental planning in a democracy must bear this fact in mind.

Certainly a planned society sets the stage for a fixation of elites and classes, and the problem for a democracy is to keep open the doors of opportunity for individuals of capacity and merit. For this reason, if we are to go in for extensive state planning, every safeguard should be provided to keep the policy and the operation as flexible as possible. Aside from public opinion and institutional checks on planners, the policy of limited objectives and short-run programs will help to forestall stifling bureaucratic growth. Moreover, such partial programs may be sufficiently diverse to provide a certain competitive situation, the result of which would be a survival of those programs most conducive to solving particular problems. This seems again to be a procedure in keeping with the ethos of democratic choice.

The matter comes down to a final question, Is planning to be by and for the few, or by and for the many? In other words, the basic criterion of any planning is: What does it do to and for our institutions, forms of association, and to us as individuals?

Planning Institutions

People concerned with planning vary among themselves as to just what areas of society and culture should be included among their objectives. Since the difficulties of our industrial-economic system are so many and so complex, the chief attention has been given them. However, on a piecemeal basis some features of community organization, such as education, housing, and recreation, have come under governmental planning. And in authoritarian countries, as we know, almost all aspects of life fall under state control and with it some modicum of, if not considerable, planning. In this section we shall deal with planning

⁷ See Barbara Wootton, *Freedom under planning*, chapter 10, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945. Also, Barbara Ward, "Limits of economic planning," *Foreign Affairs*, 1949, 27: 246-262.

⁸ Over and over again commentators on large-scale state planning have noted this trend. It was

true in fascist Italy and in Nazi Germany as it is true in Russia and to a lesser degree in Britain. Although Karl Mannheim, *op. cit.*, recognized this problem he glossed over the likelihood that a huge bureaucracy might in time undermine democracy.

in the economic order and with some of its political ramifications.

National economic planning. Some features of economic planning were described in chapter 31, and we shall not extend the presentation of further details here. Rather, we shall review briefly some major points of difference between those who favor an extension of state controls and planning over the economy and those who do not.⁹

The former contend that the older competitive system should more and more be replaced with one based on regulation. They anticipate more and more change toward socialism or other form of collective economy. The latter hold that despite some of its more obvious deficiencies the competitive system of the free market is the most satisfactory basis of a sound economy yet devised. They oppose further extension of governmental control as likely to undermine the market system and cause a decline in production. The extreme of the first, of course, is typified in the coercive planning and regulation of Soviet Russia; that of the second in the laissez-faire pattern of free trade and the profit system. But nowhere is there complete laissez faire nor complete and minute control. All national economies today are of a mixed variety. The problem is one of the degree of mixture between private venture and competition, on the one hand, and governmental control and planning on the other.

Bearing this in mind, we may examine the aims or ends of planning and some of the

means which have been suggested or put into practice to attain these ends.¹⁰ Those who argue for a planned society do so in the name of improving the general welfare. But those who accept the system of competition and the market make much the same claim. They contend that if left alone, the system will stimulate production, make for high level of employment, and in turn enhance the general welfare. Since both sides to the controversy say that they aim to better the general welfare, it is necessary to break down this concept into its various facets.

The state has long since owned and operated certain public services such as the post office and other means of communication. In some countries the state also controls, if it does not manage, the main forms of transportation. So, too, certain "natural monopolies" are in the hands of the state. The governments also usually operate at least part of their munitions plants in anticipation of war. More recently, the conservation of natural resources has been increasingly viewed as a proper function of the state. But the most striking evidence of the trend toward planning and control is seen in the growing disposition of the government to establish certain minima as to rates of pay, various unemployment and old-age insurance programs, and to set up health and other personal services for all citizens. These trends toward what is often called "the welfare state" are widespread.¹¹ Some view the trends with approval. Others see in them evidences of a "creeping socialism" which in time will destroy the free-market, free-enterprise system.

Many not only believe that there are limits to how far the government should undertake to establish minima for individuals but also sense a drift, if not direct intent on the part of certain political groups and parties, to move more definitely toward complete abolishment of the market system.

⁹ The proponents of economic planning are many. Among others, see Mordecai Ezekiel, *Jobs for all*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939; G. B. Galloway, et al., *Planning for America*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1941; F. MacKenzie, et al., *Planned society, yesterday, today, tomorrow*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937; A. W. Rath, *Planning under capitalism, the problem of planning in Great Britain*, London: P. S. King & Son, 1935; Williams, *op. cit.*; Barbara Wootton, *Freedom under planning*, *op. cit.*

The critics and opponents of economic planning are also numerous. See, among others, Ludwig von Mises, *Socialism*, trans. by J. Kahane, London: Jonathan Cape, 1936; Lionel Robbins, *Economic planning and international order*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937; Christopher Hollis, *The rise and fall of the ex-socialist governments*, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1947; and Jewkes, *op. cit.*

¹⁰ A. C. Pigou distinguishes between primary and secondary planning. The former has to do with basic ends, the latter with the means of attaining these ends. See his "Central planning and Professor Robbins," *Economica*, 1948, 15: 17-27.

¹¹ See Barbara Ward, "The acid test of the welfare state," *New York Times Magazine*, March 20, 1949.

Yet those who favor the competitive system are often in favor of having the government take steps to restrict or restrain the growth of monopolies, on the ground that they destroy competition and hence a free market. Thus, the report of the Temporary National Economic Committee, set up in the 1930's by President F. D. Roosevelt, avowed "its faith in free enterprise" . . . and condemned "the regimentation of men by government because it is the antithesis of individual liberty" as it also condemned "the regimentation of men by concentrated economic power because it likewise is the antithesis of liberty."¹² While this report is not opposed to controls, it laid its major emphasis on the need of those kinds which will free business, industry, and labor for expansion under a competitive system, corrected of its more obvious abuses. The report quite honestly recognized some of the hazards in outright state controls and sensed, at least by implication, that complete absorption of economic power by the political spells either fascism, socialism, or communism — depending on how one defines these terms.

On the other hand, monopolies and cartels may be absorbed by the state *in toto* if and when the latter assumes a more distinctly socialistic form. In fact, it is interesting to note that in Britain and Europe cartels are widespread and are viewed by many planners, especially of Marxian viewpoint, as representing a final phase in capitalist development, making the economy ready for socialism to take over.

Another problem which has long harassed the competitive system is the business cycle with its periodic fluctuations. The planners believe that they can so manage a nation's economy as to reduce if not eliminate the ill effects of the trade cycle. It has not been demonstrated as yet, but there is no doubt that the continuation of the periodic fluctuation in production, prices, and wages stimulates the public to an interest in state

planning as a means of stopping or alleviating the economic uncertainties associated with the cycle.

While there may be a modicum of agreement on the need of state help, control, and/or planning with reference to some of the aims just noted, the real debate begins over the means by which these aims shall be attained.

One of these has to do with the manner in which a society sets up ways to redistribute its total wealth. The mixed economies of the West have more and more done so by systems of graded income-tax levies and by steep and graded inheritance taxes. In addition, the tradition of private benefactions has continued. But the proponents of the free market argue that the demands of the state through taxation shall not be so high as to destroy the incentive and opportunity for saving, for it is from the latter source that funds are secured for capital investment.

The socialist planners, on the other hand, advocate a much more complete scheme of equalization. And where they have been in power they have put it into effect not only by taxation but by taking over ownership itself, either by purchase or by confiscation.

With regard to the daily operation of the economic order, planning tends toward control or abolition of the price system and the imposition of some kind of rationing. Regulation more and more comes to replace competition. The rationing applies to resources and raw materials, allotted by some quota system in relation to a control plan. It involves rationing consumption goods and thus undermines or destroys "consumer sovereignty" as to how the individual shall spend his income.

Sooner or later a planned and state-controlled economy will also require a more or less complete rationing of the labor supply. This has been a touchy point in much of the discussion about national planning, since many labor unions and their leaders have favored planning but believe it can be had without such control over labor. Nor are the theories of planning consistent.

¹² See Final Report and recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee, pp. 7, 9, 77th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document no. 35. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1941.

In 1935 Barbara Wootton, one of Britain's chief apologists for planning, was saying quite frankly a planned "economy must be quite ruthless in the matter of vested interests of particular occupational groups or of particular individuals in a given job."¹³ At that time she believed "a planning authority" must of necessity have the right and the power to deny workers a free choice of occupation if this ran counter to the planned program. Ten years later she hedged on this matter. She then expressed the belief that by proper incentives the necessary mobility of labor from job to job could be secured.¹⁴ It is the old matter of the carrot or the stick, of persuasion or coercion. Yet Wootton, in the end, is forced to admit that under planning there must always be "a small curtailment of freedom" in the matter of employment. But the critic asks, Once you start with regulations, no matter how minor, just where do you stop? In the face of changing conditions, not easily foreseen, the planners are seldom able to give a satisfactory answer. As Barbara Ward says, in any planning in a free society some way must be found to tempt workers from "redundant to expanding areas of employment" as well as to find some ways to "persuade businessmen to adapt themselves to a general policy for the location of industry."¹⁵ Yet Miss Ward does no better than Miss Wootton in informing us just how such incentives are to be built up and made effective. About the best these writers do is express a hope that the worker as well as the government employees will be fired by sufficient patriotism and loyalty to the socialist program to accept coercion in matters of employment if the planners find it necessary to apply it. (See next section.) Of course, in Soviet Russia this is not such a problem since the central authorities there do not hesitate to force labor into any job which seems necessary at the time.

¹³ Wootton, *Plan or no plan*, New York: Rinehart & Co., 1935.

¹⁴ Wootton, *Freedom under planning*, *op. cit.*, chapter 6.

¹⁵ See Ward, "Limits of economic planning," *op. cit.*

Then, too, the matter of new capital and investment is crucial. Without putting a solid fraction of annual national income back into the capital plant for replacements and expansion, a nation's economy will shrink, not grow. Ward says it is generally agreed that for an economy to be healthy from 10 to 15 per cent of its national income annually must be put into "fresh capital development." Between the two wars the figure fell to about 3 per cent in Britain; and in France there was actually less capital wealth in 1939 than there had been in 1928.¹⁶ Under capitalism most savings come from people in higher income brackets. (See chapter 22.) If this customary function is no longer possible, because of high taxation of various sorts, or by reason of confiscation, then the government will and must step in. As we know, Soviet Russia handles this matter in a firm coercive way though how efficiently we do not know. What will be done in Britain and other countries of milder socialism remains to be seen.¹⁷

The questions regarding rationing and investment are two central considerations in economic planning. Those who favor the free-market system believe that improvement in conditions depends on expanding production or, to use an analogy, in making a bigger pie. The planners, especially those of socialist leanings, seem bent, first, on redistributing wealth, that is, giving labor a larger piece of the present pie. They talk about increasing production also, but it is not always clear that they are able to do so. This whole matter is bound up with technical skill as well as motivation; and it may be that in time a planned, or better, a "planning," society, as Rupert B. Vance puts it,¹⁸ may learn how to manage incentives, rationing, and investment so as to increase production. So far there is no evidence that planned economies under socialism or communism are industrially more efficient than those under private enterprise.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

¹⁷ See Lord Brand, "Private enterprise and socialism," *Economic Journal*, 1948, 58 : 315-330, for an incisive critique of socialist planning.

¹⁸ See Rupert B. Vance, "The place of planning in social dynamics," *Social Forces*, 1948, 23 : 331-334.

Nor are the benefits of the welfare state "free" although the proponents of the same talk as if they were. All the costs of old-age, health, unemployment insurance and all the other services provided by the state are paid for, in one form or another, by productive industry. Yet "the belief persists that the benefits of the Welfare State are 'free' and that therefore one cannot have too much of them."¹⁹ Today 40 per cent of the national income of Britain goes back to the government. In the United States the figure is about 25 per cent. Only the future can tell how much of a burden of this kind can be laid on competitive economy without the system breaking down. Again the real matter concerns the size of the production pie. If a society under planning can actually step up its national wealth and still provide all the services which the idealists believe the masses should have, then state planning will represent a cultural miracle of utmost significance.

State planning and international relations. On the side of international economics, regulation and planning present other serious difficulties, some of which the more sentimental planners completely ignore or rationalize away by arguments that for a country like the United States the total volume of international trade, in comparison to internal commerce, is so small that it does not matter anyway. Such specious reasoning, of course, flies in the face of sound economics; but it has its appeal-value for politicians and the masses. In the case of Britain, of course, foreign trade is vital to her survival.

Economic intercourse among nations has been closely associated with the tremendous advances in material wealth in the past 200 years. While some nations possessed resources and machines which others did not, while mercantilism and blocking of native industries, or the restriction of resources and sale of finished goods by tariffs or other devices prevented a fully developed world-wide economy from coming into being,

there is little doubt that the system of free enterprise and free market produced widespread benefits to all levels of the population beyond anything which history had experienced. But more recently the former interdependence of the world market has been blocked by the trend toward national self-sufficiency.

In the period after World War I we had a great upswing of intensive nationalism and drift toward economic autarchy at the very time we were attempting through the League of Nations to establish some sort of international political order. There is good reason to believe that the whole scheme of collective security to prevent war failed largely because it was counteracted by the self-sufficiency pattern in economics. As P. W. Martin puts it, "It is difficult to imagine a system of collective security growing up among nations each economically entrenched behind its own frontiers."²⁰ Moreover, he goes on to say somewhat prophetically that much of the "present planning of international and commercial relations is a standing menace to the peace of the world."²¹ Many critics of planned and regulated economy, on both the national and the international front, would agree with Lionel Robbins when he says that "Not capitalism, which, rightly conditioned, is a safeguard of liberty and progress, but nationalism, which tends to poverty and conflict, is the cause of our present distress."²² The difficulties following World War II tended to confirm this view. It will be instructive to watch how the socialist governments of western Europe will handle their problems of international trade.

While others disagree with such views, it is clear that any attempts to cope with economics at the international level must reckon also with the matter of some sort of political order. Perhaps we might first attempt a

¹⁹ P. W. Martin, "Some aspects of economic planning," in *Economic essays in honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell*, p. 348. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

²² See Robbins, *Economic planning and international order*, op. cit., p. 327; also his *The economic problem in peace and war*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947.

¹⁹ From Ward, "The acid test of the welfare state," *ibid.*, p. 69.

federation of nations which would permit relatively free flow of raw materials, finished products, money and credit, and other necessary features of a competitive system. Certainly those who want only a planning for their own country with little reference to others are laying the foundation for further wars and in the end the impoverishment of all.

Obviously, international organization must be built upon more than economic relations, but the material underpinning cannot be gainsaid. In fact, the noneconomic values of world-wide co-operation will remain relatively superficial until these basic matters are brought into some kind of harmonious pattern. Economic competition does not mean anarchy, either at home or abroad; nor does it mean that the state shall have no place in the economic field. It has had and will continue to have a place. The question is one of a balance of power and a working arrangement between economics and politics which will benefit all of us, not lead us perpetually into bloody conflict, on the one hand, or a strait jacket of overall regulation of enterprise on the other. If such an accommodation can be attained, the intercourse of the world's peoples with regard to science, art, recreation, and good will ought to grow instead of contract. The choice is either some reasonable live-and-let-live policy on an international scale or a general and world-wide decline of culture and levels of living for all as population pressures come into play. A condition of "haves" and "have-nots" has no place in a world of steamboats, wireless, mass production, or for that matter in one of dive bombers, tanks, submarines, guided missiles, atomic bombs, and germ warfare. But if unity has to be bought in terms of world conquest, the price may turn out to be too high. Reasonable and reasoning men should be able to find a better way.

Whether the state planners or other kinds of planners have the final word remains in the lap of the future. Certainly if nationalism is on the way out, the present stress on *state* planning must give way to something of more *interstate* character. That much at

least the ardent nationalistically minded master-planners must grant. Those who now oppose state planning, on the other hand, can hardly expect a future international order to grow up "like Topsy" with no guidance whatsoever. This is to support chaos and anarchy, and the serious opponents of present-day state planning do not take such a view. Rather, they would leave to groups and individuals the making of plans which might operate upon a world platform for which broad general rules had been made to insure fair play and opportunity for all. In such a world inventiveness, individual merit, and "delivery" of the best goods would determine the division of the rewards. Few fancy a world of dead-level equality. Most of us want one in which individual difference and equal chances to make good are given full recognition.

Groups and Individuals in a Planned Society

Many planners are firmly convinced that once institutions are modified along their predetermined lines, individuals and associations of men will of necessity become re-conditioned to the forms of interaction which the new institutions require. Others, even when somewhat favorable to the idea of planning, are not so optimistic. They take the view that not only must planners take cognizance of the cultural imperatives but that the variability of human nature must be taken into account. That is, people who take a critical or cautious view of the possibility of pre-ordering life in society do not identify the personality completely with man's institutions. They recognize the importance of individual differences in motivation, in intelligence, and in social-emotional traits. Such variations are by no means completely correlated with the patterns and norms of culture.

Society, culture, and the personality. If one makes even a cursory examination of the vast literature of anthropology and history, one must be impressed by the fact that there is scarcely any imaginable form of

behavior which had not been found in actual practice at some time or other among the world's peoples. The plasticity or adaptability of the individual in the presence of such a variety of situations is striking indeed. From this evidence one might almost be ready to conclude that mankind is capable of any sort of social and cultural conditioning.

The resistance of groups and individuals to new inventions — both mechanical and institutional — is well-known. (See chapter 30.) And all sorts of efforts at assimilation and acculturation have failed because of the inertia due to prior cultural conditioning or because of a certain flexibility in the individual which took directions other than those anticipated by groups or persons who fostered the merging of cultures. There is clearly a differential in man's adaptability in these situations. Apparently he is more amenable to reconditioning which involves chiefly his material welfare but more resistant in matters pertaining to family and kinship or to recreational, artistic, or religious aspects of his life. In these latter matters the irrational, emotional factors are so powerful that plans to alter them may not be so easy to carry through.

Yet, on the basis of man's general organic flexibility in the presence of a variety of cultures, none of which in the past was the result of deliberate pre-ordering, is there any reason to doubt that a planned and controlled society might not be devised to which the individual would make an adequate adjustment? What, on the contrary, one asks, are we to do about individual differences? Are we to assume that individual initiative might be wiped out in the perfect society, where all activity is regulated? The whole matter comes down largely to a question of a collectivist, ordered cultural system, on the one hand, and a more individualistic, more loosely organized one, on the other.

These are challenging questions of sociological theory. In the present state of our knowledge one may only approximate the correct answers. Certainly so far as universal sociological laws are concerned, they are not at hand to give us an adequate answer.

Yet in a more concrete way these are the very problems which contemporary society faces. If we assume, as we may, that representative democracy and free enterprise or some form of authoritarian collectivism represent the two directions in which modern society is likely to move in the next decades, what are some of the problems of planned societal order that we are likely to face?

The communistic philosophy calls for a classless society as the ultimate goal and the elimination of the political state as we now know it. The basic philosophy of communism is not unlike that of anarchism. It holds that man is by nature co-operative, kindly, and capable of self-control; social evils result largely from a faulty economic system and its institutional by-products. It contends that once we eliminate the selfish motives of private property and private gain and destroy the state, class stratification will disappear, and with the disappearance of classes there will be little or no place for the political state. The standpoint of communistic ideology is expressed by John Strachey in these words, "Remove class conflict in the only way in which it can be removed, namely, by the abolition of classes, and nine tenths of the present activities of the State become redundant."²³ Lenin put his view of revolutionary communism and the state in these words: "We set ourselves, as our final aim, the destruction of the state, that is, of every organized and systematic violence, every form of violence against man in general."²⁴

No matter what the alleged long-range goal of the communists may be theoretically, the truth is that Soviet Russia has developed a powerful nationalistic state and a new class system under one-party dictatorship. The whole standpoint is found in these words of Stalin's: "We start from the premise that . . . the Communist Party is the basic instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the leadership of one party, which does not share and cannot share

²³ John Strachey, *The coming struggle for power*, pp. 350-351. New York: Covici-Friede, 1933.

²⁴ Quoted by Harry F. Ward, *In place of profit*, p. 388. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933.

this leadership with other parties, constitutes the fundamental condition without which a more or less lasting and developed dictatorship of the proletariat is inconceivable." ²⁵ Surely this is the setting for the formation of a new elite with gradations below it.

It is not very likely that planning would lead to an absence of classes, despite the communist theory. Moreover, stratification may take place from social differentiation as well as from conflict. And in a highly mechanized mass society the flexibility of an open-class system, in conjunction with the free market, has much merit. Whether such a loose class structure could survive state planning with all its rigidities is doubtful. But there is every reason to believe that some kind of class order will be present under a planned culture.

Individual choice and planning. A thoroughly planned society raises yet another problem. When the planned society touches every major phase of culture — economic, political, familial, artistic, recreational, and all the other — what freedom of choice is left for the individual? Is he to be set to a task or activity as a mere automaton, or is he to have some choice? A pre-ordered society means in effect a limited range of stimuli and responses. Under such a scheme what becomes of individual initiative?

One aspect of this is revealed in the tendency for authoritarian planners, if not others, to assume that individuals do not know what is good for them. Karl Brandt, in commenting on the disposition in some quarters for agricultural planners to act dictatorially regarding diets, wisely remarks that "a policy built on this state of affairs may remedy the symptom of bad nutrition but would miss the opportunity to remedy the cause, which is a deficiency of knowledge and ability on the part of the people to manage their own affairs intelligently." ²⁶

²⁵ Quoted by G. E. G. Catlin in H. L. Childs, ed., *Propaganda and dictatorship*, p. 134. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936.

²⁶ From Karl Brandt, "Basic elements of an international food policy," in T. W. Schultz, ed., *Food for the world*, p. 327. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945.

What Brandt says about forcing diets on people is symptomatic of many of the things about state planning which people in democratic societies will want to know about before they give themselves over wholeheartedly to such programs.

Certainly, as we have noted at various points in this and other chapters, the totalistic controls of Soviet Russia do not leave the individual much choice, though apologists for the system there tell us that within the framework laid down by the Party there is considerable freedom. But certainly in matters of art and science, two fields somewhat removed from the economic and political, the Party controls have been alternately rigid and slightly more tolerant, depending on how the masters of the Kremlin sense the cultural climate.

Even within the framework of democratic society would-be planners have talked and written naively about the retention of basic civic and personal rights and values at the same time close economic regimentation is to be enforced. This represents a curious separation of political and economic rights, as we have customarily conceived of them. Actually, in our culture they are closely interwoven. It is hard to understand how serious economists should believe that economic planning may be extensive without cutting into political rights. To return for a moment to the matter of control of the labor force: When the state begins this, it may go on to determine residence, schooling, and a host of other items which shade off into intrusion into the realm of long-established personal liberties. Miss Wootton seems ambivalent on this matter when she writes about "combining useful planning and cultural freedom" or of "the fallacy of the assumption that extensive economic planning is *inherently* synonymous with uncompromising cultural conformity." And yet she defends forms of regulation but says that "the critical issue" is to know "where to stop." ²⁷ Yet under a master plan and pressures of economic requirements some administrator or other may well undertake

²⁷ See Wootton, *Freedom under planning*, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 30, 32.

to regulate workers and the consumer public in ways which would not be tolerated under a competitive market and politically representative system. In fact, it is often the trifles of regulation which gradually eat away traditional freedoms. Miss Ward seems equally ambivalent and a bit pessimistic when she writes: "No one can doubt the state's duty to secure the welfare of all its citizens. Equally no one can doubt its tendency to eat its citizens up in the process."²⁸

So, too, in another area of man's interests it is difficult to know just what Sidney Hook means when he writes about "a planning for *diversity, creative individuality, and catholicity of taste*."²⁹ There seems to be preponderant evidence that these features are the product of a highly flexible society and culture in which individual differences and personal choice are at a premium. There are many who honestly doubt that such values can derive from a master plan of wide scope, no matter how sincerely such a hope may be expressed in the initial objectives. In the very process of carrying out a prearranged system — economic, political, and otherwise — these values may well fall by the wayside. At any rate, our thinking on the topic of planning must not neglect these matters unless from the outset they seem less important than regimented provision for economic security — even though at a low standard — and for other materialistic by-products that emerge from a highly co-ordinated economic and political program. In a democracy certainly the values of individualism may well be considered not tangential but central. These may be considered somewhat irrational to materialistically minded planners, but they can scarcely be ignored in our democratic mass society. Karl Mannheim would provide guidance and limits for divergence and irrationality, but just how this would be accomplished under large-scale planning he leaves vague.³⁰

²⁸ See Ward, "Limits of economic planning," *op. cit.*, p. 262.

²⁹ See Sidney Hook, "The philosophical implications of economic planning," in MacKenzie, ed., *Planned society*, *op. cit.*, p. 676. Italics in the original.

³⁰ Mannheim, *op. cit.*

Obviously there is no reason to believe that men's habits and attitudes in regard to economics, politics, art, or religion must necessarily be those long associated with representative democracy and capitalism. Nor is there anything magical or instinctive about so-called natural or civic rights. But we do need to recognize the implications of life under a planned authoritarian system. Certainly so far as the individual is concerned, totalitarian theory implies regimentation and complete submission of personal and subgroup wishes to the purposes of the state. It puts its essential emphasis upon the collectivity, upon some mystic group unity of higher and more sacred value than is to be found in the individual. In the face of such highly integrated philosophy and practice regarding individual and group welfare of a rigid paternalistic sort, one may well ask, What have the countries of democratic tradition to offer the individual or any subgroup within the national community in the way of security, ideals, or integrating principles? Is there only a choice between some form of dictatorship and the recurrent and unsettling effects of business depressions?

On the economic side there are two trends in democratic countries which may prove suggestive. The first of these is the spread in Europe of both consumers' and producers' co-operatives. In the United States the diffusion of these patterns has been slow, but the movement is gaining considerable momentum. The success of such ventures within the framework of essentially capitalistic countries may provide some hope and even practical devices as to how to modify the extremes of the system of private enterprise in such a way as to enable us to retain many of its benefits without suffering from its mistakes and foolishness. Along with co-operation doubtless will go further regulation and reduction of the excessive exploitative activities of capitalistic business so common in the previous century. In this connection it is worth noting that almost all state planners think only in terms of production economics. They have given slight, if any, attention to the feasibility of spreading

the democratic co-operatives.³¹ In Russia, of course, such democratic institutions as the co-operatives went out with the peasant owners.

A second trend which may prove helpful in preserving democracy is the recognition that limited and short-time planning may have a place but that the roots of democracy lie in the wider society, not merely in the structure and function of government as such. If such patterns as local, state, regional, and national land-use planning, for example, can be established, not so much as an adjunct of an overall administrative machine as an expression of the citizens' genuine interest in helping to solve community, state, and national problems, considerable gain will have been made. One of the most serious questions, of course, is whether urbanized individuals and highly specialized groups can be brought into such co-operative programs. But it may be that with a certain decentralization of industry, with some future synthesis of rural-urban life, much of the urban atomism may be remedied, and city as well as rural people may learn to work and plan together for their larger community welfare.

A particularly recurrent adjustment in all these matters must be made between the expert, the administrator, and the ordinary man. Unless the last has a hand in social projects, if all be left to the first two, then mass democracy will have failed. There are always here a certain danger and a challenge. Can a political democracy retain its representative character, determine its fundamental policies and programs through recourse to the masses and yet turn over the execution of the work itself to experts? It is an old familiar dilemma of the expert *vs.* the common man. It is partially an old struggle between the impersonal ideas and facts of logic and science and the warm and intimate personal feelings, emotionalized attitudes, and beliefs of the man in the street. Under authoritarianism the masses

are fed their daily propaganda dished up to them in highly emotionalized tones and terms, which serve to keep them thrilled and alert and happy to do the daily bidding of the experts, who in turn are dominated by the political cliques at the top.

In order to preserve the democratic process certain limitations have been set up. In representative democracy the state is not coterminous in power and function with the national community; it is the servant, not the master, of the people. Quite to the contrary, under totalitarianism the state is co-extensive with the nation and is the master, not the servant, of the people. As one means of preventing the absorption of democratic society by the state, every encouragement should be given voluntary associations: business, labor, professional, civic, educational, recreational, religious, and any others. These nonpolitical functions must be kept alive. One of the gravest threats to democracy is the growing attitude that the government should do *all* for us, should always be the seat of last appeal. Such views foster dictatorships and a complete merging of the state and the national society.

But so long as the citizens in a democracy do not abandon their safeguards to liberty and their participation in communal life, they will be able to keep some rein on the expert and on the politician, and short-time planning should prove beneficial to their welfare. Such safeguards include the use of the secret ballot, the continuance of the party system, the trial by jury, and protection of the rights of minorities. Then, too, the rights to free assembly, free speech, and free religious choice are highly significant. A real threat to the continuation of representative democracy lies in the growing belief that such matters are not important when people have been provided with a certain modicum of economic security. The development of socialist Britain may well prove to be the test case.

Moreover, in spite of the mistakes of capitalist democratic society, there is much to be said in defense of the stimulation it affords to individuals and for the relative

³¹ See H. M. Kallen, *The decline and rise of the consumer*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936; also, M. W. Childs, *Sweden — the middle way*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936.

freedom of thought and action which has grown up within its framework. Research in the social sciences in Russia, except along lines acceptable to those in power, has practically ceased. And one may well ask whether research in the natural sciences will not be retarded by the general atmosphere of censorship and of government planning of the major activities of the society. While the earlier laissez-faire individualism in economics has been greatly modified in capitalist countries, the spirit of free inquiry, of tolerance, and of initiative remains. Whether these values are more important than others, such as more equal distribution of material goods, must be decided by the particular society; but the fact remains that representative democracy and its correlated system of free economic enterprise have produced highly significant basic human values which must not be overlooked in the contemporary criticisms of democracy and capitalism.

In conclusion, we must realize that while controls and predetermined plans may aid men in securing their wanted material and political security, orderliness, and continuity, most people living in democratic societies are not ready to abandon individual choice and action in economic, political, or in other areas of their interest and faith. If the masses of men, however, accept the view that such matters are not worth preserving and, if necessary, fighting for, then the future may well witness a society and culture of quite different kind from that which the Western peoples know and believe in. If, on the contrary, we do retain faith in the common man as well as in the expert and other leaders, if we do believe that individuality as well as conformity has a place, we will not be so easily led into the "green pastures" of the demagogues. Rather, we will try to take a part in the world around us, involving as it does risks as well as security, and both freedom and responsibility, backed by emotional convictions and an expanding knowledge.

In this connection, moreover, unless we want a world of rigidity and authoritarianism, we should hold fast to the concepts and practices associated with civil liberty. A

good working definition of this liberty was given by John Stuart Mill nearly 100 years ago. It is still sound:

"... The sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others. . . .

"This . . . is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. . . . Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived."³²

It is not that culture will disappear if human society becomes planned and organized under authoritarianism, but it certainly would be a different culture from that long associated with representative democracy and individualism. The world today owes much in the way of invention, both material and institutional, to the spirit and practice of democracy and individualism despite the risks and uncertainties they sometimes bring. As individuals or as members of groups we should move cautiously along those lines of social action which may undo these contributions and perhaps replace them with something quite different and from the standpoint of many serious-minded people far less satisfactory.

³² From John Stuart Mill, *On liberty*, written in 1859. The quotation is from the reprint in Charles W. Eliot, ed., *The Harvard classics*, vol. 25, pp. 212, 214-215. New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1909.

Interpretative Summary

1. State planning, either partial or total, and of wide or narrow scope, is becoming an increasingly important part of contemporary culture.
2. The problems of planning, moreover, bring us face to face with the whole matter of science and its application. This involves questions of moral values and public policy as well as of facts and generalizations derived from science. Also, the problem of science and public policy shows the importance in a democracy of an intelligent citizenry.
3. In some quarters the trend toward state planning is closely related to another, namely toward some form of socialism or communism. In fact, the latter presupposes planning as one of the means to the attainment of equality and justice for all.
4. Since planning represents the use of power, any consideration of its function must take into account its aims or goals; the time factor; the persons who do the planning and who execute it; and, of great importance, the effects of planning on institutions, groups, and the individual.
5. Under authoritarianism, planning may be applied to all such institutions and groups as are necessary to give complete regimentation and control. Under representative democracy the imposition of rigid controls derived from state planning tends to undermine the traditional rights and liberties associated with democracy and individualism. But proponents of economic planning in democratic societies tend to gloss over this fact. Moreover, many of them naively make an unwarranted division between the economic and the political order. They argue that there may be extensive planning in the former and a complete retention of free speech, free mobility, and other traditional virtues of the democratic political order. This is like dubious science and ethics.
6. National economic planning stimulates autarchy and a drive for nationalistic self-sufficiency. Such a trend may well retard movements in other directions toward a more pacific and workable world order.
7. Yet advocates of world government, of one form or other, usually have vague global planning in mind. To date this has been more of a pious hope than a definite blueprint.
8. A consideration of the relation of planning to the individual and the larger cultural system of which it may be a part brings into sharp focus a number of crucial issues. While it is not the business of the scientist as scientist to pass moral judgments on policy or social action, he may state in terms of his knowledge what the probable outcome of one course or another may be. Bearing this caution in mind, we may say that by its very nature state planning implies a collectivist philosophy of some sort or other. Second, it implies an ordered and controlled world, designed to produce predictable patterns of life which will give safety to the individual and relieve him of risk, anxiety, and danger. On the moral side many planners operate on the open or hidden assumption that people do not know what is good for them, that it is morally bad to take risks, incur losses, or to live in a condition of danger. With these matters in mind, it is highly probable that a planned society and culture will make for fixity, stability, and loss of personal initiative.

The opponents of state planning, especially that on a large scale, rest their argument on the importance of personal liberty and of competitive struggle among individuals and groups for the scarce goods and values of this world. They believe that risk-taking, anxiety, and losses are the necessary price mankind must pay for freedom and flexibility. Moreover, they believe that a world of some uncertainty and insecurity is fundamental to further social-cultural invention and growth as well as a concomitant of a satisfactory personal life for the individual. We may say then that a culture based on such a philosophy will be less stable, that safety and certainty will be less common, that danger will threaten from time to time, and that mankind is not soon likely to find itself in any condition of heavenly perfection.

The prudent and wise man may attempt something of a golden mean between the extremes of the collectivist and individualistic theories and practices, and strive for a world of order in which there is as much freedom as possible compatible with the freedom of others. He will also recognize that the desire for freedom must be matched by a willingness to assume the responsibility which must always go with it.

Classroom Aids and Suggested Reading

A. Questions and Exercises

1. What economic-political conditions of the last two decades helped stimulate widespread interest in public planning?
2. What are the basic aims or goals of public planning? What place, if any, may the masses have in determining the aims or the means of a planned society? What has been their part in overall state planning in Soviet Russia and elsewhere?
3. Is overall state planning compatible with representative democracy? Discuss, pro and con.
4. What are some of the most serious negative implications of state planning today? What are its most evident advantages?
5. How can we preserve flexibility, freedom of choice, and private initiative in a planned society? On the other hand, how can we prevent chaos and social anarchism if we have no plan? In this connection discuss the following question put by W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, in their monograph, *The Polish peasant in Europe and America*, vol. 1, p. 86: "Is there one perfect form of organization that would unify the widest individualism and the strongest social cohesion, that would exclude any abnormality by making use of all human tendencies, that would harmonize the highest efficiency with the greatest happiness?"
6. What are the major features of a national or international crisis which leads the masses to feelings of despair and the consequent willingness to follow those who seize power and who have a plan for stabilizing society again?
7. What, if any, culture patterns of democratic planning might be devised so as to (a) leave the basic decisions of public policy in the hands of the common people, (b) give an adequate place to responsible leadership, (c) provide adequate freedom of invention and enterprise, and (d) prevent the rise of an all-powerful bureaucracy in a planned society?

B. Further Reading

In addition to the citations in the footnotes in this chapter, the following are suggested for supplementary reading:

Colm Brogan, *Our new masters*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1947.

A vigorous critique of socialism in Britain.

D. W. Brogan, *The free state: some considerations of its practical value*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945.

Though written under wartime conditions, this essay contains much that either directly or by implication bears on the subject of state planning.

W. H. Hamilton, "Collectivism," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, 3 : 633-637. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930.

An informative and keenly analytical discussion of the topic as it relates chiefly to the economic order.

Muriel Jaeger, *Liberty versus equality*. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1943.

Also a product of the war years but a stimulating essay which points up the difficulties involved in planning as related to two of the common desiderata of planning: equality and freedom. (Compare with Hayek and with Wootton, cited above.)

A. D. Lindsay, "Individualism," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, *op. cit.*, 1932, 7 : 674-680.

An analysis of the topic in its historical setting, both in the political and in the economic order.

Cleveland Rodgers, *American planning: past-present-future*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947.

An extended essay by an enthusiast for state planning which argues that unless we have planning modern culture is lost.

Guido de Ruggiero, "Liberalism," *Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, *op. cit.*, 9 : 435-442.

An excellent historical and interpretative discussion of the topic by a distinguished Italian scholar.

Glossary¹

Accommodation. Used in two senses: As a condition, a state of equilibrium between individuals or groups in which certain working arrangements have been agreed upon or accepted. As a process, the social adjustment between individuals or groups, aimed at the more or less temporary suspension of conflict. Also called "antagonistic co-operation." Some common forms of accommodation are tolerant participation, compromise, arbitration, and conciliation.

Acculturation. The merging of two or more cultures, ranging from accommodative arrangements to full assimilation or synthesis of cultures. The entire sequence of processes involved in the contact and subsequent intermixture of the traits and patterns of two or more cultures.

Amalgamation. The biological union of previously distinct racial or subracial groups.

Ambivalence. The coexistence in the individual of conflicting impulses, attitudes, feelings, or ideas toward an object, person, or action.

Animism. The belief that all things, animate and inanimate, are endowed with personal power or souls.

Anomie. A condition of the individual marked by normlessness, or want of values and goals, characteristic of members of mass society.

Aryanism. The racist dogma or social myth that the so-called Aryan race is inherently superior to all others and destined to rule the other races.

¹ For a more complete listing of sociological and social-psychological terms see H. P. Fairchild, ed., *Dictionary of sociology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1948; E. B. Reuter, *Handbook of sociology*, Part III, "Dictionary of terms," New York: The Dryden Press, 1941; E. E. Eubank, *The concepts of sociology*, Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1932; also, F. L. Harriman, *The new dictionary of psychology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1947; and H. C. Warren, ed., *Dictionary of psychology*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934.

Assimilation. The fusion of divergent habits, attitudes, and ideas of two or more groups or societies into a common set of habits, attitudes, and ideas. The process usually takes place within the framework of the national state. Not to be confused with *amalgamation*.

Association. A general term to describe a group of interacting persons, sometimes used synonymously to mean a consciously formed group, usually of a secondary sort. Also used to designate special-interest groups, e.g., trade association.

Attitude. The predisposition or tendency to react typically towards a given object, situation, or value; usually accompanied by feelings and emotions.

Behavior pattern. The relatively permanent and typical organization of habits and attitudes into a larger whole, directed toward some object, situation, or purpose.

Capital goods. Those economic goods or forms of wealth used to facilitate or promote the production of consumer goods.

Caste. A closed, endogamous group resulting from stratification in which status in a hierarchy of power relations is defined and permanently fixed by ancestry.

Censorship. The regulation and control of writing, speaking, or any form of communication in terms of group-accepted codes.

Civilization. Those cultures characterized by urban life, usually involving written language, technologies based on the use of metals, and complex economic and political patterns.

Class. A group resulting from stratification in which the status, while often determined at birth or during early life, is not so thoroughly or irrevocably fixed as in caste.

Community. A group living in a given locality or region under the same culture and having some distinctive geographical focus for their major activities.

Compensation. Substitutive behavior wherein responses are built up around some new object

or some new situation as a means of offsetting some actual or imagined weakness or inefficiency.

Competition. The act of striving for some object that is sought for by others at the same time; a contention of two or more persons or groups for the same object often without awareness of the competitors' efforts; in economics, the independent effort of two or more persons or groups to obtain the business or labor patronage of a third person or group by offering more advantageous terms as an inducement to secure the same.

Conditioned response. A learned reaction built up by association or connection of native or learned stimulus and response with a secondary stimulus or response.

Conflict. Direct and open antagonistic struggle of persons or groups for the same object or end. The aim of the conflict is the annihilation, defeat, or subjection of the other person or group, as a means to obtain the goal. In overcoming the other person or group, the goal is often temporarily relegated to a secondary and consequent aim.

Consensus. General accord or agreement in matters of opinion, belief, values, and attitudes.

Consumers' goods. Economic goods or wealth produced for direct use and consumption.

Co-operation. Joint action or working or playing together for a common object or end which may be shared; mutual aid.

Coup de poing. A hand ax or implement made from a stone core, chipped on one or all edges. The basic tool or weapon or implement of the Lower Paleolithic Age.

Covert behavior. Activity or behavior that cannot be observed by another individual, such as memory images, imagination, and feelings, but which must be inferred from *overt* action, or communicated by the individual as a result of his introspection.

Crowd. A temporarily interacting aggregation of persons responding to a common stimulus or situation. (*See Mob.*)

Cultural alternatives. Various possibilities of action with reference to the same object, situation, or problem, all of which are approved by the society in question. In other words, the individual has a choice of a given number of permitted courses of action.

Cultural conditioning. Learning which is predetermined by the culture patterns of a group or society.

Cultural evolution. Changes in culture, usually forming a discernible trend or direction. The term does not necessarily imply any universal stages of change or progress.

Cultural imperatives. Those cultural patterns, found in all societies, which are obviously the outgrowth of basic physiological and social needs.

Cultural island. A more or less integrated community living within a larger society but maintaining little or no relation with the latter. (*See Isolation.*)

Cultural lag. A condition of disequilibrium arising out of an unequal or uneven rate of change in two or more cultural elements which are functionally interrelated.

Cultural specialties. Particular aspects of behavior which characterize members of specialized groups within a larger society; an aspect of high division of labor.

Cultural universals. Those culturalized reactions and beliefs which are expected of every member of a given society and supported by the mores and value systems.

Culture. The precipitates of social interaction seen as a functional whole which provide the form and content of conduct and ideas common to a group, community, or society. It consists of both material and nonmaterial traits and patterns.

Culture patterns. Two or more separate units or traits of culture organized into some more or less constant form or configuration.

Culture systems. Those larger and more or less integrated patterns of culture which characterize a given society or civilization, *e.g.*, Oriental as contrasted to Occidental, or Classical as compared to Medieval in Europe.

Culture trait. The single unit or feature of a culture pattern used in the description and analysis of a given culture.

Definition of the situation. An individual's perception of a given object or feature of the environment which influences his attitudes, ideas, emotions, and actions. It is related to anticipatory reactions or expectancies. Such a prior definition may be culturally or individually determined.

Demography. The statistical study of human populations with particular reference to birth and death rates, age and sex composition, and economic, educational, class, and other distributive aspects of the members of a society.

Diffusion. The spread in space of culture patterns from one society to another.

Displacement. The shift of a drive or reaction from one object, goal, or stimulus to another.

Drive. The impelling force or motive behind an action, either innate or acquired; the first phase of a cycle of activity.

Ecology. The study which deals with the mutual and interacting relations of organisms and their environment. Human ecology deals with the spatial distribution of populations and their culture as these are affected by invasion, succession, segregation, centralization, and related processes.

Elite. The dominant, prestige-bearing and prestige-receiving group or class within a larger society.

Emotion. An aroused or agitated state of mind accompanied by increased physiological activity and strong feelings — pleasant or unpleasant — directed toward some object; for example, fear, anger, love, joy, and sorrow.

Enculturation. The process of inducing the individual into the culture of his group, both in the earlier years, often called *socialization* at this stage, and also in the later years. The emphasis is on the continuing impact of culture upon the individual throughout his life.

Ethnocentrism. Belief that one's race, society, or culture is superior to all others.

Ethos. Those predominant characteristics of a whole culture system which distinguish it from other culture systems.

Eugenics. A program of applied genetics which aims at improvement of the biological, that is, inherited, stock of races, subraces, and families, commonly expressed in positive or negative measures.

Euthenics. A program which aims to improve mankind by providing better environmental conditions through applied social science.

Extroversion. The psychological tendency to turn one's thoughts, interests, and activities toward the external world. The extrovert is the type of person who exhibits such a tendency.

Fantasy thinking. Process of wishful and imaginative thinking which follows personal desires undirected by logic.

Fecundity. The physiological ability to participate in reproduction.

Feeling. An internal state or experience marked by varying degrees of pleasant or unpleasant tone.

Feral man. Untamed, wild, or unsocialized human being; one who has not developed human (social) nature, due to lack of association with other human beings; the product of extreme isolation.

Fertility. The actual use of powers of fecundity; measured by the rate of reproduction.

Folkways. Culturalized habits common to a society, community, or group, including both those with moral sanctions and those which fall outside the mores.

Group. Two or more people in a state of social interaction.

Heredity. Transmission of physical traits from parents to offspring through biological mechanisms, involving genes and chromosomes.

Hormone. Any one of a number of chemical substances produced by the ductless or endocrine glands which empty directly into the lymphatic and blood streams and which influence growth, metabolism, sexuality, emotional reactions, and other adaptive processes.

Human nature. The patterns of behavior or habits, attitudes, and ideas which people acquire in the process of socialization and enculturation. Often confused with original nature, the foundation on which it is built.

Identification. The process of putting oneself in the place of another in imagination or activity.

Inferiority. A sense of inadequacy or insufficiency in regard to some act or situation, as a result of either actual or imagined shortcomings.

In-group (we-group). Any group or society toward which a person has a strong sense of belonging and of common ends; developed by identification. The opposite of Out-group (Others-group).

Institution. A social structure of relatively permanent sort, characterized by certain accepted ways of thinking and acting.

Intelligence. The capacity to learn, or to adjust efficiently to a given situation; especially the ability to foresee or anticipate consequences of an idea, emotion, or action, and to act on such judgment.

Intelligence quotient. A numerical index to denote intellectual capacity; determined by dividing the mental age (as fixed by a score on an intelligence test) by the individual's chronological age.

Interaction. Action and/or communication between individuals involving reciprocal stimulation and response. Relationship set up between two or more people in regard to each other or in regard to some common object or situation.

Introversion. The psychological tendency to turn one's thoughts, interests, and activities away from the external world toward one's own inner world and the products of one's imagination. The introvert is the type of person who exhibits such a tendency.

Invention. The construction or origination of some new device or idea; often closely associated with the discovery of some previously unknown fact in nature or society.

Isolation. State of separation, segregation, or detachment. May be geographic, cultural, or psychological.

Laissez faire. Literally, to let people do as they please or choose. In economics, a theory that economic behavior should be untrammelled by governmental or other community controls or interferences.

Leadership. A status of dominance and prestige acquired by ability to control, initiate, or set the pattern of behavior for others.

Legend. A form of social myth based, in part, on historical fact, dealing chiefly with heroes and events related to the successes and failures of a group or society.

Lethal selection. The differential selectivity of certain diseases or conditions with respect to the death rate.

Life organization. The more or less co-ordinated pattern of habits, ideas, and emotions of the individual related to his role, status, ego ideals, and his self-regard. (See *Personality*.)

Longevity. Length of life, determined by both hereditary and environmental conditions. Demography is concerned chiefly with variations in the average longevity of given groups,

not with the *span of life* of any particular individual.

Marginal man. A person who lives under two somewhat contradictory or conflicting cultures but who participates, in part, in each, thus possessing many of the divergent ideas, attitudes, and habits of these two culture groups. Such a person may or may not be accepted by either group.

Mass society. Modern populations which are chiefly characterized by secondary-group contacts, by high specialization of role and status, by anonymity, high mobility, and impersonal relationships generally. (See *Anomie*; *Urbanism*.)

Mob. An emotionally aroused crowd with some purpose such as attack upon a person, a group, or property; or such as escape from danger, e.g., a panic crowd.

Mobility. (a) "Spatial" mobility refers to daily, seasonal, or other movement. (b) "Social" mobility refers to movement up or down the class scale of status and prestige.

Mores. Folkways or customs which have moral meaning, by which right or wrong, in terms of the welfare of the group, is determined and enforced.

Motive. A more or less conscious impulse or drive to action. While usually derived from such internal conditions as need, emotion, or feeling, certain external situations may serve to set a motive in action.

Myth. Stories and descriptions, largely of an imaginative nature, which provide a group with the meaning of their life and culture. Myths represent the fundamental beliefs, convictions, and values of a group.

Nonliterate. A term applied to a level of culture marked by lack of written language, simple technologies, and relatively simple social organization. A common synonym for this is *preliterate*.

Neolithic age. Literally, "new stone" age; the period of polished stone implements and domestication of plants and animals.

Nordic race theory. The racialist dogma that the Nordic subrace is inherently superior to all other races and destined to rule them. (See *Aryanism*.)

Objective thinking. Logically correct and verifiable thinking not subject to emotional bias. Contrasted to fantasy thinking.

Opinion. Conviction about some person or object which falls short of positive knowledge.

Original nature. The organic structure and corresponding biological functions which the individual possesses at birth. Often confused with human nature.

Out-group (others-group). Any group or society toward which a person feels a strong sense of avoidance and/or opposition. Opposite of In-group.

Overt behavior. Activity or behavior usually marked by responses of the larger skeletal musculature. Behavior observable by another.

Paleolithic age. Literally, "old stone" age; the earliest period of man and culture, usually divided into Lower and Upper. Corresponds roughly to the Pleistocene of geology.

Particularism. The tendency to explain fallaciously complex events or situations by some single, particular cause.

Personal-social conditioning. Learning from social interaction which is not predetermined by culturalized habits and attitudes but which grows out of more or less natural interactions of persons. (*See* Enculturation.)

Personality. Totality of habits, attitudes, ideas, and characteristics of an individual which grow out of the interplay between his constitutional make-up and his role and status in the various groups of which he is a member and which determine his sense of self. (*See* Life organization; Self.)

Pleistocene. The geological period just prior to the present, or Holocene, in which are found the beginnings of man and his culture. Marked by successive glaciation and retreats of the ice in the Northern Hemisphere.

Prejudice. Culturally predetermined, biased attitude toward, or conception of, a person or group.

Prestige. Power or status attributed to an individual or group by others.

Primary group. Basic social group operating in terms of intimate face-to-face contacts. The source of the early personal-social and cultural training which the individual receives from others; for example, in the family, neighborhood, and play group.

Projection. (a) In the psychological sense, the more or less unconscious attributing of motives, traits, ideas, attitudes, and habits to

others. The source of projection is usually one's own repressed motives, attitudes, etc. (b) In statistics, projection refers to the extension of trends of events through time with a view to making predictions of future trends in terms of those of the past, *e.g.*, the business cycle, population growth, and marriage rates. Often presented in graphic form.

Propaganda. Open or veiled suggestions and other means of inducing modification or acceptance of certain beliefs, attitudes, and practices.

Psychosomatic. A term referring to the interrelationships of physical and mental elements in the personality, *e.g.*, in many illnesses both organic and psychological factors interact.

Public. An aggregation of individuals, not necessarily contiguous in space or time, held together through some more or less common interest or common stimulus.

Race. A main biological division of the human species, the members of which have several physical traits in common. There are usually a number of "composite" and sub-races with somewhat distinctive physical characteristics within the larger categories. Race is often confused with society and/or culture.

Racialism. A social myth built up around beliefs in the superiority of one's own race and in its manifest destiny to control or rule other races. (*See* Aryanism.)

Rationalization. Giving a socially acceptable justification or reason for an act really performed from some other motive. Often rationalizations are justifications in terms of what is considered right and proper by one's group.

Resource. A potential good or service, determined largely by the state of the culture and the social expectancies.

Role. The function or action of a person in a particular group, usually directed to some end acceptable to other members of the group. An individual usually has different roles in different groups and these may or may not conflict with each other.

Secondary group. Group or association founded on conscious common interest, not necessarily dependent on face-to-face relations. Many institutions grow out of secondary groups, *e.g.*, state, church, and education.

Self. The sense of individuality built up from drives and cycles of activity as they become associated with role-taking, with getting status, and with learning to view one's habits, attitudes, and ideas as other people do. (*See* Personality.)

Sibling. One of two or more children of the same parents, though not necessarily of the same birth or sex.

Social class. *See* Class.

Social control. Power over members of a group in terms of group-accepted codes, or power over a smaller group by a larger, more inclusive group.

Social distance. Term to express the idea of gradation of one's own group and its values with respect to those of another group; measured by the degree of acceptance and intimacy of contact. Implies sense of superiority of one group over the other.

Social expectancy. The belief or expectation that another or others will perform a certain act or take a particular attitude; developed from anticipatory responses built up in social interaction.

Social organization. More or less standardized or conventionalized form or structure of group life; develops out of persistent, repeated, and common drives and interactions.

Social process. Mode of action, operation, or interaction among individuals or groups that come into contact.

Social status. *See* Status.

Social value. *See* Value.

Socialization. The interactional process by which the individual learns the social-cultural qualities (habits, ideas, attitudes, etc.) that make him a member of society and hence a human being. (*See* Enculturation; Personal-social conditioning.)

Society. The general term for men living in social relations. More specifically, the largest social group or aggregate in which more or less common culture patterns are found, covering the fundamental institutions.

Sovereignty. As applied to the national state, the doctrine or social myth that the state has supreme and final power or authority.

Statism. The theory that the state is supreme over the national society.

Status. Relative position, rank, or standing of a person in a group, or of a group in reference to some other group or groups.

Stereotype. A group-accepted but logically false image or concept, usually expressed as a cliché, with which is associated a strong feeling-emotional tone.

Stratification. The process of forming caste, class, or other status-giving groups, or of determining level or plane of status for the individual within a group, community, or society.

Sublimation. Form of substitute behavior which is socially or ethically acceptable.

Symbol. Any object, picture, gesture, sign, mark, printed or written matter, or sound, which stands for another, or serves to recall another, and which directs mental and actional associations.

Totalitarianism. A political theory and practice which holds that the state or government shall dominate and control all the important phases of public and personal life. Totalistic theories tend to make the state coterminous and coequal with national society.

Universe of discourse. The common and shared world of words and the meanings of ideas, attitudes, and values of society or a group.

Urbanism. A condition of society and culture in which ideas, attitudes, and habits tend to be impersonal and largely determined by individualized wants. There is high mobility and high specialization of role and status. Usually associated with city life. (*See* Anomie; Mass society.)

Utopia. Group-accepted myth or fantasy about some future ideal society and culture.

Value. The quality of desirability (or undesirability) believed to inhere in an idea, object, or action. Values are accepted, in time, by the group in certain orders of priority.

Index of Authors

(FOR INDEX OF SUBJECTS, SEE PAGE 629.)

- Abrams, Ray H., 335
Adams, Abigail, 489-490
Adams, W. A., 531-532
Adler, Alfred, 112
Adler, Mortimer J., 368, 369
Ainsworth, H. F., 473
Alberty, Harold, 370
Alihan, Milla A., 271, 277
Alinsky, Saul D., 287
Allport, G. W., 99, 126, 383
Anastasi, Anne, 97, 259, 484, 485
Anderson, E. L., 526
Anderson, H. D., 407, 522-523
Anderson, Nels, 244, 315
Anderson, Sherwood, 26
Anderson, William A., 261
Angell, Norman, 457, 458
Angell, R. C., 285, 325, 514, 515
Angyal, András, 112
Appleby, Paul H., 426
Arensberg, Conrad M., 328
Arnold, T. W., 421, 438
- Baber, R. E., 347
Babson, Roger W., 378
Baker, O. E., 245-246
Baker-Crothers, Hayes, 489, 490
Baldwin, H. W., 444
Barker, R. G., 505
Barnard, Chester I., 508
Bartlett, F. C., 173, 485
Barton, Glen T., 246, 247, 248, 249
Barzun, J., 183
Bates, Alan, 334
Bates, Ernest S., 386
Beard, Charles A., 254
Beard, Mary, 492
Becker, Carl, 579, 594
Becker, Howard, 48, 348, 474-475
Bell, E. H., 262
Bell, H. M., 357, 473
Bell, H. W., 222
Bendix, Reinhard, 426
Benedict, Ruth, 38, 48, 499
Bennett, John W., 253, 518
Berle, A. A., Jr., 405, 421
Bernal, J. D., 576, 598
- Bernard, Jessie, 348
Bernard, L. L., 541
Bertillon, Jacques, 218
Beveridge, Lord, 227
Bienstock, Gregory, 258, 416, 584, 585
Bingham, W. V., 472
Bird, Charles, 503
Blumenthal, Albert, 264
Boas, Franz, 40, 165, 183, 396
Boehm, Max H., 441
Bogardus, E. S., 379, 513
Boisen, A. T., 384
Bollinger, Russell V., 362
Booth, Charles, 589
Boring, E. G., 99
Borsodi, Ralph, 246
Bossard, J. H. S., 335, 480
Bowlby, J., 460
Bowman, Henry A., 348
Bradford, L. P., 507
Braidwood, Robert J., 172
Brand, Lord, 604
Brandt, Karl, 608
Brennan, C. O., 245
Brickner, R. M., 48
Brill, A. A., 112
Brinkmann, Carl, 576
Brinton, Crane, 458
Brodell, A. P., 248
Brogan, Colm, 613
Brogan, D. W., 438, 613
Brookover, Wilbur, 362
Brown, Francis J., 370
Bruner, J. S., 108-109
Brunner, Edmund deS., 265
Bryson, L., 459
Buck, Pearl, 264
Bunzel, Ruth L., 400
Burch, G. I., 209
Burgess, E. W., 61, 82, 222, 277, 323, 329, 331, 332, 333, 334, 337, 338, 339, 348, 580
Burks, Barbara, 95
Burrows, H. H., 290
Bury, J. B., 579
Bushee, Frederick A., 283
Butterfield, K. L., 22
Byrns, R., 498

- Calverton, V. F., 314, 493
 Campbell, J. C., 259
 Campbell, Macfie, 126
 Canady, H. G., 176
 Cantril, Hadley, 99, 103, 110
 Carmichael, Leonard, 84, 91, 92
 Carpenter, C. R., 18
 Carpenter, J. E., 377
 Carpenter, Niles, 266, 274-275
 Carr, E. H., 458
 Carr, Lowell J., 14, 514
 Carr-Saunders, A. M., 184
 Case, Clarence M., 580, 583
 Case, H. W., 448
 Case, S. J., 386
 Catlin, G. E. G., 510, 607-608
 Cavan, Ruth S., 280, 325, 348
 Cayton, H. R., 288, 532
 Centers, Richard, 527-528
 Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., 552
 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 178
 Chapin, F. S., 513
 Charles, Enid, 216, 217
 Chave, E. J., 386
 Child, C. M., 90
 Childe, V. G., 170
 Childs, H. L., 607-608
 Childs, Marquis W., 610
 Christensen, Harold T., 222
 Ciocco, Antonio, 221, 230, 482
 Clark, John Maurice, 550, 559
 Clark, L. Pierce, 229
 Clarkson, J. D., 462
 Clay, Henry, 494
 Clinard, Marshall B., 280
 Cochran, T. C., 462
 Coker, F. W., 441
 Cole, G. D. H., 589
 Collins, A., 178
 Collins, S. D., 259
 Condorcet, Marquis de, 578
 Conrad, Laetitia M., 325
 Conybeare, F. C., 386
 Cook, Lloyd A., 370
 Cooley, C. H., 30, 72, 81, 124, 267, 512, 516
 Cooper, Martin R., 246, 247, 248, 249
 Cottam, H. R., 261, 263
 Cottrell, Leonard S., Jr., 222, 337, 338, 339
 Counts, George S., 351, 352
 Cowdry, E. V., 477
 Cox, La Wanda F., 253
 Cox, Oliver C., 529
 Crawford, M. P., 71
 Crickman, C. W., 247, 249
 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 600
 Crocker, L. H., 289
 Crutchfield, R. S., 460, 503
 Curie, Enid, 317-318
 Cushman, Robert E., 559
 Dale, Henry, 462
 Dallin, David, 519
 Darwin, Charles, 65, 186
 Dashiell, J. F., 99
 Davidson, P. E., 407, 522-523
 Davie, Maurice R., 203, 277, 444
 Davies, Blodwen, 382, 383
 Davis, Allison, 529, 533
 Davis, Katherine B., 338
 Davis, Kingsley, 114-115, 184, 185, 222, 288, 478, 512
 Dawson, John B., 280
 Dayton, Neil A., 229
 Dearborn, W. F., 472
 de Grazia, Sebastian, 439
 De Gruchy, Clare, 477
 de Jouvenel, Bertrand, 462
 Dennis, Wayne, 61, 62
 Deutsch, Albert, 318
 Deutsch, Karl M., 459
 Dewey, John, 368, 369, 402, 582
 Dewey, Richard, 294
 Dewhurst, J. Frederic, 279, 282, 359, 392, 393, 407, 409, 410, 411, 576, 592
 Dickinson, Robert E., 292, 310
 Dickson, W. J., 414, 554
 Dimnet, Ernest, 14
 Dixon, R. B., 561
 Dobzhansky, Th., 91
 Doering, Carl R., 229
 Dolan, Helen H., 229
 Dollard, John, 61, 133, 529, 530
 Donnison, C. P., 483
 Doob, Leonard W., 67, 72
 Dorn, Harold F., 229
 Drake, St. Clair, 288, 532
 Dressler-Andress, H., 388
 Drucker, P., 439
 Dublin, Louis I., 228
 Ducoff, Louis J., 253
 Duff, J. F., 497
 Dunbar, H. Flanders, 482
 Dunham, H. W., 285
 Dunlap, Knight, 386
 Dunn, L. D., 91
 Durand, John D., 212, 213, 214, 323, 407
 Durand, L., 138, 141
 Duranty, Walter, 25
 Durbin, E. F. M., 460
 Duvall, Evelyn R., 348
 Eaton, J. W., 244

- Edin, Karl Arvid, 220
 Edwards, Allen D., 240-241, 245
 Edwards, Lyford P., 434
 Eells, K., 525
 Eldridge, Hope T., 300, 310
 Ellis, Havelock, 402
 Ellsworth, John S., 335
 Ellsworth, R. H., 256, 257
 Embree, John F., 58
 Engels, Friedrich, 534-535
 Erikson, E. H., 48
 Ernst, Morris L., 318
 Eubank, E. E., 615
 Evans, Bergen, 113
 Evans, W., 316
 Everett, Helen, 559
 Ewing, J. A., 248
 Eysenck, H. J., 112
 Ezekiel, Mordecai, 602

 Fairchild, H. P., 7, 183, 236, 615
 Faris, Ellsworth, 39
 Faris, R. E. L., 285
 Febvre, Lucien, 158
 Feinsinger, N. P., 345
 Field, H., 366
 Fine, Benjamin, 357
 Firey, Walter, 277, 286
 Fishbein, Morris, 348
 Fiske, John, 180
 Flagg, Grace L., 250, 251, 252, 303
 Flanagan, John C., 222, 223
 Fleming, G. W. T. H., 499
 Florinsky, Michael T., 587
 Folsom, Joseph K., 348
 Forde, C. D., 158
 Form, William H., 524
 Fortune, Reo F., 42
 Foth, Joseph H., 552
 Frank, Lawrence K., 320
 Frazier, E. Franklin, 328, 531, 532, 533
 Freeman, Frank N., 95, 97
 French, J. R. P., Jr., 507
 Freud, Sigmund, 384, 448
 Freyd, Max, 499
 Fromm, Erich, 48
 Fuller, R. G., 94

 Galloway, George B., 602
 Gardner, B. B., 529
 Gardner, M. R., 529
 Garside, E. B., 485
 Geddes, D. P., 317-318
 Geddes, Patrick, 292
 Gesell, Arnold, 5, 84, 113
 Gideonse, H. D., 369

 Gilfillan, S. C., 572
 Gillespie, James M., 383
 Gillin, J. L., 81
 Gillin, John P., 40, 81, 166, 314
 Gist, Noel P., 283
 Glick, Paul C., 321, 322, 323, 383
 Glover, E., 460
 Glück, Elsie, 493
 Gobineau, Arthur, Comte de, 178
 Goddard, H. H., 94
 Godwin, William, 186-187, 579
 Goetsch, Helen B., 358
 Goldenweiser, Alexander, 40, 476, 579
 Goldhamer, H., 512
 Goncharov, N. K., 351, 354
 Goodenough, F. L., 497
 Goodman, C. C., 108-109
 Goodsell, Willystine, 328, 330
 Gorer, Geoffrey, 48
 Gowin, E. B., 478
 Grant, Madison, 180
 Gras, N. S. B., 579
 Gregory, W. K., 163
 Griffin, J. I., 418
 Gross, Llewellyn, 514
 Gruenberg, S. M., 325
 Grunsfeld, Mary-Jane, 361
 Gudernatsch, J. F., 91

 Haggerty, M. E., 497
 Hagood, Margaret J., 253
 Hajnal, J., 220
 Halbert, L. A., 283
 Hall, G. Stanley, 477
 Hallenbeck, W. C., 350
 Halliday, James L., 483
 Hambly, W. D., 350
 Hamilton, Walton H., 81, 613
 Hamsun, Knut, 265
 Hankins, Frank H., 93, 183, 224
 Haring, D. C., 204
 Harper, F. A., 189, 205
 Harriman, P. L., 615
 Harris, Chauncy D., 293-294
 Harris, Seymour E., 367
 Harrison, H. S., 561
 Harrison, Jane, 397
 Hartley, E. L., 48, 61, 133, 507
 Hartmann, G. W., 527
 Hartshorne, E. Y., 30
 Hatt, Paul K., 271, 273, 276, 521, 522
 Hauser, Philip M., 274, 300, 310
 Havighurst, Robert J., 358, 533
 Hawley, A. H., 280
 Hayek, Frederick A., 600
 Hayes, Carlton J. H., 441

- Hayes, Wayland J., 265
 Heaton, H., 421, 590
 Heisig, Carl P., 247, 249
 Helmer, Velma, 176
 Henmon, V. A. C., 498
 Herring, Pendleton, 424
 Herskovits, M. J., 4-5, 32, 64, 79, 290, 314, 396, 421, 560, 561
 Hertzler, J. O., 187, 581, 583
 Heyl, Bernard C., 402
 Hilferty, Margaret M., 229
 Hilgard, E. R., 105
 Hill, Mozell C., 532
 Hill, Reuben, 348
 Hiller, E. T., 465
 Hinds, J. H., 259
 Hintze, H., 291
 Hitler, Adolf, 155, 179, 182, 587
 Hochwalt, Frederick G., 380
 Hogben, L., 194, 236
 Hollis, Christopher, 602
 Holzinger, Karl, 95, 97
 Hook, Sidney, 609
 Hooton, E. A., 160, 166, 168
 Hoover, Herbert, 458
 Hopkin, W. A. B., 220
 Horney, Karen, 524
 Horowitz, E. L., 172, 173
 Hoslett, S. D., 414, 507
 Hough, R. B., 448
 Hovland, C. I., 448
 Howells, William W., 160, 166, 167, 172, 386
 Hoyt, Homer, 276
 Hoyt, W. D., 90
 Hsu, Francis L. K., 1, 2, 58
 Hudnut, Ruth A., 489, 490
 Hull, C. L., 105
 Humphrey, Norman D., 529
 Huntington, Ellsworth, 138
 Huntington, J. F., 462
 Hurd, Richard M., 267, 277
 Hutchins, R. M., 368, 369
 Hyman, H. H., 524

 Infield, Henrik F., 258
 Inglis, Ruth, 553
 Innis, John W., 220

 Jacks, G. V., 141, 198
 Jaederholm, G., 95
 Jaeger, Muriel, 614
 Jaffe, A. J., 215
 James, John, 277
 James, William, 125, 383, 462
 Jefferson, Mark, 269
 Jennings, Helen M., 510
 Jennings, H. S., 88, 98, 175, 233
 Jewkes, John, 595, 600, 602
 John, M. E., 260
 Johnson, Alvin, 590
 Johnson, Charles S., 480, 532
 Johnson, Sherman E., 247
 Jones, Alfred W., 528
 Joseph, Alice, 175
 Joslyn, C. S., 502
 Juneke, O. W., 259
 Junker, B. H., 531-532
 Juran, J. M., 426

 Kahane, J., 602
 Kallen, H. M., 609-610
 Kandel, I. L., 351
 Kaplan, Oscar J., 477
 Kardiner, Abram, 68
 Karpinos, B. D., 218, 219
 Katz, S. M., 244
 Kaufman, Harold F., 525
 Kecskemeti, P., 48, 55
 Keller, A. G., 581, 582
 Keller, Helen, 116-117
 Kellogg, L. A., 118
 Kellogg, P. U., 591
 Kellogg, W. N., 118
 Kempf, G. A., 259
 Kendall, P. L., 366
 Kennedy, Ruby Jo Reeves, 335
 Kephart, H., 259
 Key, Cora B., 97
 Kieran, John, 374
 Kimball, Solon T., 328
 Kinneman, John A., 265
 Kinsey, A. C., 218, 317, 318
 Kirkpatrick, Clifford, 328, 491
 Kiser, Clyde V., 215, 217, 219, 221, 223
 Kiser, Louise K., 236, 237
 Klineberg, Otto, 173, 175-176, 183, 485
 Klingender, Francis D., 402
 Kluckhohn, Clyde, 40, 99, 426, 534
 Knight, F. H., 439
 Knox, J. H. M., Jr., 229
 Köhler, Wolfgang, 18, 71
 Kohn, Hans, 180, 441, 474
 Kolb, John H., 240, 265
 Kolb, William L., 30, 522
 Kollmorgen, W. M., 260
 Komarovskiy, Mirra, 284
 Koontz, H. D., 551
 Kornhauser, A. W., 526-527
 Krech, David, 460, 503
 Kreps, T. J., 573
 Kroeber, A. L., 31, 32, 38, 79, 560
 Kropotkin, P. A., 70

- Kuczynski, R. R., 194, 209
 Kurtz, Russell H., 280, 390
- Laidler, Harry W., 579, 585, 589
 Landis, J. T., 339, 348
 Landis, Mary G., 348
 Landis, Paul H., 209, 542
 Langdon-Davies, John, 492
 LaPiere, R. T., 454
 Laski, Harold J., 426
 Lasswell, Harold D., 82, 426, 439, 504, 510
 Lawsing, Margaret, 30
 Lawton, George, 477, 480, 481
 Lazarsfeld, P. F., 325, 366
 Lederer, Emil, 30
 Lee, Alfred M., 538
 Lee, Harry B., 396, 400
 Leigh, Robert D., 370
 Leites, Nathan, 48, 55
 Leonard, Olen, 244
 Lescarbours, A. C., 574
 Leuba, James H., 382-383
 Leven, M., 592
 Levine, J. M., 107
 Lewin, Kurt, 505, 506
 Leyburn, James G., 538
 Li, C. H., 90
 Lilienthal, David E., 305, 595
 Lindsay, A. D., 614
 Lindsey, Ben, 316
 Lindstrom, D. E., 255
 Linebarger, P. M. A., 558
 Linton, Ralph, 39, 58, 68, 78-79, 99, 144, 158, 399, 468, 477, 494, 561
 Lippincott, B. E., 430
 Lippitt, Ronald, 505, 507
 Lippmann, Walter, 428
 Locke, H. J., 61, 323, 326, 329, 331, 332, 333, 334, 339, 345
 Lodge, Nucia P., 351
 Loeb, Martin B., 358
 Loomis, C. P., 244
 Lorimer, Frank, 236, 237
 Lorwin, Lewis L., 595
 Loth, David, 318
 Lotka, Alfred J., 228
 Lowdermilk, W. C., 258
 Lowie, R. H., 313, 423
 Lumley, F. E., 544, 546
 Lundberg, George A., 14, 30, 513
 Lunt, P. S., 525, 526
 Lynd, Helen M., 288, 526
 Lynd, Robert S., 288, 526
- McCormick, T. C., 243
 MacDonald, H., 497
- McDougall, William, 125, 180
 McDowell, A. J., 229
 McGee, W. G., 70-71
 McGraw, Myrtle B., 84
 McGregor, Douglas, 507
 McGregor, J. H., 165
 McGuire, Martin R. P., 380
 MacIver, R. M., 429
 McKain, Walter C., Jr., 250, 251, 252, 303
 Mackay, R. W. G., 595
 Mackaye, Percy, 259
 MacKenzie, F., 602, 609
 MacKenzie, R. D., 270-271, 273
 Mackinder, H. J., 154
 MacLeish, Kenneth, 240, 241, 514, 524-525, 526
 MacLeod, W. C., 423
 McWilliams, Carey, 253
 Maguinness, Olive D., 88
 Mahan, A. T., 154
 Maher, Helen C., 229
 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 31, 313-314
 Malthus, Thomas R., 187-188
 Malzberg, B., 94
 Mangus, A. R., 261, 263
 Mannheim, Karl, 24, 595, 596, 601, 609
 March, Lucien, 230
 Marquis, D. G., 99, 105
 Martin, Lillian J., 477
 Martin, P. W., 605
 Marx, Karl, 534-535
 Mather, W. G., Jr., 242, 246
 Matthews, M. Taylor, 259
 May, Mark A., 67, 72, 460
 Mayo, Elton, 414
 Mead, George H., 125
 Mead, Margaret, 22, 42, 43, 48, 67, 317, 350, 470, 487, 493, 563
 Means, Gardner C., 405, 421, 430
 Meeker, M., 525
 Meier, Norman C., 402
 Mendieta y Nuñez, Lucio, 512
 Merriam, C. E., 439, 459
 Merrill, Francis E., 348
 Merton, R. K., 30, 426
 Meusel, Alfred, 439
 Meyerhoff, Howard A., 144, 145, 147
 Miles, C. C., 485-486
 Miles, W. R., 476
 Mill, John Stuart, 611
 Miller, Delbert C., 524
 Miller, H. A., 82
 Miller, Nathan, 350, 468
 Miller, Neal E., 133
 Mills, C. Wright, 524
 Miner, Horace, 328

- Mitchell, B. C., 95
 Mombert, Paul, 538
 Montmasson, J. M., 576
 Moore, H. E., 310
 Moore, W. E., 202, 414
 Moreno, J. L., 507
 Morgan, E. L., 22
 Morgan, E. P., 90
 Morgan, Lewis Henry, 579
 Morgenthau, Hans J., 458
 Moriyama, I. M., 232
 Mott, Frederick D., 262
 Mowrer, Ernest R., 345
 Muenzinger, Karl, 105
 Mukerjee, R., 189, 203
 Müller, F. Max, 516
 Muller, H. J., 87-88, 90
 Mumford, Lewis, 289
 Munch, Peter A., 259
 Munn, N. L., 99, 105
 Murchison, Carl, 470
 Murdock, G. P., 277, 488
 Murphy, Gardner, 73, 99, 107, 124, 460, 513
 Murphy, Lois B., 73, 99, 124, 513
 Murray, H. A., 99, 112, 426, 534
 Myrdal, Alva, 328
 Myrdal, Gunnar, 237, 520

 Nash, H. B., 497
 Nathan, Peter, 48
 Neely, Wayne C., 332.
 Nelson, Lowry, 244, 253, 256, 257
 Neumann, F. L., 588
 Newcomb, T. M., 48, 61, 73, 99, 124, 133,
 330, 507, 513, 527
 Newman, H. H., 96-97
 Newsholme, Sir Arthur, 218
 Niceforo, Alfredo, 580
 Nimkoff, M. F., 82, 332, 334, 339, 344, 563
 Nishimoto, Richard S., 326, 536
 Norcross, Harry C., 250
 North, C. C., 470, 512, 521, 522
 Northrop, F. S. C., 38, 580
 Notestein, Frank W., 185, 203, 204, 207, 219,
 221
 Nottingham, Elizabeth K., 486
 Nourse, E. G., 592

 Odum, H. W., 310
 Ogburn, W. F., 82, 152, 270, 278, 279, 294,
 462, 563, 564, 568, 572, 576, 582, 596
 O'Malley, L. S. S., 516, 517
 Ortega y Gasset, J., 30
 Osborn, Fairfield, 141, 189, 198
 Osborn, Frederick, 237
 Osborn, H. F., 163

 Ovsiankina, M., 102
 Oxnam, G. Bromley, 383

 Pareto, Vilfredo, 537
 Park, Robert E., 82, 276, 530, 580
 Parkins, A. E., 138
 Parsons, Talcott, 55, 204, 377, 512, 537
 Patrick, G. T. W., 108
 Patterson, J. T., 89
 Pearl, Raymond, 224, 227, 228
 Pearse, Innes H., 289
 Pearson, F. A., 189, 205
 Pearson, Karl, 95
 Pendell, E., 209
 Pennington, L. A., 448
 Perkins, H. F., 224
 Pigou, A. C., 602
 Pinkley, G., 163
 Pitt-Rivers, G. H. L. F., 220
 Polanyi, Michael, 598
 Pollak, Otto, 477, 481
 Pollock, H. M., 94
 Pool, Phoebe, 589
 Poponoe, Paul, 334
 Porteus, S. D., 73
 Pound, Roscoe, 425, 559
 Powdermaker, Hortense, 533-534
 Powers, Edwin, 286
 Powers, Grover F., 229
 Price, J. S., 175
 Prince, Morton, 125
 Pruden, Durward, 30

 Rainey, H. P., 473
 Ranck, K. H., 325
 Randall, John Herman, Jr., 578, 583
 Randolph, L. F., 90
 Rather, A. W., 602
 Ratzel, F., 154
 Rauschenbusch, Walter, 378
 Reckless, W. C., 280
 Redfield, Robert, 33, 58, 79, 238
 Reiser, Oliver L., 382, 383
 Renner, George T., 149
 Reuter, E. B., 7, 194, 615
 Reves, Emery, 458
 Ribble, Margaretha A., 480
 Richmond, W. Kenneth, 353
 Riggs, A. F., 402
 Riis, Jacob, 591
 Riviere, J., 384
 Robbins, Lionel, 602, 605
 Robson-Scott, W. D., 384
 Rodgers, Cleveland, 614
 Roemer, Milton I., 262
 Roethlisberger, F. J., 414, 554

- Rosanoff, A. J., 94
 Rose, Arnold, 528, 538
 Rose, Caroline, 528
 Rosen, L. F., 576
 Rosen, S. McK., 576
 Ross, E. A., 186, 188, 259, 380, 489, 544
 Rothney, J. W. M., 472
 Rothschild, Edward F., 399
 Rouček, J. S., 542
 Rowntree, B. S., 589
 Ruch, Floyd L., 99, 105
 Rugg, Harold, 359, 369
 Ruggiero, Guido de, 614
 Rumney, Judah, 30
 Russell, J. C., 185
 Russell, William F., 286
- Sabine, G. H., 439
 Sallume, X., 221
 Salz, Arthur, 510
 Sanderson, D., 240, 242, 243, 246
 Santayana, George, 56, 402
 Sapir, Edward, 61, 133
 Sauer, Carl O., 170
 Sauvy, Alfred, 212, 214
 Scheinfeld, Amran, 87, 90, 93, 230, 481, 482
 Schermerhorn, R. A., 538
 Schmalhausen, S. D., 314, 493
 Schmidt, R., 510
 Schmiedeler, Edgar, 348
 Schnepf, Gerald J., 334
 Schroeder, Clarence W., 285
 Schultz, T. W., 198, 608
 Schwartz, Harry, 585
 Schwarz, O. L., 502
 Schwarz, S. M., 258, 584, 585
 Seashore, R. H., 6
 Selekmán, B. M., 414
 Selzner, C., 388
 Selznick, Philip, 426, 595
 Semple, Ellen, 158
 Shaffer, L. F., 99, 103
 Shaw, C. R., 281
 Shepard, W. J., 439
 Sherif, M., 99, 103, 133, 485
 Sherman, Mandel, 97
 Shils, E., 512
 Shryock, Henry S., Jr., 300, 310
 Sikes, E. H., 585, 586, 588
 Simon, E. D., 589
 Sims, N. L., 581, 583
 Singh, J. A. L., 113
 Slichter, Sumner, 418, 421
 Small, Albion W., 70
 Smith, Rockwell C., 386
 Smith, T. Lynn, 209, 244
- Snyder, L. L., 180
 Snyder, R. C., 439
 Sombart, Werner, 421
 Somervell, D. C., 38, 578
 Sorokin, P. A., 38, 519, 578
 Spengler, J. J., 186, 187, 198, 202, 415, 437, 459
 Spengler, Oswald, 38, 578
 Stagner, Ross, 99, 103
 Stalin, Joseph, 607-608
 Steffens, Lincoln, 591
 Stein, Leo, 400
 Steinbeck, John, 253
 Stephenson, Flora, 589
 Stern, B. J., 493, 571
 Stevenson, T. H. C., 218
 Stewart, George R., 238
 Stewart, M. S., 480
 Stieglitz, Edward J., 477
 Stoddard, Lothrop, 180
 Stott, Leland H., 263
 Stouffer, S. A., 217, 325, 335, 448
 Stowell, W. L., 229
 Strachey, John, 607
 Strauss, Anselm, 333
 Streit, Clarence, 458
 Stroup, Herbert H., 279
 Sumner, William G., 37, 454, 581, 582
 Sutherland, Edwin H., 280
 Sutherland, R. L., 82, 533
- Taeuber, Conrad, 300, 310
 Taeuber, Irene B., 204
 Taeusch, Carl F., 556
 Tate, Leland B., 261
 Taussig, F. W., 502, 562
 Tawney, R. H., 377, 378
 Taylor, Carl C., 253, 265
 Taylor, Henry Osborn, 329, 330
 Taylor, Horace, 415
 Terman, L. M., 334, 337, 338, 339, 485-486
 Terpenning, W. A., 244
 Thayer, V. T., 381
 Thomas, Dorothy Swaine, 326, 536
 Thomas, Franklin, 158
 Thomas, W. I., 10, 103, 373, 487, 488
 Thompson, Laura, 175
 Thompson, Warren S., 188, 189, 190, 192, 196, 205, 207, 215, 218, 219, 222, 230
 Thomson, G. H., 497
 Thorndike, Edward L., 285
 Thouless, R. H., 14
 Todd, A. J., 581, 583
 Tolman, E. C., 460
 Tolstoy, Leo, 402
 Townsend, T. H., 242, 246

- Toynbee, Arnold J., 38, 578
Tozzer, Alfred M., 466
Trewartha, G. T., 141
Truxal, Andrew G., 348
Tumin, Melvin W., 518
Turner, Frederick J., 304
Tylor, E. B., 31

Ullman, Edward, 267
Updegraff, Harland, 358

Vance, R. B., 604
van Gennep, A., 470
Veblen, Thorstein, 556, 561
Vernon, P. E., 223
Vincent, Melvin J., 75
Visher, Stephen S., 502
Vogt, William, 141, 189, 198
Vold, George B., 280
von Mises, L., 426, 602
von Taysen, A. H., 445

Wagner, D. O., 378, 579
Waldron, Gloria, 576
Walker, F. A., 415
Wallace, H. A., 90, 458
Waller, Willard, 325, 348
Wallin, Paul, 334
Wallis, Wilson D., 374, 583
Ward, Barbara, 601, 602, 604, 605, 609
Ward, Harry F., 379, 380, 607
Ward, Lester F., 582
Ware, Carolyn, 289
Warner, W. Lloyd, 358, 524, 525, 526, 529, 531-532
Warren, H. C., 7, 615
Watson, Goodwin, 448
Weatherley, Ulysses G., 583
Weber, Max, 55, 377
Weeks, H. Ashley, 344
Weinstein, A., 98
Welles, Sumner, 458
Werner, Heinz, 173, 485
West, James, 265, 525
West, Ranyard, 460
Whelpton, P. K., 211, 213, 215, 217, 219, 223, 320, 355, 356
Whetten, N. L., 258
Whipple, Maurine, 315

Whitaker, D. M., 90
Whitaker, J. R., 138, 141
Whitbeck, R. H., 138, 141
White, Andrew D., 382
White, Llewellyn, 370
White, Ralph K., 460, 505
Whitney, David D., 98
Whyte, R. O., 141, 198
Whyte, W. F., 289, 414
Wiernan, Henry N., 386
Willcox, Walter F., 184, 580
Willey, Roy Deverl, 366
Williams, F. M., 595, 596, 600, 602
Williams, J. M., 241
Willkie, Wendell L., 458
Wilson, Dr. A. T. M., 228
Wilson, H. H., 439
Wilson, Logan, 30, 522
Wilson, M. L., 246
Winch, Robert F., 333
Winston, Ellen E., 236, 237
Wirth, Louis, 33, 270, 284
Wissler, Clark, 290
Wolfe, A. B., 206, 209, 503-504
Woodward, J. L., 82
Woodworth, R. S., 95-96, 99, 105
Woofter, T. J., Jr., 244, 245
Woolley, Helen B. Thompson, 485
Wootton, Barbara, 601, 602, 604, 608
Wright, H. Myles, 589
Wright, Quincy, 450

Yerkes, Ada W., 18
Yerkes, Robert M., 18
Yerushalmy, Jacob, 226
Yesipov, B. P., 351, 354
Young, Donald, 528
Young, Helen Ann, 366
Young, Jacqueline, 383
Young, K., 99, 111, 240, 342, 345, 362, 399, 429, 485, 502, 503, 504, 526, 545, 558
Yugow, Aaron, 258, 584, 585, 586

Ziegler, Jesse H., 259
Zimmerman, C. C., 328
Zingg, R. M., 113
Zipf, George K., 286
Zorbaugh, Harvey W., 289
Zuckerman, S., 18

Index of Subjects

(FOR INDEX OF AUTHORS, SEE PAGE 621)

- Accommodation, acculturation, amalgamation, assimilation, and, 78-79; color-caste relations and, 536; following industrial conflict, 418-419; for peace, 454-457; forms of, 75-77; immigrant, 271-274
- Acculturation, assimilation, amalgamation, and, 78-79
- Age, conflicts of, 478-479; death rates related to, 225-229; differences in, and role and status, 467-479; population and changes in composition of, 212-215; problems of old, 476-477
- Aggression, childhood, 128-130; culture and, 45-48; frustration and, 66-67, 122-123; leadership and, 500-501
- Air Age, geographic factors in, 148-149; social-cultural effects of, 149-150; stimulation to peace, 451, 606
- Amalgamation, 78
- Ambivalence, 128; attitudes and, 110; displacement of attitudes and, 128-129; integration of personality and, 129-130; of opposition and human co-operation, 72
- Anthropology, 11-12; sociology and, 12; *see also* Culture
- Apes, learning of, compared to human, 118-121; social life among, 18-20
- Archeology, *see* Prehistory
- Army, as disciplined form of mass power, 444; *see also* War
- Art, *see* Esthetic experience
- Aryanism, *see* Racism
- Assimilation, 77-78; acculturation, amalgamation, and, 78-79; segregation and, 273-274
- Association, *see* Group life, Mass society, Primary group, Secondary group, Inter-action
- Atomic Age, extension of social control in, 552; geographic factors in, 150-152; need for peace in, 606; social-cultural effects of, 151-153
- Attitude, 110; ambivalence and, 110; place of, in invention, 563
- Authoritarianism *vs.* democracy, 49-57
- Birth rate, changes in, 194-196; differentials in, 215-224; education affected by, 214, 355-356; industrialization and, 201-202, 203-204; national differences in, 194-195; occupation and, 219-221; psychological factors in, 222-224; regional aspects of, 301-302; religion and, 217-218; social status and, 218-222; war and, 195, 227-228; *see also* Population
- Bureaucracy, 425-428
- Business cycle, 406-407
- Business enterprise, applied to farming, 246-249; cities and, 281; consumers and, 412-413; corporate form of, 404, 405; individual proprietorship form of, 404; laissez faire and, 415, 416, 596; partnership form of, 404; profit motive in, 404; religion and, 377-379
- Capitalism, *see* Business enterprise
- Caste system, among certain nonliterate peoples, 516; Hindu, 516-517; in Ancient World, 517-518; Negro-white (color-caste), in United States, 529-534, 535, 536
- Censorship, as social control, 397-398, 544, 546
- Children, differentiation of role of, 468-470; divorce and, 345-346; growth of independence and responsibility in, 342; need for security, status, and companionship in, 341; socialization, 468-470; status of, 468-470; training of, in family, 340-342, 468-470
- Chromosomes, 84-85
- Churches, 260, 375; *see also* Denominations
- Cities, *see* Urban community
- Civilization, as phase of culture, 32; *see also* Culture
- Class structure, age differentiation and, 466, 468; among Negroes in United States, 531-532; among nonliterate peoples, 516; anxiety-producing aspects of open-class form of, 523-524; aspects of, in United States, 524-528; color-caste and, in United States, 529-534; color-caste and conflict within America, 535-536; feudal society

- and, 518; general features of, 512-513; Hindu, 516-517; in ancient Mediterranean societies, 517-518; in modern Europe, 518-520; mass society and, 536-537; minority groups and, 528-534; mobility in, 519, 522-523, 537; occupational ranking and, 522-523; open-class form of, 520-521; primary and derived status in, 515; psychological aspects of, in United States, 526-528; ranking schemes and, 514-515, 522-523
- Classes, conflict of, 534-536; education and differences in, 256-257; population differentials and, 220-222; resistance of, to change, 571-572; under authoritarianism and democracy, 50-51
- Commensalism, 70-71
- Communication, 59-60
- Communism, *see* Russia (Soviet)
- Community, 20-21; churches in, 375; controls of play in, 393; co-operative forms of, 257-258; industrial plant as a quasi-, 413-414; resistance of, to change, 571-572; rural, 238-265; urban, 266-289
- Competition, among Kwakiutl, 45-47; conflict and, 68-69; co-operation and, 64-66; culture and, 67-68; economic, 414-415; in nature, 65-66; insecurity fostered by, 66-67; learning and, 107; monopoly affects, 415-416; personality and, 129-130; religion and business, 377-379; rural-urban contrasts in, 254
- Comradeship, 22
- Concepts, 109; place in science, 6-8
- Conditioned response, important mechanism of learning, 105-106
- Conflict, 68-69; age, 478-479; aggression, frustration, and, 66, 122-123; class, 534-536; color-caste relations and, 535-536; culture and, 68-69; educational, 366-370, 380-381; in rural communities, 255-256; industrial, 416-418; in-group *vs.* out-group, 26-28; integration of personality through, 123-124, 129-130; racial, in United States, 535-536; racialism as background to, 177-182; religious, 379-380; revolution as political, 434-436; rural-urban, 254-255; sex, 489-490; strike as, 416-418; war as, 442-443, 447-449
- Congeniality group, 22
- Consumers, 412-413; co-operatives and, 256-257; effect of modern business on, 412; efforts to protect, 412-414
- Co-operation, among Arapesh, 42-43; among Zuni, 43-45; community forms of, 257-258; culture and, 72-73; economic, 256-257, 419; foundations of, 70-71; identification, sympathy, and, 122, 124; in-group attitude and, 26; in nature, 70-71; interchurch, 381; international, 454-458; opposition and, 63, 65; psychology of, 72, 123-124; specialization and, 494-495
- Co-operatives, consumers' and producers', 256-257
- Corporations, 404-405; *see also* Business enterprise
- Courtship patterns, 329-332
- Crime and delinquency, rural-urban, 280
- Crowd behavior, 23
- Cultural alternatives, 39
- Cultural change, *see* Social-cultural change
- Cultural conditioning, interaction in, 60-63; perception and, 107-109
- Cultural differentials, 38-39
- Cultural islands, 259-260
- Cultural lag, 567-568; in federal districting, 305; in metropolitan districts, 295-296; in technological applications, 574
- Cultural specialties, 39
- Cultural systems, 34; authoritarian *vs.* democratic, 49-57
- Cultural universals, 34-37, 39
- Cultural variability, 41-58; among non-literate peoples, 42-48; under civilization, 48-57
- Culture, 17, 31-40; aspects of, in metropolitan districts, 293-295; basic factors in, 31-33; cumulative nature of, 32, 246; differentials in, 38-39; diffusion of, 564-566; ethos and, 37-38, 73; folk, 33; form and content of, 33-38; invention and, 561-562; lack of, in apes, 18, 19-20; personality, society, and, 17-134; prehistory and, 169-172; rural aspects of, 238-239, 240-245, 259-260; subcultures and, 38; technology and, 572-574; universal patterns, 34-37, 39; urban, 266, 270-275, 277-282; variability of, 41-58
- Culture and personality, 53-56
- Culture pattern, 33-34
- Culture trait, 33
- Death rate, 196-198, 224-232; age, disease, and, 225-228; differentials in, 224-232; factors in decline of, 196-198; income, food, and, 198-201; longevity and, 228-229; national differences in, 196-197; occupation and, 230-231; race and, 229; sex, marital status, and, 229-230; urban-rural, 231-232
- Definition of situation, social expectancy and, 126-127
- Democracy, bureaucratic threats to, 425-428;

- contrast of authoritarianism and, 49-57;
education and, 51-52, 352-354, 368-369;
indoctrination in, 352-354, 368-369; leg-
islative power basic to, 423-424, 428-429;
party system and, 428-429; patterns of, and
education, 368-369; problems of planning
in, 606-611; public opinion and, 428-429,
557-558; state, society, and, 429, 609-612
- Denominations, conflict and, 379-380; co-
operation among, 381; membership in,
374-375; place of, in communities, 278-
279, 375
- Differentiation, 73-74; adult roles and, 475-
476; age, 467-474, 475-477; culture sets
pattern of, 467-468; in infancy and child-
hood, 468-470; leadership a phase of, 499-
510; old age and, 476-477; sex and, 481-
493; sex and political activity and, 489-
492; specialization a phase of, 494-499;
youth and, 470-471; *see also* Specialization
of role
- Diffusion, 565-566; of Christianity, 374, 452;
of Occidental ideas and practices to wider
world, 181-191, 202-206, 452-454
- Division of labor, *see* Specialization of role
- Divorce, 343-346; *see also* Family
- Dominance, as phase of leadership, 499-501
- Drives, 101-103; acquired, 102; oppositional
pattern and, 128-130; original, 101-102
- Ecology, of metropolitan districts, 292-295;
of national regions, 298-299; of rural
communities, 239-245; of urban communi-
ties, 266-275; processes of, 239, 266-267
- Economic systems, 403-421; accommodation
in, 418-419; authoritarianism, democracy,
and, 51; banking and, 406; basic elements
in modern, 403-407; basic institutions in
capitalist, 404; Britain and planned, 588-
590; business cycles and, 406-407; capital
in, 403; competition and, 414-415; conflict
within, 416-418; conflicting forms of,
419-420; controls within, 552-556; co-
operation in, 419; co-operatives and, 256-
257; corporations and, 404-405; division
of labor and, 494-496; Germany and
planned, 587-588; government control of,
549-552; income and consumption differ-
entials and, 409-415; labor in, 403, 407-
409, 416-417; labor unions and, 413-414;
management and labor in, 413-414; money
and credit in, 406; monopoly and, 415-416;
productive capacity and, 409; religion and,
377-379; resources and, 403-405; Russia
and planned, 583-587; savings and capital
in, 411; social control and, 549-554;
social processes in, 413-420; technology
and, 409, 410, 568-569; the market and,
405-406; unemployment and, 408-409;
United States and minor planning of, 591-
593
- Economics and sociology, 12
- Education, 349-370; adult, 360-361; among
nonliterate peoples, 349-350; authoritarian
values and, 350-352; authoritarianism and
democracy and, 51-52; birth rates and, 214,
219, 355-356; changes in curricula, 359-
360; class differences and, 256-257; college,
354-355; competitive pattern in, 362;
competitors of formal, 364-366; conflicting
philosophies of, 368-369; cultural frame-
work of, 349-354; declining birth rate
and, 214, 219, 355-356; democratic values
and, 352-354, 369; effects of aging popula-
tion on, 214; elementary, 354-355; expan-
sion of American, 354-355; federal aids to,
367; formal and informal features of, 349,
350; freedom of religion and, 376, 380-381;
inequalities in American, 356-359; inter-
cultural, 361; international relations and,
367; labor unions and, 364; mass media of
communication and, 365-366; Nazi, 351;
Negro, 356-358; parent-teacher relations
and, 363; population changes and, 355-
356; public libraries and, 365; pupil
relations in, 362-363; regional variations
in, 302, 357-358; religious, 376, 380-381;
Russian, 351-352; secondary, 354-355;
social control and, 556-557; some basic
problems in American, 366-369; teacher-
pupil relations in, 361-362; teachers' roles
in community and, 363-364; urban-rural
costs of, 278
- Elite, *see* Leadership
- Emotions, 103-104
- Enculturation, 63-64; *see also* Socialization
- Endocrines, 100-101; place of, in develop-
ment, 90-91
- Endogamy, 316
- Environment, defined, 84; effects of stable,
90; relation to heredity, 95-97; twins and,
95-97; *see also* Geographic factors, Culture
- Esthetic experience, 395-402; class factors and
different standards of, 39; cultural standards
and, 398-400; foundations of, 396; mate-
rial culture and, 396-397; mores and, 397-
398; religion and, 397
- Ethnocentrism, 8-9, 10; racialism as form of,
178
- Ethos, 36-38
- Eugenics, 232-234
- Euthenics, 232-234

Exogamy, 316

Extroversion, leadership and, 498-499, 503

Family, 21-22, 313-348; as basic primary group, 313-314; authoritarian *vs.* democratic, 52-53; backgrounds of Western, 318-320; bilateral, 314; changes in roles of husband and wife, 336-337; child training in, 340-342; city life and, 278; composition and size of American, 320-322; divorce and, 343-346; economic aspects of, 319-320, 322, 323; educational differentials and the, 356; effects of depression on, 324-325; effects of war on, 325-326; husband-wife relations in, 336-340; "joint," 313; legitimacy, basic sanction of, 313-314; lines of descent and the, 314; love sentiment and the, 331; "marriage pair" as, 313; matrilineal, 314; moral training in, 340, 342; occupation and size of, 220-221; parent-child relations in, 340-342; patrilineal, 314; romantic love and, 319, 329-331; rural-urban differences in size of, 215-217; sex life outside, 317-318; size of cities and size of, 278; social structure and the, 313-317; urban aspects of the American, 278; urban-rural-regional differentials in American, 322

Fantasy thinking, 111; art and, 396; play and, 394-395; religion and, 371-372, 383-384

Feral man, 113-114

Fertility, 194; differentials by class, education, race, religion, etc., 215-222; psychological factors in, 222-224

Folk society, 33

Frustration, in personality development, 66, 122-123

Gang, 22-23

Genes, 84-85, 88

Geographic factors, 137-158; air age and, 148-150; as limitations on society and culture, 155-157; atomic age and, 150-152; climate, land, and water surfaces, and resources as, 137-148; peace and war, and, 152-154

Geopolitics, 154-155

Goal, as tension-reducing agent, 102

Government, aids to agriculture by, 432; aids to business by, 432-433; aids to labor by, 433; bureaucracy in, 425-428; executive and administrative functions of, 425-428; expansion of wage-earners in service for, 430-431; extended in wartime, 443; extension of power of, 430-434; increasing costs of, 430, 431; increasing costs of social

services of, 432-433; institutions and processes of, 423-429; intercity differences in costs of, 279; judicial institutions and functions, 424-425; legislative institutions and functions of, 423-424; metropolitan districts and, 295-296; owner-operator status of, 433-434; power problem and, 423, 542; regulations of, and economic order, 431-432; separation of power in democratic, 423-425; social security services and, 433; urban, 279-280

Group life, integration of personality in, 129-130; major forms of, 17-30; prehuman forms of, 17-20

Heredity, 85-90; aspects of human, 92-97; mechanisms of, 85-89; mental defect and, 94-95; physical handicaps and, 93-94; race and, 168-169; relations of maturation, environment, and, 83-98

Housing, 250, 281-282

Human nature, *see* Personality

Husband-wife relations, 336-340; leading to divorce, 343; psychology of, 336-340

Identification, 128

Imitation, 107

Impermanent groups, 23-24

Income, differences in, 250-251, 281-282, 409-410; distribution of national, 410; level of living and, 249-251, 281-282, 410-412; relation of death rates to food and, 198-201; rural level of living and, 250-251; rural-urban differentials in, 281-282; savings and, 411

Individual differences, cultural variability and, 467; in intelligence and occupations, 496-498; leadership and, 499-510; schools often ignore, 362

In-group, 26

In-group *vs.* out-group relations, 26, 28

Institutions, *see* citations to specific institutions

Integration, personality and, 129-130

Intelligence, tests of, and races, 174-177

Interaction, basis of social cultural processes, 59-63; direct and communicative, 59-60; personality and, 121-128; personal-social and cultural, 60-63; primary and secondary areas of, 60; urban patterns of, 282-285

International relations, 450-462; accommodation and, 454; basic considerations in, 458-461; economic aspects of, 450-452; efforts to establish peaceful, 454-461; hindrances to peaceful, 450, 453, 460; intellectual contacts and, 453-454; nonpolitical organ-

- izations and, 451, 452-454; planning for, 454, 457-458; religious contacts and, 452; science, art, and, 453; state sovereignty and, 440-441, 459-461
- Introversion, leadership and, 498-499, 503
- Invention and discovery, cultural basis of, 561-562; duplication of, 564; intellectual ability and, 563-565; lag in accepting, 567-568, 574; psychological factors in, 563-565; resistance to, 569-572; science and planned, 562; war and, 446-447
- Isolation, 113-118, 259-260; case of Anna, 114-115, 116; case of Isabelle, 115-116; case of Helen Keller, 116-118; case of Kaspar Hauser, 113-114; city life and, 283; cultural island and, 260; effects of, on personality, 113-118; effects of, on schooling, 259-260; feral man and, 113-114; in primary community, 259-260
- Labor, and industrial conflict, 416-419; opposition to inventions by, 569-570; productive capacity of, 409; rights of, and state power, 433; status differentials of, in industrial plant, 413-414
- Labor force, 403, 407-409; affected by aging of population, 213; composition of, 407; in agriculture, 252-253; occupational trends in, 407-408; productive capacity of, 409-410; unemployment and, 408-409; women in, by marital status and community locus, 323-324
- Labor union, 414; education and, 361; industrial conflict and, 416-419; monopolistic character of, 416; social control in and by, 551, 554
- Language, 109; apes have no true, 19, 120; basic to culture, 35; international order and need of universal, 453, 459; retardation of, in isolation, 114-118
- Law, as phase of culture, 36; judiciary and, 424-425; nature and function of, 424
- Leadership, 499-510; aggression and, 500-501; authoritarian *vs.* democratic, 51; community and family factors in, 501-502; contrast of autocratic and democratic, 505-506; culture sets form and direction of, 499-501; differentiation and, 499-509; followership and, 508-509; in mass society, 507-508; in wartime, 448-449; industrial morale and, 506-507; intelligence differences and, 497, 499, 501-502; old age and, 476-477, 478-479; resistance of, to innovation, 570-571; sources of, 500-501; types of, 502-505; youth movements and, 475
- Learning, 104-107
- Lethal selection, 215; differential factors in, 224-232
- Level of living, 249-251, 281-282, 410-412; differential expenditures and, 410-411; housing, 250, 281-282; regional differentials, 301-303; rural-urban differentials, 250-252, 281-282
- Life expectation, 197
- Life organization of individual, under authoritarianism and democracy, 53-55; *see also* Personality
- Logical thinking, contrasted to fantasy, 110-111
- Longevity, 228-229
- Magic, 36, 371-372; based on fantasy, 111
- Malthusianism, 187-188
- Market (the), 405-406; business cycles and, 406-407; growing state control of, 430, 431-432, 549-552; money, credit, and banking in, 406; monopoly and, 415-416
- Marriage, 314-317; companionate, 316; death rate and, 229-230; extramarital relations and, 318; forms of, 315-316; levirate, and, 317; mating patterns and, 316-317, 329-336; measures of success and failure in, 337-340; monogamous, universal, 315; nature of, 314-315; polyandrous, 316; polygynous, 315-316; premarital relations and, 317-318; romantic love and, 319, 329-331; sororate, and, 317; taboos relating to, 316; trends in rate of, 320-321; war and postwar effects on rate of, 320-322
- Mass society, 24-26; city fosters, 254, 282-283, 287; commercialized recreation and, 390-391, 392-393; controls in, 543, 556-558; education and, 364-366, 369; place of press, radio, and movies in, 364-366; play in, 390-391, 392; problems of planning in, 577, 582-583, 602-606, 609-611; role of experts in, 556-557; stratification in, 536-537; total war and, 445, 447
- Mate selection, patterns of, 332-336
- Maturation, 84, 91; environment and, 90
- Metropolitan districts, 292-296; culture of, 293-295; political lag in, 295-296; population base of, 292-293
- Migration, internal, in United States, 299-301
- Minority groups, 528-534
- Mobility, spatial, 274-275; populational, and regions, 299-301
- Monogamy, 315
- Monopoly, 415-416
- Morale, industrial, 413-414, 506-507; wartime, 447-449

- Mores, 36; art and, 397-398; religion and, 376-377; social control and, 544, 548-549; training and action, and, 130-132
- Mother-child relations, 121-122, 125, 127, 128, 340-342
- Motion picture, as competitor of and supplement to formal education, 365-366
- Motives, *see* Drives
- Mutations and heredity, 89-90
- Mutual aid, *see* Co-operation
- National Socialism, in Germany, planning under, 587-588; racialism in, 178-179
- National society, 21, 49; state and, not identical, 429
- Nationalism, 440-442; handicap to international co-operation, 441-442, 450, 458-460, 605-606; sovereignty and, 440-441; war and, 442, 449
- Negro, accommodative processes of, toward whites, 532-534, 536; class structure in, community, 531-532; color-caste system and American, 529-534; educational disadvantages of, 356-358
- Neighborhood, 22; rural, 240; urban, 283
- Neo-Malthusianism, 188, 190
- Nonliterate society and culture, 32-33
- Occupation, birth rate and, 219-221; death rate and, 230-231; distribution of, 408; division of labor and, 494-496; educational attainment and, 356-357; family size and, 220-221; intelligence and, 496-498; intercity differences in, 281; mobility in, 522-523; social-emotional traits and, 498-499; stratification related to, 521-523; trends in American structure of, 407-408, 522-523
- Old age, 476-477, 478-479
- Open-class system, 50-51, 520-521; anxiety and, 523-524; features of, in United States, 524-528
- Oppositional interaction, 64-69; co-operation and, in personality development, 123-124; frustration and, 66-67; motives in, 66
- Out-group (Others-group), 26-27
- Participation, *see* Social participation
- Particularism, 10, 596
- Peace, accommodative processes and, 443-444; cycles of war and, 442-444; economic factors making for, 450-452; efforts making for international organization of, 454-458; formal efforts at international organization for, 454-457; informal effects for world, 457-458; intellectual contacts making for, 452-453; religious factors making for war and, 452-454
- Perception, 108-109
- Personal-social conditioning, 60-63
- Personality, 17, 99-133; adjustments in primary community, 262-263; adjustments in urban community, 283, 284-285; affected by interspousal relations, 336-340; affection and discipline and, 121-122; ambivalence in, 110, 128-130; biopsychological foundations of, 99-112; co-operative attitudes and habits and, 123-124; culture and, 53-56; disintegration of, 132; drives and cycles of activity and, 101-103; effects of competition on, 123-124; endocrines and, 100-101; feelings and emotions and, 103-104; frustration and substitute reactions and, 122-123; integration of, in conflict, 130, 449-450; integration of, in group life, 129-130; isolation and, 121-128; learning and, 104-111; moral training and, 130-131; morale and, 447-449; neuromuscular factors in, 99-100; parental authority and, 127-128; planning and regimentation of, 606-612; play as balancing factor in, 392, 394-395; rationalization and, 127; religion and, 383-385; resolution of, conflicts, 122-124; rise of, 124-128; social self equated to, 124-126; socialization and, 113-133; society, culture, and, 17-135, 606-612; specialization of roles and, 498-499; status and, 126-127; under authoritarianism and democracy, 53-55
- Personality and culture, 53-56; *see also* Personality, Culture
- Planning, *see* Social planning
- Play, 387-395, 401-402; amusement, leisure, recreation, entertainment, and, 387; athletics as, 390-391; changes in forms of, 389-391; commercialized and noncommercialized, 392; control of, in Nazi Germany, 388; costs of, 392-393; cultural setting of, 387-389; forms of, 389-392; gambling as form of, 391-392; mass society and, 390-391, 392; mores and, 393-394; motion pictures, radio, and video as means of, 390-391; personality and, 392, 394-395; theories of, 387-388
- Play group, 22
- Political party system, 428-429
- Political science, sociology and, 12
- Political system, 422-439; authoritarian *vs.* democratic, 49-50; geography and, 152-155; limitations on, 428-429; nature of, 422-423
- Polyandry, 316

- Polygyny, 315-316
- Population, age and sex distributions of, 210-212; age changes in the United States, 210-212; aging, effects of, on, 212-215, 228-229; birth rate and, 194-196, differentials in, 215-224; class differences and, 220-222; community differences in, 215-217; cycles of growth, and culture, 189-191, 200; "danger spots" in, 205; death rate and, 196-198, differentials in, 224-232; density of, 193, 293; differential rates of growth in, 191-193; differentials in, 210-237; education affected by changes in, 214, 355-356; educational differences in birth rates and, 219; eugenic problem of, 232-235; "felt" pressure of, 205; growth of, in the United States, 185, 268-270; growth of, in world, 184-186; life expectation and, 197; income, food, and death rates, and, 198-201; industrialization and changes in, 201-202, 204; infant mortality and, 196; international migration of excess of, 202-203; international relations and, 198-207; Malthusian theory of, 187-188; metropolitan districts and differentials of, 292-293; mobility of, through internal migration, 299-301; nationalism and problems of, 206-207; net reproduction rates and, 194-196; occupational, birth rates, and, 219-221; occupation and death rates and, 230-231; optimum, theory of, and, 206; percentage of the U. S., and size of community, 268-269; pressure of, and subsistence, 184-191; problems of world, 184-209; regional differentials in, 215-216; religion and, 217-218, 222-223; productivity trends and, 324; rural-urban differentials in birth rates and, 215-217, 270; rural-urban differentials in death rates and, 231-232; rural-urban growth compared, 268-269; stationary and expanding, 184-186, 190-191; theories of, and of food supply, 186-189; war and peace and pressures of, 205-207
- Power, aim and use of, in planning, 597-598; amount and distribution of, 542-543; conditions of, 152-153; distribution of, in state, 423, 430-432; execution of plans, and use of, 598-599; limitation on, in democracy, 428-429; planners and, 599-600; political, and class struggle, 534-535; re-integrated in political revolution, 436; social control and, 542-543; sovereignty and, 440-441; statism and, 436-437; strategic resources and political, 146-148, 152-153; war as expression of, 442, 460-461
- Prehistory, 162-168
- Preliterate society, *see* Nonliterate society and culture
- Primary community, 21, 238-265; agricultural village type of, 243-244; breakdown under machine age, 246-249; comparison of urban, rural nonfarm, and levels of living, 250-252; ecology and types of, 239-245; farm labor in, 252-253; forms and aspects of, 238-265; forms of conflict involving, 254-256; forms of co-operation in, 256-258; forms of participation in, 258-262; income levels in, compared to urban, 281-282; isolation and, 259-260; levels of living in, 249-252, 281-282; nature of, 240-241; open-country type of, 241; plantation type of, 244-245; personality adjustments in, 262-263; recent cultural changes in, 245-254; status in, 253-254; tenure systems in, 252; town-country type of, 241-243
- Primary group, 21-23
- Primitive society, *see* Nonliterate society and culture
- Professions, in the class structure, 522, 524; social control in and by, 554-556
- Progress, 577-583; criteria of, 580-581; doctrine of universal, 578-580; social myth of, 581
- Projection, 128
- Propaganda, as a means of social control, 544, 545; in wartime, 443, 448-449
- Psychology and sociology, 12-13
- Psychosomatic factors in sex differences, 482-483
- Public opinion, authoritarianism and democracy and, 50; democracy, planning, and, 611-612; party politics and, 428-429; social control and, 557-558
- Publics, 23
- Race, 159-177; criteria of, 159-160; culture and differences in, 172-177; death rate and, 229; heredity and, 168-169; intelligence and, 174-177; origin of human, 162-167; prejudices regarding, 177-182
- Races, beginnings of culture and, 169-172; major groups of, 160-162; physical traits of, 161
- Racial history of man, 162-168
- Racialism, 177-182; Anglo-American, 179-180; German, 178-179; other illustrations of, 181-182; Pan-slavic, 180-181
- Radio, as competitor of, and supplement to, formal education, 365-366; extent of, in rural areas, 251
- Rationalization, 127
- Recreation, *see* Play

- Regionalism, 291-292
- Regions, 290-310; cultural differences in, 290, 302-303, 308-309; definitions of, 291-292; educational differentials by, 302, 357-358; federal administration districts and, 305; income differentials by, 301-303; industrial aspects of, 298-299; internal migrations and, 299-301; international, 290; interstate trade barriers and, 304-305; intranational, 296-309; metropolitan districts as, 292-296; natural resources of, 296-298; planning for, 306-309; political aspects of, 295-296; population differentials by, 302; sectionalism and, 303-304
- Religion, 52, 371-386; adherents to various kinds of, 374; art and, 397; ceremony and ritual in, 372-373; church as institution of, 372-373; competition and, 378-379; conflict in, 379-381; co-operation in, 381; creed and ideology and, 372; economic system and, 377-379; education and, 376, 380-381; effects of, on family, 318-320; freedom of, 380-381; international aspects of, 452; magic and, 371-372; mores and, 376-377; nature and function of, 371-374; personality and, 383-385; place of, in total culture, 374-379; population differentials and, 217-218, 222-223; primitive, 371-372; psychology of, 383-384; recreation and, 376; science and, 381-383; sects in, 373; social control and, 376-377, 556; social types of leaders in, 373-374; symbolism in, 373
- Religious bodies, in United States, 374-375; in world, 374
- Resources, energy-producing, 143-145; mineral, 145-148; population and, 198-202; soil, 140-143; strategic and power, 146-148
- Revolution, accomplishment of political, short of ideal expectancies, 436; background of political, 434-435; cultural change and, 567; stages in political, 435-436
- Role, 127, 465-467; child's, 468-470; male and female, in family, 336-340; old age and, 476-477; processual bases of, 467; pupil, 361-363; sex differences and, 481-493; social relations based on status and, 465-538; status and, 465-467; teacher's, 361-362, 363; varied types of, in religion, 373-374; youth and, 470-474
- Rural community, *see* Primary community
- Russia (Soviet), agriculture in, 585-586; control of economic system in, 585-586; education in, 351-352, 586; planning in, 583-587; political domination of economic system in, 419, 434; stratification in, 50, 519
- Science, concepts and, 6-8; invention and, 562; nature of, 2-8; religion and, 381-383
- Secondary community, 21, *see* Urban community
- Secondary group, 23-24, 52
- Sectionalism, 303-304
- Sex differences, conflict and, 489; criminality and, 487; cultural conditioning and psychology of, 484-489; death rates and, 229-230; economic roles and, 488-489; family roles and, 486-487; hereditary factors in, 481-484; masculinity and femininity and, 486-487; morphological and physiological foundations of, 481-484; psychological aspects of, 484-486; psychosomatic factors in, 482-483; role and status as related to, 481-493; sexual mores and, 487-488; social-emotional traits and, 486-488
- Social classes, *see* Class structure, Classes
- Social control, 541-559; aims of, 543-544; art and, 556; basic features of, 541-547; by press, radio, movie, 365-366; conflict and need for, 542; contrast of authoritarian and democratic, 50, 558; culture influences direction of, 542; economic groups and, 552-554; education and, 556-557; enlightenment and, 556-557; formal and informal forms of, 548-549; forms and agencies of, 547-558; guilt and shame as internal mechanisms of, 546-547; in labor unions, 554; in mass society, 556-557; law and, 424-425, 549-550; means of, 544-546; of mass communication, 552, 558; over education, 363-364, 380-381, 552; overt forms of, 544, 546; power and, 542-543; professions and, 554-556; public opinion and, 557-558; religion and, 376-377, 556; state and, 549-552; state expanding in, 551-552
- Social-cultural change, 560-576; concept of, 560; diffusion and, 565-566; factors affecting, 566-572; in education, 359-360, 366-369; in occupations, 407-408; in rural life, 245-254; lag in, 567-568, 574; metal ages and, 172; neolithic, 171-172; progress and, 577-583; rates of, 567-568; rational and nondeliberate, 581-583; resistance to, 569-572; technology and, 572-574; theories of, 577-578; unilinear, 579
- Social-cultural processes, 59-82; derived, 74-79; interrelations of, 80; major forms of, 63-74
- Social distance, 129, *see also* Class structure

- Social evolution, 567
- Social expectancy, definition of situation and, 126-127
- Social myth, 37; nationalism as, 441-442; social control and, 549
- Social participation, 27; culture and, 38-39; in primary communities, 260-262; in urban communities, 282-284
- Social planning, 577, 581-614; aims of, 598-599; bases for belief in, 597; cultural change as background to, 582-583, 596-598; democracy and, 606-611; doctrine of progress and, 581, 582; execution of, 600-601; for institutions, 601-606; free enterprise *vs.*, 602-605; freedom under, 608-611; groups and persons under, 606-612; in Britain, 588-590; in Germany, 587-588; in Soviet Russia, 583-587; in the United States, 591-593; national economic, 602-605; of inventions, 562; planners, power, and, 599-600; postwar recovery as, 590-591; social power and, 599-601; state *vs.* international, 605-606; theories of, 596; time factor in, 599; urban, 285-287; war as case of, 444-445
- Social processes, 59-82, *see also* citations to specific processes
- Social self, 124-126, *see also* Personality
- Social welfare, in cities, 279-280
- Socialization, 63-64; personality and, 113-133; *see also* Enculturation
- Society, 17, 20; continuity and persistence of, 28; culture, personality, and, 17-135; prehuman, 17-20
- Sociology, aims of, 1-2; and related sciences, 11-13; anthropology and, 11-12; definition of, 1-2; economics and, 12; handicaps to scientific thinking in, 8-11; history and, 12; methods in, 3-6; nature of, 1-14; political science and, 12; psychology and, 12-13
- Sovereignty, *see* Nationalism, State
- Specialization of role, 494-499, 509-510; co-operation fostered by, 496; division of labor as, 494-496; effects of, on economic production, 495-496; intelligence differences and occupational, 496-498; mass society and, 496, 556-557; social-emotional traits and, 498-499
- Standard of living, *see* Level of living
- State, 21, 422-429; background factors of, 423; contrast of authoritarian and democratic, 49-50; democratic practices and, 423-424, 428-429, 437, 549; distribution of power in, 440-441, 549-552; expansion of power in, and planning, 598-601, 602-605; extension of power of, 420-421, 423-424, 428-429, 437, 549; growth of welfare form of, 431-434; in democracy, not identical with society, 428-429; international relations and planning by, 605-606; limits on power of, in democracies, 428-429; nationalistic, 440-442; natural rights and, 429; nature and function of, 422-423; revolution and, 434-437; social control and, 549-552; social-cultural factors in development of, 422-423; sovereignty of, 440-441
- Statism, democratic checks on, 429-437; drift toward, 436-437
- Status, 127, 465-467; adult, 475-476; ascribed and acquired, 465-466; child's, 468-470; class formation and, 511-512; dead and, 477-478; differential fertility and, 218-222; in agricultural occupations, 253-254; in industrial plants, 413-414; male and female, in family, 322-324, 486-487; old age and, 476-477; personality and, 126-127; processual bases of, 467; role and, 465-467; sex differences and, 481-493; social relations based on role and, 465-538; youth and, 470-474
- Stereotypes, 109-110
- Stratification, 74, 511-515; *see also* Class structure
- Strikes, 416-418
- Subculture, 38
- Sublimation, 123
- Suggestion, 107
- Suicide, 284
- Symbiosis, 70-71
- Symbols, communication and, 59-60; leaders as, of identification and power, 509; religious, 372
- Taboo, 376
- Teachers, community attitudes toward, 363-364; increase in, 354-355; labor unions and, 364; parents and, 363; personality of, 362; pupil relations to, 361-362; salary differentials and color line among, 357
- Technology, art and, 396-397; as phase of culture, 35; changes in agriculture and, 246-249; cultural change and, 562, 568-569, 572-574; international relations and, 450-452, 459; private enterprise and changes in, 568-569; productivity and level of, 409, 410; relation of level of, to world population problems, 201-202, 206, 207; resources affected by, 140-148, 403; war and, 447
- Totalitarianism *vs.* democracy, 49-57
- Trade union, *see* Labor union

Unemployment, *see* Labor force

United Nations, 455-457

Urban community, 33, 266-289; assimilation and segregation in, 273-274; business and industry in, 281; centralization of services in, 270-271; churches in, 278-279; concentration of population in, 268-270, 274, 275; conflicts of rural and, 254-255; crime and, 280-281; decentralization and, 271; demographic aspects of, 268-270; dominance of, 269-270, 274, 287; ecology of, 266-277; education in, 278; factors in location of, 267-268; family and, 278; government and, 279-280; housing and, 281-282; integration of, 285; interactional patterns in, 282-285; invasion and succession in, 274; isolation in, 283; level of living in, 249-252, 281-282; maladjustments in, 284; mass society and the, 254, 282-283, 287; mobility and, 274-275; neighborhoods in, 283; occupations and, 281; organizations and institutions in, 277-282; planning and, 285-287; segregation in, 271, 273; social welfare and, 279-280; theories of growth of, 275-277; transportation problems in, 268, 274-275; voluntary associations in, 283-284

Urbanism, 283-285; effects of, on family, 322-324

Values, 110; as data for science, 9; effect of, on invention, 563

Video, as competitor of, and supplement to, formal education, 365-366

War, 442-450; alleged dysgenic effects of, 445-446; alleged eugenic effects of, 446; as expression of power, 442, 460-461; changes in culture and society during, 446-447; cycles of peace and, 442-444; effects of, on class structure, 519; effect of, on family, 325-326, 446; effects of, on population, 445-446; effects of technology on, 447; international efforts to counteract, 454-458; inventions stimulated by, 446-447; mass society and total, 445, 447; morale and, 447-449; myths and legends of, 448-450; nationalism and, 442, 449; personality and, 447-450; planning and executing, 444-445; postwar adjustments and, 443-444, 446; rise of an issue and, 442-443; stages in, 442-443; state controls fostered by modern, 443; strategy in, 444-445; tactics in, 445

We-group, *see* In-group

Wishful thinking, *see* Fantasy thinking

Women, changing role in family, 319, 322-324, 486-487; differential mortality rates of, 481-483; effects of emancipation of, on men, 491-492; emancipation of, 489-492; increase in gainful employment of, 323-324, 488-489; political activity of, 489-490; status of, in Western world, 318-319, 336, 486-488, 490-492

World organization, *see* International relations

Youth, role and status of, 470-474

Youth movements, 474-475

